Indonesia’s great power management in the indo pacific

asia policy, volume 17, number 4 (october 2022), 123–49
•    •

special issue

Indonesia’s Great-Power Management
in the Indo-Pacific: The Balancing
Behavior of a “Dove State”

Vibhanshu Shekhar

vibhanshu shekhar is an Adjunct Professorial Lecturer at American
University in Washington, D.C. (United States) and author of Indonesia’s
Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: Rise of an
Indo-Pacific Power (2018). He can be reached at <>
or on Twitter <@vibshekhar>.
note: This essay was first presented at the March 2021 workshop “Middle
Powers amidst U.S.-China Rivalry” organized by Hoo Tiang Boon and
Sarah Teo at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang
Technological University.

keywords:indonesia; u.s.-china relations; indo-pacific; balancing

© The National Bureau of Asian Research
One Union Square, Suite 1012, 600 University Street, Seattle, Washington 98101 USA

asia policy

executive summary

This essay investigates Indonesia’s strategic thinking toward the Indo-Pacific

region amid changing great-power politics and examines both the principal
drivers shaping Indonesia’s strategic choices and the challenges facing
Indonesian diplomacy in the region.

main argument

The Indo-Pacific region, born out of the great powers’ efforts to forge new
strategic alignments and reset the balance of power in Asia, is headed for
a multi-tiered polarization that provides a challenging geostrategic context
for Indonesia in the coming years. The U.S. and China form the two poles
shaping the global and regional balance of power. Indonesia no longer
holds a positive view toward the U.S.-China relationship in the Indo-
Pacific region, and this gloomy view has prompted Jakarta to craft a foreign
policy that mirrors what some experts refer to as “dove state” behavior. As
a dove state, Indonesia has sought to balance its interests while navigating
the uncertainties of the great-power rivalry. However, the strength of
Indonesian diplomacy is likely to depend on the country’s ability to walk a
middle path as well as its ability to both keep ASEAN together and position
the grouping as a credible regional architecture.

policy implications

• Indonesia is a status-quo power and is likely to oppose any policy initiative
that amplifies the risk of great-power conflict or instability in the region.

• As a developing country, a populist democracy, and an emerging market,
Indonesia will respond proactively and positively to overtures that advance
the country’s economic development.

• Great-power bellicosity and a weakened ASEAN may push Indonesia to

be more insular and concentrate on partnerships that support Jakarta’s
development agenda.

shekhar • indonesia’s great-power management in the indo-pacific

T he Indo-Pacific region, born out of the great powers’ efforts to forge new
strategic alignments and reset the balance of power in Asia, has emerged
as the principal frame of reference for Asian geopolitics and the main arena
for great-power politics. The two-ocean regional canvas represents more
than 50% of the world’s population, 60% of global GDP, two-thirds of global
economic growth, 65% of Earth’s maritime space, and 25% of the world’s
land.1 The increasing geoeconomic importance of the Indo-Pacific region has
coincided with the growing traction of the Sino-U.S. rivalry, especially since
Donald Trump’s presidency began in 2017. The reincarnation of the Quad
in 2017 and the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) security
pact in 2021, in particular, attest to an intensifying U.S.-China rivalry and
deepening regional uncertainty.

Indonesia, as the leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the largest actor in Southeast Asia, is facing the heat emanating
from the region’s spiraling great-power rivalry. Indonesia’s high stakes in the
competition come from three key roles that the country has taken upon itself
for much of the 21st century. These roles involve securing domestic economic
gains and maintaining strategic autonomy, facilitating peace and stability in
the Indo-Pacific region, and ensuring the relevance of ASEAN as an important
regional cooperative architecture. Any undermining of these roles is likely to
mean an undercutting of Indonesia’s national interests and regional status.

Against the backdrop of changing geopolitical realities, this essay seeks to
analyze Indonesia’s approach and responses to the emerging Sino-U.S. great-

power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region. It makes three main arguments. First,
Indonesia no longer holds a positive view toward the U.S.-China great-power
relationship in the Indo-Pacific region. Jakarta believes that Sino-U.S.
relations have become more competitive, which has intensified rivalries and
accentuated an atmosphere of instability and uncertainty.

Second, Indonesia has responded to the great-power rivalry in four
specific ways: balancing its own interests while engaging the great powers,
calling upon all states to maintain the status quo, rejecting any alliance-led
or containment strategies, and reasserting the centrality of an ASEAN-led,
cooperative, and inclusivist architecture. Indonesia’s response to the
deteriorating nature of the great-power relationship mirrors what Randall
Schweller describes as “dove state” behavior.2

1 White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C., February 2022), 5 u
/>
2 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 84–87.

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Third, the biggest challenge to Indonesia’s ASEAN-led inclusivism comes
from a serious lack of unity within the grouping that is gradually chipping
away at the diplomatic space available to ASEAN and rendering the grouping
a less attractive forum to resolve regional issues. In other words, the strength
of Indonesian diplomacy is likely to depend on the country’s ability to walk a
middle path as well as its ability to both keep ASEAN together and position
the grouping as a credible regional architecture.

This essay is structured as follows:

u pp. 126–31 examine Indonesian views of U.S.-China relations and how
U.S.-China rivalry affects the Indo-Pacific.

u pp. 131–35 contextualize Indonesia’s behavior as that of a dove state and
look at the historical events that have shaped Indonesia’s attitudes toward
great powers.

u pp. 135–42 analyze Indonesia’s great-power management strategies
during the presidency of Joko Widodo as U.S.-China relations have
grown increasingly conflictual.

u pp. 142–48 address challenges for Indonesia in continuing this dove
state position, including obstacles in its relationships with China and
the United States, developing new thinking and planning to respond
to great-power rivalry, and maintaining ASEAN unity and centrality in
the region.

u pp. 148–49 offer a conclusion.

indonesia’s gloomy view toward
great-power relations in the indo-pacific

Indonesia no longer holds a positive outlook on great-power politics in
the region. Rising China’s assertive behavior and the United States’ balancing
response is increasingly framed in Indonesia as a rivalry. Jakarta believes that
major powers continue to “increase their spheres of influence in the region…
distrust hinder[s] the creation of a conducive environment.”3 As an official

from Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense stated, “There is an East Bloc and a West
Bloc, and we are in the middle.”4 Retno Marsudi, Indonesia’s foreign minister,
declared in 2018 that the country sought to steer clear of “cooperation that

3 Retno L. Marsudi, “2020 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Indonesia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), January 8, 2020 u /> thehague/en/news/4082/annual-press-statement-of-the-minister-for-foreign-affairs-of-the-
republic-of-indonesia-2020.

4 Cited in Jonah Blank, Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific Region:
Indonesia (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2021), 13.

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shekhar • indonesia’s great-power management in the indo-pacific

is based on suspicion or, worse, a perception of threat.”5 Indonesian experts
have referred to the current Sino-U.S. dynamic as a “great-power game…
returning,”6 a “great-power clash,”7 a “Thucydides trap scenario,”8 a “zero-sum
game,”9 and a “new cold war.”10

What Is Driving Indonesian Perceptions of Great-Power Relations?

This dim outlook toward the U.S.-China rivalry gained traction
during the Trump era. The early shockwaves of the rivalry were felt in the
controversial (both domestically and internationally) “America first” policy
that resulted in U.S. withdrawals from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
and the Paris Climate Accords. This policy soon paved the way for the tariff
war that intensified in early 2019, with the Trump administration raising
tariffs on various Chinese exports from 10% to 25% and China retaliating
by imposing new tariffs on U.S. exports and threatening to stop the

export of rare earth elements and critical minerals. The bilateral hostility
quickly spread to other sectors, including high-end technologies, and to
global supply chain matters, and the Trump administration “banned U.S.
companies from using foreign-made telecommunications equipment that
could threaten national security.”11

The rise of the Quad reinforced Indonesia’s concerns about U.S.-China
relations. The Quad (initially known as the “Australia-India-Japan-U.S.
Consultation”) has resurfaced as a new U.S.-led geopolitical anchor
for building a “free, open, and rules-based order” in an increasingly
uncertain region. After nearly a decade of dormancy, the group reconvened
with a meeting in Manila on November 11, 2017, on the sidelines of the
ASEAN Summit. The rivalrous nature of the initiative can be gauged from

5 Retno L. Marsudi, “2018 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Indonesia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), January 9, 2018, 14.

6 Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia, ASEAN and Shaping the Indo-Pacific Idea,” East Asia Forum, November 19,
2019 u />
7 Evan A. Laksmana, “Indonesia Unprepared as Great Powers Clash in Indo-Pacific,” Foreign Policy,
August 26, 2021 u />
8 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” International
Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020): 113.

9 Dino Patti Djalal, “Can Biden Keep the Peace in Southeast Asia?” Foreign Policy, May 30, 2021 u
/>
10 Endy Bayuni, “ASEAN Can Stop Indo-Pacific from Becoming U.S.-China ‘Theatre’: Jakarta Post
Columnist,” Straits Times, November 23, 2018 u /> asean-can-stop-indo-pacific-from-becoming-us-china-theater-jakarta-post-columnist.

11 Council on Foreign Relations, “Timeline: U.S. Relations with China, 1949–2021” u https://www.

cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china.

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various labels given to it—“Asian NATO”; “democratic security diamond”;
“soft, ‘values-based’ containment of China”; “constellation of democracies”;
and a “great game in Asia.”12 China, notably. has termed the Quad as “sea
foam,” “group politics,” and “selective multilateralism.”13 Though Indonesia
has not taken an official position, Minister Marsudi cautioned in 2018 against
using the Quad as “a containment strategy.”14

The U.S.-China rivalry has only continued under the Biden administration
as the United States has sought to develop a more robust response to balance
China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region.15 Since coming to power,
the Biden administration has taken it upon itself to regularize and functionalize
the Quad.16 The latest U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy identified China’s “harmful
behavior” as an important challenge to regional peace and stability, noting
that China is “combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological
might” to build “a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific” and “become the
world’s most influential power” through coercion and aggression.17 Calling
China “one of the most urgent military threats,” U.S. secretary of state Antony
Blinken declared at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on March 24, 2021,
that Beijing was taking steps “to threaten freedom of navigation, to militarize
the South China Sea, to target countries throughout the Indo-Pacific with
increasingly sophisticated military capabilities.”18 Recently, Chinese and
U.S. leaders have publicly sparred twice over contentious issues—during the

12 Carry Huang, “U.S. Japan, India, Australia...Is Quad the First Step to an Asian NATO?”

South China Morning Post, November 25, 2017 u /> article/2121474/us-japan-india-australia-quad-first-step-asian-nato; Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s
Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012 u ject-
syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe; Peter Drysdale,
“China and India and the Transition of Regional Power,” East Asia Forum, January 17, 2011 u
/> power-2; and Brahma Chellaney, “Abe Propels a Potential Constellation of Democracies,” Japan
Times, November 16, 2017 u /> world-commentary/abe-propels-potential-constellation-democracies.

13 Yang Sheng, “Chinese FM Defines Multilateralism as Biden Admin Claims ‘America Is Back,’ ”
Global Times, March 7, 2021 u />
14 Renato Marsudi, “The Global Disorder: An Indonesian Perspective” (speech to 25th Pacific
Economic Cooperation Council General Meeting, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies Indonesia, Jakarta, May 7, 2018), available on YouTube at /> watch?v=EVTl7-hoGqw.

15 Felix Thompson, “Biden’s Long-Awaited China Policy ‘No Dramatic Shift’ from Trump Era,” Global
Trade Review, June 10, 2021 u /> policy-no-dramatic-shift-from-trump-era.

16 “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad,’ ” White House, March 12, 2021 u https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-
the-spirit-of-the-quad.

17 White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 5.
18 Antony J. Blinken, “Reaffirming and Reimagining America’s Alliances,” U.S. Department of State,

March 24, 2021 u />
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bilateral meeting in Alaska in March 2021 and at the Shangri-La Dialogue in
June 2022.19

The rise of AUKUS—what Biden has called “enhanced trilateral security
cooperation” with “two of America’s closest allies”20—has also reinforced the
narrative of the U.S.-China rivalry.21 AUKUS is not merely an arrangement for
the sale of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with conventional weapons
to Australia in ten years; it is also optics for the United States’ hard-balancing
toward the China threat in the Indo-Pacific region. One can infer from the
AUKUS statement that it represents the United States’ most trusted alliance
partnerships and is likely to form the bulwark of the country’s Indo-Pacific
posturing in the medium term. Commenting on AUKUS, the Indonesian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that it was “deeply concerned over the
continuing arms race and power projection in the region.”22

The emerging but somewhat tenuous bipartisan consensus within the
United States over China underscores that the Sino-U.S. great-power rivalry
is likely to grow new fangs in the coming years as the United States seeks to
gain more strategic constituencies and consolidate its position vis-à-vis China
in the Indo-Pacific.

The “Thucydides Trap”

Indonesian pessimism has also manifested in the form of increasing
references to and discussions about the “Thucydides trap.”23 The principle
of the Thucydides trap argues that “when a rising power [China] threatens

19 The issues specifically mentioned in Alaska were Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, cyberattacks on
the United States, and economic coercion toward U.S. allies. See “Secretary Antony J. Blinken,
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Director Yang and State Councilor Wang at the Top
of Their Meeting,” U.S. Department of State, Press Release, March 18, 2021; and Benjamin
Ho, “Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 and the Future of Asia,” S. Rajaratnam School of International

Studies, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, IDSS Paper, no. 33, 2022 u s.
edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/IP22033-Ho-masthead-final.pdf.

20 “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson
of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS,” White House, September 15, 2021.

21 William Chung and Sharon Seah, “Why AUKUS Alarms ASEAN,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2021
u and Xu Liping, “AUKUS
Undermines ASEAN Centrality with Nuclear Subs, Terrifies Region,” Global Times, September 21,
2021 u />
22 “Statement on Australia’s Nuclear-Powered Submarines Program,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Indonesia), September 17, 2021 u /> statement-on-australias-nuclear-powered-submarines-program.

23 Dahnil Anzar Simanjuntak, “AS, Cina, dan perangkap Thucydides” [United States, China, and the
Thucydides Trap], Republika, June 13, 2020 u /> perangkap-thucydides; and Jusuf Wanandi, “Insight: The Future of China-U.S. Relations,” Jakarta
Post, August 10, 2020 u /> of-china-us-relations.html.

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to displace a ruling power [the United States], standard crises that would
otherwise be contained…can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn,
produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.”24
The doctrine builds on the assumption of the near inevitability of a violent
power transition and the zero-sum nature of the great-power politics. In his
welcome speech at a United States–Indonesia Society event in September
2020, Indonesia’s ambassador to the United States, Muhammad Lutfi, claimed
that the United States was following a Thucydides trap trajectory.25 Similarly,
Ahmad Basrah, the vice chair of the Indonesian People’s Consultative

Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), argued that the United States
and China should find solutions to create stability so that the world can avoid
the Thucydides trap.26

Indonesian discussion of the trap revolves around two relatively
simplistic perceptions of the power transition doctrine. The first is that China
is rising and winning, while the United States is declining, as epitomized by
Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani’s provocative book title Has China
Won?27 To quote Marty Natalegawa, a former foreign minister, “There seems
to be a dominant perception or narrative of a rising China and declining
United States. As a corollary, the former is deemed set to challenge the existing
‘order,’ while the latter keen to ensure its preservation.”28 According to a 2019
report by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 73.9% of Indonesians surveyed
believed that U.S. power and influence had declined during the Trump era.29
Although views of the United States’ economic and strategic influence have
gained ground among Indonesians surveyed in recent years (8.4% and 35.1%,
respectively, in 2022) and views of China as the top power have slightly

24 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” Atlantic,
September 24, 2015 u /> united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756.

25 “USINDO Hosted a Highly Successful Virtual Welcome Event for Indonesia’s New Ambassador
to the United States, H.E. Muhammad Lutfi—September 22,” United States–Indonesia Society,
September 22, 2020 u /> in-honor-of-h-e-ambassador-lutfi-september-22.

26 Mutia Yuantisya, “Jerman kirim bantuan kapal perang ke Laut China Selatan, Ahmad Basarah:
Indonesia dapat memanfaatkan situasi” [Germany Sends Warship to the South China Sea, Ahmad
Basarah: Indonesia Can Take Advantage of the Situation], Pikiran rakyat, August 5, 2021 u https://
www.pikiran-rakyat.com/internasional/pr-012341298/jerman-kirim-bantuan-kapal-perang-ke-
laut-china-selatan-ahmad-basarah-indonesia-dapat-memanfaatkan-situasi.

27 Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Supremacy (New York:
Public Affairs, 2020).

28 Marty Natalegawa, Does ASEAN Matter? A View from Within (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak
Institute, 2018), 140.

29 Tang Siew Mun et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report,” ISEAS–Yusof Ishak
Institute, January 2019, 15.

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slipped, Indonesian respondents still rank China the most influential power
in both categories among all the states and organizations considered (67.9%
and 38.2%, respectively, in 2022).30

The second perception is that to maintain its preeminence in the region,
a challenged United States is engaging in rivalrous behavior vis-à-vis China.
Experts and officials in Jakarta began to see the Trump administration’s
foreign policy approach from the prism of an insecure and reactive great
power that was willing to maintain its primacy at the cost of regional peace
and stability. Indonesian confidence in the U.S. president declined steeply
after Trump came to power, though it remained higher than during the
George W. Bush administration.31

However, Indonesian views remain divided on the extent of the Sino-U.S.
rivalry. Some observers believe that the Thucydides trap is affecting all aspects
of Sino-U.S. relations, while others relate it to specific aspects. For example,

Jusuf Wanandi, former government adviser and co-founder of the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia, stated that “all the pillars
supporting sound U.S.-China relations—security, economic development
and culture—are being wrecked by both sides,” and appears to attribute the
current sharpness in the Sino-U.S. rivalry to the America-first policy of the
Trump era.32 By contrast, Dewi Anwar, a noted Indonesian scholar and former
adviser to the Indonesian vice president, has placed the rivalry in the context
of China’s Belt and Road Initiative versus the U.S.-led Quad.33 In this context,
the Sino-U.S. great-power rivalry appears systemic.

indonesia as a dove state

Framing Dove State Behavior

Indonesia has responded to the evolving U.S.-China rivalry by positioning
itself as a status-quo power and pursuing a policy that can be likened to the
dove state in Randall Schweller’s depiction of the pecking order between
status-quo and revisionist states. There are five qualities of dove states that
Indonesia has exhibited in its strategies for great-power management.

30 Sharon Seah et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report,” ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute,
February 2022, 22–23.

31 Richard Wike et al., “Trump Ratings Remain Low around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly
Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 2020, 15 u /> content/uploads/sites/2/2020/01/PG_2020.01.08_US-Image_FINAL.pdf.

32 Wanandi, “Insight: The Future of China-U.S. Relations.”
33 Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 113.

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First, dove states are status-quo states that aim to “maintain the peace
without sacrificing the essential characteristics of the status-quo order.” This
logic is visible in Indonesia’s emphasis on supporting the existing regional
order and a stable balance of power between the United States and China.

Second, dove states subscribe to the “spiral model” of reasons for war.
The spiral model of war implies that attempts of balancing, containment,
or military buildup escalate tensions, whereas concessions, reassurance, or
avoidance of provocations eases them.34 This logic explains concerns that
Indonesia has raised against some aspects of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy
(especially during the Trump administration). Indonesian opposition to
alliance formation, containment strategies, and provocation can be situated
against the actions of the dissatisfied powers in this context.

Third, a dove state, while pursuing its interests, follows the policy of
engagement with both the reigning champion (status-quo power) and the
challenger (revisionist power). This argument can be extended further to
argue that a dove state would like to engage all of the major powers as it
seeks to concentrate on peace and conflict avoidance. Fourth, a dove state
also engages in multilateral binding, whereby it expects great powers to
commit to the multilateral processes prevalent in the region. This argument
can be used to explain Indonesia’s emphasis on ASEAN’s regional leadership
and centrality.

Finally, dove states accept limited and “peaceful revision of the status
quo.” In doing so, they essentially aim at “appeasing the ‘legitimate’ (in their
eyes) grievances of the dissatisfied powers.”35 The appeasement argument can

be related to Indonesia’s accommodation of Chinese assertive behavior in the
region even though China and Indonesia share a disputed maritime space in
the South China Sea.

The Historical Context of Indonesia’s Experience with Great-Power
Politics

Indonesia’s dove state behavior is a cumulative expression of three distinct
sets of experiences with great-power politics—great-power conflict, great-power
meddling in Indonesian domestic affairs, and stable and peaceful great-power
relations. The first two experiences dominated Indonesia’s engagements during
the Cold War, and the last trend has shaped Indonesia’s perception toward

34 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2017), 84.

35 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 87.

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great-power politics for the first fifteen years of the 21st century in the pre-
Widodo era. The first two trends made Indonesia distrustful of great powers’
intentions and concentrate on the pursuit of national interests while avoiding
alignment or external intervention in domestic or regional affairs. The third
trend pushed Indonesia toward deeper engagement, as Jakarta realized that
the country could benefit from stable great-power relations and the peaceful
involvement of great powers in the region.

Soon after declaring independence in 1945, Indonesia found itself facing
what former prime minister Mohammad Natsir termed “a very dangerous
situation” marked by “a conflict of ideology and policy” that “could develop
any moment into a war at the frontier of the sphere of influence of the two
power blocs.”36 Indonesia had inherited a poor economy and needed resources
and international aid to embark on the process of postcolonial state-building
and economic development. Postcolonial Indonesia was underdeveloped, still
engaged in military confrontation with the Dutch, and faced religious and
ideological tensions within the country. It needed international support at the
United Nations over the West Irian issue, and aligning with any one power
would have limited the scope of international support. In other words, the
country could not afford enmity and needed international economic support
for growth and development.37

Following the logic that security and prosperity were contingent on
regional peace and stability, Indonesia’s leaders laid out two philosophical
foundations of the country’s postcolonial foreign policy: (1) free and active
(bebas dan aktif) and (2) “rowing between the two reefs.” The first principle
aimed at ensuring the country’s own agency in shaping its foreign policy,
and the second sought to minimize the negative impact of Cold War politics.
Together, they meant no alignment, no neutrality, no third bloc, and no
playing favorites.38

Indonesia’s subsequent experience with great-power politics reinforced
this independent and unaligned foreign policy. As the Communist
movement gained momentum in Indonesia, the United States grew distant
and distrustful of Indonesia as led by Sukarno, especially when John Foster
Dulles served as the secretary of state. Bringing the Cold War tension closer
to Southeast Asia, the United States forged the Manila Pact, or SEATO (the

36 Cited in Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945–65 (The
Hague: De Gruyter Mouton, 1973), 179.

37 For the discussion on Indonesia’s dependence dilemma, see Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign
Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2007).

38 Mohammad Hatta, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, April 1953, 443.

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Southeast East Asia Treaty Organization), in 1954. Indonesia opposed the
formation of the military pact and rallied around the idea of nonalignment,
which took a definitive shape in the form of the Non-Aligned Movement at
the 1955 international conference of newly independent African and Asian
states in Bandung.39

Indonesia’s troubled experience with great-power politics did not
end there; in fact, such politics came to dominate not only the region but
also Indonesia’s own domestic space. Both the United States and China
undertook subversive activities in Indonesia during the Cold War era. While
Indonesia failed to receive adequate military support from the United States
in its military campaigns against the Dutch, it also faced domestic rebellions
armed with U.S. weapons, which the United States supplied clandestinely to
the rebels in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The CIA launched covert operations in
Indonesia during the 1950s with the hope that they would be able to oust
the pro-Communist Sukarno presidency.40 Communist China, during the
1950s and 1960s, provided financial and political support to the Indonesian
Communist Party and demanded financial contributions from ethnic

Chinese Indonesians to support the Communist movement in Indonesia and
elsewhere in the region.41 Chinese meddling culminated in a failed coup by
Communist leaders in 1965 that led to a complete freeze in China-Indonesia
diplomatic relations for over two decades. Indonesia’s national sentiments
largely remain anti-Communist even today.

In contrast to the Cold War bitterness and suspicion toward the great
powers, in the first fifteen years of the 21st century Indonesia experienced the
more positive influence of great-power politics on regional geopolitics and
its own strategic calculus, which pushed it to build robust engagement with
China and the United States. During this time, Indonesia signed strategic
partnerships with most major powers, including Russia (2003), China
(2005), India (2005), Japan (2006), and the United States (2010). Democratic
Indonesia pushed for more involvement of the great powers in the ASEAN
processes, leading to the expansion of the ASEAN+ dialogue partnerships; the

39 It should be noted that for Indonesian leaders nonalignment was never a third front against either
power bloc.

40 Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and
Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: New Press, 1995); Jaechun Kim, “U.S. Covert Action in
Indonesia in the 1960s: Assessing the Motives and Consequences,” Journal of International and
Area Studies 9, no. 2 (2002): 63–85; and Jim Mann, “CIA’s Covert Indonesia Operation in the 1950s
Acknowledged by U.S.: Cold War: State Department Publishes Unprecedented 600-Page History
Documenting Anti-Communist Program,” Los Angeles Times, October 29, 1994.

41 Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy, 410; and Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia-China
Relations: The Politics of Reengagement,” Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (2009): 592–93.

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formation of the East Asia Summit and its expansion to admit China, Russia,
and the United States; and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus
(ADMM-Plus). Celebrating Indonesia’s honeymoon with great-power
politics, then president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono endorsed the idea of “a
million friends, zero enemies,” and Indonesian minister for foreign affairs
Marty Natalegawa called for a “dynamic equilibrium” in engagement with
the great powers.42 Natalegawa termed this period as a “peace dividend”
due to a “ ‘condominium’ arrangement for the region, involving common
understanding and mutual respect of their particular core interests in the
region.”43 Dewi Anwar has referred to this period as “the long period of peace,
stability and prosperity.”44 Rizal Sukma, a former Indonesian ambassador,
views this era of peace as a “short-lived unipolar moment,” when the United
States exercised preeminence in the region.45

indonesia’s dove state behavior during the widodo era

President Joko Widodo’s Indonesia—from late 2014 to the present—stands
at the intersection of all three sets of past experiences with great-power
politics: the intensification of great-power rivalry, involvement in domestic
and regional affairs, and the need for great-power support in national
development. There is general recognition among the Indonesian leadership
that it has benefited from the existing U.S.-led global liberal order and that
the continuation of this order is in the best interest of Indonesia’s economic
rise and regional leadership. Similarly, the ASEAN-led regional architecture
has provided Indonesia an important avenue for projecting this leadership.
Any systemic upheaval or escalation of the U.S.-China rivalry is likely to
undermine regional peace and stability, challenge ASEAN’s role, and limit

Indonesia’s economic rise. As Natalegawa noted in 2013, “stability and security
are a prerequisite for economic development. That is why…Indonesia’s
foreign policy never ceased to exert its utmost to maintain regional stability
and security in the face of all challenges.”46

42 Natalegawa, Does ASEAN Matter? 140.
43 Ibid., 42.
44 Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 113.
45 Sukma, “Indonesia, ASEAN and Shaping the Indo-Pacific Idea.”
46 Marty Natalegawa, “2013 Annual Press Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the

Republic of Indonesia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), January 4, 2013, 3.

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Motivated by these considerations and building on past experiences,
Widodo’s Indonesia has put forth an ASEAN-led approach to great-power
management that is status-quo-focused, risk-averse, interest-driven,
accommodative, and time-tested. As discussed below, Jakarta has
concentrated on strengthening engagements, eschewing alliances, avoiding
escalation, pursuing autonomy, and recentering ASEAN in its regional and
great-power engagements.

Engagement with All, but on Jakarta’s Terms

A recent exposition of the robust engagement with all came from Foreign
Minister Marsudi in September 2020. She declared, “ASEAN, Indonesia,
wants to show to all that we are ready to be a partner…We don’t want to

get trapped by this rivalry.”47 Indonesian equilateralism can be identified in
in three principal areas—strategic partnerships, economic engagement, and
weapons procurement and defense diplomacy.

Indonesia elevated its strategic partnership with China to a comprehensive
strategic partnership in 2015 and its comprehensive partnership with the
United States to a strategic partnership in October 2015 during Widodo’s
visit to the United States. These partnerships entail prioritized, organized,
and detailed agendas of bilateral engagements. For example, a joint
statement between the two states and the U.S.-Indonesia Memorandum of
Understanding on Maritime Cooperation from October 2015 have provided
a broader roadmap to bilateral maritime cooperation.48 Indonesia also has a
maritime partnership with China.

Driven by the logic of development, Indonesia has tried to build strong
economic relations with the major economies. Its four top trading partners
are China, India, Japan, and the United States, which are also the four largest
state economies in the world in terms of purchasing power parity. Indonesia
has additionally sought greater market access, foreign investment in the
infrastructure sector, and technologies from major economic players. As an
ASEAN member, Indonesia has signed free trade agreements with Australia,
China, India, Japan, and South Korea. In addition, Indonesia is a part of the
ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that

47 Tom Allard and Stanley Widianto, “Indonesia to U.S., China: Don’t Trap Us in Your Rivalry,” Reuters,
September 8, 2020 u /> indonesia-to-u-s-china-dont-trap-us-in-your-rivalry-idUSKBN25Z1ZD.

48 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Indonesia, “Fact Sheet: Indonesia-U.S. Maritime Cooperation”
u /> indonesia-maritime-cooperation.

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involves the major Asian economies except India. Indonesia is also one of the
founding partners of the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)
and had expressed interest in joining the TPP when the United States was still
a part of that grouping.

Indonesia has likewise pursued equilateralism in its weapons procurement
and defense diplomacy. It has bought fighter planes from France and Russia;
submarines from the United States; submarines and warships from Germany,
Russia, South Korea, and the Netherlands; and missiles from China, France,
Russia, the United States, and the UK. In doing so, Indonesia has not only
diversified its defense supplies but also avoided dependency on any one
supplier. As a part of its defense diplomacy, Jakarta either has conducted or
is planning to hold military exercises with Australia, China, India, Japan,
Russia, and the United States.49 Although Indonesia has not conducted a
bilateral military exercise with China since 2012, China has participated in
the multilateral naval exercise Komodo that Indonesia hosted in 2014, 2016,
and 2018.50

Nevertheless, one should not confuse Indonesia’s equilateral engagement
policy with the country’s actual level of cooperation with China and the United
States. Indonesia’s engagement with major powers also depends on what those
major powers can offer and what Jakarta is looking to buy. In the face of strong
domestic opposition to any trade concessions or free trade negotiations in the
United States, China has emerged as Indonesia’s dominant economic partner.
This partnership has, in general, outpaced that of Indonesia and the United
States in a large number of economic and tech-related areas, such as trade,

investment, infrastructure, 5G technologies, and even Covid-19 vaccines.51
For example, Indonesia and China signed five contracts for infrastructure
development in Indonesia worth $23 billion in 2018 alone.52 China has
been able to win over key political figures in Indonesia, such as Minister of
Maritime Affairs Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, who has reportedly acted as a key

49 Frega Wenas Inkiriwang, “Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo: Enhancing Indonesia’s Multilateral
Defence Diplomacy?” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 40, no. 3 (2021): 420–21.

50 Ibid.
51 Derek Grossman, “Indonesia Is Quietly Warming Up to China,” Foreign Policy, June 7, 2021 u https://

foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/07/indonesia-china-jokowi-natuna-sea-military-bri-cooperation-biden-
united-states.
52 “Indonesia, China Sign US$23.3 Billion Cooperation Contracts under Belt and Road,” Antara
News, April 14, 2018 u /> billion-cooperation-contracts-under-belt-and-road.

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enabler in Indonesia’s economic ties with China.53 As a part of the Belt and
Road Initiative, Indonesia proposed 28 projects worth $91.1 billion to Chinese
investors in 2019.54 And according to the 2022 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak survey,
68% of Indonesians now view China as the dominant economic power, as
opposed to 8% who view the United States as the dominant economic power.55
As one Indonesian government official states, “The U.S. uses sanctions and
muscle too much…China is smart. It always uses the soft-power approach,
the economic approach, the development approach.”56 However, there does
seem to be an interest in achieving more economic balance between the

partners: while 60% of Indonesians surveyed in 2022 expressed concerns
over China’s growing economic influence, 55% welcomed the United States’
growing economic presence.57

On the other hand, the U.S.-Indonesia partnership has expanded in the
areas of maritime security, military training, clean energy, cybersecurity, and
defense purchases.58 In February 2022, the U.S. Department of State approved
a potential sale of 36 F-15ID aircraft and related equipment worth $14 billion
to Indonesia that will “provide increased deterrence and air defense coverage
across a very complex air and maritime domain.”59 Indonesia has already
signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
and the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of
Agreement (CISMOA) that provide the foundation for “enhanced partnership,
information sharing, and defense cooperation between the United States
and Indonesia.”60 Indonesia and the United States conducted their biggest
military exercise, Super Garuda Shield, in August 2022, which involved more

53 Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, “Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan: The Prominent Enabler behind
China-Indonesia Relations,” Global Policy, July 24, 2020 u /> blog/24/07/2020/luhut-binsar-pandjaitan-prominent-enabler-behind-china-indonesia-relations.

54 “Indonesia to Propose Projects Worth US$91 Billion for China’s Belt and Road,” Straits Times,
March 20, 2019 u /> us91-bilion-for-chinas-belt-and-road.

55 Seah et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report,” 15.
56 Tom Allard, “Vaccines, Not Spy Planes: U.S. Misfires in Southeast Asia,” Reuters, October

27, 2020 u /> vaccines-not-spy-planes-u-s-misfires-in-southeast-asia-idUSKBN27C19Z.
57 Seah et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report,” 21.
58 Ade Irma Junida/Suharto, “Indonesia, U.S. Discuss Clean Energy Cooperation, Climate Change,”
Antara News, February 26, 2021 u /> clean-energy-cooperation-climate-change; and U.S. Department of State, “The United States–Indonesia

Relationship,” December 12, 2021 u />59 “Indonesia—F-15ID Aircraft,” U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, Press Release, February 10, 2022 u /> indonesia-f-15id-aircraft.
60 “U.S. Security Cooperation with Indonesia,” U.S. Department of State, March 23, 2021 u https://
www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-indonesia.

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than four thousand troops and brought in twelve other countries to exercise
with them. According to the 2022 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak report, nearly 40% of
Indonesians surveyed trusted the United States as a reliable strategic partner
and security provider, opposed to 29% of Indonesians who believed China
would “do the right thing to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity,
and governance.”61 On the question of picking sides, if forced, 56% of
Indonesians preferred the United States, opposed to 44% who chose China.62

Strategic Autonomy and Alliance Avoidance

Amid increasing tension between the United States and China, Indonesia
has reiterated its long-standing principle of strategic autonomy as a path
forward. Though autonomy may mean different things in practice to different
people, two components have stood out—no alliances and maintaining
independence. Indonesia has always followed the first principle and sought
to obtain the second, albeit unsuccessfully on various occasions. Strategic
autonomy, enshrined in the principle of bebas dan aktif, remains the
cornerstone and driving force of independent Indonesia’s foreign policy.

An important expression of this principle is not to be a part of any alliance
or exhibit behavior that others may construe as taking a side. Indonesia rejected

the claim made by the U.S. Department of Defense in its 2020 report that China
has likely considered Indonesia as a potential location for Chinese military
logistics facilities.63 Marsudi declared, “Indonesian territory cannot and will not
be used as a military facility base for any country.”64 Similarly, Indonesia turned
down a U.S. proposal to permit U.S. P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft
to land and refuel in Indonesia.65 Jakarta has not made any overture toward
building alliances with the United States against Chinese assertiveness in the

61 Seah et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report,” 39.
62 Ibid., 32.
63 The U.S. Department of Defense report states: “The PRC has likely considered Myanmar,

Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, UAE, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola,
and Tajikistan as locations for PLA military logistics facilities.” See U.S. Department of Defense,
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2020: Annual Report to
Congress (Washington, D.C., 2020), 129 u /> 1/1/2020-dod-china-military-power-report-final.pdf.
64 Budi Sutrisno, “ ‘Indonesia Won’t Be Military Base for Any Country’, Retno Says, Dismissing
Pentagon Report,” Jakarta Post, September 4, 2020 u /> news/2020/09/04/indonesia-wont-be-military-base-for-any-country-retno-says-dismissing-
pentagon-report.html.
65 Sebastian Strangio, “Indonesia Rebuffs U.S. Request to Host Spy Planes: Report,” Diplomat, October
20, 2020 u />
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South China Sea even though it has experienced a sustained escalation in the
level of altercations with China in the Natuna Sea.

As the 2022 G-20 chair, Indonesia has also sought to walk an autonomous
path. It voted in favor of the UN resolution to condemn Russia’s attack on

Ukraine but abstained during voting to suspend Russia from the UN Human
Rights Council. Indonesia has invited both Russia and Ukraine to the G-20
summit meeting to be held in November 2022. Such behavior can be attributed
to the goal of staying engaged with all of the major powers, asserting Indonesian
agency in steering the G-20, and avoiding being dragged into great-power
conflict. In a bid to play both sides and mediate the dispute, Widodo visited
both Russia and Ukraine and sought a Russian security guarantee for the supply
of Ukrainian grain, while the first lady visited a Ukrainian hospital.66 However,
it is not clear if these optics will have any meaningful impact on the Indonesian
president’s hope for a successful G-20 summit.

Indonesia’s ASEAN-Led Inclusivism

Concerned by the inflammation of the U.S.-China rivalry during the
Trump era and fearing being sidelined by a resurrected Quad, Indonesia
launched its own ASEAN-centric Indo-Pacific strategy. Widodo, while
attending the ASEAN summit retreat in Singapore in April 2018, proposed
a new Indo-Pacific cooperation strategy with ASEAN as the key instrument
and fulcrum. This pronouncement followed the earlier announcement made
by Foreign Minister Marsudi in January 2018 that Indonesia would build “an
ecosystem of peace, stability, prosperity” in the Indo-Pacific region.67 After
deliberations, ASEAN adopted Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific cooperation strategy
in 2019 as the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”68 Since then, Indonesia
has also referred to this document as its strategy.

Indonesia viewed the U.S.-led “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy
as noninclusive and posited ASEAN’s outlook as an inclusivist approach.
China, notably, is not a member of either the Quad or IPEF. Jakarta argues
that not only should pan-Indo-Pacific architecture be free and open, it
should also be (1) inclusive, transparent, and comprehensive, (2) beneficial

for the long-term interests of all countries in the region, and (3) based on a

66 Aisyah Llewellyn, “Widodo’s Russia-Ukraine Trip Divides Critics in Indonesia,” Al Jazeera, July 5,
2022 u /> divides-critics-at-home.

67 Marsudi, “2018 Annual Press Statement,” 2.
68 ASEAN, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” June 23, 2019 u />
asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific.

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joint commitment by the Indo-Pacific countries to uphold peace, stability,
and prosperity.69 Dewi Anwar has argued that ASEAN inclusivism aims
at “promoting confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy and
cooperative security, and focusing on the development of friendship rather
than the identification of enemies.”70

In addition to the polarizing effect of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, the fear
of ASEAN (and Indonesia itself) being marginalized by the resurgent Quad
pushed Indonesia toward developing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
and reasserting ASEAN centrality. Marsudi’s January 2018 pronouncement
about building an ecosystem in the region came immediately after the revival
of the Quad in November 2017. The principle of ASEAN centrality implies
that “ASEAN, which unites an increasingly cohesive group of nations, should
take charge of affairs in the region.”71 Worries that the Quad could adversely
affect ASEAN centrality were reflected in surveys of Indonesian respondents
conducted by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the ISEAS–Yusof
Ishak Institute.72

Indonesia’s own domestic debate over the rationale for ASEAN centrality
has shown divergent opinions. Rizal Sukma identifies ASEAN centrality as a
core interest of ASEAN that must be “preserved, enhanced and reinforced”
since the grouping “can no longer sit and watch extra-regional powers
actively shape the future of the region,”73 albeit it is not clear if he is referring
to ASEAN centrality in Southeast Asia or in the Indo-Pacific region broadly
where the United States and China are not extraregional powers. On the
other hand, some Indonesian experts believe that Indonesian advocacy of
the idea of ASEAN centrality amid Chinese assertiveness is essentially a
“passing the buck from behind” strategy since Indonesia cannot challenge
China militarily.74 Extending the buck-passing argument further, it has

69 Vibhanshu Shekhar, “Is Indonesia’s ‘Indo-Pacific Cooperation’ Strategy a Weak Play?”
Pacific Forum, PacNet Newsletter, no. 47, July 17, 2018 u /> uploads/2018/12/180717_PacNet_47.pdf.

70 Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 113.
71 Djalal, “Can Biden Keep the Peace in Southeast Asia?”
72 Huong Le Thu, “How Southeast Asians Really Perceive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” Asia

Maritime Transparency Initiative, November 12, 2018 u /> asians-really-perceive-quad; and Tang Siew Mun et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey
Report,” ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, January 2020, 33.
73 Aditya Eko Sigit Wicaksono, “ASEAN Centrality Essential for Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific,”
Antara News, May 31, 2018 u /> for-peaceful-prosperous-indo-pacific; and Sukma, “Indonesia, ASEAN and Shaping the Indo-
Pacific Idea.”
74 Evan A. Laksmana, “Whose Centrality? ASEAN and the Quad in the Indo-Pacific,” Journal of Indo-
Pacific Affairs 3, no. 5 (2020): 108–9.

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also been argued that ASEAN centrality is a strategy for maintaining the
status quo. “ASEAN is well known for its indecisiveness and inefficiency,”
and therefore Indonesian advocacy for ASEAN centrality is “tantamount to
doing nothing.”75

The Widodo administration has not always pursued ASEAN-led
inclusivism with the same vigor. In fact, one can identify two distinct trends—
disinterest and active interest—during the last seven years of Indonesia’s
approach toward ASEAN. The first three years (2014–17) saw an unwillingness
of the country’s top leadership to fully commit to the ASEAN process.76
Widodo did not take much interest in ASEAN and expressed an unwillingness
to participate in the meetings, also reducing Indonesia’s budget for ASEAN
affairs.77 On the other hand, he showed greater interest in supra-ASEAN
multilateralism, such as the East Asia Summit, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and a pan-Afro-Asian
Non-Aligned Movement.

In fact, one can make a case for Widodo’s continued disinterest toward
foreign policy.78 While his disinterest may have given greater bandwidth to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu) in devising an appropriate response to
great-power rivalry, this could also mean a lack of coordination between the
top office and the foreign policy establishment. As a result, Indonesia’s active
interest and leadership in ASEAN has come from Kemlu, whose operations
seem to follow a by-the-book approach. Emphasis on ASEAN leadership, the
quest for autonomy, and avoidance of alliances are essentially time-tested,
risk-averse, and textbook approaches for Indonesia that are less likely to yield
negative surprises or deviate from the existing paths of diplomacy.

challenges facing indonesia’s dove state behavior

Indonesia’s dove state behavior faces various challenges that may affect
the country’s ability to position itself strongly amid the U.S.-China rivalry
and benefit optimally from the advantages that this power dynamic may

75 Yohanes Sulaiman, “Whither Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy?” Asie Vision, no. 105 (January
2019): 8.

76 Avery Poole, “Is Jokowi Turning His Back on ASEAN?” Indonesia at Melbourne, University
of Melbourne, September 1, 2015 u /> is-jokowi-turning-his-back-on-asean.

77 Shekhar, “Is Indonesia’s ‘Indo-Pacific Cooperation’ Strategy a Weak Play?”
78 For the lack of coordination between Kemlu and the president’s office, see Evan A. Laksmana,

“Stuck in Second Gear: Indonesia’s Strategic Dilemma in the Indo-Pacific,” ISEAS–Yusof Ishak
Institute, ISEAS Perspective, no. 170, December 28, 2021, 5–7.

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