HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY docx

A HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
A HISTORY OF ANCIENT
PHILOSOPHY
FROM THE BEGINNINGS TO
AUGUSTINE
Karsten Friis Johansen
Translated by Henrik Rosenmeier
London and New York
First published in English 1998
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.
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Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
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First published in Danish 1991
as Den Europæsiske Filosofis Historie : Antikken
by Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck, Copenhagen
© 1991 Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck A/S
English translation © 1998 Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck A/S
The right of Karsten Friis Johansen to be identified as the Author of this Work has been
asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted
or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
Friis Johansen K. (Karsten)
[Den Europæsiske Filosofis Historie. Antikken. Danish]
A history of ancient philosophy: from the beginnings to Augustine
Karsten Friis Johansen. Translated by Henrik Rosenmeier.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Philosophy: Ancient—History. I. Title
B115.D36F7513 1998
F180–dc 21 97–45072 CIP
ISBN 0-203-97980-X Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-415-12738-6 (Print Edition)
This book was awarded the Amalienborg Prize by Her Majesty
the Queen of
Denmark and His Royal Highness the Prince Consort.
No serious person will ever commit serious matters to writing.
(Plato)
CONTENTS
Preface xii
Introduction 1
The evidence 3
PART I: PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY
1 Myth, poetry and philosophy 11
2 Ionian natural philosophy 21
3 Heraclitus 31
4 The Pythagoreans 39
5 The Eleatics 49
Xenophanes 49
Parmenides 51

Zeno 58
Melissus 61
6 Post-Parmenidean natural philosophy 63
Empedocles 63
Anaxagoras 69
The Atomists 73
7 Medical science 83
PART II: THE GREAT CENTURY OF ATHENS
8 Pericles’ Athens 89
9 Tragedy and view of history 93
10 The Sophists 105
Protagoras 108
Gorgias 114
Theories of language 116
Later social theories 118
11 Socrates 125
Aristophanes’ Socrates 126
Xemphon’s Socrates 128
Plato’s Socrates 131
Other Socratics. Aristotle’s Socrates 140
PART III: PLATO
12 Life, works and position 147
Works 150
The dialogue form 154
Myths 157
Plato’s philosophical vision 158
13 What is virtue? Can virtue be taught? 169
The Protagoras, Gorgias and Meno 176
14 Idea and man 183
The ‘classical’ doctrine of ideas 183

Logos and Erōs: the Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus and Cratylus 195
15 The good constitution of state and man 207
The construction of the state: Books I–V 210
‘The state in heaven’ and the decline of the state: Books V–X 216
16 The late dialogues: knowledge and being 223
The Parmenides 223
The Theaetetus 230
The Sophist 237
17 The late dialogues: nature, man and society 247
The Timaeus and Critias 247
vii
The Philebus 256
The Laws 259
18 Plato and the early Academy 265
The Seventh Letter 265
The ‘unwritten doctrines’ 266
Speusippus and Xenocrates 273
PART IV: ARISTOTLE
19 Life, works and position 279
Works 0
The Copernican turning point
28
6
Principles and methods 292
Formal concepts and pluralism 296
20 Logic and theory of science 303
The Categories and De interpretatione 304
The Analytics 312
Theory of argumentation 321
21 Natural philosophy and psychology 325

The Physics 326
Cosmology and theory of elements 336
Dynamics 339
Biology 341
Psychology 344
22 Metaphysics and theology 353
What is ‘being’? 355
What is ‘substance’? 360
Theology 370
23 Ethics and politics 377
What is happiness? 380
The practical life 384
viii
28
The theoretical life—and man’s double identity 395
Politics 396
24 Rhetoric and poetics 403
Rhetoric 403
Poetics 406
25 The early Peripatetics 411
PART V: HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY
26 Science and philosophy 419
Mathematics 421
Astronomy 426
Medicine 429
Technology 431
Philosophy 431
27 Epicurus 435
Epistemology 438
Physics 442

Ethics 447
Later Epicureanism 451
28 Early Stoicism 455
Epistemology, semantics and logic 460
Physics and theology 470
Ethics 447
29 Scepticism 483
Academic Sceptisicm 484
The ‘Pyrrhonian’ reaction 489
30 Greece and Rome 497
Middle Stoicism 499
Cicero 501
PART VI: LATE ANTIQUITY
ix
31 Imperial Rome 513
Late Stoicism 515
School philosophy: Platonic, Pythagorean and Aristotelian trends 525
Plutarch 532
Philo 534
Gnosticism 538
Numenius 541
32 Plotinus 545
Plotinus on principles 548
The three hypostases 554
Man 563
33 Late Neoplatonism 569
Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus 571
The aftermath 578
34 Early Christian thought 583
Anti-Christian polemics 586

Christianity and philosophy 588
Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria 591
Origen 593
The Christological Contraversies 596
Early Byzantine theology and anthropology 598
35 Augustine 603
Works 150
Augustine’s breakthrough 611
Knowledge of God 616
Man—knowledge and will 620
God and man: creation, providence and freedom 623
The traces of God 628
x
Abbreviations: general 639
Abbreviations: individual authors and texts 640
Bibliography 653
Index 677
xi
PREFACE
The present work spans the history of ancient philosophy from the earliest Greek thinkers
to Augustine. It was first published in Danish in 1991, and the English edition does not
differ in any essential respect from the original version.
The book addresses itself to readers who are principally interested in surveying the first
millennium of Western thought as well as to those chiefly seeking direct access to the
primary sources. To meet the requirements of the latter a detailed reference apparatus is
integrated in the text.
The aim has been to link the respective parts of the book in such a manner that an
overall picture emerges in which there is emphasis on the many interrelationships
between different trends. The underlying supposition, that ‘ancient thought’ constitutes a
coherent whole, albeit one with many variations, does of course have its limitations; it

represents but one writer’s views and presuppositions.
The book was inspired in equal measure by Anglo-Saxon and continental scholarship. In
addition, I have had the benefit of discussions with Danish colleagues and friends over
many years. I beg them all to accept my sincere thanks.
With admirable patience and engagement Henrik Rosenmeier, the translator, brought
his expertise and stylistic sensibility to bear on the work. The book was a difficult one to
translate, and without Dr Rosenmeier’s great contribution it is unlikely that the plans for
translation could have been realized. We worked in close collaboration—one that I take
pleasure in remembering. Johnny Christensen, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Fritz Saaby
Pedersen most kindly read individual sections, mainly with an eye to terminology. Major
portions of the book were reviewed by Eric Jacobsen from a stylistic and linguistic
viewpoint. The invaluable assistance of all these persons is gratefully acknowledged.
The Danish edition was published by Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck, and I am
pleased to acknowledge my indebtedness to Søren Hansen for his unflagging support.
Special thanks are extended to Malcolm Schofield of Cambridge University who
recommended the book to Routledge for publication of the English edition.
I am also indebted to Routledge for undertaking to publish this book, to Richard
Stoneman, and to the two anonymous readers who provided useful comments on several
chapters. Of course I alone remain responsible for any errors and shortcomings.
The translation was made possible by grants from the Carlsberg Foundation and the
Velux Foundation, and I am most grateful for their generous support.
Last but not least I should like to express my sincere and respectful gratitude to Her
Majesty the Queen and His Royal Highness the Prince Consort who awarded the
Amalienborg Prize to the original Danish version as a work in the humanities written in
Danish and deserving of international dissemination.
Karsten Friis Johansen
Copenhagen
October 1997
xiii
xiv

INTRODUCTION
Ancient philosophy, the basis of Western thought and science, evolved in the course of
almost one thousand years. In the sixth century BC that process was begun in which we
still find ourselves: the attempt at a rational explanation of the world and of man’s place in
the world.
The earliest period—until just past the middle of the fifth century BC—was
economically, socially and politically a period of crises, but at the same time a period
which opened up for foreign influences provoking thinkers and poets to seek for some
order behind all changes, an order that could be grasped by human thought. With the
victorious conclusion of the Persian wars, Athens became the political and cultural centre
of the Greek world. Still, the owls of Minerva do not take flight until dusk. Socrates’
work was carried out during a period of decline, and Plato and Aristotle were not the
ideologists of democratic, imperialist Athens. They brought earlier thought to a
conclusion, created a conceptual apparatus that has left its impress on all subsequent
Western philosophy, and assigned man a place in society and the cosmos at the moment
when the era of greatness had been lost irretrievably, and the city state was in decay. The
old Greek world finally lay in ruins when Alexander the Great forged his world empire.
From then on political decisions were made by distant monarchs, and individual man was
left to find his own proper place. Still, new philosophical systems were formulated—
Epicureanism and Stoicism—and philosophy was still a universal explanation of the
world; but the emphasis was on ethics, and it was in this period that philosophy and
science began to pursue their own paths.
By the second century BC the Romans had become the rulers of the entire Mediterranean
area. They adopted Hellenistic culture and with it Greek philosophy. The old
philosophical schools were continued in Roman times and culminated during the late Empire
(from the third century AD) in Neoplatonism. But times had changed. Religious
movements from the Orient appealed to a far wider circle than philosophy ever did, and
with the advent of Christianity a confrontation and cultural fusion took place, which are
unparalleled in our history. Antiquity was over, but its thought survived.
There are breaks during this long evolution—but also continuity. Each period had its

own features, but there was also recourse to the tradition, which in a sense never became
the past. The fundamental idea that originally made philosophy an especial mode of
interpreting the world was never left behind: man can understand the world as a whole
and thereby know himself. Ancient thought always aimed at an all-comprehending view—
even when moving to the limits of rationality. The universal aim was never abandoned,
not even as the several separate disciplines gradually evolved. And confidence in the
possibilities of human thought was maintained, even when reflections began about the
basis of knowledge. The world was considered a rational, orderly whole, and in many
cases the cosmic order was taken to be moral order as well.
The strength of ancient philosophy is the formulation of basic fundamental positions—
materialism, idealism and scepticism, rationalism, and empiricism, to use modern labels—
and of basic fundamental problems, which may belong within the purview of a given
period, but which at the same time have constituted the underlying fabric of a thousand-
year old tradition and have served until recently as paradigms. But ancient thought was
always speculative, and in a manner of speaking it lacked a counterpart. Individual
sciences, such as mathematics and medicine, achieved significant results; but from social
and ideological points of view one cannot in Antiquity—as in our times—speak of science
as an established authority that ties down philosophical reflection decisively. In Antiquity
one could choose one’s own philosophical position as one today chooses one’s outlook on
life or political party. But in so doing, one had also chosen a certain view of the physical world
and of man’s moral obligations.
Already in Plato there is awareness of the tradition. Since his time, philosophy has been
tied up with its own history. This history has often served as a self-evident background; yet
just as often philosophers have deliberately sought to return to the ancients, and in every
case something new has been the outcome. Until the end of the eighteenth century the
relationship with the tradition was in a certain sense free of problems. One could discuss
with a colleague from Antiquity—more or less as Aristotle had debated with his
forerunners—which is to say not out of interest in a distant past, but out of interest in subject
matters beyond differences in time. A direct relation to Antiquity has not died out, as can
be seen for example in Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, or Heidegger, and not infrequently

among analytical or Marxist interpreters. Still, towards 1800 AD emerged what has been
called historical consciousness. Primarily thanks to Herder, the view came to prevail that
man is a creature of history and that history accordingly has no meaning beyond itself. It
follows from Herder’s basic thought that every cultural phenomenon—hence also
philosophy—exists only in a historical dimension and that every age must be judged on its
own presuppositions.
But this causes the historian’s debate with the past to be far more reflected than it had
formerly been. He is obliged to respect an alien mode of thought but is also tied to his
own presuppositions. Furthermore, for the historian of philosophy the problem becomes
even more acute, because philosophy is both fixed in a certain time and seeks universal
validity. The history of philosophy is both philosophy and history and will always express
the interpretation of a particular age of a particular past, and the historian of philosophy must
consider both the atemporal and historical perspectives—not necessarily in such a manner
that he incessantly recites his own hermeneutical credo, but so that in his mind’s eye he
envisages a timeless problem emerging in a historical context. Strictly speaking, this
requires superhuman abilities but also a certain craftsman’s understanding of what it is
that a given text does not say.
2 INTRODUCTION
All these difficulties become especially clear in the history of ancient philosophy. It is a
period with relevance for us, because it is the basis for all subsequent Western thought.
Yet, there is both in time and in culture such a great distance between us and Antiquity
that ancient ways of confronting problems are often not immediately understandable,
even if the problems discussed may be today’s problems as well. The philosophy of such a
period does not become understandable by mere paraphrase. To gain access to the
conceptual world of the past with the conceptual apparatus of our own time requires
considerable balance—and that not least with respect to the philosophy of the earliest
period.
THE EVIDENCE
It may be appropriate to begin with some comments on the philological background for
the interpretation of ancient texts, both with respect to the very nature of technical-

philological work and to the kinds of surviving sources. The latter is connected with the
question of Antiquity’s understanding of itself.
The literature of Antiquity is but a torso to us. Major parts have been lost, and the first
printed editions of ancient texts in the Renaissance were based on transcripts of
transcripts made throughout the long period since the originals were written. Surviving
manuscripts are rarely older than the ninth century AD, and hence we must take into
account that in the long history of transmission, errors have crept into the texts, which
can never be detected. Thanks to the finding of papyri, none of which are older than c.350
BC, texts have been found, which are unknown in the manuscript transmission—for
example Aristotle’s treatise on the constitution of Athens and a number of Epicurean
papyri. But a papyrus has usually been preserved only in fragments, and its age is not a
guarantee of a better text than that which perhaps also has been indirectly transmitted in
medieval transcripts, and which perhaps has been derived from an authorized edition from
Antiquity. Thus the few preserved Plato papyri have seldom occasioned corrections in the
manuscript transmission.
The philologist is confronted with considerable difficulties concerning transmission and
textual criticism. The classical philologist’s ever more refined techniques make our
editions more reliable than the first to be printed, but we shall never have access to a
wholly authentic text. By means of a systematic registration of obvious errors that recur
and by the dating of manuscripts, etc., the mutual interdependence of surviving
manuscripts can be accounted for with greater or lesser probability, and in fortunate cases
it is thereby possible to reconstruct—perhaps also identify—the source of the surviving
manuscripts (the archetypus). Such a source can, for example, be a lost manuscript from
the early Middle Ages, but it can never be identified with the author’s text.
Nor was it possible in Antiquity to be certain that one held an authentic text in one’s
hand that had been approved by the author. No two manuscripts are identical, and at that
time there was often a significant difference between a reliable text and a ‘pirate edition’
(cf., e.g. Plato Parm. 128 D). A ‘sound’ text from earlier Greek Antiquity will—as it
presents itself to us—stem from philological editing in Hellenistic times (third-second
century BC). It is during this period—first and foremost in Alexandria—that the

INTRODUCTION 3
foundation of philological technique was laid down, not least with respect to establishing a
reliable Homeric text. From marginal notes, which at some time have been absorbed in
the transmission and copied in extant manuscripts, one can surmise something of the
‘working methods’ of the Alexandrian philologists. Measured by modern standards, they
worked in a rather arbitrary manner, and their methods of textual criticism were not
always exemplary. Yet they accomplished a great task by preserving the existing
transmission and by finding their way to the soundest text, and they had so much respect
for the well-transmitted text that they followed the sensible philological principle of
listing proposed textual emendations as notes rather than incorporating them in the text
itself.
A standard of editorial technique was thereby introduced, which also influenced
ancient editions of renowned philosophical texts, although the Alexandrians did not
primarily concern themselves with this genre. What and how much was transmitted varies
greatly from one philosophical writer to another. All that Plato published with a greater
public in mind seems to have been preserved, and our Plato text can be assumed to
depend on an authorized edition arranged for by the Academy (third century BC?). What
has been preserved for us by Aristotle evidently goes back to an edition of lecture notes
from the first century BC. Epicurus’ letters have been preserved as quotations in another
writer (Diogenes Laertius). Our Plotinus goes back to a posthumous edition by Porphyry,
but there are traces of an older and less sound Plotinus text.
In other words, every philosophical or literary treatment of ancient texts is fundamentally
dependent on comprehensive philological reconstruction, but the dependence is mutual.
No ancient text can be interpreted without a basis of philology and textual criticism, and
no text can be determined without interpreting its contents.
What has been lost over the course of time is owing not only to external circumstances
but to changing tastes and interests as well. Furthermore, the tendency in late Antiquity
to allow anthologies and compendia to take the place of the original texts has been fatal. To
us Plato and Aristotle are the dominant figures in Greek thought. But such a picture was
determined upon already during Antiquity. It is not accidental that from pre-Hellenistic

times only complete texts by these two men have been preserved. Therefore we may
easily get a distorted understanding and overlook the fact that there are important
connective lines that by-pass these two giants. Several of the so-called Presocratics were
presumably lost already early on, soon after the age of Aristotle. Subsequently only
random quotations were known, and hence quotations from late Antiquity are often
quotations of quotations. The fundamental works of such major Hellenistic schools as
Epicureanism and Stoicism are also known only fragmentarily, but entire, more readable
works from the later tradition have been preserved (Lucretius in the case of
Epicureanism; Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius in the case of Stoicism), and the
debate between the Hellenistic schools is amply reflected in Cicero. But with respect to
major parts of the philosophy of Antiquity, we only have recourse to quotations and
accounts in later authors, and, of course, this makes work with philological
reconstructions even more difficult. One is left with loose ends taken out of context, and
one must take into account the bias of the author who is quoting someone else.
4 INTRODUCTION
Plato’s and Aristotle’s attitude to the tradition to which they belonged is decisive for
our knowledge of it. They—and the students of Aristotle—have determined the
understanding of the development of philosophy. Both saw themselves as solvers of
problems raised in earlier thought. Yet they had different ways of confronting the
problems.
Plato does not wish to provide information about the Presocratics. He makes use of
them instead. He is interested in rethinking the problems posed by his predecessors in
order to formulate principal philosophical positions—not in paraphrasing particular
doctrines. Some of his interpretations—for example his view of Heraclitus and
Parmenides as counterparts, or his contrast of materialism with idealism—have remained.
But certainly it would be a misunderstanding to read, for example, his Parmenides as a
source for what Parmenides did, in fact, mean.
Unlike Plato’s, Aristotle’s historical view was systematic. He considers earlier
positions as the raw material of philosophy on a par with empirical observation. Almost
all his treatises therefore commence with a survey in which he—often in great detail—

summarizes, quotes, or criticizes his predecessors. Thus the entire first book of the
Metaphysics is a historical examination with an aim to conceptual analysis, and it has
remained a normative ‘history of philosophy’ for times far later than Antiquity. It follows
from Aristotle’s procedure that he treats earlier thinkers in terms of his own conceptual
apparatus. He asks about the meaning that lies behind their—often stumbling—attempts
to arrive at those truths that it was possible for Aristotle himself to formulate, precisely
because the attempts had been made. This is not simply arrogance, for in his discussions of
the development of problems Aristotle takes his predecessors seriously—far more so than
is the case with so many other great men of philosophy. If one wishes to evaluate Aristotle
as a source, one must recollect that he had access to just about the entire earlier
philosophical tradition, that he carefully gathered and preserved a very voluminous
historical material, but that he gathered and retold it in his own context.
To a large extent, Epicureanism and Stoicism must be thought of as reactions to
problems stated and discussed by Plato and Aristotle. But at the same time these schools
seek a tie to Presocratic views, reinterpreted without much regard to a historical
perspective. A Hellenistic philosopher makes use of the tradition, as Plato and Aristotle
did. But no Epicurean or Stoic had Plato’s or Aristotle’s interest in a debate with the past.
Historical material encapsulated in Hellenistic philosophy is often so masked as to be
unrecognizable. Something of an exception, however, is the late Sceptic Sextus Empiricus
(c.200 AD) who provides extensive and exact quotations especially with epistemological
contents. The Platonist Plutarch (c.100 AD) and the physician Galen (second century AD)
can also be significant philosophical sources.
In late Antiquity the long philosophical tradition was viewed through Neoplatonic
glasses or was attacked from a Christian point of view. Several Church Fathers transmitted
quotations, often these were second-hand. But as a rule the Neoplatonists had profound
familiarity with the tradition. Among the late Neoplatonists there is special reason to
single out Simplicius, who lived as late as the sixth century AD and represents a special
genre, that of the Aristotelian commentators. He was dependent on the Aristotelian
tradition, but at the same time had access to sources that were still available in his time.
INTRODUCTION 5

Thanks to him, many Presocratic fragments have been preserved. He quotes precisely,
and his commentaries are often valuable—which is also true of other Aristotelian
commentators. Simplicius is a good example showing that a late source is not necessarily a
bad source. At a time when literature only existed in an often very limited number of
manuscripts, a writer’s access to books, i.e. where he lived, can be more decisive than his
dates.
A special genre is the so-called doxography. On this genre as well, Aristotle has
indirectly left his mark. Aristotle’s student, the philosopher and botanist Theophrastus,
shared his teacher’s historical interest and wrote a comprehensive work on the history of
natural philosophy. Of this, the section on perception has survived. In his ordering and
evaluation of the material Theophrastus is dependent on Aristotle, and his work served as
the basis for many later compendia that included Aristotelianism and Hellenistic
philosophy. Some of these have been preserved. Theophrastus was still a historian of
problems, although more rigid and dogmatic than Aristotle. The doxographic tradition
followed Theophrastus’ systematics and arranged the material according to philosophical
beliefs (doxai), not according to persons or schools—under such headings as matter,
space, time, causes are furnished the views of the different schools. But no quotations are
provided, nor any commentaries and philosophical criticism. A transition has taken place
to compendia-like surveys for the use of busy readers who value easily obtained ready
information.
A variant of this genre arranged the matter according to individuals within the
particular schools, apparently with greater interest in the external history of the schools
than in their doctrines. The ordering principle is the concept of diadochō, the ‘line of
succession’—which is to say the succession of leaders within a school. This genre also
followed Aristotelian impulses, but the method could—especially with respect to the
Presocratics—lead to sterile systematization.
Finally, philosophers—and other writers—were treated biographically. But we should
not think of biographies in the modern sense. Originally this genre probably bore the stamp
of Aristotle’s interest in typical modes of life, but from quite early on it seems to have
degenerated into anecdotes and chronique scandaleuse. Biographical interest naturally goes

hand in hand with interest in chronology, and here—for better or worse—a work by
Apollodorus (second century BC) has been influential. He cannot have had much
knowledge of the oldest philosophers’ exact dates but worked out a strict sequel in which
a teacher was succeeded by a forty-years-younger student who ‘had heard him’. The
method does not inspire confidence.
Most of the works in these genres have been lost, but they were the basis for the only
‘history of philosophy’ of Antiquity that did survive, written by Diogenes Laertius
(presumably in the first half of the third century AD). Formally Diogenes writes in the
diadochō genre, but he also diligently uses doxographical and biographical matter, and he
quotes energetically—sometimes charmingly, rarely carefully, and never profoundly. To
us it can sometimes be an advantage that he serves up his material in its raw state. He
shares his contemporaries’ interest in the well-turned unreliable anecdote, their reverence
for a grand past and the clever sayings of wise men. It has been said that to him history is
broken down into stories. He did not have philosophical insight. But by a quirk of fate his
6 INTRODUCTION
work has been preserved, and down through the centuries it has probably been more
influential than any other history of philosophy. He is a second-hand source, although
often primary in the current historical sense, which is to say primary in relation to other
preserved sources.
Accordingly, the imperfect but varied source material can be divided into three groups:
1 Independently transmitted texts—where one must always take the special nature of
the transmission into account.
2 Quotations in other authors—where one must take the transmission of these authors
into account and bear in mind that the quotations are out of context and are
employed for a specific purpose.
3 Accounts in other authors (testimonia)—where one must likewise take the bias of
these authors into account.
The delimitation between the two last groups is not always easy to establish, for it can
often be difficult to know what is quotation and what is paraphrase, and the matter is even
more difficult in Antiquity where one is often quoted from memory. With respect to the

earliest thinking, it may be a help that some Presocratics wrote in verse, which is not so
easily distorted, and also that genuine textual fragments often can be identified by special
dialect features. But it holds good for the fragmentarily transmitted philosophers—for
example the Presocratics and the older Stoics—that the distinction in modern standard
editions between fragment and testimony not infrequently must be viewed with some
reservation. The distinction often depends on the editor’s discretion.
Warnings of this sort are the immediate consequence of general principles of textual
criticism and source criticism. To these must be added the interpretative difficulties.
Antiquity was itself able to furnish histories of problems—often of high standard—and
collections of material—sometimes on a most unambitious level—but hardly a history of
philosophy in the modern sense. The modern historian of philosophy must combine an
Aristotle’s preoccupation with problems with a Diogenes’ simple eagerness to collect
facts, and he must in addition bring to his task that sympathy and historical distance, which
at happy moments have been the hallmarks of humanistic scholarship.
Until about 1800 AD ‘history of philosophy’ was by and large confined to doxography.
Hegel’s history of philosophy was epochal in being the first treatment written from a
consistent philosophical position. Zeller’s Die Philosophie der Griechen (1st. ed., 1844–52)
is the first work to unite philosophical interpretation with philological method. The
subsequent years can boast of many examples of philosophical-systematic analysis and of
genetic method–which is to say that special emphasis is placed on influences and historical
sequels. To this must, of course, be added investigations from social or psychological
points of view.
The following pages have not been written with the view that philosophy follows a
necessary and autonomous course or that the past must be judged in light of what could
and would endure. The general cultural and social background will, to some extent, be
considered—especially in the earliest period and at the transition from Antiquity to
INTRODUCTION 7
Christianity—but this book is primarily a presentation of the history of philosophy. It
does not pretend to be a history of science or a general history of ideas.
8 INTRODUCTION

PART I
PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY
10