Tài liệu State of the Nation - South Africa 2008 pdf

Edited by Lungisile Ntsebeza & Peter Kagwanja
South Africa 2008
Edited By Peter Kagwanja & Kwandiwe Kondlo
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Contents
List of tables and figures vii
Foreword ix
Acronyms xii
Introduction: Uncertain democracy - elite fragmentation and
the disintegration of the ‘nationalist consensus’ in South Africa xv
Peter Kagwanja
Part I: Politics
1 The Polokwane moment and South Africa’s democracy at the crossroads 3
Somadoda Fikeni
2 Modernising the African National Congress:
The legacy of President Thabo Mbeki 35
William M Gumede
3 The state of the Pan-Africanist Congress in a democratic South Africa 58
Thabisi Hoeane
4 Black Consciousness in contemporary South African politics 84
Thiven Reddy
Part II: Economics
5 The developmental state in South Africa: The difficult road ahead 107
Sampie Terreblanche
6 Globalisation and transformation of the South African merchant navy:
A case of flag of (in)convenience shipping? 131
Shaun Ruggunan
7 Service delivery as a measure of change:
State capacity and development 151
David Hemson, Jonathan Carter and Geci Karuri-Sebina
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8 The state of our environment:
Safeguarding the foundation for development 178
Donald Gibson, Amina Ismail, Darryll Kilian and Maia Matshikiza

Part III: Society
9 Beyond yard socialism: Landlords, tenants and social power
in the backyards of a South African city 203
Leslie Bank
10 Internationalisation and competitiveness in South African
urban governance: On the contradictions of aspirationist
urban policy-making 226
Scarlett Cornelissen
Part IV: South Africa, Africa and the globe
11 South Africa and the Great Lakes: A complex diplomacy 253
Che Ajulu
12 Cry sovereignty: South Africa in the UN Security Council,
2007–2008 275
Peter Kagwanja
13 Praetorian solidarity: The state of military relations between
South Africa and Zimbabwe 303
Peter Kagwanja and Martin Revayi Rupiya
Contributors 332
Index 334
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vii
Tables and figures
Tables
Table 1.1 ANC membership and voting delegates at the December 2007
conference 17
Table 1.2 Polokwane conference election results for top six NEC positions
18
Table 1.3 2004 election results: National Assembly 25
Table 3.1 Major South African political parties represented in the
National Assembly after the 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections,

by percentage 72
Table 6.1 Unicorn’s ships and flagging practices 134
Table 10.1 Economic development goals in South Africa’s three largest
metropolises, 2006–2111 239
Table 10.2 Johannesburg Development Agency’s main partnerships and
development projects 242
Table 10.3 Durban Investment Promotion Agency’s main partnerships
and development projects 243
Table 11.1 South African foreign policy priorities, 2004–2008 255
Table 12.1 Kofi Annan’s plans for the reform of the UN Security
Council, 2005 284
Table 12.2 AU plans for UN Security Council reform, 2005 288
Figures
Figure 8.1 Conceptual models of development 180
Figure 8.2 Ecosystem services and their relationship to human
well-being 181
Figure 8.3 Levels of soil, vegetation and overall degradation in South Africa,
c. 1998 185
Figure 8.4 Status of terrestrial ecosystems, South Africa, 2004 188
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ix
Foreword
The exciting times in which we live as South Africans just never end. The
period 1994 to 1999, sometimes referred to as the era of ‘Madiba magic’,
was a heroic one; it was a time of tasting and celebrating the possibilities of
our new democracy. From 1999 to 2004, the period some refer to as the era
of ‘Mbeki logic’, responses to managerial imperatives came to the fore and
we witnessed the implementation of comprehensive policy reforms and the
steady growth of our economy. The years 2004 to the present have combined

the hope and optimism of the Madiba period and the orientation towards
policy implementation and public service management of the Mbeki period
with an increasing sense of uncertainty and anxiety as the leadership contests
within the African National Congress (ANC) dominate public attention. The
latter trend culminated in the December 2007 ANC National Conference in
Polokwane, the subsequent recall of President Mbeki, the split within the
ruling party, and the formation of a new political party – the Congress of the
People.
These developments have generated much debate and the expression of a wide
range of views. Some political analysts emphasised the basic dimension of ‘a
changing of the guard’ and its associated manifestations in the redefinition
of existing relations between party and state, between the leadership and the
led, and between the haves and the have-nots, as well as the consolidation
of internal democracy in the ANC-led alliance in a way that amounts to the
reinvention of socio-political and economic emancipation. Other analysts
saw in the changes the settling in of a possible mediation of polarisations
and disparities in our political economy and society. Yet others saw in the
same changes the dynamism of stable continuity. As a result of these varied
perspectives, the conversations and debates about the likely future political,
social and economic trajectory of the country are ongoing and have become
interestingly robust. The chapters in this edition of State of the Nation
encompass these varied perspectives and are a sample of the ongoing debates.
In keeping with its commitment to ‘social science that makes a difference’, the
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) is proud to present the selection of
views contained in this edition, which continues the tradition of contributing
to the ongoing dialogue and wide-ranging debates between researchers,
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
x
policy-makers, public managers and policy activists, as well as revealing

and revelling in the vibrancy of our democracy and sharing contemporary
insights into the challenges facing our nation. As with previous editions, the
editors of this edition have attempted to strike a balance in their coverage
of issues – a balance between focusing on South Africa’s internal politics,
society and economy, and concentrating on South Africa’s external relations,
most critically with other African nations but also in relation to the country’s
bilateral and multilateral relations with the rest of the world.
The interpretations of our situation offered in this volume are diverse,
including some that are critical of government policies, state institutions,
political parties – including the ruling party – and global institutions.
However, all the contributors have sought to interpret their topics based upon
both historical understanding and empirical research, and the chapters reflect
a nuanced take on aspects of the state of our nation. Neither the introductory
chapter by the editors nor the perspectives presented in the subsequent
chapters represent the views of the HSRC and, as is the case with all HSRC
Press publications, editorial independence is respected and upheld as a matter
of principle.
I would like to record our gratitude to the four donor organisations that
continue to provide solid support to this project. Atlantic Philanthropies,
the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation and the Ford Foundation provided the
generous financial assistance which enabled the compilation and production
of this publication. Equally important was the contribution of the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, which financed several workshops in the HSRC’s
Democracy and Governance Research Programme. The latter Foundation has
in the past also supported the launch workshops which allowed us to extend
the debate on the state of the nation well beyond the academy.
The success of State of the Nation is in large measure due to the commitment
and effort of its editors and in this regard I would like to single out the
contribution of the founding editors John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger
Southall in launching what has now become a flagship publication of the

HSRC. The contributions of subsequent editors that variously included
Sakhela Buhlungu and Jessica Lutchman are also acknowledged. Thank you
all for the continuing legacy of scholarship in the nexus of social science and
public policy.
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xi
FOREWORD
For a number of reasons the transitions between various groups of editors
have not been as seamless as we would have desired and we have struggled
with ensuring continuity amidst change. Lungisile Ntsebeza, Peter Kagwanja
and Kwandiwe Kondlo, Executive Director of the HSRC’s Democracy and
Governance Research Programme, deserve a special word of thanks in
this regard. The delayed production of this edition was overcome through
tapping into collaboration networks and by drawing upon an outstanding
commitment to ensuring that this important national project continues. We
will continue to tap into these networks and draw upon this commitment
to ensure continuity for the future. As part of these efforts a new lead editor
will be appointed following the resignation of Lungisile Ntsebeza from the
editorial team. A decision has also been made to publish State of the Nation
at the beginning of each calendar year to coincide with the beginning of the
academic year in South African institutions of higher education, rather than
towards the end of the calendar year as was previously the case.
As with previous editions, Garry Rosenberg, Mary Ralphs, Karen Bruns,
Utando Baduza and all the staff of the HSRC Press have continued to play
their part in ensuring the success of this project and I convey the appreciation
of their colleagues.
State of the Nation is a mechanism for dialogue and public debate aimed at
engendering the kind of knowledge that public policy needs in order to be
more effective. I trust that this edition keeps us on course towards achieving
this goal.

Dr Olive Shisana
President and Chief Executive, HSRC
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xii
Acronyms
Africom African Command
ANC African National Congress
Apla Azanian People’s Liberation Army
Asgisa Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa
AU African Union
Azapo Azanian People’s Organisation
BC Black Consciousness
BCF Black Consciousness Forum
BCM Black Consciousness Movement
BEE Black Economic Empowerment
BPC Black People’s Convention
CBD Central Business District
CBO Community-based organisation
Codesa Convention for a Democratic South Africa
Cosatu Congress of South African Trade Unions
CTRU Cape Town Routes Unlimited
DA Democratic Alliance
DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa
DEAT Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
DME Department of Minerals and Energy
DPSIR Drivers-pressures-state-impacts-responses
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DVRA Duncan Village Residents’ Association
ESI Environmental Sustainability Index
EU European Union

FDD Force for the Defence of Democracy
Fifa Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FLS Frontline States
FNL Forces for National Liberation
FoC Flag of convenience
Frelimo Frente de Libertação Moçambique
GDP Gross domestic product
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme
HSRC Human Sciences Research Council
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xiii
ACRONYMS
ICC International Convention Centre
ICT Information and communications technology
ID Independent Democrats
IDP Integrated Development Plan
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRIN UN Integrated Regional Information Network
IT Information technology
ITF International Transport Workers Federation
JDA Johannesburg Development Agency
JOC Joint Operations Command
MCS Marine Crew Services
MDC Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)
MK Umkhonto we Sizwe
MP Member of parliament
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NDR National Democratic Revolution

NEC National Executive Committee
Nepad New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NFSD National Framework for Sustainable Development
NGC National General Council
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NNP New National Party
NP National Party
NPA National Prosecuting Authority
NSDP National Spatial Development Perspective
NWC National Working Committee
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPDS Organ for Politics, Defence and Security
PAC Pan-Africanist Congress
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSC Public Service Commission
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme
RLDF Royal Lesotho Defence Force
RSC Regional Services Council
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
SAAF South African Air Force
SABC South African Broadcasting Association
SACP South African Communist Party
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADF South African Defence Force
SAfMA Southern African Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
Samsa South African Maritime Safety Authority

Sanco South African National Civic Organisation
Sars South African Revenue Service
Saso South African Students’ Organisation
SASSA South African Social Security Agency
Satawu South African Transport and Allied Workers Union
Sopa Socialist Party of Azania
SRI Socially Responsible Investment
Swapo South West African People’s Organisation
TETA Transport Education and Training Authority
UCDP United Christian Democratic Party
UDF United Democratic Front
UDM United Democratic Movement
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Progrmme
Unita National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNOMSA UN Observer Mission in South Africa
UNSC United Nations Security Council
Wesgro Western Cape Trade and Investment Promotion Agency
Zanu-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
Zapu Zimbabwe African People’s Union
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xv
Introduction: Uncertain democracy – elite
fragmentation and the disintegration of the
‘nationalist consensus’ in South Africa
Peter Kagwanja
Since ethnonationalism is a direct consequence of key elements of
modernization, it is likely to gain ground in societies undergoing
such a process. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that it remains
among the most vital – and most disruptive – forces in many parts

of the contemporary world. (Muller 2008: 33)
Two historic events have heralded the disintegration of nationalism in South
Africa: the electoral defeat of the nationalist icon President Robert Mugabe of
Zimbabwe in March 2008, forcing him to sign a power-sharing deal with the
opposition; and the forced exit of President Thabo Mbeki, another architect of
African nationalism, in September of the same year. Faced with bloodletting
power struggles, escalating violent crime, joblessness, grinding poverty and
mass protests by the impoverished across the country against spiralling food
prices, the high cost of living and poor service delivery, former President
Mbeki prefaced his annual ‘State of the Nation’ address on 9 February 2007
with a passionate appeal to the unifying impulse of nationalism. Mbeki’s
speech has become emblematic of South Africa’s troubling transition from
the ‘age of hope’ of the early post-apartheid years to a new ‘age of despair’
(Mashike 2008). This volume of State of the Nation draws attention to
nationalism as the salient issue that has framed the seismic shifts in South
Africa’s politics, economy, society and foreign relations in the run-up to and
aftermath of the historic 52nd African National Congress (ANC) National
Conference in Polokwane in December 2007 – which sounded the death knell
to the Mbeki presidency (1999–2008).
In the 15 years since the demise of the parochial nationalisms of the apartheid
era, South Africa’s democracy has become increasingly uncertain. What
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
xvi
was identified elsewhere in immediate post-colonial Africa as ‘the era of
the beautiful bride’, where the nationalist euphoria of the liberation period
served as the glue that held together the broad elite consensus, has come to a
close. And with it, the outlook for South African nationalism, which reached
its apex under Mbeki, looks bleak. Mbeki’s South Africa is a dramatic story,
unequalled elsewhere in Africa. Far from producing one united and equitable

nation, post-apartheid development strategies have created what analysts
have dubbed ‘two different countries’ (Herbst 2005: 93): one Lockean, largely
white, wealthy and secure; the other Hobbesian, overwhelmingly black,
poverty-stricken and crime-ridden. The ‘two countries’, however, share one
of the world’s reputably most liberal constitutions and a vibrant pluralist
democracy characterised by regular free and fair elections – albeit up to this
point dominated by the ruling ANC – and an economy that has grown faster
in the last 15 years than it did in the 1980s, increasingly attracting foreign
investments and its capital penetrating deeper into the African markets.
The glue that held Mbeki’s two countries together was a broad-based elite
consensus grounded on the miracle of transition in the 1990s, clinched under
the eminent statesman Nelson Mandela, and South Africans’ astonishingly
high optimism despite the odds. During his ‘State of the Nation’ address on
3 February 2006, Mbeki declared, ‘Our country has entered its age of hope,’
appealing to this extraordinary sense of optimism even as the impoverished
mounted protests (Mashike 2008: 433). But the glue of nationalist euphoria is
seemingly coming loose, poising the ‘two countries’ on the edge of a dangerous
clash. Post-Mbeki South Africa is at the crossroads: the elite consensus has
fallen apart, optimism is giving way to pessimism and the future of democracy
and the nationalist project is becoming increasingly uncertain. Most of the
contributions to this volume of State of the Nation were written well before
Polokwane and Mbeki’s own exit from the presidency. However, in a profound
sense, the chapters shed light on the dynamics that led to these epoch-making
events now shaping a post-Mbeki South Africa. The editors have, however,
revised this introduction and the first chapter to update the volume and
place it in the context of post-Mbeki politics, with its high point being the
unprecedented split of the ANC and the resultant far-reaching implications
for the future of South Africa’s democracy.
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INTRODUCTION

xvii
The decline of elite consensus and the ‘clash of peoples’
Long before President Mbeki was forced to exit, South Africa had already
experienced bouts of the worldwide surge of ethnonationalism, defined in
dramatic terms as the ‘clash of peoples’, now poised to drive global politics
for generations to come (Muller 2008). Underpinning South Africa’s 1994
political settlement was the idea of civic or liberal nationalism: that ‘all people’
are considered part of the nation regardless of their ethnic, racial, religious
or geographic origins (Chipkin 2007). This conceptualisation of nationalism
bequeathed the country with a liberal Constitution and a panoply of public
bodies, collectively known as Chapter 9 institutions, aimed at fortifying
democracy and promoting and protecting the rights of the ‘people’. Civic
nationalism produced a unifying vision of the nation, designed to trump the
varieties of insular nationalism or ethnicity that bedevilled South Africa at
the height of apartheid (Geertsema 2006; Ramutsindela 2002). Indeed, the
post-apartheid ‘nationalist consensus’, based on the liberal vision(s) of the
nation, is now collapsing, caving in to a new upsurge of narrow sentiments of
ethnonationalism or the idea that nations are defined by common language,
heritage, faith and often a common ethnic ancestry (Muller 2008).
Some trace the woes of civic nationalism to Mbeki’s ‘activist presidency’, which
accented African nationalism and often resorted to the language of class and
racial struggle to counter criticism, especially from white critics (Herbst
2005). In his controversially titled book – Do South Africans Exist? – Ivor
Chipkin (2007) resorts to this criticism of Mbeki to launch his strident attack
on African nationalism as inherently anti-democratic. However, Chipkin’s
analysis misses the nuanced observation made by other scholars that it is
not African nationalism but, rather, the hard-to-reconcile contradictions of
South Africa’s civic nationalism that pose the greatest threat to democracy.
Mbeki’s own activism reflected these contradictions which Herbst (2005: 94)
eloquently sums up as ‘the imperative to continue the struggle against racism;

the need to enforce the solidarity of the liberation movement; the exigencies
of participation in a multiparty democracy; and the desire to govern in a
manner that promotes the interests of all South Africans.’
These contradictions also largely account for the bitter succession struggles
within and between former liberation movements like the ANC, discussed in
this volume of State of the Nation. These struggles have, in turn, eroded the
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
xviii
necessary cohesion of the elite and stoked the embers of ethnonationalism,
threatening what Archbishop Desmond Tutu once celebrated as ‘the rainbow
nation’. The failure of the ‘nation-building project’ under the Mandela
and Mbeki administrations to reverse the entrenched racial and economic
injustice and inequalities and to create access to services, jobs and other
means of livelihood for an increasingly impoverished and disillusioned black
majority has also created fertile ground for ethnonationalism, including
xenophobia. Weak, lethargic and provincial opposition parties and former
liberation movements lack the vision, tactics, ideological force or political
capacity to halt the country’s slide to ethnonationalism. The preponderant
rise of ethnonationalism was recently commented on by one of the founders
of the United Democratic Front (UDF), Allan Boesak, who warned that the
liberation movement was recreating apartheid’s system of racial and ethnic
categorisation, demeaning coloured citizens, ‘ruthlessly and thoughtlessly’
abandoning struggle solidarity, and moving the ANC towards ‘ethnic
nationalism’ (Business Day 25.08.08).1 In the same vein, Anthony Butler
laments that ‘Mbeki and Zuma have…together undermined a century of
efforts to counter tribalism in the liberation movement. Ethnic balance has
been central to the ANC since its founding’ (Business Day 25.08.08). The
divisive succession struggle has turned ethnonationalism into the axis around
which politics in South Africa is increasingly coming to rotate.

The resurgence of ethnonationalism in South Africa has dimmed the future
of Mbeki’s African Renaissance project, which is rooted in the old movements
of pan-Africanism, including Kwame Nkrumah’s concept of the ‘African
personality’ and Aimé Césaire’s ‘negritude’. But African Renaissance has its
recent roots in Mbeki’s famous ‘I am an African’ speech, delivered on behalf of
the ANC on the occasion of the adoption of the new democratic Constitution
in May 1996. The speech captured the dual identity of ‘the peoples’ in South
Africa as both ‘South Africans’ and ‘Africans’ (Chipkin 2007). ‘I am an African’
marked South Africa’s ideational move from a ‘white tip of a black continent’
to embrace an ‘African identity’. Mbeki’s turn to African Renaissance was not
a regression to parochial nationalism, but a strategic move to promote neo-
liberalism. This followed widespread criticism that the ‘new’ South Africa
in the 1990s was ‘little more than the West’s lackey on the southern tip of
Africa’ (Landsberg 2000: 107; Tieku 2004). The indisputable achievement
of the Mbeki presidency was its unrelenting peacemaking efforts in parts of
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INTRODUCTION
xix
Africa paralysed by ‘uncivil’ nationalism, such as Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.
Driving Mbeki’s African Renaissance project has been a small but fervent
cadre of ‘liberation diplomats’ who entered the Union Buildings with
Mbeki in 1999, touting African nationalist solidarity. At the turn of the new
millennium, Pretoria’s ‘liberation diplomats’ were convinced that the end
of the Cold War and the preponderance of neo-liberal ideas had rendered
the radical populism and socialist ideology of their own party, the ANC,
unattractive (Tieku 2004). Pretoria’s pan-Africanists robustly exported South
Africa’s version of liberal nationalism to the rest of the continent, where ‘new
wars’ based on ethnonationalism had eroded the capacity of the state as a
motor of development (Hagg & Kagwanja 2007). They not only re-engineered

continental institutions such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),
founded by pan-Africanists such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere
decades ago, but also created new ones as vehicles for their neo-liberal agenda.
This culminated in the emergence of a web of transnational institutions such
as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU),
designed to ‘conclude the work of earlier pan-African movements and…to
reinvent the African state to play its effective and rightful role on the global
terrain’ (Kagwanja 2006: 159; Ahluwali 2002). Paradoxically, not all South
African citizens shared their neo-liberal vision of improving the image of
Africa in order to attract foreign investments and make the ‘new’ South
Africa an important global trading nation (Ahluwali 2002). Moreover, even
as they enmeshed themselves in this web of continental institutions, Mbeki’s
‘Renaissance knights’ failed to find a healthy balance between their promotion
of the liberal norms of democracy and human rights and the imperative of
African solidarity. Widespread accusations that Mbeki sacrificed democracy
at the altar of nationalist solidarity by failing to openly condemn illiberal
regimes such as Robert Mugabe’s in Zimbabwe have stuck like grease on
his administration. This contradiction, which lingered on throughout the
Mbeki era (1999–2008), reached its acme during South Africa’s tenure as a
non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in
2007/08.
The future of the ‘liberation’ cadres looks uncertain. They suffered a serious
setback when Zimbabwe’s opposition won the 27 March 2008 elections,
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
xx
humiliating Mbeki’s mentor and ally, Robert Mugabe, the latter also celebrated
as a nationalist hero across Africa and its diaspora (Gevisser 2007). Pretoria’s
cynics have written off Mbeki’s African agenda as a drain on their resources,

with little to show for the huge investment in Africa except the air miles.
Others lament that Africa failed to throw its lot behind South Africa for a
veto-wielding seat in the UNSC, the one ambition that united all its citizens.
But this also reflects badly on Pretoria’s diplomats for their tragic failure to
win the hearts and minds of fellow citizens and to carry them along on the
African agenda. Mbeki’s African Renaissance project is struggling to recover
from the May 2008 bout of xenophobic attacks, which killed 65 people, largely
African nationals. Mbeki’s defeat by his rival, former ANC deputy president
Jacob Zuma, and his eventual exit from power have created uncertainty
over the future of Pretoria’s pan-Africanists and the political capacity of the
African Renaissance project. As Gumede (2008) warns, it has also ushered in
an unsettling moment in South Africa’s history with deep implications for the
consolidation of its infant democracy.
Globally, the epitaph of Mbeki’s South Africa is also unflattering. South
Africa’s strong nationalist stance in defence of Africa’s sovereignty, as well as
its support for a rule-based global multilateral order against the unilateral
proclivity and meddling in Africa by major powers, alienated its allies in the
west. At its twilight, critics in the west gratuitously labelled Mbeki’s South
Africa a ‘rogue democracy’ for the sin of backing pariah regimes in the UNSC
(Washington Post 28.05.08).
2

The ANC: the clash of political cultures
Fikeni (Chapter 1, this volume) paints a bleak picture of the ANC as a party
in the grip of a fierce clash between the two nationalist traditions that evolved
during the anti-apartheid struggle. The first is the ‘centralising logic’ in the ANC
structures in exile. This political culture tended to emphasise centralisation of
power, teamwork, secrecy and discipline, but also intellectualism (Southall
2007; Sunday Nation 28.09.08).
3

It emerged as a logical response to the
liberation movement’s need for cohesion, coherence and effectiveness in the
face of the acutely dangerous and harsh environment outside South Africa. In
the succession tussle, Mbeki has emerged as the consummate symbol of the
centralising logic of the ‘exiles’. This centralising logic is contrasted with the
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INTRODUCTION
xxi
decentralised tendency of the ANC ‘inxiles’ or ‘remainees’. The decentralising
logic gained prominence in response to Sharpeville, when leaders of more
centralised movements such as the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress
(PAC) were arrested or forced into exile. Anti-apartheid lobby groups such
as the UDF evolved as decentralised mass movements with deep grassroots
support designed to operate below the radar of apartheid security apparatuses
on the home front. The Zuma faction of the ANC has identified with this
political tradition of the ‘inxiles’.
Upon coming to power, Mbeki prioritised the restructuring of the governance
structures and decision-making machinery – both of the government and the
ANC – to create what one of his spin doctors, Frank Chikane, celebrated as
‘integrated governance’ (Chikane 2001). During Mbeki’s first term (1999–
2004), the presidency was restructured in line with the recommendations of
the 1998 Presidential Review Commission to ensure ‘efficient and effective
management of government by the president together with the deputy
president and cabinet’ (South Africa 1998). The result was an oversized
presidency, which by 2004/05 comprised an establishment of 469 people with
a budget of R170 million, a nearly 100 per cent increase from the R89 million
in 2001 (Southall 2007: 3; Sunday Times 19.09.04).
Mbeki’s second term (2004–2008) saw an accelerated move to tighten the
administrative nuts and bolts and to realign the party with the governmental
structures. In June 2005 the ANC’s National General Council (NGC) produced

a document titled Organisational Design of the ANC: A Case for Internal
Renewal. The blueprint sought to restructure the ANC into a more streamlined
and technocratic organisation with its structures at the regional and branch
levels aligned to those of the government, thus bringing the party grassroots
under the firm control of the party headquarters and the government (Mail
& Guardian 24.06.05).
4
The Mbeki administration tightened the noose on
the ANC to rein in ‘unruly’ regions and branches and to limit the scope of
what it saw as creeping patronage and factionalism, which were blamed for
the spates of popular protests in poor townships over service delivery which
rocked the country from 2004. These protests, which took on an increasingly
violent streak, rose from 5 800 in 2004/05 to over 10 000 in 2006 (Bond 2007).
Critics saw the centralising model as creating an ‘imperialist presidency’, itself
a reflection of Mbeki’s authoritarian style. The centralising political culture,
rolled out in earnest after 2004, immediately alienated the ‘inxiles’, who
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gradually began to fight back. This clash between the two political cultures
and styles within the ANC largely framed the succession struggle within and
between the various factions of the ANC elite, culminating in Mbeki’s ousting
on 24 September 2008.
The ANC alliance
The succession tussle marked the culmination of the drawn-out ideological
battles within the ANC alliance – the ANC government, the South African
Communist Party (SACP), the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(Cosatu), and women and youth leagues. Ideological schisms within the ANC
can be traced to the organisation’s turn to neo-liberalism during the Mandela
era (1994–1999). The battle lines became clearly marked when the market-

friendly Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework was
adopted in 1996 to replace the left-leaning Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP). Critics in Cosatu and the SACP of the ANC’s neo-liberal
turn were not persuaded that GEAR was worth its ink as a blueprint designed
to transform South Africa into a competitive trading nation. They never
hid their bitter feelings that the framework was a stumbling block to the
implementation of the ideals of the Freedom Charter and the RDP (ANC
1997a, 1997b).
The neo-liberal turn created three distinct ideological groupings within
the ANC and its alliance. First were the remnants of the ANC radical past,
clamouring for a return to the party’s traditional populism and socialist
orientation of the exile era, mainly in the SACP and Cosatu; second were old-
regime officials or ‘realists’, urging for a policy driven by economic interests
rather than by the ethical and ideological imperatives of African nationalism;
and third was a small but vocal and powerful group of ‘neo-liberals’ or
‘idealists’ at the helm of government, pushing Mbeki’s pan-African agenda in
Africa and globally (Evans 1999; Mills 2004). The succession struggle widened
the rift between these groups, increasingly contributing to the collapse of
the elite consensus. By 26 June 2005, when the ANC celebrated 50 years of
its ‘socialist manifesto’, the Freedom Charter, ideological cleavages with its
erstwhile leftist allies had reached breaking point. Mbeki’s critics lamented
that the idea of the state controlling the commanding heights of the economy
had been effectively replaced by a pro-market economic policy and a gentle
relationship with private capital, once loathed as the underwriter of apartheid.
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Mbeki’s own intellectual aloofness and his hardball style tended to amplify his
existential challenge of holding together the ANC tripartite alliance.
In addition to the centralising proclivity rooted in the exile political culture,

Mbeki’s hardball approach carried the ‘modernising veneer’ of contemporary
European leaders such as Britain’s Tony Blair and Germany’s Gerhard
Schröder. On this point, Gevisser (2007: 773) has observed eloquently that:
When, in 1994, Nelson Mandela asked Kenneth Kaunda’s advice
as to who should be his successor, Kaunda had replied that Thabo
Mbeki best carried Oliver Tambo’s ‘great unifier’ legacy into the
new democratic era…Mbeki, for his part, chose not to follow in
Tambo’s footsteps at all, taking his cue rather from a very different
kind of political operative: there were times when his strategy
seemed to be a self-conscious mimicking of Tony Blair’s ‘New
Labour’ revolution. He had become a party strongman, not in the
crass old Stalinist way, but with the modernising veneer of a Blair
or a Schröder. The left was to shut up or ship out. Many fierce
discussions took place in 2001 and 2002.
Part of the problem is that Mbeki put his faith in the bureaucratic-executive
state, leaving tensions with the ANC to play out in dangerously public and
palpable ways. The funeral of Mbeki’s father, Govan Mbeki, in September
2001 produced one of the ugliest spectacles in the intra-ANC conflict. As
Gevisser (2007: 771) states:
[Jeremy] Cronin [deputy secretary of the SACP] also highlighted
something that was obvious to me: the way in which, despite
Govan Mbeki’s active membership of the SACP and stalwart
support of Cosatu campaigns, the alliance partners were
clearly marginalised from the proceedings: ‘The control of the
microphone was firmly in the hands of the Mbeki family and
the ANC leadership. Messages of support and condolences to the
family excluded the SACP and Cosatu. Govan Mbeki might have
had the agency to insist on being buried in Zwide, but not even he
could dictate, fully, the terms of his own burial.’
A short-lived truce occurred between the warring ANC allies in the aftermath

of the party’s 51st conference in Stellenbosch in December 2002. This truce
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paved the way for the ANC’s emphatic victory in the 2004 general election,
which ushered in Mbeki’s second term.
The Stellenbosch conference popularised the notion of the ‘developmental
state’, which the ANC left interpreted as a significant move by the Mbeki
administration to recognise the limits of the market as a tool for social
transformation and to recommit itself to RDP consensus on state-driven
development. In this volume, Sampie Terreblanche argues that ‘the shift
away from a fundamental restructuring of the South African economy (as
was envisaged in the RDP) to address the “deep-seated structural crisis”
towards a strengthening of neo-liberal capitalism…makes it extremely
difficult to institutionalise the envisaged developmental state’. However, the
developmental state remained a vaguely defined concept void of any real
substance except for the official lip-service and high-profile debates. The
Mbeki–Zuma tussle thrust the developmental state back into public debate.
Enter Zuma: the collapse of the elite consensus
As to whether Mbeki had a better alternative to firing his 65-year-old deputy,
Jacob Zuma, after the latter’s friend and financial adviser, Schabir Shaik, was
convicted of fraud and whether such a decision would have preserved ANC
unity will remain one of the ‘might-have-beens’ of history. The reality is that
Mbeki’s decision to ‘release’ Zuma from office was hailed in the west as ‘a
milestone even in South Africa’s history’ (Herbst 2005: 96). Mbeki’s good
intentions and moral responsibility in responding to what the presiding judge
labelled as a ‘mutually beneficial symbiosis’ in the relationship between Zuma
and Shaik and its potential harm to South Africa’s infant democracy never
wholly convinced internal critics, who saw the move as part of the intrigues.
For instance, it was noted that until Zuma was fired, he had remained a loyal

member of the president’s inner circle, seemingly undisturbed by Mbeki’s
alleged high-handed style and serving as ‘an important executioner of his
leader’s will’ (Gumede 2008: 262).
Zuma’s sacking rang familiar bells for the so-called ‘walking wounded’, a
reference to an ever-growing cadre of ANC veterans who blamed Mbeki for
dimming their political stars (Gumede 2008; see also Gumede in this volume).
Zuma’s decision to fight back energised and emboldened these disgruntled
ANC members who, from as early as 2000, were reportedly involved in
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behind-the-scenes manoeuvres to depose Mbeki. The story is told of how
from 2000 Cyril Ramaphosa, the former secretary-general of the ANC and
now a prominent businessman and Mandela’s choice as his successor, was
inundated with appeals to challenge Mbeki’s leadership, and how similar
unsuccessful overtures were made to Zuma in 2002. It is in this context that
in 2001 Mbeki accused Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Mathews Phosa,
who had earlier fallen out with him, of plotting behind the scenes to topple
him. This, according to Gumede (2008: 264), prompted Mandela to step in
to appeal that Mbeki should be allowed to complete his term. Mbeki finally
apologised to the trio, but forced Zuma to issue a public statement denying
he had ‘residential ambitions’.
After June 2005, support for Zuma from this disgruntled group and the ANC
alliance leadership – the SACP, Cosatu, the ANC Women’s and Youth Leagues –
provided him with the lifeline he badly needed to make a comeback. Months
ahead of his August 2008 trial on 16 charges including fraud, corruption,
money laundering and racketeering, Zuma supporters succeeded in shaping a
public perception that the trial was a political conspiracy to block Zuma from
ascending to South Africa’s presidency. Zuma strategists quickly repackaged
him as a ‘friend of the poor’, ‘friend of the left’ and a ‘man of the people’,

contrasting him to the ‘intellectually aloof and arrogant’, ‘autocratic’, ‘pro-
rich’, ‘pro-business’ and ‘elitist’ Mbeki. For his part, Zuma shrewdly played the
nationalist and ethnic cards in a fierce battle to win the hearts and minds of
the ANC rank and file. Appealing to the nationalist discourse, he presented
himself as a unifier in the tradition of Oliver Tambo, the revered ANC
leader. Analysts noted that during his rape trial, he not only spoke Zulu in
court but also invented ‘new Zulu cultural norms’ to suit his case (Gumede
2008: 262). The succession tussle not only eroded the political capacity of
state institutions (Southall 2007) but, more subtly, it intensified the ethnic
polarisation of politics.
Ethnonationalism after Polokwane
In his chapter in this volume, Somadoda Fikeni examines the ‘Polokwane
moment’ when Mbeki lost the ANC presidency. As early as October 2005,
Mbeki’s policy chief, Joel Netshitenzhe, hinted that it was not clear that the
same person should necessarily fill the offices of state president and president
of the party (Mail & Guardian 14–20.10.05). This gave weight to the view that
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Mbeki was considering prolonging his political life beyond 2009 when he was
expected to step down as state president but, like other African leaders such as
Namibia’s Sam Nujoma, remaining in control of the powerful party machine
and thus being the real power behind the throne. His public support for a
woman president for the country confirmed this view, with fingers pointing
to his deputy, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.
Mbeki’s decision to stand for a third term as the ANC president raised the
political stakes in the run-up to the ANC’s 52nd National Conference in
Polokwane on 16–20 December 2007. As Fikeni shows, this decision stirred
ethnic antagonism to a dangerous degree. The agenda of ending the Xhosa
dominance in the ANC never featured in the party’s public discussions or

among its alliance partners. But the idea was ubiquitously raised in debates
within and outside the ANC. The ‘dynastic’ lineage of Xhosa political
heavyweights, from Oliver Tambo to Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki,
was widely invoked to justify a non-Xhosa party leader to succeed Mbeki as
party president and, ultimately, state president. ‘There were signs of ethnic
mobilisation among the Zulus who rallied behind Zuma, showing little
tolerance for any internal deviation in that region,’ writes Fikeni. By the same
token, in Mbeki’s Xhosa homeland of the Eastern Cape, the ANC leadership
declared their support for their son in his bid for ANC presidency. Zuma’s
KwaZulu-Natal province answered back by declaring support for their son,
with his ardent supporters donning t-shirts with ‘100% Zulu Boy’ printed
on them. As communal consciousness and tensions escalated, Mbeki was
met with intense hostility in KwaZulu-Natal when he travelled there for the
reburial of the liberation veteran Moses Mabhida, and for the celebration of
Ghandi’s legacy.
The ground shifted from ethnonationalism to acute exploitation of nationalism
in the Zuma–Mbeki power tussle. Both Zuma and Mbeki engaged a higher
gear in the rush for icons and symbols of resistance against apartheid. Mbeki’s
‘State of the Nation’ address on 3 February 2007 was perfectly choreographed
and designed to appeal to nationalist sensibilities. The president opened his
speech with a lengthy eulogy to ‘Mama Adelaide Tambo’, the wife of the late
ANC president Oliver Tambo and a nationalist icon in her own right. He had
also invited to the President’s Box in Parliament Albertina Luthuli, daughter
of South Africa’s first Nobel Peace laureate, Inkosi Albert Luthuli; the activists
of the 1956 Women’s March and the 1976 Soweto Uprising; and ‘eminent
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INTRODUCTION
xxvii
patriots from all our provinces’. He seized the moment to wave the National
Orders named after these nationalist icons, including the Order of Luthuli and

the Order of the Companions of OR Tambo. He closed the introduction to his
speech by referring to the Freedom Charter, adopted nearly 50 years earlier
(Mbeki 2007).
Respective factions also battle for custodianship of ANC traditions and values,
with each camp portraying itself as the genuine custodian while depicting the
rival camp as a betrayer of these traditions. Names of ANC elders such as Luthuli,
Tambo, Mandela and Chris Hani were liberally invoked in political campaigns
and public utterances by both Mbeki and Zuma and their supporters, and the
country plunged into a string of festivities commemorating these icons and
historic events such as the Bambata Rebellion. This instrumentalisation of
nationalism took an ugly turn in July 2007 with the screening of a 24-minute
documentary titled Unauthorised: Thabo Mbeki, a brazen attempt to link
Mbeki to the 1993 assassination of SACP leader Chris Hani.
Broad Daylight Films, the producer of the documentary, claimed that it
was based on a formal investigation into an alleged plot against Mbeki in
2001 where the ‘alleged plotters, Tokyo Sexwale, Mathews Phosa and Cyril
Ramaphosa, were said to have spread a rumour linking Mbeki to the Hani
assassination’ (Mail & Guardian 19.07.07).
5
The documentary’s maker, Redi
Direko, reportedly appeared in the documentary to be debunking the rumour.
Many commentators dismissed the film as ‘unbelievable’ and as ‘merely a sign
of paranoia’ (Mail & Guardian 19.07.07). The South African Broadcasting
Corporation decided not to broadcast the documentary on public television,
but its screening in Johannesburg sparked a ferocious rumour across the
country. In short, a documentary primarily about rumour ended up pushing
the rumour mill into overdrive, badly hurting Mbeki’s standing at a critical
campaign moment.
The Chris Hani rumour reinforced public perceptions of Mbeki’s brutal style
of handling rivals, including the alleged abuse of power with regard to hiring

and firing in government. To drive this point home, Mbeki’s alacrity in sacking
Zuma and the former deputy minister of health, Nozizwe Madlala-Routlege,
and in suspending the head of the National Prosecuting Authority, Vusi
Pikoli, all in 2007, was juxtaposed with his unwillingness to lay off publicly
controversial officials such as the minister of health, Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang, and the since suspended commissioner of police, Jackie Selebi.
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