Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 4 P28 pptx

Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 65 [1997]), three
terminally ill patients, four physicians, and a
nonprofit organization brought action against the
state of Washington for
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT,
that a statute banning assisted suicide violated
due process clause. On June 26, 1997, the
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the right
of states to prohibit assisted suicide, holding: (1)
asserted right to assistance in committing suicide
is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by
due process clause, and (2) Washington’sbanon
assisted suicide is rationally related to legitimate
government interests. In Vacco v. Quill (521 U.S.
793, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 [1997]),
physicians challenged the constitutionality of
New York statutes making it a crime to aid a
person in committing suicide or attempting to
commit suicide. The Supreme Court held that
New York’s prohibition on a ssisting suicide did
not violate the
EQUAL PROTECTION clause of the
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Involuntary Euthanasia
The term involuntary euthanasia is used to
describe the killing of a person who has not
explicitly requested aid in dying. This term is
most often used with respect to patients who are
in a persistent vegetative state and who probably
will never recover consciousness.
Euthanasia Considerations

Euthanasia is a divisive topic, and different
interpretations of its meaning, practice, and
morality abound. Those who favor active eutha-
nasia and a patient’s right to die do not
acknowledge a distinction between active and
passive euthanasia. They assert that the with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment cannot be
distinguished in principle from affirmative steps
to hasten a patient’s death. In both situations,
they argue, a person intends to cause the patient’s
death, acts out of compassionate motives, and
causes that single outcome. In their view, turning
off a life-sustaining respirator switch and giving a
lethal injection are morally equivalent actions.
Opponents of active euthanasia argue that it
undermines the value of, and respect for, all
human life; erodes trust in physicians; desensi-
tizes society to killing; and contradicts many
people’s religious beliefs. Moreover, they main-
tain that the intentions and natures of active
and passive euthanasia are not essentially the
same. In active euthanasia, a person directly
intends to cause death and uses available means
to achieve this end. In passive euthanasia, a
person decides against using a certain form of
treatment and then directs that such treatment
be withdrawn or withheld, accepting but not
intending the patient’s death, which is caused by
the underlying illness.
Whilepeoplecitedifferingreasonsfor

choosing to end their own lives, those suffering
from a terminal illness typically state that a
serious disorder or disease has adversely
affected their quality of life to the point where
they no longer wish to continue living. Under
such circumstances, patients may have been
diagnosed with a degenerative, progressive
illness such as ALS, Huntington’sdisease,
multiple sclerosis, AIDS, or Alzheimer’sdis-
ease. Patients with such illnesses often fear,
with good reason, a gradual loss of the quality
of life in the future as the disease or disorder
progresses, or they might already have lost a
good deal of their independence and thus might
require continuous care. Some feel that this loss
of autonomy cause s an unacceptable loss of
personal dignity. Others realize that they will b e
dying in the near future and simply want to
have total control over the process. Some point
outthatinadditiontophysicalconsiderations,
they do not want to diminish their assets by
incurring large medical costs as their death
approaches. They feel that they ought to have
theoptiontodiesoonerandtopassontheir
assets to their beneficiaries.
Some patients who decide that they wish to
commit suicide are unable or unwilling to
accomplish the act without assistance from their
physician. Physician-assisted suicide helps them
to die under conditions, and at the time, that

they choose. PAS is currently legal only in the
state of Oregon, under severe restrictions. In
other states, terminally ill individuals who want
to die must continue living until their body
eventually collapses or until a family member or
friend commits a criminal act by helping the m
to commit suicide.
Historical Considerations
Traditional Christian beliefs concerning all
forms of suicide were addressed by Thomas
Aquinas during the thirteenth century. He
condemned all suicide (whether assisted or
not) on the theory that it violated one’s natural
desire to live. Among European writers, Michel
de Montaigne was the first major dissenter on
this issue. During the sixteenth century, he
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
EUTHANASIA 259
wrote a series of essays arguing that suicide
should be a matter of personal choice, a human
right. He asserted it is a rational option under
certain circumstances.
Attempting to commit suicide was once a
criminal act. It has been decriminalized for
many decades in most jurisdictions. However,
assisted suicide remains a criminal act
Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted
Suicide
E
uthanasia (sometimes called mercy

killing) and physician-assisted
SUI-
CIDE
are much debated methods of
ending the suffering of individuals who
have painful, debilitating, and terminal
diseases. These methods are much de-
bated and involve complicated questions.
One question concerns whether indivi-
duals in such conditions have the right to
die as they wish rather than live i n
persistent agony. Other questions have to
do with attending physicians’ roles, par-
ticularly their prescribing certain medica-
tions and giving directions for taking a
lethal dose. People wonder if there are
certain circumstances in which a person
ought to help another person commit
suicide. These are just some of the
questions that surround the issue of
physician-assisted suicide, a widely debat-
ed ethical issue in modern medicine.
Physician-assisted suicide is a form of
voluntary euthanasia. In other words, it
involves a patient voluntarily acting to end
his or her life. Physician-assisted suicide
differs from conventional suicide in that it
is facilitated by a physician who confirms
the patient’s diagnosis, rules out condi-
tions such as depression that may be

affecting the patient’sjudgment,and
finally provides the means for committing
suicide. Such action usually consists of
taking a lethal overdose of prescription
medication. However, the over 130
patients who were assisted by Dr.
JACK
KEVORKIAN
between 1990 and 1998 chose to
press a button which delivered a lethal
poison into their veins or to put on a mask
that emitted carbon monoxide into their
lungs. As of 2010
ASSISTED SUICIDE was a
felony offense in most states and was also
expressly forbidden in the
AMERICAN MEDI-
CAL ASSOCIATION
(AMA) Code of Medical
Ethics. In 1999, Kevorkian was found
guilty of second-degree
MURDER in an
assisted suicide case. He was sentenced to
serve10to25years,butwasparoledin
2007 after serving eight years in prison.
The debate surrounding physician-
assisted suicide in the United States has
been influenced by medical practices in
other countries, particularly the Nether-
lands, which legalized both active eutha-

nasia and physician-assisted suicide in
2002. Physician-assisted suicide in the
Netherlands is conducted within strict
guidelines that include the following
requirements: the patient’s request for
assisted suicide must be voluntary, the
patient must be experiencing intolerable
suffering, all other alternatives for treat-
ment must have been explored, and the
physician must consult another indepen-
dent physician before proceeding. A
study commissioned by the Dutch gov-
ernment indicated that, in 2001, about
3,500 deaths, or 2.5 percent of the
140,000 death cases that were reported
in the Netherlands that year, occurred by
active euthanasia. The study, known as
the Remmelink Report, defined euthana-
sia as the termination of life at the
patient’s request. Figures also indicated
that 300 deaths, or 0.2 percent, were
caused by physician-assisted suicide.
In the United States, the debate on
legalizing assisted suicide began in ear-
nest in the 1970s. On one side of the
debate were patients’ rights groups who
lobbied for what they call the right to
die—or the right to choose to die, as
some have clarified it—of terminally ill
patients. The strongest opposition to the

legalization of physician-assisted suicide
has come from physicians’ groups such
as the AMA and from religious groups
that are morally opposed to the practice.
One person who has done much to
make the case for physician-assisted
suicide is Derek Humphry, a former
journalist who founded the Hemlock
Society, in 1980, after witnessing his first
wife’s suffering as she was dying from
cancer. In 2003, the organization changed
its name to End-of-Life Choices, which
encompasses more clearly the issues
supported by its members. With a new
name and a new motto, “Dignity Com-
passion Control,” the organization con-
tinues to advocate for the right of
terminally ill people to choose voluntary
euthanasia or what Humphry has termed
self-deliverance.
Humphry has written several books
on the subject of voluntary euthanasia,
including Jean’sWay(1978), which
recounts his struggle to assist his wife’s
death in 1975; Final Exit: The Practicalities
of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for
the Dying (1991), a controversial book that
gives detailed advice on how terminally ill
people may take their own life; and Lawful
Exit: The Limits of Freedom for Help in

Dying (1993), which contains Humphry’s
own recommendations for legislation that
would legalize physician-assisted suicide
and active voluntary euthanasia. In
Humphry’s words, the “right to choose
to die” is
“the ultimate civil liberty.”
Humphry presents physician-
assisted suicide as a merciful, dignified
option for people whose illness has
eroded their quality of life beyond the
limits of tolerance. He also points out
that what he calls beneficent euthanasia
occurs every day in medical facilities as
physicians make decisions regarding the
end of life. Others, including some
medical ethicists, go so far as to claim
that a decision to withhold antibiotics,
oxygen, or nutrition from a terminally ill
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
260 EUTHANASIA
throughout the United States, with
the exception of the state of Oregon. In that
state, it is permitted under tightly controlled
conditions.
Oregon’s Euthanasia Law
In 1994 voters in the state of Oregon approved
a ballot measure that would have legalized
euthanasia under limited conditions. Under the
patient is no less “active” a form of

euthanasia than is administering a fatal
dose of morphine. Indeed, they see the
common practice of withholding life
support as more open to potential abuse
than the practice of physician-assisted
suicide. The former, they argue, is a less
visible, less easily regulated decision.
Proponents of physician-assisted suicide
also claim that diseases kill people in far
more cruel ways than would any means
of death that a physician might provide
for an irreversibly ill patient. As a result,
they see the action of assisting in suicide
as entirely compatible with the physi-
cian’s duty to the patient.
However, Humphry has been an
open critic of Kevorkian’s work. He has
described Kevorkian’s theory and prac-
tice of assisted suicide as open-ended
euthanasia. Noting Kevorkian’s lack of
precautionary measures such as the use
of waiting periods and second opinions,
Humphry sees any wider application of
Kevorkian’s methods as potentially lead-
ing to abuse and tragedy. “The thinking
people in our movement are appalled by
it,” Humphry said. “If you have Kevor-
kian’s type of euthanasia, it will be a
slippery slope. Kevorkian’s is a recipe for
skiing down a glacier.”

Detractors of physician-assisted sui-
cide also use the familiar “slippery slope”
argument, proposing that once physi-
cian-assisted suicide is legalized, other
forms of euthanasia will more likely be
practiced as well. They see assisted
suicide as potentially leading to situations
in which elderly, chronically ill, and
handicapped people, along with others,
are killed through active, nonvoluntary
euthanasia. Related to this idea is the
view that widespread practice of physician-
assisted suicide might claim the lives of
those whose intolerable suffering is
caused by treatable depression. They
point out that terminally ill people or
others in pain are often also suffering
from depression and that despite their
illness, their feelings of hopelessness can
often be addressed through means such
as counseling and antidepressant medi-
cation.
The Catholic Church opposes eutha-
nasia and assisted suicide. Basing its
arguments on passages from the Bible,
Catholic theology has for many centuries
opposed all forms of suicide. Catholicism
argues that innocent human life may not
be destroyed for any reason whatsoever.
The debate over physician-assisted

suicide eventually reached the Supreme
Court. In 1994 an advocacy group
known as Compassion in Dying filed
two lawsuits (Compassion in Dying et al v.
Washington and Quill et al v. Vacco)
challenging the constitutionality of state
laws banning assisted dying in Washing-
ton and New York. Compassion in Dying
won in the district court in Washington.
Chief Judge Barbara Rothstein wrote,
“There is no more profoundly personal
decision, nor one which is closer to the
heart of personal liberty, than the choice
which a terminally ill person makes to
end his or her suffering and hasten an
inevitable death.” In New York, Com-
passion in Dying lost and filed an appeal
in the Second Circuit.
In 1995 Washington’s Compassion
ruling was overturned by the Ninth
CIRCUIT
COURT
of Appeals, reinstating the anti-
suicide law. In 1996, however, after
reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals issued a reversal decision in
Compassion v. Washington. That decision
held that assisted dying was protected by
liberty and privacy provisions of the U.S.
Constitution. The majority wrote that

“Those who believe strongly that death
must come without physician assistance
are free to follow that creed, be they
doctors or patients. They are not free,
however, to force their views, their reli-
gious convictions, or their philosophies on
all the other members of a democratic
society, and to compel those whose values
differ with theirs to die painful, protracted,
and agonizing deaths.”
In April 1996 the Second Circuit
joined the Ninth in recognizing constitu-
tional protection for assisted dying in the
Quill case, holding that the New York
statutes criminalizing assisted suicide vio-
late the
EQUAL PROTECTION clause of the
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.However,onJune
26, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
both the Ninth and Second Circuit Court
in
WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG (521 U.S.
702, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772
[1997])andVacco v. Quill (521 U.S. 743,
117 S. Ct. 2293, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 [1997]).
The Court ruled that state laws against
assisting a suicide are not unconstitution-
al, but it also stated that patients have a
right to aggressive treatment of pain and
other symptoms, even if the treatment

hastens death. The Court wrote,
“Throughout the Nation, Americans are
engaged in an earnest and profound debate
about the morality, legality and practicality
of physician assisted suicide. Our holding
permits this debate to continue, as it
should in a democratic society.” However,
in Gonzales v. Oregon (546 U.S. 243, 126 S.
Ct. 904, L. Ed. [2006]), the Court agreed
with the state of Oregon that the federal
government could not prosecute doctors
who prescribe medications to help their
patients commit suicide.
Ultimately, then, the voters and
representatives of the states and the legal
system itself will have to decide whether
physician-assisted suicide will be legal-
ized. Regardless of what side prevails in
the debate, the exchange of ideas that it
creates may lead to a greater understand-
ing of the difficult choices surrounding
death in modern times.
FURTHER READINGS
Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. 2001. The Right to
Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics,
Medicine, and Law. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers Univ. Press.
Hendin, Herbert. 2002. “The Dutch Experi-
ence.” Issues in Law & Medicine (spring).
CROSS REFERENCES

Death and Dying; Physicians and Surgeons.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
EUTHANASIA 261
Death with Dignity law, a person who sought
physician-assisted suicide would have to meet
certain criteria:
n
Thepersonmustbeterminallyill.
n
Thepersonmusthavesixmonthsorless
to live.
n
Thepersonmustmaketwooralrequests
for assistance in dying.
n
Thepersonmustmakeonewrittenrequest
for assistance in dying.
n
The person must convince two physicians
that he or she is sincere and not acting on a
whim and that the decision is voluntary.
n
The person m ust not have been influenced
by depression.
n
Thepersonmustbeinformedof“the
feasible alternatives,” including, but not
limited to, comfort care, hospice care, and
pain control.
n

Thepersonmustwaitfor15days.
Under the proposed law, a person who met
all requirements could receive a prescription of a
barbiturate that would be sufficient to cause
death. Physicians would be prohibited from
inducing death by injection or carbon monoxide.
The
NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE,
supported by the Roman Catholic Church,
obtained a court injunction to delay implemen-
tation of the measure. The law stalled in the
appeals process. In the meantime, the measure
was not enacted. In 1997 there was a second
public referendum, and the law was enacted.
Within 24 hours of the announcement of the
results, state officials had forms for physicians
to record instances of assisted suicide. These
were later distributed to physicians in the state.
The form is entitled “Request for Medication to
End My Life in a Humane and Dignified
Manner.”
Immediately after the law was affirmed,
Thomas Constantine, the administrator of
the federal
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
(DEA), wrote a policy statement that said that
prescribing drugs to help terminally ill patients
kill themselves would be a violation of the
Controlled Substances Act. Nevertheless, on
March 26, 1998, a woman in her mid-eighties

died from a lethal dose of barbiturates, which
had been prescribed by her doctor under the
Oregon law. She was the first person to publicly
use the law to commit suicide. She had been
fighting breast cancer for 20 years and recently
had been told by her doctor that she had less
than two months to live. She had been
experiencing increased difficulty breathing. She
made a tape recording in which she stated, “I’m
looking forward to it. I will be relieved of all the
stress I have.” Her personal doctor would not
help her end her life, so she turned to an
advocacy group, Compassion in Dying. That
group located a doctor to assist her. She fell into
a deep sleep about five minutes after taking the
lethal dose of pills, and she died peacefully
about 25 minutes later. Attorney General
JANET
RENO
officially reversed Constantine’s ruling a
few weeks later, stating that doctors who use the
law to prescribe lethal drugs to terminally ill
patients will not be prosecuted and that drug
laws were intended to block illegal trafficking in
drugs, not to cover situations like the Oregon
suicide law.
Despite significant controversy, by the end
of 1998, one prediction of the anti-choice forces
had not materialized: There was no rush of
people to Oregon to seek an easy end to life.

While it was predicted that many would take
advantage of the law, of the 23 terminally ill
individuals who applied to end their own lives
in 1998, 15 committed suicide, usually within a
day of receiving the prescription. Six died from
their illnesses without using the medication.
Two remained alive at the end of 1998. From
1998 to 2002, 129 people chose physician
assisted suicide.
In early 2001 Oregon state senator Ron
Wyden wrote Attorney General
JOHN ASHCROFT
asking that the GEORGE W. BUSH administration not
mount an attack on the state law permitting
assistance in suicide. Ashcroft wrote a letter to
Asa Hutchinson, chief of the Drug Enforcement
Administration. He declared that assisting a
terminally ill patient to commit suicide is not a
“legitimate medical purpose” for federally con-
trolled drugs. He said that physicians who use
drugs to help patients die face suspension or
revocation of their licenses to prescribe federally
controlled drugs. This position was contrary to
the position taken by Janet Reno, his predeces-
sor. The attorney general of Oregon, Hardy
Myers, quickly initiated a lawsuit to have the
Ashcroft directive declared unconstitutional. The
federal district court in Oregon issued a tempo-
rary injunction, which prevents the federal
government from enforcing Ashcroft’s

GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
262 EUTHANASIA
interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA). The state of Oregon requested that the
court block the federal
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
from taking legal action against Oregon doctors
who prescribe medication to help their patients
commit suicide. A federal judge ruled in favor of
the state law in 2002, and the Department of
Justice appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appeals court
upheld the Oregon law, as did the Supreme
Court in Gonzales v. Oregon (546 U.S. 243, 126 S.
Ct. 904, L. Ed. [2006]). The Court acknowledged
the federal government has the right to regulate
drugs but stated that the attorney general does
not have the power to regulate the proper uses of
legal medications. Moreover, prior
CASE LAW
limited the power of the federal government to
regulate medical practice.
Other States
According to the online website, Euthanasia.
com, 35 states have legislated aga inst assisted
suicide, while nine other states have cited it as a
crime under common law. Still more states have
introduced or passed statut es criminalizing
assisted suicide. These statutes forbid a person
to knowingly assist or aid another in commit-

ting suicide. Some also prohibit soliciting,
advising, or encouraging another to commit
suicide. Some statutes penalize assisted suicide
under guidelines established for murder or
MANSLAUGHTER, whereas others make it a unique
offense with separate penalties. Few courts have
interpreted the assisted-suicide statutes, because
prosecutions for assisted suicide are rare. In
cases of assisted suicide, a state usually prose-
cutes individuals for murder or manslaughter.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, ruled in
1996 that assisted suicide is not a crime.
FURTHER READINGS
Behuniak, Susan M. 2003. Physician-Assisted Suicide: The
Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Issue. Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Dyck, Arthur J. 2001. When Killing Is Wrong: Physician-
Assisted Suicide and the Courts. Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim
Press.
Euthanasia.com. Available online at www.euthanasia.com
(accessed October 11, 2009).
Palmer, Larry I. 2000. Endings and Beginnings: Law,
Medicine, and Society in Assisted Life and Death.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
CROSS REFERENCE
Death and Dying
v
EVARTS, WILLIAM MAXWELL
William Maxwell Evarts served as attorney
general of the United States during the last year

of the administration of President
ANDREW
JOHNSON
. Evarts was a distinguished and power-
ful New York attorney who successfully
defended President Johnson at his
IMPEACHMENT
trial, represented the REPUBLICAN PARTY before an
electoral commission during the disputed
presidential election of 1876, served as
SECRETARY
OF STATE
during the administration of President
RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, and ended his public career
as a U.S. senator.
Evarts was born February 16, 1818, in
Boston. He graduated from Yale University in
1837 and then attended Harvar d Law School.
He was admitted to the New York bar in 1841
and subsequently established a successful legal
practice. From 1849 to 1853, Evarts acted as
assistant district attorney for the New York
District.
Evarts entered public service during the
U.S.
CIVIL WAR. He participated in diplomatic activi-
ties as a member of the Secretary of Defense
Committee for the Union. In 1863 he went to
England as a Union delegate to convince
England to stop providing war vessels and

equipment to the
CONFEDERACY.
Following the end of the Civil War,
Evarts returned to his law practice. He was
drawn back to Washington, D.C., in 1868 to help
defend President Johnson at his impeachment
trial. The charges against Johnson were weak and
politically motivated, yet the mood in the Senate
appeared to favor conviction. Evarts proved
instrumental in obtaining an acquittal, though
by a margin of only one vote. Johnson rewarded
Evarts by appointing him attorney general. Evarts
served in that position until the end of the
Johnson administration in March 1869.
Evarts then returned to New York govern-
ment. He led the New York City
BAR ASSOCIATION
for ten years and was an advocate for
political reform in the city, which was dominated
by the corrupt Democratic political machine led
by the “Tweed Ring.” The ring was named after
William Marcy “Boss” Tweed, the New York
City
DEMOCRATIC PARTY leader who ran the party
organization popularly known as TAMMANY H ALL.
Tweed and his associates used their political
connections and political offices to gain a
foothold in city and county government. Once
formed, the Tweed Ring misappropriated
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION

EVARTS, WILLIAM MAXWELL 263
government funds through such devices as faked
leases, padded bills, false vouchers, unnecessary
repairs, and overpriced goods and services
bought from suppliers controlled by the ring.
In 1876 Evarts reentered the national
political arena, this time as the chief counsel
of the national Republican party. The presiden-
tial election of 1876 between Democrat
SAMUEL J.
TILDEN and Republican Rutherford B. Hayes
ended in disputes involving the voting returns
of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina. Two
sets of returns were submitted from each of
these states, one favoring Tilden, the other
Hayes. If Hayes were awarded the electoral votes
from these states, and one more from a disputed
Oregon elector, he would defeat Tilden in a vote
of 185–184.
Congress appointed an electoral commis-
sion to decide which returns to accept. In the
end Evarts and the Republican members of the
commission were able to convince commission
member and Supreme Court Justice
JOSEPH P.
BRADLEY to cast his vote, which was the deciding
vote, for the Hayes electors and Hayes was
awarded the presidency. Tilden agreed to the
result out of fear that violence would ensue if he
disputed it. In return the Republicans made a

side agreement with southern Democrats that
led to President Hayes in 1877 removing federal
occupation troops from the former states of the
Confederacy. Evarts was also a key player in
these affairs.
President Hayes, like President Johnson
before him, reward ed Evarts, appointing him
secretary of state in 1877. Evarts served in this
capacity during the four years of the Hayes
administration. In 1885 he was elected a U.S.
senator from New York. He served in the Senate
until 1889. In failing health he retired from
politics and the law in 1891.
Evarts died February 28, 1901, in New
York City.
v
EVERS, MEDGAR WILEY
Shortly before his death, CIVIL RIGHTS activist
MEDGAR WILEY EVERS was described in the New York
Times as the movement’s “quiet integrationist.”
Although his contemporary
MARTIN LUTHER KING,
William M. Evarts.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
William Maxwell Evarts 1818–1901
❖
❖
◆
1818 Born,
Boston, Mass.

◆
1837 Graduated from
Yale University
1861–65
U.S. Civil War
1863–64
Served as
Union
delegate
to England
1841
Admitted to
New York bar
▼▼
▼▼
18001800
18501850
18751875
19001900
18251825
1876 Acted as chief counsel for the Republicans
in the Hayes-Tilden electoral battle
1868–69 Served as U.S.
attorney general
1849–53 Served
as assistant
district attorney
for the New York
District
◆

1868 Defended President Andrew
Johnson at impeachment trial
1901 Died,
New York
City
◆
◆
1870–80 Headed the Association
of the Bar of New York City
1873 William "Boss" Tweed
convicted of stealing public funds
1877–81 Served as secretary of state
1885–89 Represented
New York in the U.S.
Senate
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
264 EVERS, MEDGAR WILEY
JR., achieved greater fame for organizing nonvio-
lent demonstrations and boycotts, Evers was an
equally dedicated reformer, whose reports of civil
rights abuses in Mississippi helped to force social
and political changes in the Deep South.
From 1954 to 1963, Ev ers was state field
secretary for the National Association for the
ADVANCEMENT of Colored People (NAACP). Cou-
rageous, methodical, and devoted to his work,
Evers sought to dismantle a decades-old system
of
SEGREGATION. His approach was to create
public outrage over the treatment of African

Americans by documenting cases of brutality
and injustice. Although Evers fought tirelessly
against discriminatory laws and conduct, he
rejected violence as a means of improving the
plight of his people.
By antagonizing powerful white suprema-
cists, Evers put himself in constant danger in his
home state. When he was shot and killed by a
sniper on June 12, 1963, many Mississippians
were not surprised. Upon his death, Eve rs
became an early martyr in the African-
American struggle for equal rights. More than
30 years later, when Byron de la Beckwith finally
was convicted of Evers’s
ASSASSINATION, Evers
became a symbol of U.S. justice—delayed, but
not denied.
Evers was born July 2, 1925, in Decatur,
Mississippi, the younger of two sons born to
James Evers, a sawmill worker, and Jessie Evers,
a devout Christian who encouraged young
Medgar to succeed. The Evers family was
hardworking but poor. Townspeople remember
Evers as an upright, sympathetic young man
who chafed under the inequities of segregation.
During
WORLD WAR II, Evers served in an all–
African-American unit of the U.S. Army.
Although the military’s racial policies infuriated
him, he fought with distinction and was

decorated for his bravery in the Normandy
Invasion. During his tour of duty, Evers
experienced in Europe a more tolerant, racially
integrated society, which inspired his hope for
changes in his native Mississippi.
After the war, Evers attended Mississippi’s
Alcorn A&M College, where he participated in
football, track, debate, and choir. He also met
YOU CAN KILL A MAN
BUT YOU CAN
’T KILL
AN IDEA
.
—MEDGAR EVERS
Medgar Evers.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Medgar Wiley Evers 1925–1963
❖
1925 Born,
Decatur, Miss.
◆
1944 Decorated for bravery
after Normandy Invasion
1962 Aided James Meredith in his successful
attempt to register at University of Mississippi
1963 Assassinated, Jackson, Miss.; Byron
de la Beckwith charged with murder, but
two trials resulted in hung juries
◆◆
◆

◆
1952 Graduated from
Alcorn Agricultural and
Mechanical College
1995 Myrlie Evers
Williams, Evers's
widow, elected head
of NAACP
1961–73
Vietnam War
1939–45
World War II
1950–53
Korean War
▼▼
▼▼
19501950
19751975
20002000
19251925
1954–63 Served as NAACP
field representative in Miss.
1967 Thurgood Marshall became first
African American U.S. Supreme Court justice
◆
◆
◆
1958 Arrested for sitting in a "white"
bus seat in Meridian, Mississippi
❖

1971 Public school busing
to achieve integration began
1994 Beckwith convicted
of Evers's death
1990
Beckwith
reindicted
◆
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
EVERS, MEDGAR WILEY 265
his future wife, Myrlie Evers, with whom he had
three children. After graduation, Evers worked
as a sales agent for Magnolia Mutual, an
African-American–owned life insurance com-
pany. Assigned a rural territory, Evers witnessed
African-American poverty and debasement on
such a large scale that he could no longer abide
Mississippi’s racial discrimination. He took a
job with the NAACP in 1954, determined to
make a difference.
As an NAACP field representative, Evers
handled routine administrative duties such as
setting up chapters, recruiting new members,
and collecting dues. But more importantly,
Evers filed detailed public reports of lynchings,
beatings, and other race-related atrocities in
Mississippi. His work attracted national atten-
tion. Evers also encouraged voter registration
for African Americans and, in some instances,
boycotts.

Because he signaled the end of the era of
white power, Evers was despised by southern
bigots. He bravely endured their taunts and
death threats. Org anizations opposed to inte-
gration, such as the White Citizens Council,
branded Evers an enemy. Ironically, as African
Americans became impatient with the slow pace
of social change, Evers’s work was oversha-
dowed by more militant civil rights strategies.
On the night of his
MURDER, Evers attended a
local rally. Around midnight, he returned to his
Jackson, Mississippi, home, where an assassin
waited for him in nearby honeysuckle bushes.
Evers got out of his car and walked up the
driveway, carrying shirts that read Jim Crow
Must Go, a reference to laws conferring second-
class citizenship on African Americans. The
assassin shot him in the back with an Enfield
30.06 rifle. Evers’s wife and their young children,
Darrell, Reena, and James, heard the gunshot and
rushed to his side. Evers could not be saved.
As news of Evers’s death spread, riots erupted
in Jackson. The nation was stunned by the killing.
President
JOHN F. KENNEDY denounced the assassi-
nation, sending Evers’s wife his condolences and
praising Evers’s devotion to civil rights. The
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) was called
in to conduct a criminal investigation. Evers was

buried in Arlington National Cemetery, in
Washington, D.C.
The trail of the FBI ’s investigation led
quickly to white supremacist Byron de la
Beckwith, a fertilizer sales representative
affiliated with the
KU KLUX KLAN. Charged with
murder, de la Beckwith appeared guilty to most
observers, but the racial climate in Mississippi
prevented a sure conviction. During his trial, de
la Beckwith acted clownish and unrepentant. At
one point, Mississippi governor Ross Barnett
entered the courtroom and hugged the
DEFEN-
DANT
in full view of the all-white jury. Despite
compelling evidence from the prosecution—de
la Beckwith’s public boasting about the murder,
his
FINGERPRINTS on the rifle scope, his well-
known ability as a marksman, and reports that
his white Plymouth Valiant was parked near
Evers’s home at the time of the killing—the trial
resulted in a hung jury. Astonishingly, a second
trial also ended in a hung jury.
Evers’s widow, who had remarried, refused
to let the matter drop.
MYRLIE EVERS-WILLIAMS
lobbied long and hard to have de la Beckwith
tried for a third time for Evers’s killing. A third

prosecution was possible in this case for two
reasons. First, there is no
STATUTE OF L IMITATIONS
for murder, so the passage of time was not a
consideration. Second, de la Beckwith had not
been exonerated (with a hung jury, the
defendant is neither acquitted nor convicted),
so
DOUBLE JEOPARDY, the constitutional guaran-
tee against multiple prosecutions, was not an
issue. Evers-Williams’s d etermination to see
justice done, as well as a change in Mississippi
politics, made a third trial of de la Beckwith
possible.
Facing testimony from new and former
witnesses, de la Beckwith was reindicted in
1990. A trial was conducted by District Attorney
Ed Peters. On February 21, 1994, a jury of eight
African Americans and four whites in Hinds
County, Mississippi , found de la Beckwith, by
then 73 years old, guilty of the 1963 murder of
Evers. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld
his conviction in 1997. De la Beckwith died in
prison in 2001. Although the third trial was a
painful experience for Evers-Williams, she was
relieved that the Mississippi criminal justice
system had finally brought closure to a personal
and public tragedy.
In life and death, Evers played an impor-
tant role in the fight f or racial equality. He

inspired in others, including his family, a
commitment to the same social, political, and
economic goals for African Americans. Eve rs’s
brother, Charles Evers, was elected mayor of
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
266 EVERS, MEDGAR WILEY
Fayette, Mississippi, in 1969, and ran unsuc-
cessfully for governor of the state in 1971. In
1995, Evers-Williams was elected to head the
NAACP, the organization to which Evers had
dedicated his life.
FURTHER READINGS
Evers, Myrlie, with William Peters. 1967. For Us, the Living.
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
Evers-Williams, Myrlie and Manning Marable. 2005. The
Autobiography of Medgar Evers: A Hero’s Life and Legacy
Revealed Through His Writings, Letters, and Speeches.
New York: Basic Civitas Books.
Massengill, Reed. 1994. Portrait of a Racist: The Man Who
Killed Medgar Evers? New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Nossiter, Adam. 1994. Of Long Memory: Mississippi and the
Murder of Medgar Evers. Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley.
CROSS REFERENCES
Civil Rights Movement.
v
EVERS-WILLIAMS, MYRLIE
MYRLIE EVERS-WILLIAMS achieved national promi-
nence as the chairwoman of the National
Association for the

ADVANCEMENT of Colored
People (
NAACP). She was narrowly elected to the
post in 1995 as part of an effort to reform an
organization rocked by scandal and allegations
of financial mismanagement.
Evers-Williams was born March 17, 1933, in
Vicksburg, Mississippi. She became part of the
modern
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT through her
marriage to
MEDGAR EVERS, who was the state field
secretary for the Mississippi NAACP. Her world
changed dramatically on June 12, 1963, when her
husband was shot to death outside their home in
Jackson, Mississippi. White supremacist Byron de
la Beckwith was charged with the
MURDER,buttwo
trials in the 1960s ended in hung juries. After the
second trial, Evers-Williams vowed to bring de la
Beckwith to justice.
Following her husband’s
ASSASSINATION,
Evers-Williams assumed his position as NAACP
field secretary. Then in 1964 she decided to
move with her three young children to
Claremont, Californ ia, and begin a new life. In
1967, she published For Us the Living, a memoir
of her life with her late husband. She earned a
Myrlie

Evers-Williams.
AP IMAGES
Myrlie Evers-Williams 1933–
▼▼
▼▼
1930
2000
1975
1950
❖
◆◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
1999 Watch Me Fly: What I
Learned on the Way to
Becoming the Woman I Was
Meant to Be published
1995 Evers-Williams
elected chair of NAACP
2005 Published
The Autobiography
of Medgar Evers,

comprised of
Medgar’s writings
and speeches
1994 De la Beckwith convicted of Medgar
Evers's death; sentenced to life
1987–89
Appointed first
African American
woman to serve
as commissioner
on L.A. Board of
Public Works
1990
De la Beckwith
reindicted
1976
Married
Walter
Williams
1970
Ran for
seat in
Congress
1968 Graduated from Pomona
College; became director of
planning at the Claremont
Colleges
1967 For Us the Living published
1954–63 Medgar
served as

Mississippi's state
field secretary of
the NAACP
1963 Medgar assassinated in front of their home
in Jackson, Miss.; Byron de la Beckwith charged
1964 Two trials resulted in hung juries;
Evers family moved to California
1951 Married
Medgar Evers
1933 Born,
Vicksburg, Miss.
1939–45
World War II
1950–53
Korean War
1961–73
Vietnam War
NEVER LOSE SIGHT
OF YOUR GOALS
.WE
ARE LIVING IN A TIME
WHEN WE MUST TAKE
INTO OUR HANDS OUR
DESTINIES AND OUR
FUTURES
.
—MYRLIE
EVERS-WILLIAMS
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
EVERS-WILLIAMS, MYRLIE 267

degree in sociology at Pomona College in 1968
and the n became director of planning for the
Claremont Colleges system.
In 1970 she ran for a seat in Congress in
what was then the 24th congressional district in
California. Though she lost the election, it was a
turning point for Evers-Williams. She was
publicly transformed from Mrs. Medgar Evers
to Myrlie Evers. In the 1970s and 1980s, she
worked in the corporate arena, serving as
director of consumer affairs for the Atlantic
Richfield Company. In 1976 she marrie d Walter
Williams, a California longshoreman and
CIVIL
RIGHTS
activist.
In 1987 Evers-Willams became the first
African American woman to serve on the Los
Angeles Board of Public Works. She and her
husband moved to Bend, Oregon, in 1989.
When Mississippi prosecutors failed to try de
la Beckwith a third time for the murder of
Medgar Evers, Evers-Williams mounted a cam-
paign to generate public opinion in favor of a
retrial. When she was told that no transcripts of
the original trial were to be found, she produced
an original that she had held in a safe deposit box
since the 1960s. In 1994 her efforts succeeded,
anddelaBeckwithwasconvictedofthe1963
crime. He was sentenced to life in prison, where

he died in 2001. In 1996, Evers-Williams served
as a consultant to the movie Ghosts of Mississippi,
which recounts the story of the retrial and
conviction of de la Beckwith. Actress Whoopi
Goldberg portrays Evers-Williams in the movie.
Despite the many changes and activities in
her life, Evers-Williams remained committed to
the NAACP. Serving on the national board of
directors in the 1990s, she observed firsthand
the problems that were engulfing the once
dominant civil rights organization. A growing
dissatisfaction with the leadership of Executive
Director Benjamin F. Chavis Jr. culminated in
August 1994, when he was fired for committing
more than $330,000 in NAACP funds, without
the board’s approval, to settle a
SEX DISCRIMINA-
TION
suit filed against him. The focus then
shifted to Chairman William F. Gibson, who
was also accused of misappropriating NAACP
funds for personal use.
Evers-Williams was approached to challenge
Gibson at the 1995 board election. She hesitated
to run because her husband was dying from
prostate cance r. However, Walter Williams
urged her to take up the fight. She was elected
to the chair in February 1995, winning by a one-
vote margin; Evers-Williams was the first
woman elected to that position. Her husband

died shortly after her election.
The precarious state of the NAACP soon
became clear to Evers-Williams. Membership
had declined from 500,000 to 300,000, while the
organization’s debt had risen to over $4 million.
Corporate support had also dropped, forcing
severe staff reductions at the national headquar-
ters in Baltimore.
Evers-Williams moved quickly to restore
trust. The board hired an accounting firm to
audit financial records and directed its attorney to
seek restitution from Gibson. Evers-Williams
renewed contact with financial contributors,
crisscrossing the United States in search of
support. By the end of 1995, she had substantially
reduced the NAACP’s debt. New programs were
started with the goal of reinvigorating the
NAACP and attracting younger members. In
December 1995, the board approved the appoint-
ment of Representative Kweisi Mfume (D-Md.)
as president and executive director, capping a
frenetic year for Evers-Williams.
Evers-Williams served as chair of the NAACP
until 1998. She then began work on the M edgar
Evers Institute, headquartered in Jackson, Mis-
sissippi, which promotes c ivil rights and economic
development. In 2003 the institute part nered w ith
Oregon State U niversity t o e stablish a western
regional office in Bend, home of Evers-Williams.
Evers-Williams continued to be a well-

received speaker and author. In 1999, she
published a memoir, titled Watch Me Fly: What
I Learned on the Way to Becoming the Woman I
Was Meant to Be, with Melinda Blau. She received
numerous honorary degrees and awards, includ-
ing the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus Achieve-
ment Award, the NAACP’s Image Award for Civil
Rights, and the Woman of the Year Award from
the state of California. In March 2003 Evers-
Williams visited Mississippi in order to partici-
pate in a tribute by the Mississippi Legislature to
honor the accomplishments of the late Medgar
Evers and Myrlie Evers-Williams. In 2005 Evers-
Williams published The Autobiography of Medgar
Evers: A Hero’s Life and Legacy Revealed Through
His Writings, Letters, and Speeches.Asofearly
2010, she continued to serve on the board of the
NAACP and to live in Bend, Oregon.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
268 EVERS-WILLIAMS, MYRLIE