Bilateral free trade agreement a critical assement and WTO regulatory reform proposal

Legal Studies Research Paper Series
Research Paper No. 08-070
September 2008

BILATERAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT AND WTO
REGULATORY REFORM PROPOSAL

Ralph H. Folsom

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BILATERAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT AND WTO REGULATORY
REFORM PROPOSAL
Published by Prof. Ralph H. Folsom, © 2008 *
At this writing, most-favored-nation (MFN) principles notwithstanding, every nation save
Mongolia has entered into at least one bilateral or regional free trade agreement. The European
Union, for example, is so heavily engaged in bilateral deals that it has MFN trade relations with
only seven countries. Hundreds of bilaterals have been negotiated since the early 1990s. The
apparent failure of the Doha Round virtually guarantees their dominance of international trade
law and policy.
This article reviews the history of bilateral and regional free trade agreements
(“bilaterals”), failed attempts at their regulation under the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and critically assesses the significance
of their proliferation for international trade law and policy. Reform of WTO jurisdiction over
bilaterals concentrated in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is proposed. Specifically,
abandonment of all WTO regulation except for a Revised Transparency Mechanism (text
attached) operating in conjunction with expanded DSU opportunities is suggested.
A word on nomenclature: This article utilizes the term “bilateral(s)” because it best
characterizes the free trade agreements that are presently sweeping the seas. Generally in

*

Professor of Law, USD Law School. Prof. Folsom thanks the University of San Diego for a Summer
Research Grant in support of this publication.

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GATT/WTO parlance, “regional trade agreements” (RTA) has been and continues to be
employed. Those words, in my opinion, are not the best descriptors of what is happening when,
for example, China and Chile, Japan and Mexico, the United States and Oman, and the European
Union and South Africa agree on free trade.
Why Bilaterals?
A variety of factors help explain why bilaterals have become the leading edge of
international trade law and policy. Difficulties encountered in the Uruguay, “Seattle” and Doha
Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations are certainly crucial. GATT/WTO regulatory failures
regarding bilaterals have also fueled this reality. Yet these “negatives” do not fully explain the

feeding frenzy of bilaterals.
A range of attractions to bilaterals are also at work. For example, bilaterals often extend
to subject matters beyond WTO competence. Foreign investment law is a prime example,1 and
many bilaterals serve as investment magnets. Government procurement, optional at the WTO
level, is often included in bilaterals.2 Competition policy3 and labor and environmental matters
absent from the WTO are sometimes covered in bilaterals.4 In addition, bilaterals can reach
beyond the scope of existing WTO agreements. Services is one “WTO-plus” area where this is
clearly true.5 Intellectual property rights are also being “WTO-plussed” in bilateral free trade
agreements.6 Whether this amounts to competitive trade liberalization or competitive trade
imperialism has been provocatively explored by Prof. Bhala.7
Further, bilaterals are politically and economically selective. In other words they avoid
not only global most-favored-nation principles, but also domestically “sensitive” areas of
national politics and economics. For example, Singapore’s absence of farm exports helped make
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it an ideal U.S. and Japanese free trade partner. The micro-sized economy of Chile contributed to
its attraction as a free trade partner with Mexico, China, the European Union, the United States
and others. U.S. free trade deals with Jordan, Bahrain and Oman fit economically in a similar
fashion, not to mention national security objectives.8
Like it or not, the “spaghetti-bowl”9 maze of bilaterals is driven by powerful negative and
positive forces. It is not only the preferred trade medium of today, but very likely the future.
Already more than half of world trade is conducted under bilaterals.10 While international trade
lawyers may celebrate full employment, it bears remembering that bilaterals are discriminatory.
They could render MFN the least favored status in world trade. Such an outcome would be

especially harmful to the world’s poorest nations, those with whom few WTO partners seek a
bilateral agreement.
Most-Favored-Nation Freer Trade Principles
When the United States and its allies emerged victorious after WWII, they faced a basic
question. What should be the international economic order in the post-war era? A return to trade
protectionism, globally rampant in the 1930s, was unthinkable (unless you like economic
depression). But what about widespread trade-inhibiting national laws, for example the U.S.
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930?11
The answer came to be embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947
(GATT 1947).12 Ironically this agreement was not intended to be more than a temporary stopgap
pending creation of the broadly conceived International Trade Organization (ITO).13 When
ratification of the ITO failed in the U.S. Congress,14 GATT 1947 became by default the anchor of
post-war international trade law.
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GATT 1947 was never about free trade, merely freer trade. This it achieved over decades
through tariff-reducing multilateral trade negotiations (known as “negotiating rounds”)15 and ever
an expanding membership.16 At its core, GATT 1947 and its successor GATT 1994 embrace the
principle of general most-favored-nation (MFN) trading. This principle is essentially one of
nondiscrimination, that is to say a rejection of discriminatory tariff and trade preferences. Article
1 of the GATT (1947) and (1994) spells out the golden rules of MFN trading:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or

destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties. (emphasis added).
GATT Article 24
The origins of Article 24 have long remained obscure. Happily, Professor Kerry Chase
has recently illuminated those origins, emphasizing that a secret Canada-US free trade agreement
(never realized) explains much of its content.17 Primarily for this reason, Article 24 of the GATT
(1947 and 1994) permits members to enter into “free trade area” and “customs union”
agreements of a fixed or interim character, provided tariff compensation is given to
nonparticipants in customs unions.18 This permission constitutes a major exception to
nondiscriminatory MFN trade. Instead, such agreements embody trade preferences which
simultaneously create trade among their signatories and divert trade between those signatories
and the rest of the world.19 These effects are easily evident when customs unions are created

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because such agreements contain common external tariff and trade law provisions.20
With free trade agreements, diversionary trade effects are usually not distinct because of
the absence of a common tariff and trade wall against outsiders. Trade diversion nonetheless
occurs. “Rules of origin” in free trade area treaties keep third-party imports from seeking the
lowest tariff or highest quota state and then exploiting trade advantages within a free trade area.
Under typically complex rules of origin, free trade areas are “free” only for goods substantially
originating therein. This causes member state goods to be preferred over goods from other states,
the essence of trade diversion.21
Article 24 of the GATT attempts to manage the internal trade-creating and external tradediverting effects of bilaterals. Under its terms, free trade area and custom union proposals should
be notified “promptly,”22 although most agreements have been notified after their conclusion.23
Once notified, bilaterals should run the gauntlet of formal review and report procedures during
which recommendations are possible to bring them into conformity with Article 24.24 Prior to

the WTO, GATT “working parties” conducted these procedures. Since 1995, the WTO
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) reviews Article 24 notifications.
Conformity recommendations might, for example, deal with Article 24 requirements for
the elimination of internal tariffs and other restrictive regulations of commerce on “substantially
all” products originating in a customs union or free trade area.25 Or they might concern Article
24 requirements that tariffs and other regulations of commerce not be “higher or more restrictive”
than before creation of the free trade area or customs union.26 Whether the term “regulations of
commerce” includes rules of origin is critically unclear.27 The broad purpose of Article 24,
acknowledged therein, is to facilitate trade among the GATT/WTO parties and not to raise trade
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barriers.28
Early Regulatory Failure
The inadequacy of Article 24 as a regulatory mechanism quickly became apparent. This
was perhaps most noticeable regarding the politically and economically significant customs
union treaties of western Europe. With the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) only
two products were involved. Clearly no case could be made for its compliance with the
requirement of elimination of internal trade barriers on “substantially all” products. Hence the
GATT members, passing over Article 24's own waiver proviso for proposals leading to a
customs union or a free trade area “in the sense of Article 24,”29 reverted to Article 25. That
article allows a two-thirds vote by the contracting parties to waive any GATT obligation.
In reviewing the European Economic Community Treaty (1957), many “violations” of the
letter and spirit of Article 24 were cited. For example, the derivation of the EEC common
external tariff by arithmetically averaging existing national tariffs was challenged as more
restrictive of trade than previous arrangements. Such averaging on a given product fails to take
account of differing national import volumes. If a product was faced originally with a lower than
average national tariff and a larger than average national demand, the new average tariff is clearly
more “restrictive” of imports than before. Averaging in high tariffs of countries of low demand

quite plausibly created more restrictions on third-party trade. If so, the letter and spirit of Article
24 were breached.30
The economic association of Overseas Territories (mainly former French, Dutch, and
Belgian colonies) with the EEC also raised considerable difficulty under Article 24. The
Community argued that these “association” agreements were free trade areas in the long run,
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while GATT officials viewed them as rather open efforts at purely preferential tariff status.31
Similar problems arose later in GATT review of the multitude of “interim” EEC free trade area
treaties with Mediterranean nations.32 In 1975, the openly preferential and discriminatory Lomé
Convention negotiated between the European Community and forty-six African, Pacific and
Caribbean nations (including many former colonies) challenged the interim character of
Community “free trade areas” with developing states.33 Once again it was the GATT and not the
European Community that gave way.
Despite these and other arguments, the 1957 EEC Treaty passed through GATT study and
review committees without final resolution of its status under Article 24. Postponement of these
issues became permanent. GATT attempts through the lawyer-like conditions of Article 24 to
maximize trade creation and minimize trade diversion must be seen in the context of European
integration as generally inadequate. Treaty terms became negotiable demands that were not
accepted. This regulatory failure is representative of 60 years of GATT/WTO practice. As
several notable commentators have observed, Article 24 standards for bilaterals are deceptively
ambiguous, make little economic sense, and in application have proved a dismal experience . . .
“if not a fiasco.”34
Developing Nation Bilaterals
Developing nations in Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, South America and
Southeast Asia (among others) had free trade and customs union agreements in place as early as
the 1960s.35 In 1979, under what is commonly called the Enabling Clause,36 the GATT parties
decided to permit developing nations to enter into differential and more favorable bilateral,

regional or global arrangements among themselves to reduce or eliminate tariffs and nontariff
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barriers applicable to trade in goods. Like Article 24, the Enabling Clause constitutes an
exception to MFN trade principles. It has generally been construed to authorize third world free
trade area and customs union agreements. Whether the Enabling Clause was intended to take
such agreements out of Article 24 and its requirements, or be construed in conjunction therewith,
is unclear. However, the creation of alternative notification and review procedures for Enabling
Clause arrangements suggests Article 24 is inapplicable.
Notification to GATT of Enabling Clause arrangements is mandatory.37 Since 1995, the
WTO Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) is the forum where such notifications are
reviewed, but in practice not examined in depth.38 Enabling Clause arrangements should be
designed to promote the trade of developing countries and not raise external trade barriers or
undue trade difficulties.39 Consultations with individual GATT members experiencing such
difficulties must be undertaken, and these consultations may be expanded to all GATT members
if requested.40 Unlike GATT Article 24, neither compensation to nonparticipants nor formal
reporting on the consistency with the Enabling Clause of developing nation arrangements is
anticipated. Despite these relaxed procedures, the Enabling Clause of 1979 did not trigger a rush
of third world bilaterals.41 More recently, the ASEAN-China (2004), India-Sri Lanka (2002),
and “revived” Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS 2005) agreements
illustrate notified but unexamined preferential arrangements sheltered by the Enabling Clause.42
Regulatory Reform: Interpreting Article 24
The early regulatory failure of Article 24 and the limited requirements of the Enabling
Clause arguably created an incentive to reach free trade area and customs union agreements as a
means to avoid MFN trade principles. In the 1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s, a goodly number
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of bilaterals were established, especially in the developing world.43 Yet there was no avalanche
of agreements, in part because of a steady stream of MFN successes in GATT negotiating
rounds.44 The turning point came when major delays and perceptions of possible failure in the
Uruguay Round (1986-1994) accelerated the creation of bilaterals, most visibly the Canada-U.S.
FTA of 1989 and NAFTA (1994). The emergence, also, of export-driven (not import
substituting) developing economies, such as Mexico and Chile,45 also contributed to this
acceleration.
The Uruguay Round, which created the World Trade Organization, presented an
opportunity to come to grips with the regulatory failure of Article 24 and the implications of the
Enabling Clause. Agreement was reached in 1994 on an “Understanding on the Interpretation of
Article 24,”46 which presently binds the roughly 150 member nations of the WTO. This
Interpretation reaffirms that free trade area and customs union agreements must satisfy the
provisions of Article 24,47 clarifies the manner in which before and after evaluations of common
external tariffs are to be undertaken,48 limits in most cases interim agreements to 10 years,49 and
details Article 24 notification, report and recommendation duties and processes.50 Most
importantly, the 1994 Understanding on Interpretation expressly permits invocation of standard
WTO dispute settlement procedures (DSU) regarding any Article 24 matters.51 That said, the
1994 Understanding did not come to grips with the systemic ambiguities that led to Article 24's
early and ongoing regulatory failure.52
Integrated Services’ Agreements
DSU procedures may also be invoked since 1995 regarding “economic integration
agreements” (EIAs) covering services under Article 5 of the General Agreement on Trade in
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Services (GATS). Such agreements, which can be staged, must have “substantial sectoral
coverage,”53 eliminate “substantially” all discrimination in sectors subject to multilateral
commitments,54 and not raise the “overall” level of barriers to trade in GATS services compared

to before the EIA.55 EIAs involving developing nations are to be accorded “flexibility.56 Like
GATT Article 24 customs unions, there is an Article 5 duty to compensate EIA nonparticipants.57
Review of GATS Article 5 notifications is undertaken, when requested by the WTO
Council for Trade in Services, by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements. Thus, whereas
CRTA examinations of GATT Article 24 agreements are required, such examinations are
optional under GATS. Nevertheless, numerous Article 5 examinations have been conducted,
including notably the services components of NAFTA, the EEC Treaty (1957) and EU
Enlargement (2004), Japan’s FTAs with Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia, China’s FTAs with
Hong Kong and Macau, and various U.S. bilaterals.58 None of these examinations have resulted
in a final report on consistency with GATS Article 5.
The Impact of the Seattle and Doha Rounds
The failure to launch a new round of WTO negotiations in Seattle (1999), followed by
delays and perceptions of possible failure in the Doha Round that commenced in 2001, has
contributed to a veritable feeding frenzy of bilaterals. Well over 100 new agreements have been
notified to the WTO,59 and a large additional number are believed not to have been notified.60 In
general, most of the notified agreements are bilateral, not regional in character. Meanwhile, the
WTO Regional Trade Agreements Committee, working by consensus, has been unable since
1995 to complete even one assessment of a bilateral agreement’s conformity to GATT Article 24
or GATS Article 5.61 The same is true for WTO Committee on Trade and Development
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“review” of Enabling Clause arrangements.
It has been suggested that this record can be explained by the ambiguous relationship
between Committee reports and WTO dispute settlement proceedings.62 For example, can such
reports be used in evidence in WTO dispute proceedings? Can fact-finding by WTO Secretariat
and information gathered for WTO regulatory purposes be similarly used? This “dispute
settlement awareness” makes WTO members reluctant to provide information or agree on
conclusions that could later be used or interpreted in DSU proceedings.63

The Transparency Mechanism of 2006
The second post-Uruguay Round of regulatory failure put bilaterals on the Doha
negotiating agenda. Special emphasis has been placed on “transparency” issues, i.e., notification
and reporting duties. Surprisingly, in June 2006, agreement was reached on a “Transparency
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements.”64 This agreement has been provisionally
implemented, although it is less than clear that it will bring about all required notifications and
still retains the ex post facto nature of WTO regulatory review. Whether this Mechanism will
solve the present regulatory gridlock is seriously problematic.
The Transparency Mechanism envisions multiple electronic filings and detailed data
submissions by parties to bilaterals,65 and substantial posting of such information on the WTO
website.66 Announcement of negotiations should be “early,”67 notification of agreements “as
early as possible” but no later than after ratification and before application of preferential
treatment between the parties.68 In addition, the separate 1994 WTO Agreement on Rules of
Origin specifies transparency requirements for bilaterals, including a duty to notify the WTO
Secretariat of preferential rules of origin.69
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Review by the WTO of bilaterals should “normally” be concluded within a year of
notification.70 The WTO Secretariat will prepare a “factual presentation” primarily based on
information submitted by the parties, but if necessary from other sources.71 The Secretariat is
admonished to “refrain from any value judgment, which appears true of the presentations
reported to date on the WTO website.”72 Most importantly, its factual presentation may not be
used “as a basis for dispute settlement procedures” or “to create new rights and obligations for
members.”73 A general notice and comment period is prescribed.74 Subsequently, the CRTA and
CTD is supposed, as a rule, to devote a single formal meeting to consider each notified
agreement.75
A Reform Proposal
Bilaterals presently fall under two WTO jurisdictions: (1) The disparate regulatory

regimes of GATT Article 24, GATS Article 5 and the Enabling Clause, and (2) the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU). The regulatory regimes have a 60-year history of failure. At
most they have contributed to information sharing and peer pressure regarding bilaterals, and
even that accomplishment has a spotty record.
The DSU, this author believes, has broadly achieved a reasonable degree of success in
obtaining member state compliance with WTO agreements,76 and has already developed some
expertise in proceedings where bilaterals have been at issue.77 Specifically, the Appellate Body
has suggested that parties raising Article 24 defenses in DSU proceedings must be prepared to
have their bilateral agreements examined for compliance with WTO rules.78 Moreover, the
professionalism of WTO panels and its Appellate Body has been commendable, the DSU does
not suffer from gridlock, and it relies on member state interests (not WTO consensus) for its
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driving force. Indeed, because GATT Article 24 and GATS Article 5 often trigger compensation
rights for nonparticipants, member states are already quite interested in bilaterals and have reason
to challenge their WTO conformity.
Prof. Picker has thoughtfully proposed altering the relationship between the WTO and
bilaterals by having the CRTA identify bilateral derogations to WTO rules that cause or will
likely cause “institutional harm,” by which he principally means the creation of conflicts with or
diversion of resources from the WTO.79 Positing a rule of WTO supremacy, he would use DSU
procedures to finally and conclusively resolve disputes regarding bilaterals, excepting only
selected waivers granted by the WTO membership on a two-thirds vote. While I welcome the
call for greater use of the DSU, I am much less sanguine about continuing attempts to regulate
bilaterals.
Unlike Prof. Picker, I therefore propose abandoning the WTO regulatory regimes
applicable to bilaterals, save only notification and data reporting duties established in the 2006
Transparency Mechanism. Any failure to fulfill these duties should be sanctioned by creating a
rebuttable presumption of WTO nonconformity. The opportunity for interested member states to

pursue DSU proceedings regarding bilaterals should be as clearly delineated for GATS Article 5
and the Enabling Clause as it is in the 1994 Understanding on Interpretation of GATT Article 24.
In all cases, the right to pursue such remedies should not depend upon proper notification of the
bilateral agreement in question. A revised version of the Transparency Mechanism reflecting
these approaches is appended.
This proposal, I submit, recognizes the realities of GATT/WTO practice. It avoids the
diversionary impact of the regulatory regimes, accepts their failure, and by concentrating
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remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement is more likely to result in member state compliance with
the law of bilaterals. Greater compliance in turn may reduce the feeding frenzy, promote
successful multilateral negotiations and minimize the loss to MFN principles.

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TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM FOR
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

A Revised Proposal
by
Professor Ralph Folsom

The General Council,
Having regard to paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement");
Conducting the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the interval between meetings

pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the WTO Agreement;
Noting that trade agreements of a mutually preferential nature ("regional trade
agreements" or "RTAs") have greatly increased in number and have become an important
element in Members' trade policies and developmental strategies;
Convinced that enhancing transparency in, and understanding of, RTAs and their effects
is of systemic interest and will be of benefit to all Members;
Having regard also to the transparency provisions of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, the
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 ("GATT Understanding"),
Article V of GATS and the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment,
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries ("Enabling Clause");
Recognizing the resource and technical constraints of developing country Members;
Recalling that in the negotiations pursued under the terms of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration**, in accordance with paragraph 47 of that Declaration, agreements reached at an early
stage may be implemented on a provisional basis;
Decides:

**

W T/MIN(01)/DEC/1.

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A. Early Announcement
1. Without prejudging the substance and the timing of the notification required under Article
XXIV of the GATT 1994, Article V of the GATS or the Enabling Clause, nor affecting Members'
rights and obligations under the WTO agreements in any way:
(a)

Members participating in new negotiations aimed at the conclusion of an RTA shall
endeavour to so inform the WTO.

(b)

Members parties to a newly signed RTA shall convey to the WTO, in so far as and
when it is publicly available, information on the RTA, including its official name,
scope and date of signature, any foreseen timetable for its entry into force or
provisional application, relevant contact points and/or website addresses, and any
other relevant unrestricted information.

2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 above is to be forwarded to the WTO Secretariat,
which will post it on the WTO website and will periodically provide Members with a synopsis of
the communications received.
B. Notification
3. The required notification of an RTA by Members that are party to it shall take place as early
as possible. As a rule, it will occur no later than directly following the parties' ratification of the
RTA or any party's decision on application of the relevant parts of an agreement, and before the
application of preferential treatment between the parties.
4.
In notifying their RTA, the parties shall specify under which provision(s) of the WTO
agreements it is notified. They will also provide the full text of the RTA (or those parts they have
decided to apply) and any related schedules, annexes and protocols, in one of the WTO official
languages; if available, these shall also be submitted in an electronically exploitable format.
Reference to related official Internet links shall also be supplied.
C. Procedures to Enhance Transparency
***
D. Subsequent Notification and Reporting
5. The required notification of changes affecting the implementation of an RTA, or the operation
of an already implemented RTA, shall take place as soon as possible after the changes occur.

Changes to be notified include, inter alia, modifications to the preferential treatment between the
parties and to the RTA's disciplines. The parties shall provide a summary of the changes made, as
well as any related texts, schedules, annexes and protocols, in one of the WTO official languages

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and, if available, in electronically exploitable format.***
6. At the end of the RTA's implementation period, the parties shall submit to the WTO a short
written report on the realization of the liberalization commitments in the RTA as originally notified.
7.
Upon request, the relevant WTO body shall provide an adequate opportunity for an exchange
of views on the communications submitted under paragraphs 14 and 15.
8.
The communications submitted under paragraphs 14 and 15 will be promptly made available
on the WTO website and a synopsis will be periodically circulated by the WTO Secretariat to
Members.
E.

Bodies Entrusted with the Implementation of the Mechanism
***
F. Technical Support for Developing Countries

9. Upon request, the WTO Secretariat shall provide technical support to developing country
Members, and especially least-developed countries, in the implementation of this Transparency
Mechanism, in particular – but not limited to - with respect to the preparation of RTA-related data
and other information to be submitted to the WTO Secretariat.
G. Other Provisions
10.

Any Member may, at any time, bring to the attention of the relevant WTO body information
on any RTA that it considers ought to have been submitted to Members in the framework of this
Transparency Mechanism.
11.
The WTO Secretariat shall establish and maintain an updated electronic database on
individual RTAs. This database shall include relevant tariff and trade-related information, and give
access to all written material related to announced or notified RTAs available at the WTO. The
RTA database should be structured so as to be easily accessible to the public.
H. Provisional Application of the Transparency Mechanism
12.

This Decision shall apply, on a provisional basis, to all RTAs.
***
I. Reappraisal of the Mechanism
***
***

In their notification, Members may refer to official Internet links related to the agreement where the
relevant information can be consulted in full, in one of the W TO official languages.

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J. Presumption of Nonconformity (New)
Any failure to fulfil the notification and reporting duties specified in this
Transparency Mechanism shall create a rebuttable presumption that the RTA in question is
not in conformity with WTO rules.
K. Dispute Settlement (New)
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any

matters concerning GATT Article 24, GATS Article 5 or the Enabling Clause, including
failure to fulfil the notification or reporting duties specified in this Transparency Mechanism
and the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin (1994), Annex 2, Common Declaration with
Respect to Preferential Rules of Origin.

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ANNEX
Submission of Data by RTA Parties
1. RTA parties shall not be expected to make available the information required
below if the corresponding data has already been submitted to the Integrated Data
Base (IDB),**** or has otherwise been provided to the Secretariat in an adequate
format.*****
2. For the goods aspects in RTAs, the parties shall submit the following data, at the
tariff-line level:******
(a)

(b)

Tariff concessions under the agreement:
(i)

a full listing of each party's preferential duties applied in the year of
entry into force of the agreement; and

(ii)

when the agreement is to be implemented by stages, a full listing of

each party's preferential duties to be applied over the transition
period.

MFN duty rates:
(i)

a full tariff listing of each RTA party's MFN duties applied on the
year of entry into force of the agreement;******* and

(ii)

a full tariff listing of each RTA party's MFN duties applied on the
year preceding the entry into force of the agreement.

( c)

Where applicable, other data (e.g., preferential margins, tariff-rate quotas,
seasonal restrictions, special safeguards and, if available, ad valorem
equivalents for non-ad valorem duties).

(d)

Product-specific preferential rules of origin as defined in the agreement.

(e)

Import statistics, for the most recent three years preceding the notification

****

Trade and tariff data submissions in the context of an RTA notification can subsequently be included in
the IDB, provided that their key features are appropriate. In this respect, see document G/MA/IDB/W /6 (dated 15
June 2000) for the Guidelines for Supplying PC IDB Submissions and documents G/MA/115 (dated 17 June 2002)
and G/MA/115/Add.5 (dated 13 January 2005) for WTO Policy regarding the dissemination of IDB data.
*****
Data submissions can be furnished in PC database formats, spreadsheet formats, or text-delimited
formats; the use of word-processing formats should be avoided, if possible.
******
References to "tariff-line level" shall be understood to mean the detailed breakdown of the national
customs nomenclature (HS codes with, for example, 8, 10 or more digits). It is crucial that all data elements
supplied use the same national customs nomenclature or are associated with corresponding conversion tables.
*******
In the case of a customs union, the MFN applied common external tariff.

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for which they are available:
(i)

each party's imports from each of the other parties, in value; and

(ii)

each party's imports from the rest of the world, broken down by
country of origin, in value.

3. For the services aspects in RTAs, the parties shall submit the following data, if available, for
the three most recent years preceding the notification: trade or balance of payments statistics (by

services sector/subsector and partner), gross domestic product data or production statistics (by
services sector/subsector), and relevant statistics on foreign direct investment and on movement of
natural persons (by country and, if possible, by services sector/subsector).
4. For RTAs involving only developing countries, in particular when these comprise leastdeveloped countries, the data requirements specified above will take into account the technical
constraints of the parties to the agreement.
__________

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1. For example, virtually all U.S. bilaterals cover foreign investment, including controversial
investor-state claims’ arbitrations. See R. Folsom, NAFTA and Free Trade in the Americas,
Chapter 6. WTO coverage of foreign investment law is very narrow. Compare the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) (1994).
2. Id. Compare inclusion of procurement in U.S. bilaterals with the WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement (1994). See R. Folsom, M. Gordon and J. A. Spanogle, International
Trade and Economics Relations (2004), Chapters 5 and 7.
3. Notably the competition policy of the European Union, see R. Folsom, Principles of
European Union Law(2005), Chapter 7.
4. Id. These areas were the subject of “side agreements” to NAFTA. U.S. bilaterals since
NAFTA include coverage of labor and the environment. See R. Folsom, NAFTA and Free Trade
in the Americas (2004), Chapters 9 and 10.
5. See “Services Liberalization in New Generation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs):
How Much Further Than the GATS?” (WTO Working Paper, 2006).
6. See Bhala, “Competitive Liberalization, Competitive Imperialism, and Intellectual Property,”
(2007) Liverpool Law Review 28:77 - 105.
7. Id.
8. See Folsom, “Trading for National Security? United States Free Trade Agreement in the
Middle East and North Africa,”. San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-113,

(Sept. 2007).
9. See J. Bhogwati, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and
Democracy (1998) at 290-91.
10. See “Lamy Welcomes WTO Agreement on Regional Trade Agreements,” WTO 2006 News
Items (July 10, 2006).
11. Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
12. 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
13. Protocol of Provisional Application to the GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, TIAS No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S 308.
14. See J. H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (1969) at § 2.5.
15. Geneva Round (1947), Annecy Round (1948), Torquay Round (1950), Geneva Round
(1956), “Dillon Round (1960-61), “Kennedy Round” (1964-67), Tokyo Round (1973-79),
Uruguay Round (1986-1994).
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16. The GATT 1947 had 22 signatories. By 1960, there were 45 contracting parties, by 1973 a
total of 99 parties, and by 1986 approximately 120 signatories.
17. Chase, “Multilateralism compromised: the mysterious origins of GATT Article XXIV,”
(2006) World Trade Rev. 1.
18. GATT Article 24(5):
Accordingly the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories
of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of
an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area;
Provided that:
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to the
formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce
imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of
trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on

the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties
and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the
formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as the case
may be;
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the
formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of
such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim agreement to the trade of
contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to such agreement shall
not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other
regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the
formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement, as the case may be; and
(c) any interim agreement referred to in sub paragraphs (a) and (b) shall
include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a
free-trade area within a reasonable length of time.
GATT Article 24(6):
If, in fulfilling the requirements of sub-paragraph 5(1), a contracting party
proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions of Article
II, the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for
compensatory adjustment, due account shall be taken of the compensation already
afforded by the reductions brought about in the corresponding duty of the other
constituents of the union.

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GATT Article 24(8):
For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a

single, customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce
(except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII,
XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially
all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at
least with respect to substantially all the trade in products
originating in such territories, and,
(ii) subject to provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the
same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each
of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included
in the union;
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Article XI, XII, XIII,
XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories in products originating in such territories.
19. See generally, The World Bank, Trade, Regionalism and Development (2005).
20. See generally, J. Viner, The Customs Union Issue (1950).
21. See generally, R. Folsom, Principles of European Union Law (2005) at § 1.4.
22. GATT Article 24(7)(a).
23. See “Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the GATT/WTO” at www.wto.org.
24. GATT Article 24(7).
25. GATT Article 24(8). See note 18, supra. “Where necessary,” exceptions permitted by
GATT Articles 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 20 apply.
26. GATT Article 24(5). For customs unions, but not free trade areas, the test is whether “on the
whole” such duties and regulations are higher or more restrictive. See note 18, supra.
27. See Rivas, “Do Rules of Origin in Free Trade Agreements Comply with Article XXIV
GATT,” Chapter 6 in L. Bartels and F. Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO
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Legal Systems (2006).
28. GATT Article 24(4).
29. GATT Article 24(10).
30. See R. Folsom, Principles of European Union Law (2005) at § 1.4.
31. Id.
32. Id. at § 6.9.
33. Id. at § 6.10. This challenge is being revisited as the EU-ACP “Cotonou Agreement” is
implemented. See J. Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO (2002), Chapter 13
and Desta, “EC-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and WTO Compatibility: An
Experiment in North-South Inter-Regional Agreements,” 43 Common Mkt.L.Rev. 1343 (2006).
34. Dam, The GATT (1970) at 275-76. See Bhala, “The Forgotten Mercy: GATT Article
XXIV:11 and Trade on the Subcontinent,” 2002 N.Z. Law Rev. 301 (2002); Lamy Calls for
Integration of Regional, Bilateral Trade Deals Into WTO System, 24 BNA ITR (9-13-07) at page
1274, suggesting creation of “best practices” WTO guidelines.
35. For example, the Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa (1966), the East African
Community (1967), the Economic Community of West African States (1975), the Caribbean
Community (1973), the Central American Common Market (1958), the Latin American Free
Trade Assn (1961), the Andean Community (1969), and ASEAN (1967). See R. Folsom, M.
Gordon and J.A. Spanogle, International Trade and Economic Relations (2004), Chapter 5.
36. GATT Decision of November 28, 1979 (L/4903) (hereafter “Enabling Clause”).
37. Enabling Clause Article 4(a).
38. See “Work of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements” at www.wto.org.
39. Id. Article 3.
40. Id. Article 4(b).
41. LAFTA became the Latin American Integration Assn in 1981. The (Persian) Gulf
Cooperation Council was created in 1981. The OAS-based African Economic Community was
established in 1991 along with MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay). See R.
Folsom, M. Gordon and J.A. Spanogle, International Trade and Economic Relations (2004)

Chapter 5. By special arrangement, MERCOSUR was examined under the Enabling Clause and
GATT Article 24. WT/COMTD/5/Rev. 1 (Oct. 25, 1995).

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