Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 5 P29 potx

v
HIGGINBOTHAM, ALOYISUS
LEON, JR.
A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. was an attorney, a
scholar, and a federal judge. His distinguished
judicial career culminated in his attaining the
rank of chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.
Higginbotham was born February 25, 1928,
in Trenton, New Jersey. Although he attended
segregated public schools, his mother was
determined that he would receive the same
opportunities available to white students. “She
knew that education was the sole passport to a
better life,” he said. No African American
student had been admitted to the academic
high school program in Trenton because Latin,
a requirement for the program, was not offered
at the black elementary schools. But Higginbo-
tham’s mother fought for her son’s right to
enroll and finally convinced the principal to
allow him into the program. Higginbotham had
no doubt that his mother’s advocacy made a
difference in the outcome of his life. “When I
see students who went to [elementary school]
with me now working as elevator operators
or on street maintenance,” he said, “I often
wonder what their future would have been if the
school had offered Latin.”
After finishing high school, Higginbotham
decided to become an engineer and enrolled at

Purdue University, in West Lafayette, Indiana. A
winter spent sleeping in an unheated attic with
11 other African American students caused him
to rethink his career goals. “One night, as the
temperature was close to zero, I felt that I could
suffer the personal indignities and denigration
no longer,” he wrote in the preface to his
book, In the Matter of Color: The Colonial Period
(1978). He spoke to the university president,
who told him the law did not require the
university to “let colored students in the dorm.”
Higginbotham was advised to accept the situa-
tion or leave. “How could it be that the law
would not permit twelve good kids to sleep in a
warm dormitory?” he wondered. He decided
then and there to abandon engineering and
pursue a career in law.
▼▼
▼▼
A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. 1928–1998
19501950
19751975
20002000
19251925
❖
◆
◆
◆
1939–45
World War II

1950–53
Korean War
1961–73
Vietnam War
◆
◆
1928 Born,
Trenton, N.J.
◆
◆
❖
1952 Graduated from
Yale Law School
1953–54 Served as assistant district attorney in Philadelphia
1954 Brown v. Board of Education decided
1964–77 Sat on
the U.S. District
Court for the
Eastern District
of Pa.
1969 Elected
first black
trustee of Yale
University
1962 Appointed to Federal Trade Commission
1977–93 Sat
on the U.S.
Court of
Appeals for
the

Third Circuit
◆
1978 In the Matter of Color published
1998 Died,
Boston, Mass.
1996 Shades of Freedom:
Racial Politics and
Presumptions of the
American Legal
Process published
1989
Promoted to
chief judge
of the
Third
Circuit
1993 Joined faculty at Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
1995 Appointed commissioner of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom
◆
A. Leon
Higginbotham.
COURTESY OF THE
ESTATE OF A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM JR.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
268 HIGGINBOTHAM, A LOYISUS LEON, JR.
Higginbotham left Purdue to attend Anti-
och College, in Ohio, where he studied
sociology, earning his bachelor of arts degree
in 1949. He went on to Yale Law School, and

received his bachelor of laws degree in 1952.
Another incident that helped galvanize his
commitment to racial equality occurred shortly
after his gradua tion from Yale. He was a job
candidate for a prominent Philadelphia law firm
that did not know he was black until he arrived
for the interview. Although the partner who
spoke with him praised his qualifications, he
told Higginbotham he could not do anything
for him except direct him to local African
American law firms who might hire him.
Discouraged but not daunted, Higginbo-
tham began his legal career as an assistant
district attorney in Philadelphia and then
became a partner in a law firm that handled
business, church, and
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. Presi-
dent
JOHN F. KENNEDY made him a commissioner
with the
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION in 1962; he
was the youngest person ever appointed to the
post and the first African American. The same
year, the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce
named him one of its ten outstanding young
men. In 1964 President
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
named him a U.S. district judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania; at age 36, he was the
youngest federal judge to be appointed in three

decades. In 1977 President
JIMMY CARTER
elevated him to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, which encompasses Pennsyl-
vania, New Jersey, Delaware, and the Virgin
Islands.
Higginbotham’s distinguished judicial ca-
reer was capped in 198 9 when he was promoted
to chief judge for the Third
CIRCUIT COURT of
Appeals. At the time, he was the only African
American judge directing one of the federal
judiciary’s 12 circuits. His ascendancy was
hailed by many who saw it as proof that the
U.S. judicial system was becoming more inclu-
sive. Guido Calabresi, dean of Yale Law School,
praised him as “a first-rate judge, a sensitive
judge, who is powerful in style and analytically
strong.” But some African American lawyers felt
that too much emphasis was placed on
Higginbotham’s skin color and on the racial
import of his promotion. “There is no more
significance to it than anybody else becoming
Chief Judge,” said
THURGOOD MARSHALL, associate
justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. “I think he is
a great lawyer and a very great judge. Period.”
Higginbotham was an outspoken proponent
of
CIVIL RIGHTS and racial equality. In 1990 he

declined to officiate at a
MOOT COURT competi-
tion at the University of Chicago Law School
because, he said, Chicago was the only one of
the top ten schools in the United States that “for
two decades has not had even one black
professor in either a tenured position or a
tenure-track position.”
Higginbotham’s devotion to civil rights was
evident in his criticism of Justice
CLARENCE
THOMAS
, a conservative African American whose
nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1991
provoked criticism and controversy. In an
article titled “An Open Letter to Justice Clarence
Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague”
(U. Pa. L. Rev., Jan. 1992), Higginbotham called
upon Thomas to remain cognizant of his
responsibilities as an African Americ an on the
Supreme Court. He reminded Thom as of the
discrimination both men’s grandfathers had
faced and of Thomas’sdebttothe
CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT
, commenting that without the move-
ment, “probably neither you nor I would be
Federal judges today.” He was also sharply critical
of Thomas’s record. He noted that after studying
nearly all of Thomas’s speeches and writings,

“I could not find one shred of evidence suggesting
an insightful understanding on your part of how
the evolutionary movement of the Constitution
and the work of the civil rights organizations have
benefited you.”
During his career, Higginbotham was
awarded more than 60 honorary degrees; in
1969, he became the first African American
elected to the board of trustees of Yale
University. He was also a tireless lecturer,
teaching at various times over the course of 20
years at the University of Pennsylvania, Univer-
sity of Michigan, Stanford, New York Universi-
ty, and Yale. In addition, Higginbotham was
well known for his prolific writings, including
more than one hundred articles. His book In the
Matter of Color received several national and
international awards. In 1996, he published
Shades of Freedom: Racial Politics and Presump-
tions of the American Legal Process.
In 1993 Higginbotham retired from the
circuit court and formed an associatio n with the
law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, &
Garrison in New York City. In 1995 President
BILL CLINTON awarded Higginbotham the Presi-
dential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest
BROWN CHANGED
THE MORAL TONE OF
AMERICA
; BY

ELIMINATING THE
LEGITIMIZATION OF
STATE
-IMPOSED
RACISM IT IMPLICITLY
QUESTIONED RACISM
WHEREVER IT WAS
USED
.
—A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
HIGGINBOTHAM, ALOYISUS LEON, JR. 269
civilian award. In the same year, Presid ent
Clinton appointed him to serve a six-ye ar term
as a commissioner of the U.S.
COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS
. Higginbotham died of a stroke on
December 14, 1998, in Boston, Massachusetts.
FURTHER READINGS
“A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., Federal Judge, is Dead at 70.”
The New York Times (December 15, 1998).
Diver, Colin S. 1999 “A. Leon Higginbotham (1928–1998):
A Tribute.” The Pennsylvania Gazette. Available online
at />html; website home page:
(accessed July 29, 2009).
Higginbotham, A. Leon. 1996. Shades of Freedom: Racial
Politics and Presumptions of the American Legal Process.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
The offenses for which presidents, vice presidents,
and all civil officers, including federal judges, can
be removed from office through a process called
impeachment.
The phrase high crimes and misdemeanors is
found in the U.S.
CONSTITUTION. It also appears
in state laws and constitutions as a basis for
disqualification from holding office. Originating
in English common law, these words have
acquired a broad meaning in U.S. law. They
refer to criminal actions as well as any serious
misuse or abuse of office, ranging from
TAX
EVASION
to OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE. The ultimate
authority for determining whether an offens e
constitutes a ground for
IMPEACHMENT rests with
Congress.
The exact meaning of the phrase cannot be
found in the Constitution itself. Article II,
Section 4, establishes, “The President, Vice
President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
TREASON,
BRIBERY, or other High Crimes and Misdemea-
nors.” Treason and bribery are specific, but high

crimes and misdemeanors is not. In fact,
considerable debate occupied the Framers of
A depiction of the
1868 impeachment
proceedings against
President Andrew
Johnson. The
Senate’s vote on the
11th Article of
Impeachment fell
short of the two-thirds
majority needed to
impeach Johnson.
Two other articles
were later defeated.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
270 HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
the Constitution over the issue of impeachment,
and the wording of the grounds for impeach-
ment was itself controversial. A proposed
offense of maladministration was rejected as
being too vague and susceptible to political
abuse. Finally, they chose to use a phrase from
English common law that had no precisely
settled meaning at the time yet at least connoted
serious offenses.
The reason for the choice lies in the Framers’
approach to the larger question of impeachment.

Although borrowing language from the law they
knew best, they explicitly chose not to imitate the
English model of impeachment. Traditionally,
this approach had allowed the British Parliament
to conduct a simple review of charges and then
remove officials by a majority vote. Instead, the
Framers intended for removal from office to be
the final step in a two-part process that began in
the House of Representatives and, if charges
should result, ended in a trial-like hearing before
the U.S. Senate. Thus, two goals would be
achieved: a full public inquiry into allegations,
and, if necessary, the adjudication of those
charges requiring a two-thirds majority for
removal.
Generally, debate over the phrase high crimes
and misdemeanors has split into two camps. The
minority view is held by critics who undertake a
literal reading of the Constitution. They maintain
that high crimes means what it says—criminal
activity—and argue that the Framers wanted
only criminal activities to be the basis for
impeachment. The generally accepted viewpoint
is much broader. It defines high crimes and
misdemeanors as any serious abuse of power—
including both legal and illegal activities. Sup-
porters of this reading believe that because
impeachment is a public inquiry, first and
foremost, it is appropriate to read the phrase
broadly in order to provide the most thorough

inquiry possible. Thus, a civil officer may face
impeachment for misconduct, violations of oath
of office, serious incompetence, or, in the case of
judges, activities that undermine public confi-
dence or damage the integrity of the judiciary.
The vagueness of the standard has left much
interpretive power to Congress. In 1868 Presi-
dent
ANDREW JOHNSON underwent impeachment
proceedings when he ordered the firing of his
secretary of war. His opponents charged that
this order violated the
TENURE OF OFFICE ACT,
which set the tenure of certain officials. Johnson
escaped conviction in the Senate by only one
vote, but the attempt to
IMPEACH him quickly
came to be seen as a politically motivated
mistake. In 1974 the House Judiciary Commit-
tee recommended that the full House of
Representatives approve
ARTICLES OF IMPEACH-
MENT
against President RICHARD M. NIXON.Itdid
not cite any single impeachable offense, but
instead found a broad pattern of wrongdoing:
Nixon had conspired with his advisers to
obstruct federal and congressional investiga-
tions of the
WATERGATE break-in, the burglarizing

of the Democratic National Committee head-
quarters in Washington, D.C., which was
eventually linked to the Nixon administration.
Nixon resigned from office before the process
could continue.
The dispute over what constitutes a high
crime or
MISDEMEANOR reemerged in 1998 when
the House Judiciary Committee voted to
recommend that the House begin impeachment
proceedings against President
BILL CLINTON. The
House concurred with the recommendation,
which included charges of perjury and obstruc-
tion of justice. Legal commentators debated for
weeks about whether these charges were the
type of high crimes and misdemeanors contem-
plated by the language of the Constitution, but
the House neverth eless approved two of the
four articles of impeachment. The trial then
moved to the Senate, which failed to garner
the necessary two-thirds majority to remove
Clinton from office.
FURTHER READINGS
Coulter, Ann H. 2002. High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The
Case against Bill Clinton. New York: Perseus.
Isenbergh, Joseph. 1999. “Impeachment and Presidential
Immunity from Judicial Process.” Yale Law and Policy
Review 18.
Smith, Alexa J. 1995. “Federal Judicial Impeachment:

Defining Process Due.” Hastings Law Journal 46
(January).
Tushnet, Mark V. 1995. “Clarence Thomas: The Constitu-
tional Problems.” George Washington Law Review
(March).
Williams, Victor. “Third Branch Independence and Integrity
Threatened by Political Branch Irresponsibility.” 1995.
Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal (summer).
HIGHWAY
A main road or thoroughfare, such as a street,
boulevard, or parkway, available to the public for
use for travel or transportation.
The nature of a public way is determinable
from its origin, as well as the intention and
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
HIGHWAY 271
plans of the appropriate authorities and the use
to which it has been put. If a particular road or
highway is designated as private, its character
will not be altered if it is actually a public road
or highway. Private roads are intended for use
by a few private individuals, as distinguished
from highways that are for public use.
It is essential that a highway be established
in a manner recognized by the particular
jurisdiction, whether it be by extended use—
prescription—or by dedication to the public by
the owner of the property subject to the consent
of public authorities. Prior to the time that any
statutory procedure for the establishment of

highways was devised, prescription and dedica-
tion were the methods used in common law.
Currently, most highways are created by statute.
Extended Use or Prescription
One method of establishing a highway or public
road is through prescription—the extended use
of a piece of land for a certain length of time by
the public, absent the owner’s consent.
The actual number of persons using the
road or the frequency or extent of such use is
immaterial provided the property is openly and
continuously used as a road with no restrictions.
In addition, such public use must not be
interrupted by acts of the owner that are
designed to stop the use of his or her property
as a public highway. For example, the posting of
several “no trespassing” signs around the
land and the erection of a fence would most
likely prevent a highway from being recognized.
Verbal objections alone, or unsuccessful attempts
to curtail use as a highway, are ordinarily
insufficient.
Any property subject to the right of the state
to lay out a public way over it can become a
highway by extended use if the conditions
prescribed by statute are met. The public is
given an easement in the land as a highway, and
the width and extent of a highway are deter-
mined by the extent of its actual use for such
purposes.

Statute
The creation of highways is a function of the
government that stems from its power of
eminent domain—the authority to take private
property for public use. The legislature makes
the determination needed for public use and
convenience and provides for establishment of
highways by local boards or courts. In deciding
whether the need for a highway exists, factors
for consideration include topography, soil
character, population, location, conditio n, con-
venience of highways already established or
proposed, and the probable extent of use.
In the absence of statutory authorization, a
highway cannot be constructed through lands of
the state, or property that has already been
designated for public use, such as a park.
Additionally, some state laws proscribe the
ILLUSTRATION BY GGS
CREATIVE RESOURCES.
REPRODUCED BY
PERMISSION OF GALE,
A PART OF CENGAGE
LEARNING.
Highway Mileage in the United States in 2007
FUNCTIONAL SYSTEMS OF U.S. HIGHWAYS
NUMBER OF MILES OF ROAD SURFACE
URBAN VS. RURAL LOCATION OF HIGHWAY
NUMBER OF MILES OF ROAD SURFACE
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal

Hi
g
hwa
y
Administration, Hi
g
hwa
y
Statistics 2007.
Rural
6,113,495
Local
5,570,553
Urban
2,343,858
Interstate
212,782
Other freeways
/
expressways
50,845
Other
arterial
1,019,820
Collector
1,603,353
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
272 HIGHWAY
creation of highways through residences, build-
ings used for trade, gardens, or orchards.

Public Authorities
Public officials, such as state highway commis-
sioners, act on behalf of the particular county or
municipal corporation upon which the state has
conferred power to establish highways.
A highway and road district is a subdivision
of the state, which the legislature creates to
facilitate the admi nistration of highways. The
legislature defines and sets the territorial extent,
limits, and boundaries of the road or highway
district, and, generally, only l ands that will be
benefited are included. Highway boards and
commissions are ordinarily responsible for the
construction, improveme nt, and maintenance
of highways.
Abandonment, Alteration, and Vacation
The right of the public to use a highway may be
forfeited by abandonment. Nonuse might be
considered abandonment under statutory pro-
visions. The evidence that a highway is in such a
dangerous state of disrepair for a numb er of
years that the public stops using it and a county
fails to repair it constitutes abandonment in
some jurisdictions. Where provided by statute,
delay in opening a highway might be regarded
as abandonment if it extends over an unreason-
able length of time.
An alteration of a highway ordinarily refers
to a change in its course that the state may effect
in exercise of its

POLICE POWER. A proceeding for
a change or alteration in a public road generally
will not be brought unless the change will
further safety, convenience, or other public
interests.
Vacation of a highway occurs when its
existence is terminated by the direct action of
public officials. The authority to vacate is
generally delegated to the appropriate authori-
ties or local agencies. Certain statutes make the
provision that highways may be vacated by a
vote of the town in a town meeting. Ordinarily,
highways cannot be vacated unless they are
useless, inconvenient, or burdensome, and the
grounds are usually regulated by statutes. A
highway t hat has been laid o u t but not
constructed may be discontinued due to a change
of circumstances, such as where a variation in
traffic patterns ma kes the proposed highway
unnecessary.
Title
The public only acquires the right to use a
highway, whereas title to the land remains
with the owner, subject to the public’srights.
When a highway is constructed, the public has
the
RIGHT OF WAY as well as privileges incident
thereto, including the right to construct,
improve, and repair the highway. When a
highway is abandoned or discontinued, how-

ever, total and unlimited ownership reverts to
the true owner.
An individual whose land abuts a public
highway might have special rights, including the
right to a reasonable passageway to the highway
from his or her land.
Construction and Maintenance
The construction and maintenance of highways
are assumed by either the state, local commu-
nities, or a specifically designated agency. The
actual plan of work in constructing, maintain-
ing, or repairing highways is in the discretion of
the highway authorities, whereas the state
legislature determines their routes. The desig-
nation and location of a federally-aided state
highway must be in accordance with federal and
state law. A state, in its construction of a
highway under the federal-aid primary system
might be required to obtain the approval of
federal agencies if the highway has a marked
effect on the environment. The authorities may
make provisions for the drainage of surface
waters and for the building of ditches and
culverts.
The construction and repair of public roads
may be funded by general
TAXATION, because the
public roads are for a public purpose. The
power to impose highway taxes vests in the
legislature, and funds may be raised from

vehicle taxes, gasoline taxes, property taxes,
the sale of bonds, or by special assessments on
the property for the amount necessary to cover
the costs of construction or improvement.
In 1998 Congress enacted a law (Transpor-
tation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Public
Law (105-178) that required states to enact .08
as the blood alcohol count (BAC) needed to
constitute the crime of driving while intoxicat-
ed. States that did not lower their BAC to meet
this standard would lose federal highway funds.
By 2005 all of the states had met this new federal
standard.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
HIGHWAY 273
The U.S. TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, estab-
lished by Congress, works with the states to
establish and maintain a national highway
system (23 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.). Federal
revenues pay for most of the national highway
system. Congress may withhold portions of
these funds if states do not enact certain laws
related to highways or highway use and affecting
interstate commerce. For example, Congress
may withhold funding if a state does not set the
minimum age for alcohol consumption at 21
years; suspend, for at least six months, the
driver’s license of persons convicted of drug
offenses; or prohibit driving under the influence
of alcohol.

Obstruction
Any unauthorized obstruction that hinders the
use of a public highway, such as a fence, gate, or
ditch, is illegal and constitutes a
NUISANCE.
Officials may, however, lawfully obstruct high-
ways temporarily under their jurisdictions for a
reasonable period to make necessary repairs or
improvements. Anyone who causes or allows an
obstruction to be placed on a public highway
is liable and may be enjoined to compel its
removal.
In addition, the authorities or private indivi-
duals who have sustained special damages—
financial or other losses that differ from those
incurred by the public—may sue for damages
against one who obstructs a highway. What
constitutes
SPECIAL DAMAGES is dependent upon
the facts of each case. Special injury might exist
where the obstruction blocks access to the
plaintiff’s property. In a number of jurisdictions
the obstruction of highways is a criminal offense.
Use
The state has the power to control and regulate
the use of public highways, provided its
regulations do not constitute an unreasonable
interference with the right of travel or impede
interstate commerce. The state may determine
the character of motor vehicles that use its

highways and may properly exclude vehicles
weighing in excess of a maximum set by statute.
A reasonable tax may be imposed on vehicles
based on their excess weight in order to
compensate the state for the additional costs
of maintaining the highway as a result of the
severe wear and tear placed on the road by such
vehicles. To protect the public health, the state
may prohibit trucks that transport chemicals or
explosives from driving through populated or
residential areas. The secretary of transportation
regulates the safety per formance of all commer-
cial motor carriers transporting explosives or
dangerous articles, such as flammable or
radioactive materials, in interstate or foreign
commerce. The state may restrict the speed of
vehicles, or proscribe parking alongside the
highway except in emergencies. Bicycles used on
highways may be subject to reasonable restr ic-
tions, such as the requirement that they be
equipped with lights at night.
The law of the road is composed of a system
of rules and regulations based upon the
traditional practices and customs that govern
safe travel on highways. The law is often
embodied in statutes or government regulations
and is regarded as being so well-known that
there is a legal presumption that everyone
knows it. Highway travelers, therefore, may
properly make the assumption that other

travelers will observe the law and comply with
rules and regulations. When an individual
fails to observe the law of the road without
justification, he or she will be held liable for
injuries precipitated by the
NEGLIGENCE.A
violation of a particular rule of the road may
be justified by special circumstance.
FURTHER READINGS
King, Ledyard. “Delay of Road Bill Will Cost States.” USA
Today (September 23, 2003). Available online at http://
www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-09-23-road
money_x.htm; website home page: today.
com (accessed July 29, 2009).
Lynch, James. 1986. “The Federal Highway Beautification
Act after Metromedia.” Emory Law Journal 35.
Queary, Paul. “Seat Belt Law Comes under Fire.” Seattle
Post-Intelligencer (August 4, 2003). Available online at
/>roadmoney_x.htm; website home page: http://www.
usatoday.com (accessed July 29, 2009).
CROSS REFERENCES
Automobiles; National Transportation Safety Board.
HIJACKING
The seizure of a commercial vehicle—airplane,
ship, or truck —by force or threat of force.
Hijacking is the modern term for “piracy.” It
is derived from the phrase “High, Jack!” which
is a command to raise one’s hands before being
robbed. The word gained popular currency
during Prohibition (1920–33), when boot-

leggers commandeered truckloads of liquor
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
274 HIJACKING
from each other, and reappeared when political
activists began to seize commercial airplanes in
the 1960s.
Airplane Hijacking
The first U.S. airplane hijacking occurred in
1961. The number of such incidents, also
known as skyjackings or air piracies, grew
during the 1960s, with 40 attempts made in
1969. Many of the early hijacking incidents
involved persons seeking to divert airplanes to
Cuba, where they could gain asylum. These
hijackings became so numerous that the phrase
“Take me to Havana” entered popular culture.
In 1973 the United States and Cuba were
able to reach an agreement that allows either
country to request the
EXTRADITION of a hijacker.
The agreement came about through an ex-
change of diplomatic notes. It was in Cuba’s
interest to make the agreement because many
Cubans had hijacked planes from Cuba and
forced them to fly to the United States. The
agreement allows either country to take into
account
EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES when the
hijackers acted “for strictly political reasons and
were in real and imminent danger of death

without a viable alternative, provided there was
no financial
EXTORTION or physical injury” to
crew, passengers, or other persons (12 I.L.M.
370–76, No. 2 [March 1973]).
In addition to this agreement, the United
States, in 1961, made the hijacking of an
airplane a federal crime. Under the Aircraft
Piracy Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 32), the attempted or
successful execution of the following actions is
considered hijacking: damaging an aircraft;
placing or bringing a destructive device or
substance on an aircraft; damaging or interfer-
ing with an air navigation facility, or equipment
and property used in connection with the
operation of an aircraft; committing an act of
violence against or otherwise injuring an
individual on an aircraft; or making threats or
statements that they know are false against or
about the safety of an aircraft that is already
in flight.
Hijacking has not been confined to the
United States and Cuba. In 1970 hijackers
seized more than 90 planes around the world.
The growth of international
TERRORISM, specifi-
cally in the Middle East, led to widely publicized
hijackings. In these situations hijackers sought
the satisfaction of political demands and a
platform to air their views. In 1970 members of

the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
hijacked three airliners and flew two of them to
an airstrip in the desert near Amman, Jordan,
while blowing up the third in Cairo, Egypt after
releasing the passengers and crew. Several days
later another plane was hijacked. The hijackers
demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners in
European prisons and in Israeli jails. When their
demands were not met, they removed the
passengers from the airliners and destroyed
the planes one by one.
Faced with increased numbers of air hijack-
ings, the international community sought to
negotiate agreements that would prevent hijack-
ers from finding safe haven. The 1970 Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S.
7192 [ effective in the United States in 1971])
deals specifically with the hijacking of aircraft in
flight. The 1971 Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.
S. 7570 [effective in the United States in 1973])
addresses attacks on or
SABOTAGE of civil aircraft
either in flight or on the ground, or destruction
of or damage to air navigation facilities when
this is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in
flight. Either the state of registration or the
state in which the aircraft lands can exercise

jurisdiction. The state having the hijackers in
custody must prosecute or extradite them. A
state may decline to extradite if it considers the
offense political, or may prefer not to extradite
to a state that imposes the death penalty, but in
either of these cases, it is obligated to prosecute
the offenders.
The United States passed the Antihijacking
Act of 1974 (49 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq.) to
implement these international conventions.
This act seeks to prevent nations from adopting
a permissive posture toward illegal activities
such as the commandeering of aircraft, by pro-
viding penalties for hijackers and for nations
that shield or fail to take adequate precautions
against hijackers. The act gives the president the
power to terminate air service between an
offending nation and the United States if the
president determines that the offending nation
has acted inconsistently with its obligations
under the antihijacking conventions. Since the
signing of these international conventions in the
1970s, airplane hijacking fell sharply, esp ecially
in the United States.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
HIJACKING 275
Hijacking, however, reached a new level on
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, when terrorists comman-
deered four commercial airplanes and crashed
them into the World Trade Center in New

York, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a
field in Pennsylvania. The United States was
stunned and the definition of hijacking came
into serious question. Prior to the attacks,
experts generally found that if pilots adhered
to the hijackers’ demands, violence was less
likely to occur. In this case, however, there was
no negotiation. In effect, the hijackers proved
that planes can be used as missiles, causing mass
violence not only to those aboard a plane, but to
thousands of others located in or near a target
of terrorism. As a result, national security
became an immediate priority, and regulations
and security measures were quickly implemen-
ted in the hopes of preventing similar attacks.
Prior to September 11, airline security fell
under the purview of the
FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION
(FAA). After the attac ks, Con-
gress passed the Aviation and Transportation
Act (Pub. L. No. 107-71; codifed at 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 40101 et. seq.), which among other things
transferred this authority from the FAA to the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
One year later, Congress enacted the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296
(codified in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.A.),
which included additional provisions for the
prevention of hijacking. For example, Title XIV

of the act, known as the Arming Pilots Against
Terrorism Act, qualified certain volunteer pilots
as federal law enforcement officers in order to
protect cockpits in the case of an attempted
hijacking.
New approaches to the prevention of airline
hijacking led to a tightening of security in U.S.
airports. Persons using an airport must now
generally show identification several times
before boarding a plane. And, because the
terrorists in the September 11 attacks used a
common household item (box cutters), many
articles that could potentially be used as a
weapon are now prohibited or restricted.
Ship Hijacking
Ship hijacking is rare, but the seizure of the
Achille Lauro proved that it can happen. The
Italian cruise ship was commandeered on
October 7, 1985, by four members of a faction
of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The
hijackers boarded the ship posing as tourists,
and waited until the ship was off the Egyptian
coast before taking its crew and passengers
hostage. They threatened to kill the hostages if
Israel did not meet their demand to release 50
Palestinian prisoners. They also threatened to
blow up the ship if anyone attempted a rescue
mission. When the hijackers’ demands were not
met the next day, they shot and killed Leon
Klinghoffer, a U.S. citizen who was partially

paralyzed and used a wheelchair. They dumped
Klinghoffer’s body in the sea.
Denied access to a Syrian port, the hijackers
sailed to Alexandria, where they surrendered to
Egyptian authorities. The hijackers were allowed
to leave Egypt for Italy to stand trial, where they
were convicted for violating an Italian statute
that made terrorist kidnapping illegal. The
hijacker who confessed to killing Klinghoffer
was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
FURTHER READINGS
Karber, Phillip A. 2002. “Reconstructing Global Aviation in
an Era of the Civil Aircraft as a Weapon of Destruc-
tion.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 25,
no. 2.
Niles, Mark C. 2002. “On the Hijacking of Agencies (and
Airplanes): The Federal Aviation Administration,
‘Agency Capture,’ and Airline Security.” American
Univ. Journal of Gender, Social Policy, and the Law 10.
Taillon, J. Paul D. 2002. Hijacking and Hostages: Government
Responses to Terrorism. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
v
HILL, ANITA FAYE
A little-known law professor testifying before a
U.S. Senate committee in 1991 became a cause
célèbre when she accused a respected U.S.
Supreme Court nominee of
SEXUAL HARASSMENT.
Anita Faye Hill became a household name
during the televised confirmation hearings of U.

S. Supreme Court candidate
CLARENCE THOMAS,
the second African American in U.S. history to
be tapped for the High Court. Hill, who is also
African American, was calm and articulate as
she withstood an intense grilling by the all-male,
all-white
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE. Despite
skepticism and open hostility from some of the
senators, Hill stood firm on her account of
sexually explicit remarks and behavior by
Thomas, her former boss. Conservatives reviled
Hill, feminists revered her—and by the end of
the hearings, U.S. citizens of all political persua-
sions had a keener awareness of the problem of
sexual harassment in the workplace.
Nothing in Hill’s background prepared
her for the unremitting media attention she
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
276 HILL, ANITA FAYE
received during and after the Thomas confir-
mation hearings. The youngest of Albert Hill
and Erma Hill’s 13 children, she was an
extremely private person. Hill was born July
30, 1956, and raised on a struggling family farm
near Morris, Oklahoma. Her religious parents
emphasized the importance of hard work,
strong moral values, and education. Intelligent
and disciplined, Hill was valedictorian of her
high school class and an honor student at

Oklahoma State University, in Stillwater, where
she graduated in 1977 with a degree in
psychology. After college, Hill attended Yale
University Law School on a scholarship from
the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (
NAACP).
Hill graduated from law school with honors
in 1980, and worked briefly for the Washington,
D.C., law firm of Wald, Harkrader, & Ross. In
1981 she left private practice to become special
counsel to the assistant secretary in the U.S.
Department of Education’s Office of
CIVIL
RIGHTS
. The assistant secretary was Thomas. It
was during this time that Thomas asked her out
and, according to Hill, sexually harassed her. In
1982 Thomas was appointed chair of the
EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
(EEOC),
and Hill moved to the EEOC with her boss in
what she felt was a necessary career step.
In 1983 Hill decided to leave Washington,
D.C., to become a law professor at Oral Roberts
University. In 1986 she accepted a teaching
position at the University of Oklahoma. Al-
though full professorship and tenure are
normally granted at Oklahoma after six years,

Hill achieved both in just four years.
Hill’s transformation from legal scholar to
feminist icon came about after Thomas was
offered the career opportunity of a lifetime.
President
GEORGE H. W. BUSH nominated Thomas,
then a federal appeals court judge, to fill an
opening on the U.S. Supreme Court. During
the mandatory Senate investigation of Thomas,
Hill disclosed in private sessions the alleged
incidents of sexual harassment by Thomas.
Reports of Hill’s private testimony were
leaked to a National Public Radio reporter.
Anita Faye Hill 1956–
▼▼
▼▼
1950
2000
1975
❖
◆
◆
◆◆
◆
◆
◆
◆◆
◆
◆
1956 Born,

Morris, Ok.
1950–53
Korean War
1961–73
Vietnam War
1977 Graduated from
Oklahoma State University
1980 Graduated with honors
from Yale Law School
1981 Became special counsel to Clarence Thomas, assistant
secretary of the Education Department’s Office of Civil Rights
1982 Thomas appointed chair of EEOC; Hill followed him to EEOC
1983 Left
D.C. to
become law
professor at
Oral Roberts
University
1990 Granted
tenure and full-
professorship
status at Oklahoma
1991 Thomas narrowly confirmed to
replace Thurgood Marshall on Supreme
Court after Hill testified about alleged
sexual harassment by him while at EEOC
1995 Race,
Gender and
Power in
America,

written
with Emma
C. Jordan,
published
1997 Speaking Truth
to Power published
1998 Appointed
professor of
Women’s
Studies at
Brandeis
University
2005
Named
one of
the first
Fletcher
Fellows
1986–97
Taught at
Univ. of
Oklahoma
School
of Law
Anita Faye Hill.
SCOTT WINTROW/GETTY
IMAGES
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
HILL, ANITA FAYE 277