The second world war volume iii the grand alliance

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TheGrandAlliance
TheSecondWorldWar[3]
WinstonChurchill
MarinerBooks(1954)
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The Grand Alliance describes the end of an extraordinary period in British
militaryhistoryinwhichthatcountrystoodvirtuallyaloneagainsttheGerman
onslaught.TwocrucialeventsbringabouttheendofBritains̓isolationandprove
to be key turning points in the war against Hitler. The first is Hitlers̓ welldocumenteddecisiontoattacktheSovietUnion,openingupabattlefrontinthe
East. The second event is the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the entry of the
UnitedStatesintothewar.



THEGRANDALLIANCE

WINSTONCHURCHILL


TheGrandAlliance
2
Copyright
TheGrandAlliance
Copyright © 1948 by Winston Churchill Cover art and eForeword to the
electroniceditioncopyright©2002byRosettaBooks,LLC
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief
quotationsembodiedincriticalayrticlesandreviews.
For information address First electronic edition
published2002byRosettaBooksLLC,NewYork.
ISBN0-7953-0612-1


TheGrandAlliance


3
Contents
eForeword


Preface
Acknowledgments


BookOne:

GermanyDrivesEast
1:TheDesertandtheBalkans
2:TheWideningWar
3:BlitzandAnti-Blitz,1941:Hess
4:TheMediterraneanWar
5:ConquestoftheItalianEmpire
6:DecisiontoAidGreece
7:TheBattleoftheAtlantic,1941TheWesternApproaches8:TheBattleofthe
Atlantic,1941TheAmericanIntervention9:Yugoslavia
10:TheJapaneseEnvoy
11:TheDesertFlank:Rommel:Tobruk
12:TheGreekCampaign
13:Tripoliand“Tiger”

TheGrandAlliance
4
14:TheRevoltinIraq
15:Crete:TheAdvent
16:Crete:TheBattle
17:TheFateofthe“Bismarck”


18:Syria
19:GeneralWavell’sFinalEffort:“Battleaxe”
20:TheSovietNemesis


BookTwo:
WarComestoAmerica
1:OurSovietAlly

2:AnAfricanPause:Tobruk
3:MyMeetingwithRoosevelt
4:TheAtlanticCharter
5:AidtoRussia
6:PersiaandtheMiddleEastSummerandAutumn,1941
7:TheMountingStrengthofBritainAutumn,1941
8:CloserContactswithRussiaAutumnandWinter,1941
9:ThePathAhead
10: Operation “Crusader” Ashore, Aloft, and Afloat 11: Japan 12: Pearl
Harbour!
13:AVoyageAmidWorldWar
14:ProposedPlanandSequenceoftheWar15:WashingtonandOttawa
TheGrandAlliance
5
16:Anglo-AmericanAccords
17:ReturntoStorm
Appendices


Notes
AbouttheAuthor
AboutthisTitle


TheGrandAlliance
6
MapsandDiagrams
TheAdvancefromTobruk
TheCampaigninEastAfrica
The Battle of the Atlantic: Merchant Ships Sunk by U-Boats in the Atlantic

Phase I. From the Outbreak of War to the Invasion of Norway, September 3,
1939,toApril9,1940
PhaseII.TheWesternApproaches,April10,1940,toMarch17,1941
PhaseIII.TheOceanuptotheEntryoftheUnitedStatesintotheWar,March
18,1941,toDecember6,1941
TheBalkans
Rommel’sCounter-Offensive,April,1941
TheGermanInvasionofGreece
Habbaniya-Falluja
SyriaandIraq


CreteandtheAegean
TheChaseoftheBismarck
Map1:Situationat6.00a.m.May24
Map2:Situationat3.06a.m.May25
Map3:Situationat10.30a.m.May26

TheGrandAlliance
7
Plan1:Situationat9.00a.m.May26
Plan2:Situationat8.48a.m.May27
Plan3:Situationat10.15a.m.May27
TheSyrianCampaign
DiagramtoIllustrateOperation“Battleaxe”
TheGermanAttackonRussia
OperationsinPersia
TheMediterraneanArea,June21,1941
EnemyDispositionsNovember18OpeningPhase,November18-19
FirstBattleofSidiRezegh

Rommel’sRaidNovember24–28SecondBattleofSidiRezegh,November29–
30
TheSouthChinaSea
Malaya


Cyrenaica


TheGrandAlliance
8
eForeword
Oneofthemostfascinatingworksofhistoryeverwritten,WinstonChurchill’s
monumentalTheSecondWorldWarisasix-volumeaccountofthestruggleof
the Allied powers in Europe against Germany and the Axis. Told through the
eyesofBritishPrimeMinisterWinstonChurchill,TheSecondWorldWarisalso
thestoryofonenation’ssingular,heroicroleinthefightagainsttyranny.Pride
and patriotism are evident everywhere in Churchill’s dramatic account and for
good reason. Having learned a lesson at Munich that they would never forget,
theBritishrefusedtomakepeacewithHitler,defyinghimevenafterFrancehad
fallenandafteritseemedasthoughtheNaziswereunstoppable.
Churchillremainedunbowedthroughout,asdidthepeopleofBritaininwhose
determinationandcourageheplacedhisconfidence.
PatrioticasChurchillwas,hemanagedtomaintainabalancedimpartialityinhis
description of the war. What is perhaps most interesting, and what lends the
workitstensionandemotion,isChurchill’sinclusionofasignificantamountof
primarymaterial.Wehearhisretrospectiveanalysisofthewar,tobesure,but
wearealsopresentedwithmemos,letters,orders,speeches,andtelegramsthat
give a day-by-day account of the reactions-both mistaken and justified-to the
unfoldingdrama.StrategiesandcounterstrategiesdeveloptorespondtoHitler’s

ruthless conquest of Europe, his planned invasion of England, and The Grand
Alliance9
his treacherous assault on Russia. It is a mesmerizing account of the crucial
decisionsthathavetobemadewithimperfectknowledgeandanawarenessthat
thefateoftheworldhangsinthebalance.


The Grand Alliance, the third volume of this work, describes the end of an
extraordinary period in British military history in which that country stood
virtuallyaloneagainsttheGermanonslaught.Twocrucialeventsbringaboutthe
endofBritain’sisolationandprovekeyturningpointsinthewaragainstHitler.
The first is Hitler’s well-documented decision to attack the Soviet Union,
openingupabattlefrontintheEast.Stalin,whoafewmonthsearlierhadbeen
making plans with Hitler to carve up the British Empire between them, now
findshimselflookingtotheBritishforsupportandentreatingChurchilltoopen
up a second front in France. Churchill includes the fascinating correspondence
betweenhimselfandtheRussianleader.
The second event is the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United
Statesintothewar.U.S.supporthadlongbeenseenascrucialtotheBritishwar
effort,andChurchilldocumentshiseffortstodrawtheAmericanstotheaidof
theiralliesacrosstheocean,includinghisdirectcorrespondencewithPresident
Roosevelt.TheattackonPearlHarbor,ofcourse,changeseverything,andsoon
after the British began coordinate their efforts against Nazi Germany with the
cooperationoftheUnitedStates.TheGrandAllianceisformed.
ChurchillwontheNobelPrizeforLiteraturein1953dueinnosmallparttothis
awe-inspiringwork.
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TheGrandAlliance
11


Preface
THISVOLUME,liketheothers,claimsonlytobeacontributiontothehistory
of the Second World War. The tale is told from the standpoint of the British
Prime Minister, with special responsibility as Minister of Defence for military
affairs.Asthesecamedirectlytosomeextentintomyhands,Britishoperations
are narrated in their scope and in some detail. At the same time it would be
impossibletodescribethestrugglesofourAlliesexceptasabackground.
Todofulljusticethesemustbelefttotheirownhistorians,ortolaterandmore
general British accounts. While recognising the impossibility of preserving
proportion,Ihavetriedtoplaceourownstoryinitstruesetting.
The main thread is again the series of my directives, telegrams, and minutes
upon the daily conduct of the war and of British affairs. These are all original
documents composed by me as events unfolded. They therefore constitute a
moreauthenticrecordandgive,Ibelieve,abetterimpressionofwhathappened
andhowitseemedatthetimethananyaccountwhichIcouldwritenowthatthe
course of events is known. Although they contain expressions of opinion and
forecastswhichdidnotcometrue,itisbythemasawholethatIwishmyown

shareintheconflicttobejudged.Onlyinthiswaycanthereaderunderstandthe
actual problems we had to face as defined by the knowledge then in our
possession.

TheGrandAlliance
12
Space would not allow, nor indeed in many cases have I the right, to print the
replies, which very often took the form of lengthy departmental memoranda. I
have therefore been careful to avoid, so far as I can, throwing blame on
individuals.WherepossibleIhaveendeavouredtogiveasummaryofrepliesto
telegrams.Inthemainhoweverthedocumentswhichareprintedtellthetale.
Weareagaindealingwithwaronthegiantscale,andthebattleontheRussian
frontinvolvedasmanydivisionsonbothsidesaswereengagedintheBattleof
France. Atevery point along afarlongerfrontthegreatmassesengaged, with


slaughterincomparabletoanythingwhichoccurredelsewhereduringthewar.I
cannotattempttodomorethanrefertothestrugglebetweentheGermanandthe
Russian Armies as the background of the actions of Britain and the Western
Allies.TheRussianepicof1941
and1942deservesadetailedanddispassionatestudyandrecordintheEnglish
language.EventhoughnofacilitiesforforeignerstonarratetheRussianagony
andglorymightbeaccorded,theeffortshouldbemade.Norshouldthisimpulse
be chilled by the fact that the Soviet Government have already claimed all the
honourforthemselves.
Hitler’sinvasionofRussiabroughttoanendtheperiodofalmostexactlyayear
during which Great Britain and her Empire stood alone, undismayed, and
growing continually in strength. Six months later the United States, violently
assaultedbyJapan,becameourallyforallpurposes.Thegroundforourunited
action had been prepared beforehand by my correspondence with President

Roosevelt,anditwaspossibletoforecastnotonlytheformofouroperationsbut
also their sequence. The effective combination of the whole English-speaking
worldinthewagingofwarandtheTheGrandAlliance13
creationoftheGrandAllianceformtheconclusiontothispartofmyaccount.
WINSTONS.CHURCHILL
CHARTWELL
January1,1950


TheGrandAlliance
14


Acknowledgments
IMUSTAGAINACKNOWLEDGEtheassistanceofthosewhohelpedmewith
the previous volume, namely, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall,
CommodoreG.R.G.Alien,ColonelF.W.Deakin,andSirEdwardMarsh,Mr.
DenisKellyandMr.C.C.Wood.Ihavealsotothanktheverylargenumberof
otherswhohavekindlyreadthesepagesandcommenteduponthem.
LordIsmayhascontinuedtogivemehisaid,ashavemyotherfriends.
IrecordmyobligationtoHisMajesty’sGovernmentforpermissiontoreproduce
the text of certain official documents of which the Crown Copyright is legally
vestedintheControllerofHisMajesty’sStationeryOffice.AttherequestofHis
Majesty’s Government on security grounds, I have paraphrased some of the
telegramspublishedinthisvolume.Thesechangeshavenotalteredinanyway
thesenseorsubstanceofthetelegrams.


TheGrandAlliance
15

MoraloftheWork
InWar:Resolution
InDefeat:Defiance
InVictory:Magnanimity
InPeace:GoodWill



TheGrandAlliance
16
ThemeoftheVolume
HowtheBritishfoughton
withHardshiptheirGarment
until
SovietRussiaandtheUnitedStatesweredrawn
intotheGreatConflict


TheGrandAlliance
17
Publisher’sNote
Thefollowingchangesinthetextwerereceivedtoolateforinclusioninthefirst
edition,butwillappearintheirproperplacesinfutureeditions:Page48,line13
for:OnSaturday,May10
read:OnSunday,May11
Page48,3linesfrombottomfor:DukeofHamilton’sestatein Scotlandread:


DukeofHamilton’sestatewestofScotlandPage50,lines20and21
for:TherewastheDukeofHamilton.HehadmethimattheOlympicGames.

read:There was the Duke of Hamilton who had been known to the son of his
politicaladviserKarlHaushofer.
Page159,line21
for:March18
read:March4
Page160,lines1,2,3frombottomfor:WhenthereturnedMinisterslaidbefore
theYugoslavCabinetthetextofthepactthreecolleaguesresigned,TheGrand
Alliance18
read:Even before the returned Ministers laid before the Yugoslav Cabinet the
text of the pact, three colleagues had resigned, Page194, line 12 from bottom
for:wasvalidagainstRussia.
read:wasnotvalidagainstRussia.
Page254,line8
for:EmirAbdulIlia,read:EmirAbdulIlah,
Page356,line27
for:shortlyafterPrincePaulhadmadehissecretvisittoHitleratBerchtesgaden
read:assoonastheYugoslavMinistersmadetheirsubmissioninVienna,Page
507,lines2and3frombottomdelete:especiallyAirMarshalHarris,theheadof
BomberCommand,Page535,line11frombottomfor:OnDecember6
read:OnDecember5
Page620,lastline
for:Onthe12th
read:Onthe11th


Page744,line1,
for:destroyers,maps
TheGrandAlliance
19
read:destroyingmaps

TheGrandAlliance
20


BookOne
GermanyDrivesEast

TheGrandAlliance
21
1
TheDesertandtheBalkans
TheOnsetofEventsin1941—ASecureFoundation—TheHingeoftheWar—
FalseDawnintheDesert—MyWarAppreciationofJanuary6—AFirmFlank
at Benghazi — The Campaign in Abyssinia — The Spanish Riddle — Vichy
Obscurities — Threat of German Air Power in Sicily —OverridingDangerin
theBalkans—TheNeedtoSupportGreece—OurMainTask—Hitler’sNew
YearThoughts—HisLettertoMussolini,December31,1940—Coincidenceof
OurViewAbout Spain—Hitler’sConclusionsAboutRussiaandAfrica—Mr.
Eden’s Anxieties — Need to Limit Our Desert Advance — General Smuts’
TelegramofJanuary8—DirectionstoGeneralWavellofJanuary10—Wavell
FliestoAthens—MyTelegramtoWavellofJanuary26—MyReplytoGeneral
SmutsofJanuary12.
LOOKING BACK upon the unceasing tumult of the war, I cannot recall any
periodwhenitsstressesandtheonsetofsomanyproblemsallatonceorinrapid
succession bore more directly on me and my colleagues than the first half of
1941.Thescaleofeventsgrewlargereveryyear;butthedecisionsrequiredwere
notmoredifficult.Greatermilitarydisastersfelluponusin1942,butbythenwe
were no longer alone and our fortunes were mingled with those of the Grand
Alliance.Nopartofourproblemin1941couldbe

TheGrandAlliance
22
solvedwithoutrelationtoalltherest.Whatwasgiventoonetheatrehadtobe
taken from another. An effort here meant a risk there. Our physical resources
were harshly limited. The attitude of a dozen Powers, friendly, opportunist, or
potentiallyhostile,wasunknowable.Athomewemustfacethewaragainstthe
U-boats, the invasion threat, and the continuing Blitz; we had to conduct the
group of campaigns in the Middle East; and, thirdly, to try to make a front
againstGermanyintheBalkans.Andwehadtodoallthisforalongtimealone.
After shooting Niagara we had now to struggle in the rapids. One of the
difficulties of this narrative is the disproportion between our single-handed
effortstokeepourheadsabovewaterfromdaytodayanddoourduty,andthe
remorselessdevelopmentoffarlargerevents.
WehadatanyrateasolidfoundationinGreatBritain.Iwassurethat,provided
wemaintainedthehigheststateofreadinessathomeandthenecessaryforces,a
German attempt at invasion in 1941 would not be to our disadvantage. The
Germanairstrengthinalltheatreswasverylittlegreaterthanin1940,whereas
our air fighter force at home had grown from fifty-one to seventy-eight
squadrons, and our bombers from twenty-seven to forty-five squadrons. The
Germanshadnotwontheairbattlein1940.Theyseemedtohavelittlechanceof
winningitin1941.OurarmyintheIslandhadgrownfarstronger.
BetweenSeptember,1940,andSeptember,1941,itwasraisedfromtwenty-six
active divisions to thirty-four, plus five armoured divisions. To this must be
addedthematurityofthetroopsandtheenormousincreaseintheirweapons.
TheHomeGuardhadrisenfromamilliontoamillionandahalf;andnowall
hadfirearms.Numbers,mobility,

TheGrandAlliance

23
equipment, training, organisation, and defence works were vastly improved.
Hitler, of course, had always a superabundance of soldiers for invasion. To


conquerushewouldhavehadtocarryandsupplyacrosstheChannelatleasta
millionmen.Hecouldby1941havehadalargethoughnotasufficientquantity
oflanding-craft.Butwithourdominantairforceandnavalpowergivingusthe
commandofbothelementswehadnodoubtofourabilitytodestroyorcripple
hisarmada.Allthearguments,therefore,onwhichwehadreliedin1940were
now incomparably stronger. So long as there was no relaxation in vigilance or
seriousreductioninourowndefencetheWarCabinetandtheChiefsoftheStaff
feltnoanxiety.
AlthoughourAmericanfriends,someofwhosegeneralsvisitedus,tookamore
alarmist view of our position, and the world at large regarded the invasion of
Britain as probable, we ourselves felt free to send overseas all the troops our
availableshippingcouldcarryandtowageoffensivewarintheMiddleEastand
theMediterranean.
Herewasthehingeonwhichourultimatevictoryturned,anditwasin1941that
thefirstsignificanteventsbegan.Inwararmiesmustfight.Africawastheonly
continentinwhichwecouldmeetourfoesonland.ThedefenceofEgyptandof
Maltaweredutiescompulsiveuponus,andthedestructionoftheItalianEmpire
the first prize we could gain. The British resistance in the Middle East to the
triumphantAxisPowersandourattempttorallytheBalkansandTurkeyagainst
themarethethemeandthreadofourstorynow.
TheDesertvictoriescheeredtheopeningdaysoftheyear.
Bardia,withmorethanfortythousandmen,surrenderedonTheGrandAlliance
24
January5.Tobrukseemedcertainlywithinourgrasp,andwasinfacttaken,with
nearlythirtythousandprisoners,inafortnight.Onthenineteenthwereoccupied

Kassala,intheSudan,andonthetwentiethinvadedtheItaliancolonyofEritrea,
seizing the railhead at Biscia a few days later. On that same day the Emperor
HaileSelassiere-enteredAbyssinia.Butallthewhilethereportsaccumulatedof
theGermanmovementsandpreparationsforaBalkancampaign.Idrewupfor
theChiefsofStaffanappreciationuponthewarasawhole,withwhichIfound
themingeneralagreement.
Prime
Minister


to
6Jan.41
GeneralIsmay,forC.
O.S.Committee
ThespeedydestructionoftheItalianarmedforcesinNortheast Africamustbe
our prime major overseas objective in the opening months of 1941. Once the
ItalianarmyinCyrenaicahasbeendestroyed,theArmyoftheNilebecomesfree
forothertasks.Wecannotyettellwhatthesewillbe.
2.ThefallofBardiashouldenableanadvancedbasetobeestablishedtherefor
thecaptureofTobruk.
With Bardia and Tobruk in our hands it should be possible to drop the land
communicationswithAlexandriaalmostentirelyandtorelyuponseatransport
forourfurtherwestwardadvance.EveryplanshouldbemadenowtouseTobruk
toitsutmostcapacity.
3. The striking force to be maintained west of Bardiaand Tobruk need not be
large.The2dand7thBritishArmouredDivisions,the6thAustralianDivision,
theNewZealandbrigadegroup,soontobecomeadivision,withperhapsoneor
two British brigades, comprising not more than 40,000 to 45,000 men, should
sufficetooverpowertheremainingItalianresistanceandtotakeBenghazi.The
distancefromTobruk to Benghazi by the coastal road is not much above 250

miles,comparedwithabout370fromAlexandriatoTobruk.1Thus,onceTobruk
isestab-TheGrandAlliance25
lished as the base and our land communications begin from there, no greater
strainshouldbethrownuponthelandtransportthanatpresent,anditshouldbe
possible to start afresh from Tobruk as if Tobruk were Alexandria, and to
maintainthemoderatebutadequatestrikingforcerequired.Withthecaptureof
BenghazithisphaseoftheLibyancampaignwouldbeended.
4. The question is, how long will this take? Having regard to the very heavy
Italianlossesintheirbesttroopsandintheirvehiclesandequipment,andtothe
fact that we have the command of the sea, the collapsein Cyrenaica might be
very rapid. Indeed, all might gowith a run at any time. The need for haste is


obvious. It would, however, suffice for our general strategy if Benghazi and
everythingeastofitwereeffectivelyinourpossessionandoccupiedasamilitary
andnavalbaseatanytimeduringMarch.
5. The aforesaid Libyan operations need not, therefore, at all affect the
simultaneouspushingofthecampaignagainsttheItaliansinAbyssinia.General
Wavellhasalreadywithdrawnthe4thIndianDivision.
The5thIndianDivisionisalsoavailable,anditshouldbepossibletocarryout
theKassalaoperationandto spreadtherevolt inAbyssinia, whileatthesame
time the Kenya forces press northward by Lake Rudolf. At any time we may
receivearmisticeproposalsfromthecut-off Italian garrison in Abyssinia. This
armymusthavebeenbuoyedupwithhopesofanItalianconquestoftheDelta
andoftheCanal,enablingcommunicationstoberestoredandsuppliestoreach
thembytheNileandtheRedSea.Thesehopesarealreadydead.Ontheother
hand,thevastsizeofAbyssinia,thelackofallcommunications,especiallysea
communications, and the impossibility of nourishing large forces may bring
about an indefinite delay. It is, however, not an unreasonable hope that by the
endofApriltheItalianarmyinAbyssiniawillhavesubmittedorbeenbrokenup.

6.Themomentthatthisisapparentthenorthwardmovementofalltheeffective
forces in Kenya, as well as those in the Sudan and Abyssinia, will become
possible. These forces will thenceforward become a reserve available for
operationsintheEasternMediter-TheGrandAlliance26
ranean.IfwetakethepresenttotalstrengthofthearmiesintheMiddleEastat
about370,000(includingconvoysW.S.5and6),itmightbereasonablyexpected
thattheequivalentoftendivisionswouldstandintheNileValley,togetherwith
two additional divisions from home, a total of twelve, after providing the
necessary garrisons and security troops for Abyssinia, Cyrenaica, Egypt, and
Palestine. These twelve divisions should thus be free (apart from new
distractions)bytheendofApril.
II
7.Toinvadeand forceawaythroughSpaintotheStraitsof Gibraltaragainst
the will of the Spanishpeople and Government, especially at this season, is a
mostdangerousandquestionableenterpriseforGermanytoundertake,anditis
nowonderthatHitler,withsomanysullenpopulationstoholddown,hassofar


shrunk from it. With the permission of the Spanish Government it would, of
course, be a short and easymatter for the Germans to gain control of Lisbon
and of the Algeciras and Ceuta batteries, together with appropriate airfields.
According to Captain Hillgarth [ourNaval Attaché in Madrid], who has lived
long in Spain and is fresh from contact with our Ambassador, it is becoming
increasingly unlikely that the Spanish Government will give Hitler passage or
join the war againstus. General Wavell’s victories in Libya have played, and
will play, an important part in Spanish opinion. If the Germans are refused
permission it is most unlikely that they will try to force their way into and
throughSpainbeforethemonthofApril.Fromeverypointofviewthisdelayis
helpfultous.WehavetheuseofGibraltar;wehavethetimeforourstrengthin
theMiddleEasttoaccomplishitstaskthereandagaintobecomefree;aboveall,

thereisthepossibilityofeventstakingafavourableturninFranceandatVichy.
8. We must now be most careful not to precipitate matters in Spain, or set the
SpanishGovernmentagainstusmorethanitisalready,orprovokeHerrHitler
toaviolentcoursetowardsSpain.AlltheseTheGrandAlliance27
matters are highly speculative. There can be no certainty about them. But the
factthatHitlerhasnotactedthroughSpainaswefeared,whenconditions,both
political and climatic, were more favourable to him, makes it on the whole a
reasonableworkingassumptionthatanyGermanadventureinSpainwillatleast
waitforthespring.
III
9.TheprobabilitiesofdelayinSpainuntilthespringgiverisetothehopethat
theVichyGovernment,underGermanpressureoractualGermanincursion,may
either proceed to North Africa and resume the war from there, or authorise
GeneralWeygandtodoso.Ifsuchaneventcouldbebroughtaboutbeforethe
StraitsofGibraltarfellintoGermancontrol,weshouldhaveaverygoodchance
of resisting a German attempt against the Straits indefinitely. We could move
troopsintoMoroccobytheAtlanticports;weshouldhavetheuseoftheFrench
air bases in North Africa. The wholesituation in the Mediterranean would be
completely revolutionised in our favour. The position of any Italian forces
remaininginTripoliwouldbecomeimpossible.
We might well be able to open the Mediterranean for supplies and
reinforcementsfortheMiddleEast.