the development of ethics from socrates to the reformation volume 1 nov 2007

The Development of Ethics
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The Development
of Ethics
A Historical and Critical Study
Volume I: From Socrates to the Reformation
TERENCE IRWIN
1
1
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 Terence Irwin 2007
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In Memoriam
Henry Ernest Irwin
1915–2006
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PREFACE
This book was originally intended to be a companion to The Development of Logic,by
William and Martha Kneale, published by Oxford in 1962. I undertook it at the suggestion
of Angela Blackburn, who was at that time editor for Philosophy at the Press, and with the
encouragement of Sir Anthony Kenny, who was at that time the Delegate to the Press for
Philosophy. I was doubtful whether I could match the learning, acuity, clarity, and brevity
of Kneale and Kneale, and my doubts have certainly been vindicated. To say nothing of
the first three features of Kneale and Kneale, I have not been able to achieve their brevity.

On the contrary, the work has expanded to three volumes, and in this respect resembles a
Victorian novel.
The three-volume novel has not been universally admired. In The Importance of Being
Earnest, Miss Prism offers a rather unsuccessful defence:
MISS PRISM. Do not speak slightingly of the three-volume novel, Cecily. I wrote one myself in earlier
days.
CECILY. Did you really, Miss Prism? How wonderfully clever you are! I hope it did not end happily?
I don’t like novels that end happily. They depress me so much.
MISS PRISM. The good ended happily, and the bad unhappily. That is what Fiction means.
CECILY. I suppose so. But it seems very unfair.
According to the incisive literary critic Lady Bracknell, Miss Prism’s work was ‘a three-
volume novel of more than usually revolting sentimentality’. Though Henry James is less
direct than Lady Bracknell, he none the less denounces some Victorian novels as ‘large,
loose, baggy monsters, with their queer elements of the accidental and the arbitrary’ (Preface
to TheTragicMuse).
I have not sought to draw precisely the moral described by Miss Prism, but I have a
reasonably optimistic attitude to the history of ethics, and I don’t know whether I have
avoided revolting sentimentality. Some readers, if they get through the whole book, may
well take Henry James’s view. But perhaps some reasons can be given to explain why it is
looser and baggier than Kneale and Kneale, and may not be free of queer elements of the
accidental and the arbitrary.
Kneale and Kneale decided, quite reasonably, to devote most space to logic after 1879,
and to treat the previous history relatively briefly. Any similar decision about the history of
ethics would be misguided, Even if we supposed that, say, moral philosophy made a great
advance in 1874 with Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics, we could hardly understand or evaluate
Sidgwick’s achievement without a comparison with his predecessors. More important, good
reasons can be given for doubting whether Sidgwick in the 19th century, or Kant or Hume in
the 18th, or Hobbes in the 17th, made the sort of advance that would justify us in relegating
their predecessors to a relatively minor role.
Preface

Many people teaching the history of moral philosophy, or teaching moral philosophy
from a historical point of view, would probably want to include some ‘pre-modern’ moralist,
usually Aristotle, in their presentation of the area. Alasdair MacIntyre said he wanted to
include the Greeks in his Short History of Ethics for the sake of undergraduates confined to the
‘treadmill’ of Hume, Kant, Mill, and Moore (Preface). Fewer people, however, have taken it
to be equally important to discuss moral philosophy between Aristotle and Hobbes. I have
tried to do something to encourage the closer study of moral philosophy between the 4th
century  and the 17th century , This choice has greatly increased the size of the book.
One might well argue, however, that my treatment of this important period is still too
short. While I have given some space to Aquinas and to Suarez, the treatment of Augustine,
Scotus, and Ockham is quite brief, and many important people (including Neoplatonists,
Church Fathers, Abelard, and less well-known mediaeval writers) are omitted. The decision
to omit them reflects my aim (explained further in the Introduction) of concentrating on the
development of an Aristotelian outlook, but it may have been mistaken. At any rate, I hope
this part of the book will encourage some more people to pursue the study of mediaeval
moral philosophy far enough to discover how little of it I have covered.
A further reason for the length of this book is my aim of expounding different views fully
enough to show what can be said for and against them. This is not meant to be a neutral
exposition that refrains from evaluation; I also try to defend, object, or revise, where it seems
appropriate. Success in these tasks would demand would need a clear understanding of all
the major questions in moral philosophy, not to mention the relevant questions in other
areas of philosophy. Readers who understand the questions better than I do will no doubt
discover many errors in interpretation and judgment. But perhaps they will be encouraged
to improve the account that I offer.
Some parts of this book (e.g., the chapters on Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill) cover very
familiar ground and express views on questions that many others have discussed in detail.
Other parts (e.g., the chapters on Suarez, Cudworth, Balguy, Price) discuss moralists who
have received far less attention from moral philosophers writing in English. I have tried, as
far as possible, to ignore the familiarity or unfamiliarity of a particular author. I have not
refrained from going over familiar issues; nor have I discussed someone at greater length

simply because he has attracted more attention from other critics. Readers may well find,
therefore, that the discussion of Kant (e.g.) is rather thin, in so far as it overlooks some of
the questions, elaborations, and complications that have resulted from later philosophical
criticism. This uneven character (as it may seem) of different parts of the book reflects my
attempt to allocate space to different people according to their importance in the argument,
not according to the degree of attention they have attracted.
Though the three volumes are being published separately, they have been conceived as a
single study. The division simply results from the excessive length of the book. The volumes
begin at reasonably natural places (the second with Suarez, the third with Kant), but I would
not want the reader to attach any particular philosophical significance to these divisions.
One inconvenience for the reader results from the separate publication of the volumes.
I have not inserted cross-references to later volumes, in case the sections are re-numbered
in the final stages of revision. Instead I have inserted references to the works of later
viii
Preface
philosophers. When readers have the later volumes in their hands, they should be able to
find some relevant discussion by looking at the chapters that discuss these later works.
The notes and bibliography are intended to give the necessary information reasonably
briefly. It seemed to me difficult and unnecessary to try to separate ‘original sources’ from
‘secondary sources’ (where ought Sidgwick’s Outlines, for instance, to be placed?), and
so I have gathered them all in a single alphabetical list. Readers who consult the list of
abbreviations should be able to cope with the notes and bibliography.
I have been working intermittently on this book since 1990 or so, but it expresses an
interest, beginning in the early 1970s, in the history of ethics. I mainly owe this interest to
the teaching and advice of Gregory Vlastos, and to some conversations with John Rawls.
Hence many of the papers I have published have provided matter, more or less proximate,
for the following chapters. I have also learned from many people during this time I have
been working on this book. Some of them are the helpful and well-informed people who,
on hearing about the project, asked me questions of the form: ‘And what are you going to
say about X?’. In some cases I had to say ‘Who?’, and in some cases ‘Nothing’. The present

length of the book is partly the result of such questions. To many reasonable questions
of the same form I would still have to say what Dr Johnson said about an entry in his
dictionary: ‘Ignorance, madam, pure ignorance.’ But in some cases I discovered that X was
worth reading and discussing, and moreover that Y, discussed by X, also deserved attention,
and so on.
I have received comments from a number of helpful and acute anonymous referees. For
Volume 1 in particular, I am pleased to be able to thank Gareth Matthews and Richard Kraut
by name. Among those whose work I have learned most from I would include Richard
Kraut, John Cooper, Julia Annas, and Alasdair MacIntyre.
In trying to construct some reasonably clear lines of argument, I have been helped
considerably by the patient, intelligent, and thoughtful students, both undergraduate and
graduate, at Cornell who have heard and discussed some of the main ideas in this book
in many courses on the history of ethics. The tenacity of those who have lasted through
a whole academic year, and not just one term, has been especially encouraging. Though
the book contains too much to squeeze into a 28-week academic year, these students have
probably been the readers I have had in mind most often.
Since I have taught in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell for quite a few years,
I have absorbed—no doubt incompletely—many aspects of the philosophical outlook of
my colleagues. If I have any slight grasp of any relevant questions in metaphysics and
epistemology, I owe much of it to Richard Boyd and Sydney Shoemaker. My temerarious
efforts in the study of mediaeval philosophy were encouraged by the models of scholarship
and philosophical imagination provided by Norman Kretzmann and Scott MacDonald. If I
have any slight grasp of moral philosophy, I owe much of it to Nicholas Sturgeon. Though
he will certainly find that many things I say are false, confused, or superficial, anything that
approaches truth or clarity probably results from his influence. I owe so much, in so many
ways, to Gail Fine that I will not even try to describe it in detail.
The writing of this book might have taken even longer had I not been able to work on it
during several periods of leave, which I owe to Cornell University, the National Endowment
for the Humanities, and the Guggenheim Foundation. In 2004 I was fortunate to spend a
ix

Preface
month at the Rockefeller Foundation Study Centre in Bellagio. I spent some of the leave in
Oxford, where I found more things to write about by exploring some of the resources of the
Bodleian Library, and where I especially learned from discussion with David Charles.
The finishing of a long book written over many years involves a number of indispensable
but tedious tasks. Fortunately, I have been helped in these tasks by the careful attention of
Yurii Cohen. It would be too much to hope that he has succeeded completely in removing
the effects of my errors and oversights, but he has worked hard and diligently in the interests
of readers who would like citations and cross-references to be accurate and relevant.
I mentioned that Oxford University Press suggested this book to me. For this reason
and for many others, it is a duty and a pleasure to thank the Delegates and officers of this
admirable institution that has done so much to advance classical and philosophical learning.
In particular, Peter Momtchiloff has been a source of wise advice and patient encouragement
over a number of years, to me as to many other philosophers.
The design on the title page is based on Plato, Republic 328a. I owe it to William Whewell,
who used it in several of his books on ethics, including those on the history of ethics (which
I will come to in the later volumes). Since Whewell was not only a considerable moral
philosopher, and a leader in the revival of the English universities in the 19th century, but
also one of the first people in modern England to take up the systematic study of the history
of ethics, including Plato, from a philosophical point of view. He could justly claim to have
passed on the torch that had reached him from Plato.
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Oxford
June 2007
x
SUMMARY CONTENTS
Contents xiii
Abbreviations xxv
1. Introduction 1
2. Socrates 13

3. The Cyrenaics 45
4. The Cynics 57
5. Plato 69
6. Aristotle: Happiness 114
7. Aristotle: Nature 134
8. Aristotle: Virtue 153
9. Aristotle: Virtue and Morality 198
10. The Sceptics 233
11. Epicurus 257
12. Stoicism: Action, Passion, and Reason 285
13. Stoicism: Virtue and Happiness 312
14. Christian Theology and Moral Philosophy 360
15. Augustine 397
16. Aquinas: Will 434
17. Aquinas: Action 456
18. Aquinas: Freedom 475
19. Aquinas: The Ultimate End 492
20. Aquinas: Moral Virtue 516
21. Aquinas: Natural Law 545
22. Aquinas: Practical Reason and Prudence 571
23. Aquinas: The Canon of the Virtues 588
24. Aquinas: Sin and Grace 628
25. Scotus: Will, Freedom, and Reason 653
26. Scotus: Virtue and Practical Reason 679
Summary Contents
27. Ockham 701
28. Machiavelli 725
29. The Reformation and Scholastic Moral Philosophy 744
Bibliography 775
Index 793

xii
CONTENTS
Abbreviations xxv
1. Introduction 1
1. Scope 1
2. The Socratic Tradition 2
3. Aristotelian Naturalism 4
4. Critics of Aristotelian Naturalism 5
5. Beginning and End 6
6. Progress, Optimism, and Pessimism 6
7. What this Book is Not 10
8. Level and Organization 11
2. Socrates 13
9. The Founder of Moral Philosophy? 13
10. Method 15
11. What is a Socratic Definition? 16
12. Basic Moral Principles 19
13. Knowledge of the Good: Eudaemonism 22
14. Why Virtue is Necessary for Happiness 23
15. Why is Virtue Sufficient for Happiness? 25
16. Wisdom and its Product 27
17. The Supremacy of Virtue 28
18. Does Happiness give a Reason for being Virtuous? 29
19. What sort of Virtue is Supreme in Happiness? 30
20. Integrity and Socratic Virtue 32
21. The Nature of Happiness: Socratic Hedonism 33
22. Hedonism and Socratic Virtue 35
23. Objections to Hedonism: The Gorgias 37
24. Hedonism without Prudence? 38
25. An Adaptive Conception of Happiness 40

26. Is Virtue Identical to Happiness? 41
27. Reason and Desire 42
3. The Cyrenaics 45
28. The ‘One-Sided’ Socratics 45
29. Aristippus and the Protagoras 47
Contents
30. Hedonism without Eudaemonism 48
31. For and against Eudaemonism 49
32. Epistemological and Metaphysical Objections to Eudaemonism 51
33. Doubts about the Continuing Self 53
34. A Conflict between Hedonism and Eudaemonism? 55
4. The Cynics 57
35. Socrates and the Cynics 57
36. Socratic Alternatives to Hedonism: Virtue or Self-Sufficiency? 58
37. Happiness and Adaptation 60
38. Do the Cynics Improve on Socrates? 62
39. Socrates and the Cynics: Is Virtue Identical to Happiness? 65
40. An Objection to Cynicism 67
5. Plato 69
41. Plato’s Reflexions on Socrates 69
42. The Scope of Plato’s Ethical Thought 70
43. Definitions and Disputes 71
44. Why Explanation Requires Non-sensible Forms 72
45. Appropriate Definitions 73
46. Non-rational Desires 75
47. Why a Tripartite Soul? 76
48. Why Parts of the Soul? 79
49. The Tripartite Soul, Virtue, and Vice 81
50. Why is Justice to be Chosen for Itself ? 84
51. How is Justice a Non-instrumental Good? 87

52. Is Justice Sufficient for Happiness? 89
53. Inadequate Conceptions of Happiness 91
54. Cyrenaic Hedonism v. Eudaemonism 94
55. Why Intelligence is Not the Good 96
56. Responses to the Philebus 97
57. Why Justice is Insufficient for Happiness 98
58. Are Plato’s Questions Reasonable? 100
59. What is Psychic Justice? 101
60. How Psychic Justice Fulfils the Human Function 103
61. The Philosopher as Ruler: A Conflict between Justice and Happiness? 105
62. The Philosopher as Ruler: No Sacrifice of Happiness? 107
63. Love, Self-Concern, and Concern for Others 109
64. Eudaemonism and Concern for Others 111
6. Aristotle: Happiness 114
65. Interpreting Aristotle 114
66. Aristotle’s Main Contributions 115
67. Method 119
xiv
Contents
68. The Role of the Final Good 122
69. The Final Good and Happiness 123
70. The Final Good and the ‘Three Lives’ 126
71. A Comprehensive Conception of Happiness 128
72. Happiness and Goodness 129
73. Implications of Eudaemonism 132
7. Aristotle: Nature 134
74. The Function Argument 134
75. Function, Essence, End, and Explanation 136
76. Function and Practical Reason 139
77. Aristotelian Naturalism? 140

78. A Non-naturalist Account of the Function Argument 142
79. Nature, Happiness, and External Goods 143
80. Naturalism and ‘Second Nature’ 145
81. The Extent of Naturalism in the Ethics 147
82. Happiness, Function, and the Theoretical Life 149
8. Aristotle: Virtue 153
83. The Function Argument and the Virtues 153
84. Virtue, Continence, Incontinence, and Vice 154
85. The Doctrine of the Mean 155
86. Virtue and Harmony 157
87. Rationalist v. Anti-rationalist Accounts of Virtue 158
88. Anti-rationalism: Virtue and Pleasure 160
89. Anti-rationalism: Limits of Practical Reason 161
90. Anti-rationalism: Moral Virtue and Responsibility 162
91. Anti-rationalism: The Voluntary 164
92. Anti-rationalism and the Weakness of Practical Reason: Incontinence 165
93. Anti-rationalism: Vice 166
94. Virtue, Election, and Reason 167
95. Pleasure and Reason 168
96. Virtue, Election, and Deliberation 171
97. Wish and Will 173
98. Prudence and Deliberation 175
99. Virtue, Reason, and Responsibility 177
100. Voluntary Action in Rational Agents 179
101. Rational Agency and Character 181
102. Moral Responsibility and Morality 183
103. Questions about Incontinence and Responsibility 183
104. Incontinence, Ignorance, and Deliberation 185
105. Vice, Reason, and Appetite 187
106. Self-Love, Reason, and the Fine 189

xv
Contents
107. How is the Fine Connected with Reason? 190
108. Vice and Pleasure 192
109. The Vicious Person’s Regret 192
110. The Instability of the Vicious Person 194
111. Vice, Reason, and Nature 196
9. Aristotle: Virtue and Morality 198
112. Why Virtues? 198
113. The Content of the Virtues 200
114. Are the Virtues of Character Moral Virtues? 202
115. Is Aristotle an Unsystematic Theorist? 204
116. Virtue and the Fine 206
117. Justice, the Common Good, and Concern for the Fine 208
118. The Fine and the Virtues of Character: Bravery 210
119. The Fine and the Virtues: Temperance 210
120. The Fine and the Virtues: Generosity and Magnificence 212
121. The Fine and the Virtues: Magnanimity 213
122. How can Friendship Justify Morality? 215
123. Friendship and Concern for Others 216
124. The Friend as Another Self 218
125. Why Other Selves? 220
126. The Extension of Friendship 224
127. Different Aspects of Friendship in the Political Community 226
128. Friendship and Morality 227
129. Aristotelian and other Conceptions of Morality 230
10. The Sceptics 233
130. Scepticism in the History of Greek Ethics 233
131. The Sceptic as an Investigator 234
132. Socrates as a Source of Scepticism 236

133. Protagoras and Plato 238
134. Aristotle and Conflicting Appearances 239
135. Aristotle on Nature and Convention 241
136. Arguments against Objective Goodness 243
137. Natural Goodness 244
138. Sceptical Tranquillity 245
139. Actions without Beliefs? 248
140. What kind of Life can we live without Beliefs? 251
141. Scepticism, Belief, and Deliberation: Sextus, Hobbes, and Hume 253
142. Do we Need Beliefs? 254
11. Epicurus 257
143. Epicurus’ Aims 257
144. Hedonism 259
xvi
Contents
145. Epicurean Eudaemonism v. Cyrenaic Hedonism 260
146. Why Freedom Matters 262
147. Why we should Reject Compatibilism 263
148. Why we should Reject Determinism 264
149. Epicurus’ Indeterminism 265
150. Indeterminism and Epicurus’ Ethical Theory 266
151. Types of Pleasure 266
152. Fear of Death as the Source of Excessive Desires 267
153. Does Epicurus Show that Death is Not an Evil? 268
154. Kinetic Pleasure v. Freedom from Pain 270
155. Is Epicurus a Hedonist? 273
156. Hedonism and Good Pleasures 274
157. A Defence of Virtue? 276
158. Justice and its Consequences: Epicurus v. Plato 278
159. The Value of Friendship: Epicurus and Aristotle 280

160. Difficulties in Epicureanism 283
12. Stoicism: Action, Passion, and Reason 285
161. The Stoics and their Predecessors 285
162. Eudaemonism 287
163. Reactions to Stoic Ethics 289
164. Stoic Strategies 291
165. Preconceptions 292
166. Nature, Conciliation, and Appearances 295
167. Passions as Assents 297
168. How can we Correct our Assents? 300
169. Questions about Responsibility 300
170. Assent as Principal Cause 302
171. Fate v. Necessity 303
172. Incompatibilist Objections 305
173. Assent as the Basis for Responsibility 307
174. Passions, Assent, and Responsibility 308
175. Action and Practical Reason 309
13. Stoicism: Virtue and Happiness 312
176. Practical Reason and Preconceptions 312
177. Practical Reason, Consistency, and Agreement 313
178. The Use and the Value of Practical Reason 314
179. The Non-instrumental Value of Practical Reason 316
180. The Non-instrumental Value of Virtue 318
181. Virtue as the Only Good 321
182. Indifferents 323
183. Preferred Indifferents 325
184. Crafts, Ends, and Objectives 327
xvii
Contents
185. The Connexion of the Virtues 328

186. Concern for Preferred Indifferents 331
187. The Selective Value of Virtue and the Preferred Indifferents 332
188. Why Virtue is Praiseworthy 333
189. Why should Virtue be Identified with Happiness? 336
190. Two Roles of Aristotelian Happiness 338
191. Freedom from Passion 342
192. Appearances without Passions 345
193. Is the Sage really Free of Passion? 346
194. The Extent of Friendship 347
195. Expanding Circles of Friendship 350
196. The Characteristics of Friendship 351
197. Stoic Political Theory 352
198. The Community of Sages 354
199. The Community of Human Beings 356
200. Limitations of Stoic Friendship 357
201. Estimate of the Stoic Position 359
14. Christian Theology and Moral Philosophy 360
202. Christian Influences 360
203. Questions for Moral Theory 363
204. The Difference between the Moral and the Ceremonial Law 365
205. Law and Gospel 370
206. Natural Law 371
207. Perfectionism 373
208. The Moral Law and the Consciousness of Sin 375
209. Justification 379
210. Moral Implications 381
211. The Christian Conception of Morality 383
212. Moral Psychology 386
213. Free Will 389
214. Eudaemonism 392

215. The Virtues 393
15. Augustine 397
216. The Rejection of Greek Ethics? 397
217. The Importance of the Will: Rejection of Psychological Dualism 398
218. The Will and Other Mental States 400
219. Will and Passion: Stoics v. Peripatetics 403
220. Augustine’s Objections to the Stoics on Passions 404
221. Will and Passions 406
222. Platonists and Peripatetics on Passions 407
223. The Primacy of the Will 409
224. The Will and the Good: Eudaemonism and Intellectualism 411
xviii
Contents
225. Freewill and Determination 412
226. Pagan Morality and Natural Law 414
227. The Character of Happiness 416
228. Pagan Virtue 418
229. The Direction of the Will 420
230. Pagan Virtues and Misdirected Will 422
231. The Aim of Pagan Virtue 425
232. Are Pagan Virtues Genuine Virtues? 427
233. Pagan Arrogance 429
234. Self-Love, Arrogance, and the Earthly City 431
16. Aquinas: Will 434
235. Aims 434
236. Interpretations of Aristotle 435
237. The Form of Aquinas’ Argument 437
238. Aquinas and Naturalism 438
239. The Structure of Aquinas’ Ethical Theory 439
240. Augustine and Aristotle 441

241. Rational Agency, Voluntary Action, and Freedom 442
242. Will and Properly Human Actions 443
243. Rational v. Non-rational Agents 444
244. The Passivity of the Passions 447
245. The Passions and Sensory Desire 449
246. Criticism of the Stoics on the Passions 451
247. Will and the Ultimate Good 452
248. The Influence of the Ultimate End 453
17. Aquinas: Action 456
249. Will and Action 456
250. Aiming at Ends 456
251. Deliberation 458
252. Consent and Election 459
253. The Influence of the Passions on the Will 461
254. The Influence of the Will on the Passions 462
255. Action without Deliberation? 465
256. The Inter-dependence of Will and Practical Reason 466
257. How is the Will Rational? 468
258. The Influence of Will on Intellect 470
259. Will, Reason, and Desire 473
18. Aquinas: Freedom 475
260. Voluntary Action and the Will 475
261. How Action on Passions is Voluntary 476
262. The Will as the Source of Virtue and Vice 478
xix
Contents
263. The Connexion between Voluntariness and Freewill 481
264. Objections to an Aristotelian Account of Freewill 482
265. Will as the Source of Freewill 483
266. Freewill as Absence of Necessitation 485

267. Freewill as Rational Agency 486
268. Freedom and External Reasons 487
269. The Place of Will and Intellect in Freedom 488
270. Freedom, Necessity, and Determination 489
19. Aquinas: The Ultimate End 492
271. Why Must the Will Pursue the Ultimate Good? 492
272. The Final Good and the Natural Law 493
273. Subordinate Ends 494
274. Aiming at Perfection 497
275. Intellectual Love 498
276. Reasons and Perfection 501
277. Is the Pursuit of Perfection Necessary? 502
278. The Place of Happiness in Aquinas’ Argument 503
279. Criteria for Happiness 504
280. How is Happiness Self-Sufficient? 505
281. Two Grades of Happiness 508
282. The Complete Good 510
283. The Pursuit of the Two Grades of Happiness 513
20. Aquinas: Moral Virtue 516
284. Virtue and Freewill 516
285. Will and the Formation of Character 517
286. Reason, Passion, and Virtue 519
287. The Passions as Subjects of Virtues 520
288. Means, Ends, and the Virtues 521
289. The Positive Contribution of the Passions 522
290. Will, Passion, and Virtue 526
291. Moral and Intellectual Virtues 527
292. Vice and Sin 529
293. Virtue v. Continence 530
294. The Sources of Sin 532

295. Passion and Sin: The Problem of Incontinence 533
296. How Incontinence is Based on Consent 535
297. Deliberate Fault 538
298. Sin and Vice 539
299. Sin and Virtue 541
300. The General Tendency of Aquinas’ View of Virtue 543
xx
Contents
21. Aquinas: Natural Law 545
301. Questions Raised by Natural Law 545
302. Questions about Law 546
303. Law and Obligation 548
304. Law, Reason, and Ends 549
305. Law and Publication 551
306. Eternal Law and Natural Law 552
307. The Natural Law and the Will of God 553
308. What is Natural about Natural Law? 556
309. The Relevance of Natural Law 558
310. The First Principle of Natural Law 560
311. Natural Inclinations and the Highest Precepts of Natural Law 561
312. Rational Agency and Social Nature 563
313. Derived Principles of Natural Law 565
314. Dispensations and Exceptions 567
315. Misunderstandings of Natural Law 569
22. Aquinas: Practical Reason and Prudence 571
316. Virtue, Will, and Practical Reason 571
317. Universal Conscience and the Ultimate End 573
318. How Universal Conscience Grasps Natural Law 576
319. Why Universal Conscience is Indestructible 577
320. How Prudence Discovers Ends 580

321. How Prudence Forms the Virtuous Motive 584
322. Objections to Aquinas’ View 586
323. Natural Law, Universal Conscience, and Prudence 586
23. Aquinas: The Canon of the Virtues 588
324. The Unity of Prudence 588
325. The Reciprocity of the Virtues 589
326. Objections to the Reciprocity of the Virtues 590
327. From the Ultimate End to the Cardinal Virtues 591
328. The Nature of a Cardinal Virtue 592
329. ‘Principal’ Displays of the Cardinal Virtues 593
330. The Range of a Cardinal Virtue 595
331. Subordinate Virtues 597
332. Moral Goodness in Latin Sources 599
333. The Honestum in Aquinas’ Commentary 603
334. The Honestum in the Summa 606
335. Justice 608
336. Friendship 609
337. Friendship as a Basis for Justice 614
xxi
Contents
338. The Aims of Justice 615
339. Eudaemonism and Justice 619
340. Commands and Counsels 621
341. Self-Love, Sin, and Virtue 624
342. Success of the Argument for the Virtues 626
24. Aquinas: Sin and Grace 628
343. Questions for Aquinas 628
344. The External Causes of Sin 630
345. Sin and Causal Responsibility 631
346. God and Human Freewill 633

347. How God Causes Sin 634
348. Original Sin 635
349. The Effects of Original Sin 637
350. Natural and Supernatural Good 638
351. The Need for Grace 639
352. Grace, Freewill, and Merit 642
353. Infused Virtue 644
354. How the Infused Virtues Perfect the Acquired Virtues 647
355. Sin and Infused Virtues 648
356. Defence of Pagan Virtue 649
25. Scotus: Will, Freedom, and Reason 653
357. Alternatives to Aquinas 653
358. Early Critics of Aquinas 654
359. The Character of the Will 658
360. Psychological Objections to Eudaemonism 659
361. Defences of Eudaemonism 660
362. The Conflict between Eudaemonism and Freedom 661
363. Moral Objections to Eudaemonism: The Two Affections of the Will 663
364. Freedom Identified with the Affection for Justice 665
365. Sin and Self-Love 666
366. Sin and Freedom 668
367. Eudaemonism, Intellectualism, and Voluntarism 670
368. A Dualism of Practical Reason 672
369. Will as Rational Capacity 674
370. Rational Capacity and Contingency 676
371. Voluntarism and Indeterminism 677
26. Scotus: Virtue and Practical Reason 679
372. Passion, Will, and Virtue 679
373. Intellect, Will, and Virtue 680
374. Universal Conscience 682

375. Practical Reason and Prudence 684
xxii
Contents
376. The Unity of Prudence: Aquinas against Scotus 685
377. Eudaemonism and the Unity of Prudence 686
378. Knowledge of Natural Law 687
379. Divine Commands and Natural Law 689
380. Natural Law and the Will of God 690
381. God’s Justice 691
382. Consonance with Natural Law 693
383. Biel on Consonance and Dispensations 695
384. The Extent of God’s Freedom 697
385. God’s Promises and God’s Generosity 699
27. Ockham 701
386. Approaches to Ockham 701
387. How to Reject Happiness 702
388. Does Eudaemonism Exclude Freedom? 703
389. Moderate v. Extreme Voluntarism 704
390. Difficulties for Voluntarism 705
391. Developments of Voluntarism 707
392. Virtue and Passion 708
393. Correct Reason and Will 709
394. Separability of the Virtues 711
395. Non-positive v. Positive Morality 713
396. Divine Freedom and Divine Justice 716
397. Questions about God’s Justice 718
398. Conflicts within Morality 719
399. God and Morality: Versions of Voluntarism 721
400. Voluntarism, Morality, and Reasons 724
28. Machiavelli 725

401. Questions about Moral Philosophy 725
402. Civic Virtues 726
403. Civic v. Christian Virtue 727
404. Machiavellian Virtue v. Moral Virtue 729
405. Civic Virtue and its End 731
406. Instrumental Practical Reason 732
407. Morality and Circumstances 735
408. Adaptation to Circumstances 736
409. Exceptions to Morality? 738
410. The Strength of Machiavelli’s Objections to Morality 740
29. The Reformation and Scholastic Moral Philosophy 744
411. Objections to Scholasticism 744
412. Natural Law 746
xxiii
Contents
413. Dispensations from Natural Law? 749
414. Hooker on Natural Law 751
415. The Effects of Sin 752
416. Objections to Self-Love 755
417. Pagan Virtue 757
418. Sin and Freewill 762
419. Justification, Grace, and Faith 767
420. Grace and Virtue 769
421. Natural Law and Ethics 771
422. Implications 773
Bibliography 775
Index 793
xxiv