the philosophy of mind

There is
assuredly
no more
effectual
method
of
clearing
up
one
'
s
own
mind
on
any subled
than
by talking
it
over
,
so to
speak
,
with
[
persons
]
of
real
power

and
grasp
who have considered
it
from
a
totally
different
point
of
view. The
paral1a
.r
of
time
helps
us to
the
true
position
of
a
conception
,
as the
paral1a
.r
of
space helps
us to

that
of
a star.
T. H.
Huxley
We assembled this volume with several
goals
in
mind. First
,
we wanted to
provide
a
pedagogical
tool
for
those
teaching
the
philosophy
of mind
to
upper
level
undergraduates
. We have each
taught
courses in the
philosophy
of mind

,
and we have
each been
frustrated
by
the lack
of
an
introductory
reader
that
contains
historically
relevant
material. There are several
excellent collections of recent
writings
in
the
philosophy
of
mind
,
but
we
thought
it
was
important
for students to see how certain

problems
have
survived
through
the centuries.
Our
solution was
to
pull together
the historical and
contemporary
work and
organize
the material
by
topics
.
Each section of the volume is
dedicated to
a
single
area
and
progress
es Horn the relevant historical work
(
by
,
for
example

,
Descartes
)
to more
contemporary writings
(
by
,
for
example
,
Fodor
)
.
Our second
goal
was not
pedagogical
so much as
ideological
.
Some
philosophers
have contended
privately
that
the
philosophy
of mind is an
irreducibly trendy

branch of
philosophy
. We
disagreed
with this assessment and wanted this collection to show how
many
of
the current
concerns
in
the
philosophy
of mind have their roots in intellectual
history
.
Finally
,
we wanted
to
provide
a
helpful
resource manual for those
working
in
the
philosophy
of mind and the
cognitive
sciences. Few

people
will have
all
of these
readings
,
and
those who do will not have
all
of them
at
their
fingertips
. Of course we
also
hoped
that
by
making
some of the historical selections more accessible
,
they
would
become more
widely
read and
appreciated
. As the
quote
Horn

Huxley
suggests
,
there is
much to be learned Horn
dialogue
with these
thinkers
.
It
is
customary
to note that
many
excellent
essays
had to be left out due to
space
limitations.
Sometimes
this
disclaimer is made
merely
to be
polite
,
but not
in
this case
.

The
writings
in
philosophy
and
psychology
over the last 2500
years
have been vast
,
and there is
simply
no
way
to include all of the
worthy
material.
One
can also envision
additional sections that
might
be added to
a
collection of this nature.
Candidate
topics
(
which we have considered
)
include

qualia
,
psychological
content
,
and so forth. To
some extent
,
all
these
topics
are treated
along
the
way
,
but we will be the first to admit
that more extensive discussion of these
topics
is
possible
.
We have
provided
a brief
introduction to each section. We
prefer
that
the introductory
material be viewed as

articulating
one
interpretation
of
these works and their
interrelationship
,
not as
articulating
some canonical view
.
The
introductions should be
read
critically
,
as
should
all
texts.
Preface

Peter
Ludlow
'
Dept
. of
Philosophy
SUNY
Stony

Brook
Stony
Brook
NY
11794
email:
PLUDLOW
@
ccvm.
sunysb
.edu
Brian
Beakley
Dept
of
Philosophy
Eastern
Illinois
University
Charles to
~
IL
61920
email:
dbxb
@
ux1
.eiu.edu
xii
Pre Eace

This
collection was
compiled
with the
help
of
a
number of individuals. Ned
Block
Stephen
Neale
,
and
Robert van Gulick read
our
initial
proposal
and
made
a
number
ol
very
helpful suggestions
for
improvements
.
( Ned
and
Stephen

also
provided
invaluable
assistance
with various
aspects
of
preparation
,
ranging
horn
help
in
securing
permissions
to
advice on section
introductions
)
.
We have also bene6ted
horn discussion
with
and
suggestions
horn
Marcos
Bisticas
-
Cocoves

,
Nancy
Franklin,
Steve Fuller
,
Kathy
Kemp
,
Peter
Nagy
,
and
Anderson
Weekes. We also wish
to
thank
Betty
Stanton
ol
Bradford
Books for
shepherding
us
through
this
process
.
Finally
,
we

welcome
comments and
aitidsms horn
readers
,
espeaally
students. Please
write!
Rene
Descartes
From Mtdit
Rtions n
and
VI
and from
Reply
to
Objldions
n
From Haldane
and Ross
,
eds
.
,
TIll
Phiiosophi
C Rl Works
of
DISc Rrla

(
Cambridge
:
Cambridge
University
Press
,
1911
)
.
George
Berkeley
From TIll
Principles
of
H Um Rn
Knowltdgt
From A
C
.
Fraser
,
ed.
,
TIll
Works
of
George Berbiey
(
London,

1871
)
.
John
Stuart Mill
Of the Laws of Mind
From
TIll
System
of Logic
,
8th edition
(London
,
1871.
)
.
Gilbert
Ryle
Descartes
'
Myth
From TIll
Concept
of
Mirul
(New
York:
Harper
Collins

Publishen
,
1949
)
,
by
pennission
of the
publisher
.
U
. T.
Place
Is
Consciousness a Brain
Process?
From the British
JOumRl
of
Psychology
(
1956
)
,
by
permil Sioo
of
the autl K Jr and the
British
Psydto1ogical

Society
.
Saul
Kripke
From
'
identity
and
Necessity
"
From Milton
Munitz,
ed.
,
Identify
Rnd lrulioid U
Qtion
( New
York: New York
University
Press
,
1971
)
,
by
pennission
of the
author
.

Knowltdgt
(
Cambridge
,
Hilary
Putnam
The
Nature of
Published
as
-
-
(
Pittsburgh
:
Patricia O Iurchland
Mental
"
Psymol~
~1
Predicates
"
eds
Rel
~
Ned
Block
Troubles with
Functionalism
From

C
.
W
.
Savage
,
ed.
,
Ptr C Iption
mid
Cognition
:
] . , a
in
the
~ fions

Noam
O\
omsky
From
LAng U Rgt
tmd
Probltms
of
and
publisher
.
MA:
MIT

Press
,
1988
)
,
by
permission
of
the author
I States
in
W
. H.
Capitan
and D. D.
Merrill,
Art
,
Mind
-
Univenity
of
Pittsburgh
Press
,
1967)
,
by per million
of the author
and

publisher
.
of Psvcl
.
oiogv
,
volume 9 of the
Reductionism and
Antiredudionism in F\
mdionalist
Theories of Mind
From
Neurophilosoph
,v
(
Cambridge
,
MA: MIT
Press
,
1986
)
,
by
permission
of
the author a OO
publisher
.
Aristotle

From
Metaphysics
,
book
7
,
and On
the SoaJ
,
book 2
From
W
. D. Ross
,
ed.
,
The
Orford
Aristotle
,
voL 8
(
Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press
,
1928
)
,

by
per million
of the
publisher
.
Thomas
Hobbes
Of
Sense
From Leoi Rth Rn
,
ed
.
Oakeshott
(New
York:
Maanillan
Publishing
Company
,
1962
)
,
by
pennission
of
the
publisher
.
Acknowledgments

Minnesota
Studies
in the
Philosophy
of Sdence
(
MilU\e8polis
:
Univenity
of Minnesota
Press
,
1978
)
,
by
pe Imi S Iion
of the author and
publisher
. This venion ha been
signi6cantiy
revised
by
the
author
.
Hilary
Putnam
Philosophy
and Om Mental Ufe

From Mind
,
l A I Ig~
,

RMlity
,
volwne 1. of Putn8m
'
s
AliiC Ophical
University
Prell
,
1975
)
,
by
pennillion
of
the
au
~ and
publisher
.
(
Cambridge :
Cambridge
From The Di
Rlog U I S of

PlRto
,
trans.
B
.
Jowett ( New
Yom: Random Hoose
,
1891
.
)
.
Rene Descartes
From P
RISions
of
the Soul
From The
Phiiosophieal
Works
of
~
,
trans. Haldane and ROIl
(
Cunbrldge
:
Cambridge
University
Press

,
1911
)
.
Nicolas Malebrandte
From
"
The Union of
Soul and
Body"
From
The
SMrch
.
/fer
Trulh,
trans.
Thomu
Lennon
and
Paul
Oilcamp
(
Cohanbus
:
Ohio State
University
Huvle1
'
Thomas

Henry
.
On the
Hypothesis
From
Col1edtd
w, ys
,
voL
1
(I
. ondon,
1893
)
.
That Animals
Are Automata
From Lawrence
Foster and
J
.
W
.
Swanson,
eds.
,
&" rima
. .
ThIDry
(

Amherst:
University
of Massachusetts
Press
,
1970
)
,
by
permi Jlion
of the author and
publisher
.
Jerry
A. Fodor
Making
Mind Matter More
From
Philosophical Topicsivo
L 17
(
1989
)
,
by
permi Jlion
of the author and
publisher
.
Thomas

Aquinas
That
the Soul Never
Thinb with~ t an
Image
Frmn 5NmmR 1
'h1 Oioga
,
voL 11.
( New
Yark:
Blackfrian,
McGraw
-
HilL
1968
)
,
by
permil
Sion of the
publisher
.
Thomas Hobbes
Of
Imagination
From
Ll
Pwhlm,
ed.

Oabshott
(New
Yark:
Maani
Uan
Pubblhing
Company
,
1961
.
)
,
by
pennission
of the
publisher
.
(
Cambridge
::
C8nbridge
(OxfordUniv
~
b
.
publica
-
Psvclroi O Rll ,
Sources
and

PRplrS
Plato
From ~ P#I Q I Jo
Immanuel Kant
The
Third
Antinomy
Donald Davidson
M ~ Tai Ev~ h
Rene
Descartes
From Mtdif R Hon VI
and from
Objldion
IV
and
R Ip
'"
From
Haldane and Ross
,
eds
.,
1111
Alii Dl Ophai
Works
of
Dt6c,.
-it

Press
,
1911
)
.
University
David Hume
Of the Ideas of the
Memory
and
Imagination
From A Trr R Ii St
of
H
Um Rn Naturr
,
ed.
L
A.
Se Iby
-
8igg
~
tion:
London,
1739
)
.
Press
,

1888
)
.
(
Original
voL 1.
( New
York:
Henry
Holt
,
1890
)
.
Press
,
1980
)
,
by
permission
of the
publisher
.
Gott&Led Wilhelm ~ hni%
From
Critique of
Purr
RMSOn
,

tnns
. F
. Max MUller
(I
. ondon,
1881
)
.
William
james
Imagination
From The
Principia
of
Sources
and
Acknowledgments
xv
Oswald
Kwpe
The
Modem
Psychology
of
Thinking
Originally
given
as a
lecture in
Berlin.

1912
.
Translation
by
G
.
Mandler
and
J
.
Mandler &
om
1hinking
:
From
A.voci Rtion
toGest Rit
(New
York:
Wiley
,
1964
)
,
by
pennission
of the
translaton
and the
publisher

.
John
Watson
Image
and
Affection in
Behavior
From The
}
0UmR1
of
Philosophy
,
Psychology
Rnd
Scientific
Met
~
,
vol.
10
,
no.
16
(
1913
)
,
pp
. 421

-
424.
Gilbert
Ryle
"
The
Theory
of
Spedal
Status
Pictures
"
and
'
imagining
"
From
The
Con Ctpf
of
Mind
( New
York
:
Harper
Collins
Publishen
,
1949
)

,
by
pennission
of
the
publisher
.
Daniel
Dennett
The
Nature of
Images
and the
Introspective
Trap
From
Content Rnd
Consci
Ousn5
(
London:
Routledge
and
Kegan
Paul,
1969
)
,
by
pennission

of the
author
and
publisher
.
Roger
Shepard
and
Jacqueline
Metzler
Mental
Rotation
of
Three-
Dimensional
Objects
From Scitna
,
vol. 171
(
1971
)
,
pp
.
701
-
703
,
by

pennission
of
the
authon and
the
American
Assodation for
the
Advancement of
Science.
Stephen
Kosslyn
Scanning
Visual
Mental
Images
: The
First
Phase of
the
Debate
From
Daniel
Oshenon,
Stephen
Kosslyn,
and
John Hollerbach,
eds.
,

Vis U Rl
Cognition
Rnd
Adion
,
vol\
une
~
of An
Invif
Rtion to
Cognitive
Scien Ct
(
Cambridge
,
MA:
MIT
Press
,
1990
)
,
by
pennission
of the
author
and
publisher
.

Zenon W
.
Pylyshyn
Tact
Knowledge
and
"
Mental
Scanning
"
From
Comput
Rtion Rnd
Cognition
(
Cambridge
,
MA: MIT
Press
,
1984
)
,
by
pennission
of
the
publisher
.
Stephen

Kosslyn
Demand
O1araderistics1: The Second Pha.W: of th~ ~ bat~
-
-
- -

- - -
- -
- -
-
From
Daniel
Oshenon,
Stephen
Kosslyn.
and
John
Ho
Uerbadt,
eds
.
,
Vis U Rl
Cognition
Rnd
Action
,
volmne 2
of An Int7it

Rtion
to
Cognitiw
Science
(
Cambridge
,
MA: MIT
Press
,
1990
)
,
by
pennission
of the
author
and
publisher
.
Thomas
Hobbes
Of
the
Consequence
or Train
of
Imaginations
From
Ltviath Rn

,
ed.
Oakeshott:
(New
YoM:
Maanillan
Publishing
Company
,
1962
)
,
by
pennission
of
the
publisher
.
John
Locke
(
Original
William
James
The
Elementary
Law of
Association
From The
Principles

of
Psychology
,
vol. 2
( New
York:
Henry
Holt
,
1890
)
.
James
L.
Mc Cle
Uand,
David E.
Rumelhart
,
and
Geoffrey
E
.
Hinton
The
Appeal
of
Parallel
Distributed
Processing

From
James
L.
Rumelhart
,
David E
.
McClelland,
and
the PDP
Research
Group
,
Parallel
Distributed
PrO C I S
Sing
:
~
lica
-
Of the
Association
of
Ideas
From
An
ES S Ry
Concm
Iing

Hunwn
Undmt
Rnding
,
fifth
edition
(London
,
1706
)
.
David
Hume
Of
the
Connection
or
Association
of
Ideas
From A
Trt
Rti St
of
Human
NRturt
,
ed.
LA.
Selby

-
Bigge
(
Oxford
Univenity
Press
,
1888
)
tion:
London,
1739
)
.
John
Stuart
Mill
The
Principal
Investigations
of
Psychology
Q,
araderised
From A
System of
Logic
,
vol 2
,

book,
6
(London,
1843
)
.
xvi
Sources
and
Acbtowledgments
& p1or
Rlions in the Mlcrostn4durr
of Cognition
,
vol
. 1
(
Cambridge
,
MA: MIT Press
,
1986
)
,
by
pennission
of
the authon and
publisher
.

Jerry
A
Fodor am Zenon
W
.
Pylyshyn
Connectionism am
Cognitive
Ardtitedure :
A
Critical
Analysis
From
Cognition
,
voL 20
(
1988
)
,
by
pennission
of the authon and
Elsevier Science Publishen .
Paul
Smolensky
The
Constituent
Strudure
of

Connectionist
Mental States: A
Reply
to Fodor
and
Pylyshyn
From
The Southern
]
m. mQ/
of
Philosophy
,
voL 26
supp
.
(
1987
)
,
by
pennission
of the
journal
and the author .
Seymour
Papert
One
AI
or

Many ?
From
~
I
.
,
]
oamwl
of
the AmIriC Rn
Ac I Idtm.v of
Am -
Scitn tS
,
&om the issue
entitled .
"
Arti
fidal
Intelligence
,
"
voL 117
(
1988
)
.
Plato
From The MInD
pennissiol1

Harvard
Colleg
~
From The Di
Riog U I S of
PlRfo
,
trans
. B
.
Jowett (New
York: Random
House
,
1892
)
.
Rene Descartes
From
"
Comments on a
Certain
Broadsheet
"
From
Phiiosopllic
.l
Writings of
Dl Sc R Tta
,

trans.
Cottingham
,
Stoothoff
,
and
Murdoch
(
Cambridge
:
Cambridge
Univenity
Press
,
1985
)
,
by
pennission
of
the
publisher
.
John
Locke
No Innate
Prindples
in
the MiOO
From

An
. v
Conaming
Hunwn Undmt
Rnding
,
Afth edition
(London
,
1706
)
.
Jean
Piaget
The
Psydtogenesis
of
Knowledge
and Its
Epistemological Signi6cance
From
Massimo Piatelli
-
Palmerini.
ed.
,
lAng U Rgt
Rnd Ll
Rming
:

The o, _ fe
Bth Dttn
]
Mn
Pi Ilgft
Rnd
NORm
C~
1Sky
(
Cambridge
,
MA:
Harvard
Univenity
Press
,
1980
)
,
by
pennission
of
the author and
publisher
.
Copyright
<C>
1980
by

the President
and Fellows of
Harvard
College
.
Jerry
A
Fodor
How There
Could Be
a
Private
Language
and What It
Must Be Uke
From The
lAng
U Rgt
of
Thmcght
(
Cambridge
,
MA:
Harvard
University
Press
,
author
and

publisher
.
Copyright
<C>
1975
by
ThomasY.
Cromwell
Company
,
Noam
Otomsky
~ ion of Putnam
'
. Corn~ h
1975
)
,
by
permission
of
the
Inc
.
Noam
O1omsky
On
Cognitive
Structures
and Their

Development
:
A
Reply
to
Piaget
From Massimo
Piatelli
-
Palmerini,
ed
.
,
langUAge
And
iMming
:
11rt
DebRtt Bth Dttn
Jean
Pi I Igtt
And
NCMm
Chornsicy
(
Cambridge
,
MA: Harvard
Univenity
Press

,
1980
)
,
by
permission
of
the author
and
publisher
.
Copyright
<C>
1980
by
the
President and FeUows
of Harvard
Co
Uege
.
From
Massimo Piatelli
-
Palmerini,
ed.
,
langUAge
And
iMming

:
11rt
Del Nltt Bth Dttn
Jean
Pi I Igtt
And
NCMm
Chomskv
(
Cambridge
,
MA:
Harvard
University
Press
,
1980
)
,
by
_
__~__a
of the
author and
Copyright
<C
1980
by
the
President and

FeUows of
Over the
past
2500
years
there
have been
many
responses
to the
mind
/
body
problem
.
The
readings
in
this
section
represent
a
chronological
sketch
of the
movement
between
four of
the most
influential

general
proposals
:
dualism,
materialism
,
idealism,
and
functionalism
.
Dualism is
the
doctrine that
there
are
two different
types
of
substance:
physical
substance
,
which is the
object
of the
natural
sciences
,
and
mental

substance
,
which is
the stuff
of
which our
conscious
states are
comprised
.
Materialism
is the
position
that
there
is
only
physical
substance.
For the
materialist
,
mental
states like
pains
,
beliefs
,
desires
,

etc.
are
fundamentally
physical
states
.
Idealism
,
like
materialism
,
holds that
there
is
only
one
substance
,
but
claims that
the
substance
is mental
.
Functionalism
steers a
middle
course
between
dualism

and
materialism
.
Against
dualism,
the
functionalist
holds that
the mind
is
not
something
that
exists
apart
Horn
the
physical
.
Against
materialism,
the
functionalist
denies
that mental
states are
identical
to
physical
states.

Roughly
,
the
idea
is that it
is
not the
physical
substance itself
that
is
important
,
but
rather
the
way
in
which the
physical
substance is
organized
.
Although
the
claim is
hotly
debated
among
contemporary

philosophers
and
clas
-
sicists
,
Aristotle
may
be
thought
of as the
first
functionalist. In
his
discussion of
definition
-
which
he
takes to
express
the
formula,
or
essence
,
of a
thing
-
Aristotle

describes
objects
as
combinations of
foma
and
matter.
According
to
Aristotle
,
there
are
many
cases
where the
form of
the
object
is
essential
to the
object
,
while
the
matter is
not. For
example
,

a
word
written in wax
contains its
letters
as
part
of its
formula
but is
only
coincidentally
made
of wax
(
since it
could
equally
well
be
engraved
in
stone
,
written
on
paper
,
etc
.

)
.
Because
the form
of
a
word
like
"
dog
"
can be
realized in
many
different
substances
,
we
know
that the
form
and the
material
substance are
not
identical.
Contemporary
philosophers
call
this a

multiple
instantiation
argument
,
for it
appeals
to
the
fact that a
single
form can
be
instantiated
(
realized
)
in
many
different
physical
substances.
Although
,
as it
turns
out
,
the formula
of the
soul is

only
realized in
material
like
bones and
muscle
,
Aristotle
says
that
we
should not
make
the
mistake of
thinking
that the
soul and
body
are
identical.
For if
words
were
only
written in wax
,
we
would
still be

mistaken in
supposing
that
word
$
are
identical to
wax.
Thomas
Hobbes
provides
an
early
and
influential
statement
of
identity
theory
in
his
account
of
perception
:
visual
experiences
are
really
only

the
action of
external
physical
objects
on
our
physical
organs
.
Rene
Descartes
provides
the
classical
statement
of
dualism.
Starting
with
the experience
of his
own
mental
existence
,
Descartes asks
whether
the
idea of

his mental
existence is
indistinguishable
Horn
the
idea of
his
body
.
His answer
is that
it is
not
,
concluding
that
the idea
or
essence
of mind
is
different
Horn
the idea
of
body
.
Since
two
things

that
correspond
to
different
ideas
cannot
be
identical,
the
mind
must
be
different
Horn
the
body
.
George
Berkeley
argues
that a
thorough
empiricist
will
be led to
adopt
idealism.
According
to
Berkeley

,
if all
our
knowledge
comes
to us
through
sense
impressions
,
Introduction
4 Part I Introduction
then we can
never have
knowledge
of material substance
itself. We
may
posit
material
substance as
the cause of these
impressions
,
but there is
no direct evidence for such
substance
,
and
positing

such substance
may
lead us into contradiction
. His conclusion
is
that there are
only
minds
and sense
impressions
.
John
Stuart
Mill
introduces
a new concern into
the debate.
Mill
agrees
that materialism
is a
plausible
answer
to the onto
logical
question
about the mind
(
the
question

of
what the mind
really
is
)
,
but
argues
that we should not
overlook the
methodological
question
of how science should
proceed
to
study
the mind. Even
if we hold that mental
states are brain
states
,
the brain is so
complex
and so
poorly
understood
that we must
study
mental
regularities independent

of brain research. Thus
,
Mill concludes that the
study
of mind
(
psychology
)
should
remain a
separate
science even
if material i
$
m should
turn
out to be
true.
Gilbert
Ryle
,
who is a
logical
be Mviorist
,
provides
an influential critidsm of dualism.
According
to
Ryle

,
dualists are
guilty
of a
category
mistake
.
For
example
,
it is
perfectly
legitimate
to
talk
about
a football team
winning
a
game
,
and it
is also
legitimate
to talk
about
the individual members of
a
football
team

,
but
it would
surely
be a blunder
to think that the team is
something
that exists in addition to the members of
the team.
For
example
,
if
someone
were introduced to the members of
the team and then exclaimed
,
"
Now I
'
d like to meet the team
,
"
we would
say
that the
person
was
fundamentally
confused

. Talk
of
the team is
really
just
talk
of the
members of the team at
a
certain level of abstraction
. Likewise
,
according
to
Ryle
,
we
can
talk about mental states
(
like
pain
)
and we can talk of certain behaviors
(
like
holding
damaged
body
parts

and
moaning
)
,
but it would be
a mistake to
suppose
that the mental state of
pain
exists in
addition to some relevant class of behavior.
U
. T. Place
attempts
to defuse certain
arguments against
the
identity theory
.
Place
argues
that two
things
can turn out to be identical even
if their definitions are different
:
'
1ightning
"
,

for
example
,
doesn
'
t mean the same
thing
as
"
electrical
discharge
"
,
but we
can discover
that
lightning
and electrical
discharge
are identical
.
Likewise
,
though
"
mind
"
and
"
body

"
may
have different definitions
,
we can nonetheless discover
that
mind
and
body
are identical.
The selection
&om
Saul
Kripke presents
a
broadly
Cartesian
response
in
support
of
dualism
.
According
to
Kripke
,
science discovers
essences.
So

,
when we discover
that
lightning
is electrical
discharge
,
we discover that the essence of
lightning
is
that of
electrical
discharge
.
Alternatively
,
if
the essence of
lightning
and electrical
discharge
should turn out to be distind
,
then
lightning
and electrical
discharge
would amount to
distind
things

.
According
to
Kripke
,
the essence of mind
may
well be
distind &om the
essence
of
body
. If this is so
,
then
mind and
body
must be distind as well.
Noam
Chomsky
sketch
es a radical
approach
to materialism
.
According
to
Chomsky
,
the notion of

body
is itself
subject
to revision
by
the
sciences
. For
example
,
the
concept
of
body
employed
by
Descartes
was
soon
superseded
by
the Newtonian notion of
body
,
and research
in
particle
physics during
the last
century

has
continually
revised
our
understanding
of
the nature
of
physical
bodies. This
being
the case
,
Chomsky
argues
that the
very
notion of
the mind/
body
problem
is ill defined. It is
ill
defined
because we have no clear
conception
of
what the
body
is. Moreover

,
he
suggests
that
if
our
understanding
of mental
phenomena
seems
incompatible
with our
understanding
of the
physical
body
,
then
our
understanding
of the
physical
body
will have to
change
to accommodate the
mental.
Our
ultimate
understanding

of
body
will
be
shaped
by
(
among
other
things
)
our
theories of the mental.
Hilary
Putnam initiates
the
contemporary
discussion of functionalism. Like Aristotle
,
Putnam is concerned
with the formula of the soul
,
though
he
suggests
in
"
The
Nature of
The

Mind/
Body
ProblemS
Our Mental
States
"
that it
can be
thought
of
as a
Turing
machine
,
an
abstract
computing
machine.
Turing
machines
can be
instantiated
in
many
different
kinds
of
hardware
-
silicon

chips
,
Tinker
toy
models
,
and,
according
to
Putnam
,
the
human
body
.
Putnam
argues
against
the
identity
theory
by
using
a
multiple
instantiation
argument
:
because
a

given
psychological
state
(
e.
g
.
,
pain
)
can
be
realized in
creatures
with
nervous
systems
quite
different
from
our
own,
and
indeed
can
presumably
even
be
realized
by

the
silicon
-
based
creatures of
science
fiction,
there is
no
single
physical
type
that
correlates
with
the
psychological
type pain
.
Consequently
,
no
reduction
of
the
psychological
state
pain
to a
single

type
of
neurophysiological
state is
possible
.
Patricia
Church
land is
unimpressed
by
this use
of
the
multiple
instantiation
argument
.
She
argues
that
Putnam
'
s
notion
of
reduction is far
too
restrictive
-

so
restrictive
that
by
Putnam
'
s
standards it
is not
clear
that
any
science
has
been
success
fully
reduced
to a
more
fundamental
science.
Take
,
for
example
,
the
theory
of

thermodynamics
,
which
is
widely
taken
to
have
been
reduced
to
statistical
mechanics. As
Church land
notes
,
a
kind of
multiple
instantiation
argument
is
possible
here
as well
,
for in
gases
,
heat is

reduced
to mean
kinetic
energy
,
in
solids
something
else
,
and in
a
vacuum
something
else
again
.
But we
don
'
t
conclude
that
there is
no
reduction.
Ned
Block
attacks
functionalism

from
another
direction,
arguing
that
any
functional
definition
of
mental
states will
be
either
too
liberal
(
ascribing
mental
states to
creatures
that
don
'
t
really
have
them
)
,
or

too
chauvinistic
(
failing
to
ascribe
mental
states to
creatures that
do
have
them
)
. In
setting
up
his
argument
,
he
surveys
a
number of
concerns that
have been
raised
against
functionalism
,
including

the
problem
of
accounting
for the
phenomenology
of
mental
states
.
Block
'
s
article is
also useful in
providing
an
extensive
classification of
the
various
types
of
functionalism
.
In
"
Philosophy
and
our

Mental
Life
,
"
Putnam
criticizes
his
earlier
formulation of
functionalism
,
arguing
that
the
multiple
instantiation
argument
can
also be
extended
to
Turing
machines
-
thus
showing
that
mental
states
cannot

be
reduced
to
Turing
machine
states.
But
Putnam
does not
reject
functionalism.
Rather
,
he
defines
functional
states
more
broadly
as
classes of
structurally
identical
states
,
perhaps
returning
to
something
a bit

more like
Aristotle
'
s
notion of
"
form.
"
Further
Reading
Several
good
collections
are aval
Jable
on the
mindlbody
problem
,
though
they
are
primarily
concerned
with
the
debate
between
materialism
and

dualism.
They
include
:
Bont
,
C
.
V
.
,
ed.
1970. The
Mind
/
8min
1dmh'
ty
Theory
.
London:
MacMillan.
Presley
,
C.
F
.
,
ed.
1967

.
The
/
dmtity
Theory of
Mind.
University
of
Queensland
Press
.
Rosenthal,
David,
ed.
1971. M
Rttri Rlism
Rnd
the Mind
-
Body
Probltm
.
Englewood
Qifh
,
NJ
:
Prentice Hall
.
The

following
collections
are
more
general
but
also
address the
mind/
body
problem
.
The
Block and
Lycan
collections
have
particularly
good
sections on
functionalism
.
Block,
Ned,
ed.
1980.
Readings
in
the
Philosophy

of
Psychology
00/
.
1
.
Cambridge
,
MA:
Harvard
University
Press
.
Hook,
Sidney
,
ed. 1960.
Dimensions
of
Mind
. New
York:
Collier.
Lycan
,
William,
ed.
1990.
Mind Rnd
CORnition

: A
Reader.
Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Chapter
1
From
Metaphysics
,
book
7
,
and On
the Soul
,
book
2
Aristotle
Since
a definition
is
a
fonnula
,
and
every
fonnula
has
parts
,

and as
the fonnula
is to
the
thing
,
so is
the
part
of
the fonnula
to the
part
of
the
thing,
the
question
is
already
being
asked
whether
the fonnula
of
the
parts
must be
present
in the fonnula

of
the whole or
not
. For
in some cases
the fonnulae
of
the
parts
are seen
to be
present
,
and
in some not
.
The fonnula
of
the circle does
not
include
that of the
segments
,
but
that of
the
syllable
includes
that of

the letters
;
yet
the
circle is
divided into
segments
as the
syllable
is
into
letters
.
And further
if the
parts
are
prior
to the
whole
,
and the acute
angle
is
a
part
of
the
right
angle

and the
finger
a
part
of
the animal
,
the acute
angle
will be
prior
to the
right
angle
and the
finger
to
the
man. But the
latter are
thought
to be
prior
;
for
in
fonnula
the
parts
are

explained
by
reference
to them
,
and
in
respect
also
of the
power
of
existing
apart
from
each other
the
wholes
are
prior
to
the
parts
.
. Let
us
inquire
about
the
parts

of
which
substance consists
.
If then
matter is one
thing
,
fonn
another
,
the
compound
of these
a third
,
and both
the matter
and the fonn
and the
compound
are substance
,
even
the matter
is in
a sense called
part
of
a

thing,
while
in
a
sense
it is not
,
but
only
the
elements
of which
the fonnula
of
the fonn
consists
. E.
g
.
,
. . .
the bronze
is a
part
of
the concrete
statue
,
but not
of the

statue when
this
is
spoken
of
in the sense of
the fonn
.
(For
the fonn
,
or
the
thing
as
having
fonn
,
should
be said
to be
the
thing
,
but
the
material element
by
itself must
never be

said to
be
so.
)
And so the
fonnula of
the circle
does not
include
that of
the
segments
,
but
the
fonnula
of
the
syllable
includes
that of the
letters
;
for
the letters
are
parts
of
the fonnula
of

the fonn
,
and not
matter
,
but the
segments
are
parts
in the sense
of matter
on which
the fonn
supervenes
;
yet
they
are nearer
the fonn
than the bronze
is
when roundness
is
produced
in bronze
. But
in a sense not
even
every
kind of

letter
will be
present
in the
fonnula
of
the
syllable
,
e.
g
.
,
particular
waxen
letters or
the letters
as movements
in the
air
;
for
in these also
we have
already
something
that is
part
of the
syllable

only
in the
sense
that it is
its
perceptible
matter
. For even
if the line
when divided
passes
away
into
its halves
,
or the
man into bones
and
muscles
and flesh
,
it does not
follow
that
they
are
composed
of
these as
parts

of their essence
,
but
rather as
matter
;
and these
are
parts
of
the concrete
thing
,
but not also
of the
fonn
,
i
.e.
,
of
that to
which the
fonnula refers
;
wherefore
also
they
are not
present

in the
fonnulae
. In one
kind of fonnula
, then,
the
fonnula
of
such
parts
will be
present
,
but
in another
it must not be
present
,
where the
fonnula
does not
refer to
the concrete
object
. For
it is for this
reason
that some
things
have

as their constituent
principles
parts
into which
they
pass
away
,
while
some have
not
. Those
things
which
are
the fonn
and the
matter taken
together
,
e.
g
.
,
.
. . the bronze
circle
,
pass
away

into these
materials
,
and the
matter is
a
part
of
them
;
but
those
things
which
do not
involve
matter but
are without
matter
,
and
whose fonnulae
are
fonnulae
of
the fonn
only
,
do not
pass

away
Therefore
these
materials
are
principles
and
parts
of the
concrete
things
,
while
of the fonn
they
are neither
parts
nor
principles
. And
therefore
the
clay
statue is
resolved into
clay
and
the ball
into bronze
and

Callias
into
8
Aristotle
flesh and
bones
,
and
again
the
circle into its
segments
;
for there is a sense of
'
circle
'
in
which it
involves
matter.
For
'
circle
'
is used
ambiguously
,
meaning
both

the
circle
,
unqualified
,
and the
individual
circle
,
because
there is no name
peculiar
to the
individuals.
The truth
has
indeed
now been
stated
,
but
still let us state it
yet
more
clearly
,
taking
up
the
question again

.
The
parts
of
the
formula,
into which the formula
is divided
,
are
prior
to it
,
either all
or
some of them
. . . . The
circle and the
semicircle also
are
in
such a
relation
;
for
the
semicircle is
defined
by
the

circle
;
and so is the
finger
by
the
whole
body
,
for a
finger
is
'
such and
such a
part
of a man.
'
Therefore
the
parts
which are of
the
nature
of matter
,
and
into which as
its matter a
thing

is divided
,
are
posterior
;
but
those
which
are of the
nature of
parts
of the
formula
,
and
of the
substance
according
to
its
formula,
are
prior
,
either all
or some
of them.
And since the
soul of
animals

(
for this is
the
substance of a
living being
)
is their
substance
according
to
the formula
,
i.
e.
,
the form
and the
essence of a
body
of a certain
kind
(
at least
we shall
define each
part
,
if
we
define

it
well
,
not
without
reference to
its function
,
and this
cannot
belong
to it
without
perception
)
,
so that
the
parts
of soul are
prior
,
either all
or some
of
them,
to the con
-
crete
'

animal
,
'
and so
too with each
individual
animal
;
and
the
body
and
its
parts
are
posterior
to this
,
the essential
substance
,
and it
is not the
substance
but the
concrete
thing
that is divided
into these
parts

as its
matter: this
being
so
,
to the
concrete
thing
these are in a
sense
prior
,
but in a
sense
they
are
not. For
they
cannot
even exist if
severed from
the whole
;
for it
is not a
finger
in
any
and
every

state that
is the
finger
of a
living thing,
but a
dead
finger
is
a
finger
only
in
name
. . .
.
'
A
part
'
may
be a
part
either
of the form
(
i.
e.
,
of the

essence
)
,
or of
the
compound
of the form
and the
matter
,
or of
the
matter itself.
But
only
the
parts
of the
form are
parts
of the
formula,
and the
formula
is
of
the
universal
;
for '

being
a
circle
'
is the
same as the
circle
,
and '
being
a
soul
'
the
same
as
the soul. But
when we
come to the
concrete
thing
,
e.
g
.
,
this
circle
,
i

.e.
,
one of the
individual
circles
,
whether
perceptible
or
intelligible
(I
mean
by
intelligible
circles the
mathematical
,
and
by
perceptible
circles those of
bronze and
of wood
)
-
of these there
is
no definition
,
but

they
are known
by
the aid
of intuitive
thinking
or
of
perception
. .
. .
We
have
stated,
then
,
how matters
stand with
regard
to
whole and
part
,
and their
priority
and
posteriority
. But when
anyone
asks whether

the
right
angle
and the
circle
and the animal
are
prior
,
or the
things
into which
they
are
divided and
of which
they
consist
,
i.e.
,
the
parts
,
we must
meet the
inquiry
by
saying
that

the
question
cannot
be
answered
simply
. For if
eve J'\
bare
soul is the
animal or the
living thing,
or the
soul of
each
individual is the
individual itself
,
and '
being
a
circle
'
is the
circle
,
and '
being
a
right

angle
'
and the
essence of the
right angle
is the
right angle
,
then the
whole
in
one
sense
must be called
posterior
to the
part
in one
sense
,
i
.e.
,
to the
parts
included in
the formula
and to the
parts
of the

individual
right
angle
(
for both
the
material
right
angle
which
is made of
bronze
,
and that
which is
formed
by
individual
lines
,
are
posterior
to
their
parts
)
;
the immaterial
right
angle

is
posterior
to the
parts
included in
the
formula
,
but
prior
to those
included
in
the
particular
instance
,
and the
question
must
not be
answered
simply
. If
the soul is
something
different and is
not identical
with the
animal

,
even so some
parts
must
,
as we
have maintained
,
be called
prior
and
others must
not.
. . . In the
case of
things
which are found
to occur in
specifically
different
materials
,
as
a
circle
may
exist in
bronze or stone
or wood
,

it seems
plain
that
these
,
the bronze
or
the stone
,
are no
part
of
the essence of the
circle
,
since it is
found
apart
from them.
Of
things
which are not
seen to exist
apart
,
[
even here
]
there is
no

reason
why
the
same
may
not be
true
,
just
as
if all
circles that had
ever been seen
were of bronze
;
for none the
less the
bronze
would be no
part
of the form
;
but it
is hard to
eliminate it in
thought
.
From
Metaphysics
,

and
On the
Soul
9
E.
g
.
,
the fonD of man
is
always
found in
flesh and
bones
and
parts
of
this kind
;
are
these
then
also
parts
of
the fonD and
the
fonnula1 No
,
they

are
matter
;
but
because
man is
not
found also in
other
matters we
are
unable to
perfonn
the
abstraction.
such.
.
While
waking
is
actuality
in a
sense
corresponding
to
[
actually
]
seeing,
the soul

is
actuality
in
the
sense
corresponding
to the
power
of
sight
. . .
;
the
body
corresponds
to

We are
in
the habit
of
recognizing
,
as one
determinate kind
of
[
being
]
,

substance
,
and
that
in
several
senses
,
(
a
)
in
the
sense of
matter or
that
which in
itself is
not
'
a
[
such
-
and
-
such
]
,
'

and
(
b
)
in
the
sense of
form or
essence
,
which
is that
precisely
in
virtue of
which
a
thing
is called
'
a
[
such
-
and
-
such
]
,
'

and
thirdly
(
c
)
in
the
sense of
that
which is
compounded
of both
(
a
)
and
(
b
)
. Now
matter
is
potentiality
,
form
actuality
;
of the
latter
there

are
two
grades
related
to
one another
as
,
e.
g
.
,
knowledge
to the
exercise
of
knowledge
.
Substances are
,
by
general
consent
,
[
taken to
include
]
bodies and
especially

natural
bodies
;
for
they
are the
principles
of all
other
bodies.
Of
natural
bodies
some have
life in
them
,
others not
;
by
life
we mean
self
-
nutrition
and
growth
(
with
its

correlative
decay
)
.
It
follows
that
every
natural
body
which has
life in it
is a
substance
in
the
sense
of a
composite
.
But
since it
is also a
body
of such
and such a
kind
,
viz.
having

life
,
the
body
cannot be
soul
;
the
body
is
the
subject
,
or
matter
,
not what
is
attributed
to
it
.
Hence the
soul
must
be a
substance in the
sense
of the
form of a

natural
body
having
life
potentially
within
it. But
form is
actuality
,
and
thus soul
is the
actuality
of a
body
as
above
characterized.
Now the
word
actuality
has two
senses
corresponding
respectively
to
the
possession
of

knowledge
and the
actual
exercise
of
knowledge
. It
is
obvious that
the
soul is
actuality
in
the
Arst sense
,
viz.
that of
knowledge
as
possessed
,
for
both
sleeping
and
waking
presuppose
the
existence

of soul
,
and of
these
waking
corresponds
to
actual
knowing
,
sleeping
to
knowledge possessed
but
not
employed
,
and
,
in
the
history
of
the
individual
,
knowledge
comes before
its
employment

or
exercise.
That
is
why
the
soul is the
first
grade
of
actuality
of a
natural
body
having
life
potentially
in
it.
The
body
so
described is a
body
which
is
organized
.
The
parts

of
plants
in
spite
of
their
extreme
simplicity
are
'
organs
'
;
e.
g
.
,
the leaf
serves
to shelter
the
pericarp
,
the
pericarp
to shelter
the fruit
,
while
the

roots of
plants
are
analogous
to the
mouth of
animals
,
both
serving
for the
absorption
of food. If
,
then
,
we
have to
give
a
general
formula
applicable
to
all
kinds of soul
,
we
must
describe it

as the first
grade
of
actuality
of a
natural
organized body
.
That is
why
we can
wholly
dismiss as
unnecessary
the
question
whether
the soul
and the
body
are one: it
is as
meaningless
as to
ask
whether the wax
and
the
shape given
to it

by
the
stamp
are one
,
or
generally
the
matter
of a
thing
and that
of
which it is
the matter. . .
.
We
have now
given
an
answer to the
question
,
What
is sou17
-
an
answer
which
applies

to it in
its full
extent.
It is
substance in
the
sense
which
corresponds
to the
definitive
formula
of a
thing
'
s
essence. That
means that it
is
'
the
essential
whatness
'
of a
body
of
the
character
just

assigned
.
Suppose
that
the
eye
were an
animal
-
sight
would
have
been its
soul
,
for
sight
is the
substance
,
or
essence
,
of
the
eye
which corresponds
to the
formula
,

the
eye
being
merely
the
matter
of
seeing;
when
seeing
is
removed the
eye
is
no
longer
an
eye
,
except
in
name
-
it
is no
more a real
eye
than
the
eye

of a
statue
or of a
painted
figure
.
We
must now
extend
our
consideration &
om the
'
parts
'
to the
whole
living
body
;
for
what the
departmental
sense is
to the
bodily
part
which is
its
organ

,
that
the
whole
faculty
of
sense is
to the
whole
sensitive
body
as
10
Aristotle
what exists in
potentiality
;
as
the
pupil
plus
the
power
of
sight
constitutes the
eye
,
so
the

soul
plus
the
body
constitutes the animal.
From
this it
indubitably
follows that the
soul is
inseparable
from its
body
,
or at
any
rate
that certain
parts
of
it
are
(
if it
has
parts
)
-
for
the

actuality
of some of them is
nothing
but
the actualities
of their
bodily
parts
.
Chapter
2
Of Sense
Thomas Hobbes
Concerning
the
thoughts
of man
,
I will
consider them
first
singly
,
and
afterwards
in
train
,
or
dependence

upon
one another .
Singly
,
they
are
every
one a
representation
or
appearance
,
of some
quality
,
or other
accident of a
body
outside us
,
which is
commonly
called
an
object
.
Which
object
works
on the

eyes
,
ears
,
and other
parts
of a man
'
s
body
;
and
by diversity
of
working
,
produceth
diversity
of
appearances
.
The
original
of them all
,
is that
which we call
sense
,
for there is

no
conception
in
a
man
'
s mind
,
which has not at
first
,
totally
,
or
by
parts
,
been
begotten
[
by
]
the
organs
of
sense. The
rest are derived
from that
original
.

To know the natural
cause of sense
,
is not
very
necessary
to the
business
now
in
hand
;
and I
have elsewhere
written of the
same at
large
.
Nevertheless
,
to fill
each
part
of
my
present
method
,
I
will

briefly
deliver the same in
this
place
.
The cause of
sense
,
is the external
body
,
or
object
,
which
presseth
the
organ
proper
to each sense
,
either
immediately
,
as
in
the
taste and touch
;
or

mediately
,
as
in
seeing
,
hearing
,
and
smelling;
which
pressure
,
by
the
mediation of the
nerves
,
and
other
strings
and
membranes of
the
body
,
continued
inwards to
the brain and heart
,

causeth there
a
resistance
,
or counter
-
pressure
,
or
endeavour of the heart
to deliver
itself
,
which
endeavour
,
because outward
,
seemeth to be
some matter
outside
.
And this
seeming
,
or
fancy
,
is that
which men

call sense
;
and
consisteth,
as to
the
eye
,
in
a
light
,
or colour
figured
;
to the ear
,
in a sound
;
to the
nostril
,
in
an odour
;
to the
tongue
and
palate
,

in a savour
;
and
to the rest
of the
body
,
in heat
,
cold
,
hardness
,
softness
,
and
such other
qualities
as we
discern
by
feeling
.
All
which
qualities
,
called
sensible
,

are
,
in
the
object
that
causeth them
,
[
nothing
]
but so
many
several motions
of the matter
,
by
which it
presseth
our
organs
diversely
.
[ Nor]
in
us that are
pressed
,
are
they any

thing
else
,
but divers
motions
;
for
motion
produceth
nothing
but
motion . But
their
appearance
to us is
fancy
,
the
same
waking
,
[
as
]
dreaming
. And as
pressing
,
rubbing,
or

striking
the
eye
,
makes us
fancy
a
light
;
and
pressing
the ear
,
produceth
a din
;
so do the
bodies we see
,
or hear
,
produce
the same
by
their
strong,
though
unobserved action .
For
if

these
colours and sounds
were in the
bodies
,
or
objects
that cause them
,
they
could
not be severed
from them
,
as
by
glasses
,
and
in
echoes
by
reflection,
we see
they
are
;
[
so
]

we
know the
thing
we see is
in
one
place
,
the
appearance
in
another .
And
though
at
some certain
distance
,
the real
and
very
object
seems
invested with the
fancy
it
begets
in
us
;

yet
the
object
is one
thing,
the
image
or
fancy
is another
. So that
sense
,
in
all cases
,
is
nothing
else
but
original
fancy
,
caused
,
as I
have said
,
by
the

pressure
,
that
is
,
by
the motion of
external
things
upon
our
eyes
,
ears
,
and
other
organs
thereunto
ordained .
Sense
Chapter
3
From Meditations
Rene
Descartes
:
II
and
VI

and from
Reply
to
Objections
II
By
the
body
I
understand all that which
can
be de Aned
by
a certain
figure
:
something
which can
be confined
in a
certain
place
,
and which can fill a
given
space
in
such
a
way

that
every
other
body
will
be excluded Horn it
;
which can be
perceived
either
by
touch
,
or
by
sight
,
or
by
hearing
,
or
by
taste
,
or
by
smell: which can be moved in
many ways
not

,
in truth
,
by
itself
,
but
by
something
which is
foreign
to it
,
by
which it is
touched
[
and Horn which it receives
impressions
]
: for to have
the
power
of self
-
movement
,
as
also of
feeling

or of
thinking,
I
did not consider to
appertain
to the nature of
body
: on
the
contrary
,
I
was rather astonished to And that faculties similar to them existed
in
some bodies
.
But what am I
,
now that I
suppose
that there is a
certain
genius
which is
extremely
powerful
,
and
,
if I

may say
so
,
malicious
,
who
employs
all
his
powers
in
deceiving
me?
Can
I affirm
that
I
possess
the least of all those
things
which I have
just
said
pertain
to
the nature of
body
?
I
pause

to consider
,
I
revolve all these
things
in
my
mind
,
and I find
none of which
I
can
say
that it
pertains
to me
.
It would be tedious to
stop
to enumerate
them. Let us
pass
to the attributes of soul and see
if
there is
anyone
which is in me?
What of nutrition or
walking

[
the first mentioned
)?
But if it is so that I have no
body
it is
also true that
I
can neither walk nor take nourishment. Another attribute is sensation.
But
one cannot feel without
body
,
and besides
I
have
thought
I
perceived
many
things
during
sleep
that I
recognised
in
my
waking
moments as not
having

been
experienced
at all. What
of
thinking
? I And here that
thought
is
an
attribute
that
belongs
to me
;
it
alone cannot be
separated
Horn me.
I
am
,
I
exist
,
that is certain. But how often?
Just
when
I
think;
for it

might possibly
be the case if I ceased
entirely
to
think.
that I should
likewise cease
altogether
to exist. I do
not
now admit
anything
which is not
necessarily
true
:
to
speak
accurately
I am
not more
than a
thing
which thinks
,
that is to
say
a
mind
or

a
soul
,
or
an
understanding,
or a
reason
,
which are terms whose
significance
was
formerly
unknown to me.
I am
,
however
,
a
real
thing
and
really
exist
;
but what
thing
?
I
have answered

: a
thing
which thinks
.
And first of all
,
because
I
know that all
things
which
I
apprehend
clearly
and
distinctly
can be created
by
God as
I
apprehend
them
,
it suffices that
I
am able to
apprehend
one
thing apart
from another

clearly
and
distinctly
in order to be certain that
the one is different from the other
,
since
they
may
be made to exist
in
separation
at
least
by
the
omnipotence
of God
;
and it does not
signify
by
what
power
this
separation
is
made in order to
compel
me to

judge
them
to be different
:
and
,
therefore
,
just
because
I
know
certainly
that I
exist
,
and
that
meanwhile I do not remark that
any
other
thing
necessarily
pertains
to
my
nature or
essence
,
excepting

that
I
am a
thinking thing
,
I
interpolation


Bracketed text
is translator
'
s
rather
certainly
,
as
I
shall
say
in a
moment
)
I
possess
a
body
with which
I am
very

intimately
conjoined
,
yet
because
,
on
the
one
side
,
I
have a clear and distinct
idea of
myself
inasmuch as
I am
only
a
thinking
and unextended
thing,
and as
,
on the other
,
I
possess
a
distinct idea of

body
,
inasmuch
as it is
only
an extended and
unthinking
thing
,
it
is certain that
this
I
[
that is to
say
,
my
soul
by
which
I am what I am
L
is
entirely
and
absolutely
distinct from
my body
,

and can exist without
it.
Do
you deny
that in
order to
recognise
a real
distinctness between
objects
it is
sufficient for
us to conceive
one of them
clearly
apart
from the other? If
so
,
offer us some
surer token
of real
distinction
. I
believe that none such can be found. What
will
you
say
? That
those

things
are
really
distinct each of which can exist
apart
from
the other.
But
once more I ask
how
you
will know that one
thing
can be
apart
from the other
;
this
,
in
order to be a
sign
of the
distinctness
,
should be known.
Perhaps
you
will
say

that it is
given
to
you
by
the senses
,
since
you
can
see
,
touch
,
etc.
,
the one
thing
while the other
is absent. But
the trustworthiness of the senses
is inferior to
that
of
the
intellect
,
and it is
in
many

ways
possible
for one and the same
thing
to
appear
under various
guises
or in
several
places
or in different
manners
,
and
so to be taken to be two
things
.
And
finally
if
you
bear
in
mind what
was
said at
the end of the Second Meditation
about
wax,

you
will
see
that
properly
speaking
not even are
bodies themselves
perceived
by
sense
,
but
that
they
are
perceived
by
the intellect alone
,
so
that
there is no
difference between
perceiving
by
sense one
thing
apart
from another

,
and
having
an
idea
of one
thing
and
understanding
that that idea
is not the same as
an
idea of
something
else. Moreover
,
this
knowledge
can be drawn from no other
source
than the
fact that the one
thing
is
perceived
apart
from the
other
;
nor can this be known

with
certainty
unless
the
ideas
in
each case are clear and distinct. Hence that
sign
you
offer of
real distinctness must be reduced to
my
criterion
in
order to be infallible.
But if
any
people
deny
that
they
have distinct ideas of mind and
body
,
I can
do
nothing
further than ask them to
give
sufficient attention to what

is said
in
the Second
Meditation.
I
beg
them to note that the
opinion
they
perchance
hold,
namely
,
that
the
parts
of
the
brain
join
'
their
forces
with the
soul to fonD
thoughts
,
has not arisen from
any
positive

ground
,
but
only
from the fact that
they
have never had
experience
of
separation
from
the
body
,
and have not seldom been hindered
by
it in their
operations
,
and that
similarly
if
anyone
had from
infancy
continually
worn irons on
his
legs
,

he
would
think that those irons were
part
of his
own
body
and that he needed them in
order to
walk.
14
Rene Descartes

It
is evident to
anyone
who takes a
survey
of
the
objects
of
human
knowledge
,
that
they
are either ideas
actually
imprinted

on the
senses
;
or else such as are
perceived
by
attending
to the
passions
and
operations
of the mind
;
or
lastly
,
ideas formed
by
help
of
memory
and
imagination
-
either
compounding, dividing
,
or
barely
representing

those
originally perceived
in
the aforesaid
ways
.
By
sight
I have
the ideas of
light
and colours
,
with their
several
degrees
and variations.
By
touch I
perceive
hard and
soft
,
heat and
cold
,
motion and resistance
,
and of all
these more and less either as to

quantity
or
degree
.
Smelling
furnish

es me with odours
;
the
palate
with tastes
;
and
hearing
conveys
sounds to the mind in all their
variety
of tone and
composition
. And as several of
these
are observed
to
accompany
each other
,
they
come to be marked
by

one name
,
and
so to
be
reputed
as one
thing
. Thus
,
for
example
,
a certain
colour
,
taste
,
smell
,
figure
and
consistence
having
been
observed to
go
together
,
are accounted one

distinct
thing,
signified
by
the name
apple
;
other collections of ideas constitute a
stone
,
a
tree
,
a
book,
and the like sensible
things
-
which as
they
are
pleasing
or
disagreeable
excite the
passions
of love
, hatred,
joy
,

grief
,
and so forth.
But
,
besides all that endless
variety
of ideas or
objects
of
knowledge
,
there is likewise
something
which knows or
perceives
them
,
and exercises divers
operations
,
as
willing
,
imagining, remembering,
about them. This
perceiving,
active
being
is what I call mind

,
spirit
,
soul
,
or
myself
.
By
which words
I
do not denote
anyone
of
my
ideas
,
but a
thing
entirely
distinct from them
,
wherein
they
exist
,
or
,
which is the same
thing,

whereby
they
are
perceived
-
for the existence of
an
idea consists
in
being
perceived
.
That neither our
thoughts
,
nor
passions
,
nor ideas
formed
by
the
imagination
,
exist
without the
mind
,
is what
everybody

will allow. And to me it is no less evident that the
various sensations or ideas
imprinted
on
the
sense
,
however blended or combined
together
(
that is
,
whatever
objects
they
compose
)
,
cannot exist otherwise than
in a
mind
perceiving
them. I think an intuitive
knowledge
may
be obtained
of this
by any
one
that

shall
attend
to
what
is meant
by
the term exist when
applied
to sensible
things
.
The table I write on I
say
exists
,
that
is
,
I
see and feel it
;
and
if I
were out of
my study
I
should
say
it existed
-

meaning
thereby
that
if I
was in
my study
I
might
perceive
it
,
or
that
some other
spirit
actually
does
perceive
it. There
was
an
odour
,
that is
,
it
was smelt
;
there was a sound
,

that
is
,
it
was heard
;
a colour or
figure
,
and it
was
perceived
by
sight
or touch. This is all that I
can understand
by
these and the like
expressions
.
For as to
what is said of the absolute existence of
unthinking things
without
any
relation to their
being perceived
,
that is to me
perfectly unintelligible

. Their esse is
perripi
,
nor is it
possible
they
should have
any
existence out of the
minds or
thinking things
which
perceive
them.
It
is
indeed an
opinion
strangely
prevailing amongst
men
,
that
houses
,
mountains
,
rivers
,
and

in
a word all sensible
objects
,
have an
existence
,
natural or real
,
distinct from
their
being perceived
by
the
understanding
. But
,
with
how
great
an
assurance
and

Chapter
4
From The
Principles
of
Human

Knowledge
George Berkeley
acquiescence
soever
this
principle
may
be
entertained in the
world
,
yet
whoever shall
And in his heart to call it
in
question
may
,
if I mistake not
,
perceive
it to involve a
manifest contradiction. For
,
what are the forementioned
objects
but the
things
we
perceive

by
sense? and what do we
perceive
besides our own ideas or
sensations? and is
it
not
plainly repugnant
that
anyone
of these
,
or
any
combination of
them
,
should exist
unperceived
?
If we
throughly
examine this tenet it will
,
perhaps
,
be found at bottom to
depend
on
the

doctrine of
abstract ideas.
For
can there be a
nicer strain of abstraction than
to
distinguish
the existence of sensible
objects
from their
being perceived
,
so as to
conceive
them
existing unperceived
?
Light
and colours
,
heat and cold
,
extension and
figures
-
in a word the
things
we see and feel
-
what are

they
but so
many
sensations
,
notions
,
ideas
,
or
impressions
on the sense? and is it
possible
to
separate
,
even
in
thought
,
any
of
these
from
perception
?
For
my
part
,

I
might
as
easily
divide a
thing
from itself.
I
may
,
indeed
,
divide
in
my
thoughts
,
or conceive
apart
from each other
,
those
things
which
,
perhaps
,
I
never
perceived

by
sense so divided. Thus
,
I
imagine
the
trunk of
a human
body
without the limbs
,
or conceive the smell
of
a
rose without
thinking
on
the rose
itself
.
So
far
,
I will
not
deny
,
I
can abstract
-

if
that
may
properly
be called abstraction which extends
only
to the
conceiving
separately
such
objects
as
it
is
possible
may really
exist or be
actually
perceived
asunder.
But
my
conceiving
or
imagining
power
does not extend
beyond
the
possibility

of real
existence
or
perception
.
Hence
,
as
it
is
impossible
for me to see or feel
anything
without an actual sensation
of that
thing,
so is it
impossible
for me to
conceive
in
my
thoughts
any
sensible
thing
or
object
distinct from the sensation or
perception

of it.
[In
truth
,
the
object
and the
sensation are the same
thing
,
and
cannot therefore be abstracted from each other.
]
Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need
only
open
his
eyes
to see them.
Such
I take this
important
one to be
,
viz.
that
all
the choir of heaven
and furniture of the earth
,

in a
word
all
those bodies which
compose
the
mighty
frame
of the world
,
have not
any
subsistence without a mind
,
that their
being
is
to
be
perceived
or known
;
that
consequently
so
long
as
they
are not
actually

perceived
by
me
,
or
do not exist in
my
mind or that of
any
other created
spirit
,
they
must either have no
existence at all
,
or else
subsist
in the
mind of some Eternal
Spirit
-
it
being
perfectly
unintelligible
,
and
involving
all

the
absurdity
of abstraction
,
to attribute to
any
single
part
of them an existence
independent
of
a
spirit
.
[To
be convinced of which
,
the reader
need
only
reflect
,
and
try
to
separate
in
his own
thoughts
the

being
of a sensible
thing
from its
being
perceived
.
]
From
what has been said it
is evident there is not
any
other
Substance
than
Spirit
,
or
that which
perceives
. But
,
for the fuller
demonstration of this
point
,
let it be considered
the sensible
qualities
are colour

,
figure
,
motion,
smell
,
taste
,
etc.
,
i
.e.
,
the ideas
perceived
by
sense. Now
,
for
an
idea to exist
in
an
unperceiving thing
is a manifest
contradiction
,
for
to have an idea is all one as to
perceive

;
that
therefore wherein colour
,
figure
,
etc
.
exist must
perceive
them
;
hence it is clear there can be no
unthinking
substance or
substratum of those ideas.
But
,
say you
,
though
the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind
,
yet
there
may
be
things
like them
,

whereof
they
are
copies
or resemblances
,
which
things
exist
without the
mind in an
unthinking
substance. I answer
,
an idea
can
be like
nothing
but
an idea
;
a
colour or
figure
can
be like
nothing
but another colour or
figure
. If we

look
but never so little into our
thought
,
we
shall
And it
impossible
for us
to conceive
a
likeness
except
only
between
our ideas.
Again
,
I ask whether those
supposed originals
or external
things
,
of which our ideas
are the
pictures
or
representations
,
be themselves

perceivable
or no? If
they
are
,
then
they
are ideas
and we have
gained
our
point
;
but if
16
George
Berkeley
you
say they
are not
,
I
something
which is
appeaJ
invi
ible
~
the rest.
Some

there
are who
the fonner
they
mean
extension,
number
;
by
the latter
they
denote
and so forth. The
ideas we have of these
figure
,
aU
From ThI
Principles
of
H Um Rn
Know
/edge
17
to
anyone
whether it be
sense to assert
a
colour is like

;
hard or soft
,
like
something
which is
intangible
;
and so of
make
a
distinction betwixt
primary
and
secondary
qualities
.
By

,
-
-
'
, motion,
rest
,
solidity
or
impenetrability
,

and
-"
other sensible
qualities
,
as
colours
,
sounds
,
tastes
,
they
acknowledge
not to be the
resemblances
of
anything existing
without the
mind,
or
unperceived
,
but
they
will have our ideas
of
the
primary qualities
to be

patterns
or
images
of
things
which exist
without the mind
,
in
an
unthinking
substance which
they
call Matter.
By
Matter
,
therefore
,
we are
to understand
an
inert
,
senseless
substance
,
in
which
extension,

&sure
,
and motion do
actually
subsist.
But it
is evident
,
Horn what
we have
already
shewn,
that
extension,
figure
,
and
motion are
only
ideas
existing
in the mind
,
and that an idea
can be like
nothing
but
another
idea,
and that

consequently
neither
they
nor their
archetypes
can exist
in
an
unperceiving
substance. Hence
,
it
is
plain
that the
very
notion of what is
called Matter
or
corporeal
substance
,
involves a
contradiction
in
it.
[Insomuch
that I should
not
think

it
necessary
to
spend
more time in
exposing
its
absurdity
. But
,
because the
tenet of the
existence of Matter
seems to have taken
so
deep
a
root in the
minds of
philosophers
,
and
draws after it so
many
ill
consequences
,
I
choose rather to be
thought

prolix
and
tedious
than
omit
anything
that
might
conduce to the full
discovery
and
extirpation
of
that
prejudice
.
]
Chapter
5
Of the Laws of Mind
John
Stuart Mill
What
Is Meant
by
Laws
of
Mind
What the
Mind is

,
as well
as
what
Matter
is
,
or
any
other
question respecting Things
in
themselves
,
as
distinguished
Horn their
sensible
manifestations
,
it
would be
foreign
to
the
purposes
of this
treatise to
consider. Here
,

as
throughout
our
inquiry
,
we shall
keep
clear of all
speculations
respecting
the
mind
'
s own
nature
,
and shall
understand
by
the
laws of mind
those of mental
phenomena
-
of
the various
feelings
or
states of consciousness
of

sentient
beings
.
These
,
according
to the
classification we have
unifonnly
followed
,
consist of
Thoughts
,
Emotions
,
Volitions
,
and
Sensations
;
the last
being
as
truly
states of Mind as the
three former. It
is usual
,
indeed

,
to
speak
of sensations as
states of
body
,
not of mind.
But this is
the common
confusion of
giving
one and the
same name
to
a
phenomenon
and
to the
proximate
cause or
conditions of the
phenomenon
. The
immediate
antecedent of
a
sensation
is a state of
body

,
but the
sensation itself
is
a
state of
mind.
If
the word
mind means
anything,
it
means that which
feels
.
Whatever
opinion
we hold
respecting
the fundamental
identity
or
diversity
of
matter and
mind,
in
any
case the
distinction between

mental and
physical
facts
,
between the internal and
the external
world,
will
always
remain
as
a
matter of
classification
;
and in that
classifica
-
tion,
sensations
,
like
all
other
feelings
,
must be ranked as
mental
phenomena
.

The
mechanism of their
production
,
both in the
body
itself and in what
is called outward
nature
,
is
all
that can with
any
propriety
be classed
as
physical
.
The
phenomena
of mind
, then,
are the
various
feelings
of our nature
,
both those
improperly

called
physical
and
those
peculiarly
designated
as mental
;
and
by
the laws
of
mind I
mean the laws
according
to which
those
feelings generate
one
another.
Is There
a
Science
of Psychology
?
All states
of mind are
immediately
caused
either

by
other
states of mind
or
by
states
of
body
. When a state of mind
is
produced
by
a
state of mind
,
I
call the law
concerned in
the case a law
of Mind. When a
state of mind is
produced
directly by
a
state of
body
,
the
law is a law
of

Body
,
and
belongs
to
physical
science
.
With
regard
to
those states of mind
which are
called
sensations
,
all are
agreed
that
these have for their
immediate
antecedents states of
body
.
Every
sensation
has for its
proximate
cause some
affection of the

portion
of
our
&
ame
called the
nervous
system
,
whether this affection
originate
in
the action
of some
external
object
,
or in some
pathological
condition
of the nervous
organisation
itself. The
laws of this
portion
of our
nature
-
the
varieties of our

sensations
and the
physical
conditions on
which
they
proximately
depend
-
manifestly
belong
to the
province
of
Physiology
.
Whether the
remainder of
our mental
states
are
similarly
dependent
on
physical
conditions
,
is one
of the vexatae
question

es in
the
science
of human
nature. It is
still

disputed
whether
our
thoughts
,
emotions
,
and
volitions
are
generated
through
the
intervention of material mechanism
;
whether we have
organs
of
thought
and of emotion
in
the same sense in which we have
organs

of sensation.
Many
eminent
physiolo
-
gists
hold the
a
Hinnative. These contend that a
thought
(
for
example
)
is as
much the
result
of nervous
agency
as
a
sensation
;
that some
particular
state of our
nervous
system
,
in

particular
of that central
portion
of
it
called the brain
,
invariably
precedes
,
and is
presupposed
by
,
every
state of our
consciousness
.
According
to this
theory
,
one
state of mind
is never
really
produced
by
another
;

all are
produced
by
states of
body
.
When one
thought
seems to call
up
another
by
association
,
it
is not
really
a
thought
which recalls a
thought
;
the association did not exist between
the two
thoughts
,
but
between the two states of the brain
or nerves which
preceded

the
thoughts
~ one of
those states recalls the other
,
each
being
attended
,
in
its
passage
,
by
the
particular
state of
consciousness which is
consequent
on it. On this
theory
the
uniformities of
succession
among
states of mind
would be mere derivative
uniformities
,
resulting

from
the laws of
succession of the
bodily
states
which cause them. There
would be no
original
mental laws
,
no Laws of Mind
in
the sense in
which
I
use the term
,
at all
;
and
mental science would
be
a
mere branch
,
though
the
highest
and most recondite
branch

,
of the science of
Physiology
.
M
. Comte
,
accordingly
,
claims the scientific
cognisance
of moral and intellectual
phenomena
exclusively
for
physiologists
;
and
not
only
denies
to
Psychology
,
or Mental
Philosophy properly
so called
,
the
character of a

science
,
but
places
it
,
in the
chimerical nature of its
objects
and
pretensions
,
almost on a
par
with
astrology
.
But
,
after
all
has been said
which can be said
,
it remains
incontestable that there exist
uniformities of
succession
among
states of mind

,
and that
these can be
ascertained
by
observation and
experiment
. Further
,
that
every
mental
state has a nervous
state for
its immediate antecedent and
proximate
cause
,
though
extremely
probable
,
cannot
hitherto be said
to be
proved
,
in the conclusive
manner
in

which this can be
proved
of
sensations
;
and
even were it certain
,
yet
every
one must admit that we
are
wholly
ignorant
of the
characteristics of these nervous states
;
we
know not
,
and at
present
have no means
of
knowing
,
in what
respect
one
of them

differs from another
;
and our
only
mode of
studying
their
successions or co-existences must be
by
observing
the
successions and
co-existences of the mental states
of which
they
are
supposed
to
be the
generators
or Causes.
The successions
,
therefore
,
which obtain
among
mental
phenomena
do not admit of

being
deduced from the
physiological
laws of our nervous
organisation
;
and all
real
knowledge
of them
must continue
,
for a
long
time
at
least
,
if
not
always
,
to be
sought
in
the
direct
study
,
by

observation and
experiment
,
of the
mental
successions themselves.
Since
,
therefore
,
the order of our
mental
phenomena
must be
studied
in
those
phenomena
,
and not inferred from the
laws of
any
phenomena
more
general
,
there is a
distinct and
separate
Science

of Mind.
The
relations
,
indeed
,
of that science
to the science of
physiology
must never be
overlooked or undervalued. It
must
by
no means be
forgotten
that the laws
of mind
may
be
derivative laws
resulting
from laws of animal life
,
and
that their truth
therefore
may
ultimately
depend
on

physical
conditions
;
and the
influence of
physiological
states
or
physiological changes
in
altering
or
counteracting
the mental
successions is one of
the
most
important
departments
of
psychological
study
. But
,
on the
other hand
,
to
reject
the

resource of
psychological
analysis
,
and
construct the
theory
of the mind
solely
on such data
as
physiology
at
present
affords
,
seems to me as
great
an
error in
principle
,
and an
even more
serious one in
practice
.
Imperfect
as is the science
of mind

,
I
do not
scruple
to a Hinn that it
is
in
a
consider
ably
more advanced
state
than
the
portion
20
John
Stuart
Mill
Of the Laws
of Mind
21
of
physiology
which
corresponds
to
it
;
and to discard the

fonner
for the latter
appears
to me
an
infringement
of the tNe canons of
indudive
philosophy
,
which must
produce
,
and which does
produce
,
erroneous conclusions
in
some
very
important
departments
of
the science
of human nature.
The
Official
Doctrine
There is
a

doctrine about the
nature and
place
of minds which
is so
prevalent
among
theorists and
even
among
laymen
that it
deserves to be
described as the official
theory
.
Most
philosophers
,
psychologists
and
religious
teachers subscribe
,
with
minor
reservations
,
to its main
articles and

,
although
they
admit certain
theoretical difficulties in it
,
they
tend to assume that
these can
be overcome
without
serious
modifications
being
made
to the
architecture of the
theory
. It will
be
argued
here that the
central
principles
of
the doctrine are
unsound and
conflict with the
whole
body

of what
we know
about
minds when
we are not
speculating
about them.
The official
doctrine
,
which hails
chiefly
from
Descartes
,
is
something
like
this. With
the
doubtful
exceptions
of idiots and
infants in
arms
every
human
being
has both
a

body
and a
mind.
Some would
prefer
to
say
that
every
human
being
is both a
body
and a mind.
His
body
and
his mind
are
ordinarily
harnessed
together
,
but after the
death
of the
body
his
mind
may

continue to exist
and function.
Human
bodies are in
space
and are
subject
to the
mechanical
laws which
govern
all
other bodies in
space
.
Bodily
process
es and
states can be
inspected
by
external
observers
.
So
a man
'
s
bodily
life is

as much a
public
affair
as are
the lives of
animals and
reptiles
and even
as the careers
of trees
,
crystals
and
planets
.
But
minds are
not
in
space
,
nor are their
operations
subject
to
mechanical laws. The
workings
of one mind are
not
witnessable

by
other
observers
;
its
career is
private
.
Only
I
can take
direct
cognisance
of the
states and
process

es of
my
own
mind. A
person
therefore lives
through
two
collateral
histories
,
one
consisting

of what
happens
in and
to his
body
,
the
other
consisting
of what
happens
in and
to his mind.
The first is
public
,
the
second
private
.
The events in
the first
history
are events in
the
physical
world,
those
in
the

second are events in
the mental
world.
It
has been
disputed
whether a
person
does or
can
directly
monitor all or
only
some
of
the
episodes
of his own
private
history
;
but
,
according
to the
official
doctrine
,
of at
least some of

these
episodes
he has
direct and
unchallengeable
cognisance
. In
consciousness
,
self-
consciousness and
introspection
he is
directly
and
authentically
apprised
of the
present
states and
operations
of his
mind. He
may
have
great
or small
uncertainties
about
concurrent and

adjacent
episodes
in
the
physical
world
,
but he can
have none about at
least
part
of what
is momenta
rily
occupying
his mind.
It
is
customary
to
express
this
bifurcation of his
two lives and
of his two
worlds
by
saying
that
the

things
and events
which
belong
to the
physical
world
,
including
his
own
body
,
are external
,
while
the
workings
of his own mind
are internal.
This
antithesis
of outer and
inner is
of course meant
to be
construed as a
metaphor
,
since minds

,
not
being
in
space
,
could
not be
described as
being
spatially
inside
anything
else
,
or
as
having things
going
on
spatially
inside
themselves. But
relapses
from
this
good
intention
are
common and

theorists
are
found
speculating
how stimuli
,
the
physical
sources

Chapter
6
Descartes
'
Myth
Gilbert
Ryle
of which are
yards
or
miles outside
a
person
'
s skin
,
can
generate
mental
responses

inside
his skull
,
or how decisions
framed inside his cranium can set
going
movements of his
extremities
.
Even when
'
inner' and
'
outer
'
are construed as
metaphors
,
the
problem
how
a
per
-
son
'
s mind and
body
influence one another is
notoriously

charged
with theoretical
difficulties
. What
the mind wills
,
the
legs
,
arms and the
tongue
execute
;
what affects the
ear and the
eye
has
something
to do
with
what the mind
perceives
;
grimaces
and smiles
betray
the mind
'
s moods and
bodily

castigations
lead
,
it
is
hoped
,
to moral
improvement
. But
the actual transactions between the
episodes
of the
private
history
and
those
of the
public
history
remain
mysterious
,
since
by
definition
they
can
belong
to neither

series.
They
could not be
reported among
the
happenings
described in a
.
person
'
s
autobiography
of his inner life
,
but
nor could
they
be
reported among
those described
in some one else
'
s
biography
of that
person
'
s overt career.
They
can be

inspected
neither
by
introspection
nor
by laboratory
experiment
.
They
are theoretical shuttlecocks
which are forever
being
bandied from the
physiologist
back to the
psychologist
and
from the
psychologist
back to the
physiologist
.
Underlying
this
partly
metaphorical representation
of the
bifurcation of
a
person

'
s
two lives there is
a
seemingly
more
profound
and
philosophical
assumption
. It is
assumed that there are
two different kinds of existence or status. What exists
or
happens
may
have the status of
physical
existence
,
or
it
may
have the status of mental
existence.
Somewhat as
the
faces of coins are either heads or tails
,
or

somewhat as
living
creatures are either male or
female
,
so
,
it
is
supposed
,
some
existing
is
physical
existing,
other
existing
is mental
existing
. It is a
necessary
feature
of
what
has
physical
existence
that it
is

in
space
and time
,
it is a
necessary
feature of what has mental
existence that it is in time but
not
in
space
. What has
physical
existence
is
composed
of
matter
,
or else is
a
function of matter
;
what has mental
existence consists of consciousness
,
or else is a function of
consciousness
.
There is thus

a
polar opposition
between mind and matter
,
an
opposition
which is
often
brought
out
as follows
.
Material
objects
are situated
in
a common field
,
known as
'
space
'
,
and what
happens
to one
body
in one
part
of

space
is
mechanically
connected
with what
happens
to other bodies
in
other
parts
of
space
. But mental
happenings
occur
in
insulated fields
,
known as
'
minds
'
,
and there is
,
apart
maybe
from
telepathy
,

no direct
causal connection between what
happens
in
one mind and what
happens
in another .
Only
through
the medium of the
public
physical
world can the mind of one
person
make
a
difference to the mind of another. The mind is its own
place
and in
his inner life
each of
us lives the
life of
a
ghostly
Robinson Crusoe.
People
can see
,
hear and

jolt
one
another's bodies
,
but
they
are
irremediably
blind and deaf to the
workings
of one
another
'
s minds and
inoperative
upon
them.
What sort of
knowledge
can be secured of the
workings
of a mind?
On
the
one side
,
according
to the official
theory
,

a
person
has
direct
knowledge
of the best
imaginable
kind
of the
workings
of his own mind . Mental
states and
process
es are
(
or are
normally
)
conscious states and
process
es
,
and the
consciousness which irradiates them can
engender
no illusions and
leaves the door
open
for no doubts . A
person

'
s
present
thinkings
,
feelings
and
willings
,
his
perceivings
,
rememberings
and
imaginings
are
intrinsically
'
phosphorescent
'
;
their existence and their
nature are
inevitably betrayed
to their
owner . The inner life is a
stream of consciousness of such a sort that it would be absurd
to
suggest
that the mind whose life

is
that
stream
might
be unaware of what is
passing
down
it .
True
,
the evidence
adduced
recently by
Freud seems to show that there exist channels
tributary
to
this stream
,
which run hidden
from their owner
.
People
are actuated
by
24
Gilbert
Ryle