handbook of self-regulation research, theory, and applications

HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION

HANDBOOK OF
SELF-REGULATION
Research, Theory, and Applications
SECOND EDITION
EDITED BY
Kathleen D. Vohs
Roy F. Baumeister
THE GUILFORD PRESS
New York London
© 2011 The Guilford Press
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Handbook of self-regulation : research, theory, and applications / edited by Kathleen D.
Vohs, Roy F. Baumeister.–2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-60623-948-3 (hardcover)
1. Self-control. 2. Self-management (Psychology) I. Vohs, Kathleen
D. II. Baumeister, Roy F.

BF632.H262 2011
153.8—dc22
2010009381
To Lauren
—K. D. V.
To Athena
—R. F. B.
vi
About the Editors
Kathleen D. Vohs, PhD, is Associate Professor of Marketing at the Carlson School of
Management at the University of Minnesota. She holds a McKnight Presidential Fellow-
ship and has recently been named the Board of Overseers Professor of Marketing. Dr.
Vohs has more than 120 professional publications, including six books. Her research is
concerned with self-regulation, particularly in regard to impulsive spending and eating,
decision making, self-esteem, the fear and feeling of being duped, self-escape behaviors,
and the psychology of money.
Roy F. Baumeister, PhD, holds the Eppes Professorship in the Department of Psychology
at Florida State University. He also has taught and conducted research at the University of
California, Berkeley; Case Western Reserve University; the University of Texas; the Uni-
versity of Virginia; the Max-Planck Institute in Munich (Germany); and Stanford Univer-
sity’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Dr. Baumeister has written
nearly 500 professional publications (including 27 books). His research on self-regulation
addresses such topics as aggression, eating, sexuality, emotion, limited resources, addic-
tion, free will, physiology, and task performance.
vii
Contributors
Henk Aarts, PhD, Department of Psychology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Ozlem Ayduk, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley,
Berkeley, California
Alan D. Baddeley, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of York, York, United Kingdom

Austin S. Baldwin, PhD, Department of Psychology, Southern Methodist University,
Dallas, Texas
Russell A. Barkley, PhD, Department of Psychiatry, SUNY Upstate Medical University,
Syracuse, New York
Isabelle M. Bauer, PhD, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida
Roy F. Baumeister, PhD, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee,
Florida
Clancy Blair, PhD, Department of Applied Psychology, Steinhardt School of Culture, Education,
and Human Development, New York University, New York, New York
Susan D. Calkins, PhD, Department of Human Development and Family Studies
and Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Greensboro,
Greensboro, North Carolina
Evan C. Carter, MS, Department of Psychology, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida
Charles S. Carver, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida
Daniel Cervone, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois
Benjamin A. Converse, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia
Colin G. DeYoung, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Nancy Eisenberg, PhD, Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona
Lesa K. Ellis, PhD, Department of Psychology, Westminster College, Salt Lake City, Utah
Ronald J. Faber, PhD, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota
viii Contributors
Eli J. Finkel, PhD, Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
Ayelet Fishbach, PhD, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois
Gráinne M. Fitzsimons, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo,
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Malte Friese, PhD, Institute of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland

Paul T. Fuglestad, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Peter M. Gollwitzer, PhD, Department of Psychology, New York University, New York,
New York, and Faculty of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
Kasey M. Griffin, MS, Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
James J. Gross, PhD, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California
Jennifer Guadagno, BA, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University,
Durham, North Carolina
Todd F. Heatherton, PhD, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College,
Hanover, New Hampshire
Julie D. Henry, PhD, School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney,
New South Wales, Australia
C. Peter Herman, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Toronto,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Andrew W. Hertel, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota
E. Tory Higgins, PhD, Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, New York
Wilhelm Hofmann, PhD, Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois
Sander L. Koole, PhD, Faculty of Psychology and Education, VU University Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Mark R. Leary, PhD, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University,
Durham, North Carolina
Alison Ledgerwood, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis,
Davis, California
Esther M. Leerkes, PhD, Department of Human Development and Family Studies, University
of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, North Carolina
Michael E. McCullough, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Miami,
Coral Gables, Florida
Kateri McRae, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado

Walter Mischel, PhD, Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, New York
Nilly Mor, PhD, School of Education, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Kevin N. Ochsner, PhD, Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, New York
Gabriele Oettingen, PhD, Department of Psychology, New York University, New York,
New York, and Faculty of Psychology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Contributors ix
Heather Orom, PhD, Department of Health Behavior, School of Public Health and Health
Professions, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York
Esther K. Papies, PhD, Department of Psychology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Janet Polivy, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Mississauga,
Ontario, Canada
Michael I. Posner, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon
Catherine D. Rawn, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Mary K. Rothbart, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon
Alexander J. Rothman, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota
M. Rosario Rueda, PhD, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Granada,
Granada, Spain
Michael A. Sayette, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Michael F. Scheier, PhD, Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Brandon J. Schmeichel, PhD, Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University,
College Station, Texas
Abigail A. Scholer, PhD, Department of Psychology, Gettysburg College,
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
Walter D. Scott, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming
William G. Shadel, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Gal Sheppes, PhD, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California
Cynthia L. Smith, PhD, Department of Human Development, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia
Tracy L. Spinrad, PhD, Department of Family and Human Development, Arizona State
University, Tempe, Arizona
Yaacov Trope, PhD, Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York
Alexandra Ursache, MA, Department of Applied Psychology, Steinhardt School of Culture,
Education, and Human Development, New York University, New York, New York
Lotte F. van Dillen, PhD, Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Utrecht
University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Kathleen D. Vohs, PhD, Department of Marketing, Carlson School of Management, University
of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
William von Hippel, PhD, School of Psychology, University of Queensland, St. Lucia,
Queensland, Australia
Dylan D. Wagner, BA, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College,
Hanover, New Hampshire

xi
Preface
S
elf-regulation has emerged from obscurity and uncertain beginnings to become one
of the most centrally important concepts in all of psychology. The first edition of the
Handbook of Self-Regulation was created to reflect self-regulation’s place in understand-
ing human behavior, and it was a great success. Yet the continuing spread of influence
of self-regulation has rendered the first edition obsolete, much more rapidly than would
happen for many topics. Hence, we have reconvened most of our original authors and an
impressive lineup of additional ones to produce the second edition of the Handbook of
Self-Regulation. No chapter has remained the same from the first to the second edition.
Still, the amount of change inevitably varies from one chapter to another. Some authors
have updated their coverage with the latest findings, whereas others have made funda-

mental changes based on new research and directions in the area.
Undoubtedly the most dramatic changes from the first to the second edition are to
be found in the new topics and chapters. There is a chapter on automaticity to reflect
the growing awareness that not all self-regulation is confined to controlled processes.
Another exciting new chapter links self-regulation to working memory, thereby merging
two literatures that grew up somewhat independently but increasingly dealt with many of
the same issues and concerns. We are pleased with the chapter linking self-regulation to
construal level, which follows recent developments that connected the level of abstraction
of thought to processes of self-regulation. A new chapter on counteractive self-control
explores the complementary processes of reducing temptations and strengthening goals.
We also have added a pair of exciting chapters on development across the lifespan. One
provides views on the role of executive functioning in children’s growth, and the other is
on similar processes in older adults.
A new focus for this edition is strong coverage of the social basis of self-regulation in
Part IV. One chapter argues that people often subjugate personal well-being for interper-
sonal acceptance, such that what looks like self-regulation failure might be self-regulation
aimed at social acceptance. Twin chapters discuss the bidirectional influences of interper-
sonal relationships and self-regulation. The influence of religion on self-regulation rounds
out the section by addressing culture’s institutional forces in the service of promoting
self-regulation.
xii Preface
Another recent trend in self-regulation is the growing importance of individual dif-
ferences. Our new chapter on impulsivity (including the Big Five) demonstrates the wide
variation in chronic tendencies to engage in regulated responding.
In this Preface we have highlighted new chapters, but all the chapters have been
revised, some of them quite extensively. Our goal is for this volume to be an even more
comprehensive and valuable resource to the researchers and practitioners scattered across
myriad fields who want to understand this basic key to human nature and social life.
This project thrived with the support of some key people. We are grateful once again
for the encouragement we received from Seymour Weingarten, our insightful and good-

natured editor at The Guilford Press. Carolyn Graham at Guilford was helpful at crucial
points. Finally, we thank Jessica Alquist for preparing the book’s indexes.
Enjoy!
Kat h l e e n D. Vo h s
Ro y F. Ba u m e i s t e R
xiii
Contents
PART I. BASIC REGULATORY PROCESSES
1. Self- Regulation of Action and Affect 3
Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier
2. The Self- Regulation of Emotion 22
Sander L. Koole, Lotte F. van Dillen, and Gal Sheppes
3. Giving In to Temptation: The Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience
of Self- Regulatory Failure
41
Dylan D. Wagner and Todd F. Heatherton
4. Self- Regulatory Strength 64
Isabelle M. Bauer and Roy F. Baumeister
5. Willpower in a Cognitive Affective Processing System:
The Dynamics of Delay of Gratification
83
Walter Mischel and Ozlem Ayduk
6. Self- Regulation and Behavior Change: Disentangling Behavioral Initiation
and Behavioral Maintenance
106
Alexander J. Rothman, Austin S. Baldwin, Andrew W. Hertel, and Paul T. Fuglestad
PART II. COGNITIVE, PHYSIOLOGICAL, AND NEUROLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF SELF-REGULATION
7. Nonconscious Self- Regulation, or the Automatic Pilot of Human Behavior 125
Esther K. Papies and Henk Aarts
8. Promotion and Prevention Systems: Regulatory Focus Dynamics

within Self- Regulatory Hierarchies
143
Abigail A. Scholer and E. Tory Higgins
xiv Contents
9. Planning Promotes Goal Striving 162
Peter M. Gollwitzer and Gabriele Oettingen
10. The Reason in Passion: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach
to Emotion Regulation
186
Kateri McRae, Kevin N. Ochsner, and James J. Gross
11. Working Memory and Self- Regulation 204
Wilhelm Hofmann, Malte Friese, Brandon J. Schmeichel, and Alan D. Baddeley
12. Local and Global Evaluations: Attitudes as Self- Regulatory Guides
for Near and Distant Responding
226
Alison Ledgerwood and Yaacov Trope
13. Identifying and Battling Temptation 244
Ayelet Fishbach and Benjamin A. Converse
PART III. DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-REGULATION
14. Effortful Control: Relations with Emotion Regulation, Adjustment,
and Socialization in Childhood
263
Nancy Eisenberg, Cynthia L. Smith, and Tracy L. Spinrad
15. Attentional Control and Self- Regulation 284
M. Rosario Rueda, Michael I. Posner, and Mary K. Rothbart
16. A Bidirectional Model of Executive Functions and Self- Regulation 300
Clancy Blair and Alexandra Ursache
17. Aging and Self- Regulation 321
William von Hippel and Julie D. Henry
PART IV. SOCIAL DIMENSION OF SELF- REGULATION

18. The Sociometer, Self- Esteem, and the Regulation of Interpersonal Behavior 339
Mark R. Leary and Jennifer Guadagno
19. Early Attachment Processes and the Development
of Emotional Self- Regulation
355
Susan D. Calkins and Esther M. Leerkes
20. When People Strive for Self- Harming Goals: Sacrificing Personal Health
for Interpersonal Success
374
Catherine D. Rawn and Kathleen D. Vohs
21. The Effects of Social Relationships on Self- Regulation 390
Eli J. Finkel and Gráinne M. Fitzsimons
Contents xv
22. The Effects of Self- Regulation on Social Relationships 407
Gráinne M. Fitzsimons and Eli J. Finkel
23. Waiting, Tolerating, and Cooperating: Did Religion Evolve
to Prop Up Humans’ Self-Control Abilities?
422
Michael E. McCullough and Evan C. Carter
PART V. PERSONALITY AND SELF- REGULATION
24. Temperament and Self- Regulation 441
Mary K. Rothbart, Lesa K. Ellis, and Michael I. Posner
25. Self- Efficacy Beliefs and the Architecture of Personality:
On Knowledge, Appraisal, and Self- Regulation
461
Daniel Cervone, Nilly Mor, Heather Orom, William G. Shadel, and Walter D. Scott
26. Impulsivity as a Personality Trait 485
Colin G. DeYoung
PART VI. COMMON PROBLEMS WITH SELF- REGULATION
27. Self- Regulatory Failure and Addiction 505

Michael A. Sayette and Kasey M. Griffin
28. The Self- Regulation of Eating: Theoretical and Practical Problems 522
C. Peter Herman and Janet Polivy
29. Self- Regulation and Spending: Evidence from Impulsive
and Compulsive Buying
537
Ronald J. Faber and Kathleen D. Vohs
30. Attention- Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Self- Regulation,
and Executive Functioning
551
Russell A. Barkley
Author Index 565
Subject Index 585

PART I
Basic RegulatoRy PRocesses

3
CHAPTER 1
Self- Regulation of Action and Affect
CHARLES S. CARVER
MICHAEL F. SCHEIER
T
his chapter outlines the fundamentals of a viewpoint on self- regulation in which
behavior is seen as reflecting processes of feedback control. Indeed, we propose that
two layers of control manage two different aspects of behavior, jointly situating behavior
in time as well as space. We suggest further that this arrangement helps people handle
multiple tasks in their life space. More specifically, it helps transform simultaneous con-
cerns with many different goals into a stream of actions that shifts repeatedly from one
goal to another over time.

The view described here has been identified with the term self- regulation for a long
time (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990, 1998, 1999a, 1999b). This term, however,
means different things to different people. Many authors in this book use this term as
roughly equivalent to s e l f - c o n t r o l : overriding of one action tendency in order to attain
another goal. We prefer to reserve the term s e l f - c o n t r o l for such cases and use the term
self- regulation more broadly. When we use the term self- regulation, we intend to convey
the sense of purposive processes, the sense that self- corrective adjustments are taking
place as needed to stay on track for the purpose being served (whether this entails over-
riding another impulse or simply reacting to perturbations from other sources), and the
sense that the corrective adjustments originate within the person. These points converge
in the view that behavior is a continual process of moving toward (and sometimes away
from) goal representations. We also believe that this process embodies characteristics
of feedback control. Additional points are made in this chapter, but these ideas lie at its
heart.
The ideas presented in this chapter are broad strokes, as much meta- theory as theory.
We describe a viewpoint on the structure of behavior that accommodates diverse ways
of thinking about what qualities of behavior matter and why. For this reason, we believe
this viewpoint complements a wide variety of other ideas about what goes on in human
self- regulation.
4 BASIC REGULATORY PROCESSES
BEHAVIOR AS GOAL DIRECTED AND FEEDBACK CONTROLLED
In describing this viewpoint, the easiest place to start is with another concept altogether:
goals. The goal construct is quite prominent in today’s psychology (Austin & Vancouver,
1996; Elliott, 2008), under a wide variety of names. The concept is broad enough to cover
both long-term aspirations (e.g., creating and maintaining a good impression among col-
leagues) and the end points of very short-term acts (e.g., pulling one’s car squarely into a
parking space). Goals generally can be reached in diverse ways, leading to the potential
for vast complexity in the organization of action. People who think about behavior in
terms of goals tend to assume that understanding a person means understanding that
person’s goals— indeed, that the substance of the self consists partly of the person’s goals

and the organization among them (cf. Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
Feedback Loops
We actually are less concerned here with the goals themselves than with the process of
attaining them. We have long subscribed to the view that movement toward a goal reflects
the functioning of a negative, or discrepancy- reducing, feedback loop (MacKay, 1966;
Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973; Wiener, 1948). Such a loop involves a
sensing of some present condition, which is compared to a desired or intended condition
(as a reference value). If the two are identical, nothing more happens. If there is a discrep-
ancy between the two, the discrepancy is countered by subsequent action to change the
sensed condition. The overall effect of such an arrangement is to bring the sensed condi-
tion into conformity with the intended condition (Powers, 1973). If the intended condi-
tion is a goal, the overall effect is to bring the person’s behavior into conformity with the
goal—thus, goal attainment.
There also are discrepancy- enlarging loops, in which deviations from the compar-
ison point are increased rather than decreased. The value in this case is a threat, an
“anti-goal.” Effects of discrepancy- enlarging processes in living systems are typically
constrained by discrepancy- reducing processes. Thus, for example, acts of avoidance
often segue into other acts of approach. Put differently, sometimes people are able to
avoid something they find aversive by the very act of approaching something else. Such
dual influence occurs in instances of what is called active avoidance: An organism fleeing
a threat spots a relatively safe location and approaches it.
Given the preceding description, people sometimes infer that feedback loops act only
to create and maintain steady states, and are therefore irrelevant to behavior. Some refer-
ence values (and goals) are static. But others are dynamic (e.g., taking a vacation across
Europe, raising children to be good citizens). In such cases, the goal is the process of
traversing the changing trajectory of the activity, not just the arrival at the end point. The
principle of feedback control applies readily to moving targets (Beer, 1995).
We started here with the goal construct. Many people write about goal- directed
behavior. What we have brought to the conversation about goals (and though we were
not the first, we are probably the most persistent) is the notion that goal seeking (human

behavior) involves feedback control. Why feedback control? Why not just goals and goal
attainment? Good question.
Many people view the feedback loop as an engineering concept (and engineers do use
it), but the concept has roots in physiology and other fields. Homeostasis, the processes
Action and Affect 5
by which the body self- regulates physical parameters such as temperature, blood sugar,
and heart rate, is the prototypic feedback process (Cannon, 1932). The concept has been
useful enough in diverse fields that sometimes it is even suggested that feedback processes
are some of the fundamental building blocks of all complex systems.
We believe there is merit in the recognition of functional similarity between the
systems underlying human behavior and other complex systems (cf. Ford, 1987; von Ber-
talanffy, 1968). Nature is a miser and a recycler. It seems likely that an organization
that works in one complex system recurs over and over in nature. For the same reason,
it seems likely that principles embodied in physical movement control (which also rely in
part on principles of feedback) have more than just a little in common with principles
embodied in higher mental functions (Rosenbaum, Carlson, & Gilmore, 2001). For these
reasons, we have continued to use the principle of feedback control as a conceptual heu-
ristic over the years.
Levels of Abstraction
Goals exist at many levels of abstraction. One can have the goal of being a good citizen,
one can also have the goal of conserving resources—a narrower goal that contributes to
being a good citizen. One way to conserve resources is recycling. Recycling entails other,
more- concrete goals: placing newspapers and empty bottles into containers and moving
them to a pickup location. All of these are goals, values to be approached, but at varying
levels of abstraction.
It is often said that people’s goals form a hierarchy (Powers, 1973; Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987), in which abstract goals are attained by attaining the concrete goals that
help define them. Lower-level goals are attained by briefer sequences of action (formed
from subcomponents of motor control; e.g., Rosenbaum, Meulenbroek, Vaughan, &
Jansen, 2001). Some sequences of action have a self- contained quality, in that they run

off fairly autonomously once triggered.
Viewed from the other direction, sequences can be organized into programs of action
(Powers, 1973). Programs are more planful than sequences and require choices at vari-
ous points. Programs, in turn, are sometimes (though not always) enacted in the service
of principles. Principles are abstractions that provide a basis for making decisions within
programs and suggest undertaking or refraining from certain programs. What Powers
called principles are roughly equivalent to values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz
& Rubel, 2005). Even that is not the end of potential complexity. Patterns of values can
coalesce to form a very abstract sense of desired (and undesired) self, or a sense of desired
(and undesired) community.
All these classes of goals, from very concrete to very abstract, can be reference points
for self- regulation. When self- regulation is undertaken regarding a goal at one level, pre-
sumably self- regulation is simultaneously being invoked at all levels of abstraction below
that one. We return to this diversity among potential superordinate goals later in the
chapter.
Other Phenomena of Personality– Social Psychology and Feedback Control
The goal concept, in its various forms, is one place in which the constructs of personality
and social psychology intersect with the logic of the feedback loop. Before moving on,
6 BASIC REGULATORY PROCESSES
we note briefly that the intersection is actually broader. The notion of reducing sensed
discrepancies has a long history in social psychology, in topics such as behavioral con-
formity to norms (Asch, 1955) and cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1946;
Lecky, 1945). The self- regulatory feedback loop, in effect, constitutes a meta- theory for
such effects.
FEEDBACK PROCESSES AND AFFECT
Thus far we have considered behavior— getting from here to there. Another important
part of experience is feelings, or affect. Two fundamental questions about affect are what
it consists of and where it comes from. Affect pertains to one’s desires and whether they
are being met (e.g., Clore, 1994; Frijda, 1986, 1988; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). But
what exactly is the internal mechanism by which it arises?

The answer we posed to this question (Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998, 1999a, 1999b)
focuses on some of the functional properties that affect seems to display in the behaving
person. We used feedback control again as an organizing principle. We suggested that
feelings are a consequence of a feedback process that runs automatically, simultaneously
with and in parallel to the behavior- guiding process. Perhaps the easiest way to convey
what this second process is doing is to say that it is checking on how well the first pro-
cess (the behavior loop) is doing at reducing its discrepancies (we focus first on approach
loops). Thus, the input for this second loop is some representation of the rate of discrep-
ancy reduction in the action system over time.
An analogy may be useful. Action implies change between states. Thus, behavior is
analogous to distance. If the action loop controls distance, and if the affect loop assesses
the progress of the action loop, then the affect loop is dealing with the psychological ana-
logue of velocity, the first derivative of distance over time. To the extent that this analogy
is meaningful, the perceptual input to the affect loop should be the first derivative over
time of the input used by the action loop.
Input per se does not create affect (a given rate of progress has different affective
implications in different circumstances). We believe that, as in any feedback system, this
input is compared to a reference value (cf. Frijda, 1986, 1988). In this case, the reference
is an acceptable or desired rate of behavioral discrepancy reduction. As in other feedback
loops, the comparison checks for deviation from the standard. If there is one, the output
function changes.
We suggest that the error signal from the comparison in this loop (the representa-
tion of a discrepancy) is manifest subjectively as affect, positive or negative valence. If
the rate of progress is below the criterion, negative affect arises. If the rate is high enough
to exceed the criterion, positive affect arises. If the rate is not distinguishable from the
criterion, no affect arises.
In essence, the argument is that feelings with a positive valence mean you are doing
better at something than you need to, and that feelings with a negative valence mean you
are doing worse than you need to (for more detail, see Carver & Scheier, 1998, chaps.
8 and 9). One implication of this line of thought is that, for any given action domain,

affective valence should potentially form a bipolar dimension; that is, for a given action,
affect can be positive, neutral, or negative, depending on how well or poorly the action
is going.
Action and Affect 7
What determines the criterion for this loop? The criterion is probably quite flexible
when the activity is unfamiliar. If the activity is familiar, the criterion is likely to reflect
the person’s accumulated experience, in the form of an expected rate (the more experi-
ence you have, the more you know what is reasonable to expect). Whether “desired” or
“expected” or “needed” most accurately depicts the criterion may depend greatly on the
context.
The criterion can also change. The less experience the person has in a domain, the
more fluid the criterion; in a familiar domain, change is slower. Still, repeated overshoot
of the criterion automatically yields an upward drift of the criterion (e.g., Eidelman &
Biernat, 2007); repeated undershoots yield a downward drift. Thus, the system recali-
brates over repeated experience in such a way that the criterion stays within the range of
those experiences (Carver & Scheier, 2000). An ironic effect of recalibration would be to
keep the balance of a person’s affective experience (positive to negative) relatively similar,
even when the rate criterion changes considerably.
Two Kinds of Behavioral Loops, Two Dimensions of Affect
Now consider discrepancy- enlarging loops. The view just outlined rests on the idea that
positive feeling results when a behavioral system is making rapid progress in doing what
it is organized to do. The systems considered thus far are organized to reduce discrepan-
cies. There is no obvious reason, though, why the principle should not apply as well to
systems organized to enlarge discrepancies. If that kind of a system is making rapid prog-
ress doing what it is organized to do, there should be positive affect. If it is doing poorly,
there should be negative affect.
The idea that affects of both valences can occur would seem comparable across both
approach and avoidance systems; that is, both approach and avoidance have the potential
to induce positive feelings (by doing well), and both have the potential to induce negative
feelings (by doing poorly). But doing well at moving toward an incentive is not quite the

same as doing well at moving away from a threat. Thus, the two positives may not be
quite the same, nor may the two negatives.
Based on this line of thought, and drawing on insights from Higgins (e.g., 1987,
1996) and his collaborators (see Scholer & Higgins, Chapter 8, this volume), we assume
two sets of affects, one relating to approach, the other to avoidance (Carver & Scheier,
1998). Approach activities lead to such positive affects as elation, eagerness, and excite-
ment, and such negative affects as frustration, anger, and sadness (Carver, 2004; Carver
& Harmon-Jones, 2009b). Avoidance activities lead to such positive affects as relief and
contentment (Carver, 2009), and such negative affects as fear, guilt, and anxiety.
Merging Affect and Action
The two- layered viewpoint described in the preceding sections implies a natural link
between affect and action. If the input function of the affect loop is a sensed rate of prog-
ress in action, the output function must be a change in rate of that action. Thus, the affect
loop has a direct influence on what occurs in the action loop.
Some changes in rate output are straightforward. If you are lagging behind, you push
harder. Sometimes the changes are less straightforward. The rates of many “behaviors”
are defined not by a pace of physical action but by choices among actions or entire pro-
8 BASIC REGULATORY PROCESSES
grams of action. For example, increasing your rate of progress on a project at work may
mean choosing to spend a weekend working rather than skiing. Increasing your rate of
being kind means choosing to do an action that reflects that value when an opportunity
arises. Thus, adjustment in rate must often be translated into other terms, such as con-
centration, or reallocation of time and effort.
The idea of two feedback systems functioning in concert with one another is some-
thing we more or less stumbled into. It turns out, however, that such an arrangement is
quite common in control engineering (e.g., Clark, 1996). Engineers have long recognized
that having two feedback systems functioning together—one controlling position, the
other controlling velocity— permits the device in which they are embedded to respond in
a way that is both quick and stable, without overshoots and oscillations.
The combination of quickness and stability is valuable in the kinds of electrome-

chanical devices with which engineers deal, but its value is not limited to such devices. A
person with strongly reactive emotions is prone to overreact and to oscillate behaviorally.
A person who is emotionally nonreactive is slow to respond, even to urgent events. A per-
son whose reactions are between the two extremes responds quickly but without undue
overreaction and oscillation.
For biological entities, being able to respond quickly yet accurately confers a clear
adaptive advantage. We believe this combination of quick and stable responding is a con-
sequence of having both behavior- managing and affect- managing control systems. Affect
causes people’s responses to be quicker (because this control system is time- sensitive) and,
provided that the affective system is not overresponsive, the responses are also stable.
Our focus here is on how affects influence behavior, emphasizing the extent to which
they are interwoven. Note, however, that the behavioral responses related to the affects
also lead to reduction of the affects. Thus, in a very basic sense, the affect system is self-
regulating. Certainly people also make voluntary efforts to regulate emotions (Gross,
2007), but the affect system does a good deal of that self- regulation on its own. Indeed, if
the system is optimally responsive, then affective arousal is generally minimized over the
long term because the relevant deviations are countered before they become intense (cf.
Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007).
AFFECT ISSUES
This theoretical model differs from others in several ways. At least two of the differences
appear to have interesting and important implications.
Divergent Views of Dimensionality Underlying Affect
One difference concerns how affects are organized. A number of theories conceptual-
ize affects as aligned along dimensions (though not all theories do so). Our view fits
this picture, in holding that affects related to approach and to avoidance both have the
potential to be either positive or negative, thus forming a bipolarity for each motivational
tendency.
Most dimensional models of affect, however, take a different form. For example,
Gray (1990, 1994) held that one system is engaged by cues of punishment and cues of
frustrative nonreward. It thus is responsible for negative feelings, whether those feelings