Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 3 P40 pot

but still breathing and circulating blood. If a
brain-dead person is maintained on artificial
respiration until his or her heart fails, then these
usable organs would perish. Thus, the medical
category of brain death makes it possible to
accomplish another goal: saving lives with organ
transplants.
The Right to Die: Individual Autonomy
and State Interests
The first significant legal case to deal with the
issue of termination of life-sustaining medical
care was
IN RE QUINLAN (70 N.J. 10, 355 A. 2d
647). This 1976 case helped resolve the question
of whether a person could be held liable for
withdrawing a life-support system even if the
patient’s condition is irreversible. In 1975 Karen
Ann Quinlan became comatose for reasons that
were not understood, and she was put on a
mechanical respirator. Her parents authorized
physicians to use every possible means to revive
her, but no treatment improved her condition.
Although doctors agreed that the possibility of
her recovering consciousness was remote,
they would not pronounce her case hopeless.
When her parents themselves lost all hope of
Quinlan’s recovery, they presented the hospital
with an authorization for the removal of the
respirator and an exemption of the hospita l and
doctors from responsibility for the result.
However, the attending doctor refused to turn

off the respirator on the grounds that doing so
would violate his professional
OATH. Quinlan’s
parents then initiated a lawsuit asking the court
to keep the doctors and the hospital from
interfering with their decision to remove
Quinlan’s respirator.
In a unanimous decision, the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled that Quinlan had a
constitutional right of privacy that could be
safeguarded by her legal guardian; that the
private decision of Quinlan’s guardian and family
should be honored; and that the hospital could
be exempted from criminal liability for turning
off a respirator if a hospital ethics committee
agreed that the chance for recovery is remote.
Quinlan was removed from the respirator, and
she continued to live in a coma for ten years,
nourished through a nasal feeding tube.
In cases following Quinlan, courts have
ruled that life-sustaining procedures such as
artificial feeding and hydration are the legal
equivalent of mechanical respirators and may
be removed using the same standards (Gray v.
Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 [D.R.I. 1988]). Courts
have also defined the right to die according to
standards other than that of a constitutional
right to privacy. The patient’s
LEGAL RIGHT to
refuse medical treatment has been grounded

as well on the common-law right of bodily
integrity, also called bodily self-determination,
and on the liberty interest under the due process
clause of the
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. These
concepts are often collected under the term
individual autonomy or patient autonomy.
Subsequent cases have also defined the
limits of the right to die, particularly the state’ s
interest in those limits. The state’s interests in
cases concerning the term ination of medical
care are the preservation of life (including the
prevention of suicide), the protection of depen-
dent third parties such as children, and the
protection of the standards of the medical
profession. The interests of the state may, in
some cases, outweigh those of the patient.
In 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
first decision on the right-to-die issue, Cruzan v.
Director of Missouri Department of Health (497
U.S. 261, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224).
Cruzan illustrates the way in which individual
and state interes ts are construed on this issue,
but leaves many of the legal questions on the
issue still unresolved. Nancy Cruzan was in a
persistent vegetative state as a result of severe
brain injuries suffered in an automobile acci-
dent in 1983. She had no chance of recovery,
although with artificial nutrition and hydration
could have lived another 30 years. Her parents’

attempts to authorize removal of Cruzan’s
medical support were first approved by a trial
court and then denied by the Missouri Supreme
Court. Her parents then appealed the case to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court held that the guarantee of liberty
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution does not prohibit Missouri
from insisting that “evidence of the incompe-
tent [patient’s] wishes as to the withdrawal of
treatment be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.” The Court left other states free to
adopt this “clear-and-convincing evidence” stan-
dard but did not compel them to do so. Thus,
existing state laws remained the same after the
Cruzan decision. Although the Court affirmed
that a competent patient has a constitutionally
protected freedom to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, it emphasized that an incompetent
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
378 DEATH AND DYING
person is unable to make an informed choice to
exercise that freedom.
The Court explained that the state has an
interest in the preservation of human life and in
safeguarding against potential abuses by surro-
gates and is, therefore, not required to accept
the “substituted judgment” of the patient’s
family. The Court agreed with the Missouri
Supreme Court ruling that statements made by

Cruzan to a housemate a year before her
accident did not amount to clear-and-convinc-
ing proof that she desired to have hydration and
nutrition withdrawn. Cruzan had allegedly
made statements to the effect that she would
not want to live should she face life as a
“vegetable.” There was no testimony that she
had actually discussed withdrawal of medical
treatment, hydration, or nutrition.
After the Court’s decision, Cruzan’s parents
went bac k to the Missouri
PROBATE court with
new evidence regarding their daughter’s wishes.
On December 14, 1990, a Missouri judge ruled
that clear evidence of Cruzan’s wishes existed
and permitted her parents to authorize with-
drawing artificial nutrition and hydration.
Cruzan died on December 27, 12 days after
feeding tubes were removed.
In the early 2000s, the case of Terri Schiavo
drew attention to the conflicts that occur when
the values of preservation of life and the right to
die are pitted against one another. In 1990, Terri
Schiavo, age 27 at the time, suffered card iac
arrest, which resulted in oxygen deprivation and
brain damage. Doctors reported that whereas
her brain stem was undamaged, allowing her
body to function, her cognitive abilities had been
destroyed and there was no real hope of
recovery. A Florida

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE suit
resulting from a misdiagnosis of a chemical
imbalance that led to the cardiac arrest resulted
in a $1 million award to her husband, Michael
Schiavo, who used the award to pay for the
treatment for his wife. In 1998 Michael Schiavo
filed a court petition asking to remove Terri’s
feeding tube, allowing her to die. Though
Schiavo did not have a living will, her husband
claimed that she had told him that in a situation
such as this, she would not wish to continue life-
sustaining procedures and would want to be
allowed to die. Schiavo’s parents objected,
claiming that this did not sound like their
daughter’s wishes. They believe d in her eventual
rehabilitation, which led them to file a lawsuit
that sought to block the removal of the feeding
tube. The case was battled out in the Florida
state and federal courts for years. In 2001
Michael Schiavo prevailed in having the feeding
tube removed from Terri Schiavo, but the
parents again intervened and obtained a court
order that forced the reinsertion of the tube.
By 2002 the parents had succeeded in gaining
national publicity for their cause. Pro-Life and
disability rights groups made the preservation of
Terri Schiavo’s life a top priority. The parents
claimed they had new evidence that proved their
daughter was not in a vegetative state. They
showed a tape that supposedly showed Schiavo

responding to vocal stimuli and tracking a
moving object with her eyes. They argued that
her condition could be improved with further
therapy. Experts for Michael Schiavo countered
that Schiavo’s responses were random and
reflexive and, therefore, not indicative of con-
sciousness. The parents’ state lawsuit was dis-
missed in 2003, and a similar lawsuit in federal
district court was thrown out in that same year.
On October 15, 2003, Schiavo’s feeding tube
was again removed. However, on October 20,
the Florida legislature enacted an emergency bill
that Governor Jeb Bush immediately signed into
law, which allowed him to order the feeding
tube restored and to appoint a new guardian for
Schiavo. The next day the feeding tube was
reinserted into Schiavo. Michael Schiavo then
filed a lawsuit in Florida state court that
challenged the constitutionality of the law,
which had been written to apply only to
Schiavo. In May 2004 the court struck down
the law. Governor Bush appealed to the Florida
Supreme Court in September 2004, which set
the foundation for the final legal battle.
In February 2005 a state court judge signed
an order that directed the removal of the
feeding tube on March 18. State and congres-
sional Republicans then moved to bring the
matter to Congress. On March 20 the Senate
passed a bill that transferred jurisdiction of

the case to the federal courts. The House of
Representatives enacted the bill on March 21,
which led President
GEORGE W. BUSH to fly back
from his ranch in Texas to sign the bill that
same day. Despite these efforts, the federal
courts quickly rejected the state’s lawsuit,
leading again to the removal of Schiavo’s
feeding tube. She died on March 31, 2005. An
AUTOPSY revealed that Schiavo’s brain was half
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
DEATH AND DYING 379
the normal size of a female brain and that nearly
all of the regions were damaged.
Advance Directives
A court must consider many factors and
standards in right-to-die cases. It must deter-
mine, for example, whether a patient is compe-
tent or incompetent. A competent patient is
deemed by the court to be able to give
INFORMED
CONSENT
or refusal relative to the treatment
under consideration, whereas an incompetent
patient (e.g., a patient in a coma) lacks the
decision-making capacity to do so. According to
the principle of individual autonomy, the court
must honor the informed consent of competent
patients regarding their medical care.
For incompete nt patients who cannot make

informed decisions regarding their care, an
advance directive may provide a means of
decision making for the termination of life-
supporting treatment. An advance directive is a
document, prepared in advance of incompe-
tence, which gives patients some control over
their health care after they have lost the ability to
make decisions owing to a medical condition. It
may consist of detailed instructions about
medical treatment, as in a living will, or the
appointment of a proxy, or substitute, who will
make the difficult choices regarding medical
care with the patient’s earlier directions in mind.
The appointment of a proxy is sometimes called
a proxy directive or durable power of attorney. The
patient names a proxy decision maker when he
or she is competent. In other cases, the physician
may appoint a proxy, or the court may appoint a
legal guardian who acts on behalf of an
incompetent person. Usually, a relative such as
a spouse, adult child, or sibling is chosen as a
proxy. If an advance directive provides adequate
evidence of a patient’s wishes, a decision about
the termination of life support can often be
made without involving a court of law.
For an incompetent patient whose prefer-
ences regarding medical care are known from
prior oral statements, the patient’sproxymay
make a substituted judgment,thatis,ajudgment
consistent with what the patient would have

chosen for himself. If no preference regarding
medical treatment is known, the standard for the
proxy’s decision is the “best interests of
the patient.” According to that standard, the
proxy’s decision should approximate what most
reasonable individuals in the same circumstances
as the patient wo uld c hoose. Individual states
have statutes governing the requirements for
living wills and advance directives.
FURTHER READINGS
American Medical Association. 2008. Code of Medical Ethics:
Current Opinions with Annotations. Chicago: American
Medical Association. Available online at http://www.
ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics.shtml; website home page:
(accessed July 19, 2009).
Callahan, Daniel. 1990. “Current Trends in Biomedical
Ethics in the United States.” In Bioethics: Issues and
Perspectives. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Health
Organization.
Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. 2001. The Right to Die with
Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and Law. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
Ditto, Peter H., Joseph H. Danks, William D. Smucker, et al.
2001. “Advanced Directives as Acts of Communica-
tion.” Archives of Internal Medicine 161.
Howarth, Glennys, and Oliver Leaman, eds. 2001. Encyclo-
pedia of Death and Dying. New York: Routledge.
Humphry, Derek. 1993. Lawful Exit: The Limits of Freedom
for Help in Dying. Junction City, Or.: Norris Lane Press.

———. 1991. Final Exit. Eugene, Ore.: Hemlock Society.
Monagle, John F., and David C. Thomasma. 1994. Health
Care Ethics: Critical Issues. Gaithersburg, Md.: Aspen.
Schneider, Carl E., ed. 2000. Law at the End of Life: The
Supreme Court and Assisted Suicide. Ann Arbor: Univ.
of Michigan Press.
Urofsky, Melvin. 1994. Letting Go: Death, Dying, and the
Law. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press.
CROSS REFERENCES
Euthanasia; Physicians and Surgeons; Power of Attorney.
DEATH PENALTY
See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.
DEATH WARRANT
An order from the executive, the governor of a
state, or the president directing the warden of a
prison or a sheriff or other appropriate officer to
carry into execution a sentence of death; an order
commanding that a named person be put to death
in a specified manner at a specific time.
CROSS REFERENCE
Capital Punishment.
DEATHBED WILL
See NUNCUPATIVE WILL.
DEBENTURE
[Latin, Are due.] A promissory note or bond offered
by a corporation to a creditor in exchange for a loan,
the repayment of which is backed only by the
general creditworthiness of the corporation and not
by a mortgage or a lien on any specific property.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION

380 DEATH PENALTY
Debenture

I.D. Control # ________________________________________
License # ________________________________________
DEBENTURE
$ __________________________________________________________________________________ (the "Original Principal Amount")
___________________________________________________________________________________ (the "Maturity Date")
___________________________________________________________________________________ (the "Company")
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(Street) (City) (State) (Zip)

PART I – PERIOD SPECIFIC TERMS
A. Applicable for the Scheduled Interim Period (and New Interim Periods, as applicable)
Interest rate per annum for the Scheduled Interim Period: _________________%
Annual Charge applicable to the Scheduled Interim Period: 1% per annum
Date of Issuance: ________________________________________________
Scheduled Pooling Date: __________________________________________
Scheduled Interim Period: from and including the Date of Issuance to but excluding the Scheduled Pooling Date

The following italicized terms will apply if the Interim Period is extended by SBA:
New interest rate(s) per annum (a) % (b) % (c) %
New Annual Charge per annum (a) 1% (b) 1% (c) 1%
New Pooling Date(s): (a) ____________ (b) ____________ (c) ____________
New Interim Period(s): from and including: (a) ____________ (b) ____________ (c) ____________
to but excluding: (a) ____________ (b) ____________ (c) ____________

The Company, for value received, promises to pay to JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., as Custodian (the "Custodian") for the U.S. Small
Business Administration ("SBA") and SBIC Funding Corporation (the "Funding Corporation"), pursuant to the Custody and Administration
Agreement (the "Custody Agreement") dated as of April 27, 2009 among SBA, the Funding Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank of

Chicago, as Interim Funding Provider (the "Interim Funding Provider"), and the Custodian: (i) interest on the Original Principal Amount listed
above at the applicable rate per annum listed above, and (ii) an Annual Charge on the Original Principal Amount listed above at the
applicable rate per annum listed above, each at such location on SBA, as guarantor of this Debenture, may direct and each at the related
rate per annum identified for the Scheduled Interim Period (and each New Interim Period, if any). This Debenture will bear interest for, and
the Annual Charge will apply to, the Scheduled interim Period (and each New Interim Period, if any) at the rate(s) and for the applicable
period(s) indicated above, to be paid in arrears by 1:00 p.m. (New York City time) on the Business Day prior to the Scheduled Pooling Date
(and each New Pooling Date, if any) listed above. As used throughout this Debenture, "Business Day" means any day other than: (i) a
Saturday or Sunday; (ii) a legal holiday in Washington, D.C.; and (iii) a day on which banking institutions in New York City are authorized or
obligated by law or executive order to be closed. Interest on this Debenture and the Annual Charge for the Scheduled Interim Period (and
each New Interim Period, if any) will each be computed on the basis of the actual number of days in the applicable Interest Period divided
by 360. The Company may not prepay this Debenture, in whole or in part, during the Scheduled Interim Period or any New Interim Period.

B. This Section B. is effective only after (i) the Scheduled Interim Period and any New Interim Period(s) expire and (ii) the
Custodian receives this Debenture for pooling.

The Company, for value received, promises to pay to the order of JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., acting as Trustee (the "Trustee") under that
certain Amended and Restated Trust Agreement dated as of February 1, 2008, as the same may be amended from time to time, by and
among the Trustee, the SBA and SBIC Funding Corporation, and as the Holder hereof, interest semiannually on March 1st and September
1st (the "{Payment Dates") of each year, at such location as SBA, as guarantor of this Debenture, may direct at the rate of _____________%
per annum (the "Stated Interest Rate"), and to pay a 1% per annum fee to SBA on each Payment Date, each calculated on the basis of a
year of 365 days, for the actual number of days elapsed (including the first day but excluding the last day), on the principal sum from the
last day of the Interim Period until payment of such principal sum has been made or duly provided for. The Company shall deposit all
payments with respect to this Debenture not later than 12:00 noon (New York City time) on the applicable Payment Date or the next
Business Day if the Payment Date is not a Business Day, all as directed by SBA.

The Company may elect to prepay this Debenture, in whole and not in part, on any Payment Date, in the manner and at the price as next
described. The prepayment price (the "Prepayment Price") must be an amount equal to the outstanding principal balance of this Debenture,
plus interest accrued and unpaid thereon to the Payment Date selected for prepayment, plus a prepayment premium (the "Prepayment
Premium"). The Prepayment Premium amount is calculated as a declining percentage (the "Applicable Percentage") multiplied by the
Original Principal Amount of this Debenture in accordance with the following table:

Consecutive Payment Dates Applicable Percentage
1st or 2nd 5%
3rd or 4th 4%
5th or 6th 3%
7th or 8th 2%
9th or (10th - If not also Maturity Date) 1%
[continued]
A sample debenture.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
DEBENTURE 381
A sample debenture
(continued).
ILLUSTRATION BY GGS
CREATIVE RESOURCES.
REPRODUCED BY
PERMISSION OF GALE,
A PART OF CENGAGE
LEARNING.
Debenture
No Prepayment Premium is required to repay this Debenture on its Maturity Date. No Prepayment Premium is required when the
prepayment occurs on a Payment Date that is on or after the 11th consecutive Payment Date of this Debenture, if this debenture has a 20
consecutive Payment Date term.

The amount of the Prepayment price must be sent to SBA or such agent as SBA may direct, by wire payment in immediately available
funds, not less than three Business Days prior to the regular Payment Date. Until the Company is notified otherwise in writing by SBA, any
Prepayment Price must be paid to the account maintained by the Trustee, entitled the SBA Prepayment Subaccount and must include an
identification of the Company by name and SBA-assigned license number, the loan number appearing on the face of this Debenture, and
such other information as SBA or its agent may specify.

II. –GENERAL TERMS

For value received, the Company promises to pay to the order of the Trustee the Original Principal Amount on the Maturity Date at such
location as SBA, as guarantor of this Debenture, may direct.

This Debenture is issued by the Company and guaranteed by SBA, pursuant and subject to Section 303 of the Small Business Investment
Act of 1958, as amended (the "Act") (15 U.S.C. Section 683). This Debenture is subject to all of the regulations promulgated under the Act,
as amended from time to time, provided, however, that 13 C.F.R. Sections 107.1810 and 107.1830 through 107.1850 as in effect on the
date of this Debenture are incorporated in this Debenture as if fully set forth. If this Debenture is accelerated, then the Company promises
to pay an amount equal to the outstanding principal balance of this Debenture, plus interest accrued and unpaid on such balance to but
excluding the next Payment Date following such acceleration.

This Debenture is deemed issued in the District of Columbia as of the day, month, and year first stated above. The terms and conditions of
this Debenture must be construed in accordance with, and its validity and enforcement governed by, federal law.

The warranties, representations, or certification made to SBA on any SBA Form 1022 or any application letter of the Company for an SBA
commitment related to this Debenture, and any documents submitted in connection with the issuance of this Debenture, are incorporated
in this Debenture as if fully set forth.

Should any provision of this Debenture or any of the documents incorporated by reference in this Debenture be declared illegal or
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining provisions will remain in full force and effect and this Debenture must be
construed as if such provisions were not contained in this Debenture.

All notices to the Company which are required or may be given under this Debenture shall be sufficient in all respects if sent to the above-
noted address of the Company. For the purposes of this Debenture, the Company may change this address only upon written approval of
SBA.

COMPANY ORGANIZED AS CORPORATION

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this debenture to be signed by its duly authorized officer and its corporate seal to be

hereunto affixed and attested by its Secretary or Assistant Secretary as of the date of issuance stated above.

CORPORATE SEAL
___________________________________________________
(Name of Licensee)
By: ___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
(Typed Name and Title)
ATTEST:
________________________________________________
Secretary or Assistant Secretary (Strike One)
SBA FORM 444C
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
382 DEBENTURE
Debentures are usually offeredin issues under
an INDENTURE, a document that sets the terms of
the exchange. A debenture is usually a
BEARER
instrument. When it is presented for payment,
the person in possession of it will be paid, even if
the person is not the original creditor. Coupons
representing annual or semi-annual payments of
interest on the debt are attached, to be clipped
and presented for payment on their due dates.
They may be deposited in, and collected by, the
banks of holders of the debentures, the creditors
of the corporation.
A convertible debenture is one that can be
changed or converted, at the option of its holder,
into shares of stock, usually

COMMON STOCK,ata
fixed ratio as stated in the indenture. The ratio
can be adjusted in light of stock dividends;
otherwise the value of converting the debt into
SECURITIES would be worth less than retaining the
debenture until its date of maturity.
A subordinate debenture is one that will be
repaid only after other corporate debts have been
satisfied. A convertible subordinate debenture is
one that is subject or subordinate to the prior
repayment of other debts of the corporation but
which can be converted into another form of
security. A sinking fund debenture is one whereby
repayment is secured by periodic payments by
the corporation into a sinking fund, anamount of
money made up of corporate assets and earnings
that are set aside for the repayment of designated
debentures and long-term debts.
DEBIT
A sum charged as due or owing. An entry made on
the asset side of a ledger or account. The term is used
in bookkeeping to denote the left side of the ledger, or
the charging of a person or an account with all that
is supplied to or paid out for that person or for the
subject of the account. Also, the balance of an
account where it is shown that something remains
due to the party keeping the account.
As a noun, an entry on the left-hand side of an
account. As a verb, to make an entry on the left-
hand side of an account. A term used in accounting

or bookkeeping that results in an increase to an asset
and an expense account and a decrease to a liability,
revenue, or owner’s equity account.
v
DEBS, EUGENE V.
Labor leader, presidential candidate, author,
and rad ical, social, and political agitator,
Eugene Debs employed a combination of self-
determination , grit, defiance, and risk-taking to
play a sometimes pivit al role in Ameri can law
from the late 1890s through the early twentieth
century.
The son of Alsatian immigrants,
EUGENE
VICTOR DEBS
was born in Terre Haute, In diana,
on November 5, 1855. As a young teenager
growing up in Terre Haute, Debs took a job as a
rail way fireman, where he bec ame ac tive in the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen (BLF).
Although Debs left his job as a railway fireman
four years later, he remained active in the BLF,
undertaking increased leadership responsibili-
ties. Debs then was elected to serve two terms
as the city clerk for Terre Haute and one term
in the Indiana House of Representativ es. In
winning all three elections , Debs leveraged his
role as grand secretary and treasurer in the BLF
to garner votes fr om wo rking class laborers.
In 1893 Debs broke with the tradition

of limiting membership in craft unions to skilled
artisans by helping found the American Railway
Union, which organized both skilled and un-
skilled workers. Debs believed that labor’s great-
est strength lay more inits sheer numbers and less
in the individual skills of its members.
The following year Debs, now president of
the American Railway Union, led a strike against
the Pullman Palace Car Company, which was
owned by George Pullman and located in
Pullman, Illinois, a company town in which
nearly all residents worked fo r Pullman. Pull-
man also provided housing units for his workers
to rent. In 1894 Pullman began laying off
workers, cutting wages, and withholding their
paychecks as payment for unpaid rent.
The Debs-led strike, known as the Pullman
BOYCOTT, turned violent when workers began
pillaging, rioting, and burning railway cars.
Railway strikes erupted across the Midwest,
forcing much of the nation’s railroad system to
shut down. President Grover Cleveland deployed
12,000 troops to quell the strike in Pullman.
After two workers were killed in clashes with the
troops, President Cleveland declared the strike
over. Workers were allowed to return to work
only if they promised not to unionize again.
A few weeks before Cleveland deployed the
troops, a federal court had issued an injunction
ordering Debs and the other union leaders to

cease and desist their concerted activities against
Pullman. Debs ignored the injunction, and was
WHILE THERE IS A
LOWER CLASS
,IAM
IN IT
; WHILE THERE IS
A CRIMINAL ELEMENT
,
I
AM OF IT; AND
WHILE THERE IS A
SOUL IN PRISON
,IAM
NOT FREE
.
—EUGENE V. DEBS
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
DEBS, EUGENE V. 383
eventually arrested and cited for CONTEMPT of
court. Tried before a judge without a jury and
defended by
CLARENCE DARROW, Debs lost and was
sentenced to six months in jail. Debs challenged
his conviction on the ground that he had been
denied the
SIXTH AMENDMENT right to a jury trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Debs’s
argument, finding that he and the other union
leaders had formed an unlawful conspiracy in

RESTRAINT OF TRADE (In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 S.
Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 [U.S. 1895]). The injunction
obtained by the federal government was an
EQUITABLE REMEDY, the Supreme Court said, and
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not
apply in equitable proceedings. To preserve their
power in equitable proceedings, judges must have
the authority to punish violations through the
power of contempt, the Court concluded. Debs
was forced to serve out the full six months of his
jail sentence.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Debs
served to legitimize Cleveland’s deployment of
the strike-breaking troops, even though the
Court did not expressly weigh in on that issue.
Almost 40 years would pass before industrial
unions would receive increased recognition and
protection from U.S. law.
Nonetheless, Debs continued advocating
unions as the best means to advance labor’s
interests. The same year that Debs led the
PULLMAN
STRIKE
, President Cleveland signed into law an act
that declared the first Monday in September as a
holiday to honor the American laborer. Despite
the concession from the White House, Debs
forged his own brand of politics by organizing the
Social
DEMOCRATIC PARTY of America in 1897. As its

candidate for presidentin 1900,he received 96,116
votes. Thereafter he spent most of his time as a
lecturer and organizer in the socialist movement,
although he purported to be less interested in the
political underpinnings of the movement and
instead, viewed
SOCIALISM as a means to guarantee
dignity and equality for the average worker. He
was the presidential candidate of the
SOCIALIST
PARTY
in 1904, 1908, and 1912.
In 1905 Debs’s politics moved further to
the left when he helped form the
INDUSTRIAL
WORKERS OF THE WORLD
(IWW), also known as
Eugene Debs 1855–1926
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1855 Born,
Terre Haute, Ind.
1880 Appointed Grand Secretary of
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
1884 Elected to serve as
representative in Indiana
General Assembly
1894 Leads Pullman strike
1897 Helps form the Socialist Party of America
1900 Makes first run for U.S. Presidency
1908 Makes third of
five unsuccessful runs
for U.S . Presidency
1905 Founds the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)
1918 Convicted for giving
anti-war speech
1920 Makes final unsuccessful
bid for U.S. Presidency
from prison cell
1926 Died,
Lindlahr Sanitarium
outside Chicago, Ill.
1919 Prohibition Era begins

when states ratify
18th Amendment
1914–18
World War I
1901 President
William McKinley
assassinated
1895 U.S. Supreme Court affirms Debs conviction for contempt of federal injunction
Eugene V. Debs.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
384 DEBS, EUGENE V.
the Wobblies. The IWW was an inclusive
organization that sought to create “One Big
Union,” by welcoming African Americans,
immigrants, and women. The IWW promoted
a rigorous standard of racial equality, and
attempted to educate workers about the ways
in which capitalists used race to undermine
labor interes ts. Debs marketed IWW to workers
as a radical alternative to the American Fede ra-
tion of Labor led by
SAMUEL GOMPERS.
In 1907 Debs was named associate editor for
the progressive magazine Appeal to Reason,
published in Girard, Kansas. For the next five
years he received a salary of $100 per week. The
weekly magazine achieved a circulation of
several hundred thousand due in part to the
powerful writing of Debs.

In 1918, during
WORLD WAR I, Debs was
convicted of violating the
ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1917,
after he gave a speech in Canton, Ohio,
encouraging listeners to obstruct the draft. The
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, notwith-
standing Debs’s argument that the federal law
violated his rights to free speech guaranteed by
the
FIRST AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution
(Debs v. United States, 39 S.Ct. 252, 249 U.S. 211,
63 L.Ed. 566 [U.S. 1919]). Debs served two years
in prison, from 1919 to 1921. While in prison he
again ran for president on the Socialist ticket in
1920 and received almost one million votes.
Debs died on October 20, 1926, in Elmhurst,
Illinois. He was survived by his wife of 41 years,
Kate Metzel. They had n o children. In 1962
the Debs Foundation was established i n Terre
Haute, as a memorial to Eugene Debs, and as an
archive and research center for the study of the
social sciences, and labor and political history. Each
year the foundation bestows the
EUGENE V . DEBS
Award on an individual “who has contributed to
the advancement of the causes of industria l
unionism, social justice, or world peace.”
FURTHER READINGS
Debs, Eugene V. “The Canton, Ohio, Anti-War Speech.”

Available online at />debs/works/1918/canton.htm; website home page:
(accessed July 19, 2009)
Eugene V. Debs Foundation. Available online at http://www.
eugenevdebs.com/index.htm; website homepage: http://
www.eugenevdebs.com (accessed July 19, 2009).
Ginger, Ray. 2007. The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene
Debs. Chicago: Haymarket.
Papke, David Ray. 1999. The Pullman Case: The Clash of
Labor and Capital in Industrial America. Lawrence:
Univ. Press of Kansas.
DEBT
A sum of money that is owed or due to be paid
because of an express agreement; a specified sum
of money that one person is obligated to pay
and that another has the legal right to collect or
receive.
A fixed and certain obligation to pay money or
some other valuable thing or things, either in the
present or in the future. In a still more general
sense, that which is due from one person to
another, whether money, goods, or services. In a
broad sense, any duty to respond to another in
money, labor, or service; it may even mean a
moral or honorary obligation, unenforceable by
legal action. Also, sometimes an aggregate of
separate debts, or the total sum of the existing
claims against a person or company. Thus people
speak of the “national debt,” the “bonded debt” of
a corporation, and so on.
Federal Debt, 1940–2007

SOURCE: U.S. Office of Mana
g
ement and Bud
g
et, Historical Tables, annual.
Billions of dollars
Year
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
Ϫ300
1940
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
9,000
7,000
5,000
3,000
1,000
Total gross federal debt
a

a
Gross federal debt includes money borrowed by the U.S. Treasury and various federal
agencies.
Surplus or deficit in
given fiscal year
ILLUSTRATION BY GGS
CREATIVE RESOURCES.

REPRODUCED BY
PERMISSION OF GALE,
A PART OF CENGAGE
LEARNING.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
DEBT 385
DEBT, ACTION OF
One of the oldest common-law forms of action
available to private litigants seeking to collect what
is owed to them because of a harm done to them
by another.
Originally, the action was allowed for any
PLAINTIFF who claimed an obligation owed by
another person, but the courts gradually
began to recognize two
FORMS OF ACTION:
detinue, an action to collect a specific item
of property, and a debt for a sum of money.
The distinction had become clear in England by
the early thirteenth century. In debt, as in
detinue, a
DEFENDANT who lost the case had the
option of either paying a sum of money for the
judgment or giving back the property that gave
rise to the debt. Later in the thirteenth century,
courts began to permit
REPLEVIN,anactionforthe
return of goods wrongfully taken or withheld,
and covenant, an action for damages from

someone who broke an agreement. Gradually,
judges began to demand firm proof of the
agreement, and finally they would accept
nothing less than a contract made under seal.
Later the action in
ASSUMPSIT enlarged the rights
of a disappointe d party to a contract by allowing
monetary damages for any breach. This action
enjoyed growing popularity and supplanted the
action of debt for a time because it permitted
the defendant to prove his or her case by
swearing in
OPEN COURT and by bringing along
eleven neighbors who would proclaim their
belief in their neighbor’s truthfulness. When
this procedure, called the
WAGER OF LAW, was
abolished during the reign of King William IV
(1830–1837), the action of debt again became
important as an action to enforce a simple
contract.
As long as common-law forms of action
were the required modes for pleading civil
actions, the action of debt continued to be
useful. Relief was available only for those
whose claims fit exactly into its form, however,
and there was criticism of its rigidity and
technicalities. By the end of the nineteenth
century most states had passed laws to replace
the old forms of action with

CODE PLEADING.
Today, the law of
CIVIL PROCEDURE recognizes
only one form for a lawsuit, thecivil action. An
individual can still sue to collect what is due on
a debt, but no longer is it necessary to draw the
complaint in the form of the ancient action
of debt.
DEBT POOLERS
Individuals or organizations who receive and
apply monthly funds from a person owing mon ey
to several creditors and who make arrangements
to pay these creditors less than what is actually
owed.
Debt poolers, also known as debt adjusters
or consolidators, are helpful to consumers,
particularly when they are nonprofit organiza-
tions that provide their services free or for a
reasonable fee. In other cases, however, their
usefulness to consumers is lessened when they
charge fees that would make it less costly for
consumers to make similar arrangements with
creditors on their own.
DEBTOR
One who owes a debt or the performance of an
obligation to another, who is called the creditor;
one who may be compelled to pay a claim or
demand; anyone liable on a claim, whether due or
to become due. In bankruptcy law, a person who
files a voluntary petition or person against whom

an involuntary petition is filed. A person or
municipality concerning which a bankruptcy case
has been commenced.
DECALOGUE SOCIETY OF LAWYERS
Founded in 1934, the Decalogue Society of
Lawyers is an association of attorneys of the
Jewish faith who seek to advance and improve
the law, the legal profession, and the adminis-
tration of justice; to foster friendly relations
among its members, and between its members
and other members of the bar, the courts, and
the public; to cooperate as lawyers and citizens
in worthy movements for the public welfare; to
maintain vigilance against public practices that
are antisocial or discriminatory; and to cooper-
ate with other bar associations for the attain-
ment of those objectives. Activities include a
forum on legal topics of general and Jewish
interest, lectures and seminars on recent deci-
sions and legislation, and the presentation of
awards. The society provides a placement service
for members and maintains a w elfare fund.
Meetings are held annually in June.
The society has several active committees
including those on arbitration, civic affairs,
CIVIL
RIGHTS
, FAMILY LAW,lawyercounseling,LEGAL
EDUCATION
, legislation, and professional relations.

GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
386 DEBT, ACTION OF
The s ociety pub lishe s The Decalogue Jour-
nal (quarterly) and a membership directory
(annually).
DECEDENT
An individual who has died. The term litera lly
means “one who is dying,” but it is commonly used
in the law to denote one who has died, particularly
someone who has recently passed away.
A decedent’s estate is the real and
PERSONAL
PROPERTY
that an individual owns upon his or
her death.
DECEIT
A misrepresentation made with the express inten-
tion of defrauding someone, which subsequently
causes injury to that person.
In order for a statement to be deceit, it must
be untrue, made with knowledge of its falsity,
or made in reckless disregard of the truth. The
MISREPRESENTATION must be such that it causes
harm to another individual.
DECENNIAL DIGEST
Ò
One of the titles of the American Digest System
that classifies by topic the summaries of court
decisions that were reported chronologically in the
various units of the National Reporter System.

Each of the more than 400 subject classifi-
cations corresponds to a general legal concept—
torts, for example—and all cases found under
a specific topic discuss similar points of law.
The digest contains summaries of cases decided
during the period from 1897 to 1905 and for
every ten-year period until 1976, and every five
years thereafter.
DECISION
A conclusion reached after an evaluation of facts
and law.
As a generic term, decision refers to both
administrative and judicial determinations. It
includes final judgments, rulings, and
INTERLOC-
UTORY
or provisional orders made by the court
pending the outcome of the case. Frequently, a
decision is considered the initial step in a
rendition by a court of a judgment in an action.
When referring to judicial matters, a deci-
sion is not the same as an opinion, although
the terms are sometimes used interchangeably.
A decision is the pronouncement of the solution
of the court or judgment in a case, while an
opinion is a statement of the reasons for its
determination made by the court.
DECISION ON THE MERITS
An ultimate determination rendered by a court in
an action that concludes the status of legal rights

contested in a controversy and precludes a later
lawsuit on the same cause of action by the parties
to the original lawsuit.
A
DECISION ON THE MERITS is made by the
application of
SUBSTANTIVE LAW to the essential
facts of the case, not solely upon technical or
procedural grounds.
DECLARATION
The first pleading in a lawsuit governed by the rule
of common-law pleading. In the law of evidence, a
statement or narratio n made not under oath but
simply in the middle of things, as a part of what
is happening. Also, a proclamation.
A declaration is the plaintiff’s statement of
a claim against the
DEFENDANT, formally and
specifically setting out the facts and circum-
stances that make up the case. It generally is
broken into several sections, which describe the
different counts of the
CAUSE OF ACTION. The
declaration should give the title of the action,
the court and place of trial, the basis for the
claim, and the relief demanded. The defendant
then answers with a
PLEA. COMMON-LAW PLEADING
has been abolished in the United States, and
modern systems of

CODE PLEADING and rules
based on federal
CIVIL PROCEDURE now provide
for a complaint to accomplish the same purpose
as did the declaration in former times.
Under some circumstances, statements made
out of court by one person may be repeated in
court by someone else even though the hearsay
rule ordinarily forbids secondhand testimony.
For example, a
DYING DECLARATION is a statement
in which a
HOMICIDE victim names his or her
killer on his or her deathbed. If the victim had
known who had attacked him or her, had
abandoned all hope of recovery, and had in fact
died of the wounds, a person who heard the
dying declaration can repeat it in court at the
time the killer is brought to trial. The theory is
that a deceased person would not have lied just
before dying.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
DECLARATION 387