Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 7 P25 docx

The federal judiciary has described the
liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clauses as an interest guaranteeing a number of
individual freedoms, including the right to
personal autonomy, bodily integrity, self-dignity,
and self-determination (Gray v. Romeo, 697
F. Supp. 580 [1988]). The word liberty, the
Supreme Court stated, means something more
than freedom from physical restraint. “It means
freedom to go where one may choose, and to
act in such manner as his judgment may
dictate for the promotion of his happiness
[while pursuing] such callings and avocations as
may be most suitable to develop his capacities,
and give to them their highest enjoyment”
(
MUNN V. ILLINOIS, 94 U.S. 113, 4 Otto 113, 24
L. Ed. 77 [1876][Field, J., dissenting]).
The Supreme Court has said the full breadth
of constitutional liberty is best explained as a
rational continuum safeguarding every facet of
human freedom from arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints (Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989 [1961]). The
government may not intrude upon this liberty
unless it can demonstrate a persuasive counter-
vailing interest. However, the more the U.S.
legal system cherishes a particular freedom,
the less likely a court is to enforce a law that
infringes upon it.
In this regard the Supreme Court has

identified certain fundamental rights that qual-
ify for heightened judicial protection against
laws threatening to restrict them. This list of
fundamental rights includes most of the specific
freedoms enumerated in the
BILL OF RIGHTS,as
well as the FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION; the right to
vote and participate in the electoral process; the
right to marry, procreate, and rear children; and
the right to privacy. The right to privacy, which
is not expressly enumerated anywhere in the
Constitution, guarantees the freedom of adults
to use
BIRTH CONTROL (GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT,
381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510
[1965]) and the right of women to terminate
their pre gnancy before the fetus becomes viable
(
ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35
L. Ed. 2d 147 [1973]).
During the 1990s the right to privacy was
enlarged to recognize the right of certain
terminally ill or mentally incompetent persons
to refuse medical treatment. In Cruzan v.
Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
110 S. Ct. 2841, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990), the
Supreme Court ruled that a person who is in a
persistent vegetative state, marked by the
absence of any significant cognitive abilities,
may seek to terminate life-sustaining measures,

including artificial nutrition and hydration
equipment, through a parent, spouse, or other
appropriate guardian who demonstrates that
the incompetent person previously expressed a
clear desire to discontinue medical treatment
under such circumstances.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
later cited Cruzan in support of its decision
establishing the right of competent but termi-
nally ill patients to hast en their death by
refusing medical treatment when the final stages
of life are wrought with pain and indignity
(Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790 [9th Cir. 1996]). However, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that
physicians possess no due process right to assist
terminally ill patients in accelerating their death
by prescribing a lethal dose of narcotics (Quill v.
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 [2d Cir. 1996]). In a
notorious case involving Dr.
JACK KEVORKIAN,
the Michi gan Supreme Court ruled that patients
have no due process right to physician-assisted
SUICIDE (People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 527
N. W. 2d 714 [1994]).
In the Cruzan decision, the manner in
which the Supreme Court recogni zed a qualified
right to die reflects the Enlightenment tradition
of secular natural law. Where Locke inferred the
inalienable rights of life, liberty, and property

from observing human behavior, the Supreme
Court said in Cruzan that “a Cons titutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our
prior decisions.”
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25
S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643 (1905), the Supreme
Court protected the constitutional right of a
person to decline a smallpox vaccination that
was required by state law. In Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 108 L. Ed.
2d 178 (1990), the court ruled that the liberty
interest guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses
prohibits the government from compelling
prisoners to take antipsychotic drugs. These
cases, as well as others, the Supreme Court
reasoned in Cruzan, establish that all U.S.
citizens have a general right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, which includes the specific
right of certain mentally incompetent and
terminally ill persons to hasten their death.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
228 NATURAL LAW
Another example of Supreme Court justices
debating over natural law principles occurred in
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240,
144 L. Ed. 2d 2240 (1999). In that case, the
court’s majority disagreed with Justice
DAVID
SOUTER

’s opinion regarding whether the concept
of
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY was originally based on
natural law principles.
Historical Natural Law
Another school of natural law is known as
historical natural law. According to this school,
law must be made to conform with the well-
established, but unwritten, customs, traditions,
and experien ces that have evolved over the
course of history. Historical natural law has
played an integral role in the development of
the Anglo-American system of justice. When
King James I attempted to assert the absolute
power of the British monarchy during the
seventeenth century, for example, English jurist
SIR EDWARD COKE argued that the sovereignty of
the crown was limited by the ancient liberties of
the English people, immemorial custom, and
the rights prescribed by
MAGNA CARTA in 1215.
Magna Carta also laid the cornerstone for
many U.S. constitutional liberties. The Supreme
Court has traced the origins of grand juries,
petit juries, and the writ of
HABEAS CORPUS to
Magna Carta. The
EIGHTH AMENDMENT propor-
tionality analysis, which requires that criminal
sanctions bear some reasonable relationship to

the seriousness of the offense, was foresha-
dowed by the Magna Carta prohibition of
excessive fines (Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 [1983]). The
concept of due process was inherited from the
requirement in Magna Carta that all
LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS
comport with the “law of the land”
(
IN RE WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25
L. Ed. 2d 368 [1970]).
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, the Supreme Court has
observed, contains both procedural and histori-
cal aspects that tend to converge in criminal
cases (
ROCHIN V. CALIFORNIA, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.
Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952] ). Procedurally, due
process guarantees criminal defendants a fair
trial. Historically, due process guarantees that
no
DEFENDANT may be convicted of a crime
unless the government can prove his or her
guilt
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. Although the
REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD can be found now-
here in the express language of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court has said that the demand for
a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases
has been repeatedly expressed since “ancient

times” through the common-law tradition and
is now “embodied in the Constitution ” (In re
Winship).
The legacy of the trial of
JOHN PETER ZENGER,
17 Howell’s State Trials 675, further illustrates
the symbiotic relationship between history and
the law. In 1735, Zenger, publisher of the New
York Weekly Journal, was charged with libeling
the governor of New York. At trial Zenger
admitted that he had published the allegedly
harmful article but argued that the article was
not
LIBELOUS because it contained no inaccurate
statements. However, in the American colonies,
truth was not considered a defense to
LIBEL
actions. Nonetheless, despite Zenger’s admis-
sion of harmful publication and lack of a
cognizable legal defense, the jury acquitted him.
The Zenger acquittal spawned two ideas that
have become entrenched in U.S. jurisprudence.
First, the acquittal gave birth to the idea that
truth is indeed a defense to accusati ons of libel.
This defense received constitutional protection
under the First Amendment in
NEW YORK TIMES V.
SULLIVAN, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed.
2d 686 (1964). Looking back, the Supreme
Court came to describ e the Zenger trial as “the

earliest and most famous American experience
with freedom of the press” (McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S. Ct.
1511, 131 L. Ed. 2d 426, [1995]).
The Zenger trial is also the progenitor of
JURY NULLIFICATION, which is the power of a jury,
as the conscience of the community, to acquit
defendants against whom there is overwhelming
evidence of guilt in order to challenge a specific
law, prevent oppression, or otherwise achieve
justice. For example, the Zenger jurors issued an
acquittal despite what amounted to a confession
by the defendant in
OPEN COURT. Some observers
have compared the Zenger trial to the trial of
O. J. SIMPSON, in which the former football star
was acquitted of a double
HOMICIDE notwith-
standing
DNA EVIDENCE linking him to the crimes.
According to these observers, the defense
attorney for Simpson,
JOHNNIE COCHRAN,im-
plored the jurors to ignore the evidence against
his client and render a verdict that would send a
message denouncing
POLICE CORRUPTION, PERJURY,
and racism.
All three schools of natural law have
influenced the development of U.S. law from

GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
NATURAL LAW 229
colonial to modern times. In many ways the
creation and RATIFICATION of the Constitution
replaced Scripture and religion as the ultimate
source of law in the United States. The federal
Constitution makes the people the fundamental
foundation of authority in the U.S. system of
government. Many of the Framers characterized
the Constitution as containing “sacred and
inviolate” truths. In the same vein,
THOMAS PAINE
described the Constitution as a “political Bible.”
In 1728 many Americans understood that
the
COMMON LAW encompassed the Law of
Nature, the Law of Reason, and the Revealed
Law of God, which are equally binding at all
times, in all places, and to all persons. The law of
history could have been added to this list.
Between 1776 and 1784, 11 of the original 13
states made some allowance for the adoption of
the English common law. One federal court said
the Constitution “did not create any new rights
to life, liberty or due process. These rights had
existed for Englishmen since Magna Carta. The
Declaration of Independence merely de-
clared and established these rights for the
American colonies” (Screven County v. Brier
Creek Hunting & Fishing Club, 202 F. 2d 369

[5th Cir. 1953]). Thus, natural law in the United
States may be best understood as the integration
of history, secular reason, and divine inspiration.
FURTHER READINGS
Berman, Harold J. 1983. Law and Revolution: The Formation
of the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge: Harvard
Univ. Press.
George, Robert P., ed. 2003. Natural Law. Burlington, VT:
Ashgate/Dartmouth.
Harris, Philip Anthony. 2002. The Distinction between Law
and Ethics in Natural Law Theory. Lewiston, NY: Edwin
Mellen Press.
Horwitz, Morton J. 1992. The Transformation of American
Law, 1780–1860. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
Levy, Leonard W. 1963. Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The
Darker Side. Chicago: Elephant Paperback.
Locke, John. 1980. (First printed in 1690.) Second Treatise on
Government. Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing.
Norberto, Bobbio. 1993. Thomas Hobbes and the Natural
Law Tradition. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Pierce, Christine. 2001. Immovable Laws, Irresistible Rights:
Natural Law, Moral Rights, and Feminist Ethics.
Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas.
Pojman, Louis P. 1995. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Weinreb, Lloyd. 1987. Natural Law and Justice. Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press.
Wood, Gordon S. 1972. The Creation of the American
Republic: 1776–1787. New York: Norton.
Zuckert, Michael P. 1994. Natural Rights and the New

Republicanism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
CROSS REFERENCES
Abortion; Constitution of the United States; Death and
Dying; Hobbes, Thomas; Jurisprudence; Libel and Slander;
“Second Treatise on Government” (Appendix, Primary
Document).
NATURAL LAW PARTY
Citizens of Fairfield, Iowa, formed the Natural
Law Party in April 1992. In a few short months,
the party succeeded in placing its presidential
ticket on the ballot in 28 states for the 1992
election. By 1996 the party was offering
candidates for elective office in all 50 states.
Despite its fast growth in the 1990 s, the party
declined just as rapidly in the 2000s. By 2004,
the national office of the Natural Law Party had
closed its doors.
Fairfield, Iowa, is the site of Maharishi
International University, a school that teaches
students to use transcendental meditation (TM)
to achieve good health and a heightened aware-
ness and understanding of the self and the
world. The school, founded by Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi, provided the Natural Law Party
with the inspiration and resources to enter the
field of electoral politics.
The Natural Law Party fashioned an un-
usual and ambitious political platform. The
party endorsed the practice of TM as a humane
and cost-effective way to rehabilitate convicted

and accused criminals. The party offered a
proactive alternative to the health care system, a
system that party candidates called “disease
care.” Instead of pouring millions of dollars
each year into the creation of drugs to manage
disease, the Natural Law Party promoted health
education and stress management, along with
TM, as ways to avoid disease.
Dr. John S. Ha gelin became the standard-
bearer for the Natural Law Party. Hagelin, a
renowned physicist, was the party’s nominee for
president in 1992, 1996, and 2000. Although he
was a professor at the Maharishi International
University and a staunch proponent of the
benefits of TM, Hagelin worked to expand the
party’s scope beyond the TM message. The
party emphasized the importance of social
equality for all persons, and party candidates
talked of world peace as a reachable goal. The
party platform also stressed environmental
protection. For example, the party endorsed
alternative methods of energy production, such
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
230 NATURAL LAW PARTY
as a redirection of resources away from fossil
fuels and toward renewable energy.
Although party membership grew rapidly,
reportedly reaching more than 100,000 mem-
bers at one time, the party’s goals in the political
process proved elusive. In 1996 Hagelin was one

of only five presidential candidates who was on
enough ballots to conceivably win the election
in the
ELECTORAL COLLEGE and from a party
that had held primaries. Hagelin, along with
REFORM PARTY candidate H. Ros s Perot and
LIBERTARIAN PARTY candidate Harry Browne,
sought to participate in the nationally televi sed
presidential debates based on these accomplish-
ments. However, the Commission on Presiden-
tial Debates, a private nonprofit organization
formed by the Democratic and Republican
National Committees, concluded that Hagelin,
Perot, and Browne had no realistic chance of
winning the election and excluded all three
from the debates. Hagelin won 113,667 votes
in the national election, or about 0.12 percent of
the vote.
In 1999 Hagelin announced his candidacy
for both the Natural Law Party and the Reform
Party presidential nominations. When the
Reform Party split over the candidacy of
PATRICK
BUCHANAN
, supporters of Hagelin took the name
Independence Party. In the 2000 elections,
Natural Law-Independence Party coalition can-
didates received more than 1.4 million votes. In
March 2003 the Natural Law Party condemned
the invasion of Iraq by the United States. In

April 2003 the Party announced that Represen-
tative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) had reintro-
duced his legislation to establish a U.S.
Department of Peace, legislation that Hagelin
had helped to draft.
Hagelin did not run as the Natural Law
Party’s candidate in the 2004 election. Instead,
the party supported Kucinich’s candidacy.
Hagelin announced that he would become
president of the U.S. Peace Government, which
the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi established in
2000. The Natural Law Party’snationalhead-
quarters closed in 2004, and the state and
local affiliates of the party had disbanded by
2006.
FURTHER READINGS
Carlson, Peter. 2000. “A Two-System Party Results in Dual
(and Dueling) Nominees.” Washington Post (August 14).
Natural Law Party. Available online at ural-
law.org/ (accessed May 19, 2009).
Roth, Robert. 1999. A Reason to Vote: Breaking the Two-
Party Stranglehold. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin.
The U.S. Peace Government. Available online at http://www.
uspeacegovernment.org/ (accessed May 19, 2009).
CROSS REFERENCES
Libertarian Party; Third Party.
NATURALIZATION
The process under federal law whereby a foreign-
born person may be granted citizenship. In order
to qu alify for naturalization, an applicant must

meet a number of statutory requirements, includ-
ing those related to residency, literacy, and
education, as well as an exhibition of “good moral
character” and a demonstration of an attachment
to constitutional principles upon which the United
States is based.
CROSS REFERENCES
Aliens; Citizens.
NAVIGABLE RIVERS
See INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS.
NAVIGABLE WATERS
Navigable waters are those that provide a channel
for commerce and transportation of people and
goods.
Under U.S. law, bodies of water are
distinguished according to their use. The dis-
tinction is particularly important in the case of
navigable waters, which are used for business
or transportation. Jurisdiction over navigable
waters belongs to the federal government rather
than states or municipalities. The federal gov-
ernment can determine how the waters are
used, by whom, and under what conditions. It
John S. Hagelin (far
right) was the
National Law Party’s
presidential candidate
in 1992, 1996, and
2000.
AP IMAGES

GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
NAVIGABLE WATERS 231
also has the power to alter the waters, such as by
dredging or building dams. Generally a state or
private property ow ner who is inconvenienced
by such work has no remedy against the federal
government unless state or private property
itself is taken; if such property is taken, the laws
of
EMINENT DOMAIN would apply, which may lead
to compensation for the landowner.
The basis for federal jurisdiction over
navigable waters lies in the U.S. Constitution.
Since the early nineteenth century, the U.S.
SUPREME COURT has held that the COMMERCE
CLAUSE
(Article 1, Section 8) gives the federal
government extensive authority to regulate
interstate commerce. This view originated in
1824 in the landmark case Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23. In Gibbons, the
Court was faced with deciding whether to give
precedence to a state or federal law for the
licensing of ve ssels. It ruled that navigation of
vessels in and out of the ports of the nation is a
form of interstate commerce and thus federal
law must take precedence. This decision led
to the contemporary exercise of broad federal
power over navigable waters and in countless

other areas of interstate commerce.
In practical terms federal regulation of
navigable waters takes many forms. One area
of this regulation covers matters of transporta-
tion and commerce: for example, rules govern-
ing the licensing of ships and the dumping of
waste. A second area applies to the alteration of
the navigable waters, which is strictly controlled
by federal law. The Rivers and Harbors
APPROPRI-
ATION
Act of 1899 forbids building any unautho-
rized obstruction to U.S. navigable waters and
gives enforcement powers to the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. A third area of regulation
involves
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION claims. The
concept of navigable waters is important in
claims made under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act of 1988 (33 U.S.C.A.
§§ 901–950). The act provides that employers
are liable for injuries to sailors that occur upon
navigable waters of the United States.
The vast body of federal regulation concern-
ing navigable waters frequently gives rise to
litigation, and in many cases the courts have the
difficult task of determining whether particular
bodies of water are navigable (and thus subject
to the law or regulation in question). Lakes
and rivers are generally considered navigable

waters, but smaller bodies of water may also be
navigable. Attempting to address years of
problematic litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1979 created four tests for determining what
constitutes navigable waters. Established in
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100
S. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, the tests ask whether
the body of water (1) is subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide, (2) connects with a continuous
interstate waterway, (3) has navigable capacity,
and (4) is actually navigable. Using these tests,
courts have held that bodies of water much
smaller than lakes and rivers also constitute
navigable waters. Even shallow streams that are
traversable only by canoe have met the test.
The Supreme Court test affects t he reach of
the federal
CLEAN WATER ACT, 86 Stat. 877, w hich
sets standards and review processes for industries
that discharge material into navigable waters.
In addition, the test can influence decisions on
whether a unit of government can assert
IMMUNITY
from damages suits. In Northern Insurance
Company of New York v. Chatham County,
Georgia, 547 U.S. 189, 126 S. Ct. 1689, 164
L. Ed. 2d 367 (2006), the Supreme Court rejected
a county government’s claim that it should
be granted immunity because in cases involving
ships, which is known as admiralty law, the

county’s “exercise of core state functions with
regard to navigable waters” barred civil lawsuits.
The Court cited precedents in admi ralty law
that demonstrated it had not created a special
category governing
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.Tothe
contrary, the Court used prior cases to conclude
that sovereign immunity did not bar an admiralty
suit against a city. Therefore, the county could
not avoid litigation on the damages claim.
FURTHER READINGS
“Annotated Federal Statutes of Limitation: Title 33—
Navigation and Navigable Waters.” 1995. Southwestern
University Law Review 24 (winter).
Findley, Roger. 2004. Environmental Law in Nutshell. 6th ed.
St. Paul, MN: West Group.
Getches, David. 1997.Water Law in a Nutshell. 3d ed. St.
Paul, MN: West Group.
Shiva, Vandana. 2002. Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution,
and Profit. Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press.
CROSS REFERENCES
Admiralty and Maritime Law; Pilot; Riparian Rights; Water
Rights.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
The U.S. Navy was founded on October 13, 1775,
when Congress enacted the first legislation creating
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
232 NAVY DEPARTMENT
the Continental Navy of the American Revolution.
The Department of the Navy and the Office of

Secretary of the Navy were established by the act of
April 30, 1798 (10 U.S.C.A. §§ 5011, 5031). For
nine years before that date, by act of August 7,
1789 (1 Stat. 49), the conduct of naval affairs was
under the secretary of war. The National Security
Act Amendments of 1949 provided that the
Department of the Navy be a military department
within the Department of Defense (63 Stat. 578).
The navy is one of three primary compo-
nents of the U.S. military. Incorporating the
Marine Corps, it serves along with the army and
the air force as part of the nation’s defense.
The navy’s mission is to protect the United States
as directed by the president or the secretary of
defense by the effective prosecution of war at
sea. With its Marine Corps component, the
navy’s objectives are to seize or defend advanced
naval bases; support, as required, the forces of
all military departments of the United States;
and maintain freedo m of the seas. The Depart-
ment of the Navy includes the U.S. Coast Guard
when it is operating as a service in the navy.
Office of the Secretary of the Navy
The secretary of the navy is the head of the
Department of the Navy. Appointed by the
president of the United States, the secretary
serves under the direction, authority, and
control of the cabinet-level secretary of defense
(10 U.S.C.A. § 5031). The secretary is responsi-
ble for the policies and control of the navy,

including its organization, administration, func-
tioning, and efficiency. Next in succession for
the position is the under secretary of the nav y,
who functions as deputy and principal assistant
to the secretary and has full authority in the
general ma nagement of the department.
Civilian Executive Assistants The civilian
executive assistants are the principal advisers
and assistants to the secretary of the navy. They
include the under secretary of the navy, the
assistant secretaries of the navy, and the general
counsel of the navy. With department-wide
responsibilities for administration, the civilian
executive assistants carry out their duties in
harmony with the statutory positions of the
chief of naval operations, who is the principal
military adviser and executive to the secretary
regarding naval matters, and the commandant
of the Marine Corps, who is the principal
military adviser and executive regarding Mar ine
Corps matters. Each is authorized and directed
to act for the secretary within his or her
assigned area of responsibility.
Staff Assistants The staff assistants to the
secretary of the navy are the naval inspector
general, the comptroller of the navy, the auditor
general of the navy, and the chief of informa-
tion. The secretary or the law has established the
following positions and boards for administra-
tive purposes.

Judge Advocate General The JUDGE ADVOCATE
general is the senior officer and head of the
Judge Advocate General’s Corps and the Office
of the Judge Advocate General. The officer’s
primary responsibilities are to administer mili-
tary justice throughout the Department of the
Navy, perform functions required or authorized
by the
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, and
provide technical supervision for the Naval
Justice School at Newport, Rhode Island. In
cooperation with the general counsel to the
navy, the judge advocate general also has broad
responsibility for providing legal advice and
related services to the secretary of the navy on
military justice, ethics, administrative law,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, operational and INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW
and treaty interpretatio n, and
LITIGATION involving these issues. Officers of
the Judge Advocate General’s Corps and judge
advocates of the Marine Corps provide a variety
of legal services to both individual service
members and naval commands, ranging from
personal representation for individual service
members for courts-martial to legal services for
naval commands on matters such as investiga-
tions and claims.
Naval Criminal Investigative Service The
director of the Naval Criminal Investigative

Service commands a worldwide organization
with representation in more than 160 geo-
graphic locations to provide criminal investiga-
tion, counterintelligence, law enforcement,
information, and personnel security support to
the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, both ashore
and afloat.
Office of Naval Research Established by act
of Congress on August 1, 1946 (10 U.S.C.A.
§§ 5150–5153), the Office of Naval Research is
the integrated headquarters of the navy for
science and technology investment. It manages
funding for basic research, exploratory develop-
ment, advanced technology development,
manufacturing technologies, and small business
support.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
NAVY DEPARTMENT 233
Department of the Navy
Auditor
General
Chief of
Information
DoN Chief
Information
Officer
Judge Advocate
General of
the Navy
Chief of Naval

Operations
Naval
Inspector
General
Director
Program
Appraisal
Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Research,
Development, and
Acquisition)
Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Manpower
and Reserve Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Financial
Management)
Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Installations
and Environment)
General Counsel of
the Department
of the Navy
Director Small &
Disadvantaged
Business Utillization
Assistant for
Administration
Chief of
Legislative

Affairs
Secretary
of the Navy
Under
Secretary
of the Navy
Director of
Naval Nuclear
Propulsion
Program [NooN]
Chief of Naval
Research
Master Chief
Petty Officer
[MCPON]
Director Test &
Evaluation Tech.
Reqs. [No91]
Surgeon General
of the Navy
[No93]
Chief of Navy
Reserve [No95]
Vice Chief
of Naval
Operations
Director,
Navy Staff
[DNS]
Chief of

Chaplains [No97]
Director for
Material
Readiness
& Logistics [N
4
]
DCNO Manpower
Personnel
Education &
Training [N1]
DCNO
Information
Plans & Strategy
[N3/N5]
DCNO
Communication
Networks
[N6]
Director of
Naval
Intelligence
[N2]
DCNO
Integration of
Capabilities &
Resources [N8]
Chief of Naval
Education &
Training [DCNP]

ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
234 NAVY DEPARTMENT
Personnel Boards The Naval Council of
Personnel Boards has four components:
1. The Naval Discharge Review Board reviews,
pursuant to 10 U.S.C.A. § 15 53, the
discharge or dismissal of former members
of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, except
in cases of
COURT-MARTIAL. It determines
whether, under reasonable standards of
naval law and discipline, a disc harge or
dismissal shou ld be changed and, if so,
what change should be made.
2. The Naval Complaints Review Board
reviews, upon request, decisional docu-
ments and index entries created by the
Naval Discharge Review Board after April
1, 1977, to determine whether they con-
form to applicable regulations of the
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE and the Department
of the Navy.
3. The Naval Clemency and Parole Board
reviews, pursuant to 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 953–
954, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps court-
martial cases referred to it and grants or
denies clemency and, pursuant to 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 952, reviews and directs that parole be

granted or denied.
4. The Physical Evaluation Board org anizes
and administers disability evaluations
Department of the Navy
Chief of Naval
Operations
Office of the
Chief of Naval
Operations
Naval Sea
Systems
Command
Space & Naval
Warfare Systems
Command
Naval
Meteorology and
Oceanography
Command
Naval Legal
Service
Command
Naval Air
Systems
Command
Strategic
Systems
Programs
Office of
Naval

Intelligence
United States
Naval
Observatory
Naval Facilities
Engineering
Command
Naval Supply
Systems
Command
Naval Education
and Training
Command
Naval
Security Group
Command
United States
Naval
Academy
Naval Strike &
Air Warfare
Center
Naval Safety
Center
Secretary
of the Navy
Operating Forces
Shore Establishment Operating Forces
Commandant of
the Marine Corps

Support
Naval
Reserve Forces
Operational
Test and
Evaluation
Forces
U.S. Naval
Forces
Europe
Military
Sealift
Command
Naval Special
Warfare
Command
U.S. Naval
Forces Central
Command
Naval Network
Warfare
Command
A
tlant
ic Fleet
include
s
Fleet Marines
Naval
Installations

Type
Commanders
P
acific Fl
eet
inc
lude
s
Flee
t Marines
Type
Commanders
Fleet Forces
Command
Bureau of
Naval Personnel
Bureau of Medicine
and Surgery
ILLUSTRATION BY GGS
CREATIVE RESOURCES.
REPRODUCED BY
PERMISSION OF GALE,
A PART OF CENGAGE
LEARNING.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
NAVY DEPARTMENT 235
within the Department of the Navy,
pursuant to 10 U.S.C.A., ch. 61, and other
applicable provisions of law and regulation.

Naval Records The Board for Correction of
Naval Records is the highest echelon of review
of administrative errors and injustices suffered
by members and former members of the U.S.
Navy and Marine Corps. Established under 10
U.S.C.A. § 1552 to give the secretary of the
navy direction on taking actions that otherwise
would require congressional decision, the board
relieves Congress of the need for additional
legislation. This statutory civilian board reviews
service members’ complaints about actions
taken by various boards and officials in the
department. The secretary of the navy, acting
through this board of civilians of the executive
part of the department, is authorized to change
naval or military records to correct an error or
to remove an injustice.
United States Navy
Chief of Naval Operations The chief of naval
operations is the highest-ranking officer of the
naval service. The chief is the U.S. Navy
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the group
of sen ior military officers who advise the
president. Under the secretary of the navy, the
chief of naval operations exercises command
over certain central executive organizations,
assigned shore activi ties, and the Operating
Forces of the Navy.
In the broadest terms, the chief of naval
operations is responsible for the navy’s readi-

ness and for executing military orders. The chief
plans for and provides the personnel, material,
weapons, facilities, and services to support the
needs of the navy, with the exception of the
Fleet Marine Forces; maintains water transpor-
tation services, including sea transportation
services for the Department of Defense; directs
the Naval Reserve; and exercises authority
for matters of naval administration, including
matters related to customs and traditions of the
naval service, security, intelligence, discipline,
communications, and operations.
Operating Forces of the Navy The Operating
Forces of the Navy are responsible for naval
operations necessary to carry out the Depart-
ment of the Navy ’s role in upholding and
advancing the national policies and interests
of the United States. The Operating Forces of
the Navy include the several fleets, seagoing
forces, Fleet Marine Forces, and other assigned
Marine Corps forces, the Military Sealift Com-
mand, and other forces and activities as may
be assigned by the pr esident or the secreta ry
of the navy.
The U.S. Navy’s two fleets are composed
of ships, submarines, and aircraft. The Pacific
Fleet operates throughout the Pacific and Indian
Oceans, and the Atlantic Fleet operates through-
out the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.
Additionally, the Naval Forces, Europe, is

composed of forces from both fleets.
Navy Command Structure The chief of naval
operations manages and supports the Operating
Forces of the navy through an organizational
structure that is composed of sea systems, air
systems, space and naval warfare systems, supply
systems, naval facilities, strategic systems, naval
personnel, naval medicine, oceanography, space
command, legal services, computers and tele-
communications, cryptology, intelligence, educa-
tion and training, and naval doctrine command.
United States Marine Corps
The United States Marine Corps was established
on November 10, 1775, by resolution of the
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. The Marine Corps’s
composition and functions are detailed in 10
U.S.C.A. § 5063. Within the Department of the
Navy, it is organized to include not fewer than
three combat divisions and three aircraft wings,
along with additional land combat, aviation,
and other services. Its purpose is to provide
forces necessary to seize or defend advanced
naval bases and to conduct land operations
essential to a naval campaign. In coordination
with the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force, the
Marine Corps develops the tactics, techniques,
and equipment used by landing forces in
amphibious (involving both sea and land)
operations.
The Marine Corps also provides detach-

ments and organizations for service on armed
vessels of the navy, provides security detach-
ments for the protection of naval property at
naval stations and bases, and performs such
other duties as the president may direct.
The Marine Corps is composed of the
Marine Corps headquarters, the Operating
Forces, and the supporting establishment.
The Operating Forces co nsist of Fleet Marine
Force Atlantic, Fleet Marine Force Pacific,
Marine Corps Reserve, Marine Security Forces,
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
236 NAVY DEPARTMENT
and Marine Detachments Afloat. The support-
ing establishment includes recru iting activities,
training installations, reserve support activities,
ground and aviation installations, and logistics
bases.
Basic combat units of the marines are
deployed as Marine Air Ground Task Forces
(MAGTFs). There are four types of MAGTFs:
the Marine Expeditionary Force, the Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, the Marine Expedition-
ary Unit, and the Special Purpose MAGTF.
Each group has a command element, a ground
combat element, an aviation combat element,
and a combat service support element. Marine
Expeditionary Forces are routinely deployed on
amphibious ships to the Mediterranean Sea,
Persian Gulf, and Pacific Ocean. Larger MAGTFs

can rapidly deploy by air, sea, or any combina-
tion of means from both coasts of the United
States and bases in the western Pacific to respond
to emergencies worldwide.
United States Naval Academy
The United States Naval Academy is the
undergraduate college of the naval service.
Located in Annapolis, Maryland, the academy
offers a comprehensive four-year program that
stresses excellence in academics, physical edu-
cation, professional training, conduct, and
honor. It prepares young men and women to
be professional officers in the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps. All graduates receive a bachelor
of science degree in one of 18 majors.
FURTHER READINGS
Navy Website. Available online at www.navy.mil (accessed
July 9, 2009).
U.S. Government Manual Website. Available online at www.
gpoaccess.gov/gmanual (accessed July 9, 2009).
CROSS REFERENCES
Armed Services; Defense Department; Military Law.
NEAR V. MINNESOTA
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS is a bedrock constitutional
principle. However, the presumption that the
press cannot be restrained from publishing
stories was not established until 1931, when
the U.S.
SUPREME COURT issued its landmark
ruling in Near v. Minnesota,, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.

Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357. This
FIRST AMENDMENT
decision became a core constitutional precedent
that protects the press from unwarranted
government interference in the newsroom.
Near v. Minnesota grew out of the state of
Minnesota’s disgust at the rise of yellow
journalism. Sensationalistic newspapers peddled
the alleged financial and sexual misdeeds of
prominent politicians and community leaders.
These papers angered the subjects of their lurid
stories, who demanded that something be done.
In response the Minn esota legislature enacted a
law in 1925 that provided for the abatement
(prevention of publishing), as a public nuisance,
of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory
newspaper, magazine or other periodical.” Under
the law, which was dubbed the Minnesota Gag
Law, a judge could also stop the publication of a
newspaper if the judge concluded it was
“obscene, lewd, and lascivious.” The judge
determined these facts without a jury and was
empowered to enter an injunction ordering no
future publication. A person who violated the
injunction and continued to publish could be
charged with contempt, fined $1,000, and
sentencedupto12monthsinjail.Apublisher
could defend the periodical using truth as a
defense, but the publisher had to demonstrate
“good motives” and “justifiable ends.”

The city of Minneapolis used the law to
prosecute J. M. Near, the publisher of the
Saturday Press. The paper reported stories about
police corruption and racketeering and did so in
a lively but reasonably accurate manner. Near ’s
stories angered the mayor and police chief, who
were alleged to have connections with
ORGANIZED
CRIME
and may have been guilty of dereliction of
their duties. Near’s newspaper was tinged with
anti-Semitism, anti-labor, and anti-Catholic
sentiments, so Near drew little sympathy. In
November 1927 the court issued an
INJUNCTION
ordering Near to destroy the last three months
of the Press and forbidding him to publish
any future editions of the newspaper or any
publication that contained the same type of
material. The judge had effectively prevented
Near from publishing anything that did not
conform to the good taste of Minnesota judges.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the law
and the order against Near, paving the way for
the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case.
The U.S. Supreme Cour t, in a 5-4 decision,
overturned the injunction and ruled the
Minnesota statute unconstitutional as a
PRIOR
RESTRAINT

on the press. Chief Justice CHARLES
EVANS HUGHES
, in his majority opinion, noted
that the law was “unusual, if not unique,” yet it
raised important issues concerning freedom
of the press and
FREEDOM OF SPEECH. In prior
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
NEAR V. MINNESOTA 237