Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 2 P24 pptx

C-SPAN is increasingly used in school
classrooms as a teaching tool. The network
offers the program “C-SPAN in the Classroom,”
which includes free membership and resourc es
to educators who use the network’s resources in
the classroom. For classrooms that do not have
cable access, C-SPAN offers videotapes and
Web access so students can view the content.
The network also offers a Teacher Fellowship
Program through the C-SPAN Education Foun-
dation to honor educat ors who have demon-
strated creative use of the programming in the
classroom.
FURTHER READINGS
C-SPAN Timeline: Cameras in the Court. Available online
at l (accessed June 11,
2009).
Frantzich, Stephen E., and John Sullivan. 1996. The C-SPAN
Revolution. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press.
Frantzich, Stephen E., 2008. Founding Father: How
C-SPAN’s Brian Lamb Changed Politics in America.
Rowman & Littlefield.
CROSS REFERENCE
Broadcasting.
CABINET
A counsel or group of advisers to a king or other
chief executive of a government. The group of
executive department heads who advise the presi-
dent of the United States.
The president’s cabinet was created by
custom and tradition (it is not specifically

mentioned in the Constitution) and was first
assembled by
GEORGE WASHINGTON. The modern
cabinet is composed of the heads of each of
the fifteen executive departments of the
government:
n
the Secretary of State
n
the Secretary of the Treasury
n
the Secretary of Defense
n
the Attorney General
n
the Secretary of the Interior
n
the Secretary of Agriculture
n
the Secretary of Commerce
n
the Secretary of Labor
n
the Secretary of Health and Human Services
n
the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development
n
the Secretary of Transportation
n

the Secretary of Energy
n
the Secretary of Education
n
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs
n
the Secretary of Homeland Security
In addition to these, other officials have
been granted cabinet status, including the U.S.
ambassador to the
UNITED NATIONS and the
director of the Office of Management and the
Budget.
CROSS REFERENCE
Executive Branch.
CABLE TELEVISION
The cable television industry exploded from
modest beginnings in the 1950s into a service
that by 2003 reached 69 percent of all U.S.
households that had television. Cable was
initially a response to a need for improved
transmission in areas where signals were weak
or nonexistent. By the 1960s consumers began
to demand not only better reception but also
more signals. This demand fueled the exponen-
tial growth of the industry. In 2003 almost
10,000 cable systems provided services to
73 million household subscribers in the United
States. The industry has faced many legal issues,
including programming and rate regulation, lack

of competition, and customer service complaints.
In addition, deregulation of the industry in the
late 1990s has led to the consolidation of major
cable companies.
The most contentious issue in cable televi-
sion arises from
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COM-
MISSION
(FCC) regulations that require cable
operators to allot up to one-third of their
channels to local broadcast stations. Known as
must-carry rules, these were first enacted in the
1960s in an effort to protect the interests of local
broadcasters. In 1985 and 1987, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that must-carry rules, as promulgated at
the time, violated the
FIRST AMENDMENT (Quincy
Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 [1985], cert .
denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S. Ct. 2889, 90 L. Ed.
2d 977 [1986]; Century Communications Corp. v.
FCC, 835 F.2d 292 [1987], cert. denied sub nom.
Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 486 U.S. 1032, 108 S. Ct. 2014,
129 L. Ed. 2d 497 [1988]).
Congress addressed the must-carry issue
in the Cable Television
CONSUMER PROTECTION
and Competition Act of 1992 (47 U.S.C.A. § 325
et seq.). The 1992 Cable Act, passed over

GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
218 CABINET
President GEORGE H. W. BUSH’s VETO, required
cable systems to carry most local broadcast
channels and prohibited cable operators from
charging local broadcasters to carry their signal.
These requirements were challenged on First
Amendment grounds in Turner
BROADCASTING
System v. FCC (512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
129 L. Ed. 2d 497 [1994]). Turner Broadcasting
asked the Supreme Court to apply a
STRICT
SCRUTINY
test, similar to the one used to evaluate
the constitutionality of restriction s on printed
material, to determine whether the FCC
regulations infringed the industry’s
FREEDOM
OF SPEECH
. The FCC urged the Court to apply
the same relaxed standard it had applied to
broadcast media in Red Lion Broadcasting v.
FCC (395 U.S. 367, 89 S. Ct. 1794, 23 L. Ed. 2d
371 [1969]).
The Court took a middle ground on cable
communications. Noting that cable television is
neither strictly a broadcast medium nor a print
medium, the Court held that the relaxed
scrutiny test adopted in Red Lion was inappro-

priate, but declined to adopt the strict scrutiny
protection given to print publications. The
Court held that any regulations that are content
neutral—in other words, that do not dictate the
content of programming and that have an
incidental burden on free speech—will be
judged by an “intermediate level of scrutiny.”
Any regulations found to be content based—in
other words, that attempt to restrict program-
ming based on its content—will receive the
strict scrutiny applied to print media. It
returned the case to the district court for a full
hearing under this ruling.
The case returned to the Supreme Court in
1997. In Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal
Communications Commission (520 U.S. 180, 117
S. Ct. 1174, 137 L. Ed. 2d 369 [1997 ]), the Court
upheld the statute and rejected the cable
operators’ First Amendment claims. The court
found that the la w served an important and
legitimate legislative purpose because it pro-
tected noncable households from losing regular
local broadcasting service due to competition
from cable companies. In addition, there was a
legitimate governmental purpose in seeking to
ensure public access to a variety of information
sources. Finally, the government had an interest
in eliminating restraints on fair competition
even when the regulated parties were engaged in
protective expressive activity.

The regulation of the rates charged by cable
companies is another area of contention between
the industry and the government. Before 1984,
local franchising authorities regulated the rates
charged by franchisees. The 1984 Cable Com-
muni cations Policy Act (46 U.S.C.A. §§ 484-
487, 47 U.S.C.A. § 35, 152 et seq.), which was
designed to promote competition and allow
competitive market forc es to determi ne rates,
deregulated rates for almost all franchisees.
Although industry representatives had argued
that competition w ould keep rates reasonable,
after deregulation average monthly cable rates
increased far faster than the rate of inflation, in
some cases as much as three times faster.
During the same period, the average cable
subscriber received only six additional chan-
nels, and competition from other operators was
almost non existent. In 1991 only 53 of the
more than 9,600 cable systems in the United
States had a direct competitor in their service
area.
The 1992 Cable Act provided a regulatory
structure for basic and expanded programming,
but exempted individually sold premium chan-
nels, such as HBO and the Disney Channel,
and pay-per-view programming. The 1992
act authorized local governments to regulate
Cable Television Subscribers and Monthly
Basic Rates, 1975 to 2007

Cable TV subscribers
Premium cable TV subscribers
Monthly basic cable rate
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1975 1985 1995 2000 2007
Year
Number of subscribers (in millions)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Average monthly basic cable rate
(in dollars)
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 2009.
ILLUSTRATION BY GGS
CREATIVE RESOURCES.
REPRODUCED BY

PERMISSION OF GALE,
A PART OF CENGAGE
LEARNING.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
CABLE TELEVISION 219
programming, equipment, and service rates
charged by companies in areas where there is
no competition. Basic rates could be regulated
but only under prescribed circumstances that
indicate a lack of competition in the area.
According to figures gathered in 1994, the new
regulations led to average rate reductions of
more than 8 percent.
When Congress deregulated the cable
industry with the 1984 Cable Act, its primary
intent was to promote competition. The 1984
act sought to balance the government’sdual
goals of providing cable access to all areas and
deregulating rates. The industry had argued
that competitive market forces would produce
competition and stabilize rates. However, com-
petition did not occur in the ensuing years, and
cable operators continued to en joy a
MONOPOLY
in virtually all service areas. Before 1992,
exclusive c able franchises were granted to the
bidders who promised the widest access and
most balanced programming. The government
felt that this was the best way to ensure that

cable’s new and expensive technology was
available to people in poor and rural areas as
well as more affluent areas. As a result, bidders
who promised more than they delivered were
protected from competition. The 1992 Cable
Act eliminated many of the barriers to
competition that existed before. Most impor-
tant, it abolished the exclusive
FRANCHISE
agreement, which had been a powerful mo-
nopolistic tool.
Although the 1992 act did much to encour-
age competition, it did not address the 1984
act’s ban on ownership of cable companies by
local telephone utilities. This ban was chal-
lenged in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.
v. United States (42 F.3d 181 [1994]), in which
the Fourth
CIRCUIT COURT of Appeals held that it
violated the telephone companies’ First Amend-
ment right to free speech. The ban was removed
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (110
Stat. 56), which President
BILL CLINTON signed in
February 1996.
The 1996 act marked a return to the pre-
1992 act philosophy, as the FCC was again
directed to deregulate the cable television
industry. The industry, which lobbied hard for
the changes, contended that deregulation would

produce more competition and lower prices. In
addition, cable operators believed they could
move into the areas of broadband
INTERNET
service and local phone service. Critics raised
concerns that deregulation would produce less
competition, high prices, and the consolidation
of cable services into the hands of a few
powerful companies.
By 2009 the cable landscape had changed,
with four companies controlling 80 percent of
the national cable market. In addition, cable
subscriber costs rose steadily. The FCC contin-
ued to advocate for a d eregulated cable market
and has permitted companies to pass on
external costs (those unrelated to the delivery
of programming and maintenance of infra-
structure) to their subscribers. Competition
from satellite television providers also grew,
but not enough to pose a serious threat to the
cable industry. In 2009 U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated an
FCC rule that banned cable companies from
controlling more than 30 percent of the U.S.
cable market, leading some experts to predict
that the largest providers will acquire their
rivals.
The growth of cable television led to other
issues, including
LITIGATION over the distribution

of sexually explicit content on cable systems.
For example, United States v. Playboy Entertain-
ment Group Inc. (529 U.S. 803, 120 S. Ct. 1878,
146 L. Ed. 2d 865 [2000]) involved a provision
in the 1996 Cable Act that required cable TV
systems to restrict sexually oriented channels to
overnight hours if they did not fully scramble
their signal to nonsubscribers.
Even before the enactment of the 1996
provision, cable TV operators scrambled the
signals of their programming so nonsubscribers
could not view the channels. In addition, so-
called premium channels are scrambled so only
those cable subscribers who pay an additional
fee have access to the programming. However,
scrambling techno logy is imperfect. A phenom-
enon known as signal bleed allows audio and
video portions of scrambled programs to be
heard and seen for brief periods. The federal law
sought to prevent children from hearing or
seeing sexually explicit content because of signal
bleed. If a cable operator could not completely
scramble the signal, it could only transmit
sexually explicit programming between 10 p.m.
and 6 a.m.
Playboy Entertainment Group, which owns
and prepares programming for adult television
networks, filed a lawsuit alleging the law was
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, although
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION

220 CABLE TELEVISION
it acknowledged that many adults would find
the material offensive, ruled that the law did
violate the First Amendment becaus e it sought
to ban indecent rather than
OBSCENE material.
Adults had a right to view such material.
Moreover, the law only restricted signal bleed
to sexually explicit content, which meant that
the law was not content neutral and had to be
judged using the strict scrutiny test. Although
Congress had a compelling interest in prevent-
ing children from viewing sexually explicit cable
programming, the method it had prescribed was
too restrictive to the rights of adult subscribers.
Therefore, the government had failed to justify a
nationwide daytime speech ban. In so ruling,
the Court found that another provision of the
act, which permits cable customers to request
complete channel blocking, was a better and
legal alternative.
FURTHER READINGS
Arnesen, David W., and Marlin Blizinsky. “Cable Television:
Will Federal Regulation Protect the Public Interest?”
American Business Law Journal 32.
Gustafson, Madie D. “Transfers of Cable Television Systems:
Regulatory Concerns at Federal, State, and Local
Levels.” Practising Law Institute/Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series 380.

Lay, Tillman L., and J. Darrell Peterson. “Federal, State, and
Local Regulation of Cable Television Franchise Trans-
fers.” Practising Law Institute/Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series 405.
Markey, Edward J. “Cable Television Regulation: Promoting
Competition in a Rapidly Changing World.” Federal
Communications Law Journal 46.
National Cable and Telecommunications Association.
Available online at www.ncta.com (accessed November
23, 2009).
Parsons, Patrick. 2008. Blue Skies: A History of Cable
Television. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press.
Parsons, Patrick, and Robert Frieden. 1997. The Cable
and Satellite Television Industries. Boston: Allyn and
Bacon.
Peritz, Marc. “Turner Broadcasting v. FCC: A First
Amendment Challenge to Cable Television Must-Carry
Rules.” William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 3.
Robichaux, Mark. 2002. Cable Cowboy: John Malone and the
Rise of the Modern Cable Business. New York: Wiley.
CROSS REFERENCES
Broadcasting; Telecommunicatio ns; Television
v
CAHN, EDMOND NATHANIEL
Edmond Nathaniel Cahn was the author of
numerous publications including The Sense of
Injustice (1949), The Moral Decision (1955), and
The Edmond Cahn Reader (1966).
Cahn was born January 17, 1906, in New

Orleans, Louisiana. He received a bachelor of
arts degree in 1925 and a doctor of jurispru-
dence degree in 1927 from Tulane University.
He also received a doctor of laws degree from
the Jewish Theological Seminary of America,
located in New York City, in 1962.
After his admission to the Louisiana bar in
1927 and the New York bar in 1928, Cahn
established a law firm in New York City where
he practiced law from 1927 to 1950. He
extended his career interests to the field of
education and taught at New York University in
1945, accepting a professorship of law in 1948.
In 1958 and 1962 he lectured on the philosophy
of law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem
and on ethics at the Jewish Theological Semi-
nary of America in New York City in 1961.
From 1948 to 1951 he was the director of
the Conference on Social Meaning of Legal
Concepts. He was awarded the Phillips Prize in
Edmond Nathaniel Cahn 1906–1964
❖
1906 Born, New
Orleans, La.
1914–18
World War I
◆
1927 Earned J.D. from Tulane
University Law School;
moved to New York City

◆
1939–45
World War II
1950 Became full-time member of
NYU School of Law faculty
1948–51 Served as director of Conference
on Social Meaning of Legal Concepts
1949 The Sense of
Injustice published
1950–53
Korean War
1955 Awarded Phillips Prize
in Jurisprudence; The
Moral Decision published
1961 The
Predicament
of Democratic
Man published
1964 Died, New York City
1966 The Edmond Cahn
Reader published posthumously
1961-73
Vietnam War
▼▼
▼▼
19751975
19501950
19001900
19251925
◆

❖
◆
◆
◆
IN EVERY MATURE
SOCIETY
, THERE IS
CONSIDERABLE
OVERLAP BETWEEN
LEGAL QUESTIONS
AND MORAL
QUESTIONS
.
—EDMOND CAHN
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
CAHN, EDMOND NATHANIEL 221
Jurisprudence by the American Philosophical
Society in 1955. Cahn died August 9, 1964, in
New York City.
CALENDAR
A list of cases that are awaiting trial or other
settlement, often called a trial list or docket.
A special calendar is an all-inclusive listing of
cases awaiting trial; it c ontains dates for t rial,
names of counsel, and the estimated t ime
required for trial. It is maintained by a trial judge
in some states and by a court clerk in others.
Calendar call is a court session during which
the cases that await trial are called in order to
determine the current status of each case and to

assign a trial date.
v
CALHOUN, JOHN CALDWELL
John Caldwell Calhoun achieved prominence as
a U.S. vice president, Southern politician, and a
staunch defender of states’ rights.
Calhoun was born March 18, 1782, in
Abbeville County, South Carolina. After gradu-
ating from Yale University in 1804 and
LITCHFIELD
LAW SCHOOL
in 1806, Calhoun was admitted to the
South Carolina bar in 1807 and established a
successful legal practice there.
In 1808 Calhoun entered politics, beginning
as a member of the South Carolina Legislature.
Three years later, he began his career in federal
government, representing South Carolina in the
House of Representatives until 1817. During his
tenure, he performed the duties of acting
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
and in 1811 was a member of the War Hawks, a
group that advocated war with England in 1812.
CalhounresignedfromtheHousein1817and
assumed the duties of secretary of war for the next
eightyears.In1825,hebeganhisfirsttermasvice
PRESIDENT OF T HE UNITED STATES,servingunder
President
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS forfouryears.He
remained in this office during the presidency of

ANDREW JACKSON, but relinquished his p ost in 1832
after a disagreement with Jackson c oncerning
states’ rights. The d ispute bet ween Jackson and
Calhoun r esulted in the Nullification Controversy
of 1832 and 1833. Calh oun w as a proponent of the
right o f a sta te to d eclare a federal law null and void
if the state deemed such a law unc onstitutional. His
attitude was a result of the passage of protective
tariffs that Calhoun believed favored the interests
of the North over those of the South. Calhoun
expressed his beliefs in his work, South Carolina
Exposition, in which h e discussed his views of
sovereignty o f t he states. He believed t hat a state
John Caldwell Calhoun 1782–1850
❖
◆
1782 Born,
Abbeville County, S.C.
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
1808 Elected to South
Carolina legislature
1825 Became vice president under
John Quincy Adams
1817 Resigned
from House to
become

secretary of war
1828 Reelected
vice president under
Andrew Jackson
1843 Appointed U.S.
secretary of state
1845
Returned
to U.S.
Senate
1832 Resigned as
v.p.; elected to U.S.
Senate
1850 Died,
Washington, D.C.
1861–65
U.S. Civil War
1775–83
American Revolution
◆
◆
1811 Elected to U.S.
House of Representatives
▼▼
▼▼
17751775
18251825
18501850
18751875
18001800

❖
◆
1850 Compromise
of 1850 passed
John Caldwell
Calhoun.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
THE RIGHT OF
SUFFRAGE IS THE
INDISPENSABLE AND
PRIMARY PRINCIPLE IN
THE FOUNDATION OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT
.
—JOHN CALHOUN
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
222 CALENDAR
had the right to secede from the Union in order to
keep the powers of the federal government in
check. T he Nullification Controversy finally ended
with a compromise, and Calhoun emerged as the
foremost speaker for the Sou th during t hat era.
Calhoun represented South Carolina in the
U.S. Senate from 1832 to 1843, and again from
1845 to 1850. He continued his campaign for
states’ rights, supported
SLAVERY, and introduced
a policy of “concurrent majorities,” wherein
every area of the United States would participate

equally in the exercise of federal power. During
the period between his two senatorial terms,
Calhoun served as U.S.
SECRETARY OF STATE from
1843 to 1845. Calhoun died March 31, 1850, in
Washington, D.C.
As an author Calhoun wrote many publica-
tions, including Disquisition on Government and
Discourse on the Constitution and Government of
the United States. A compilation of his works
from 1851 to 1855 was published posthumously
by R. K. Crallé in a six-volume set.
CALL
To convoke or summon by public announcement;
to request the appearance and participation of
several people—such as a call of a jury to serve, a
roll call, a call of public election, or a call of names
of the members of a legislative body.
In contract law, the demand for the payment
of money acc ording to the contract terms, usually
by formal notice.
As applied to corporation law, the demand of
the board of directors that subscribers pay an
installment or portion of the amount that is still
owed on shares that they have agreed to buy. A
call price is the price paid by a corporation for the
redemption of its own
SECURITIES.
In securities, a contract that gives a person the
right to demand payment of a certain specified

number of shares of stock at a stated price or upon a
fixed date.
CALVO CLAUSE
A provision in an agreement between a private
individual and a foreign state that says, in effect,
that “aliens are not entitled to rights and privileges
not accorded to nationa ls, and that, therefore, they
may seek redress for grievances only before local
authorities.”
Under the Calvo Clause, a claimant waives
the right to apply to his or her government or to
another forum for protection if a claim is
denied by local authorities.
CALVO DOCTRINE
The principle set forth by an Argentine jurist,
Carlos Calvo, that a government has no duty to
compensate aliens for losses or injuries that they
incur as a result of domestic disturbances or a civil
war, in cases where the state is not at fault, and,
therefore, no justification exists for foreign nations
to intervene to secure the settlements of the claims
made by their citizens due to such losses or injuries.
CAMERA
A chamber, room, or apartment in old English
law. A judge’s chamber. Treasury, chest, or coffer.
To be in camera is to be in private or in
chambers.
CAMERAS IN COURT
The debate over whether courts should permit
cameras in courtrooms during trials began in

the 1930s and has continued in the 2000s.
Cameras and courtrooms have long had an
uneasy relationship. Blaming cameras for dis-
rupting trials, the
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
(ABA) led the drive for their removal in the
mid-1930s. The effort succeeded: All but two
state courts banned them, and Congress prohib-
ited them from all federal trials. But the television
era ushered in new problems, and courts
eventually were forced to grapple with the
constitutional question of whether TV cameras
are injurious to a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
In 1965 the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to say
they are. In Estes v. Texas (381 U.S. 532, 85 S. Ct.
1628, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543), the Court overturned
a conviction because cameras had denied a
DEFENDANT his due process rights. But the Court
changed its mind in the 1981 case of Chandler v.
Florida (449 U.S. 560, 101 S. Ct. 802, 66 L. Ed. 2d
740). Reacting to the permissiveness of Chandler,
many states passed legislation allowing televised
trials. Moreover, from 1991 to 1994, some federal
courts conducted an experiment with cameras.
Photographers lost their place in court in
the early 1930s thanks to a highly sensational
trial, and it took four decades for them to regain
it. In 1934, nearly 700 reporters and photo-
graphers descended on the New Jersey town
where Bruno Hauptmann was on trial for

KIDNAPPING and murdering the baby of famous
aviator Charles A. Lindbergh and author Anne
Morrow Lindbergh. The trial judge allowed still
photography but was unprepared for the
barrage of flashbulbs and the presence of a
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
CAMERAS IN COURT 223
newsreel camera that was smuggled inside the
court. Decrying the media circus that resulted,
the ABA in 1937 called for prohibiting photo-
graphy in its Canons of Professional and
Judicial Ethics. At the same time, the U.S.
Congress amended the Federal Rules of CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
to ban cameras and any form of
BROADCASTING from federa l courts. All but
two states—Texas and Colorado—gradually
adopted the ABA ban. Later, Texas permitted
“Raise Your Right Hand and Try to
Look Natural”: The Courtroom
Camera Debate
I
s allowing television ca meras in
courtrooms a good idea? U.S. law
never tires of debating the question.
Widely banned after the sensational
1934 Bruno Hauptmann
KIDNAPPING
and MURDER trial, cameras i n the court-
room have fluctuated for decades

in their acceptability. The courts, the
media, lawye rs, and scholars have often
heralded the camera as if it were
democracy’sowneye—or railed at it as
a leering Peeping Tom. S upporters
claim that cameras enlighten the public,
whereas opponents counter that cam-
eras corrupt the trial process and yield
bad journalism. Only since the mid-
1970s has the pro- camera lo bby been
ascendant. By 2009 all 50 states permit-
tedsometypeoftelevisioncoverageof
trial or appellate proceedings, though
some states limit or prohibit cameras in
trial courts. The rise of cable television
network Court TV (renamed in 2007 as
truTV) in the 1990s soon made televised
trials routine affairs. But despite com-
plaints, federal trials remained largely
off-limits. Moreover, controversy over
the media’streatmentofthe
O. J. SIMPSON
mur der trial brought new ca lls for
pulling the plug altogether.
In 1934 Hauptmann was tried for
kidnapping and murdering the young
son of aviator Charles A. Lindberg h
and author Anne Morrow Lindbergh.
The trial excited the nation , obsessed
the news media, and created a circus

atmosphere of “expert” commentators,
tabloid interviews, souvenir hawkers,
and courtroom grandstanding. In 1995
the trial of Simpson, who was accused
and ultimately acquitted of the murders
of his former wife Nicole Brown
Simpson and her friend Ronald Lyle
Goldman, caused similar excitement,
obsession, and atmospherics. Of course,
the camera’s role i n each case was quite
different. One hundred and forty-five
journalists crammed i nto the Haupt-
mann courtroom, and flashbulbs
popped and a smuggled newsreel cam-
era turned up, all in violation of the
trial judge’s orders. Afterward, critics
deplored the media’s behavior. Sixty-
one years later, a single television
camera was permitted to follow the
Simpson trial. Critics decried the media
“circus,”“frenzy,”“orgy,” an d so for th.
In both in stances, it was said that
cameras skewed t he proceedings and
gave a distorted view of the justice
system. Some said the media got
Hauptmann convicted; some believe
the media got Simpson off.
On the simplest level, then, the debate
is about the press. Critics believe journal-
ists are only barely capable of behaving

themselves in court. After the Hauptmann
experience, the
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
(ABA) reacted furiously. It swiftly passed
judicial canon 35 of its Canons of
Professional and Judicial Ethics:
Proceedings in court should be
conducted with fitting dignity
and decorum. The taking of
photographs in the courtroom,
during sessions of the court or
recesses between sessions, and
the
BROADCASTING of court pro-
ceedings are calculated to detract
from the essential dignity of the
proceedings, degrade the court
and create misconceptions with
respect thereto in the mind of
the public and should not be
permitted.
This 1937 rule led the majority of
states to ban still cameras and was
amended in 1952 to include TV cameras.
Although the ABA has long since chan-
ged its views, distrust of the media’s
intentions survives in state rules govern-
ing courtroom proceedings. These guide-
lines strictly dictate how many cameras
are allowed (usually one), what they may

do (remain stationary), whom they may
film (never jurors and sometimes not
WITNESSES), who may operate them (one
person), what that operator may wear
(appropriate dress), and when she or he
may leave the courtroom (only during
RECESS). It is hardly accidental that the
guidelines resemble a teacher’s orders to
a class.
While generally accepting limits as
necessary to the proper administration
of justic e, supporters of courtroom
journalism chafe at the idea that cam-
eras get in the way. In the Simpson trial,
for example, when Judge Lance Ito
threatened to have the camera removed,
Floyd Abrams, a noted
FIRST AMENDME NT
attorney, entered a plea to have it
remain: The camera, Abrams said, was
“absolutely, positively, 100 percent not
guilty.” Supporters note that states
require shielding witnesses, children,
and others from the camera. Exactly,
respond opponents. “The first thing to
note about such options is that their
very existence affirms the adverse effects
of cameras on witnesses,” wrote Profes-
sor Rory K. Little, o f the Ha stings
College of the Law.

This aspect of the debate—the effect
on a witness of being filmed—is conten-
tious. Few people are perfectly comfort-
able on television; even actors and
reporters are prone to stage fright. But
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
224 CAMERAS IN COURT
television cameras, and it was a Texas criminal
case that led to the next stage of development in
this area of U.S. law.
In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court took up
the constitutional issue in Estes. This case
involved a claim by a convicted swindler that
the televising of his heavily publicized trial had
deprived him of his right to due process under
the
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. The counterargu-
ment advanced by the state of Texas remains the
trials themselves can be tense events.
Proponents of cameras in the courtroom
attribute nervousness to publicity and
speaking in front of a group. They do not
believe there is any evidence that shows
witnesses would be less nervous if in
their presence there were a bevy of print
reporters taking notes. But even if the
majority of states are satisfied, not every
observer is. In 1993 the Washington, D.
C.,
PUBLIC DEFENDER Service noted that a

substantial percentage of witnesses feel
uncomfortable on camera, and the dis-
trict’s U.S. attorney’s office has expressed
fears about cameras chill witness cooper-
ation and even endanger witnesses. The
media and tourists may hound witnesses
who have appeared on television, and so
may others with frightening motives.
Lawyers and judges can also be aff-
ected by the camera. Critics say the temp-
tation to grandstand is overwhelming—
lawyers will show off, aware that
their reputation can be bolstered by
flights of impressive speech. Supporters
respond that lawyers had big egos long
before cameras were there to record
them. Yet, can judges keep order, let
alone resist the temptation themselves?
This old question in the debate drew
comment by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Estes v. Texas (381 U.S. 532, 85 S. Ct.
1628, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543 [1965]). In his
concurring opinion in that case, Chief
Justice
EARL WARREN looked scathingly on
a Texas trial judge who said that he had
sworn to uphold the state constitution—
not the federal Constitution. (Of course,
state judges must uphold both.) “One is
entitled to wonder,” Warren wrote, “if

such a statement would be made in a
court of justice by any state trial judge
except as an appeal calculated to gain the
favor of his viewing audience.” In 1995,
much commentary in the Simpson case
asked whether Judge Ito had succumbed
to the allure of the camera when he
allowed prosecutors and defense attor-
neys to bicker endlessly. No, said
supporters, cameras can actually be a
corrective for these problems. As attor-
ney Abrams put it, “A single, silent
courtroom camera serves as an antidote
to such behavior by truthfully showing
the public how attorneys and judges
actually behave.”
The effect on juries concerns critics
in a special way. Because juries are not
televised, there would seem to be little
reason to worry about what they will do
in the jury box. Not so. It is what they
may do afterward—especially in high-
profile cases—and how that may affect
their performance in the box that bothers
critics. “[W]orst of all,” wrote attorney,
author, and camera-opponent Wendy
Kaminer, “juries will play to the prospect
of appearing on talk shows when the trial
is over … we can’t expect jurors not to
be corrupted by publicity.” Book deals

present another problem. There is the
real possibility that people will try to get
on juries simply to make a profit from
doing so; in fact, one person was
dismissed from the Simpson jury for
allegedly taking notes for this very
reason. Thus, opponents argue, cameras
can jeopardize the quality of justice: Not
only can they result in bad juries, but the
dismissal of jurors can threaten to sink
an entire trial. Against this argument,
supporters can say little except words of
regret about human nature.
Given its length, notoriety, and mul-
tiple problems, the Simpson case pro-
duced a backlash against televising trials.
Afterward, some judges barred cameras,
and others put new restrictions on them.
Vowing that “nothing like t he O.J.
Simpson case is going to happen in my
courtroom,” Judge Lawrence Antolini of
the California Superior Court limited
filming to five minutes per day. Critics
mocked supporters’ claims that cameras
help educate the public. As attorney
Kaminer quipped in the ABA Journal,
“People who claim they watch the
Simpson case to educate themselves
remind me of people who say they buy
Playboy for the articles.” Court TV took

much of the blame for its choice of what
to broadcast—not only the Simpson case,
but the previous trials of Lorena Bobbitt
for the castration of her husband and of
brothers Erik Menendez and Lyle Menen-
dez for the murder of their parents. News
programs were criticized, too, for carrying
too little footage during a brief experi-
ment in broadcasting federal trials; the
FEDERALJUDICIALCENTERdetermined th at
the average length of coverage in a
newscast was only 17 seconds.
In the wake of the backlash, sup-
porters backpedaled as quickly as possi-
ble, waiting for the controversy to
dissipate. By 2009 the Simpson trial
was a distant memory and support for
cameras in the courtroom remained
strong. However, the renaming of Court
TV to truTv reflected a change in viewer
interest. Though the n etwork still tele-
vises trials during the day, it has shifted
to “reality” pro grams for its evening
programming.
The U.S. Supreme Court remains off
limits to cameras. Over the years, justices
have felt that such publicity could detract
from the serious nature of the Court’s
business. As of 2006, transcripts of
proceedings are posted on the Court’s

website the day of the argument. On rare
occasions, the Court has allowed audio-
tapes of proceedings to be released to the
public on the day of argument. The
hearings surrounding the 2000 presiden-
tial contest between
GEORGE W. BUSH and
AL GORE were deemed sufficiently impor-
tant by the Court to warrant this, as were
the 2003 hearings for the University of
Michigan Law School
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
case and the constitutionality of the
McCain-Feingold campaign finance
reform law.
CROSS REFERENCES
Courtroom Television Network; Simpson,
O. J.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
CAMERAS IN COURT 225
one most pro-camera supporters continued to
make into the 2000s: Cameras neither caused
distractions nor prejudiced the trial. The sup-
porters also argued that cameras in fact served
the public’s right to know in a manner both
educational and likely to promote respect for
the courts. The Supreme Court sided with the
defendant. Emphasizing the obtrusive techno-
logy used in the courtroom, from fat cables to the
red light on cameras, the Court decided that

the trial had not been fair and overturned
the conviction. Yet, to many observers, Estes
appeared to stop short of announcing that all
photographic or broadcast coverage of criminal
trials is inherently a denial of due process; it
focused narrowly on the particulars in Billie Sol
Estes’s case. More important, observers noted,
the decision looked to the future. “When the
advances in these arts permit reporting by …
television without their present hazards to a fair
trial,” Justice
TOM C. CLARK wrote for the majority
in Estes, “we will have another case.”
Developments in the 1970s changed the
picture. Technology had improved, making TV
cameras far less disruptive, and the electronic
media was demanding the same access to trials
enjoyed by the print media. The ABA became
much more tentative about its hard-line posi-
tion. Its Committee on Fair Trial-Free Press
recommended that the ABA revise its standards.
Judge Wapner and The People’sCourt
B
B
efore televised trials became commonplace,
there was The People’sCourt.This highly
popular syndicated TV program ran from 1981
through 1993 and featured retired judge Joseph A.
Wapner of the California Superior Court. Millions of
viewers tuned in daily to watch Wapner hear actual

cases from small-claims court. The parties agreed
to submit to his judgment of their sometimes petty,
and often quite funny, disputes, which included
claims for fender benders, complaints about plumb-
ingjobs,andevenaplaintiffwhosuedwhena
liquor store that had sold him a flat can of beer
refusedtogivehimafreshone.Theground-
breaking People’s Court probably did more than any
other program before i t to open the way for the
reality p rogramming tide that swept civil and
criminal trial s onto television. It also popularized
understanding of at least one k ind of courtroom
process, that of small claims.
The genius of The People’ s Court was its
verisimilitude. The program operated by the rules
of California’s small-claims courts: No l awyers were
allowed, aggrieved parties represented themselves,
and the damage limit was $1,500 . To find partici-
pants for the show, Ralph Edwards Productions
combed court dockets for cases that were essen-
tially matters of principle and then invited the
parties to appear on the program. On the show, as
in real life, both parties told their sides of the story
tothejudge,whosedecisionwasfinal.Theshow’s
12-year run featured more than 5,000 cases.
The affably grumpy, no-nonsense Wapner cer-
tainly knew his profession. The former president of the
California Judges Association had earned degrees in
philosophy and the law from the University of
Southern California in the late 1940s, had practiced

law for a decade, and had tried civil and criminal
cases for twenty years before retiring from the bench
in 1979. His TV rulings were commonsensical, swift,
and just. The victim of a bad can of beer, for instance,
was awarded eighty cents. In another case, one man
in a romantic love triangle had bitten off the ear of
another rather than give up the woman in question;
Wapner awarded the one-eared man $1,500 for pain
and suffering. As part of the show’s terms, the
production company paid all awards, and the
aggrieved parties merely agreed to call it a day after
the judge passed sentence.
The effect of The People’sCourthas often been
debated. The show may have encouraged litig ious-
ness, according to such critics as noted attorney
Alan M. Dershowitz and Judge Abner J. Mikva, of
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. It is undoubtedly true that the use of
small-claims courts increased in the 1980s after the
show began airing. Others found in Wapner a
traditional model of fairness: In a 1989 essay i n the
University of Chicago Law Review, Justice Antonin
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
226 CAMERAS IN COURT
Encouraged to experiment, a number of states
tried short-term pilot programs as a first step
toward changing their laws. Then, in 1978, the
Conference of State Chief Justices voted 44–1to
approve a resolution allowing the highest court
of each state to set its own guidelines for radio,

TV, and other photographic coverage. By 1980
19 states permitted cover age of trial and appellate
courts, three permitted coverage of trial courts
only, six permitted coverage of appellate courts
only, and 12 others were considering the issue.
The U.S. Supreme Court provided the
decisive push in 1981 with its ruling in Chandler.
Chandler revisited the Estes decision of 16 years
earlier and on quite similar terms: In Florida, two
men convicted of
BURGLARY claimed that televis-
ing their trial over their objections was a denial of
due proce ss. At the time, Florida was following a
pilot program for televising and permitting still
photography at state trials under canon 3A(7) of
the Florida
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. The parties
in Chandler read Estes differently: The appellants
argued that Estes meant that the televising of
criminal trials is inherently a denial of due
process, whereas the state claimed that Estes did
not establish any such constitutional rule.
Seeking to clarify the earlier ruling, which had
comprised no less than six opinions, the Supreme
Court agreed with Florida. It held that states
could provide access to the electronic media
Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court described Wapner
as a descendant of Solomon and Louis IX of France.
Wapner himself saw the program as educational.
To the public, which made The People’ s Court

the fifth-highest-rated syndicated show in the mid-
1980s, Wapner became the best-known judge in the
United States. A 1989 Washington Post poll found
that fewer than 10 percent of respondents knew the
name of Justice William H. Rehnquist of the U.S.
Supreme Court but more than half could identify
Wapner. Wapner p ublished the book AViewfrom
the Bench in 1987. After the show’s cancellation in
1992, he served as president of the board of
directors of the Brandeis-Bardin Institute, a Jewish
cultural organization in California.
As tastes in daytime television changed in the
1990s, Wapner’s descendants reflected the times.
The era of no-holds-barred reality TV had dawned,
and into it in 1996 barreled Judge Judy.Ifthe
betrayed and the broken-hearted went on The Jerry
Springer Show to smash chairs, Judge Judy was
where they settled their legal di fferences for the
price of a tongue-lashing from retired New York City
judge Judy Sheindlin. Averaging 9 million viewers
per day, Sheindlin rarely failed to remind disputing
parties of their shortcomings.
The huge success of Judge Judy spawned
competition. In fact, a brief revival of The People’ s
Court between 1998 and 1999 featured former New
York City mayor Ed Koch hamming it up at the gavel.
Similarly, Divorce Court, originally a 1960s show
with actors, reappeared with real couples ready to
untie the knot on camera. Other shows, such as
Judge Mills Lane, covered the familiar territory of

small claims cases being tried by humorous grumps.
The 2000s breathed fresh air into the format
with African American judges and new thematic
approaches. Divorce Court and Judge Mathis
featured attorney Mablean Ephriam and former
state judge Greg Mathis, respectively. As a former
teenage dropout and gang member who became a
Michigan judge, Mathis promoted the theme of self-
redemption while c iting his life as an example for
young offenders. Following their lead was noted
former Georgia juvenile court judge Glenda Hatch-
ett, whose Judge Hatchett also sought to balance
entertainment with a social message. As of 2009,
there were ten syndicated courtroom shows, with
Judge Judy still the number one rated program.
FURTHER READINGS
Frankel, Bruce. 2000. “Past Imperfect; In re jurisprudence, TV’s
Judge Mathis Had Two Good Teachers: Law School and
Jail.” People (October 2).
Holston, Noel. 1999. “Fall TV Preview.” Minneapolis Star
Tribune (September 13).
“Judge Glenda Hatchett Bio.” 2003. Available online at www.
sonypictures.com/tv/shows/judgehatchett/about4.phtml
(accessed on November 20, 2003).
“Judge Mills Lane TV Show Canceled.” 2001. AP Online
(April 11).
Zurawik, David. 1999. “Tough Justice: TV Judges Deal in Black
and White.” Newsday (April 21): B3.
CROSS REFERENCES
Small Claims Court; Television.

B
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
CAMERAS IN COURT 227