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674 PART 4 • Information, Market Failure, and the Role of Government
potential gain from a broad-based emissions
trading program. In one study, the cost of achieving an 85-percent reduction in hydrocarbon emissions in all U.S. DuPont plants was estimated
under three alternative policies: (1) each source
at each plant must reduce emissions by 85 percent; (2) each plant must reduce its overall emissions by 85 percent with only internal trading
possible; and (3) total emissions at all plants must
be reduced by 85 percent, with both internal
and external trading possible. 9 When no trading
was allowed, the cost of emissions reduction was
$105.7 million. Internal trading reduced the cost
to $42.6 million. Allowing for both external and
internal trading reduced the cost even further, to
$14.6 million.
Clearly, the potential cost savings from an effective tradeable emissions program can be substantial. This may explain why Congress focused on
transferable permits as a way of dealing with “acid
rain” in the 1990 Clean Air Act. Acid rain can be
extremely harmful to people, animals, vegetation,
and buildings. The government initially authorized
a permit system to reduce annual sulfur dioxide
emissions by 10 million tons and nitrogen oxide
emissions by 2.5 million tons by the year 2000.
That program remains in place today.
Under the plan, each tradeable permit allows a
maximum of one ton of sulfur dioxide to be released
into the air. Electric utilities and other polluting entities are allocated permits in proportion to their current level of emissions. Companies can make the
capital investments necessary to reduce emissions,
perhaps by selling excess permits, or they can buy
permits and avoid having to make costly emissionsreducing investments.
In the early 1990s, economists expected
these permits to trade for around $300. In fact,