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A. Nurse

animal faeces’ (2009, p. 283). The health visitors and school nurse
observed the same scene, noting that the dog also had no shelter or
access to food and water. This indicated the possibility of neglect within
the family and the interior of the property which contained a malnourished and frightened cat, the presence of animal faeces within the home,
discarded used nappies and rotting food confirmed this. Animal neglect
thus has importance not just in respect of its impact on animals as direct
or indirect abuse causing animal harm, but also as an indicator of other
forms of interpersonal abuse.

Conclusion: Re-contextualising Neglect as Abuse
This chapter identifies current animal protection law (both anti-cruelty and
welfare) as making provision for neglect to be considered as animal abuse.
While discussions of abuse primarily focus on deliberate acts of cruelty or
maltreatment, failure to adequately consider non-human animal needs is
recognised within some legal systems as a crime, notwithstanding the legal
reality that animals are denied crime ‘victim’ status (Hall 2013; Wise 2000).
Schaffner (2011) identifies flaws in contemporary law such that cruelty laws
currently tend to address both abuse and neglect but with the unfortunate
consequence that wild animals are exempt from both. Thus, she contends
that ‘the law must separately address abuse and neglect: laws against abuse
should govern all animals, and neglect laws should govern only domestic
animals (2011, p. 188). This chapter’s discussion of non-human companion
neglect identifies neglect as abuse, particularly, where specific legal responsibility is owed towards non-human companions.
The UK Animal Welfare Act 2006 falls short of providing animals with
legal personhood and directly enforceable rights. However it does in part
reflect Regan’s (1983) distinction between legal rights and moral rights
commensurate with arguments that animals should be granted the same (or

similar) rights to humans because they have value. Tannenbaum has argued
that anti-cruelty provisions in animal laws ‘create legal duties to nonhuman animals. They therefore afford legal rights to non-human animals’
(1995, p. 167) albeit these rights are not comparable with human rights
and legal personhood. Arguably there are also problems with enforcing
these rights within contemporary justice systems; numerous limitations and
exemptions exist which provide for continued animal exploitation. As this
chapter indicates, non-human animals continue to be exploited for food,
for scientific purposes and in some ‘entertainment’ settings (for example,