Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 7 P10 pdf

as the test for pornography and obscenity in
U.S. courts.
RESOURCES
Brockwell, P. Heath. 1993-1994. “Grappling With Miller v.
California—The Search for an Alternative Approach to
Regulating Obscenity.” Cumberland Law Review 24.
Carter, T. Barton, Juliet Dee Lushbough, and Harvey L.
Zuckman. 2006. Mass Communication Law in a
Nutshell. Eagan, MN: West.
Cohen, Daniel Mark. 2003. “Unhappy Anniversary: Thirty
Years since Miller v. California: The Legacy of the
Supreme Court’s Misjudgment on Obscenity.” St.
Thomas Law Review 15 (spring).
CROSS REFEREN CES
Obscenity; Pornography.
v
MILLER, WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON
William Henry Harrison Miller served as U.S.
attorney general from 1889 to 1893, in the
administration of President
BENJAMIN HARRISON.
Miller, Harrison’s law partner and political
adviser, was recognized for his incorruptibility.
Miller was born on September 6, 1840, in
Augusta, New York. His connection with Benja-
min Harrison appeared preordained, because
Miller was named after the ninth president,
William Henry Harrison, the grandfather of
Benjamin. Miller attended country schools and
Whitestown Seminary before enrolling at Hamil-
ton College, from which he graduated in 1861.

He studied law in the office of future U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice
MORRISON R. WAITE
and was admitted to the Indiana bar in 1865. He
started a law practice in Peru, Indiana, and also
held the office of county school examiner. In
1866 he moved his law practice to Fort Wayne,
Indiana. He remained there until 1874, when he
moved to Indianapolis and became the law
partner of General Benjamin Harrison.
Harrison had achieved fame as a Civil War
commander. For his heroism in leading the
Seventieth Indiana Regiment, President
ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN
promoted him to brigadier general.
Upon his return to Indianapolis, Harrison
began to build a political career. Miller entered
Harrison’s law firm and the political arena. He
soon became a trusted adviser to Harrison, who
ran unsuccessfully for the Indiana governorship
in 1876. Harrison later served in the U.S.
Senate from 1881 to 1887, and in 1888 he was
the Republican nominee for president. It was
during the 1888 campaign that Miller served as
a confidential adviser to Harrison, who defeated
President
GROVER CLEVELAND.
Harrison, who had promised the country a
Legal Deal, appointed six lawyers and two

businessmen to his cabinet. Miller was named
William Henry Harrison Miller 1840–1917
❖
1840 Born,
Augusta, N.Y.
1861 Graduated from
Hamilton College
1861–65
U.S. Civil War
1893 Returned to
Indianapolis and resumed
his law practice
1865 Admitted to Indiana bar
▼▼
▼▼
1875
1900
1825
1850
◆◆ ◆◆ ◆
1889–93 Served as
U.S. attorney
general under
Benjamin Harrison
❖
1925
1862 Served tour of duty as
lieutenant in the Ohio Volunteers
1866 Began law practice in Ft. Wayne, Ind.
1874 Moved to

Indianapolis and formed
law partnership with
Gen. Benjamin Harrison
◆
1917 Died,
Indianapolis,
Ind.
1914–1918
World War l
William Henry
Harrison Miller.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
78 MILLER, WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON
attorney general, a position he held for the four
years of the Harrison administration. In 1890
Congress passed the
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT (15
U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.), which outlawed trusts
and monopolies that restrained trade. Miller did
not make any effort, however, to use the new
legislation.
The Harrison administration was un-
touched by scandal, but an economic depres-
sion in the West severely hurt the
REPUBLICAN
PARTY
. Democrat Grover Cleveland defeated
Harrison in the 1892 election. Miller returned
to Indianapolis in March 1893 and resumed his

law practice. He died on May 25, 1917, in
Indianapolis.
FURTHER READINGS
“Collection on William Henry Harrison Miller.” 2005.
Indiana State Library, Manuscript Section, Indiana
Division.
Justice Department. 1985. Attorneys General of the United
States, 1789–1985. Washington, D.C.: GPO. Available
online at />website home page: (accessed July
8, 2009).
Merrill, Brian. 2008. From George W. to George W.: The
Presidents and Their Cabinets. Scotts Valley, CA:
CreateSpace.
v
MILLETT, KATHERINE MURRAY
Katherine Murray Millett is a writer and
sculptor who is best known for her ground-
breaking work of feminist theory, Sexual Politics
(1969). Although she abandoned literary criti-
cism after writing that book, turning to works
of fiction and autobiography, Sexual Politics
became a starting point for scholars working in
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE.
Millett was born on September 14, 1934, in
St. Paul, Minnesota. She was educated at the
University of Minnesota, Oxford University, and
Columbia University. As a graduate student and
part-time instructor in English at Columbia
during the 1960s, she became active in the
CIVIL

RIGHTS MOVEMENT
. Millett soon focused her
attention on sexual
DISCRIMINATION against wom-
en. Her dissertation shifted from traditional
literary criticism to an analysis of the sexual
subordination of women in the works of nove-
lists D. H. Lawrence, Henry Miller, and Norman
Mailer. She was granted a Ph.D. degree in 1970,
on the heels of the publication of Sexual Politics,
a revised version of her dissertation.
Overnight the book became a national
bestseller, attracting both strong support and
vitriolic opposition. Millett argued that in the
twentieth century, social and technological
Katherine Murray Millet 1934–
▼▼
▼▼
19251925
20002000
19751975
19501950
◆
❖
1939–45
World War II
1950–53
Korean War
1961–73
Vietnam War

◆
◆
◆
◆
1934 Born,
St. Paul, Minn.
◆
◆
◆◆◆◆
1956
Earned
B.A. from
University
of Minn.
1969
Sexual
Politics
published
1964–70
Worked as
part-time
instructor
at Barnard
and Columbia
1981 Sandra Day O'Connor appointed to
Supreme Court, becoming first female justice
1976 Sita published;
women first admitted
to U.S. military academies
1974 Flying published

1972 Shirley Chisholm
became first woman to
run for president and
receive delegates at a
national major-party
convention
1990
Looney
Bin Trip
published
1994 Politics of Cruelty published
1995 A.D. published
1997 Sculpture retrospective held at University of Maryland
2001 Mother
Millett published;
papers collected
at the Sallie
Bingham Center
for Women's
History and
Culture, Duke
University
Kate Millett.
ª SOPHIE BASSOULS/
SYGMA/CORBIS
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
MILLETT, KATHERINE MURRAY 79
change had helped women in the United States
to begin redefining gender roles. In the face of

change, the male-dominated society had sought
to preserve a patriarchal social structure and the
patriarchal family through an ideology of sexual
domination and violence. This ideology was
most fully expressed in novels written by men
and acclaimed by male intellectuals and critics.
Millett charged D. H. Lawrence with glorify-
ing masculinity, Henry Miller with exalting the
sexual degradation of women, and Norman
Mailer with promoting a cult of virility. She
believed that writers served as a mirror for
culture and helped to explain why women have
been sexually subordinated. Sexual subordina-
tion, in Millett’s view, is tied to the economic
and political subordination of women.
Sexual Politics was published before the field
of feminist
JURISPRUDENCE started. Mille tt’s
analysis of sexual subordination in literature
inspired feminist legal scholars to examine U.S.
law for patriarchal influences. In their attacks
on
PORNOGRAPHY, law professor CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON and writer ANDREA DWORKIN derived
many of their ideas from Millett’s work.
After writing Sexual Politics, Millett wrote
Flying, an autobiography (1974), and a novel,
Sita (1976). Her personal life was marked by
periods of mental illness and institutionaliza-
tion. She wrote about this part of her life in

The Loony Bin Trip (1990). She published The
Politics of Cruelty in 1994, which explored
the use of torture in the modern world, and
another memoir, A.D., in 1995.
In the later 1990s Millett had difficulty
finding work, and most of her books went out
of print. In the early 2000s the University of
Illinois republished Sexual Politics and several
other of her works. In 2000 Millett became an
adjunct professor at New York University. In
2001 she published Mother Millett, her story of
caring for her dying mother.
Millett used the money she made from
Sexual Politics to establish the Women’s Art
Colony Farm in Poughkeepsie, New York,
which is still in existence as of 2009. She sells
Christmas trees and art from the farm, which
also serves as her primary residence.
FURTHER READINGS
Bullock, Alan, and R. B. Woodings, eds. 1983. 20th Century
Culture: A Biographical Companion. New York: Harper &
Row.
Davis, Flora. 1999. Moving the Mountain: The Women’s
Movement in America since 1960. Champaign: Univ. of
Illinois Press.
Evans, Sara. 1980. Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s
Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New
Left. New York: Random House.
Rose, Phyllis, ed. 1993. Women’s Lives. New York: Norton.
CROSS REFERENCES

Sex Discrimination; Women’s Rights.
MILLIGAN, EX PARTE
An 1866 Supreme Court decision, Milligan ex
parte, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 18 L.Ed. 281,
recognized that a civilian and citizen of a state
that is not invaded by hostile forces during
wartime is not subject to the jurisdiction of a
COURT-MARTIAL.
In 1864 Lambdin P. Milligan, a civilian, was
arrested in Indiana for conspiracy, insurrection,
and other crimes arising from his alleged
involvement in organizing a secret military unit
in the state to assist the Confederacy. His arrest
and detention were made pursuant to the orders
of General Alvin P. Hovey, commander of the
military district of Indiana. He was brought to
trial before a military commission in Indiana-
polis, convicted, and sentenced to death. Milligan
applied for a writ of
HABEAS CORPUS to the Supreme
Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the military
commission to try and sentence him.
The Court acknowledged that Article III,
Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution—which
provides “that the trial of all crimes, except in
cases of
IMPEACHMENT, shall be by jury”— and
other constitutional provisions safeguarded this
right. It recognized, however, that in times of
war, various civil liberties and the right to

challenge illegal detention by a writ of habeas
corpus may be suspended.
MARTIAL LAW might be
imposed, however, only where an actual inva-
sion of enemy forces effectively stopped the
operation of the civil government.
The military argued that the designation of
Indiana as a military district with a commander
because of the constant threat of invasion by
Confederate troops justified the imposition of
martial law. The military commission, there-
fore, had lawful jurisdiction under the “laws and
usages of war.” The Court rejected this argu-
ment. The state of Indiana had not opposed
federal authority, its civil and criminal courts
continued to operate during the war, and
Milligan was a civilian who was not connected
IT IS INTERESTING
THAT MANY WOMEN
DO NOT RECOGNIZE
THEMSELVES AS
DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST
; NO BETTER
PROOF COULD BE
FOUND OF THE
TOTALITY OF THEIR
CONDITIONING
.
—KATHERINE MURRAY

MILLETT
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
80 MILLIGAN, EX PARTE
to the military. Although civil liberties and
habeas corpus could be suspended in wartime,
to permit the military commission to determine
the fate of Milligan, a civilian, in a state which
was loyal to the Union, and where there was
only a mere threat of invasion and the courts
were open, would usurp the powers of the
courts in violation of the Constitution. The
Court decided that the military commission had
no jurisdiction over Milligan and therefore
ordered Milligan’s release.
MINE AND MINERAL LAW
The law governing the ownership, sale, and
operation of mines, quarries, and wells, and the
rights to natural resources found in the earth.
The extraction of natural resources from the
earth is governed by specific laws dealing with
mines and minerals. Federal and state govern-
ments have mine and mineral laws to protect
the health and safety of miners, encourage the
efficient use of natural resources, protec t the
environment, and raise tax revenues.
A mine is an excavation in the soil and
subsoil from which ores, coal, or other mineral
substances are removed. A mineral is valuable,
inert matter created by forces of nature and
found either on or in the earth. A mineral right

is the possessory interest in minerals in the
ground. The owner of the mineral rights has
the right to enter the land and occupy it for the
purpose of removing the minerals. It is possible
for someone to own the mineral rights and mine
the minerals without owning the land itself.
The federal government has played a large
role in the exploitation of mineral resources by
granting mineral rights, called
PATENTS,to
persons and companies that wish to mine on
land owned by the federal government. The
Mining Act of 1872 has remained unchanged
since its enactment during the presidential
administration of
ULYSSES S. GRANT. The law tried
to help small prospectors by making land more
affordable. It set the price of mineral rights to
federal property at between $2.50 and $5.00 an
acre and gave prospectors the right to mine
without paying
ROYALTIES. A royalty is the
payment by the lessor to the owner of the
property of a percentage of the value of the
minerals that are mined.
The Mining Act of 1872 has drawn
increased criticism since the 1980s because of
the small amount of money companies pay to
obtain minera l rights valued at millions and
even billions of dollars and because the compa-

nies do not have to pay a royalty to the federal
government. Most of the federal land is located
in the West. Western leg islators have been
unwilling to amend the law, out of fear that
changes would reduce employment and depress
the mining industry. Attempts to amend the act
to raise the price of mineral rights and to
impose a royalty have met fierce resistance by
western lawmakers and the mining industry,
which is dominated by companies located
outside the United States.
Mining operations are considered one of the
main sources of environmental
POLLUTION.
Under the Mining Act of 1872, mining compa-
nies are not required to clean up mining sites
that are on federal property. The
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
estimates that cleaning up
fifty-five of the United States’ most dangerous
mines will cost taxpayers $32 billion. On lands
that are not owned by the federal government,
state and federal environmental regulations
require mining companies to clean up and
restore their mining sites.
Mining is a dangerous occupation. Since the
late 196 0s, state and federal legislation has set
numerous operating standards regarding dust
and gas concentrations in the mines, as well as

general rules regarding roof support. These
provisions attempt to prevent explosions, mine
collapses, and the breathing of tainted air. The
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (30
U.S.C.A. § 801) is a comprehensive safety and
health act that applies to all metal and nonmetal
mines, including coal mines.
CROSS REFE RENCES
Environmental Law; Land-Use Control “The West Wrestles
with D.C.” (In Focus); Law of the Sea; Miner’s Codes; Solid
Wastes, Hazardous Substances, and Toxic Pollutants.
MINERAL RIGHT
An interest in minerals in land, with or without
ownership of the surface of the land. A right to
take minerals or a right to receive a royalty .
Mineral right is a term encompassing all the
ways a person can have a possessory interest in
minerals in the ground. It includes the right to
enter the land and occupy it in order to remove
the minerals. Mineral rights can be retained
when land is sold or conveyed, thus making it
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
MINERAL RIGHT 81
possible for someone to own the right to mine the
minerals without owning the land. A right of
entry onto the land can be held by the grantor
who retains the mineral rights, or other arrange-
ments can be made to gain access to the minerals.
Mineral rights can be leased or sold. A landowner
who leases mineral rights often receives a royalty,

or a percentage of the value of the minerals which
are mined by the leaseholder.
CROSS REFEREN CE
Mine and Mineral Law.
MINER’S CODES
During the era of Western settlement in the
middle of the nineteenth century, various forms
of primitive legal practices were instituted to
bring order to the frontier; many formal legal
codes evolved from these early precepts, includ-
ing the Miner’s Codes.
Originally the codes were various traditional
laws that were respected throughout mining
camps in the West. The codes were recorded,
and their purpose was to establish guidelines for
filing a nd determining c laims and arbitrating
disagreements among miners. The miner’s
“courts” rendered decisions in disputes, and the
tenets of the codes guaranteed their enforcement.
The Gregory Diggings Code of Colorado
was the best example of a functioning system
based on the laws of the Miner’s Code. The
Gregory Code successfully produced a harmo-
nious political and judicial system that was
imitated by other mining towns. Between 1861
and 1862, the legislature of the Colorado
territory formally adopted the canons of the
Gregory Code.
CROSS REFERENCE
Mine and Mineral Law.

MINIMUM CONTACTS
See PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
MINIMUM WAGE
The minimum hourly rate of compensation for
labor, as established by federal statute and
required of employers engaged in businesses that
affect interstate commerce. Most states also have
similar statutes governing minimum wages.
Along with a requirement for overtime pay
and restrictions on child labor, the minimum-
wage law is one of the most significant,
substantive obligations created more than 50
years ago by the
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT of
1938 (FLSA) (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201 et seq.). The
FLSA culminated a l ong struggle for state and
federal protective legislation for workers that
had begun during the nineteenth century.
The original campaign for minimum-wage
legislation in the United States began at the state
level and resulted from growing public concern
about the prevalence of sweatshops—workhouses
where recent immigrants, women, and young
children were paid substandard wages. Propo-
nents of minimum-wage legislation appealed to
society’s sense of obligation to act through its
elected officials to ensure an adequate standard of
living for all working citizens.
In 1912 Massachusetts, an industrial state,
was the first state to enact minimum-wage

legislation. The momentum continued, and by
1920, 13 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia had enacted minimum-wage pro-
grams. The Great Depression moved even more
states to enact protective minimum-wage legisla-
tion, and 25 states by 1938 had some form of
minimum-wage law. In creating minimum wage
legislation, the states generally used three mini-
mum wage models. The Massachusetts model
established a wage commission that recom-
mended voluntary minimum-wage rates based
on what commission members determined was
the best combination of a “living wage” for
employees and the “financial condition” of the
employer’sbusiness.Thenextmodelestablished
a similar wage commission but disregarded the
financial conditions of the employer, made the
minimum wage compulsory, and established
sanctions for non-compliance. The third law,
Traditionally,
respected regulations
that governed mining
camps in the frontier
West were known as
the Miner’s Codes.
Such seemingly
primitive laws can
prove effective and
evolve into formally
adopted legislation.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
82 MINER’ S CODES
the Utah model, established a flat rate of
minimum compensation for all covered workers.
Despite the success of state legislatures in
creating minimum-wage laws, state supreme
courts and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected as
unconstitutional any legislation that interfered
with an employer’s freedom to contract with
employees over wages.
Establishing the Fair Labor
Standards Act
Under the leadership of President FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, Congress passed the NATIONAL INDUS-
TRIAL RECOVERY ACT OF
1933 (NIRA) (June 16,
1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195). NIRA granted the
president authority to establish minimum-wage
and maximum-hour standards for all private-
industry workers. Its legal basis was the federal
government’s power to regulate interstate
commerce. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the NIRA’s legal basis as unconstitutional in
ALA Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935). From
1923 in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S.
525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785, to 1937 in
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S.

587, 56 S. Ct. 918, 80 L. Ed. 1347, the court
consistently ruled against the constitutionality
of all minimum-wage legislat ion.
During his second administration, President
Roosevelt worked with members of Congress to
create a modified version of the labor provisions
of the NIRA, and in 1937 the FLSA was
introduced. Although national business lobbies
and agricultural interests vigorously fought the
proposed legisla tion—even organized labor did
not support it—Congress passed the FLSA, and
it was signed into law on June 25, 1938.
Referring to the FLSA the night before signing
the bill into law, President Roosevelt declared,
“Except perhaps for the
SOCIAL SECURITY Act, it is
the most far-reaching, the most far-sighted
program for the benefit of workers ever
adopted.” In a landmark decision in 1941
(United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct.
451, 85 L. Ed. 609), the U.S. Supreme Court
found the FLSA constitutional:
[I]t is no longer open to question that the
fixing of a minimum wage is within the
legislative power and the bare fact of its
exercise is not a denial of due process under
the Fifth more than under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Increasing the Minimum Wage
The minimum-wage law has evolved significantly

since the court declared it constitutionally sound
in United States v. Darby. The federal minimum
wage remains the same until Congress passes a
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
No state minimum wage law
$7.15
$7.25
$6.25
$8.00
$7.28

$8.00
$7.15
$7.55
$7.21
$5.15
$7.25
$7.25
$8.00
$7.25
$7.25
$2.65
$7.25
No state minimum wage law
$7.50
$7.25
$8.00
$7.40
$6.15 (large employer)
$5.25 (small employer)
No state minimum wage law
$7.05
$7.25
$7.25
$6.85
$7.25
$7.25
$7.50
$7.25
$7.25
$7.25

$7.30
$7.25 (large employer)
$2.00 (other employer)
$8.40
$7.25
$7.40
No state minimum wage law
$7.25
No state minimum wage law
$7.25
$7.25
$8.06
$7.25
$8.55
$7.25
$6.50
$5.15
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment
Standards Administration, Wa
g
e and Hour Division.
Minimum Hourly Wage, by State, in 2009
State Minimum Hourly Wage
ILLUSTRATION BY GGS
CREATIVE RESOURCES.
REPRODUCED BY
PERMISSION OF GALE,
A PART OF CENGAGE
LEARNING.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3

RD E DITION
MINIMUM WAGE 83
bill to raise it and the president signs the bill into
law. The minimum wage started at 25¢ per hour,
and Congress has increased it more than 20
times. Since the law was enacted, increases to the
minimum wage have been signed into law by
Presidents
HARRY S. TRUMAN, DWIGHT D. EISEN-
HOWER
, JOHN F. KENNEDY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
RICHARD M. NIXON, JIMMY CARTER, GEORGE H. W.
BUSH, BILL CLINTON,andGEORGE W. BUSH.The
increases in the minimum wage have been
sporadic. The wage rose five times in the
inflationary 1970s, but was unchanged for the
last nine years of the 1980s. In 1989 the FLSA
was amended to raise the minimum wage in two
steps: from $3.35 to $3.80 per hour on April 1,
1990, and from $3.80 to $4.25 per hour on
April 1, 1991. Subsequent amendments to the
FLSA increased the federal minimum wage to
$4.75 an hour on October 1, 1996, and to $5.15
an hour on September 1, 1997. The federal mini-
mum wage then remained stagnant until the FLSA
was amended in 2007, which established a three-
step increase over the next three years: $5.85,
effective on July 24, 2007; $6.55 effective on July
24, 2008; and $7.25 effective on July 24, 2 009.
Under the FLSA, if a state’s minimum wage

is lower than the federal minimum wage, then
the federal minimum wage must be paid to
workers in that state. If a state’s minimum wage
is higher than the federal minimum wage, then
the state rate applies. After the July 24, 2009,
increase to the federal minimum wage, the state
minimum wage in 12 states and the District
of Columbia was higher than that of the
federal government: California ($8.00); Color-
ado ($7.28); Connecticut ($8.00); District of
Columbia ($7.55); Illinois ($8.00); Massachu-
setts ($8.0 0); Michigan ($7.40); New Mexico
($7.50); Ohio ($7.30); Oregon ($8.40); Rhode
Island ($7.40); Vermont ($8.06); and Washing-
ton ($8.55). Although states can choose to
increase their minimum wage at any time, many
economists expected both the federal and state
minimum wages to remain steady in the short
term as American companies struggled to
remain profitable amid the global economic
downturn that began in 2008.
Minimum Wage in U.S. Territories
The minimum wage is significantly differen t in
American Samoa and the Commonwealth of
Northern Mariana Islands. In 2007 Congress
passed the Fair Minimum Wage Act, which was
designed to eliminate the disparity between the
minimum wage paid in those two territories
and the minimum wage paid in the rest of the
United States. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1). The

current minimum wage in both American
Samoa and the Commonwealth of Northern
Mariana Islands is considerably less than the
current federal minimum wage. The Fair
Minimum Wage Act provides for a longer
phasing-in of higher minimum pay rates. In the
Northern Mariana Islands, the minimum wage
was raised to $3.55 an hour on July 24, 2007,
and will be raised by $0.50 an hour on each May
25th thereafter until minimum wage reaches the
federal minimum wage rate. The transition in
American Samoa is more complicated because
in American Samoa there are different mini-
mum wages for different industries. The mini-
mum wage for each industry in American
Samoa was raised by $0.50 on July 24, 2007,
and each year thereafter on May 25th, the
minimum wage will be increased by $0.50 an
hour until the applicable minimum wage
reaches the federal minimum wage.
Enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act
The minimum wage is the most direct and
definitive measure to guarantee workers a living
wage, but the FLSA (and thus its minimum-
wage provisions) does not protect all employees.
In 1988 the FLSA did not cover about eight
million of the approximately 110 million wage
and salary earners in the United States because
of coverage limits , nor another 28 million
workers because of exemptions.

The minimum-wage law can be enforced by
employees themselves, by the secretary of labor,
or by the attorney general. Under section 216(b)
of the FLSA, employees can file suit in federal or
state court to enforce their rights to minimum
wages and overtime compensation. Employees
also can seek redress if employers retaliate
against them for trying to enforce their rights
under the FLSA. The secretary of labor can
enforce the act on behalf of employees under
sections 216(c) and 217 by either filing a wage
suit on behalf of the employees or by seeking an
INJUNCTION.
If a suit by either the employees or the
secretary of labor is successful, the FLSA
authorizes recovery of any unpaid minimum
wages and/or overtime compensation. With
some exceptions, the injured party may be able
to recover an equal amount in
LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES
, as well. In addition, employees who
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
84 MINIMUM WAGE
win FLSA suits may be awarded attorneys’ fees.
For repeated or willful violations of the
minimum-wage provisions, the secretary is
authorized to assess civil penalties, subject to
administrative review, of up to $1,000 per
violation (29 U.S.C.A. § 217(e)). Finally, the

attorney general has the authority to file
criminal actions for FLSA violations, although
this authority has rarely been used.
Although the FLSA is the most significant
federal wage statute, a number of other laws
impose minimum-wage obligations on entities
that perform work for the federal government.
For example, the
DAVIS-BACON ACT (40 U.S.C.A.
§§ 276a–276a–5) applies to contracts in excess
of $2,000 to work on federal buildings or other
public works; the Walsh-Healey Act (41 U.S.C.
A. §§ 35–45) applies to employers that provide
materials, supplies, and equipment to the
United States under contracts exceeding
$10,000; and the Service Contract Act (41 U.S.
C.A. §§ 351–358) applies to contracts in excess
of $2,500 to provide services to the federal
government. These statutes all require contract-
ing entities to pay workers the prevailing wage
in the locality.
FURTHER READINGS
Cherry, Miriam A. 2009. “Working for (Virtually) Mini-
mum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor Standards Act in
Cyberspace.” Alabama Law Review. 60.
Levitan, Sar A., and Richard A. Belous. 1979. More Than
Subsistence: Minimum Wages for the Working Poor.
Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
Linder, Marc. 1990. “The Minimum Wage as Industrial
Policy: A Forgotten Role.” Journal of Legislation 16.

Neumark, David and William Wascher. 2008. “Minimum
Wages and Low-Wage Workers: How Well Does Reality
Match the Rhetoric?” Minnesota Law Review. 92 (May).
Norlund, Willis J. 1988. “A Brief History of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.” Labor Law Journal 39.
Quigley, William P. 1996. “‘A Fair Day’s Pay for a Fair Day’s
Work’: Time to Raise and Index the Minimum Wage.”
St. Mary’s Law Journal 27.
Waltman, Jerold L. 2000. The Politics of Minimum Wage.
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Wright, Russell O. 2003. Chronology of Labor in the United
States. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc.
CROSS REFERENCES
Child Labor Laws; Employment Law; Labor Law; National
Recovery Administration; New Deal.
MINISTER
See AMBASSADORS AND CONSULS; DIPLOMATIC AGENTS.
MINISTERIAL
Done under the direction of a supervisor; not
involving discretion or policymaking.
Ministerial describes an act or a function
that conforms to an instruction or a prescribed
procedure. It connotes obedience. A ministerial
act or duty is a function performed without the
use of judgment by the person performing the
act or duty.
MINITRIAL
A private, voluntary, and informal type of
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
The minitrial is an alternative dispute

resolution (ADR) procedure that is used by
businesses and the federal government to
resolve legal issues without incurring the
expense and delay associated with court liti-
gation. The minitrial does not result in a formal
adjudication but is a vehicle for the parties to
arrive at a solution through a structured settle-
ment process. It is used most effectively when
complex issues are at stake and the parties
need or wish to maintain an amicable relation-
ship.
Though minitrials can be arranged under
rules negotiated by the parties, they usually
conform to procedures used by facilitators of
ADR. The parties sign an agreement consenting
to a minitrial and then each chooses a
management representative to sit on the panel.
These representatives have the authority to
negotiate a settlement. The parties also select a
“neutral adviser” to sit on the panel. The adviser
must be independent and impartial, as this
person will moderate the minitrial. If the parties
cannot agree on a neutral adviser, the ADR
facilitating agency may make the selection. The
parties pay an equal share of the adviser’s fees
and bear their own minitrial costs.
Prior to the minitrial the parties select and
then provide the neutral adviser with back-
ground materials. The parties also file legal
briefs and exhibits with the adviser that contain

information they intend to present at what is
termed the “information exchange.” This ex-
change is, in effect, the minitrial. The parties
must agree on the length of briefs and the due
dates for documents.
At the information exchange each party
makes presentation, and each party is entitled to
make a rebuttal. As with all other procedures,
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
MINITRIAL 85
the parties must either agree on the lengths of
their presentations and rebuttals or let the
neutral adviser set the time limits. During this
information exchange the neutral adviser acts as
a moderator rather than a judge. Factual
witnesses and expert witnesses may also make
presentations. The members of the panel may
ask questions of the presenters. In addition to
the lawyers representing the parties, each
management representative may have advisers
in attendance.
After the conclusion of the information
exchange, the management representatives meet
by themselves to see if they can resolve the
dispute. The information exchange should have
revealed the strengths and weaknesses of each
party’s case and motivated the representatives to
settle the dispute. If they cannot resolve the
dispute on their own, they may ask the neutral
adviser to meet with them separately, or jointly,

and give an oral opinion on the issues and the
likely outcome at trial of each issue. The
representatives may also ask the neutral adviser
to issue a written opinion and to mediate the
negotiations and settlement terms.
If an agreement is reached it is set out in
writing and signed by the representatives. The
agreement is legally binding on the parties. If the
parties cannot settle, the proceedings will termi-
nate 30 days after the date of the information
exchange.
An important difference between a court
trial and a minitrial is that the
RULES OF EVIDENCE
do not apply at the minitrial except for the rules
governing
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS and attor-
ney work product. Another difference is that
minitrials are not recorded, so no transcript can
be produced. Finally, the proceedings are tota lly
confidential and any offers or statements made
in the process are inadmissible at a court trial.
FURTHER READINGS
Mayer, Bernard. 2000. The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution.
Indianapolis: Wiley.
Moore, Christopher W. 2003. The Mediation Process:
Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict. 3d ed. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Nolan-Haley, Jacqueline. 2008. Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion in a Nutshell. 2d ed. Eagan, MN: Thomson West.

MINOR
An infant or person who is under the age of legal
competence. A term derived fro m the
CIVIL LAW,
which described a person under a certain age as
less than so many years. In most states, a person is
no longer a minor after reaching the age of 18
(though state laws might still prohibit certain acts
until reaching a greater age; e.g., purchase of
liquor). Also, less; of less consideration; lower; a
person of inferior condition.
MINORITY
The state or condition of a minor; infancy. Opposite
of majority. The smaller number of votes of a
deliberative assembly; opposed to majority. In
context of the Constitution’s guarantee of
EQUAL
PROTECTION
, minority does not have merely numer-
ical denotation but refers to identifiable and
specially disadvantaged groups such as those based
on race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin.
v
MINTON, SHERMAN
Sherman Minton served as an associate justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1949 to 1956.
A strong supporter of President
FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT’s NEW DEAL policies when he served as
a U.S. senator from Indiana, Minton main-

tained a consistent judicial philosophy that
allowed the legislative and executive branches
wide discretion without judicial interference.
Minton was born on October 20, 1890, in
Georgetown, Indiana. He graduated from Indi-
ana University in 1915 and earned a law degree
from Yale Law School in 1916. He entered the
private
PRACTICE OF LAW in Indiana but also
devoted himself to
DEMOCRATIC PARTY politics. In
1934 he was elected to the U.S. Senate, where he
served one term. While in the Senate, Minton was
a staunch supporter of Roosevelt’s legislative
efforts, including the president’splanto“pack”
the Court with extra justices to break the
conservative majority that had ruled many pieces
of New Deal law unconstitutional. Minton lost
his seat in the 1940 election.
In 1941 President Roosevelt first appointed
Minton to advise him on military agencies and
planning and then nominated him to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
President
HARRY S. TRUMAN, who got to know
Minton when they served in the Senate togeth-
er, elevated him to the Supreme Court in 1949.
During his confirmation process, Minton re-
fused to testify before the
SENATE JUDICIARY

COMMITTEE
, claiming it would be improper
to testify. Surprisingly, the committee did not
object.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
86 MINOR
During his seven years on the Court,
Minton maintained his belief that the judiciary
should not intrude on the actions of the other
branches unless absolutely required. His con-
servative view led him to support decisions that
upheld anticommunist policies such as
LOYALTY
OATHS
and restrictions on the civil liberties of
subversives. Minton, writing for the majority in
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.
Ct. 380, 96 L. Ed. 517 (1952), ruled that a New
York statute that prohibited members of
politically subversive groups from teaching in
public schools was permissible.
As a result of his deference to the other
branches of government, Minton was the only
dissenter in
YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE CO. V.
SAWYER, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed.
1153 (1952). In this case President Truman had
claimed executive authority when he seized U.S.
steel mills in 1952 as the steel workers union
went on strike. This occurred during the second

year of the
KOREAN WAR. Truman needed steel for
war production and wanted to ma ke sure that a
pay hike would not cause higher steel prices,
which would increase inflatio n in the national
economy. The majority rejected Truman’s claim
to inherent executive power in the Constitution
to protect the public interest in times of crisis.
Minton sided with the president’s position.
Minton suffered serious health problems for
several years and resigned from the Court for
health reasons in 1956. He died on April 9,
1965, in New Albany, Indiana.
FURTHER READINGS
Gugin, Linda C., and James E. St. Clair. 1997. Sherman
Minton: New Deal Senator, Cold War Justice. Indiana-
polis: Indiana Univ. Press.
Radcliff, William F. 1997. “A Lawyer’s Biography of
Sherman Minton.” Res Gestae 40 (June).
———
. 1996. Sherman Minton: Indiana’s Supreme Court
Justice. Indianapolis, IN: Guild Press of Indiana.
MINUTE BOOK
An account where official proceedings are
recorded.
A minute book refers to a book kept by the
clerk of a court for recording a summary of all
the judicial orders in a proceeding. The records
are identified by case numbers.
It also refers to a record of official actions

taken at a meeting of a board of directors or of
the stockholders of a corporation.
MINUTES
The written record of an official proceeding. The
notes recounting the transactions occurring at a
Sherman Minton 1890–1965
❖
1890 Born,
Georgetown, Ind.
◆
1915 Earned LL.B.
from Indiana
University
1935–41 Served in
U.S. Senate
1914–18
World War I
1965 Died,
New Albany,
Ind.
1939–45
World War II
1956 Assumed
senior status
1950–53
Korean War
1961–73
Vietnam War
▼▼
▼▼

19001900
18751875
19251925
19501950
19751975
❖
◆
1916 Earned LL.M. from Yale Law School
1937 Testified before Congress
in support of Roosevelt's
court-packing plan
◆◆
1952 Wrote majority opinion in Alder v. Board
of Education, dissented in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer
1949–56 Served as associate
justice of the Supreme Court
1941 Appointed to U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
◆
◆
◆
1949 Declined to
testify before
Congress during
confirmation
hearings
Sherman Minton.
PHOTOGRAPH BY
HARRIS & EWING.

COLLECTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES.
ONE’S ASSOCIATES,
PAST AND
PRESENT
, MAY
PROPERLY BE
CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING
FITNESS AND
LOYALTY
[FOR A JOB].
—SHERMAN MINTON
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
MINUTES 87