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176 PART 2 • Producers, Consumers, and Competitive Markets
have an incentive to avoid treating very old or sick
patients. As a result, such patients would find it difficult or impossible to obtain treatment.
Whether more information is better depends on
which effect dominates—the ability of patients to
make more informed choices versus the incentive
for doctors to avoid very sick patients. In a recent
study, economists examined the impact of the
mandatory “report cards” introduced in New York
and Pennsylvania in the early 1990s to evaluate
outcomes of coronary bypass surgeries.9 They
analyzed hospital choices and outcomes for all
elderly heart attack patients and patients receiving coronary bypass surgery in the United States
from 1987 through 1994. By comparing trends in
New York and Pennsylvania to the trends in other
states, they could determine the effect of the
increased information made possible by the availability of report cards. They found that although
report cards improved matching of patients with
hospitals and doctors, they also caused a shift in
treatment from sicker patients towards healthier
ones. Overall, this led to worse outcomes, especially among sicker patients. Thus the study concluded that report cards reduced welfare.
The medical profession has responded to this
problem to some extent. For example, in 2010, cardiac surgery programs across the country voluntarily
reported the results of coronary-artery bypass grafting procedures. Each program was rated with one
to three stars, but this time the ratings were “risk
adjusted” to reduce the incentive for doctors to
choose less risky patients.
More information often improves welfare because
it allows people to reduce risk and to take actions
that might reduce the effect of bad outcomes.