The palgrave international handbook of a 238

International Trade in Animals and Animal Parts

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Rational Choice Theory
As the IWT is regarded to be the third largest black market in the world,
explanations often focus on rational choice and opportunity theories.
Rational choice theory (Cornish and Clarke 1986) has been used repeatedly
to explain how and why offenders chose certain species and processes to
engage in IWT (Pettrossian and Clarke 2014; Pires and Clarke 2011, 2012).
This research persuasively argues that acceleration in the collection and
killing of wildife is mainly explained by market forces. Put simply, substantial economic gain is increasingly likely as more wildlife is labelled ‘endangered’ and ‘scarce’, leading to intensified demand, higher prices and thereby a
stronger motivation to offend. The resale value of rhino horn, for example, is
estimated at around €40,000/kilo (comparatively gold is approximately
€31,000/kilo), while tiger bones sell for up to €900/kilo and raw ivory prices
can reach €620/kilo (European Commission [EC] 2014, p. 2). Where
individual wildlife does not command such large financial sums—Regueira
and Bernard (2012), for example, have recorded the sale of song birds for as
little as $1 in South American markets—animals are traded in their millions
to ensure profit. Although most of these live animals may die enroute, this is
deemed acceptable collateral damage. Self-interested rational offenders are
only concerned with the instrumental value of wildlife—any harms or abuses
inflicted on animals happen as an indirect consequence of trade activities—a
simple cost benefit analysis.
The ‘rational’ choice to engage in legal or illegal trade can be influenced by
a combination of push and pull factors which help inform decision making.
IWT is frequently linked to the socio-economic and political characteristics
of countries and regions, typically facilitated in countries characterised by
poverty, economic development, new trade borders, governance challenges,
organised crime, violent conflicts and corruption (De Greef and Raemaekers
2014; Lemieux and Clarke 2009; Nellemann et al. 2014). In countries,

such as Brazil, with high biodiversity and social inequality, poachers and
smugglers without legitimate means to achieve their financial goals, use
the IWT to subsidise their earnings. Frequently, there are few obstacles in
the path of would-be offenders as these countries are also often characterised
by their remoteness and poorly managed and monitored trade systems,
challenges that are exacerbated by bureaucracy, corruption (Sollund and
Maher 2015; Wyatt 2014), conflict (Lemieux and Clarke 2009) and, more
recently, organised crime groups. Rapid economic and population growth
can also provide the perfect conditions in which IWT can flourish.