FIGHTING TERRORISM IN THE LIBERAL STATE doc

FIGHTING TERRORISM IN THE LIBERAL STATE
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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 9 ISSN: 1574-5597
Fighting Terrorism in the

Liberal State
An Integrated Model of Research, Intelligence and
International Law
Edited by
Samuel Peleg
Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center,
Netanya College, Israel
and
Wilhelm Kempf
Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Germany
Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC
Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division
Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal
State: An Integrated Model of Research, Intelligence and International Law
Konstanz, Germany
15–16 April 2005
© 2006 IOS Press.
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Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State v
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© 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
Introduction:
Terrorism and the Open Society –
A Question of Balance
Samuel PELEG
Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center at Netanya College,
Israel
In June 1974, I was staying with my Aunt and Uncle during my summer vacation. They
lived in northern Israel, in the sleepy little town of Naharya. At the age of 16, it was the
farthest away from home that I could go. On the fifth night of my visit, at around
2:00 a.m., we were violently awakened by a barrage of bullets and the deafening blasts
of hand grenades. We were all terribly frightened and felt totally helpless. The
onslaught lasted for about 30 minutes, and then suddenly everything fell ominously
silent. At dawn, we learned how fortunate we had been: The attack on the apartment
house was the work of a terrorist band that had crossed over the border from Lebanon
earlier that night. My relatives’ building had been randomly selected, simply because it
was located near the shore. The terrorists continued wounding and killing the residents
of the ground floor until Israeli Special Forces moved in, surrounded them and ended

their rampage. That was my first encounter with the phenomenon of terrorism – but not
my last.
On March 4, 1996, a beloved teaching assistant and former student, Taly Gordon,
was killed by a suicide bomber, along with 19 other innocent persons who happened to
be present in a central shopping mall in Tel Aviv. The terrorist was a Palestinian artist
from Gaza who belonged to Islamic Jihad. Four months earlier and three kilometers
away, I had attended a peace rally that ended with the assassination of Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin. Only an hour before the murder, my wife, our small daughter and I had
passed very close by the spot where the Jewish extremist who killed Rabin was
patiently waiting for his opportunity. I may even have seen him. He had not appeared
the least bit suspicious either to us or to the hundreds of security personnel who were
guarding the area. These examples illustrate my personal acquaintance with the nature
of terrorism: indiscriminate, ruthless and unexpected. Lurking in the shadows like a
ferocious beast, terrorism is aggressive and vicious. To its prey, it does not matter
whether the beast is hungry or has a right to kill. From the victim’s point of view, any
lethal assault is depraved, senseless and criminal.
Nevertheless, however clearly and unambiguously terrorism is captured in these
personal recollections, it is still a highly perplexing and confusing phenomenon.
Scholars and practitioners are constantly debating the nature of terrorist activities in
various parts of the world. The anti-terrorist effort is notoriously faltering and
indecisive, and global cooperation against terrorism is reprehensibly inadequate. These
shortcomings are especially conspicuous in liberal states, where insidious, ruthless and
indiscriminate terrorism exploits the liberty and vulnerability of the open society.
Terrorism appears to flourish and attract attention by striking at the soft underbelly of
vi
democracy. The accessibility of targets and the “silent collaboration” of the media,
which exploit the sensationalism of terrorist attacks for commercial advantages, play
into the hands of terrorists. This is the dilemma of terrorism in the liberal state: Should
democratic liberties be curtailed for the sake of greater security? Isn’t the restriction of
civil liberties a triumph for terrorism? If a “golden path” must be found, combating

terrorism without sacrificing human rights and freedoms, where does such a path lead?
Such questions inspired the April 2005 NATO Advanced Research Workshop,
which was held at the University of Konstanz in southern Germany. This volume
presents the outstanding contributions of participants at that gathering. It consists of
papers by 18 leading scholars and practitioners of the war against terrorism from four
continents and nine countries. They include philosophers, political scientists,
psychologists, criminologists, jurists, sociologists, historians, computer analysts,
intelligence analysts and law enforcement officers. This remarkably varied range of
participants yielded a fascinating meeting and a noteworthy, often provocative
collection of papers. The great diversity enriched our undertaking with a variety of
philosophies, perspectives, and understandings. It brought together a plurality of
cultures, norms and experiences to afford an exhilarating mixture of definitions and
approaches. The workshop benefited greatly from the open-mindedness and
forbearance reserved for those unique occasions where a diverse group of persons is
present. The complex and varied nature of the contributions is reflected in this
collection.
Terrorism and counter-terrorism are in many ways mirror images of each other,
and their names reflect that notion quite well. They are both violent activities that
attempt to influence political developments and situations: the former in the direction
of change, instability and disorder, the latter in the opposite direction of the status quo,
stability and order. They both vie for an attentive audience and for the legitimacy of the
“critical mass.” The challengers aspire to convince the population of the callousness
and brutality of their government, while the authorities in turn strive to portray their
opponents as ruthless criminals and malefactors. Both parties try to win the hearts and
minds of the people. This struggle is waged on all political fronts, whether aimed at the
members of a tribe, the citizens of a nation or world public opinion. It is relevant and
meaningful on every level. While counter-terrorism marches under the banner of law
and morality, terrorism defies the law and attempts to recast morality in its own terms.
While the former boasts of order and stability, the latter proclaims justice and equality.
The papers in this book illustrate this balanced dichotomy between terrorism and

counter-terrorism against the background of the liberal state. This is a unique
battlefield, where the tactical advantage is seemingly conceded to terrorists, who are
free to exploit the liberties of the open society, while the authorities are constrained by
those very rights and freedoms. They work under the constant scrutiny of the free
press, public opinion, the political opposition, human rights organizations and the
guardians of legal codes. But, as already pointed out, they have only an apparent
advantage, which is forfeited the more depraved and indiscriminate terrorism becomes.
Then terrorists begin to lose their popular support, and the authorities begin to win
citizens’ trust in their efforts to restore tranquility. Thus, it really boils down to a
question of balance: of how to establish the delicate equilibrium of combating terrorism
while preserving the liberties of the open society. This book begins with this question
and becomes increasingly complex as it tackles the different aspects and dimensions of
this dilemma.
vii
The layout of the chapters follows the logic of the terrorism – counter-terrorism
dichotomy. The first entries grapple with the notion of terrorism, its elusive and
problematic definition, its structural preconditions, motivations and incentives. The
next three chapters juxtapose terrorism with counter-terrorism and emphasize the
movement – countermovement dynamics between them. This is presented via three
case studies from three different corners of the globe. Then, counter-terrorism is
introduced through communications and media, international law and foreign policy
analyses. As in the terrorism section, both sympathetic and critical views are expressed,
conveying a sense of the wide gamut of approaches to this sensitive topic. Finally, the
practical and programmatic portion of the book is laid out. The three chapters of this
section illustrate analytical and adaptive models for countering terrorism while
minimizing the loss of the liberties of the democratic state. Thus, the book returns full
circle and offers an equilibrant to the predicament of terrorism in the liberal state.
My opening chapter challenges the widespread perception of terrorism as
irrational, indiscriminate and improvised. Instead, I show that terrorism is a deliberate
and premeditated activity that is sometimes intentionally made to seem pathological

and irrational. The suggestiveness of, “Don’t offer any resistance, we are ruthless
fanatics who won’t stop at anything,” might serve terrorists by intimidating the
authorities and deterring citizens from cooperating with the police, but it can also
benefit a State that resorts to harsh retaliatory measures against terrorists, “who don’t
listen to reason.” Nonetheless, to portray terrorism as irrational is misleading and
should be avoided. Unless terrorism is comprehended and countered rationally, it
cannot be defeated.
Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi delves into the anatomy of terrorism and
turns it on its head. He demonstrates logically and eruditely the vagueness and
ambiguity of the term ‘terrorism’ in contrast to the clarity and consistency it is
ordinarily perceived and understood to possess. His view is that, “terrorism as a term is
already a pre-judgment. It has a moral connotation. The problem is resolved
beforehand, even without the necessary effort to understand. It is a partial perception
which works against the objective analysis of socio-political phenomena.” Lack of
communication and reciprocal demonization between the West and the Arab world are
responsible for the current gulf between terrorists and the targets of terrorism, or in
Hanafi’s words, the victimizers and the victims. To bridge the chasm separating the
two cultures, a dialogue between equal partners must be promoted, because so far, “…
the stumbling block in the Euro-Arab dialogue is the discrepancy between the
European economic agenda and the Arab political agenda.”
In a similar fashion, Mokhtar Benabdallaoui does not consider terrorism in the
conventional sense. He relates it to the larger concept of violence and maintains that in
different contexts violence changes its meaning and its legal and moral status. But
despite its complex, protean nature, terrorism, the extreme form of violence, should be
condemned in all its forms, including, and above all, state terrorism, which is often
thought to complement and support the law. Nevertheless, concludes the author, the
eradication of global terrorism should not be pursued by pointing a finger at a specific
religion or culture, or by invoking cultural Darwinism. The best way to counter the
phenomenon is by constructing a more just and interdependent world society,
composed of autonomous and free governments and societies with the appropriate

means to promote new values.
viii
Dealing more with the perpetrators of terrorism than with the act itself, Anne
Speckhard calls attention to the unique and devastating phenomenon of suicide
terrorism. In a detailed and insightful study of suicide terrorism, one of the first of its
kind, the author describes the motivations and rewards that induce young persons to
become suicide bombers. The individual, psychological and social conditions that
underlie and support these tragic choices are objectively depicted in order not only to
better understand this most devastating form of terrorism, but more importantly, to find
ways of opposing it. Speckhard offers some valuable proposals following her in-depth
analysis and a series of rare interviews with prospective suicide-bombers. She argues,
among other things, that “religious leaders must begin to stand up to the manipulation
of Islam by Jihadist militants, and those who do speak out ought to be supported (if
quietly) by the West.” The prevention and gradual reduction of the threat posed by
suicide terrorism must address its root causes. She asserts further that, “Repressive
governments must be encouraged and pressured to reform, so as to open the way for
economic growth and increased opportunities for the frustrated, disillusioned and often
well-educated youth who constitute the most explosive sector of the societies from
which suicide terrorism comes.”
General Mansour Abu Rashid, a former Director of the Jordanian Military
Intelligence Department, discusses issues from the pure practitioner’s perspective.
After discussing several practical difficulties in the conceptualization of terrorism and
counter-terrorism, he turns to the pragmatic and programmatic questions of what can be
done about terrorism. In a succinct and realistic manner, Abu Rashid enumerates what
should be done on various levels – political, economic, ideological and informational.
He concludes that: “fighting the contemporary wave of terrorism requires a multi-
branched, multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response. Although the traditional
instruments – police and intelligence services – are the most critical, they are
inadequate to meet the extent and emerging challenge of terrorism.” Finally, the
General adds a counter-intuitive argument, which resonates well with his extensive

experience: “an effort to institutionalize the war on terror should avoid trying to
achieve greater intelligence-sharing. This oft-cited goal is best handled through
bilateral intelligence channels.”
Abu Rashid’s contribution structurally links terrorism and counter-terrorism and
also relates to three further papers which do this using illustrations from three
distinctive case studies: the Palestinian-Israeli, the Spanish-Basque and the Russian-
Chechnyan. In the first of the three, Eitan Alimi analyzes the revealing case of the
Tanzim (Arabic for organization). In the second Intifadah (2000–2004), or uprising of
the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation, this militant faction of the Palestinian
armed forces was at the forefront of violent assaults against the Israelis. Although
regarded by Israeli Intelligence as a terrorist group, some of its leaders were previously
committed supporters of the Oslo peace initiative. Alimi expands the theoretical
approach to comprehending terrorism by embedded his case study in the larger
framework of collective action and social movement theory. Such an approach, Alimi
believes, will shed more light on the radicalization of the formerly non-extremist
Tanzim and in addition supply counter-terrorism with fresh new insights to improve on
the ways it has been conducted so far. Radicalization in general, and the resort to
violence and terrorism in particular, can be better understood in the context of internal
organizational dynamics, or in the author’s terms, the milieu of the SMO (social
movement organization). “The study of counter-terrorism would benefit from viewing
ix
a terrorist organization as one actor in the overall ‘field of actors’ – a social movement,
and from furthering the analysis of the internal dynamics within the movement.”
Thereby, perceptiveness, discernment and pragmatism in understanding terrorism and
counter-terrorism would be best served.
Juan Aviles introduces the Spanish case, specifically the fight against the Basque
separatist terror group ETA. The author poses the question of how to characterize the
indiscriminate killing of civilians during armed conflict. This is a hybrid situation
between the killing of civilians in peacetime, which is clearly terrorism, and the killing
of army and police personnel during violent conflict, which is more like guerrilla

warfare. However, ETA terrorism falls in the middle, for it also attacks (though not
exclusively) civilian targets in the midst of an ongoing conflict with the Spanish
government. Additionally, in an age of protracted, low-intensity conflicts, does the
struggle constitute a war or an anomaly in a time of peace? How to characterize ETA
then: terrorist group? guerrilla movement? paramilitary unit, or perhaps a band of
committed freedom fighters? This is not simply an exercise in semantics, but rather a
serious question of how to defeat Basque extremists and with what means: legal,
political, military or diplomatic. Ultimately, Aviles concludes that recognizing ETA as
a political actor and permitting its political arm to participate in Basque elections was a
mistake. Another mistake was that the Spanish authorities resorted to undemocratic
measures in their campaign against ETA. This was counter-productive and hurt the
interests of the State. One of the biggest challenges, perhaps the most crucial, in
fighting terrorism in an open society is waging efficient counter-terrorism without
abandoning the principles of the democratic State.
A Russian and an Armenian scholar introduce the problem of terrorism in
Chechnya. Vorkunova and Hovhannesian argue that terrorism challenges order and
stability by “ultimately … creating the conditions for chaos and uncoordinated
activities. It is conceived to include systems of disorder at all levels of human
activity’.” They call attention to the expansion of the official Russian approach to
terrorism as the Chechnyan terrorist campaign began to take its toll on the Russian
people. From the rather limited and narrow Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code
to the Russian Federation Federal Law On the Fight Against Terrorism, adopted on
June 25, 1998, the scope of counter-terrorism has widened in direct proportion to the
growing menace of Chechnyan terrorism. The authors point to the amalgam of
traditional and modern motives in Chechnyan terrorism which render it extremely
brutal and ruthless. Bolstered by intense Islamic fervor, this terrorism represents a
formidable challenge to the newly founded democracy in Russia. However, as the
authors poignantly stress, counter-terrorism in that region is still very cumbersome and
handicapped by mutual suspicions and fears for economic, environmental and genetic
security, the breakdown of the traditional system of values and the traditional way of

life in the South Caucasus.
The last part of the book concentrates on counter-terrorism and its challenges
before the background of the open society. This section focuses on analytical models
for combating terrorism in democracies without sacrificing civil liberties. Dealing
again with the delicate issue of finding a balance between the necessity to oppose
terrorism and the need to preserve the spirit of liberty, this section brings to the fore the
legal perspective. Two experts on international law, one Israeli and the other German,
present two contrasting viewpoints on that controversial subject, whose differences are
quite apparent when juxtaposed. Barry Feinstein, in a carefully reasoned study of the
x
State’s right to defend itself against terrorism, positively evaluates and justifies
counter-terrorism as a form of preemptive strike. He draws heavily on international law
when he asserts that, “[b]eyond the responsibility of a State for all acts conducted
within its territory which violate the rights of another State, as well as for any resulting
violations of the other State’s sovereignty, it moreover must actively prevent such acts
and violations.” Of course, if there are other alternatives to the use of force against the
threat of terrorism, they must be chosen. But if there are none, “the State thereby
attacked is indeed permitted to exercise force to protect itself pursuant to its inherent
right of self-defense” according to Article 51 of the UN Charter. But then, an obviously
pragmatic, but also moral, question arises: when to launch a pre-emptive strike? What
are the justifiable grounds to initiate counter-terrorism, or should anti-terrorism efforts
be exclusively reactive? Must States threatened by terrorism wait for a clear and
present danger to arise, or for a threat of considerable consequence? Feinstein rejects
this latter alternative. He believes that counter-terrorism is applicable not only in
situations where a threat is imminent, “but also in those cases where the danger is more
remote, but nevertheless real,” if the intent of the terrorist to attack has been
demonstrated in the past.
Berthold Meyer is less willing to condone pre-emptive measures. He earnestly
questions whether increasing security is a suitable means to protect liberty. In an
illuminating survey of German Law and German security measures taken after 9/11,

Meyer concludes that German leaders neglected their most critical obligation: to defend
freedom and civil liberties. By shifting the balance between security and democracy in
favor of security, and by relying too heavily on “stockpiles of paragraphs on suspicion”
and presumed intentions to act, rather than on actual and demonstrated infringements of
security, the German Law on Terrorism, known as Security Packet II, fails to embody
the spirit of democracy. The criteria for when to apply the strict Law are the tests of
sufficient probability and life experience. Using such criteria is, in the author’s words,
“treading on shaky ground.” Meyer’s own recommendations are clear: there must be
stricter and more demanding standards for action, even, and especially, when emotions
and sentiments are strongly aroused. The usefulness of any countermeasure against
terrorism must be evaluated before its implementation, and new security legislation
should expire after two years unless extended. This is the only way, warns Meyer, “to
prevent civil rights from being permanently limited.”
Wilhelm Kempf and Lubna Nadvi also offer reservations and admonitions against
excessive counter-terrorist measures. Their perspectives differ from the previous
writers and reflect their respective research disciplines, psychology and political
science. Kempf examines and criticizes the overly ambitious and overly aggressive
trends of post-9
/11 counter-terrorism. He points out that, “outrage at war is
transformed into outrage at the enemy,” which does not serve democracies well. The
reprehensible attacks of September 11, 2001 could, he proposes, have been adequately
dealt with using strong legal, economic and diplomatic means, but instead the United
Stated chose a policy of extreme force. The author attributes this response to America’s
threatened pride in its world leadership. The vulnerability of the US triggered a “…
natural impulse that American self-confidence needed to be restored and strength
needed to be demonstrated by fighting back.” This was the wrong approach to counter-
terrorism not only because it is irrational, but also because it is counter-productive and
self-defeating. The US launched an all-out war against an elusive enemy and
committed its armed forces to a protracted campaign that has provoked animosity and
xi

resentment in many parts of the world. Enormous amounts of energy and resources
were invested by the American government in convincing its people of the legitimacy
of the war. Such efforts can easily deceive the public, cautions Kempf, who concludes
that, “Fighting terrorism exclusively by military means bears the danger that the values
of democracy will gradually be reduced to a mere facade.”
Nadvi also addresses the reaction to 9/11. She asks whether “… the war against
terrorism that had been unleashed by a range of governments on ‘militant insurgents’ is
actually curtailing terrorist activities, or whether their actions are simply serving to
inflame further violent militancy.” Nadvi insightfully points to the futility of the
vicious cycle of terrorism from below and terrorism from above, or insurgent terrorism
and State terrorism. The two forms of terror nourish and draw energy from each other.
The only way to escape the predicament of this “chaotic global security situation” is for
global civil society to step in and “create a space for constructive engagement where
the public can demand accountability from both governments and non-state militants
who are essentially responsible for the chaos that is being unleashed on civilian
populations.” This is a fresh and ambitious approach to the task of countering
terrorism. Since governments are incapable of fulfilling this mission, civic networks,
grass-root movements and NGOs must come together at global summits and coordinate
a plan of action to prevent, or at least to reduce the prospects of global terrorism.
The final three contributions offer practical approaches for combating terrorism in
the liberal State. Eitan Hadar, a computer scientist, Irit Hadar, a management
information systems analyst, and Alexander Bligh, a well-known political scientist with
a strong military intelligence background, propose instructive and thought-provoking
models to supply encompassing solutions for the shifting balance of security and
freedom. The Hadars’ contribution consists of two complementary papers: one presents
an archetypical model of an adaptive global intelligence system for detecting and
warning against developing terrorist activities, while the other supplements and
strengthens the model by adding “the human aspects that may impact the process of
building and using the system, the challenges and risks derived from them, and possible
solutions.” Both writers share a similar point of departure – the need to explore better

collaboration against international terrorism not only across cultures, political systems
and borders, but also across intelligence agencies. Eitan Hadar pinpoints the
weaknesses of past endeavors in this demanding area: “conventional collaboration
technologies do not provide enough flexibility to achieve these ambitious goals. These
systems must adapt to rapid changes within a dynamic environment. … [and] current
centralized systems are inadequate.” He then goes on to suggest a remedy in the form
of a peer-to-peer network using a decentralized grid of computers that collaborate with
one another on a geographically distributed computational platform. Each terminal, or
each ‘node’ of the grid supplies specific and unique information that is rapidly
combined into a concrete whole of relevant material on terrorism. This is a vision
which focuses on the “… network language and on the interface definition of the
systems boundaries and architecture.” If adopted and implemented, this model could
contribute enormously to the war against terrorism.
Irit Hadar offers a perspective to further improve the model. She calls attention to
the human aspects involved in designing and developing artificial intelligence systems
and complex computer grids. This is an opposite orientation to the previous entry:
instead of mechanizing human collaboration, Irit Hadar’s vantage point is to try to
humanize or personalize machines. This is crucial to the enhancement of the model,
xii
because a consideration of the cognitive processes of decision-makers, the associations
and fears of leaders and the stigmata, prejudices and social motivations of analysts
incorporated into the design of the hardware may enrich the system with human
subtleties and sensitivities. The intricate situations that counter-terrorism must face can
be dealt with in a significantly better way if human aspects are prudently integrated
into the mechanism.
Alexander Bligh combines analytical skills with an understanding of intelligence
services and their needs to devise a standardized model for anti-terror agencies to share
information and jointly act on their information. Bligh starts where the Hadars leave
off: he develops the Hadars’ rudimentary prototype and adds preemptive and punitive
dimensions. His elaborate model purports to “break down each terrorist incident into its

smallest elements, endeavoring through appropriate software to find associations and
commonalities among certain actions and their stages.” Thus, details are combined to
create an inclusive scenario of terrorism. This clearinghouse of information, in the
author’s words, will “enable law enforcement agencies, on a regular basis, to classify
the degree of risk and operate within the imperatives of all pertinent laws.” With such
precise means of identifying and combating terrorism, the excessive and
disproportionate face of counter-terrorism, which has deleterious effects on democracy
and liberty, could be avoided or at least minimized.
In the concluding paper, I attempt to shed some light on the new arena and the new
actors of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the post-9/11 world. The most crucial step
on the road to successful counter-terrorism is the precise identification of the
phenomenon of terrorism and its perpetrators. Terrorism has changed in the last two
decades since the war in Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution. It has grown in range,
intensity and cruelty. It has become more global, destructive and relentless. New actors
have assumed the roles of perpetrators. Instead of socialist, communist or Anarchist
revolutionaries, on the one hand, or fanatical nationalists and vehement de-colonizers,
on the other, the new terrorists are cut from a different cloth: they are messianic
fundamentalists, and their cause is redemption on their own terms. Counter-terrorism
must espouse new tools and new understandings in order to come to grips with such a
formidable enemy. My paper introduces revitalization movements, such as Al-Qaeda,
which “must discredit the prevailing system in the most fundamental manner. Its
leaders should discount and denounce every aspect of the current regime, focusing
chiefly on the issues pertaining to the group’s predicament.” This partly answers the
de-contextualized “why-do-they-hate-us” quandary in the wake of the terror attacks on
New York and Washington. This pathetically naïve question illustrates the unsettling
effects of terrorism. It challenges conventional wisdom and forces a reconsideration of
taken-for-granted ‘truths’. Ignorance frustrates pre-emptive capability, and awareness is
overwhelmed by surprise. If terrorism breeds and spreads through ignorance and
surprise, then awareness and preparedness must become key features of counter-
terrorism.

xiii
Contents
Introduction: Terrorism and the Open Society – A Question of Balance v
Samuel Peleg
Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 1
Samuel Peleg
The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom? 8
Hassan Hanafi
September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda 14
Wilhelm Kempf
Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for
Analyzing the Tanzim 20
Eitan Y. Alimi
Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA 40
Juan Aviles
Combating Terrorism Through International Law 48
Barry A. Feinstein
Violence and Terrorism: The Sense and Its Names 83
Mokhtar Benabdallaoui
Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws: A Tightrope Walk Between
Protecting Security and Losing Liberty 88
Berthold Meyer
Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents: Modular
Infrastructure for Adaptive Distributed Intelligent Systems 98
Eitan Hadar
The Impact of the Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative Information
Technology Systems 108
Irit Hadar
A Practitioner’s Thoughts About Terrorism 113
Mansour Abu Rashid

The Role of Business in the UK Policing Counter-Terrorist Effort 122
Jeff Fouhy
An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation 124
Alexander Bligh
Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 134
Olga A.Vorkunova and David Hovhannesian
xiv
The War Against State Terrorism: Reframing the Debate on Global
Terrorism 154
Lubna Nadvi
Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and
Their Senders 158
Anne Speckhard
The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game 176
Samuel Peleg
Subject Index 193
Author Index 197
Contemporary Modern Terrorism:
Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures
Samuel PELEG
Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center at Netanya College,
Israel
Abstract. This article sets the tone for the entire book. It introduces terrorism as a
political term: It is an act intended to influence politics. As such, it is a calculated
and premeditated initiative, which is carried out with purposive motivations.
Consequently, terrorism is not a spontaneous caprice or a whimsical impulse but a
rational deed, which has a goal, chosen means and a fit between them.
Counterterrorism, therefore, must severe this crucial link between goals and means
and render terrorism less attractive to its prospective perpetrators.
Keywords. Political terrorism; rationality; stress-seekers; messianism;

participation; deprivation; ideology
Introduction
“We must put an end to this madness,” vowed British Prime Minister Tony Blair after
the July 7, 2005 terror attack on London, which claimed the lives of 59 people and
injured many more. But this was no madness. This was a premeditated, cold-blooded
and vicious assault on one of the most vibrant symbols of the open society. London
was not attacked by mentally deranged outcasts that awful morning, but rather by a
team of rational and calculating human bombs with a mission: to disrupt the everyday
routines of a democracy. The British capital, like every other thriving, bustling city that
cherishes its freedoms, was a very propitious stage for the perpetrators’ atrocities.
Taking advantage of their freedom to move about at will carrying deadly explosives
without the risk of being stopped and searched, the terrorists found it easy to deliver
destruction into the very heart of the metropolis.
Blair’s statement was typical of the immediate responses to despicable and
indiscriminate terrorism. It is consoling to assume that rational persons do not commit
morally depraved crimes, since they weigh the costs and benefits of their actions and
are guided by some form of moral code. This perspective contrasts the reasonable and
sensible against the inexplicable and insane. The most comforting way to cope with
incomprehensible savagery is to quarantine the perpetrators in the category of the
criminally insane and stamp them with the all-encompassing label of “mad fanatics.”
Such a demarcation serves two purposes: it isolates and excludes the “bad guys” from
normal society, and it protects the “good guys,” people such as we. Such an
understanding actually undermines the struggle against terrorism, however, because it
abandons a thorough analysis of the background and motivation of terrorism for the
sake of a fleeting reassurance that “we are all right.” It trades the insecurity of
Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State
S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2006
© 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
1

regarding terrorism as logically patterned behavior for the reassuring preference for
viewing terrorism as pathological and deviant. Labeling terrorism as abnormal
exonerates society for maltreating its pariahs and excuses policymakers for their
failings. This is a colossal misunderstanding.
Characteristics of Political Terrorism
There are reasons why people commit terrorism. The reasons usually involve political,
ideological or social meanings and orientations. In their condemnation of terrorism,
many analysts and policymakers often overlook that the perpetrators always have an
ultimate objective and a designated target. The ultimate objective is to bring about
political change; the chosen target can be anyone seen as blocking this desired change,
or anyone perceived as responsible for an unacceptable status quo. The indiscriminate
character of modern terrorism, as opposed to, for example, the selective nature of 19th
century terrorism
1
, is explained using the distinction that has been developed between
two types of victims: the innocent, or immediate victim, and the ultimate victim. The
former can be a crowd of shoppers in a shopping mall, or the passengers on a bus,
whereas the latter are usually policymakers and power elites [2]. The growing
psychological effect of terrorism, improved technologies of violence and the distance
of political leaders from society have led to differences among victims: the more
spectacular the act of terrorism, the more rapid the governmental response. A
government is regarded as incompetent when it does nothing to ward off the threat of
terrorism or when, through its countermeasures, it aggravates the plight of those who
initiated a challenge to order and stability. Increasing mistrust of and delegitimization
of the system result, coupled with a harsh doctrine that provokes true believers to
draconian action. Such action is often translated into political terrorism [3].
The decision to opt for terrorism may be based on three grounds:
1. Terrorism may be indicative of extremist groups that can ideologically justify
violence and are disillusioned with all other channels of expression.
2. Terrorism is one of the most effective ways to disrupt the status quo or to

block the emergence of an alternative, unacceptable state of affairs. Terrorism
puts governments on the spot, since it challenges their capacity to govern.
Thus, it compensates perpetrators for their lack of military capability to
change their situation. Hence, terrorism makes a group’s power to act appear
much greater than it really is, as Gideon showed with his few warriors against
the Midianites.
3. By its nature, terrorism is more easily diffused across borders than any other
type of politically oriented violence. It requires secrecy, commitment, loyalty,
confidence, and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the cause. But these are
precisely the traits that often appeal to disheartened, humiliated self-
proclaimed world redeemers. Traditionally, becoming a terrorist has meant
joining a marginal group or organization of radical activists, identifying with
their goals and methods of operation, and accepting their norms, principles,
moral codes and rules of behavior. When this was the case, this transformation
1
For an excellent comparison of ancient, old and modern terrorism see Walter Laqueur’s The Age of
Terrorism [1].
S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures2
meant a total break with a terrorist’s previous way of life and the absorption of
his individual self into the collective identity of the group. Political extremists
who decide to act and become terrorists see themselves not as lone assassins,
but rather as representatives of a vigorous constituency. The attempt to
stigmatize them as loners, madmen, psychopaths or socio-paths distorts the
fact that many potential political terrorists flourish under the auspices of a
protecting identity group, be it ethnic, religious or national, and are buoyed up
by the camaraderie and esprit des corps of a group.
What is it that prompts young, idealistic individuals who are dissatisfied with the
socio-political situation surrounding them to try to change the status quo by joining a
radical and violent group? We can distinguish between the “push” of individual
psychological attributes and the “pull” of the organizational incentives and benefits that

terrorist groups promise their potential recruits. A combination of “pushes” and “pulls”
is responsible for the final matching of the terrorist organization and its recruits. The
internal psychological need to become a terrorist stems from discontent and
disenchantment with the existing state of affairs. A sense of revolt and defiance of
materialistic and accepted reality is accompanied by profound contempt for monetary
values, luxuries or the culture of consumption. The worldview of a potential terrorist is
dichotomous: it is comprised of a sense of the opposition between good and evil: the
unfair status of the ‘top-dogs’ who oppress the ‘underdogs’ without there being any
intermediate gray tones or circumstances to mitigate the sharp contrast [5]. Potential
terrorists are so convinced of their self-righteousness that they are totally insensitive to
the suffering and injustice they themselves wreak in their quest to create a perfect
society.
Many terrorists do not personally suffer from inequality and poverty. On the
contrary, they often come from middle-class families and tranquil social environments.
They first encounter social injustice when they grow up and leave home, begin their
university education and become aware of social and political instability in the world.
Others are not attracted as much by a concern for social justice as by the thrill of action,
the excitement and constant danger of being pursued day and night; psychologists call
these individuals stress-seekers [6]. A similar reason for joining a terrorist group is to
escape from boredom or the dull routines of everyday life. Others are intoxicated by the
mystique and the aura of heroism and romanticism surrounding terrorism. They enjoy
the sense of power and the advantage of being unexpected, unpredictable, and always
initiating. The young terrorist or “freedom fighter” expects to enjoy eternal glory in
exchange for joining the good fight; he hopes to achieve martyrdom or sainthood if he
dies carrying out a dangerous mission.
The organization provides an alternative framework or family for disenchanted
youth. Being part of a group offers a sense of belonging and an opportunity for
camaraderie, friendship and participation in a common fate. Such reassuring
experiences diminish the recruit’s insecurities vis-à-vis a hostile environment and
bolster his belief in the righteousness of his chosen path. Social status is also

guaranteed by joining a terrorist group, especially if the organization is popularly
perceived as expressing the anguish of a large, persecuted group, as in the cases of the
Irish Republican Army or the various factions of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization. In these cases, the terrorist has no need to break with his own social
background, since that very milieu may have led to his recruitment by a terrorist group
in the first place. The young terrorist or “freedom fighter” has the prospect of achieving
S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 3
eternal glory by joining the struggle; he can hope for martyrdom or sainthood if he
perishes in the course of performing his destructive duty.
Another distinction relevant to what makes terrorists tick is between rational and
irrational motives for joining terrorist groups. The rational terrorist is the goal-oriented,
calculating activist who makes a careful cost-benefit calculation of the risks and
incentives before choosing a course of action. The rational terrorist needs material or
other tangible incentives in order to become an active member of the militant group:
large salaries, respected status and a luxurious life-style. Terrorists in this category act
more like mercenaries or professional assassins than deeply committed idealists.
Money and security can raise the appeal of terrorism: if the risk of being caught is
offset by financial compensation or reduced by diplomatic immunity or safe passage
through certain territories, then the advantages of the terrorist act overshadow the
potential risks. Though tangible incentives are the easiest to comprehend, intangible
rewards such as eternal bliss in paradise and enhanced social status for one’s family
are, in the social and religious environments where they are ardently believed in, no
less “rational.” The terrorist, in this case, sacrifices a transitory this-worldly life for an
immensely better eternal one.
On the one hand, rational participation in terrorism is inspired by purposive
incentives such as consecrating the deed and glorifying the end, which justify the
terrorist act as a necessary means, regardless of its seemingly depraved nature. The
greater the dedication, and the greater the sense of potential fulfillment, the more likely
it is that a recruit will rationally choose to participate in terrorist groups. On the other
hand, irrational terrorism is often the act of emotional, spontaneously radical

individuals. Such activists neither possess a burning commitment to a cause or an
ideology, nor are they usually motivated by material incentives. They act instead in
response to sudden, unexpected mood swings and outbursts of hatred and the desire for
vengeance. Sometimes the yearning for esteem and acceptance by peers drives them to
commit the most depraved atrocities. These two motivations of terrorism co-exist in
many identity groups, thus both escalating their struggle and making it more effective.
The leadership can be perceived as rational because it devises goals, weighs options
and makes choices. The rank-and-file may be seen as emotional, driven by religious,
ethnic or patriotic zeal, and bound together by the fellowship of the group. The leaders
and adherents complement each other: the former derive their authority to make
rational decisions from the devotion of their followers, while the latter gain deference
and meaning through the ideology and tasks delegated to them by their leaders.
Terrorists are well aware that they are crossing a point of no return in the strategy
of the struggle and that incremental tactics of escalation are virtually impossible to
adopt once the ultimate weapon has been employed. But they seem to relish the
shocking impact of their deeds and utilize the immediate, short-term success of their
audacity to strengthen their faltering spirits. Thus, many terrorist factions are
characterized by unbounded ruthlessness and the small size of the group. Belonging to
a factional, close-knit group supports the secrecy and efficiency that foster terrorism.
To choose terrorism as a course of action, a recruit has to hold passionate convictions
of the right sort, and must develop a profound disdain for any potential hindrance. He
also has to believe that a better future is possible, even imminent, and that human effort
S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures4
may expedite motion toward this future. A passionate certitude of a cataclysmic
redemption that justifies any means is archetypal of messianic thought patterns
2
.
Composite Profile of Political Terrorism
From the aforementioned, a quintessential description of political terrorism may be
drawn. Its major characteristics include:

1. Political Terrorism Is Intentional and Rational. It is rational not in a logical-
moralistic sense, but rather in a functional-strategic sense, meaning that it
chooses goals and selects means which are conceived as appropriate to those
goals. Political terrorism is not an incomprehensible undertaking, but rather the
coherent and organized work of resolute perpetrators.
2. Political Terrorism Is Primarily a Political Act. In addition to being criminal
and illegal, it is also an attempt to exert political influence on behalf of people
who, in the terrorists’ view, have been neglected and abused. Terrorists as
political actors who challenge the status quo [7], and who use their weapons as
negotiation tactics [8], are often underemphasized in analyses.
3. Political Terrorism Is Mostly About Change. Terrorism is instigated in
response to dissatisfaction with or fear of an existing or impending social and
political reality. Thus, the professed objective of extremists is to undermine
routine daily life and to disrupt expected agendas. Political terrorists are
frequently visionaries who aspire to swift and decisive changes in the human
condition (preferably in their group’s own condition). They abhor moderate
change and incremental reform and inexorably sanctify their means with the
justness of their cause. There have been, throughout history, political terrorists
who acted in the name of preserving the status quo, but these were rare and far
less significant, because the State and its agents of social control were more
effective in achieving their ends [9, 10]
3
.
4. Political Terrorism Is a Form of Political Participation. Engaging in the
exertion of power and influence and attempting to change the political agenda
are evidence of a set of independent political preferences and a desire to
2
Messianism is not innately and necessarily a religious phenomenon. By definition, the major attribute of
the concept is comprehensive apocalyptic and traumatic change for large populations. In order to be a true
believer and survive the apocalypse, one must follow the directives and edicts of “those in the know.” While

it is true that by its nature religion is more akin to notions such as boundless faith, miraculous circumstances,
vast changes, and infallible, divine leadership, secular ideologies like Marxism, Maoism, or Nazism are also
messianic in nature. They boast a monopoly of the truth, they demand unquestioning loyalty, and they
promise a swift and limitless change for the better for those who support them. It is, thus, no wonder that
such very different persons as Vladimir Lenin – the fierce Russian revolutionary – and Sayyid Qutb – the
precursor of revived Islamic fundamentalism – saw themselves as “vanguards of the revolution.”
3
Terrorist groups that organize to stave off change and protect the status quo are sometimes affiliated
with governments, but not necessarily. The Vendée uprising of peasants in Western France against the
revolutionary government in Paris was a local initiative aimed at restoring the Monarchy and overthrowing
the radical regime, but the members organized because of their own economic and religious interests [7].
Similarly, Gush Emunim, the extremist religious group of Jewish settlers on the West Bank, organized in
order to thwart the prospects of the Middle East peace process. Although they reaffirmed the policy
tendencies of the right-wing Shamir government at the time, they did not act in the name of that government
[3]. Hence, terrorism in the name of the status quo ought to be distinguished from state terrorism, or
“terrorism from above,” in which the government officially and directly employs the means of terrorism to
pursue its policies [11].
S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 5
realize them and to benefit others with their advantages. In other words, it
means the terrorist wants to participate in decision-making processes and
wants to influence their outcomes. Terrorism is therefore a channel to direct
participation in politics. It is a criminal and destructive channel, and yet
nevertheless an effective means.
5. Political Terrorism Is the Weapon of the Weak. This dictum stems from the
ironic truth that the success of the political terrorist ultimately depends on the
good will of his victims. The terrorist’s accomplishments are not measured by
the number of buses blown up or by the number of airplanes hijacked. They
are judged by the political change they are intended to expedite. This change
hinges upon governmental compliance with the terrorist’s wishes. When
change can be brought about “from below,” regardless of, or despite a

government’s response, terrorists become revolutionaries.
6. Political Terrorism Challenges the Existing Order and Confronts the
Government. To be against the status quo means to be against the existing
order. At the two extremes of the political philosophy spectrum stand order
and justice [12]. Order calls for maintaining and preserving an acceptable
today; justice dictates a progression toward a better tomorrow. This dichotomy
pits not only order and justice against each other in opposing and
uncompromising positions, but also pits challengers (i.e., terrorists) against the
guardians of the status quo (i.e., governments). There is an inherent
incompatibility between political terrorists and governments.
7. Political Terrorism Is a Collective Undertaking. Terrorism draws strength
from a group ethos. It is a spirit of “all for one and one for all” which favors
qualities such as self-sacrifice, total commitment and unconditional loyalty
among extremists. The members of the terrorist movement, group, or cell
4
encourage and inspire one another. They become a surrogate family for
individuals who have joined them and perhaps thereby severed all ties to their
former way of life. This is particularly true of Islamist terror groups, which
clearly designate themselves as an alternative “community,” “nation” or
“family” and demand that their followers repudiate any ties to “non-
believers.” Although lone perpetrators often carry out many terrorist attacks,
these actors usually act for, and are embraced by, a group.
8. Political Terrorism Is Sustained by Community Deprivation. Through group
spirit and resolve, activists draw strength from their sense of belonging to a
community. Whether it is a religious, national, ethnic or class spirit, the
solidarity and cohesion that typify many terrorist groups emerge from the
feeling that their identity and destiny are inextricably linked with their core
community.
4
Terrorist movements, groups or cells do not merely differ in size. There are also ideological

considerations here: revolutionaries have always attempted to recruit the masses for their cause in order to tilt
the balance of power in the state. Thus, they have always written and spoken about ‘movements’, even when
their followers were few; for incitement purposes, they had to claim to be leading a movement. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the tactics used to bring about socio-political change were modified due to the repeated failures of
attempted revolutions. The ideal of the urban guerrilla became popular, and with it, the tactic of “the strike in
the middle,” which was advocated by Guevara and Debrais. Urban guerrilla efforts necessitated smaller
operating units, hence terrorist groups. Finally, the term terrorist “cell” is an expression that originated in the
anarchist terrorist tradition. The anarchist disdain for structure and hierarchy led anarchist theorists and
adherents to activism in small and minimally structured units, hence, in terrorist cells [13, 9, 14].
S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures6
9. Political Terrorism Is Guided by Ideology. Terrorists experience a profound
sense of conviction and belief. They adhere to strict precepts that are anchored
in a consistent worldview and a fervent ideology. Ideology, with its clear
explanation for the ills of the present and its utopian solutions for the future,
supplies the energy that galvanizes terrorists to adopt frightening methods.
10. Political Terrorism Espouses a Messianic Aura. Following Rapoport’s ideas,
it seems that political terrorists are on a mission to make the world a better
place. Some may even perceive them as modern day crusaders who are willing
to sacrifice their own welfare for the benefit of others. Their image as moved
by values and steadfast commitments wins them sympathy and support, and
sometimes provisions and material sustenance. Terrorists set out to proselytize
the public and convince it of the justice of their cause [15]. Due to the
spectacular nature of their deeds, they enjoy a permanent captive audience
[16].
Ultimately, political terrorism is more complex than it was formerly given credit
for being. The above discussed characteristics point to a composite profile that should
be studied carefully if this phenomenon is to be countered effectively. These
characteristics of political terrorism can be realized in different ways, and their
consequences can be diversely appreciated. They must be heeded if terrorism is to be
defeated in the 21st century. The specific type of terrorism which currently occupies

the global agenda is the radical Islamist brand. It is a vicious and relentless kind of
terrorism, for it combines all the above-discussed characteristics with an unyielding
and uncompromising ideology. This ideology must be carefully analyzed and
understood if the battle against modern terrorism is to be won.
References
[1] Laqueur, W. (1987). The age of terrorism. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987.
[2] Wilkinson, P. (1986). Terrorism and the liberal state (2nd edition). New York: New York University
Press.
[3] Peleg, S. (1997). They shoot Prime Ministers too, don’t they? Religious violence in Israel: Premises,
dynamics and prospects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20, 227-247.
[4] Peleg, S. (2002). Zealotry and vengeance: Quest of a religious identity group. Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books.
[5] Galtung, J. (1971). A structural theory of imperialism. Journal of Peace Research, 8(2), 81-117.
[6] Crenshaw, M. (1986). The psychology of political terrorism. In: Hermann, M. (ed.). Political
psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
[7] Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
[8] Thornton, T. (1964). Terror as a weapon of political agitation. In: Eckstein, H. (ed.). Internal war. New
York: Free Press.
[9] Oberschall, A. (1973). Social conflict and social movement. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
[10] Rule, J. (1988). Theories of civil violence. Berkeley: University of California Press.
[11] Arendt, H. (1968). On violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
[12] Bull, H. (1995) The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (2nd edition). New York:
Columbia University Press.
[13] Brinton, C. (1965). The anatomy of revolution. New York: Vintage Books.
[14] Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movement (2nd edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.
[15] Hoffer, E. (1951). The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of mass movements. New York: Harper
and Row.
[16] Heymann, P. (1998). Terrorism and America: A commonsense strategy for a democratic society.
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 7

The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of
Whom?
Hassan HANAFI
Department of Philosophy at Cairo University, Egypt
Abstract. To condemn or to understand? / Victimizers and victims / Terrorism or
resistance? / Terrorism of the mutual image / Dialogue between equal partners.
Keywords. Authoritarian state, state terrorism, fundamentalism, globalization,
dialogue of cultures, regional co-operation
To Condemn or To Understand?
1. It is easy to condemn, but difficult to understand. Condemning without
understanding results from blindness, presuppositions and the power of
arrogance. It may backfire into an infinite spiral of violence which works
against dialogue and conflict resolution.
2. To understand is not to justify. Understanding is the first step toward changing
the roots of terrorism. To understand comes first, to change, second. Changing
the roots of violence is a part of conflict resolution which works by
eliminating the sources of conflict.
3. Using the term terrorism is already a pre-judgment. It has a moral connotation.
The problem is resolved beforehand, even without the necessary effort to
understand. It is a partial perception which works against the objective
analysis of socio-political phenomena. A more impartial word is violence,
including counter-violence, primary and secondary violence, oppressive and
liberating violence, visible and invisible violence, state and individual
violence…, etc., common distinctions in Latin American socio-political
literature.
4. Global war against terrorism is a kind of counter-terrorism. Punishment is
never a solution to crime. That is why capital punishment, namely the death
penalty, doubles the crime of homicide, because not only the victim, but also
the victimizer, is killed. Instead of a single crime sacrificing one human soul,
there are two crimes, sacrificing two human souls.

5. Global war against terrorism and global war against hegemony may be of the
same order of magnitude. The question is: what is the cause and what is the
effect? A linear notion of causality belongs to religious thinking, pre-
supposing a primary cause, while a circular notion of causality is more
scientific.
Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State
S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2006
© 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
8
6. Terrorism, or more precisely violence, cannot be theoretically understood
without being existentially lived. It is not a matter of a theoretical analysis, but
rather of an existential drama. It is a matter of life and death for the terrorized.
7. Science is not the gathering of intelligence. This is the function of intelligence
agencies, usually linked to state power. Science is motivated by the search for
“Truth,” namely the laws of reality. Espionage and superstitious techniques
are not part of the methodology of science. The assault on privacy is a crime
and a violation of human rights. It is usually linked to break-ins, surveillance
and residence confinement.
8. Terrorism is not only a problem of security, but also a problem of justice.
When forms of injustice prevail, terrorism emerges in an effort to create a
more just world, even by using evil means.
9. Scholars do not work for institutions such as ministries of defense, or even for
alliances such as NATO. Scholars are motivated by an interest in knowledge.
They can make the military and security force more aware of the limitations of
their approaches. Surely knowledge minimizes risks by revealing more
horizons of conflicts and reasons for tension. Science may also create weapons
of mass destruction and lead to the use of atomic weapons in wars against
people in the name of the war against terrorism.
10. The Liberal State is not the only form of state. Terrorism is practiced by both

liberal states and authoritarian states. Authoritarianism causes more terrorism
than liberalism. In authoritarian regimes dialogue yields to violence.
Divergences of views lead to power struggles and civil wars. If the Liberal
State is identified with the model of the European State, then fighting
terrorism means defending Europe against its enemies. National experiences
are not just those of Spain and America. Both of these countries, as victims of
terror, are Western states, while the victimizers in both cases were Muslim.
Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kashmir are also victims, and the
West, the USA and Russia are their victimizers. Israel and India, although
located in Asia, like Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan …, etc., act in the
manner of Western cultures. The West is not a geographical site, but rather a
worldview, namely that of hegemony.
Victimizers and Victims
1. It has become very common to look at terrorism from the perspective of the
victim, not from that of the victimizer, as if terrorism were a one-way street,
not a two-way street, blaming the victims, not the victimizers, hearing the cry
of pain, but not seeing the needle, pointing the finger at the weak, not at the
strong. This creates, in small nations or in individuals, a great sense of
frustration against the ‘cocalization’, namely the Americanization or the
Westernization of the World.
2. The New World order may be the victimizer of small nations, leading
dissident groups or individuals to use violence against the symbols of power in
modern times, such as the WTO, the GATT, the Pope, and even making
threats against the UN system, which is often misused by the Great Powers.
Globalization as a new form of hegemony is the crux of this new world that
H. Hanafi / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom? 9
arose in the fifties and the sixties: decolonization, liberation movements,
national struggles, the Third World emerging in the bi-polar World.
3. Big Powers, especially the Western ones, are also part of the New World
Order: The Group of Eight, most industrial countries, the European Union,

allied to the USA, and sometimes France, are returning to their colonial
history, as in the case of Darfour in Sudan, championing the UN resolution to
try war criminals, with the exception of those of the USA, before the
International Court of Justice. Russia invades Chechnya to fight the
Chechnyan national movement for independence, which is called separatism.
Israel occupies all of Palestine, half in 1948, the other half in 1967. India,
playing the Big Power in Asia, occupies Kashmir and rejects the
implementation of a UN resolution concerning the right to self-determination
of the Kashmiri people.
4. The sole Big Power in the uni-polar system is a source of state terrorism, the
invasion of Afghanistan under the pretext of fighting terrorism, of Iraq under
the pretext of seeking weapons of mass destruction. Now it is threatening Iran
under the same pretext, Syria under the pretext of its sheltering terrorist
groups, and Sudan to save the people of Darfour from genocide. The Big
Power sometimes manipulates the UN System and sometimes violates it.
5. State Terrorism is also practiced internally by the "New Nation State." It was
at the beginning the outcome of the national liberation movement. It became at
the end a source of oppression. It became an Army and Police State,
controlling education, information, political institutions and civil society.
Terrorism or Resistance?
1. It is glorious on the epistemological level to define terrorism. Given the
specificities of different national experiences, it is hard to standardize a
definition which does not take into consideration all the different kinds of
terrorism.
2. There is no one stereotyped definition of terrorism. It depends on the
perspective, the commitment of the scholar and his attitude to life. There is no
one simple, unilateral and sole definition of terrorism, because it is a complex
phenomenon. Terrorism cannot be defined as a fixed essence, but is rather a
changing relationship. It refers to two sides, that of the terrorist and that of the
terrorized. The operational definition is based on major distinctions.

3. Terrorism is an expression of a strong sense of frustration and feelings of
injustice. If the two sides of the equation, that of the terrorist and that of the
terrorized, are not equal in power, to create a fair struggle the weak side will
use any means it possesses to compensate for its weakness. Power is not only
physical, but also moral. It is not only destruction, but also persuasion, or
more precisely, dissuasion. Nuclear weapons are created as a force of
dissuasion to deter the other side from using them.
4. In the case of equal power, the struggle between two opposed sides is called
battle, conflict, hostilities, or even war. Where there is a power imbalance, the
weak side empowers itself by any means it has, including martyrdom, so-
called suicide-bombing, or terrorism, to resist the stronger side.
H. Hanafi / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom?10
5. A sense of frustration arises in the face of double-standard judgments. The
Palestinian is a terrorist, not the militarized settler. The PLO is a terrorist
organization, not the Likud party or the state of Israel. Hamas and Jihad are
terrorist movements, while the state of Israel is a terrorist state. Iraqi resistance
against American occupation is terrorism, while the American invasion of Iraq
is not.
6. Therefore, individual terrorism is a myth used to justify state terrorism as a
reality. Both pretend to be self-defensive mechanisms against the
transgression of the other side and a legitimate self-defense against the
aggression of the other.
Terrorism of the Mutual Image
1. Visible terrorism is a concrete expression of the invisible form, which is more
serious and does not need security forces. This is the terrorism of the mutual
image which each side, the terrorist and the terrorized, the victimizer and the
victim, creates of the other. Each partner is known as such, but constructed as
an image which includes one real thread and many invented ones. An image is
a construct made up of perceptions, motivations, interests, power struggles,
historical accumulations, misunderstandings, misconceptions and

misapprehensions. Over time, images became realities and are completely
substituted for them. Bloodshed on both sides is the outcome. The power of
information contributes to this transformation.
2. The Muslim World has been identified as the terrorist per excellence. The
mass media even identify terrorism, a socio-political phenomenon, with Islam
itself, as an essence and a culture. All of its history in centers such as
Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Qayrawan, Fès and in the magnificent Andalusia,
Grenada, Cordoba and Seville has been reduced to 11 September in
Washington and New York and the Madrid train bombings.
3. Terrorism is a sign of underdevelopment, because it solves conflicts by means
of violence, not by negotiation. Terrorism against the other is also directed
against the Self in “suicide bombings.” Muslim societies become number one
in the number of political prisoners, torture, violations of human rights,
political dictatorship, discrepancies between poverty and wealth. The statuses
of women, minorities and NGOs are very deplorable. The question is how an
argument de facto becomes an argument de jure. If it does, then racism,
arrogance, Nazism, fascism, war and persecution will be arguments de facto
against the “love thy neighbor” of Jesus, an argument de jure.
4. Given the centrality of Europe in modern times over the past five centuries,
Eurocentrism has given the European consciousness a certain arrogance,
intertwined with skin color and race. The ideals of the Enlightenment have
made Europe a model per excellence of modernism. The West creates, and the
Rest transfers. This center and periphery dichotomy created in the West a
superiority complex, and in the Rest an inferiority complex. Superiority is
intertwined with supremacy and hegemony, while inferiority is linked to the
Semitic mind, to a primitive “mentality” and a “pensée sauvage.” The
H. Hanafi / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom? 11