In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 1 pptx

In Search of Consistency:
Ethics and Animals
Human–Animal Studies
Editor
Kenneth Shapiro
Animals and Society Institute
Editorial Board
Ralph Acampora, Hofstra University
Clifford Flynn, University of South Carolina
Hilda Kean, Ruskin College, Oxford
Randy Malamud, Georgia State University
Gail Melson, Purdue University
Kenneth Shapiro, Co-Executive Director
Animals & Society Institute
Editor, Society and Animals
Coeditor, Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science
403 McCauley Street
Washington Grove MD 20880
t/f 301-963-4751
www.animalsandsociety.org
VOLUME 3
In Search of Consistency:
Ethics and Animals
by
Lisa Kemmerer
BRILL
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2006
ISSN 1573-4226
ISBN-13: 978 90 04 14725 6

ISBN-10: 90 04 14725 X
© Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic
Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated,
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Fees are subject to change.
printed in the netherlands
Photos on the cover:
As in a Mirror (oil on canvas) and Clamshell Ethics (crayon).
Both are originals and made by the author.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kemmerer, Lisa.
In search of consistency : ethics and animals / by Lisa Kemmerer.
p. cm. — (Human-animal studies, ISSN 1573-4226 ; v. 3)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN-13: 978-90-04-14725-6
ISBN-10: 90-04-14725-X (pbk.: alk. paper)
1. Animal welfare. 2. Animal rights. 3. Ethics. I. Title. II. Series.
HV4708.K44 2006
179’.3—dc22 2006047543
Dedicated to/In loving memory of the many other members of my
family, past and present:

Snoopy, Saudi, Peanuts, Fez, Pester, Molly, Crabapple, Annie;
Hippi, Tidbit, Colorful;
Star and two whose names I cannot remember;
Rylie, Pal, Kim, Hans, Randy, Zack, Zeebee, Panda, Orphie, Nachie, Brownie,
Lucy, Jojo, Angie, Wags, Suzie;
Matilda, Tuck-Tuck, Baby Fondles, and those that did not live to adulthood;
Biddy, Fotinia, Dalila, and dozens of others;
Suzie, Ms. Duckie, and many others;
Troubles, Stubby, Commander, Shale, Samantha, Tweezer, Mama Schnook,
Kao, Muffin, Gryder, Snerf, Schnickelfritz, BeBee (Problem), Sandi, Skunky,
Silver Tabby, Boss Charlie, Underfoot, Sam, Blacky, Pill, Missy, Mustache,
Melissa, Sascha, Mosta, Spud, Smokey, Satin, Fluff, Stuffy, Graykin, Jex,
Ringer, Boo-witch, Lady Jane Gray, Longjohn, Elf, Popeye, Twitch, Fat Orange,
Butterscotch (Buttercrotch on off days), Cinders (Cinderella), Skittle, Saphire,
BoBlack, Flag, TummyMummy, Bob, Crosspatch, Simey, Mr. Max, Tom
Thumb, Stripe, Mini, Heba, Sheba, Miss Flea, Chocolate, Mabel, Boffer,
MyDogSpot, MyDogSpot’s Sister Mariezlie (Mizo, Meazlie), Chibi-chan, Friskie,
Strip, Strip’s tiny sister who did not live long, Baby Orange, Nabor, Satin,
Rabbit, Maggie, Gank, Martha/Grouse, Ebony, Squid Kid, Nosey, Mackie,
Mutt, Jeffrey, Paddy, Calli, Sid, Barney, Tipper, Quatro, Mama, Peabody,
Cream Puff (CreamyMeamy), Priscilla (Pisscilla in moments of bad behavior),
and others whose names are temporarily forgotten.

CONTENTS
Acknowledgements xiii
Preface xv
Introduction 1
PART ONE
METHODS AND TERMS
Chapter one

T1. Protectionism 7
M1. Selection of scholars 9
T2. Anymals, Nonhuman Animals, Other-Than-Human
Animals 10
M2. Applied philosophy 12
T3. Moral standing 16
T4. Morally relevant distinctions 18
T5. Inherent value/intrinsic worth 22
M3. Lifeboat scenarios 24
M4. Idealism 27
M5. Consistency and logical extremes 32
T6. Intuition 37
T7. Speciesism 38
M6. Impartiality 40
M7. Casuistry 47
T8. Living entity 49
T9. Western morality/ethics 50
M8. Interdisciplinary 52
Final Note 56
viii contents
PART TWO
PHILOSOPHICAL PROTECTIONIST THEORIES
Chapter two
Tom Regan: The Rights View 59
A. Regan’s Rights View
1. Equal inherent value 60
2. Welfare 61
3. Moral standing 64
4. Respect Principle 65
5. Harm Principle 66

6. Overriding rights 66
Summary 68
B. Discussion 68
1. Methods 68
2. Central concepts 70
3. Undesirable consequences 94
Conclusion 101
Chapter three
Peter Singer: Utilitarian Protectionism 103
A. Singer’s Utilitarian Theory 103
1. Utilitarianism 103
2. Sentience 105
3. Mental capacity 109
4. Death and killing 110
Summary 112
B. Discussion 112
1. Common concerns 112
2. Problems associated with utilitarianism 113
3. Sentience 128
4. Mental capacity 130
5. Reason without virtues 142
6. Speciesism 143
Conclusion 144
Chapter four
Paul Taylor: Bio-Protectionism 145
A. Protectionism and Environmental Ethics: An Uneasy
Alliance 145
B. Taylor’s Foundation 150
1. Individual versus species 150
2. Natural and nonnatural 150

3. Moral standing 151
4. Moral agents and moral patients 154
5. Rights 155
6. Philosophical principles and standards 158
C. Taylor’s Respect for Nature 158
1. Belief system—Biocentric Outlook 159
2. Attitude—Respect for Nature 161
3. Four rules and moral triage 162
4. Five principles 165
Summary 169
D. Discussion 170
1. Controversial assumptions 170
2. Theoretical considerations 177
3. Humanocentrism 190
Conclusion 210
PART THREE
PROTECTIONIST THEOLOGY
Chapter five
Andrew Linzey: Christian Protectionism 213
A. Theology 214
B. Christianity and Protectionism Across Time 217
C. Linzey’s Protectionist Theology 228
1. Creation 229
2. Covenant 235
3. Challenges 236
4. Life of Jesus 243
5. Linzey’s Generosity Paradigm 245
Summary 250
contents ix
D. Discussion 251

1. General issues 251
2. Interpretation of scripture 255
3. Theoretical considerations 270
Conclusion 281
Chapter six
Consistency across Religious Traditions 283
1. Indigenous traditions 288
2. Vedic/Hindu tradition 302
3. Buddhism 321
4. Daoism and Other Chinese Religions 333
5. Islam 347
Summary 359
PART FOUR
CONSISTENCY AND IMPARTIALITY IN
APPLIED PROTECTIONIST PHILOSOPHY
Chapter seven
Six Medical Cases: The Value of Innocent Human Life 363
1. Six medical cases 365
2. Comparative value of human life 374
3. Western ethics and the value of human life in
practice 385
Chapter eight
Minimize Harm Maxim 391
1. Premise One: All Living Entities Have Moral
Standing 391
2. Premise Two: Death and Harm Are Part of Life 407
3. Premise Three: Hierarchies of Moral Standing Are
Indefensible 408
Maxim: Minimize Harm 418
1. Subpoint One: Minimize Interference 419

2. Subpoint Two: We May Use Other Life-forms Only
with Consent 435
3. Subpoint Three: Intentions Matter 437
4. Subpoint Four: Self-Defense Is Morally Permissible 440
x contents
5. Extending Ethics Regarding Protection of Human
Life: A Parallel Theory 443
Summary 445
Chapter nine
Application: Contemporary Moral Dilemmas 447
A. Ongoing protectionist issues 447
1. Zoos and circuses 447
2. Clothing 455
3. Diet 458
4. Science 468
5. Anymal companions 474
B. Hypothetical scenarios 477
1. Organs versus organisms/Species versus individuals 477
2. Adrift on a lifeboat 479
Conclusion 489
Chapter ten
Review and Future Directions 491
A. Overview 491
1. A conspicuous problem 491
2. A cooperative enterprise 493
3. The Minimize Harm Maxim 494
B. Philosophical standards and the Minimize Harm Maxim 495
1. Ethical theories 495
2. Examining the Minimize Harm Maxim 497
3. Comparison 497

C. Reexamining Predominant Western Ethics 499
1. Reconsidering the value of human life 500
2. Continuing the trend—moving ethics outward 502
3. Human limitations 503
4. An ongoing endeavor 504
Bibliography 509
Index 531
contents xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank those who came before me in the field of ethics and animals,
including Tom Regan, Peter Singer, Andrew Linzey, and Paul Taylor.
I am very grateful to each of these scholars for providing thoughtful
comments on my presentation of their work. This process was par-
ticularly important because I have been determined to present their
work in a manner acceptable to them, though there can be no guar-
antee that I have actually managed this. I am especially thankful to
Tom Regan, who helped an unknown student with her doctoral dis-
sertation—even flew to Scotland for the defense of that dissertation—
which has now become this very book.
Special thanks to Susan Stuart (and her partner, Norm Grey) for
making a foreign student welcome in Scotland, and in their home, for
discussions on topics such as conatus, the unacceptability of violence
in defending the innocent, the perfection of potatoes, and the impor-
tance of cats—including the beloved Mr. Finn, the esteemed feline
fond of hunting worms.
I am thankful to the Culture and Animals Foundation for financial
support. Many thanks to Kenneth Shapiro for his help in getting this
book into print. Thank you to Brill for putting together a series that
focuses on animals and society, and to reviewers, especially Paul

Waldau, whose many helpful comments greatly improved the manu-
script. Thank you to Steven Wells, who proofread the earlier dis-
sertation, as well as key chapters of this book, and to Alex (Myshkin)
Bury. I thank others who offered comments on portions of the man-
uscript or key concepts, including Robin Downie, John Halley, Fred
Porta, Samantha Joo, Kim Woeste, Ed Sandeman, Walter Gulick,
Joel Lidz, Matthew Calarco, Brian Dillon, Dagmar Wilhelm, Jennifer
Tobin, Walter Kemmerer, Ed Kemmerer, and to editors Lillia
Gajewski and Linda Hoffman.
I thank Mum (Ruthli) for always having confidence in me. I thank
Dad (Walter) for his respect for all living things. I thank my brother, Ed,
for his intense interest in ideas and willingness to dialogue on subjects
(like the moral acceptability of spraying insecticide on a hoard of
aphids swarming one’s prize pansies). I thank my sister, Jan, for her
huge heart, for her unusual perspectives on animals and people, and
for sharing her home with me—not just her home, but eight beautiful
acres filled with rescued animals that became the core meaning of
our shared daily life as I wrote this text. I thank my family for being
a family: for offering camaraderie, encouragement, food for thought,
long walks outdoors, and plenty of distraction from my labors. I thank
the many critters in my life for their companionship, and for the
labor they require, both of which have kept me healthy and happy.
I especially thank nonhuman animals past and present that have
helped me to realize truths I otherwise might not have understood,
particularly those who fixed their hearts upon me as only a nonhuman
can, especially Troubles, Snoopy, Saudi, Bebee, Popeye, and Angie.
xiv contents
PREFACE
In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals examines the discrepancy in
applied ethics between treatment of human life and treatment of all

other life-forms. In the process, this book offers both explanations
and critical analyses of basic moral theories, including utilitarianism
and deontological (rights-based) ethics. In Search of Consistency also
offers an in-depth view of moral theory in different areas, such as
environmental ethics and theology.
Western philosophies are remarkably inconsistent in applying moral-
ity exclusively to the lives of human beings rather than to the lives
of all living entities. This book explores that often-overlooked dis-
crepancy via the works of four contemporary philosophers from four
different schools of thought; all four are well known for their novel
contributions in this potentially divisive area of ethics.
Four chapters are dedicated to the work of these scholars. Each
chapter presents and discusses the proposition by one of these schol-
ars to adjust ethical theory to include nonhuman animals. Tom
Regan proposes a theory in support of animal rights. Peter Singer
offers a utilitarian theory designed to maximize the satisfaction of
preferences, aiming for an outcome that maximizes the preferences
of individuals affected. Paul Taylor defends a theory of environmental
ethics designed to protect wild organisms, based on the inherent worth
of teleological entities. Andrew Linzey, the final scholar discussed
(and a theologian), outlines an ethic of obligatory servitude to God’s
creation, including nonhuman animals, rooted in the Hebrew Scriptures
and New Testament.
The sixth chapter explores protectionist ethics from a range of
spiritual sources, revealing similarities between Linzey’s work and ideas
from other religious traditions. This chapter investigates “animal-
friendly” teachings with protectionist tendencies from indigenous,
Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, and Islamic religious traditions throughout
history. Chapter 6 does not explore writings that contradict protec-
tionist theology, but rather reveals the strong presence of protectionism

in major religious traditions.
Informed by the strengths and weaknesses of the four theories
discussed in chapters 1–4, chapter 7 explores the consistent and
impartial application of contemporary Western morality through the
Minimize Harm Maxim. The Minimize Harm Maxim emerges from
the consistent application of Western moral respect for human life,
a respect for life that we now reserve almost exclusively for human
beings, in a consistent fashion that includes all life-forms that are
similar in morally relevant ways. The result is a significantly expanded
ethic, complete with a new array of moral dilemmas.
The final chapter returns to the ethical dilemma around which
the book centers—the glaring discrepancy in applied ethics with
regard to our treatment of human life as opposed to our treatment
of all other life-forms.
In Search of Consistency exposes the ongoing necessity for philo-
sophical work in the field of ethics with regard to the treatment of
living beings and the urgent need for an ethic that is less partial
and more consistent for both humans and nonhumans.
xvi preface
INTRODUCTION
Is moral concern something owed by human beings only to human
beings? Certainly two thousand five hundred years of moral philoso-
phy have tended to suggest that this is the case, surprisingly enough,
not by systematic argument, but simply by taking it for granted. Yet
this answer is by no means obvious, and it crumbles when exposed to
the most childlike question of all, “Why.” (Rollin 4)
Morality requires that our sentiments be balanced with relevant facts
and reason. Philosophy is a “human product”; each individual phi-
losophizes with more than just reason—we use our will, feelings,
“flesh and blood,” our “whole soul and whole body” (Stern 6).

We might wish moral philosophy to be a clean and neat process,
predictable and dependable, with absolute answers to complex moral
dilemmas, but nothing could be farther from the truth.
This is not to say that people do not have answers. Answers are
provided by almost anyone confronted with delicate questions about
complicated moral matters. From abortion and addiction to capital
punishment and war, people often believe they know what is right
for themselves and for those around them. However, neither per-
sonal preference nor majority opinion makes a sound moral decision,
though these definitely can and do determine a dominant (popular or
common) morality. In fact, the definition of morals conflicts with the
idea that what the majority approves is “right” and what the major-
ity disapproves is “wrong.” While we are all familiar with the dom-
inant morality of our time and place, the majority is much less aware
of whether or not their common moral opinions are rooted in rea-
son and empirical evidence.
Collectively, we participate in an outrageous moral inconsistency.
We accept without question the discrepancy between our moral
regard for human beings and our lack of moral regard for all other
living entities. When returning by car from my parent’s home last week,
I came upon a medic unit and a police car. A man was sitting on
the bumper of one of the medic cars, with skinned knees. Two medics
were attending him. He had gone around a corner too fast and had
tipped his motorcycle in the street. I drove on, and within half an
hour I watched a truck slam into the hind end of a doe. She was
2 introduction
bounding, and as if in slow motion she flew from the front of the
truck, spun in the air, and landed in a crumpled heap in the ditch. The
truck kept going. The three cars behind the truck kept going. I was
the fourth car behind the truck. I watched her try to stand up, her

hind end destroyed. There were no medics, no police, not even a
pause in the rushing of cars, though she was in shock and terribly
wounded. How could a young man with skinned knees receive so
much attention, while a doe who had been hit by a truck received
no more than the passing glance as the people who had run over
her rushed on their way? How many deer were hit that same night;
how many of them died slowly in ditches? And what of snakes, opos-
sums, robins, raccoons, swallows, salamanders, and domestic cats and
dogs? Can such a morality, where only human life is held to be
worthy of preservation and protection, possibly be defensible?
Part I of this book explores moral alternatives to this ongoing dis-
crepancy through the eyes of three contemporary philosophers from
three different schools of thought. Tom Regan presents a deonto-
logical rights-based theory. Peter Singer offers a utilitarian theory
designed to satisfy the maximum number of preferences and enhance
preferred outcomes or consequences. The third scholar, Paul Taylor,
defends a theory of environmental ethics designed to protect wild
organisms, based on the inherent worth of teleological entities.
Part II begins by discussing the work of Andrew Linzey, a the-
ologian. Chapter 4 presents and critiques Linzey’s theory of Christian
obligation of servitude to God’s creation (including cactus wrens and
channel cats) rooted in the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament.
Including a chapter on theology in a philosophy book will seem
strange to some, but theology is central to moral issues in general,
and important to ethical theories regarding treatment of nonhuman
animals for two reasons. First, understanding theology enhances our
understanding of morality in general. Philosophy was for many years
the handmaid and mouthpiece of the church; philosophers labored
to prove the existence of God and to solve “the problem of evil”
which troubled many Christian scholars. In that sense, Western morals

cannot be separated from Christianity. Many of our moral standards,
from attitudes about abortion to laws regarding gay marriage, have
been formed by the dominant religious tradition—Christianity.
Second, many Westerners are Christians. The United States in
particular remains strongly Christian (as evidenced by church affiliation).
While philosophical works rooted in scientific notions (evolution and
introduction 3
ethology, utilitarianism and rights theories) might have no impact on
conservative Christians, Linzey’s work will. Arguments are more effective
when the person you are talking to can relate to what you are say-
ing, and when what you are saying really matters to them personally.
For a strong Christian, scripture is key. Linzey speaks to those of
faith as Regan speaks to those who feel strongly about human rights.
For this reason it is critical to include Linzey in this volume and to
make use of religious—specifically Christian—language, as is done
in chapter 5.
The sixth chapter explores protectionist ethics across religious tradi-
tions, This segment of the book investigates “animal-friendly” lore from
indigenous, Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, and Islamic religious traditions,
revealing protectionist tendencies across religious traditions from
around the world.
Part III explores the consistent and impartial application of con-
temporary Western morality through the Minimize Harm Maxim. The
Minimize Harm Maxim consistently applies everyday, commonsense
American respect for human life to cover all life-forms that are sim-
ilar in morally relevant ways, resulting in a significantly expanded ethic,
complete with a new array of moral dilemmas.
Before discussing the abovementioned theories, it is necessary to
prepare some general groundwork. Chapter 1 introduces terms that
are important to the overall text and explains and justifies methods

used in this text. These terms and methods are explained because
they are immediately necessary to the content and intent of this
book, or because they are not specific or central to any one of the
four theories discussed. Terms such as “rights,” or “utilitarianism”
will be discussed thoroughly in chapters specific to those concepts.
Because reading terms and methods can be tedious, readers can gain
the core of each term and method by reading the first sentence of
each subsection and then move on to the next term or method. For
more in-depth coverage of the topic, read the entire section.

PART ONE
METHODS AND TERMS

CHAPTER ONE
METHODS AND TERMS
Term 1. Protectionism
What most people call “animal rights” is referred to as protection-
ism throughout this book.
Tom Regan calls attention to the meaning of “lexical gap,” the
absence of a word or expression to refer to an idea or object. He cites
as an example the strings of fiber on the outer surface of a banana
(Animal 80): we have no word for these “banana strings.” Similarly,
there is no generally accepted term that includes all theories, let
alone all outlooks, goals, and activists in the “animal rights” movement.
“The expression ‘animal rights,’ while often used loosely as a syn-
onym for animal liberation, if used correctly, has a more limited
application. Not all liberationists agree that focusing on the concept
of moral rights is useful, and some even deny that animals (or humans)
possess moral rights” (A. Taylor, Animals 18). Moral “rights” are the
subject of specific philosophical theories. Those who favor animal

rights propose that nonhuman animals have moral rights that we
ought to respect.
Of the four scholars included in this book, Tom Regan proposes
a specific philosophical theory defending the existence of moral rights
for at least some nonhuman animals. Linzey discusses “theos-rights,”
rights that he believes we owe not to animals but to the Creator.
Linzey is not known as an “animal rights” philosopher, but as a the-
ologian who focuses his moral theories on the divine—theos-rights
are owed to God, not to created beings. The other scholars pre-
sented propose different types of theories including utilitarianism and
environmental ethics. Because there are a wide variety of theories,
only very few of which focus on rights theory, “animal rights” is not
a suitable label for the many theories that extend ethics to include
protection of nonhuman animals.
Another commonly used term is “animal welfare.” This term usu-
ally encompasses theories that are concerned for animals, but which
ultimately favor human beings. Traditionally, the animal-welfare
8 chapter one
movement “has sought to minimize the suffering of exploited ani-
mals but has not fundamentally challenged the view that animals
are essentially resources” (A. Taylor, Animals 18–19). Although there
are radical welfarists whose placement of humans vis-à-vis nonhu-
man animals is far from conventional, the term “animal welfare”
designates a specific philosophical outlook that cannot be general-
ized to include all protectionist theories.
In contrast, the animal-liberation movement rejects the idea that
animals are resources. To fight for animal liberation is to hope to
put “an end to the routine sacrifice of animal interests for human
benefit, even where the sacrifice is executed humanely” (Sapontzis
77). For animal liberationists liberation of nonhuman animals is “anal-

ogous to the two great liberation movements of recent decades in
the United States: that of blacks and women” (Finsen 181). Indeed,
the “animal rights” movement is a liberation movement, but this
term cannot fill the lexical gap for a handful of reasons:
• This term may conjure up images of violence, yet not all who fight
to protect the lives of animals accept violence; in fact, very few do.
• This term is committed to other uses, e.g., “women’s liberation.”
• Other liberation movements have their own specific titles. “Abolition”
distinguishes those who fought for the abolition of slavery in the
United States prior to the Civil War. The civil rights movement
advocated racial equality in the United States. The menagerie of
methods and intents with regard to liberating various nonhuman
species should also have a term that is uniquely its own. Though
for many it is a liberation movement in all respects, for others
this is not the case, which leads to the next point.
• “Animal liberation” does not include less radical people who are
only struggling to free certain nonhuman animals from the most
cruel forms of oppression. One such group is often referred to as
animal welfarists; they seek to improve the welfare of animals, but
not their complete emancipation. Neither “rights” nor “liberation”
are appropriate terms for this form of participation in the effort
to end the suffering of other species.
• This term is sometimes understood to refer to a narrow, physical
form of “liberation,” but the spectrum of ethical issues concern-
ing nonhuman animals is much broader, including such topics as
habitat destruction, hunting, and companion animals.