was jesus god aug 2008

WAS JESUS GOD?
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WAS JESUS GOD?
Richard Swinburne
1
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am most grateful to two Oxford University Press readers, to the
OUP philosophy editor Peter Momtchiloff, and to my daughter
Nicola, for very helpful comments on an earlier version of the
book. Thanks to Oxford University Press for permission to reuse
much material already published in some of my longer books. And
thanks too once again to Sarah Barker for all her patient typing and
retyping.
R.S.
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CONTENTS
Introduction 1
Part I: God Loves Us 3

1.God 5
2. God Is Love 28
3. God Shared Our Human Nature 39
4. God Atoned for Our Wrongdoing 53
5. God Teaches Us How to Live 61
6. God Offers Us Heaven 78
Part II: God Shows Us That He Loves Us 89
7. The Life and Death of Jesus 91
8. The Resurrection of Jesus 114
9. Provisional Conclusion 128
10. The Church 134
11. The Bible 144
12. Final Conclusion 161
Index 171
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INTRODUCTION
Arethere goodreasons forbelieving thatthere is a God? I have
argued elsewhere, and especially in my book Is There a God?, that
the general character of the natural world (and in particular the fact
that it is governed by laws ofnatur
e whichlead to theevolution
of human beings) makesit probablethatthere is a God. But why
should we supposethat God(ifthere is a God) is the Christian
God? I plan to answer that questioninthis book and to show that,if
the
re is
aGod, then the main doctrines which the Christian Church
teachesabout God, the doctrineswhichare special to Christianity
and distinguish it from otherreligions which alsoclaim thatthere
is a God, are very probably true. Since th

e most importantthing
which
Christians believe about Godisthat, while remaining God,
he acquired a human nature and lived on earthfor thirtyyears
as a human being, Jesus Christ, I havecalled this book Was Jesus
God?. This book can be read as a sequel to Is There a God? o
r
independently ofit.
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PART I
GODLOVES US
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1 GOD
I assume in this book that, on the basis of evidence suchasthe
general character of the natural world oraperson’s own religious
experience, there is a moderate probability thatthere is a God of the
kind w
orshipped by Christians, Jews, and Muslims. (I emphasize
the‘moderate’. Iamnot even assuming thattheexistence ofGod
is more probablethan not, as I have argued elsewherethat it is.)
In this chapter I shall spell outthe natureof theclaim thatthere
is G
od. Then,
in the remaining chapters ofPart I, I shall set out
thecentral theological doctrines of Christianity(that is, doctrines
aboutthe nature and actions ofGod), and give a priori reasons
forbelieving them to betrue. By ‘
a priori
reasons’ I mean reasons
arising from the very natureofGod and from the general condition

of the human race why we should expect them to betrue. Then,
in Part II, I shall arguethat, given the moderate probability on
other e
vidence
thatthere is a God and given these a priori reasons,
the historical evidence aboutthe life and Resurrection ofJesus and
the subsequentteaching of the Churchmakesit very probablethat
these doctrinesar
etrue. This historical evidence provides
what I
shall call ‘aposteriori’ reasons.
The NatureofGod
What Imean by my claim thatthere is a God is thatthere is (at
least) one divine person, who is essentially omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly free, and eternal. I shall call this claim ‘theism’; it is a claim
which Christianity, Judaism, and Islam and many oth
erreligions
share. I
shall assume for the restof this chapter that—as Judaism
and Islam claim—there is only one divine person, and I will call
him ‘God’. For the nextten pages I shall spell out what it is
for theretobe a divine person
. (I shall refer to Goda
s ‘he’; but
of course, though personal, Godisneithermale norfemale.)In
Chapter 2 and thereafter I shall need to usethe word ‘God’ in a
6 God Loves Us
somewhat widersense,inorder to take accountof the Christian
doctrineof the Trinity.
A person is a being who has (or, when fully developed, will

have)powers (to perform intentional actions, that is, actions which
h
eors
he means to do), beliefs, and free will (to choose among
alternative actions without being compelled by irrational forces
to doone rather than theother); when the beliefs and actions
includeones ofs
ome sophistication (such as using language). I shall
assumethroughoutthis book that humans do have free will and
so are persons.Ordinary human persons exist for a limitedperiod
of time,dependenton physical causes(their bodiesandespecially
t
heir
brains) for their capacities to exercisetheir powers, form
beliefs, and makechoices. God is supposed to be unlimitedinall
these respects, and not to depend onanything for his existence or
capacities.
God is suppos
ed to be unlimited
in his power;that is, God
is omnipotent,hecan do any action. Hecan make a physical
universeexist, ormovethe stars, orsustain orabolish the physical
causes whichsustain humans in existence. Hecannot do alogically
impossibl
e action, that is,
an action which cannot be described
withoutcontradiction; and so hecannot make me both exist and
not exist atthe sametime. But since it makesno sensetosuppose
that I could both exist
and not exist atthe sametime,alogically

impossible actionisnot really an actionat all—any morethan an
imaginary personisreally a person.
God is supposed to be unlimitedinhisbeliefs;that is, Godis
omniscient; he has all true beliefs aboutevery
thing (about whichit
is
logically possibletohavetrue beliefs), and in him they constitute
not just beliefs but infallible knowledge. We knowsomethings,
and have false beliefs aboutother things. God, however, knows
infallibly how many stars th
ere are,whetherit snowedi
nNew
York State on 1 January exactly 2 millionyears ago, and what you
are now thinking about. (I will come backshortly to the issueof
whether there aretrue beliefs whichit is not logically possible fo
r
God to have.)
We humans have bodies. Abody is a physical object through
whichwecan make a difference to the world and learn aboutthe
world; and ordinary humans aretieddown to acting and acquiring
information through their bodies. I can only make a differ
ence to the
world by doing something withsome partofmybody—by using
God 7
my arm to move something, ormymouth to tell yousomething.
And I can only learn aboutthe world by stimuli landing onmy
senseorgans (light rays landing onmyeyes orsound waves landing
onmyears, for example). God, being omnipotent and omniscient,
is not tiedd
own to acting ona

nd learning aboutthe world through
one particular physical object, and so Goddoesnot needabody.
Godissupposed to be a perfectly free person in the senseof
one whosechoicesare in no way limited by,
that is, influenced by,
irrational forces. Heonly desires to do an actioninso far as he
seesareasonfordoing it, that is, in so far as he believes that it
is a goodaction to do. Paradoxically, any being who is perfectly
free (in this sense) will ine
vitably
do in any situation that action
whichhe believes to bethe best possible action to do,ifthere is
suchanaction. The best action is that which there is most reason
to do. Although
we humans are not in general perfectly free,we
are sometimesinthis situationwhere we are not influencedby
irrational forces. Suppose you have plenty ofmoney and youmeet
someone who needs some
special medicinet
o keep him alive which
he is too poor to buy, then (unless there is some special reason why
this would be a bad thing to do) the best actionwould betobuy
the medicine for him. If youbelievethatthis would b
ethe best
action,
and are not influenced by irrational forces, you will buy the
medicine.
Sometimes, however, a perfectly free being will have a choice
between twoormore possible actions, only oneofwhichhecan do,
whenhe believes that noneof these actions are better than theother

actions. There is, he believes, no best actionbutthere aretwoor
more equal best actions. Thenhe must
simply choose whichaction
to do—forno reasonat all. We humans are also sometimesinthis
situationwhere we are not influenced by irrational forces and have
a choice between twoormoreequal best actions.
Supposethat you
haveonly a little money and youmeet two people A and B, who
bothneed the special medicine,andyou haveonly enough money
to buy medicinetokeep one alive. Thenalthough youshould give
the money to oneof th
ose in need, it might be an equal
best action
to give ittoA, and an equal best action to give ittoB. There may
be no reasonfordoing oneof these actions rather than theother.
If youbelievethis and are
not influenced by irrational
forces, you
will dooneof these actions, but whichyou will do depends onyour
free choice.
8 God Loves Us
However, unlike aperfectly free person, humans are sometimes
influenced by irrational forces. In so far as someone believes that
an actionisgood, they will have adesiretodo it. Suchdesiresare
rational desires;theyare in
accord withreason. And in so far as
someone believes that an action is bad, they will have adesire not
to do it. But humans are sometimessubjecttoirrational desires,
that is, desires to do bad actions, ordesires to d
o actions

less good
than a best action, whichare stronger than the desiretodothe best
action. (By one desire being stronger than another one,Imean that
the person concernedfee
ls more inclined to yield to it.)Aperfectly
free being
is not subject to irrational desires. Humans, however,
are s ometimes subject to bad desires, ordesires to do aless good
action, stronger than any desiretodo abest acti
on. But since (given
my assumption that humans have free will) irrational desires only
influence us and do not compelus,we are free to makethe better
choice,although it requiresaneffortof will to do so.
Asmoker can choose whether to
smoke a cigarette
ornot. The
smoker has reasons forsmoking (he likesit) and reasons fornot
smoking (it will make him more pronetolung cancer). And he
may concludethatthe reasons fornot smoking are better than the
reasons forsmoking;
indeed, that it would
be bad to smoke. And
yet the smoker may have an irrational desiretosmoke,adesire
whichisstronger than his desire not to smoke (in that he feels more
inclined to yield to it); and thenhe has th
echoice ofwhether or
not to yield to the desiretosmoke.
So,given that humans have free will, there aretwo aspects to
this free will. Whenwe are uninfluenced by irrational desires, we
sometimes have afree choice between (what we

believetobe) two
ormoreequal best actions. Whenwe are influenced by irrational
desires to do an action whichis(we believe)badorless good than
abestor equal best action, wecan choose whether to dothe better
action or to yield to the irrational desire.
It is because it is up to us whattodo in thesetwo kinds of
circumstance that, if anyone had a beliefbeforehand about what
we would do,we would b e abletomakethat
belief false. Suppose
that Ihave a choice betweenmowing the lawn and watching
thetelevision; Ibelievethat it would bethe best action to mow
the lawn but Iamsubject to astronger irrational desiretowatch the
tel
evision. What I
will do depends onmyfree choice atthattime.
If youbelieve beforehand that I will watch thetelevision, I have
God 9
it in my power(bymowing the lawn) to bring it aboutthat your
beliefproved false. Certainly if youknow that my desiretowatch
thetelevisionisastrong one,you may rightly think it probablethat
I will watch thetelevision, bu t you cannot bec
ertain. It seems to
follow that not evenGod can have an infallibletrue beliefandso
infallible knowledge about whether I will watch thetelevision or
mow the lawn. Generally it looksasifit is not logicallypossible
fo
rGod to
know infallibly beforehand what afree agent will
do in such circumstances. But since Godisomnipotent,it is only
because he permits this that we have free will and are sometimes

situatedincircumstanceswher
e we are subject
to irrational desires
or have a choice between what we believetobeequal best actions.
God is himself responsible for there being limits to his knowledge
ofhowwe will act; and hecan take away our free will and sot
hese
limits to his
knowledgeof the future,wheneverhechooses.
God himself, however, is supposed to be perfectly free and so not
to be subject to irrational desires. So when there is an action which
he be
lieves to in the best available action,
inevitably he will do it.
Find since,being omniscients, he knows whichactions are good and
whichare better than others, he will inevitably dothe best action.
He must,however,
often have a choice betweenactions
whichhe
believes to beequal best; and for him this choice is simply the
choice ofwhich of equal best actions to do. It would seem to be an
equal best actionforGod to
arrangethe initial state of the universe
sothat iteventually caused Uranus to rotate in a direction different
from thatof theother planets, as to arrangethat state sothat Uranus
rotatesinthe same directionastheother planets.
God cannot do
bothactions. It might have beena
n equal best action to choose Mary
to bethe mother ofJesus as to choose any of a number ofpossible

mothers, but Jesus could haveonly one mother. And soon. But, since
Godisomnipotent, the rangeofi
ncompatibleequal best actions
availabletohim is so muchgreater than the range availabletous.
Further, Godmustoftenbe in a situationwhere wecannot be,
of having a choice between an infinite number ofpossibl
e actions
such thateachaction
is, he believes, less good than someother
actionhecould do. And since Godknows whichactions are good
and whichare better than others, this means a choice betweenan
infinite number ofacti
ons, each of whichisless
good than some
otheractionhecould do. For example, animals whichdo not eat
other animals are agood thing;they can be happy and loving. So
10 God Loves Us
the moreof them the better (given thattheyare spread out among
an infinite number of planets, sothattheydo not crowd each other
out). So however many such animals God creates, it would have
beenbetterifhe had createdmore. (And
hecould still havecreated
more, evenifhecreated an infinite number of them.)So although
not influenced by irrational forces, God cannot alwaysdothe
best action. Hecannot dothis when t
woormore possible actions
areequal
best; orwhere—as in theexample just given—there is
no bestor equal best possible action; and he has then to exercise
his choice between the actions in an arbitrary way.

It may be,however, that when there is
no best action available
to God, there may be a bestkind ofaction availabletoGod, such
that it would be better to do some action of that kind than to do any
number ofactions ofa
ny otherincompatible kind. For example,
God can create creatures of many differenttypes, including angels,
humans, and animals. If it werethecasethat it would be better to
create at least some humans (
evenifhecreatesno angels or animals)
than to create any number of angels and animals and no humans,
or to do an act ofanyotherincompatible kind, thenit would be a
best kind ofactionforGod to create some humans, although there
would be no b
est numberfor
him to create. If Godbelieved that
this is thecase, then, I suggest,God, being influencedbyreason
alone, will inevitably create some humans. And if he believes that
there aretwoormore equal b
estkinds ofaction availabletohim
he will inevitably do some action of oneof these kinds. So God
will inevitably always dothe bestor equal best action, oranaction
ofabestor equal best kind, wherethere is suchanacti
on. But he
cannot always
dothe best actionbecausethere will not always be a
best action.
Goodactions can be dividedinto thosethat are obligatory(or
duties),andthosethat go beyond obligatio
n and whichwecall

supererogatory. Iamobliged(it is my duty) to pay my debts,
but not to give my lifetosavethatofacomrade—supremely,
‘supererogatorily’ good though it is that Ishould do so. To fail to
fulfil an obligationisto do something wrong
. Apersonisinsome
way at fault fordoing what is wrong, and if he believes that he
is doing wrong, he is blameworthy fordoing it; but he doesnot
deserve praise merely for fulfilling his obligations (doing his duty).
And he is in some way meritorious fo
rdoing what is supererogatory;
and
if he believes that he is doing something supererogatory, he
God 11
is praiseworthy fordoing it. Positiveobligations normally arise
becauseofbenefitsreceived(Iowe my parentsmuchbecausethey
have done muchforme) orbecauseof commitments, explicitor
implicit. I must keepmypromises
and pay my debtsbecause I
haveexplicitly committedmyself to doing so. And I must feedmy
childrenbecause by bringing theminto existence I have implicitly
committedmyself to doing so. Negativeobligations—obligations
not to dothings—normally concern n
ot damaging otherpeople.
It is
wrong to steal or kill (possibly subject to some qualifications).
Obligations are a limitedset ofgoodactions, and mostofuscan
fulfil all our obligations, although sometimeswe find ourselves
withincompatibleobligations.
Although
God cannot always dothe

best,hecan always fulfil all his obligations. As the source of the
existence ofallotherbeings, he doesnot owe anyone anything
as a resultofbenefitsreceived orfor any otherreason; and since
ther
e is goodreason to
ensurethis, he will ensurethat he never
enters into commitments whichhecould not fulfil. For example,
he will neverpromisetoone person that he will do some action
and alsotoanotherperson that h
e will not dothat action. And
since it is always a best action to fulfil an obligationwhen one
has noconflicting obligations, God will fulfil all his obligations.
Paradoxically, then, God, being perfectly free and omniscient, can
do no bad action and abov
e all (within theclass of
bad actions) no
wrong action.
It follows from the argumentof the last few pages that we must
understand Godbeing perfectly good as Goddoing no bad actions
and many goodactions, and always doing the b
est action ora
n
equal best action(oraction ofabestor equal best kind) wherethere
is one availabletohim.
Godisalso a sourceofmoral obligation in that his command
to us to do some action makesitobligatory forus
to dothat
actionwhenit would not otherwise beobligatory. Many truths of
moralityhold whether ornot there is a God. Clearly it is good to
feed the starving and obligatory to keeppromises(possibly subject

to certain exceptions), whet
her ornot there is a God. But among
truths ofmoralitywhichhold independently ofGodisthetruth
that we have an obligation to pleaseour benefactors (those who
arethe source ofmuchgood to us)—wi
thin limits. It is
because
of this thatchildren have a (limited) obligation to pleasetheir
parents(those who are not merely biological parentsbut nurturing
12 God Loves Us
parentswho feed, clothe, educate, and care for them in many other
ways). And an obvious way to please benefactors is to obey their
commands. But if there isaGod, he is so muchmorethe source of
good things to us than
areour parents. He keeps us in being from
momenttomoment, and all the good things which our parentsand
others provide forusthey can provideonly because God allows
them to do so. So if God commands us to do some act
ion,
it will be
our duty to do it. Maybethere are limits onwhat God has the right
to command; having created humans as free rational creatures,
perhaps he doesnot havethe righttotell them whattodoevery
minute of their lives. But,ifso
,being perfectly
good, he will not
command anyonetodo what he has no righttocommand. For to
command what you have no righttocommand is wrong.
Godiseternal. Butthis has been understoodintwo different
senses:eitherastheclaim that Godistimeless (he

doesnot exist
in time, orat any
rate in our time) orastheclaim that Godis
everlasting (heexistedatevery momentof pasttime, existsnow,
and will exist atevery momentoffuturetime). In my opinion the
timele
ss viewisincompatible with everything elsethat religious
believers
have wanted to say about God. For example,it doesseem
strongly that Godbeing omnisciententails that he hears the prayers
of humans att
he sametime as theyutter them; yet
on thetimeless
viewGoddoesnot exist atthe sametime as (simultaneously with)
any momenton our timescale. For this and otherreasons I shall
in future understand Godbeing eternal as Godb
eing everlasting;
though
it might be possibletore-express much of the restof what
I havetosay on the assumption that Godistimeless rather than
everlasting. Being everlasting, G od is unlimitedinthetime during
whichh
eexists.
Because Godisomnipotent, and omniscient, everything elsethat
exists exists only because he knowingly causes or allows someone
elsetocause ittoexist. Hence hecould have prevented the universe
from ever existing
and hecould annihilate it at any moment. So
its existence frommomenttomoment depends entirely on him;
in that sense Godiscreator and sustainer of the universe and

of all that itcontains.
The universe may or may not have always
existed— we do not knoww
hether the universe had a beginning.
But if it had a beginning, Godbrought it into existence then; and if
it has always existed, God has always kept it in existence.
God 13
Being omnipotent, omniscient, etc. are properties ofGod. God,
like individual persons, stones, tables, and planets, is a thing; philo-
sophers sometimes call thesethings ‘substances’. Substances have
properties: a certain table may
havethe properties ofbeing br own,
square, and weighing 5 kg. Someof the properties of substances
areessential to them. Apropertyisanessential property ofa
substance if that subs
tance
could not losethat propertywithout
ceasing to exist. Being brown is not an essential property ofmy
table: thetablecould continuetoexist if i t were repaintedred. But
occupying space is an essential property of th
etable: if
itceased to
occupy space,it would ceasetoexist. The properties of substances
include both their monadic properties(properties which they have
in themselves apart from their relations
to other substances) and
their relational properties(their relations to other things). Being
brown, square, and weighing 5 kg are monadic properties; whereas
‘being 10 ft away from a wall’ or ‘being made by a carpenter’ or
‘being an

elderbrother’
are relational properties.
God is supposednot merely to beomnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly free, and eternal, buttobe soessentially—if God ceased
to beomnipotent, omniscient, orpe
rfectly free,he would cease
to
exist; and (since being eternal is also an essential property of
God)abeing whocould ceasetoexistcould never have been
Godat all. God cannot commit suicide.Thesepropertiesare
essential to God.
Theybelong to God’s
natureor essence. But
Godhasother properties which are non-essential (accidental or
contingent); he has these accidental propertiesbecause hechooses
to hav
ethem. Among these propertiesi
sbeing creator and sustainer
of the universe: the universeexists only because hechooses that
it should exist. Theexact degree of our power, knowledge, and
freedo
mare, of course,not properties whichmakeordinary human
persons the particular people we are (although we need to have,
at least when fully developed, some degree or other of these
properties)
. Iremain the same personi
fIforget many things orlose
the power to move my legs.
Ordinary human persons could be duplicatedinthatthere
could be a different personwith exactly the same properties,

monadi
c and relational, as I have. Therec
ould be in anotherworld
exactly likethis world in all otherrespectsanotherperson exactly
like me in his appearance,mental life, and history, and writing
14 God Loves Us
abook entitled Was Jesus God?.Or, instead ofme, my parents
could have produced a different sonwith exactly the same genes,
who wenton to havetheexperiences and livethe life whichI
have lived—without meever having existed. You can
see this
by imagining yourself being shown before your birth a film of
what will happeninafuture world (and whichwould picture in
some way all theexperiences and thoughtswhich the inhabitants
of different bodieswould have)
. Youwould
still wanttoknow
whetheryouwould live in that world and whichbody and which
experiencesandthoughtsyouwould have. Philosophers sometimes
express this point by saying thateach human being has (as well as
some properties
essential
for all humans) a thisness,whichisnot
aproperty or combination ofpropertiesbut something underlying
those propertieswhich makes him orher the particular human they
are. Although ordinary humans havethisness, not all things have
thisness. Gravitational
fields, for example,do not havethisness;
any gravitational field which had the same strength, shape, and size
as theone which surrounds our earthwould bethat gravitational

field. And it is a controversial issu
e whether fundamental particles,
suchaselectrons and protons, havethisness; and so,for example,
whether the world would be any different if you exchanged the
positions of twoelectrons.
DoesGod havethisness?
Fairly few philosophers
and theolo-
gians have faced this question, butthose who haveclaim in effect
that Goddoesnot havethisness. For example, Augustine (the great
theologian who was a bishopinNorth Africainthe fourth cent
ury
ad)denied that Godi
sproperly calleda‘substance’ that‘has’ prop-
erties. God, Augustineclaimed, is more properly calledan‘essence’
because he‘is’ his properties. That is, theessential propert
ies of
GodwhichIhave listed (and perhaps deeperpropertiesfrom which
these derive)are what makesGodGod. This means thatthings
couldn’t be different in the respect that a different God(with all the
same prope
rtiesasthe actual
God) was in chargeof the universe. For
any being who had all the same propertiesasthe actual Godwould
bethe actual God. Forreasons of a kind which I shall give later
in this chapter, I think that Augustine’s viewis
correct: if there is
a
God, Goddoesnot havethisness. If so, thenit will be an aspect of
the divine naturethat he has nothisness; it will not be a contingent

featureofGod. We shall see in Chapter2that,ifGod has thisness,
th
ere are importantc
onsequencesfor the doctrineof the Trinity.