''''The Worst Place in the World to be a Woman or Girl'''' – Rape in the DR Congo: Canada, Where Are You? docx

'The Worst Place in the World to be a Woman or Girl' –
Rape in the DR Congo: Canada, Where Are You?


Policy Position and Discussion Report


By the




www.acacdrcongo.org



SEPTEMBER 2009


Research for this report was supported by

The Liu Institute for Global Issues, the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation and the
Centre of International Relations



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
'THE WORST PLACE IN THE WORLD TO BE A WOMAN' 3
CANADA MUST SUPPORT THE WOMEN AND GIRLS OF THE DRC 3
CONTEXT 5
CANADA AND ‘THE DEADLIEST CRISIS SINCE WORLD WAR II’ 5
Background: before the Rwandan Genocide 5
Peacekeeping 5
Mining and investments 6
Women, peace and security 7
Canadian policy and conflict in the DRC today 9
THE RISE OF MASS RAPE IN THE DRC 11
Women’s and girl’s bodies as the battlefield of war 11
Inequality: precursor to crisis 11
The Kivu Provinces in the DRC: At the centre of ‘Africa’s World War’ 12
A vibrant civil society: hope amid crisis 13
RECOMMENDATIONS 14
PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY 14
1. Adopt and legislate the recommendations of the advisory panel on Corporate Social Responsibility 14
2. Work with the UN Group of Experts on the DRC to develop a map of mineral-rich zones in the Kivus . 14
3. Modify Export Development Canada’s regulatory legislation 14
INVEST LOCALLY 15
1. Make long-term funding available to grassroots women’s groups in the Kivus 15
2. Support grassroots women’s involvement in the democratic processes 15
3. Renew the mandate of the Canadian ambassador to the Great Lakes Region 16
END IMPUNITY 17
1. End impunity for war criminals in Canada 17
2. End impunity for war criminals in the Kivus and DRC 17

3. Establish an international commission to investigate crimes of sexual violence 17
4. Support gender-sensitive security sector reform in the DRC 18
REFERENCES AND RESOURCES 19
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


'THE WORST PLACE IN THE WORLD TO BE A WOMAN OR GIRL'

The two eastern Kivu provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are the worst
places in the world to be a woman or a girl. Over the last decade, a complex and ongoing series
of conflicts, described as the world’s “deadliest crisis since World War II,”
1
unleashed
unprecedented violence on the bodies of women and girls in this region. The brutality is extreme:
“the raping of three-month-old infants and eighty-year-old women, the dispatching of militias
who have HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases to rape entire villages, women
being held as sex slaves for weeks, months and years and women being forced to eat murdered
babies.”
2
Women and girls are raped with such frequency that the Congolese invented a new
word to describe the phenomenon: révioler, to re-rape.
3
For years, the international community
has attempted to stop mass rape in the DRC; yet, as recently as in 2008, the United Nations’
(UN) Special Rapporteur on violence against women described the situation in the Kivus as, “the
worst crisis of violence against women documented so far.”

4
This has been echoed by aid
workers and humanitarians who have called this region the “rape capital of the world”
5
and “the
worst place in the world to be a woman or girl.”
6


CANADA MUST SUPPORT THE WOMEN AND GIRLS OF THE DRC

Canadians play significant economic and political roles in this region and strongly impact the
lives of Congolese women and girls. Politically, since the 1960s, the Government of Canada
(GoC) has supported peace-building initiatives in the DRC and throughout the Great Lakes
Region (Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) by sending peacekeepers to
UN missions
7
and taking lead roles in peace talks.
8
Economically, Canada is the largest non-
African investor in the mining industry in the DRC; its corporations own over $5.7 billion in
cumulative mining assets
9
and formally employ over 13,000 Congolese.
10
Much of this
investment is legitimate and bolsters the weak Congolese economy, but the UN and several non-
government organizations (NGOs) allege that Canadian corporations have committed
wrongdoing in the DRC,
11

where mineral exploitation fuels a conflict that preys upon women
and girls.
12
On an individual level, millions of Canadians own coltan from the Kivus,
13
a mineral
component of cell phones, which is

exploited by violent armed groups for profit
14
and exported
by Canadian companies.
15


Despite formidable links to the DRC, the GoC has, since 1996, disregarded UN requests for
peacekeeping support in this region, failed to secure meaningful women’s participation in peace
processes and failed to allocate aid dollars to effective programs that support rape survivors in
the DRC. In the last three years, the GoC has withdrawn its political support for peace processes
in this region,
16
cut its direct aid to the region
17
and instructed its foreign service not to use the
terms “gender equality,” “justice for victims,” and “international humanitarian law” when
referring to survivors of rape in the DRC.
18
We, as Canadians, must not neglect our responsibility
to offer solidarity and needed resources to Congolese women and girls, whose bodies are a
battlefield in the worst place in the world to be a woman. We must build a relationship with the

women, children and men of the DRC that we can be proud of.
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Because Canadian corporations were accused of wrongdoing in the Kivus; because the
GoC prioritized corporate lobbying over defending Congolese women's lives; because UN
requests for Canadian peacekeepers to bolster missions in the DRC were disregarded;
because millions of Canadians carry a piece of the DRC’s conflict with them everyday in
their cell phones and electronics; and because the Kivus are the worst place in the world to
be a woman; Canada must join with the international community and grassroots
organizations in a co-ordinated manner to answer the calls for support and solidarity from
survivors of rape in the Kivus by:

• Promoting Transparency: Canadian companies have been accused of wrongdoing in the
Kivus, a place where armed groups use targeted rape as a weapon of war to generate the
profit needed to fuel their activities by driving people from their mineral-rich lands
through fear, shame, violence and the intentional spread of HIV throughout entire
families and villages.
19
Currently, there are no binding legal mechanisms in place in
Canada to ensure that Canadian corporations do not directly or indirectly contribute to
conflict and mass rape in the Kivus. The GoC must promote transparency to ensure that
Canadians do not contribute to conflict in the DRC by implementing sound legal
mechanisms, including the creation of an ombudsman able to launch independent
investigations and to ensure full public disclosure of the activities of Canadian
corporations working in developing or conflict-affected areas.

• Investing Locally: The GoC must be responsible to its taxpayers and accountable to
survivors of rape and conflict in the Kivus by ensuring that its aid is effectively allocated.

Congolese women refuse to be passive victims of war and, despite ongoing threats to
their security, repeatedly show their ability to effectively care for survivors of rape and
advocate for gender equality and their security. The GoC must allocate aid to funding
credible grassroots and local women's organizations in the Kivus.

• Ending Impunity: Congolese women and girls are literally killed by impunity. Social
norms stigmatize and shun rape survivors instead of perpetrators and, because of this,
many survivors do not disclose their rape status or seek potentially life-saving medical
care.
20
Canada has an obligation to join the fight against impunity because it harbours
alleged génocidaires and perpetrators of war crimes in the DRC.
21
Existing resources,
like the Canadian war crimes unit, must be used to investigate, and if required, prosecute
and punish criminals. By doing so, the GoC can demonstrate zero-tolerance for the
abhorrent situation of women in the DRC and position itself to join international efforts
to combat impunity with credibility.

L. Gen Roméo Dallaire has pointed out that the Congo catastrophe is “five times” larger than the
Rwandan genocide.
22

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CONTEXT

CANADA AND ‘THE DEADLIEST CRISIS SINCE WORLD WAR II’

Background: before the Rwandan Genocide

The origins of conflict in the Kivus can be traced back to Mobutu’s reign and the preceding
colonial period. Both of these periods were characterized by the ruling elite using inequitable
land distribution, discriminatory citizenship granting practices and forced migration as tools to
create tension amongst various groups in the region; using “divide and conquer” tactics, they
maintained the allegiance of the powerful and subjugation of would-be adversaries.
23
However,
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda catalyzed “a crisis that had been latent for a good many years and
that later reached far beyond its original Great Lakes locus.”
24
The crisis destabilized the region,
unleashing the brunt of its violence on Congolese women and girls. This colossal political and
humanitarian crisis is directly related to Canadian history and foreign policy.

In July 1960, Canada and the DRC established bilateral relations when the first democratically
elected Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, visited Ottawa to request the Canadian
military’s assistance to help maintain order during the period of unrest that followed
independence from colonial Belgium.
25
Canadian help was wanted, according to the Congolese
Prime Minister, because “Canada's background was similar to the Congo's in that it had emerged
from colonial status to freedom and could understand [his] land's problems."
26
Canada deployed
1,900 peacekeepers to the UN over four years to assist the Congolese Government.
27

However,
Cold War dynamics and Congolese politics resulted in the assassination of the pro-communist
Lumumba.

A subsequent coup by a notoriously corrupt but pro-West military dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko,
set the stage for Canada’s engagement in the DRC for the next 31 years. The GoC joined its
Western allies and supported Mobutu. All the while, Mobutu was embezzling state money at an
unprecedented rate, almost singlehandedly destroying the Congolese economy and impoverishing
millions, while generating resentment across Africa for permitting rebel groups from Angola,
Rwanda and Uganda to use the DRC as a rear base for attacks on their countries of origin.
28


Peacekeeping

War was triggered in the DRC when approximately one million Hutu refugees fled from Rwanda
to the Kivus to escape retribution from the Tutsi-led army that stopped the genocide and took
control of Rwanda in 1994.
29
The UN and NGOs quickly established refugee camps in the Kivus,
near the Rwandan border. No effort was made to separate armed elements and génocidaires were
consequently dispersed throughout the refugee population. Almost immediately, the camps
became safe havens for them to re-build and re-arm.
30
Using threats and violence, they took
control of the camps’ food supplies and used the food to extort funds for their attacks against
Congolese Tutsis and planned re-invasion of Rwanda.
31
At the same time, many Congolese
Tutsis united to form rebel groups and launch counter attacks.

32
For two years, UN aid continued
to flow to armed and unarmed refugee camps without distinction, and though lives were saved by
this aid, it also enabled rebel groups and génocidaires to rebuild. Violence escalated in this
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period and threatened to spread throughout the Great Lakes Region (Burundi, the DRC, Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda). This prompted the UN Secretary General to call for the creation
of a multi-national force (MNF) to secure the refugee camps.
33
Soon after, the GoC was asked to
contribute forces, given its recent experience in Rwanda.
34
The Rwandan experience was
evidently not sufficient to convince the GoC, or to convince the GoC to convince the UN, of the
violent and deadly effects of allowing génocidaires and other armed groups to remain among
and to receive aid destined for civilians. The GoC agreed to contribute forces to the UN-
proposed MNF and suggested that Canada be named lead nation of the force.
35
Following some
“behind the scenes activity by Canadian diplomats,” the GoC secured Raymond Chrétien’s
appointment as the UN Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region.
36


Unfortunately, the Canadian-led mission, which was supposed to have a force size of
approximately 10,000, was never fully deployed.
37

The Tutsi-led rebels intensified their attacks
with Rwandan support and drove hundreds of thousands of refugees back to Rwanda. The
international community then declared that the humanitarian issue was resolved, though
conflicting reports estimated that between 200,000 – 650,000 refugees remained in the Kivus.
38

Despite troop commitments from fourteen countries, only Canada deployed any peacekeepers,
approximately one quarter of its promised contribution.
39
Ultimately, the international
community abandoned at least 200,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees in need of food, medicine and
protection from the génocidaires that used them as human shields and the Rwandan-supported
rebel groups that attacked them. By 1997, Congolese rebels, Angola, Rwanda and Uganda had
united forces and swept through the DRC. They deposed Mobutu and installed a rebel leader,
Laurent-Désiré Kabila, as president.

The Canadian military could not have stopped the unfolding war. However, the GoC did not
attempt to work with the UN representatives that were seeking to adapt the mission to protect the
refugees amid the increasing violence. Despite recent Canadian experience in Rwanda, the GoC
did not demand that the UN Security Council add the removal of armed elements and
génocidaires from the refugee camps to the mandate of the peacekeeping mission. Rather, the
GoC demanded the UN Security Council to terminate the mission altogether. This was granted
despite calls from NGOs and within the UN to alleviate the desperate plight of the remaining
refugees who faced disease, starvation and violence.
40
Canadian contributions to peacekeeping
missions in the DRC and Great Lakes Region have since been “meagre,”
41
rarely deploying more
than twelve personnel at a time.

42


Mining and investments

To prove his independence from the international forces that supported him in overthrowing
Mobutu in 1997, the newly inaugurated President Kabila ordered the Rwandan and Ugandan
forces that remained in the DRC after the first war to leave in 1998. He also incited violence
against Congolese Tutsis.
43
Rwanda and Uganda invaded once more and an estimated 5.4 million
people died as a consequence of the subsequent ‘African World War’ and its lingering effects.
44

Angola, Chad, Libya, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe supported the Congolese President against
the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebel group and its allies, Burundi, Rwanda and
Uganda.
45
Over the next five years, belligerents funded their interventions by either public money
or civilian extortion, seizing the opportunities that widespread conflict afforded to generate
individual and corporate profits by looting the abundant mineral resources in the DRC.
46

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Canadian corporations were present in the DRC during the war and have a long history of
investment there and throughout Africa. In the 1980s, many small, “junior” exploration mining

companies, which raise more capital on the Canadian stock exchanges than in the United States,
South Africa and Australia combined, were the first to take advantage of new investment
opportunities in the liberalizing economies of African nations.
47
Canadian companies have
invested in the DRC since 1996,
48
attracted by relatively unexplored territories
49
and the massive
deposits of copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, tin, zinc and coltan (a component of mobile phones).
The implications of these investments are diverse. They generate needed tax revenues for the
Congolese Government. Yet Canadian companies have been identified in UN Experts’ reports
for violating international standards for corporate behaviour in developing countries (2002),
50

working in the DRC with individuals sanctioned for smuggling arms in Liberia during its civil
war (2006),
51
and exporting minerals like coltan from mines believed to be taxed by armed
groups that have committed mass rape and other atrocities (2008).
52
As recently as July 2009,
Global Witness released a report, “Faced with a Gun What Can You Do,” that yet again alleges
that Canadian companies have contributed to conflict in the DRC.

Since 2002, the GoC has been reticent in addressing allegations of wrongdoing by Canadian
companies in the DRC. After the first UN report was released, the Canadian embassy and former
Prime Ministers Chretien, Clark and Mulroney helped Canadian mining companies secure
contracts in the DRC.

53
In 2002, Canada’s special envoy to the Great Lakes Region attempted to
discredit the report in order to protect Canadian companies from scrutiny.
54
According to the
International Crisis Group, major international donor countries, including Canada, stopped
pressing for accountability and rule of law reforms in the DRC when the investment climate
began to improve in 2004.
55


In 2006, the GoC supported a series of national roundtables among representatives from
academia, civil society and industry to find ways to ensure Canadian mining companies operating
abroad adhere to social responsibility standards.
56
However, they disregarded the key
recommendations from the ensuing report authored by the Advisory Panel on Corporate Social
Responsibility. These include the creation of an independent ombudsman able to independently
instigate investigations and the implementation of binding recommendations, policy or
legislation on Canadian corporations.
57
In 2007, the Congolese Government reviewed mining
contracts entered into during the preceding war and democratic transition, a process described as
its test of will “to overcome the legacy of war profiteering and corruption and respond to the
widespread public demand for accountability and the rule of law.”
58
Two of the three biggest re-
examined contracts involved Canadian companies.
59
NGOs, the World Bank, a parliamentary

commission of the DRC, and professional consultants paid by the Bank identified problems in
these contracts that were potentially detrimental to Congolese development.
60
Despite these
findings, the GoC refused to support the process and lobbied for at least one contract.
61


Women, peace and security

While lobbying for its corporate citizens in the DRC, the GoC took on leadership roles in peace
processes that were initiated after the ceasefire attempt in 1999. Historically, through its image as
a leader in human security and development, particularly in Africa, the GoC has differentiated
itself from American foreign policy and gained diplomatic support in multilateral forums like the
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G-8 and UN.
62
This positive image allowed Canada to gain the support of all African member
states in its successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in 1999-2000.
63
It is
not surprising, then, that the GoC provided financial support and political leadership to
Congolese peace-processes for years. Since the 1999 ceasefire, Canada:

• Donated $2.5 million to support the implementation of the Lusaka accord, the 1999
ceasefire agreement;
64

• Contributed $1 million to support the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, a series of peace
talks that facilitated the design of Congolese democratic institutions as well as free
and transparent elections, and encouraged national dialogue and peaceful conflict
resolution;
65

• Co-chaired the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region, taking a lead role in
developing and implementing the Region’s new peace and stability plan;
66

• Actively supported the 2003 – 2006 democratic transition in the DRC by participating
in the international community’s Committee for Supporting the Transition in the
DRC
67
and contributed over $15 million to support the 2006 democratic elections;
68

• Financially supported the Goma Peace Process that took place in early 2008 and
produced the Amani Program that established a ceasefire, mechanisms for the
demobilization of armed groups, commitments from belligerents for the withdrawal
of troops from key areas and the creation of a UN "buffer zone” in the Kivus.
69


Unfortunately, the GoC undermined the Inter-Congolese Dialogue by sending funds late,
70

recently reduced its support for Congolese peace processes
71

and has, as shown below, repeatedly
fell short on its international commitment to secure women’s participation in peace processes.

On October 31, 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325). This
landmark resolution was the first passed by the Security Council that “specifically addresses the
impact of war on women and women's contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable
peace.”
72
Among other things, it gave UN member states, including Canada, a mandate to
promote women’s “equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and
promotion of peace and security,” and to “increase [women’s] role in decision-making with
regard to conflict prevention and resolution.”
73
The GoC has consistently failed to seize
opportunities to secure women’s participation throughout its involvement in peace processes and
democracy-building initiatives in the DRC. Initially, only one woman was designated to attend
the preparatory meeting for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
74


This dismal underrepresentation provoked Congolese women’s groups into uniting to draft the
Nairobi Declaration, demanding that women’s concerns be integrated into the peace process and
outlined a methodology to do so.
75
Ultimately, over 150 women’s organizations were mobilized
throughout the DRC with the aim of sending representatives to the Dialogue.
76
Yet only 40
women, 9% of all the delegates, attended the Dialogue.
77

Women were attacked, harassed and
threatened by conflict belligerents to prevent them from attending.
78
Despite its commitments to
the implementation of UNSCR 1325, the GoC made little effort to protect these women or to
provide them with adequate resources to attend the conference.
79
Nor did Canada use its role as a
substantial donor to the elections to press the Congolese Government to fulfill its constitutional
duty and ensure equitable women’s representation.
80
After the 2006 election, approximately 7%
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of elected officials were women.
81
The GoC also did not use its position as financial supporter to
demand women’s inclusion and participation in the subsequent Goma Peace Process and Nairobi
Accords.
82
This is an utterly shameful contradiction of our commitment to implement UNSCR
1325.

Canadian policy and conflict in the DRC today

Currently, despite improvements in bilateral relationships between the DRC and its neighbours,
local conflicts continue in the Kivus and threaten to again destabilize the Great Lakes Region.
Since the end of the second Congo war, relations between the DRC and Rwanda have been toxic,

causing ongoing conflict in the Kivus. The Congolese Government permitted the Forces
Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a Congolese-Rwandan politico-military
movement, originally composed of ex-génocidaires who fled Rwanda at the end of the 1994
genocide, to take refuge in the Kivus.
83
In turn, Rwanda exploited Congolese mineral wealth and
supported several Congolese rebel groups, most recently the Tutsi-led Congolese rebel group, Le
Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). When Rwanda arrested the leader of the
CNDP in January 2009, these relationships improved, and facilitated a peace deal in the DRC
that converted the CNDP into a Congolese political party and integrated them and several local
self defence militias (Mayi Mayi) into the government’s national army, the Forces Armées de la
République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC).

Unfortunately, this peace deal is critically endangered. Conditions in the national army for both
regular soldiers and newly integrated fighters are abysmal. Troops live in inhumane conditions
and are some of the poorest members of society in the DRC.
84
They rarely receive their salaries
on time or in full, there is a persistent lack of food and resources are simply inadequate; some
soldiers buy their own uniforms. Though the FARDC is expected to provide security to the
country, the conditions under which the soldiers live are a source of insecurity as they turn to
prey on the local population for survival.
85
They are commonly deployed far from their families;
this, coupled with an unreliable income, make the men unable to fulfill their perceived
responsibilities and sustain a family.
86
Though higher ranking officers are far more likely to have
some money, access to health care and education, and stability, they also routinely neglect the
rights of their soldiers and contribute to the indiscipline of soldiers, perpetuating civilian abuse.

The frustration and desperation borne of these conditions often encourage soldiers to desert and
return to non-state armed groups. This has contributed to the breakdown of several peace deals in
the DRC to date.
87
Several Mayi Mayi groups currently threaten to quit the process because of
FARDC’s poor living conditions and their own perceived under-representation within FARDC.
88

Some are now fighting alongside the CNDP’s key adversary, the FDLR.
89
Given the superficial
assimilation of the CNDP and Mayi Mayi into FARDC,
90
the increasing frequency of FDLR
attacks on civilians that could provoke the CNDP to regroup
91
and the numerous profiteering
opportunities that conflict in the DRC affords armed parties,
92
resurgence of full-scale war in the
Kivus and the DRC is possible.

Though the situation in the Kivus is perilous, the GoC is significantly decreasing its support and
political engagement in the DRC and throughout the Great Lakes Region. In 2007, Canada
terminated the mandate of the Canadian ambassador to the Great Lakes Region, who had
represented Canada in peace processes in the region. In 2008, when the CNDP marched on the
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capital city of North Kivu, displacing hundreds of thousands of people and unleashing a
monstrous political and humanitarian crisis, Canada was absent as, in “a flurry of international
diplomatic activity…representatives from the UN, the US and the EU all [arrived in the DRC] in
late October and early November [to reinvigorate the peace processes].”
93


Though the GoC directed $15 million to a UN Population Fund (UNFPA) initiative that aimed to
support survivors of rape in the DRC from 2005 – 2009, this money was not used effectively.
Many Congolese groups on the ground complained that the funds were directed to support the
bureaucracy of various initiatives rather than survivors and did not ‘integrate the experience of
local NGOs.’
94
The GoC has an obligation to support Congolese women and must ensure that
Canadian tax dollars that are allocated for aid are used efficiently. In 2009, the GoC shifted the
focus of its official development assistance from Africa to Latin America. The DRC was not
identified as one of the Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA) priority countries
to receive bilateral assistance. Disconcertingly, the GoC has recently instructed its foreign service
not to use the terms “gender equality,” “justice for victims,” “impunity” and “international
humanitarian law.”
95
The ramifications of excluding these terms from our foreign policy lexicon
are real and sobering and have life and death implications for civilians in the Congo. At a time
when the international community is taking a renewed and robust interest in ending impunity and
promoting equality and justice, Canada is no longer a leader in this realm. President Barack
Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton have demonstrated strong leadership in African
development and security through two visits to Africa since coming to power in January 2009.
Canada has a long history of showing leadership in addressing political and humanitarian crises,
but has increasingly lost prestige on the world stage for its recent reversal in commitments to

global justice and equality.

The GoC has demonstrated that the DRC is no longer a foreign policy priority despite shared
economic, cultural and political links. Worst of all, the GoC is destroying its ability to effectively
address mass rape in the worst place in the world to be a woman or a girl, a place from which
Canada has a history of profiting politically and economically. In a region where impunity for
rapists keeps all females under constant threat, a region where justice is denied daily to survivors
of some of the most horrific crimes that have ever occurred and a region where international
humanitarian law is the tool through which the world can collectively denounce mass rape, the
current Canadian policies towards the DRC are not acceptable.

“Canadian diplomats that were [in the DRC] showed no interest at all [in committing to acting to
stop the vicious cycle of violence and control in the region]. I would regularly brief diplomats
from the UK, U.S., European Union, Belgium, occasionally France. Never saw a Canadian. I
tried, no interest."
96
Dr. Philip Lancaster, retired Canadian major and recent head of the UN's
demobilization program in the DRC (2007-2008).

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THE RISE OF MASS RAPE IN THE DRC

Women’s and girls’ bodies as the battlefield of war

Women and girls are disproportionately affected economically, physically, politically and
socially by conflict in the Kivus. Armed groups, including FARDC and the Congolese police,
commit campaigns against women, structured around rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage.

97

Social stigma has led husbands and families to abandon survivors or marry them to attackers.
98

Women who give birth to children conceived by rape are often ostracized by their families and
their children rejected by their communities.
99
Livelihood opportunities are destroyed, food
security is compromised and access to education is restricted as women and girls monitor their
movements and stay home from school and their fields to avoid the armed groups that patrol their
communities.
100
In 2006, a ‘landmark sexual violence law,’ that provided a strong legal
framework to prosecute rapists was implemented in the DRC.
101
In 2008, the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 1820 (UNSCR 1820), which demanded a cessation to the use of
sexual violence and rape as a weapon of armed conflict. However, law enforcement and justice
authorities are unable, or unwilling, to enforce the law.
102
Soldiers and police officers have been
accused of rape and, though many senior officers have been implicated in rape, the most senior
officer convicted of crimes of sexual violence in the Kivus to date has been a captain—no major,
lieutenant colonel, colonel or general has ever been prosecuted.
103
Impunity permits armed
groups to intimidate the survivors, witnesses and human rights defenders who try to report
attacks.
104

Because of these factors, women are reluctant to reveal their rape status and seek
medical care.
105
The need for support is great; in some areas in the Kivus, as many as 22 per cent
of female rape victims become HIV-positive,
106
approximately 20 per cent will suffer irreparable
damage to their genital organs as a result of rape
107
and approximately half will develop clinical
symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
108


Ongoing conflict has disintegrated the relationships between men and women in the Kivus and
entrenched a social system that promotes the use of rape as a tool for violent armed men to
exercise power over women, girls and communities. Some explanations for the onset and
unprecedented severity of the mass rape crisis are found by analyzing a unique combination of
conditions specific to the Kivus: women’s and girls’ subordinate position in Congolese society,
decades of economic ruin caused by a parasitic government and the resulting military culture of
abuse, repeated foreign military interventions and the ubiquitous presence of mineral wealth.

Inequality: precursor to crisis

Before the wars, Congolese women and girls were legally and socially defined as subordinate to
men.
109
Their participation in society was restricted; many girls were forced to marry early and
had limited access to education and ownership of land and property.
110

In contrast, Congolese
men were socially defined as breadwinners, the purchasers of marriage and protective,
controlling and virile husbands who were free to engage in extra-marital relationships.
111


An unequal and abusive relationship between civilians and the military was entrenched during
the final years of Mobutu’s parasitic rule that destroyed the Congolese economy and ruined
public service infrastructure. With Mobutu’s direct encouragement, a culture of ‘la
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débrouillardise,’ was established throughout the DRC, which literally encouraged people to fend
for themselves by whatever means necessary.
112
This extended to the soldiers and police officers
who were rarely paid their meagre salaries or provided food rations.
113
Under la débrouillardise,
they provided for themselves and their families by imposing illegal taxes and fines and by using
violence to steal from civilians.
114
The abusive soldier-civilian relationship was so extreme that
the Congolese embodied this relationship in the popular expression: civil azali bilanga ya
militaire, ‘the civilian is the [corn] field of the military.’
115


The Kivu Provinces in the DRC: At the centre of ‘Africa’s World War’

The outbreak of war in the DRC exacerbated the abusive and unequal woman-man and military-
civilian relationships, instigating the mass rape crisis. As foreign armies invaded and violence
broke out, hundreds of thousands of families were separated.
116
Many women and girls were
displaced from their families and farms, cut off from their male relatives’ income and forced to
turn to ‘survival sex’ with the comparatively wealthy foreign soldiers who occupied the DRC.
117

Many male Congolese were unable to live up to their expected societal roles and were
emasculated.
118
Additionally, government soldiers, whose living conditions before the war were
grim, were deployed far from their families and surrounded by the “craziness of war,” and its
accompanying psychological trauma.
119
Rape became an outlet for a “general wish to destroy”
caused by “suffering and frustration.”
120
This was made worse by the Rwandan and Ugandan
invasions into the DRC which exacerbated or introduced ethnic conflict.
121
Targeted rape,
reminiscent of the Rwandan genocide, broke out.
122
In retaliation, many Congolese men joined
‘ethnicized’ armed groups; controlling, humiliating, and torturing rivals by targeting the
traditional ‘heart’ of their communities – women – through rape.
123

Emasculated and frustrated
men retaliated with violence, provoking a cycle of rape, militarization and more violence.
124
The
arrival of the UN Organization Mission in DRC (MONUC) in 1999 did little to alleviate the
situation; within four years of its deployment widespread abuses perpetrated by peacekeepers,
including rape and sexual exploitation, were discovered.
125


Long-term peace in the DRC requires addressing this social breakdown. However, action is
needed now to stop the catastrophe in the Kivus’ conflict zones, where the majority of the 1,100
rapes reported each month in the DRC occur.
126
Here, in the presence of the Kivus’ abundant
mineral resources, the use of mass rape has diversified. In addition to being a tool for obliterating
the social fabric of rival groups and reinforcing a male’s masculinity, rape is also a tactic for
securing profit through the control of mineral wealth. By using mass rape to terrorize
communities, armed groups force them to submit to the militarized confiscation of their lands
and its abundant mineral wealth.
127


The Kivus also border three countries, and profiteering opportunities lure local and foreign
groups. Some Mayi Mayi have stopped defending local populations and exist solely to profit
from mining.
128
As long as certain FARDC commanders continue to profit from mining, it will
not be in their interest to end the conflict in Kivus.
129

The Rwandan and Ugandan governments
and their supported rebel groups are repeatedly implicated in illegal mineral exploitation in the
Kivus.
130
Income generation from mining motivates the FDLR not to disarm and repatriate to
Rwanda.
131
Though these groups rarely fight each other for control of resources, many use
mining proceeds to purchase the weapons from FARDC, one of the largest perpetrators of rape,
to carry out their terror campaigns against communities.
132
The impact of ubiquitous
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militarization in the Kivus’ conflict zones is clear; though rape perpetrated by civilians is on the
rise, armed groups are responsible for 81 per cent of rapes.
133
This is where armed groups have
consolidated their economic bases, becoming ever more entrenched.
134
Women are desperately
fighting to survive here, where the economic and social factors that continually promote rape
intersect with the politics of impunity.

A vibrant civil society: hope amid crisis

It is rightly acknowledged that the Kivus’ conflicts and Congo wars produced barbarism, horror
and evil. There must also be recognition for the humanity and heroism of many Congolese

women and men who are the long-term hope of their society. Dr. Jo Lusi, an internationally
respected Congolese orthopaedic surgeon, works in conflict prone North Kivu, running a hospital
that provides free holistic care to thousands of survivors of rape each year. Dr. Denis Mukwege, a
Congolese gynaecologist recognized as ‘African of the Year’, performs hundreds of free vaginal
reconstruction surgeries in South Kivu each year to restore health and dignity to survivors of
rape. Members of the South Kivu Women's Media Association, a group of young women
journalists and broadcasters, risk their lives to publicly share rape survivors’ stories.
135
Chouchou
Namegabe, the leader of this association, risked retaliatory violence from perpetrators by publicly
denouncing sexual crimes before the International Criminal Court and United States Senate.
136

Justine Masika of North Kivu continues to document rape with the Congolese women’s
organization, Synergie des femmes contre les violence sexuelles, despite having to send her
family overseas to protect them from violent retribution.
137
In 2002, Congolese women from
diverse backgrounds united at a peace talk to form a human wall that physically prevented armed
parties from abandoning the talks.
138
There are hundreds of thousands of unsung heroes in the
Kivus, like the father of Munguiko, a nine-year-old Congolese girl, who walked through a
conflict zone for three days with his daughter to find her life saving medical care after a violent
rebel attack.
139


Too often, the strength of Congolese society is not harnessed by large-scale international aid
efforts. Civil society, particularly Congolese women’s groups, have firsthand information about

attacks in their communities, a wealth of experience caring for survivors of rape and the bravery
to advocate for their rights to security and equality in the midst of the war that has singled out
their bodies as the battlefield. Canadians have a stake in the worst place in the world to be a
woman or a girl and have both the ability and the responsibility to listen to and partner with the
international and grassroots communities to take co-ordinated action in accordance with the
demands of the affected to help stop mass rape in the DRC. We must ensure that the result of
Canadian mining contracts, peacekeepers, support for peace talks and foreign aid is a positive
legacy.

‘I come to these meetings on violence against women. It is always a so-called expert talking about
us rape survivors. I have never seen that they give the floor to us to talk about ourselves. We have
a voice and we can articulate what has happened to us and how that has impacted our lives.’
Honorata Kizende, survivor and Congolese activist
140

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RECOMMENDATIONS


PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY

In the Kivus, rape is commonly used to terrorize communities into submitting to the militarized
occupation of their lands so that armed group can sustain themselves by reaping the benefits of
the DRC’s abundant and lucrative mineral wealth found in the areas under their control.
141

Because Canadian companies are major investors in the DRC’s mining industry and were
accused of wrongdoing there and because millions of Canadians carry a piece of the DRC’s
conflict with them everyday in their cell phones and electronics, Canada must:

1. Adopt and legislate the recommendations of the Advisory Panel on Corporate Social
Responsibility

In particular, an independent ombudsman office that is capable of independently investigating
allegations of misconduct must be created. This will help ensure that Canadian companies do not
directly or indirectly contribute to the conflict economy in the Kivus that fuels war and instigates
rape.

2. Work with the UN Group of Experts on the DRC to develop a map of mineral-rich zones in
the Kivus

This will remove the excuse that companies are unaware of which areas are controlled by armed
groups. The Group has already collected information on the locations of armed groups and needs
technical and financial support to compile data on mineral-rich areas and to make the map
accessible to the global public. Canada, as the largest non-African investor in the DRC's mining
industry and global leader in mineral exploration, has a wealth of knowledge about the mineral
geography of the DRC and Kivus and would be a logical contributor to this project.

3. Modify Export Development Canada’s regulatory legislation

The needed modifications include the creation of binding human rights standards and elimination
of legislation that permits Canadian companies working in conflict zones to withhold 'privileged'
information. The GoC must ensure that there is full public access for information about the
location and activities of Canadian companies. This will simplify efforts to monitor companies
that operate in conflict zones or companies that violate human rights standards.
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INVEST LOCALLY

Congolese women are not passive victims of war; they are an integral part of the DRC’s vibrant
civil society that is fighting in the face of incredible adversity to ensure human security and
dignity for all Congolese. Now is the time for Canada to capitalize on the Congolese civil
society’s many experiences with campaigns against sexual violence and support for democratic
reform and peace processes in the DRC. It can do so by investing in local Congolese women's
groups that best understand how to care for survivors of rape and promote positive social change
in their communities.
142
As many attacks occur in areas where only local NGOs are present
143

and survivors benefit from assistance from women who share their cultural and linguistic
background,
144
funding responsible local women’s groups and building their capacity will ensure
immediate access to effective medical care and long-term psycho-social support for rape
survivors.

Because the GoC did not fulfil its commitment to implement UNSCR 1325 in the DRC,
prioritized corporate lobbying over defending Congolese women's lives and failed to
effectively allocate aid dollars to support survivors of rape Canada must:

1. Make long-term funding available to grassroots women’s groups in the Kivus

To do this, add the DRC to the Canadian Global Peace and Security Fund priority countries list

and create a fund in CIDA that routes money through Canadian and African NGOs that have
experience vetting and working with credible grassroots Congolese women’s groups. Canadian
organizations such as Oxfam Québec, the Stephen Lewis Foundation and the African
Organization ‘Femme Africa Solidarité’ have experience working with the GoC and supporting
and vetting credible grassroots organizations in the Kivus that provide care to survivors of rape.
Funds should support projects and initiatives as well pay salaries and fund administrative
infrastructure (furniture, fixtures and equipment), to ensure organization sustainability.
145


2. Support grassroots women’s involvement in the democratic processes

In 2006, Canada gave political support and $9 million in funding to the DRC’s national elections.
Despite the Congolese government’s constitutional commitments and the Canadian
government’s commitments to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and other international
agreements, to actively seek equitable women’s representation in government, neither
government fulfilled their obligations; a meagre 7% of elected Congolese officials are women.
146

Canada can re-invest in the 2011 national Congolese elections and fund credible Canadian and
African NGOs that are working to engender the democratic process in the DRC.
147
This will
build long-term grassroots capacity and prevent post-election ‘brain-drain’ that occurs if the best
and brightest leaders of these groups are elected.
148
Canada must help stop rape in the DRC and
fulfill its international commitments, like the implementation of UNSCR 1325, which calls for
all countries to ensure the “increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in
national, regional and international institutions.”

149
By doing this, Canada will promote women’s
rights and peace throughout the DRC by capitalizing on elected women’s proven ability to
promote healthy gender roles
150
and create laws that protect women’s and children’s rights and
security.
151

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3. Renew the mandate of the Canadian ambassador to the Great Lakes Region

Over the last five years, Canadian policy in the DRC has eroded Canada’s credibility to engage in
Congolese peace-building initiatives. Additionally, Canada has little political representation in
many of the countries in the Great Lakes Region that border the DRC; Burundi, the DRC,
Rwanda, Uganda and 13 other countries are all represented by the Canadian High Commission in
Kenya.
152
Canadian history in the DRC should compel Canadian engagement with Congolese
peace processes. Given that conflict in the DRC, especially in the Kivus, is intertwined with
conflicts in border countries in the Great Lakes Region, Canada must therefore renew the
mandate of the Canadian ambassador to the Great Lakes Region to build a political presence in
this region that will facilitate contributions to peace-building processes in this region.


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END IMPUNITY

Canada can help end the impunity that kills Congolese women and girls. Congolese civil society
is leading an inspiring fight for justice, despite the terrifying obstacles. Canada must join and
support them by actively fighting impunity from within its own borders, in international arenas
and through the Congolese security sector.

Because UN requests for Canadian peacekeepers to bolster missions in the DRC were
disregarded and because alleged war criminals live on Canadian soil un-investigated and
un-sanctioned, Canada must:

1. End impunity for war criminals in Canada

The Canadian war crimes unit, whose efforts led to the recent conviction of a Rwandan
génocidaire in a Québec Superior Court,

carries out investigations and prosecutions with an
annual budget of $15.6 million, mostly used for deportations.
153
The GoC must increase funding
to the Justice and RCMP departments in the Canadian war crimes unit, to facilitate more
investigations and trials of suspected war criminals residing in Canada. Specifically, Canada
must investigate and try known and suspected members of the FDLR and other Congolese rebel
groups living on Canadian soil. Additionally, the International Crisis Group recommends that
Canada work with partners such as the European Union and United States to prevent known
FDLR leaders residing in their borders from fundraising and disseminating propaganda.
154

2. End impunity for war criminals in the Kivus and DRC

To date, no charges have been laid for suspected mass rape in the DRC by the International
Criminal Court (ICC). Considering existing admissible evidence,
155
the GoC must join with
Congolese civil society and immediately call on trial judges in the Thomas Lubanga case at the
International Criminal Court (ICC) to add charges of sexual slavery and cruel and inhumane
treatment. The GoC must demand that the Congolese Government surrender Bosco Ntaganda to
the ICC and that the ICC investigate his alleged use of rape as a weapon of war. Canada must
also work with Congolese civil society so that resources are in place to ensure the safety of
witnesses who risk harassment or death upon returning home after giving testimony before the
ICC.

3. Establish an international commission to investigate crimes of sexual violence

As part of its campaign for a non-permanent chair on the UN Security Council (UNSC) for 2011-
12, Canada should join local women’s groups call for the establishment of a UNSC-led
international commission to investigate crimes of sexual violence committed in the Kivus since
the official end of hostilities in the second Congo war, July 1, 2002.
156
Canada must provide
adequate resources for the commission to conduct investigations and secure the input of
community-based organizations, which have firsthand evidence about incidents in their areas.
157


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4. Support gender-sensitive security sector reform in the DRC

Through the Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP) Canada can provide gender training
to MONUC peacekeepers, to safeguard women’s needs.
158
According to Canadian General Rick
Hillier, Canadian Forces are especially valued by African nations not only for their professional
skills, but also for their bilingual capacity and lack of colonial baggage.
159
Despite Canada’s
limited ability to send formed peacekeeping units to MONUC, Canada can provide strategic
leadership to MONUC and “influence the pace and tone of operations”
160
by committing to
sending Force commanders and other high-ranking officers to MONUC.


‘I will not be ashamed or keep a secret of how they raped me and ripped my genitals all the way to
the back. I'm not healed, I'm hurting. I'm not going to hide it.’ Survivor
161



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REFERENCES AND RESOURCES



1International Rescue Committee (IRC), “Congo Crisis,” (New York, N.Y: IRC, 2007), available at
s/2007/congoonesheet.pdf, accessed 3 July 2009.
2 Eve Ensler and Stephen Lewis, “The Never Ending War,” The Huffington Post, 12 December 2008, available at
accessed 30 August 2009.
3 Stephanie Nolan, "Rape again rampant in Congo; In the mineral-rich east, home to no fewer than 23 armed groups, the epidemic of rape has
flared in a vicious new outbreak with renewed fighting," the Globe and Mail, 18 October 2008, available through Lexis Nexis Academic Search
at isne xis.com/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do, accessed 16 July 2009.
4 Yakin Ertürk, “Violence against women in armed conflict: The case of DRC,” Utenriksdepartementet E-note, 2008, available at
/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/menneskerettigheter/erturk.html?id=535163, accessed 15 July 2009.
5 Jeffrey Gettlemen, “Clinton Presses Congo on Minerals,” The New York Times, 10 August 2009, available at
/08/11/world/africa/11diplo.html?hp, accesses 15 August 2009.
6 IRIN, “DRC:

Rape crisis set to worsen amid Kivu chaos,” 19 November 2009, available at

accessed 15 August 2009; see also UN Dispatch, “9-Year-Old Raped in "One of the
Worst Places to be a Woman or Girl,” 11 August 2009, available at accessed 15 August 2009.
7 Canadian military observers have been deployed on Operation “Crocodile” in the DRC since November 1999, and, moreover, Operations
“Lance” in Rwanda, “Scotch” in the DRC, and “Passage” in Rwanda and “Assurance” in the DRC all testify to Canadian military involvement
in this region, however meagre. Canada’s involvement with the peace process in the Congo dates back to the first United Nations (UN) operation
between 1960 and 1964, see, Olivier Lanotte, reviewed by Major Roy Thomas, ret’d, “GUERRES SANS FRONTIÈRES EN RÉPUBLIQUE
DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO,” Canadian Military Journal Spring 2004, 60, available
accessed 15 May 2009; also Canada participated in the French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force that was deployed to Bunia, in the
DRC, at the request from the United Nations for assistance in restoring order in that region. Canada deployed two CC-130 Hercules tactical
transport aircraft and about 50 CF personnel, detached from the Tactical Airlift Detachment (TAL Det) deployed in the Persian Gulf (Arabian
Gulf) region; see, National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Operation CARAVAN: June 8 2003 - July 6 2003,” available at

accessed 02 September 2009.
8 Canada donated $2.5 million to support the implementation of the 1999 ceasefire that marked the first attempt to bring the second Congo war
to an end and contributed $1 million to support the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, a series of peace talks that facilitated the design of Congolese
democratic institutions as well as free and transparent elections, and encouraged national dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution, see,
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), “Canada Announces Projects to Support Peace Process in Democratic Republic
of the Congo,” 24 January 2009 available at 445
&dictum=9, accessed 24 August 2009; Canada also Co-chaired the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region, taking a lead role in developing
and implementing the Region’s new peace and stability plan, see, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, “Statement issued by
Canada on the occasion of the UN Security Council High-Level Meeting on Regional Organizations, particularly the African Union and the joint
meeting of UN Security Council—African Union Peace and Security Council,” 16 April 2008, available at
,”
accessed 25 August 2009; Canada actively supported the 2003 – 2006 democratic transition in the DRC by contributing over $15 million to
support the 2006 democratic elections and deploying military observers to monitor the elections, see, DFAIT, “Canada Welcomes Second Round
of Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 30 October 2008, available at
d=384507&lang=eng&docnum=124; Canada also supported the
democratic transition by actively participating in the international Comité international d’Accompagnement de la Transition [ in the DRC], see,
CIDA, “Canada and the G8 Africa Action Plan: Maintaining the Momentum,”2004, 12, available at i-
cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/Canada_Fundm_f or_Africa/$file/G8-Interim-Report-2004-EN.pdf, accessed 15 August 2008;
finally Canada financially supported the Goma Peace Process that took place in early 2008 and produced that Amani Program that established a
ceasefire, mechanisms for the demobilization of armed groups, commitments from belligerents for the withdrawal of troops from key areas and
the creation of a UN "buffer zone” in the Kivus, see, Surendrini Wijeyaratne, “Promoting an Inclusive Peace: A Call to Strengthen Canada’s
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Peace-Making Capacity: Is Canada Turning Its Back on the Democratic Republic of Congo?,” A Canadian Council for International Co-
operation Country Study Discussion Paper (November 2008), 2, available at cess_seminar.shtml, accessed
15 July 2009.

9 Statement by Ken Sunquist, Assistant Deputy Minister, (Asia and Africa) and Chief Trade Commissioner, DFAIT at the Parliament, 2nd
Session of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development on 13 May, 2009. Transcribed report available at,
ublication.aspx?DocId=3896964&Language =E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#T1535, accessed 12
July, 2009.
10 Digital Congo, “Le Premier ministre informé des activités des sociétés canadiennes en Rdc,” 8 June 2009, available at
accessed 15 July 2009.
11

In spite of Canada’s participation in voluntary corporate social responsibility initiatives, Canadian companies have been mentioned in United
Nations Experts’ reports for being in violation of OECD principles (2002), see the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),“Report of the
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(S/2002/1146),” Para 33, 45; annex pages 8 – 10; available at www.un.org, accessed November 2008; for working in the DRC with individuals
sanctioned for smuggling arms in Liberia during its civil war (2006), see both, UNSC, “Letter dated 15 June 2006 from the Group of Experts on
the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533
(2004) (S/2006/525),” available at www.un.org, accessed November 2008, and, UNSC, “List of Individuals and Entities Subject to the
Measures Contained in Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 1532 (2004) Concerning Liberia (The Assets Freeze List),” available at
www.un.org, accessed 15 July 2009; for exporting minerals like cassiterite, coltan and wolframite from mines believed to be taxed by armed
groups that have committed mass rape and other atrocities (2008), see, UNSC, “Letter dated 21 November 2008 from the Group of Experts on
the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533
(2004) (S/2008/773),” 32, available at www.un.org, accessed 30 May 2009; finally, Global Witness released a report in July, 2009, “Faced with
a Gun What Can You Do,” that yet again alleges that Canadian companies have contributed to conflict in the DRC.
12 For example see, Enough! Project, “Eastern DRC: Roots of the Crisis,” available at
accessed 15 August 2009.
13 Nearly three-quarters (74.3%) of Canadian households indicated they had a cell phone in 2008, see, Statistics Canada “Residential Telephone
Service Survey,” December 2008, available at accessed 28 August 2009.
This does not factor in the many more Canadians that own computers, gaming consoles and other electronics with Congolese coltan. Currently,
international monitoring systems that trace the origins of coltan do not exist so it is not possible to definitively quantify how many electronics in
Canada contain Congolese coltan. However, approximately 20% of the world’s coltan comes from the eastern DRC which is mixed with coltan
from other parts of the world as it is shipped to smelters, processors and chemical processing plants around the world, see, Enough! Project and
Grassroots Reconciliation Group, “A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals,” Strategy Paper, 24 April 2009, available at

accessed 20 April 2009. Because the
coltan in electronics is a mixture of ores from around the world, on average one fifth of the coltan found in a given coltan-containing electronic
device will be Congolese. Therefore millions of Canadians own Congolese coltan, given that virtually all Canadians will own at least one cell
phone, computer, gaming console, music player or other coltan containing electronic device.
14 Enough! Project.
15 UNSC

(S/2008/773), 32.
16 Surendrini Wijeyaratne, 5.
17 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Caribbean, Colombia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Mali, Mozambique, Pakistan, Peru,
Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Ukraine, Vietnam, West Bank/Gaza are designated to receive 80 per cent of Canada’s bilateral assistance, see, CIDA,
“Canada Moves on Another Element of its Aid Effectiveness Agenda,” 23 February 2009, available at i-
cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NAT-223132931-PPH, accessed 24 February 2009.
18

Lee Berthiaume, “Tories Elected to Set Foreign Policy: Cannon,” Embassy, 5 August 2009, available at assy
mag.ca/page/view/ tories_elected _foreign_policy-8-5-2009, accessed 8 August 2009.

19 As stated by Chouchou Namegabe, founder, South Kivu Women’s Media Association in the DRC to the United States Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Human Rights, Democracy and Global Women’s Issues; and
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the Subcommittee on African Affairs for the Hearing, see, San Francisco Bay View, “’Help us heal our nation’: Confronting rape and other
forms of violence against women in conflict zones,” 18 May 2009, available at E2%80%98help-us-heal-our-
nation%E2%80%99-confronting-rape-and-other-forms-of-violence-against-women-in-conflict-zones/, accessed 17 August 2009.
20United Nations (UN) Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “Consideration of reports submitted by States parties

under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Combined fourth and fifth periodic
reports of States parties: Democratic Republic of the Congo (CEDAW/C/COD/4-5),” 2, available at www.un.org, accessed 3 July 2009.
21, International Crisis Group (ICG), “Congo: 5 Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy,” Policy Paper (11 May 2009), iii, available at,
cuments/africa/central_africa/150_congo____five_priori ties_for_a_peacebuilding_strategy.pdf, accessed
12 May 2009
.
22Olivier Lanotte, 60.
23For examples, see, ICG, iii; Morten Bøås, “”Just Another Day”—The North Kivu Security Predicament After the 2006 Congolese Elections,”
Journal of African Security, 1, no.1 (2008), 62 – 63; also see, Chris Huggins, Prisca Kamungi, Joan Kariuki, Herman Musahara, Johnstone
Summit Oketch, Koen Vlassenroot and Judi W. Wakhungu, 12 – 13, and, Laura Davis and Priscilla Hayner, “Difficult Peace, Limited Justice:
Ten Years of Peacemaking in the DRC,” International Center for Transitional Justice Report, 23, March 2009, available at
Africa/DRC/ICTJDavisHayner_DRC_DifficultPeace_pa2009.pdf, accessed 2 June 2009.
24 Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War (North America: Oxford University Press, 2009), xxxi.
25 Directorate of History Canadian Forces Headquarters, “Canada and Peacekeeping Operations: The Congo, 1960-64,” Report No.8, para 59,
16 June 1966, available at accessed 25 August 2009.
26 Ibid., para 63.
27 Ibid., para 111.
28 Gérard Prunier, 73 – 99.
29 Dr. Michael A. Hennessy, “Operation “Assurance”: Planning a Multi-National Force For Rwanda/Zaïre,” Canadian Military Journal, Spring
(2001), 11, available at accessed 15 May 2009.
30 Ibid., 27.
31Gérard Prunier, 25 – 26.
32 Dr. Michael A. Hennessy, 12.
33 Ibid., 12.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 14.
38

For the 650,000 estimate see Gérard Prunier, 123; for the 200,000 estimate see Dr. Michael A. Hennessy, 16.
39 The government of Canada deployed 354 of 1,500 promised peacekeepers. Ibid., 13.
40 Ibid., 14.
41 Olivier Lanotte, 60.
42 Since 1999 Canada has deployed a 8 – 12 member task force composed of staff officers with expertise in fields such as law, information
operations and training who work at MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa and the divisional headquarters in Goma, see, National Defence and the
Canadian Forces, “Operation CROCODILE,” available at accessed
30 August 2090. The one exception was in 2003 when Canada participated in the French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force that was
deployed to Bunia, in the DRC, at the request from the United Nations for assistance in restoring order in that region. Canada deployed two CC-
130 Hercules tactical transport aircraft and about 50 CF personnel, detached from the Tactical Airlift Detachment (TAL Det) deployed in the
Persian Gulf (Arabian Gulf) region; see, National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Operation CARAVAN: June 8 2003 - July 6 2003.”
43 Gérard Prunier, 149 – 172.
44 IRC, “Congo Crisis.”
45 Gérard Prunier, 181 – 233.
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46
Kevin C. Dunn, “A Survival Guide to Kinshasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the Son,” in John F. Clark, ed.,

The African Stakes of the Congo War (United States of
America: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

47 David Black and Malcolm Savage, “Mainstreaming Investment: Assessing the foreign policy implications of Canadian Extractive Industries
in Africa,” Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Assocation, Saskatoon, SK, May 2007, 10.
48

Gérard Prunier, 138.
49

Stratos Inc., “Risks, Responsibilities and Real Benefits: Mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Workshop Report,” Export
Development Canada Workshop, 19 June 2007, available at, ependent__report_e.pdf, accessed 4 June
2009.
50 This refers to the OECD guidelines, which oblige multi national corporations working in developing countries with weak regulatory capacity
to honour the norms and laws in the jurisdictions they call home, see, UNSC, “(S/2002/1146).” para 33, 45; annex pages 8 – 10.
51 See both, UNSC, “(S/2006/525),” and, UNSC, “List of Individuals and Entities Subject to the Measures Contained in Paragraph 1 of Security
Council Resolution 1532 (2004) Concerning Liberia (The Assets Freeze List).”
52 UNSC (S/2008/773), para, 127-131.
53 Jim Freedman, “International Remedies for Resource based Conflict,” International Journal, no.62 (winter 2006-2007), 108-119.Alan
Freeman, “Canadian Ex-Prime Minister influence peddling for Canadian firms,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 5 March 2005, available online at
accessed 10 July 2009.
54 Jim Freedman, 112.
55 Carter Center, “Review of DRC Mining Contracts - Update and Recommendations,” Carter Center Report, 30 November 2007, 1, available
at accessed 20 June 2009.
56 Lee Berthiaume, “Corporate Social Responsibility Rules for Mining Industry Blasted,” Embassy, 1 April 2009, available
bassymag.ca/page/view/rules_mining-4-1-2009, accessed 1 June 2009.
57 Ibid.
58 Carter Center, 1.
59 Stratos Inc.
60 Carter Center, 1.
61 Carter Center, 8.
62 David Black and Malcolm Savage, 7.
63 Ibid.
64 DFAIT, “Canada Announces Projects to Support Peace Process in Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
65 Ibid.
66 Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, “Statement issued by Canada on the occasion of the UN Security Council High-Level
Meeting on Regional Organizations, particularly the African Union and the joint meeting of UN Security Council—African Union Peace and

Security Council.”
67 CIDA, “Canada and the G8 Africa Action Plan: Maintaining the Momentum,” 12; finally Canada financially supported the Goma Peace
Process that took place in early 2008 and produced that Amani Program that established a ceasefire, mechanisms for the demobilization of
armed groups, commitments from belligerents for the withdrawal of troops from key areas and the creation of a UN "buffer zone” in the Kivus,
see, Surendrini Wijeyaratne, 2.

Canada actively supported the 2003 – 2006 democratic transition in the DRC by contributing over $15 million to
support the 2006 democratic elections and deploying military observers to monitor the elections, see, DFAIT, “Canada Welcomes Second Round
of Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
68

DFAIT, “Canada Welcomes Second Round of Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
69

Surendrini Wijeyaratne, 2.
70 Rights & Democracy, “Strong Contingent of Peacekeepers needed in Congo-Kinshasa,” 17 December 1999, available at -
rd.ca/site/media/index

.php?id=470&subsection=news, accessed 9 July 2009.
71 Surendrini Wijeyaratne, 2.
72 Peace Woman, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 On Women, Peace and Security,” available at
1325.html, accessed 15 July 2009.
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73 Ibid.
74

Nadine Puechguirbal, “Women and War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society, 28, no.4
(2003), 1275 available at
b0%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3Q

tbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=sih&AN=10448025, accessed via Ebsco database, 3 July 2009.
75 Ibid , 1276.
76 Ibid., 1275.
77 Ibid.
78

Ibid.
79

Under UNSCR 1325 both Canadian and the DRC governments should be committed to, “ensuring increased representation of women at all
decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of
conflict,” and, “increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts,” see, UNSC, “Resolution
1325 (S/RES/1325/2000),” available at accessed
June 2008; despite this, male Congolese representatives, including the official government, were reluctant to see a strong female representation at
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and donors, including Canada, did not make adequate funds and resources available for women to fully participate,
see, Michael Fleshman, “African women struggle for a seat at the peace table,” Africa Recovery, 16, no.4 (February 2003), 1, available at
6no4/164wm1.htm, accessed 9 July 2009; also see, Rights and Democracy; finally during the
recent peace processes, the Goma and Nairobi Agreements, women were not fully included, see, Surendrini Wijeyaratne, 2.
80

Article 14 of the constitution of the DRC states that, “The public authorities shall ensure the elimination of all forms of discrimination
against women and ensure the protection and promotion of their rights. They take in all fields, particularly in the civil, political, economic, social
and cultural fields, all appropriate measures to ensure full development and full participation of women in the development of the nation. They
take measures against all forms of violence against women in public life and private life. The woman is entitled to equitable representation in
national institutions, provincial and local. The State guarantees the implementation of gender in these institutions. The law establishes the

procedures for implementing these rights.” Translated, from French, using Google Translator. Constitution of the DRC available at
www.wikipedia.org, accessed 15 July 2009.
81 VDAY, “Sexual Violence in the DRC: Background,” available at o/background, accessed 25 August 2009.
82 Women interviewed after the Goma Conference said that these issues were not sufficiently discussed and much more work needs to be done
to ensure women’s issues are included in the implementation of the agreements. Additionally, these initiatives were described as, “agreements
between men from armed groups and mostly arrived at through “behind-the-scenes” negotiations,” see Surendrini Wijeyaratne, 2.
83 IRIN, “DRC: MONUC denounces coalition between Mayi-Mayi and Rwandan rebels,” 15 July 2009, available at nnews.o
rg/Report.aspx?ReportId=85170, accessed 15 July 2009.
84

Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, “Making Sense of Violence: Voices of Soldiers in the Congo (DRC),” Journal of Modern African
Studies, 46, no.1 (2008), 64.
85 Ibid., 64.
86 Ibid.
87 IRIN.
88 Radio France Internationale, “DR Congo: Militia group threatens to quit peace process,” British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 13 May
2009, available through

Lexis Nexis Academic Search at accessed 9 July
2009.
89 IRIN.
90 Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert, “Mapping Conflict Motives: Kivus,” International Peace Information Service (IPIS) Research Project
Publication, March 2008, 12, available at />full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf, accessed 12 June 2009; also see, Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, “Kivu’s Intractable Security
Conundrum,” Journal of African Affairs 108, no. 432 (May 2009), available at accessed
July 2, 2009.
91 HRW, “DR Congo: Massive Increase in Attacks on Civilians,” 2 July 2009 available at news/2009/07/02/dr-congo-
massive-increase-attacks-civilians, accessed 15 July, 2009.
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92 This has been extensively documented throughout both media and academia, for example, see, UNSC, “Report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/357),” available at www.un.org, accessed November
2008.
93 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Congo (Dem Rep) politics: On hold,” EIU Country Briefings, 30 October 2008, available at
eVW3&article_id=973911682&region_id=&country_id=1240000324&ch
nnel_id=210004021&category_id=&refm=vwCh&page_title=Channel+ Latest&rf=0, accessed 10 June 2009.
94

The Congolese Women’s Campaign Against Sexual Violence in the DRC, sponsored by the Canadian Rights and Democracy Organization,
has called on Canada, and other donor countries to, “restructure the joint initiative against sexual violence in the DRC so as to integrate the
experience of local NGOs in the development and implementation of programs to curb the scourge of sexual violence,” see, Congolese Women’s
Campaign Against Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Homepage:
accessed 10 June 2009; also, “Representatives of civil society organizations working for victims of sexual violence also complained that UNFPA
funds have not translated into direct victim assistance and many suspect that the money has gone to administrative costs, international salaries
and UN system overhead costs,” see, Surendrini Wijeyaratne, 2.
95

Lee Berthiaume, “Tories Elected to Set Foreign Policy: Cannon.”
96 Michelle Collins, “Reliving Rwandan Horrors in the DR Congo: The Canadian head of the country's UN demobilization program says rebel forces are pushing peacekeepers the
way they did in 1994,” Embassy, 14 January 2009, available at accessed 15 June 2009.
97 Yakin Ertürk, Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences (Yakin Ertürk), “Promotion and Protection of all
human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural including the right to development. Mission to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (A/HRC/7/6/Add.4)” 28 February 2008, available at l/7ses sion/reports.htm, accessed 10
July, 2009, 7; see also, Medecins sans frontiers (MSF), “Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: MSF report eastern DRC,” 1 April 2004,
available at accessed 10 July, 2009, 17; see also, Medecins sans
frontiers (MSF), “Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: MSF report eastern DRC,” 1 April 2004, available at
/>

/drc/2004/drcreport-nojoy.pdf, accessed 10 July, 2009, 16.
98 Yakin Ertürk, 2.
99 Ibid., para 63.
100 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.
101 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone: Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic
Republic of Congo,” July 2009, 6, available at www.hrw.org, accessed 15 July 2009.
102 Ibid., para 66.
103 HRW, 6.
104 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “(CEDAW/C/COD/4-5),” para. 74 – 79.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid., 14.
107 Ibid.
108 Birthe Steiner, Marie T Benner, Egbert Sondorp, K Peter Schmitz, Ursula Mesmer and Sandrine Rosenberger, “Sexual violence in the
protracted conflict of DRC programming for rape survivors in South Kivu,” Conflict and Health 3, no. 3 (2009), 3, available at
accessed 3 July 2009.
109 HRW, “The War Within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Kivus,” June 2002, available at www.hrw.org, accessed 10
June 2009.
110 Adewale Banjo, “A Review of Poverty Studies, Drivers and Redressive Strategies in Southern Africa,” Journal of Sustainable Development
in Africa 10, no.4 (2009), available at -
africa.com/Jsda/V10N4_Spring2009/PDF/A%20Review%20of%20Poverty%20Studies.pdf, accessed 10 June 2009; Women’s Commission for
Refugee Women and Children, “Global Survey on Education in Emergencies,” February 2004, 38; Eunice Njeri Sahle, “Gender, States, and
Markets in Africa,” Studies in Political Economy 77 (spring 2006); and see, Yakin Ertürk, “(A/HRC/7/6/Add.4),” para. 97.
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111 Eli Mechanic, “Why Gender Still Matters: Sexual Violence and the need to Confront Militarized Masculinity: a Case Study of the Conflict
in the DRC.” Partnership Africa Canada Report, December 2004, 4, available at />16dec.pdf, accessed 01 June 2009.

112 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, “Making Sense of Violence: Voices of Soldiers in the Congo (DRC),” Journal of Modern African
Studies, 46, no.1 (2008), 82.
113 Maria Eriksson Baaz, “Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC,”
International Studies Quarterly no. 53 (2009), Interviews with Congolese Soldiers, Baaz & Stern, 502.
114 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, “Making Sense of Violence: Voices of Soldiers in the Congo (DRC).”
115 Ibid., 65.
116 Currently, an estimated 17% of the over 250,000 displaced families in the Kivus have lost contact with a husband or wife due to fighting,
see, Oxfam, “Half of families torn apart by war in the Congo, say aid agencies,” survey by World Vision, Save the Children, Action Aid and
Merlin, (22 November 2008), available at accessed 15 July 2009.
117 Eli Mechanic, 20.
118 Ibid., 22.
119 Maria Eriksson Baaz, “Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC,” 512.
120 Ibid.
121 See, Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers; also see, HRW, “Uganda in Kivus: Fuelling Political and Ethnic Strife,” (March 2001),
available at /reports/2001/drc/drc0301-03.htm accessed September 29, 2008.
122 Yakin Ertürk, “(A/HRC/7/6/Add.4),” para 21.
123 Eli Mechanic, 21 – 25.
124 Ibid., 5; also see, Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, 77 – 80.
125 The United Nations recorded 176 allegations in 2006 in which MONUC personnel were accused of having engaged in sexual exploitation or
abuse, see, UN Secretary General, “Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (A/61/957)” report of the
Secretary-General, 15 June 2007, annex IV.
126 Ban-Ki Moon, Secretary-General of the UN, “The twenty-seventh report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organization Mission in the
DRC (S/2009/160),” para 68, available at www.un.org, accessed 16 July 2009.
127 Ibid., 16.
128 Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert, 32.
129 UNSC, “Letter dated 21 November 2008 from the Group of Experts on the DRC addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) (S/2008/773),” 32, available at www.un.org, accessed 30 May 2009.
130 This has been extensively discussed in academia and the media, for the first report of this problem see, UNSC, “(S/2002/1146),” para 33,
45; annex pages 8 – 10.
131 Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert, 27.

132 Ibid.,, 14 and 28.
133 Ban-Ki Moon, Secretary-General of the UN.
134 Ibid., 4.
135 See, .
136 Alix Rijckaert, “’Punish rape as weapon of war’,”The Times 11 December 2007, available at, .
za/News/Article.aspx?id=65798, accessed 10 July 2009; see also, San Francisco Bay View.
137 Amnesty International, “Justice for Justine Masika,” 2 March 2009 available at ion/action/20333/, accessed
15 July, 2009.
138 Shelley Whitman, “Women and Peace-building in the DRC: An assessment of their role in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue,” African Journal
on Conflict Resolution 6, no. 1 (2006), 42, available at eengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=FD2A6588-7239-
4891-3935-5A8756AB0F6D&lng=en, accessed 3 July 2009.
139 Heal Africa, “Rehabilitation Initiative,” available at accessed 02 September 2009.