Osprey essential histories 040 the anglo afghan wars 1839 1919

GREGORY

FREMONT-BARNES

holds a doctorate in
History from Oxford

Modern
University

a n d s e r v e s as a S e n i o r L e c t u r e r i n
W a r Studies at t h e R o y a l M i l i t a r y
A c a d e m y Sandhurst, d i v i d i n g his
w o r k b e t w e e n t e a c h i n g cadets o n
site a n d c o m m i s s i o n e d

officers

of the British A r m y posted to
garrisons t h r o u g h o u t t h e

UK

a n d a b r o a d . H i s w r i t i n g focuses
principally o n the military

and

naval history of the 1 8 t h a n d
1 9 t h centuries.

PROFESSOR ROBERT

O'NEILL,

A O D.Phil. ( O x o n ) , H o n D. Litt.
( A N U ) , F A S S A , is t h e S e r i e s E d i t o r
of t h e Essential Histories.
His w e a l t h of knowledge

and

e x p e r t i s e s h a p e s t h e series
content and provides up-to-them i n u t e research a n d theory.

Born

in 1936 an Australian citizen,
h e served i n t h e Australian A r m y ,
a n d has h e l d a n u m b e r of e m i n e n t p o s i t i o n s i n h i s t o r y circles,
including

C h i c h e l e Professor of

t h e H i s t o r y of W a r at A l l Souls
College, Oxford, a n d

Chairman

of the Board of the Imperial W a r

M u s e u m a n d the C o u n c i l of the
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute for
Strategic Studies, L o n d o n .
H e is t h e a u t h o r o f m a n y b o o k s
including works o n the

German

A r m y a n d t h e N a z i Party, a n d t h e
Korean a n d V i e t n a m wars.

Now

based i n Australia o n his
r e t i r e m e n t f r o m O x f o r d h e is t h e
Director of t h e L o w y Institute for
International Policy a n d

Planning

Director of t h e US Studies C e n t r e
at t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Sydney.


Essential Histories

T h e Anglo-Afghan W a r s
1839-1919

Essential Histories

The Anglo-Afghan Wars
1839-1919
Gregory Fremont-Barnes


Readers s h o u l d n o t e t h a t consistent t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n f r o m
Pashtun, D a r i and o t h e r A f g h a n languages into English is

Glossary

p r o b l e m a t i c , particularly w i t h respect t o place names and
family names, m a n y o f w h i c h b o r e different renderings in t h e

Abattis

D e f e n c e w o r k consisting o f a t r e e w i t h

19th c e n t u r y t h a n t h e y d o today, thus: K a n d a h a r / Q a n d a h a r ;

s h a r p e n e d branches, felled so t h a t its branches

Kabul/Cabool/Cabul/Cabaul/Qabul;Jellalabad/Jalalabad;

point outwards

Jugdulluk/Jagdalak; K h o o r d C a b u l Pass/Khurd-Kabul Pass;
Ali Musjid/Ali Masjid; Gilzai/Gilzye, e t c . T h e a u t h o r has t h e r e f o r e

Doolie

C o v e r e d s t r e t c h e r litter o r palanquin f o r t h e
evacuation o f t h e w o u n d e d

adopted t h e most c o m m o n l y accepted f o r m o r that which
m o s t closely reflects local p r o n u n c i a t i o n .

Feringee

A disparaging t e r m f o r a European

O n an historical n o t e , readers s h o u l d be a w a r e t h a t until 1858

Ghazi

Fighter f o r t h e Faith w h o has killed an infidel

Havildar

Indian infantry sergeant

Infidel

Unbeliever

Indian affairs w e r e m a n a g e d j o i n t l y b e t w e e n C r o w n officials
and t h o s e o f t h e East India C o m p a n y (EIC). In L o n d o n , t h e
apparatus o f t h e f o r m e r consisted o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f State

f o r W a r and t h e C o l o n i e s , w h o issued instructions t o t h e
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l in C a l c u t t a and t h e Board o f C o n t r o l , w h o s e

Jezail

L o n g - b a r r e l l e d m a t c h l o c k musket carried
by t r i b e s m e n

president, as a cabinet m i n i s t e r was a c c o u n t a b l e t o Parliament.
In C a l c u t t a w a s t h e EIC, originally a c h a r t e r e d c o m p a n y w i t h

Jihad

Holy war

Jirga

A s s e m b l y o f tribal elders o r representatives

Kotal

M o u n t a i n pass

purely c o m m e r c i a l c o n c e r n s , b u t w h i c h by t h e 18th c e n t u r y
exercised w i d e political and military c o n t r o l o v e r m u c h o f t h e
s u b c o n t i n e n t o n behalf o f t h e C r o w n . T h e EIC m a i n t a i n e d
its o w n armies, w h i c h s e r v e d in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h o s e
o f t h e C r o w n , all c o m m a n d e d by a c a b i n e t - a p p o i n t e d
c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f a n s w e r a b l e t o t h e W a r O f f i c e in L o n d o n .
In I 858, t h e EIC was disbanded, t h e C r o w n assuming all

a u t h o r i t y o v e r India via t h e S e c r e t a r y o f State f o r India, w h o

Lakh

100,000 rupees, t h e equivalent o f £ 10,000 t o d a y

Mullah

Religious teacher, leader o r holy m a n

Nullah

Small valley o r ravine

Poshteen

Sheepskin jacket w i t h a fleece lining

Sangar

Stone b r e a s t w o r k

Sepoy

Indian i n f a n t r y m a n

sat in t h e cabinet, a civilian viceroy, and a c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f
o f t h e n e w l y established, British-led Indian A r m y .

Sirdar

Commander

Sowar

Indian cavalry t r o o p e r

Wazir

C h i e f minister o r advisor

First published in G r e a t Britain in 2 0 0 9 by O s p r e y Publishing,
M i d l a n d H o u s e , W e s t W a y , Botley, O x f o r d O X 2 0 P H , U K
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1


Contents
Introduction

7

Chronology

10

PART l:THE FIRST A N G L O - A F G H A N W A R , 1839-42

Origins and background o f the war

14

W a r r i n g sides

I8

The fighting

20

H o w the w a r ended

33

Portrait of a civilian: Florentia, Lady Sale (1787-1 853)

37

The w o r l d around war: the playground of the Great Game

43

PART ll:THE S E C O N D A N G L O - A F G H A N W A R , 1878-81
Origins and background of the w a r

50

W a r r i n g sides

54

The fighting

56

H o w the w a r ended

72

Portrait of a soldier: A r t h u r Male, A r m y chaplain, I 3th Hussars

74

PART IILTHETHIRD A N G L O - A F G H A N W A R , 1919
Origins and background of the w a r

80

W a r r i n g sides

82

The fighting

83

H o w the w a r ended

85

Conclusion and consequences

86

Bibliography and further reading

92

Index

94



Introduction

O n 13 J a n u a r y 1 8 4 2 , a British officer,

Afghanistan would become a byword

p e r c h e d o n t h e r o o f t o p of t h e fortress at

savage a n d c u n n i n g e n e m i e s ,

Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan,

climate, bitter winters, scorching

summers

and rugged and beautiful terrain,

including

a lone horseman, h u n c h e d over
exhausted, ponderously

spotted
and

approaching.

T h e rider was D r W i l l i a m B r y d o n ,

deep ravines a n d precipitous

an

for

inhospitable

mountains,

all ideal for m o u n t i n g defence a n d a m b u s h .

a r m y s u r g e o n a n d t h e sole s u r v i v o r o f a n

Afghanistan appeared a seemingly

A n g l o - I n d i a n a r m y of 1 6 , 0 0 0 soldiers

unconquerable place w h e r e

and

heroism,

c a m p followers t h a t h a d left K a b u l o n l y a

c o w a r d i c e a n d sacrifice a b o u n d e d ,

and

week before - n o w utterly annihilated

where death awaited those foolish

enough

by

exhaustion, frostbite a n d almost

continuous

t o v e n t u r e across t h e f r o n t i e r w i t h o u t

attack by A f g h a n tribesmen. T h e

total

m o s t careful a t t e n t i o n paid to strategy

destruction of the A r m y of the

Indus

exemplified the nature of fighting
this forbidding a n d hostile
populated by fiercely

in

environment,

independent,

ferocious w a r - m i n d e d peoples,
perhaps the most formidable

indeed

proper supply, organization a n d

T h e country's i n f a m o u s reputation for
causing suffering o n c a m p a i g n

I n d i a n a n d G u r k h a soldier of this p e r i o d ,

inspired

Rudyard Kipling to produce o n e of the
m o s t p o p u l a r p o e m s of t h e age:

T h e British camp at Pezwan, September I 880.
(Author's collection)

and

transport.

guerrilla

fighters i n t h e w o r l d . To t h e British,

the


8

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

t o t h e p r o b l e m at t h e h e a r t o f t h e first t w o

W h e n y o u ' r e w o u n d e d a n d left o n

c o n f l i c t s , at least, c o u l d n e v e r lie i n m i l i t a r y

Afghanistan's plains,

intervention alone.

A n ' the w o m e n come out to cut u p

Britain's fear of Russian e x p a n s i o n i n t o

what remains,
Jest r o l l t o y o u r r i f l e a n ' b l o w

A f g h a n i s t a n f o r m e d t h e b a c k d r o p o f its f i r s t

out

t w o conflicts; i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , f o u g h t

your brains,

between 1839 and 1842, the

A n ' go t o y o u r G a w d like a soldier.

Governor-

G e n e r a l of I n d i a insisted u p o n a n invasion
Yet if A f g h a n i s t a n was to p r o v e t h e graveyard

e v e n after t h e ostensible reason for hostility

of m a n y a soldier, it was o n l y o n e

h a d passed. T h e consequences w e r e

amongst

d e v a s t a t i n g , f o r after t h e i r i n i t i a l l y successful

m a n y of the conflicts waged b y Britain
d u r i n g Victoria's reign ( 1 8 3 7 - 1 9 0 1 ) .

Every

c a m p a i g n , i n w h i c h A n g l o - I n d i a n forces

year o f h e r r e i g n saw h e r forces d e p l o y e d

imposed o n the Afghans an unacceptable

o n c a m p a i g n s o m e w h e r e across t h e g l o b e ,

ruler, t h e y p r o c e e d e d d o w n t h e r o a d of

particularly i n Africa a n d Asia, i n a n

folly by attempting to control the country

u n i n t e r r u p t e d series o f c o l o n i a l w a r s a n d

t h r o u g h m e r e o c c u p a t i o n . T h e r e s u l t is w e l l

m i n o r operations to protect British nationals

k n o w n : unable to hold even Kabul, the army

a n d British interests, shift a frontier i n t h e

w i t h d r e w t o w a r d s I n d i a , o n l y t o m e e t its

Empire's favour, suppress a m u t i n y or revolt,

inevitable demise along the

or r e p e l a n a t t a c k . As t h e w o r l d ' s l e a d i n g

r o a d s a n d passes e n r o u t e t o J a l a l a b a d .

snow-bound

i m p e r i a l power, Britain w a g e d these

Subsequent operations w e n t some w a y

campaigns without hesitation, and

t o w a r d s resurrecting British prestige, b u t

w i t h the full confidence of ultimate

t h e lesson w a s clear: despite a c e n t u r y of
m i l i t a r y success i n I n d i a , B r i t i s h a r m s w e r e

v i c t o r y against foes w h o w e r e i n e v i t a b l y
n u m e r i c a l l y superior, yet t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y

and

organizationally inferior. Such was the price

not invincible, and Afghanistan could not
l o n g be h e l d u n d e r f o r e i g n sway.

of m a i n t a i n i n g a n d e x p a n d i n g the Empire,

Nevertheless, Anglo-Russian rivalry in

o f u p h o l d i n g t h e n a t i o n ' s p r i d e i n its o w n

C e n t r a l Asia led to a second British i n v a s i o n

perceived cultural, economic a n d political

of Afghanistan ( 1 8 7 8 - 8 1 ) , leading to yet

superiority i n t h e w o r l d - a n d usually at

another partial and temporary -

r e l a t i v e l y little cost.

m i l i t a r i l y m o r e successful -

A m o n g s t all these conflicts, however,
three Anglo-Afghan Wars ( 1 8 3 9 - 4 2 ,

the

1878-81

a n d 1919) stand out. I n military terms they

though

occupation,

for effective c o n t r o l , especially of t h e vast
countryside, again proved impossible.
As i n t h e first war, t h e British w o u l d

shared m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h other British

suffer a c r u s h i n g defeat, at M a i w a n d ,

campaigns - initial, sometimes

w i t h t h e i r r e p u t a t i o n o n l y restored after

even

catastrophic failure, but ultimate victory

a c h i e v i n g a decisive victory over t h e

i n t h e field. Yet i n p o l i t i c a l t e r m s t h e wars

A f g h a n s at K a n d a h a r . But t h e w a r

e n d e d u n e a s i l y at best a n d disastrously at

f i n i s h o n t h e basis o f c o m p r o m i s e ,

would
with

worst, w i t h a n extension of British influence

Britain controlling the foreign policy of

b u t never extensive a n n e x a t i o n or evidence

Afghanistan, a p o i n t that largely contributed

that the original aims could not have been

t o a t h i r d , b u t m u c h s h o r t e r a n d less c o s t l y

achieved t h r o u g h diplomacy alone. T h e wars

conflict i n 1919, w h e n Afghanistan sought

w e r e m a r k e d b y v a r y i n g degrees of political

t o t h r o w o f f t h e last vestiges o f B r i t i s h

a n d military incompetence a n d brilliance,

c o n t r o l o v e r its i n t e r n a l affairs.

disaster a n d t r i u m p h i n r a p i d succession.

T h e origins of Britain's wars i n

T h e r e w e r e also p l e n t i f u l e x a m p l e s o f

A f g h a n i s t a n m a y b e t r a c e d t o its o b s e s s i o n

supreme folly by politicians, w h o

w i t h the vulnerability of the

failed

Indian

t o i d e n t i f y at t h e outset clear p o l i t i c a l

s u b c o n t i n e n t - its greatest i m p e r i a l

objectives or recognize t h a t t h e

possession - to possible i n v a s i o n b y

solution


Introduction

feringees

9

Afghan tribesmen lie in ambush a m o n g rocks during t h e

the invading

Second Afghan W a r Eastern Afghanistan is ideal ground

for a E u r o p e a n ) . O v e r t h e course of a c e n t u r y

for irregular warfare. (National A r m y Museum)

(a d i s p a r a g i n g t e r m

of British rule, w h i c h c o n c l u d e d w i t h t h e
i n d e p e n d e n c e o f I n d i a a n d its p a r t i t i o n

R u s s i a v i a A f g h a n i s t a n . K n o w n as ' t h e G r e a t

i n 1947, m a i n t a i n i n g security along the

G a m e ' , t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for influence i n

N o r t h - W e s t Frontier ( n o w t h e 'tribal areas' of

C e n t r a l Asia f u e l l e d t h e fears o f t w o

western Pakistan) w o u l d require the dispatch

generations of V i c t o r i a n soldiers, politicians,

of dozens of p u n i t i v e o p e r a t i o n s . I n effect,

colonial administrators and the public.

the Anglo-Afghan Wars m a y more

W h e n s h o r t l y after t h e First A f g h a n W a r

the

accurately

b e d e s c r i b e d as t h r e e c o n f l i c t s c o n d u c t e d

in

border of British India e x p a n d e d to include

A f g h a n i s t a n p r o p e r , a n d a series o f s p o r a d i c ,

w h a t b e c a m e k n o w n as t h e

low-intensity operations conducted between

North-West

Frontier - a l a n d peopled largely b y Afghans

A n g l o - I n d i a n forces a n d A f g h a n

of various tribes - t h e m i l i t a r y

along the North-West

commitment

o f B r i t a i n a n d t h e Raj p e r f o r c e e x p a n d e d ,
removing any further buffer

with

tribesmen

Frontier.

T h o u g h l i t t l e is r e m e m b e r e d o f t h e s e
conflicts - i n d e e d , the t h i r d lasted b u t a f e w

Afghanistan and drawing into the Empire

weeks a n d concluded nearly a century ago

a r e g i o n n o t o r i o u s f o r its v o l a t i l e , w a r l i k e

their relevance to Britain's interests i n t h e

p o p u l a t i o n of disparate tribes. These tribes,

region stands o u t all t h e m o r e

w h i l e largely hostile to o n e another,

s i n c e t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f its a r m e d forces i n

g e n e r a l l y m a d e c o m m o n cause t o o p p o s e

the country in November 2 0 0 1 .

prominently

-


Chronology

First Afghan War, 1839-42

23 November Brigadier-General John
S h e l t o n is s o u n d l y d e f e a t e d b y

1836

1837

4 March Lord Auckland

A f g h a n rebels i n t h e B e h m a r u Hills

appointed

Governor-General of India

11 December Anglo-Afghan

2 0 J u n e Princess V i c t o r i a succeeds t o

agreement; British t o w i t h d r a w

t h e British t h r o n e at t h e age o f 18

K a b u l o n t h e 1 5 t h u n d e r safe c o n d u c t

September Captain Alexander

2 3 D e c e m b e r Sir W i l l i a m

Burnes

Mohamed

K h a n d u r i n g negotiations respecting

1 D e c e m b e r P e r s i a n siege o f H e r a t

t h e safe w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e K a b u l
garrison

begins
1 9 D e c e m b e r I v a n V i t k e v i c h , Tsar's

William

commander-

1 O c t o b e r A u c k l a n d issues a m a n i f e s t o

in-chief i n Afghanistan, concludes
a n agreement w i t h Akbar K h a n for

Shuja t o t h e A f g h a n t h r o n e b y force

t h e safe c o n d u c t o f a l l B r i t i s h t r o o p s

10 December Bengal division marches

to Peshawar

f r o m Ferozepore i n India

6 J a n u a r y A n g l o - I n d i a n garrison

19 February A n g l o - I n d i a n forces r e a c h

of 4 , 5 0 0 troops a n d 1 2 , 0 0 0 civilians

west b a n k of t h e Indus

leaves K a b u l o n m a r c h t o Jalalabad

1 0 M a r c h Sir J o h n K e a n e ' s A r m y

13 J a n u a r y Last s t a n d o f t h e

o f t h e I n d u s e n t e r s t h e B o l a n Pass,

4 4 t h Foot at G a n d a m a k

beginning the invasion of Afghanistan

10 J a n u a r y A k b a r K h a n takes

3 May A r m y of the Indus

Elphinstone a n d Shelton prisoner

concentrated at Kandahar; Shah Shuja

A p r i l S h a h S h u j a is m u r d e r e d

crowned

in Kabul

Amir

2 3 J u l y Keane's forces s t o r m fortress

7 A p r i l Sir R o b e r t Sale, a t J a l a l a b a d ,

of

m a k e s a m a j o r sortie against his

Ghazni

besiegers i n h o p e o f assisting t h e

K a b u l a n d i n s t a l l s S h a h S h u j a as n e w

a d v a n c e of a relief c o l u m n u n d e r

Amir; Dost M o h a m e d , t h e deposed

Major-General George Pollock

A m i r , flees n o r t h t o t h e H i n d u
December Dost M o h a m e d

Kush

surrenders

Spring British build
outside

16 April Pollock's force relieves t h e
garrison at Jalalabad
2 3 April E l p h i n s t o n e dies i n c a p t i v i t y

to t h e British

1841

1 January Major-General

d e c l a r i n g i n t e n t i o n t o restore S h a h

6 August A r m y of t h e Indus enters

1840

1842

Elphinstone, British

special e n v o y , arrives i n K a b u l

1839

Macnaghten

a n d a n aide are m u r d e r e d b y Akbar

arrives i n K a b u l o n m i s s i o n t o Dost

1838

from

cantonment

Kabul

2 N o v e m b e r Start o f a n t i - S h u j a r e v o l t

at Tezeen
2 0 A u g u s t Pollock leaves Jalalabad i n
an advance o n Kabul

i n Kabul; Burnes, t h e British resident,

15 S e p t e m b e r Pollock's troops

his brother a n d others m u r d e r e d i n

retake Kabul

Kabul

12 October T h e 'Avenging A r m y '

22 November Akbar Khan, Dost

leaves K a b u l for Peshawar; Dost

M u h a m e d ' s eldest son, arrives i n

M o h a m e d later released f r o m British

Kabul to lead t h e ongoing rebellion

c u s t o d y a n d r e i n s t a t e d as A m i r


Chronology

1843

23 D e c e m b e r British troops reach

21 January Stewart occupies

Ferozepore

Kalat-i-Gilzai

January Dost M o h a m e d returns to his

21 F e b r u a r y Sher A l i dies; his son,

t h r o n e w i t h British approval

Y a k u b K h a n , agrees t o n e g o t i a t e

II

6 April G a n d a m a k occupied by AngloI n d i a n forces

Second Afghan War, I 8 7 8 - 8 I

8 M a y Y a k u b K h a n arrives at t h e
British c a m p at

1878

Gandamak

2 N o v e m b e r Lord Lytton, Viceroy of

26 M a y Treaty of G a n d a m a k ,

I n d i a , sends Sher A l i , t h e A f g h a n A m i r ,

a n apparent e n d to the conflict

a n u l t i m a t u m , d e m a n d i n g h e accept a

2 4 J u l y Sir P i e r r e L o u i s N a p o l e o n

British d i p l o m a t i c mission i n K a b u l

C a v a g n a r i enters Kabul

bringing

2 2 N o v e m b e r M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir

3 September Attack o n the British

S a m u e l B r o w n e captures t h e fortress

Residency at K a b u l

at A l i M a s j i d

26 S e p t e m b e r Y a k u b K h a n leaves

24 N o v e m b e r B r o w n e occupies Dacca

Kabul

2 December Major-General

6 O c t o b e r Battle of Charasia

Frederick

Roberts takes Peiwar K o t a l

13 O c t o b e r Roberts enters K a b u l

1 3 D e c e m b e r S h e r A l i a p p o i n t s as

28 O c t o b e r Yakub K h a n abdicates

r e g e n t his s o n , Y a k u b K h a n , a n d flees
his capital
20 D e c e m b e r B r o w n e occupies
Jalalabad
1879

British cavalry and horse artillery in action outside Kabul,
I I D e c e m b e r I 879, w h e n Brigadier-General D u n h a m
Massy, w i t h only 2 0 0 officers and t r o o p e r s o f t h e
9th Lancers, a b o u t 4 0 Bengal Lancers and f o u r guns o f

8 J a n u a r y M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir D o n a l d

t h e RHA, blundered into an Afghan force o f thousands

Stewart occupies K a n d a h a r

and was obliged t o retreat t o w a r d s Sherpur.


I2

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

In t h e years b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e A n g l o - A f g h a n wars,
sporadic warfare c o n t i n u e d in t h e rugged f r o n t i e r

Third Afghan W a n 1919

t e r r i t o r y H e r e , as t h e G o r d o n Highlanders s t o r m
t h e Dargai Heights o n 2 0 O c t o b e r I 897 - p a r t
o f t h e T i r a h campaign against an Afghan t r i b e , t h e
Afridis - Piper Findlater continues t o play despite
his w o u n d s , f o r w h i c h e x t r a o r d i n a r y act he received
t h e V i c t o r i a Cross. ( A u t h o r ' s collection)

1919

3 M a y A f g h a n t r o o p s cross i n t o I n d i a
a n d occupy village of Bagh
9 M a y British forces a t t a c k t h e
Afghans at Bagh
17 M a y A f g h a n s a b a n d o n their
defences at Dacca

1880

1 April Stewart leaves K a n d a h a r

27 M a y British troops capture A f g h a n

for Kabul

fortress o f S p i n Baldak; N a d i r

19 April Battle o f A h m a d

Khel

Khan

besieges T h a i

2 M a y Stewart arrives i n K a b u l

3 1 M a y British agree t o g r a n t

22 July Abdur R a h m a n declared A m i r

armistice requested b y Afghans

27 July Battle of M a i w a n d

3 J u n e Armistice signed

6 A u g u s t A y u b K h a n besieges K a n d a h a r
8 A u g u s t Roberts leaves K a b u l f o r
Kandahar
11 A u g u s t Stewart leaves K a b u l f o r

Shah Shuja (Shuja-ul-Mulk), w h o s e installation as

31 August Roberts marches i n t o

A m i r o f Afghanistan o n 3 May I 839 f o r m e d t h e

Kandahar

ostensible basis o n which Anglo-Indian forces

1 September Battle of K a n d a h a r
1881

O p p o s i t e page:

India

2 2 April British evacuate

Kandahar

had invaded t h e c o u n t r y t w o months earlier
(National A r m y Museum)


Part I

The First Anglo-Afghan W a r
I 839-42


Origins and background
of the war
T h e o r i g i n s o f Britain's r i v a l r y w i t h Russia

w e r e n o t t o a t t a c k A f g h a n i s t a n a t Russia's

i n C e n t r a l Asia m a y be traced t o t h e 1820s,

behest. H e r a t u n d e r Persian c o n t r o l could

w h e n Russia b e g a n t o e x p a n d s o u t h t h r o u g h

l e a d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a base for

t h e C a u c a s u s i n t o n o r t h - w e s t Persia, a

f u r t h e r i n c u r s i o n i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n - at least

process unsuccessfully o p p o s e d b y British

as f a r as K a n d a h a r - w h e n c e t h e R u s s i a n s

d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t for Persia a n d T u r k e y .

could reach India, either via Kabul a n d

B y t h e e a r l y 1 8 3 0 s , Persia h a d b e c o m e a

t h e K h y b e r Pass o r s o u t h - e a s t t h r o u g h t h e

v i r t u a l Russian satellite. To c o m p e n s a t e for

B o l a n Pass. T h u s u n d e r n o

losses i n t h e n o r t h - w e s t , t h e S h a h , w i t h

w a s B r i t a i n p r e p a r e d t o t o l e r a t e Russia or

circumstances

Russian e n c o u r a g e m e n t , seized territory

a R u s s i a n - b a c k e d Persia e s t a b l i s h i n g a

i n western A f g h a n i s t a n , specifically t h e

presence i n Afghanistan. This antagonism

region around Herat, ruled by Kamran,

c o n s t i t u t e d w h a t b e c a m e k n o w n as t h e

w h o s e g r e a t - g r a n d f a t h e r h a d t a k e n it f r o m

' G r e a t G a m e ' , w i t h t h e First A f g h a n W a r

Persia. I n 1 8 3 5 , t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l o f

as i t s o p e n i n g m a n i f e s t a t i o n .

India recognized in a m e m o r a n d u m

for

A s f a r as t h e n e w l y a p p o i n t e d

Governor-

his superiors i n L o n d o n t h a t Russia c o u l d

General of India, Lord Auckland, together

e x p a n d i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n v i a its i n f l u e n c e

w i t h t h e East I n d i a C o m p a n y ( E I C ) w e r e

o v e r Persia, t h u s i m p e r i l l i n g B r i t i s h I n d i a :

c o n c e r n e d , t h e best m e a n s of o b v i a t i n g
Russian influence i n Afghanistan was to

I t is t h e i n t e r e s t o f R u s s i a t o e x t e n d
strengthen t h e Persian Empire,

and

which

ensure that Dost M o h a m e d , the present A m i r
i n K a b u l , s u p p o r t e d British interests i n t h e

occupies a central position b e t w e e n

region. T h e question posed before Auckland

t h e d o u b l e lines of o p e r a t i o n of t h e

a n d his advisers i n 1 8 3 7 was w h e t h e r or n o t

Autocrat to eastward and westward, a n d

D o s t M o h a m e d satisfied this n e e d .

as P e r s i a c a n n e v e r b e a r i v a l o f R u s s i a

T h e S h a h o f Persia, despite British

the a u g m e n t a t i o n of her strength can

w a r n i n g , c o n t i n u e d t o m a i n t a i n a close

o n l y increase t h e offensive m e a n s of

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Russia, a n d l a u n c h e d a

Russia... W h a t t h e Russian p o l i c y

r e n e w e d c a m p a i g n against H e r a t i n late July

might

b e a f t e r t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n o f H e r a t i t is

1 8 3 7 , l a y i n g siege t o t h e c i t y o n 1 D e c e m b e r ,

u n n e c e s s a r y n o w t o c o n s i d e r b u t i t is

w i t h resistance e x p e c t e d to be brief. British

impossible to d e n y t h a t she m i g h t

fears w e r e h e i g h t e n e d w h e n , o n t h e 1 9 t h ,

arrive

at t h a t p o i n t i n l e g i t i m a t e support of her

a Cossack officer b y t h e n a m e of I v a n

a l l y , t h e K i n g o f P e r s i a , a n d i t is e q u a l l y

V i k t o r o v i c h V i t k e v i c h , b e a r i n g a letter

difficult to d e n y that f r o m that point

f r o m Tsar N i c h o l a s I w h o h o p e d t o establish

she m a y p r o c l a i m a crusade against

diplomatic relations w i t h the Amir,

British I n d i a , i n w h i c h she c o u l d be

i n K a b u l . D o s t M o h a m e d w a s less i n t e r e s t e d

arrived

j o i n e d b y a l l t h e w a r - l i k e , restless

i n a c o n n e c t i o n w i t h Russia t h a n i n u s i n g

tribes t h a t f o r m e d t h e

t h e letter to his advantage i n a n o t h e r way.

overwhelming

force of T i m u r .

Since September t h e British already h a d a
special e n v o y at t h e A f g h a n capital i n t h e

T h e Persians f a i l e d t o seize H e r a t i n

1834,

f o r m of C a p t a i n A l e x a n d e r Burnes, sent b y

a n d Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign

A u c k l a n d . Burnes h a d m a d e his r e p u t a t i o n

Secretary, h a d issued a w a r n i n g t h a t t h e y

as a r e s u l t o f h i s r e c e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t


T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

I5

of his travels t h r o u g h C e n t r a l Asia a n d

Sir W i l l i a m M a c n a g h t e n , A u c k l a n d ' s

Afghanistan, d u r i n g t h e course of w h i c h

Secretary, o f f e r i n g n o clear n e g o t i a t i n g

Chief

journey he h a d established g o o d relations

powers a n d lacking detail b e y o n d

w i t h Dost M o h a m e d i n 1830. Burnes was

e m p h a s i z i n g t h e n e e d to favour t h e interests

in Kabul o n account of a n appeal f r o m the

of R a n jit S i n g h over those of D o s t M o h a m e d ,

A m i r for British aid i n his quarrel w i t h t h e

w h o m Burnes was to a d m o n i s h n o t to begin

powerful Sikh k i n g d o m i n the

negotiations w i t h a n y other power over the

neighbouring

Punjab, u n d e r their f o r m i d a b l e ruler R a n jit

issue o f P e s h a w a r . T h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s p l a c e d

Singh. Four years earlier t h e Sikhs h a d seized

Burnes i n a difficult p o s i t i o n at K a b u l ; yet

Peshawar, f o r m e r l y t h e richest p r o v i n c e i n

h e u n d e r s t o o d t h e u r g e n c y of affairs, for

Afghanistan. T h e British were n o t entirely

Dost M o h a m e d h a d given h i m a copy of

amenable to interfering between the Afghans

t h e Russian e n v o y ' s letter.

a n d t h e Sikhs, for t h e latter w e r e allies o f
t h e E I C b y treaty. T h e r e w a s also n o

obvious

Burnes, i n possession of his n e w
instructions but aware that he must

advantage i n m e d d l i n g in a dispute between

give priority to Sikh interests, i n f o r m e d

i n d e p e n d e n t states, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f a c t

Auckland that the A m i r was o n

that British I n d i a a n d the P u n j a b shared a

terms w i t h Britain, but he was chiefly

c o m m o n border. Such sentiments

interested i n t h e recovery of Peshawar.

formed

friendly

t h e basis o f A u c k l a n d ' s m e s s a g e t o D o s t

Barring a change i n British policy i n t h e

M o h a m e d , b u t h e d i d express a strong

f o r m of some a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h Dost

desire t o discuss t r a d e b e t w e e n I n d i a

M o h a m e d , t h e y risked alienating the Amir,

and

A f g h a n i s t a n a n d t h e u s e o f t h e I n d u s as

d r i v i n g h i m i n t o t h e a r m s of Russia i n t h e

a w a t e r w a y to facilitate c o m m e r c e . Burnes

pursuit of a n alternative ally against the

had therefore arrived in Kabul to encourage

Sikhs. Burnes characterized D o s t

commercial relations.

as m o r e i n c l i n e d t o B r i t a i n t h a n t o R u s s i a ,

Yet it w a s s o o n a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e A m i r
was n o t interested i n discussing trade; his

Mohamed

s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e case b y e n c l o s i n g t h e
Tsar's l e t t e r i n h i s d i s p a t c h b a c k t o C a l c u t t a .

troops, u n d e r Akbar K h a n , h a d recently
returned following their failure to take the

D o s t M o h a m e d , A m i r o f Afghanistan, w h o s e reign

fort at J a m r u d f r o m t h e Persians. W h a t

stretched f r o m I 834 t o I 863, i n t e r r u p t e d by exile

he

desired, instead, w a s British assistance i n
recovering Peshawar f r o m t h e Sikhs, u n d e r
R a n jit S i n g h . Burnes h a d n o p o w e r t o
negotiate political terms a n d thus h a d to
await further instructions. These were i n fact
o n their way. Auckland h a d received f r o m
t h e Secret C o m m i t t e e o f t h e EIC's C o u r t o f
Directors a m e m o r a n d u m requiring

him

t o m o n i t o r e v e n t s i n A f g h a n i s t a n closely,
w i t h t h e specific i n t e n t i o n of p r e v e n t i n g

t h e progress of Russian i n f l u e n c e t h e r e . T h e
m e a n s to a c c o m p l i s h this objective w e r e left
t o h i m , b u t if h e saw fit h e w a s a u t h o r i z e d
t o interfere i n A f g h a n affairs directly.
Auckland was almost certainly the w r o n g
person i n w h o m to invest such w i d e powers,
o w i n g t o his i n e x p e r i e n c e of A f g h a n affairs,
w h i l e Burnes h i m s e l f was o n l y a j u n i o r officer
w i t h little k n o w l e d g e of d i p l o m a t i c affairs.
Burnes received n e w instructions, drafted b y

during t h e First Afghan W a r (Author's collection)


I6

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

a volte face i n h i s p o l i c y , B r i t a i n w o u l d n o t
offer h i m friendship. This h a r d e n i n g of t h e
British attitude, a n d Dost M o h a m e d ' s

need

for a n a l l y i n h i s struggle against t h e Sikhs
a n d t o k e e p t h e Persians i n check, l e d t h e
A m i r t o t u r n t o t h e Russians w h e n , i n A p r i l
1838,

h e m e t w i t h Vitkevich. Burnes h a d

been proved right and, w i t h his mission
over after seven m o n t h s , t h e Scotsman
returned to India.
In turn, Auckland viewed the
d e v e l o p m e n t s as j u s t i f y i n g h i s d i s t r u s t o f
Dost M o h a m e d , a n d consequently led the
Governor-General to consider t h e Amir's
replacement w i t h a n e w ruler

favourably

i n c l i n e d b o t h t o t h e British a n d t h e Sikhs
for t h e purpose of curbing either direct
Russian or Russian-backed Persian influence
i n A f g h a n i s t a n , so r e s t o r i n g t h e b a l a n c e o f
British i n f l u e n c e i n C e n t r a l Asia. T h e m o s t
suitable candidate appeared to be a previous
Amir, the Shah Shuja-il-Mulk, w h o
m a i n t a i n e d f r i e n d l y t e r m s w i t h R a n jit S i n g h
a n d w h o , after h i s last a t t e m p t t o retake h i s
throne from Dost M o h a m e d i n 1834, h a d
M o h a m e d A k b a r Khan, eldest son o f D o s t M o h a m e d ,

settled i n L u d h i a n a i n western I n d i a u n d e r

w h o led t h e uprising in Kabul in late 1841 and promised

British protection. Both t h e E I C a n d t h e

t o guarantee t h e safe passage o f Elphinstone's army and

Sikh court argued strongly i n favour of

camp followers back t o Jalalabad. His helmet, mail and

his suitability, a n d this insistence, together

shield o n his back are testament t o t h e fact that Afghan
w i t h unsubstantiated reports that h e w o u l d

forces proved formidable o p p o n e n t s despite their
medieval e q u i p m e n t and lack o f formal training.

be well received i n t h e A f g h a n capital,

(National A r m y Museum)

was sufficient to persuade A u c k l a n d a n d

For t h e n e x t three m o n t h s , Burnes

b e p l a c e d o n t h e t h r o n e . T h e British also

M a c n a g h t e n that Shah Shuja ought to

to advocate support for t h e Amir,

continued
unaware

entertained the hope that, w i t h

financial

backing f r o m t h e treasury i n Calcutta,

that i n India Auckland a n d Macnaghten
were growing increasingly unsympathetic to

t h e Sikhs w o u l d p r o v i d e t h e troops t o

t h e A f g h a n g o v e r n m e n t , n o t least w h e n

reinstall Shah Shuja i n Kabul, for they

Dost

M o h a m e d completely rejected a c o m p r o m i s e

h a d m u c h to gain f r o m his restoration:

plan over Peshawar - a rejection that fuelled

specifically, r e c o g n i t i o n o f Ranjit Singh's

Auckland's suspicions t h a t t h e A m i r w a s

r i g h t t o t e r r i t o r y o n t h e w e s t e r n side o f

i n fact hostile t o British views. Evidence

t h e I n d u s River, w h i c h D o s t

appeared to support his contention, for

d i s p u t e d . Still, t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e A f g h a n

Dost M o h a m e d h a d received i n his capital

people m i g h t n o t take kindly to their

Mohamed

a d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f r o m Russia,

Sikh enemies imposing o n t h e m a n e w

w h i c h m a i n t a i n e d a military presence w i t h

m o n a r c h does n o t appear t o h a v e figured

t h e Persian a r m y besieging Herat a n d offered

i n Auckland's calculations.

assistance i n n e g o t i a t i n g t e r m s w i t h Persia.

Ranjit Singh was not, however,

prepared

Furthermore, h e was n o t prepared to reach

t o b a c k t h i s p l a n w i t h h i s o w n forces,

a n a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h R a n jit S i n g h . W i t h o u t

so w h i l e h e i n i t i a l l y s u p p o r t e d t h e


T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

I7

signatory to the tripartite Treaty of Simla,
concluded in June 1838 between

himself,

S h a h Shuja a n d t h e British, w i t h t h e Sikhs
receiving i n t u r n a guarantee of possession
of the trans-Indus territory. Shah Shuja was
to be restored to his t h r o n e w i t h British aid,
after w h i c h h e w o u l d agree t o British c o n t r o l
of his foreign policy - thus e n a b l i n g
a n d Calcutta to ensure n o u n d u e

London

Russian

i n f l u e n c e i n A f g h a n affairs.
I n a m a n i f e s t o issued o n 1 October,
A u c k l a n d declared his i n t e n t i o n s

respecting

A f g h a n i s t a n , stated t h e reasons w h i c h
justified British i n t e r v e n t i o n - n o t least
the corrupt malpractices a n d illegitimacy of
D o s t M o h a m e d ' s g o v e r n m e n t - a n d stressed
above all t h e security of British I n d i a .

The

w e l f a r e o f o u r possessions i n t h e East,' h e
a n n o u n c e d , 'requires t h a t w e s h o u l d h a v e
Sir Alexander Burnes, assigned as British diplomatic

on

o u r w e s t e r n f r o n t i e r a n a l l y w h o is i n t e r e s t e d

representative at Kabul by Lord Auckland, t h e GovernorGeneral o f India. Burnes was killed by an Afghan m o b o n

i n resisting aggression, a n d

establishing

tranquility, i n t h e place of chiefs r a n g i n g

2 N o v e m b e r I 8 4 1 . (Author's collection)

themselves i n subservience to a hostile
enterprise h e negotiated different terms

power a n d seeking to p r o m o t e

w i t h M a c n a g h t e n , w h o agreed to furnish

of conquest a n d aggrandizement.' T h e war,

C o m p a n y troops for t h e u n d e r t a k i n g . T h e

h e w e n t o n , was n o t to be conducted

Sikhs w e r e c o m m i t t e d t o n o t h i n g m o r e

a v i e w t o w a r d o c c u p a t i o n or territorial

than

m a i n t a i n i n g a reserve force at Peshawar for

schemes

with

a g g r a n d i z e m e n t ; as p r o o f o f t h i s p l e d g e ,

eventualities, the circumstances of w h i c h

British troops w o u l d w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e

n e v e r b e c a m e clear. I n t h e e n d , R a n jit S i n g h

c o u n t r y o n c e S h a h Shuja h a d b e e n safely

d i d c o m m i t h i m s e l f t o t h e e n t e r p r i s e as a

a n d rightfully installed.


Warring sides

T h e forces t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d b r i n g t o bear

W h e n t h e First A f g h a n W a r b e g a n i n 1 8 3 9 ,

against t h e A f g h a n tribes w e r e c o m p o s e d

the Bengal A r m y contained 6 9 regiments of

almost exclusively of those of the EIC.

sepoys

For t h e p r e v i o u s c e n t u r y these forces h a d

o f o n e b a t t a l i o n , as w e l l as 1 5 l o c a l

e n j o y e d a l m o s t u n h i n d e r e d success i n t h e

battalions, including three of Gurkhas:

a n d o n e of Europeans, each consisting

field against indigenous I n d i a n armies, some

superb, h i g h l y reliable troops recruited

of whose troops took u p e m p l o y m e n t i n one

f r o m Nepal. T h e Madras presidency mustered

of t h e C o m p a n y ' s three separate s t a n d i n g

5 1 sepoy

armies, representing each presidency: Madras,

2 6 . C a v a l r y s e r v i n g i n t h e C o m p a n y ' s forces

battalions, t h e B o m b a y presidency,

B o m b a y a n d Bengal. T h e r a n k a n d file o f

consisted o f t w o types: regular regiments o f

these forces w a s d r a w n f r o m t h e area i n

light cavalry - three f r o m Bombay, a n d eight

w h i c h they were recruited, a n d they trained,

each f r o m the Bengal a n d Madras armies -

dressed a n d f o u g h t i n t h e style o f t h e British

outfitted, a r m e d a n d trained like their
counterparts i n British light dragoon

A r m y , w i t h w h i t e officers i n c o m m a n d .
B y t h e t i m e o f t h e First A f g h a n W a r , e a c h

sepoy

(infantry) c o m p a n y served u n d e r t h e

regiments, a n d irregular m o u n t e d units,
of w h i c h Bengal supplied four a n d B o m b a y

c o m m a n d o f a British captain or lieutenant,

o n e . T h e C o m p a n y h a d its o w n

together w i t h a British subaltern a n d t w o

of artillery, b o t h o f foot a n d o f horse (the

complement

I n d i a n officers w h o h a d risen f r o m t h e ranks,

d i s t i n c t i o n b e i n g t h a t t h e crews o f t h e f o r m e r

w i t h ten such companies composing a

m a r c h e d o n foot, whereas those o f t h e latter

' N a t i v e ' b a t t a l i o n (or r e g i m e n t , a l l s u c h u n i t s

m o v e d o n horseback), composed entirely

c o m p r i s i n g b u t a single b a t t a l i o n , u n l i k e their

o f E u r o p e a n p e r s o n n e l . T h e C o m p a n y also

counterparts i n t h e British A r m y , w h i c h h a d

m a i n t a i n e d a n engineering capacity i n the

two), under a major or lieutenant-colonel.

f o r m o f sappers a n d m i n e r s o f b o t h E u r o p e a n

A similar system existed for regiments o f

and indigenous composition.

c a v a l r y , w h e r e t r o o p e r s w e r e k n o w n as

sowars.

I n a d d i t i o n t o C o m p a n y forces i n British

A m o n g s t t h e l o c a l ' a n d irregular corps, o f

I n d i a , t h e C r o w n itself sent o u t f r o m h o m e

w h i c h there were m a n y i n India, only the

d e p o t s its o w n t r o o p s - t h a t is, r e g u l a r f o r c e s

c o m m a n d i n g officer,

second-in-command

a n d a d j u t a n t were British, Indians filling
all t h e r e m a i n i n g officers' positions, w i t h
exclusively I n d i a n troops beneath t h e m .
Regular c a m p a i g n i n g , w h e t h e r against fellow
I n d i a n forces o r i n t h e First B u r m e s e W a r o f
1 8 2 4 - 2 5 , h a d helped develop a strong b o n d
o f m u t u a l respect a n d trust b e t w e e n t h e

sepoys

a n d t h e i r British officers, a n d N a t i v e u n i t s

g e n e r a l l y f o u g h t w e l l a n d l o y a l l y - a t least
until m u c h of the Bombay A r m y mutinied i n
1 8 5 7 . T h e r e w e r e also ' E u r o p e a n ' u n i t s
maintained b ythe EIC, composed entirely
of British ( m o r e specifically, m o s t l y Irish)
s o l d i e r s , s u c h as t h e B e n g a l H o r s e A r t i l l e r y .

Baluchis in the Bolan Pass, 1842. (National A r m y Museum)


T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

h o l d i n g t h e Q u e e n ' s c o m m i s s i o n - t o serve

escorts; s e e k i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e o f t h e e n e m y ' s

i n one of the presidency armies, n u m b e r i n g

strength a n d disposition a n d guarding the

20 battalions of infantry a n d four regiments

i n f a n t r y ' s f l a n k s a n d rear.

of light cavalry. Troops posted t o I n d i a

I9

Little c a n said of t h e i r A f g h a n o p p o n e n t s ,

generally spent m o s t of t h e i r a d u l t lives t h e r e ,

for t h e A m i r s m a i n t a i n e d n o s t a n d i n g force of

since t h e m a n y m o n t h s ' t r a v e l t o r e a c h t h e

a n y k i n d , r e l y i n g instead e n t i r e l y o n a large,

subcontinent m i l i t a t e d against regular

s p o n t a n e o u s l y raised force of irregular fighters

rotation to another station. Thus, a regiment

of v a r y i n g reliability a n d effectiveness.

m i g h t r e m a i n i n I n d i a for t w o decades or

T h e y were d r a w n f r o m the countryside

m o r e , w i t h w a s t a g e - f r o m disease, especially

assembled o n the w o r d of a local

sirdar

and

mullah

c h o l e r a , b u t also h e a t , excessive d r i n k ,

(religious teacher or leader),

casualties or discharge - r e p l a c e d b y drafts

c o m m a n d e r ) or t h e A m i r himself, w h o

of recruits sent o u t f r o m B r i t a i n . Troops f r o m

theory could s u m m o n up untold thousands

(tribal
in

home, once acclimatized and experienced o n

of tribesmen w h e n required, t h o u g h w i t h

campaign, proved hardy and dependable, and

n o established t e r m s o f service, a n d t h u s

together w i t h their

sepoy

counterparts proved

rendering their long-term

commitment

a f o r m i d a b l e f i g h t i n g force; their forebears

u n c e r t a i n at best a n d d u b i o u s at worse.

h a d , after all, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h

They wore no uniform and employed the

Company

forces, c o n q u e r e d B e n g a l u n d e r C l i v e ,

simplest of tactics, s n i p i n g f r o m hillside cover

southern India from the French and the

with the

sultans of M y s o r e , a n d later c o n q u e r e d t h e

w i t h d i s t i n c t i v e c u r v e d stock - or, w h e n

Mahrattas i n t h e west.

jezail

- a long, hand-crafted musket

s e e k i n g t o close w i t h t h e i r e n e m y ,

W h e t h e r belonging to a Queen's regiment

attacking

i n great swarms w i t h o u t consideration of

or a C o m p a n y ' s , all units w e r e o r g a n i z e d a n d

f o r m a t i o n , cutting a n d slashing w i t h their

a r m e d identically, their principal weapons

l o n g , s t r a i g h t s w o r d s a n d k n i v e s . (As m a n y

consisting of the smoothbore,

muzzle-loading

as h a l f a d o z e n k n i v e s a t a t i m e w e r e t u c k e d
t i g h t l y i n t o t h e i r w a i s t scarf.)

flintlock m u s k e t a n d b a y o n e t for t h e
i n f a n t r y , a n d t h e sabre or l a n c e c a r r i e d b y
t h e cavalry. A r t i l l e r y w a s also s m o o t h b o r e ,

Afghan tribesmen a r m e d w i t h t h e famous long-barrelled,
hand-made jezail, w h o s e extraordinary range enabled t h e

f i e l d b a t t e r i e s c o n s i s t i n g o f six 6 - p d r s , w i t h

t r i b e s m e n during t h e First Afghan W a r t o pick off enemy

heavier pieces, i n c l u d i n g m o r t a r s , reserved for

t r o o p s f r o m beyond t h e range o f t h e standard-issue

siege o p e r a t i o n s , t h o u g h m o u n t a i n o u s t e r r a i n

British s m o o t h b o r e muskets.

often rendered transportation of heavy
artillery all b u t impossible. T h e i n f a n t r y
w e r e dressed s m a r t l y y e t i m p r a c t i c a l l y for t h e
c l i m a t e i n h e a v y s c a r l e t t u n i c s , w h i t e cross
belts, black leather p o u c h e s , haversacks a n d
tall black shakos. T h e y m a r c h e d i n closely
ordered ranks, deployed

shoulder-to-shoulder

as a t W a t e r l o o a g e n e r a t i o n b e f o r e a n d i n d e e d
as u n d e r M a r l b o r o u g h m o r e t h a n a c e n t u r y
earlier, a d v a n c i n g i n c o l u m n b u t d e p l o y i n g
for a c t i o n i n lines consisting of t w o ranks.
T h u s t h e y m a d e best use o f d i s c i p l i n e d
volleys to repulse t h e e n e m y or u n n e r v e

him

sufficiently that a b a y o n e t attack could drive
h i m off. C a v a l r y m a n o e u v r e d b y s q u a d r o n ,
either i n line or i n c o l u m n , t h e troopers
w i e l d i n g t h e i r sabres i n t h e c h a r g e , b u t m o r e
o f t e n t h a n n o t s e r v i n g as s c o u t s a n d b a g g a g e


"he fightin

F r o m t h e start, British m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s

A r m y consisted of t w o Queen's regiments

h a d to tackle the p r o b l e m of dispatching

of foot - the 2 n d a n d 17th - four regiments

a m a j o r e x p e d i t i o n f r o m I n d i a across t h e

of B o m b a y Native Infantry, the 4 t h Light

Sutlej a n d m u c h f u r t h e r east. T h e shortest

D r a g o o n s (a Q u e e n ' s r e g i m e n t ) , t w o

route available to the ' A r m y of the Indus'

regiments of n a t i v e cavalry, t w o c o m p a n i e s of

lay f r o m Peshawar t h r o u g h the Punjab. Even

f o o t artillery (all E u r o p e a n ) a n d o n e

this route was 4 0 0 miles a n d w o u l d

o f sappers a n d m i n e r s . I n a d d i t i o n t o these

require

company

m o v i n g t h e a r m y a n d its m a t e r i e l - a b o v e a l l

forces, a separate force o f 6 , 0 0 0 irregulars

its b a g g a g e a n d g u n s - t h r o u g h t h e

w a s raised i n I n d i a for S h a h Shuja's use,

Khyber

a n d o t h e r passes o n a s l o w j o u r n e y t o i t s

consisting of four regiments of infantry,

ultimate destination, Kabul. The

t w o regiments of cavalry a n d a troop of

journey

w o u l d p r o v e a l l t h e m o r e d i f f i c u l t as t h e

horse artillery, e q u i p p e d f r o m British

Sikhs, t h o u g h f r i e n d l y a n d supportive of

m a g a z i n e s a n d l e d b y British officers.

t h e e n t e r p r i s e , w o u l d n o t g o so f a r as t o

L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l Sir J o h n K e a n e ,

p e r m i t B r i t i s h forces t o cross t h e i r t e r r i t o r y .

c o m m a n d i n g the B o m b a y division, was

T h e best a l t e r n a t i v e , therefore, was to take a

to m o v e initially by water from

far l e n g t h i e r r o u t e t h r o u g h B a l u c h i s t a n

and

to Sind, there to rendezvous w i t h the

t h e B o l a n Pass, p r o c e e d i n g t o K a n d a h a r

and

thence to Kabul - a journey more t h a n three

Bengal division, led by

Bombay

Major-General

Sir W i l l o u g h b y C o t t o n , w i t h a f u r t h e r

times the distance of the route originally

1,200-mile trek t h r o u g h Baluchistan to

p r o p o s e d , b u t less a r d u o u s i n t e r m s o f

K a n d a h a r . T h e c o n t i n g e n t raised for S h a h

n a t u r a l obstacles at t h e outset, a n d w i t h

S h u j a was t o m o v e d o w n t h e Sutlej a n d

some l i m i t e d transport available for t h e

Indus where, w i t h the entire a r m y unified,

first 4 5 0 m i l e s , i n t h e f o r m o f f l a t - b o t t o m e d

Keane w o u l d assume overall c o m m a n d ,

barges o n t h e Sutlej a n d I n d u s rivers. I n t h e

M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir W i l l i a m N o t t l e a d i n g t h e

with

event, this was the route chosen b y British

B o m b a y d i v i s i o n . Sir W i l l i a m M a c n a g h t e n ,

military planners.

the n e w l y a p p o i n t e d e n v o y to Shah Shuja,

The expedition would

would accompany the expedition.

comprise

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 0 , 0 0 0 British a n d I n d i a n

Even before the a r m y could advance, the

t r o o p s i n t w o d i v i s i o n s o f d i f f e r i n g sizes,

casus belli

w i t h t h e force f r o m t h e Bengal presidency

for unexpected news arrived a n n o u n c i n g the

of the war appeared to evaporate,

consisting of n i n e infantry regiments, one

c o n t i n u e d resistance of H e r a t against Persian

being a Queen's regiment a n d the others

forces, n o t least d u e t o t h e l e a d e r s h i p of

C o m p a n y troops: the 1 3 t h Foot, t h e Bengal

L i e u t e n a n t Eldred Pottinger, a n officer i n t h e

Europeans a n d seven regiments Bengal Native

EIC w h o h a d offered to organize the defence

Infantry. Five regiments of cavalry w o u l d

of the place u p o n f i n d i n g himself i n Herat

a c c o m p a n y the expedition, one of w h i c h was

during an unofficial

a Queen's r e g i m e n t - t h e 1 6 t h Lancers -

o p e r a t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e Persians, w o r n

and

four of Bengalis. O t h e r units i n c l u d e d a t r o o p

intelligence-gathering

o u t b y a n u n p r o f i t a b l e n i n e - m o n t h siege,

of horse artillery a n d t w o companies of foot

a n d b o w i n g t o t h e d i p l o m a t i c pressure

artillery, all w i t h E u r o p e a n personnel, plus

a p p l i e d b y t h e Russians, w h o n o longer

t w o c o m p a n i e s of sappers a n d m i n e r s . T h e

w i s h e d t o s u p p o r t this enterprise, raised t h e

smaller contingent provided b y the

siege a n d w i t h d r e w , r e m o v i n g a l l t h r e a t o f

Bombay

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

2I

Russian e x p a n s i o n i n w e s t e r n A f g h a n i s t a n .

consisted n o t m e r e l y of necessities like

N o t o n l y that, t h e Russian ambassador to

a m m u n i t i o n , f o o d a n d fodder, b u t

Tehran, w h o had played an

quantities of officers' kit, m u c h of this m o r e

instrumental

huge

part i n e n c o u r a g i n g t h e Persians t o attack

appropriate to living in camp rather t h a n

H e r a t , w a s r e c a l l e d b y t h e T s a r , as w a s

the field. All armies operating i n a n d out of

in

Vitkevich f r o m the A f g h a n capital. Auckland

I n d i a w e r e f a m o u s for their prodigious t r a i n

received news concerning Herat i n early

of vehicles a n d e q u i p m e n t , b u t this was

N o v e m b e r 1 8 3 8 . This d i d n o t dissuade

him

f r o m proceeding w i t h his g r a n d e x p e d i t i o n ,

exceptional, w i t h knapsacks, blankets
t o n s o f o t h e r stores, especially t h a t

and

most

however, for h e was d e t e r m i n e d to oust Dost

essential of all: water. V e r y little t h o u g h t

M o h a m e d f r o m power, a n enterprise

b e e n given to m e t h o d s of re-supply, w i t h the

had

supported b y the Board of C o n t r o l , the b o d y

a r m y foolishly relying substantially o n the

i n L o n d o n w i t h responsibility over t h e affairs

p u r c h a s e o f l o c a l g o o d s a n d services t h r o u g h

of the EIC. T h e e x p e d i t i o n , therefore, w o u l d

the civilian contractors w h o

p r o c e e d as p l a n n e d .

t h e e x p e d i t i o n , as w e l l as b y l i v i n g o f f t h e

O n 10 December, the Bengal division

accompanied

l a n d - a practice w h i c h i n verdant

India

left Ferozepore a n d o n 19 F e b r u a r y 1 8 3 9 all

h a d generally sufficed d u r i n g operations

forces w e r e o n t h e w e s t b a n k o f t h e I n d u s ,

i n t h e past, b u t c o u l d n o t be a p p l i e d t o

w i t h t h e deserts o f B a l u c h i s t a n y e t t o

m u c h of Afghanistan. T h e folly of these

traverse. T h e force was e n o r m o u s , w i t h a

m e t h o d s soon c a m e apparent, for t h e

massive train of c a m p followers a n d baggage

wastes of Baluchistan bore n o r e l a t i o n to

animals. T h e Bengal division comprised

t h e p r o d u c t i v e areas o f t h e P u n j a b or t h e

9,500 troops, b u t a staggering 3 8 , 0 0 0

Ganges Valley, leaving t h e m e n short of

followers a n d 3 0 , 0 0 0 camels, the

camp

numbers

enlarged b y t h e fact t h a t m a n y officers w e r e
a c c o m p a n i e d b y several - s o m e t i m e s e v e n
d o z e n s - o f s e r v a n t s , as w a s t h e n o r m

in

I n d i a n armies. T h e vast a m o u n t of baggage

T h e great fortress at Ghazni, which blocked Sir John
Keane's advance o n t h e Afghan capital in 1839.
T h e defenders bricked up all t h e entrances apart f r o m
t h e Kabul Gate (centre), against w h i c h a d e m o l i t i o n party
placed a large charge o f gunpowder.


22

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

Routes of the Anglo-Indian invasion during the First Afghan War
O Bokhara
T

U

R

K

E

S

T

A
C

H

I

N

A

/

I

N

D

I

A

Delhi O

1.
2.
3.
4.

December 1838
February 1839
Armies combine,April 1839
Entry into Kabul, 7 August 1839
Bengal A r m y
Shah Shuja's A r m y
Bombay A r m y
British A r m y o f t h e
' c o m b i n e d forces)

Indus

250 miles
ARABIAN

SEA

f o o d a n d w a t e r a n d suffering at t h e h a n d s

sufferings of t h e troops were c o m p o u n d e d b y

o f a h a r s h , u n f o r g i v i n g t e r r a i n . Beasts o f

i n a p p r o p r i a t e c l o t h i n g , for

b u r d e n , transport a n i m a l s a n d horses

the intense heat, they wore the same heavy

suffered especially. N o r was t h e a d v a n c e

l e a t h e r shakos a n d scarlet t u n i c s used i n

unopposed; hostile tribesmen

frequently

notwithstanding

Britain. O w i n g to the weakness of their

h a r a s s e d t h e c o l u m n i n t h e B o l a n Pass,

horses, m a n y troopers h a d to

w h e r e a n y stragglers, especially a m o n g s t

a n d m o v e o n foot, prodding their animals

t h e c a m p f o l l o w e r s , fell easy v i c t i m .

w i t h their lances. Despite these hardships,

O n 3 1 M a r c h 1 8 3 9 , C o t t o n a n d Keane's

dismount

the army reached Kandahar o n 3 M a y

and

divisions, t o g e t h e r w i t h S h a h Shuja's

oversaw the c o r o n a t i o n of Shah Shuja,

c o n t i n g e n t , j o i n e d at Q u e t t a , b u t f u r t h e r

for w h o m his people offered o n l y a cool

delay occurred w h e n headquarters failed to

reception. Supplies p r o v e d m o r e readily

consider the m o s t efficient routes, leading

available here, but the a r m y

t o t h e loss o f t r a n s p o r t a n d m a t e r i e l . T h e

f r o m malaria a n d dysentery.

suffered

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

W h i l e K a b u l still r e m a i n e d 3 2 5

miles

23

O n 2 0 July, skirmishers f r o m Keane's force

away, t h e r o u t e a h e a d at least o f f e r e d m o r e

scattered t h e e n e m y outposts before

f o r a g e a n d , as t h e e l e v a t i o n r o s e , b a l m i e r

a n d r e c o n n o i t r e d t h e fortress, w h o s e walls

temperatures. Moreover, apart f r o m the

t h e y discovered to be exceedingly strong

harassing attacks b y t r i b e s m e n i n t h e Bolan,

a n d y e t t h e a r m y ' s f o u r g r e a t siege g u n s h a d

t h u s far t h e progress of t h e a r m y h a d

b e e n left w i t h N o t t at K a n d a h a r , a n d n e i t h e r

b e e n seriously opposed, for D o s t

not

Mohamed

Ghazni

-

m i n i n g n o r escalade w o u l d suffice against

h a d b l o c k e d t h e K h y b e r Pass w i t h h i s b e s t

walls of such thickness a n d height.

troops to p r e v e n t t h e Sikhs, s h o u l d t h e y

d e s c r i b e d t h e p l a c e i n a l e t t e r t o Sir J a s p e r

Keane

make the attempt, from advancing o n Kabul.

Nicholls, the commander-in-chief in India:

H e believed the British, w i t h Shuja i n
Kandahar, w o u l d be focusing o n

operations

O n t h e m o r n i n g of t h e 21st July t h e

around Herat. T h e road to Kabul was n o t

A r m y i n t h r e e c o l u m n s m o v e d close t o

entirely o p e n , however, for h a v i n g left N o t t

the outworks of the place, a n d instead

i n K a n d a h a r at t h e e n d o f J u n e , K e a n e still

o f f i n d i n g i t , as t h e a c c o u n t s h a d s t a t e d ,

faced a gruelling m a r c h i n s u m m e r heat of

v e r y w e a k a n d i n c a p a b l e of resistance,

2 0 0 miles to the north-east to G h a z n i , w h i c h

a second Gibraltar a p p e a r e d before us.

lay i n his p a t h . G h a z n i presented walls

70ft

A h i g h r a m p a r t i n g o o d repair built

high, the whole surrounded by a moat,

with

a scarped m o u n d a b o u t 35 feet h i g h ,

a powerful garrison under 21-year-old

Hyder

flanked by numerous towers, a n d

K h a n , o n e of D o s t M o h a m e d ' s sons. A n o t h e r

surrounded by a well constructed

on

son led 5 , 0 0 0 G h i l z a i cavalry, posted i n t h e

[escalade] a n d a w i d e w e t d i t c h . I n s h o r t

hills o n e i t h e r side o f t h e r o a d .

we were astounded, but there we were.

British t r o o p s storming t h e fortress at Ghazni, 23 July
1839. In t h e absence o f a siege train, no alternative

Intelligence received f r o m A b d u l Rashid,

remained but t o take t h e place by a coup de main.

a disgruntled n e p h e w of Dost M o h a m e d ,

(National A r m y Museum)

r e c o m m e n d e d a surprise s t o r m of t h e

Kabul