In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 2 pot

40 chapter one
a particular case is engaged to be married to a man who is on trial
for theft, justice is at risk. Vested interests, emotional attachment,
and close affinity threaten impartiality. When one is in charge of
making decisions that affect others, an emotional attachment to only
one (or a portion) of those affected puts justice at risk. This is not to
suggest that emotional attachment or close affinity are vices—rather,
they are virtues. In contrast, complete emotional detachment is a
vice, as evidenced by psychopaths, who are a danger to animals
(including humans). Emotional attachment need not cause bias in all
situations, though such an effect is highly likely.
Human beings, who create moral guidelines for human interactions
with anymals, have vested interests, including an emotional attach-
ment to themselves and to others of their kind. Human beings have
a particular relationship with the human species over and against all
other species, and are likely to have a vested interest in human life.
It is not possible for Homo sapiens to move outside of this position of
bias—it is inherent. However, in the interest of promoting justice,
we must strive to be impartial in spite of our vested interests and
personal connections. Since we are inherently biased, we must be
wary of human assessments of other species, especially assessments
that elevate our own ethical standing. We must critically examine
the means we use to reach conclusions and regard moral assessments
that favor humans as inherently suspicious.
There are scores of examples of biased assessments of other species.
Our first attempt to teach chimpanzees to speak is an example.
Scientists concluded that chimps did not have linguistic ability, that
they lacked the cognitive mechanisms necessary for all but the most
basic forms of communication. Noted scholars concluded that speech
is the exclusive realm of human beings, a defining characteristic
shared by no other animal—and an important element in assessing

moral status. It has since been discovered that chimps lack the phys-
iology for verbal speech, but communicate effectively—beyond basic
communication—via sign language. We are now finding that any-
mals, such as whales, apes, dolphins, and vervet monkeys, have com-
plex forms of communication (M. S. Dawkins 23–24, Warren 53).
[Vervet] monkeys are able to pick up subtleties in their grunts that
completely escape the human ear. To a human, a grunt is a grunt is
a grunt. It takes technological aids in the form of tape recorders and
sound spectrograph to show that, as far as the monkeys are concerned,
methods and terms 41
there is far more to it than that We still do not fully understand
what it is that the monkeys are responding to or exactly how they
manage to detect the differences between the grunts. But do it they
clearly do, and they leave their human observers slightly baffled.
(M. S. Dawkins 23–24)
Human investigations into anymal language appear to have carried
an unspoken motive: “For a variety of economic, religious, or other
ideological reasons, it has been important to many people to insist
on an unbridgeable gulf between humans and animals, and language
has seemed the most promising instrument for achieving this” (Dupre
331). Few contemporary ethicists consider language a necessary con-
dition for moral standing; such an assessment is now broadly rec-
ognized as a form of humanocentrism (Orlans 150).
Similar to human investigations into language, human understandings
of pain, intelligence, communication, thought, community, learning
ability, and ethics necessarily stem from a narrow perspective, one
gained from an inner understanding of these attributes as parts of our
lives. Rene Descartes (1596–1650) is perhaps the best-known example
of a human being incapable of fairly assessing anymals. He concluded
that other species could neither think nor feel (Descartes 115). Sadly,

while Descartes is a particularly flagrant example, he has not proven
to be an exception to the rule: humans have concocted a plethora
of tests to assess the intelligence, ethical tendencies, and sensitivities
of anymals, with the hope and expectation of further exemplifying
the special and preferable nature of human beings. Ongoing “scientific”
assessments of anymals say more about the nature of science—and
about human nature—than they do about anymals.
Valuing one species over another is not consistent with scientific
information. Darwin provides no hierarchy in the evolutionary con-
tinuum, no progression toward perfection, yet even in this “scientific”
age, long after Darwin’s discoveries, people continue to believe that
human beings are the most “advanced.” Concurrently, we believe
that we are the most worthy of moral consideration. But why should
we believe that we are radically different from anymals? All animals
exhibit adaptive behavior and have similar central nervous systems—
we are all sentient. Animals, both Scandinavians and cocker spaniels,
exhibit emotional responses and associate with one another in close-
knit groups. If anymals fall short of our expectation, then we should
avow that people do, too.
42 chapter one
[A]ny reason we have to doubt the existence of the minds of animals
also gives us reason to doubt the existence of the minds of other
humans. We are faced with a choice between attributing mental states
to animals and solipsism or skepticism concerning other minds gener-
ally. As most of us are quite ready to accept that other human beings
have minds, then we should accept that animals too have minds.
The brains of all multicellular animals, including human beings, are
made of the same matter. The fundamental characteristics of neurons
and synapses are roughly the same [T]he brains of small whales,
dolphins and porpoises are close in size to those of human beings, both

absolutely and in relation to size of body.
. . . the general truth that animal brains are anatomically similar
to our own must be accepted. And this gives us reason for believ-
ing that the mental events that take place ‘within’ them are in some
degree similar to those which occur in our own brains. (Crisp, “Evolution”
310–12)
More specifically, Dawkins argues that “we now know that these
three attributes—complexity, thinking and minding about the world—
are also present in other species. The conclusion that they, too, are
consciously aware is therefore compelling” (M. S. Dawkins 177).
Contemporary science reveals that human beings are not distinct
from anymals in any morally relevant way, leading to the important
and inescapable conclusion that “behavioral and emotional kinship
with nonhuman animals” indicates “moral kinship as well” (Bekoff 360).
Methods of assessing cognition and cognitive abilities lack depend-
ability even among human beings. It is difficult to grasp how people
might come to understand the diverse abilities and interests, psy-
chological tendencies, and mental capabilities of even one other human.
How much more difficult, then, is it for them to understand and
appreciate the minds and feelings of anymals? The epistemological
difficulties inherent in human assessments of anymals must remain
at the center of any discussion of other species and ought to tem-
per any conclusions we reach. Because we have proven partial, and
because we remain inherently partial to our own species, human
studies of anymals cannot reasonably be assumed to be adequately
grounded to justify moral conclusions.
The force and prevalence of speciesism among humans is fore-
shadowed by the history of human partiality across the categories of
race, sex, age, and sexual orientation. The assumption that all human
beings have moral standing is a recent development. Romans “did

not include in their moral community criminals, captives, foreigners,
or nonhumans” (Marshal 80). When Europeans arrived in North
methods and terms 43
America, they destroyed most of the inhabitants. Only recently has
the United States legally granted African Americans equal moral
consideration. Around the world, women have been (and are) denied
equal moral consideration alongside men. In light of a demonstrated
human tendency for those in power to be partial and unjust in assess-
ing the moral standing of other human beings (particularly when the
assessor has a vested interest), disparaging assessments of anymals is
not surprising.
Another example of human partiality and hubris relates directly
to ethics. Humans have long assumed that only the human animal
has a system of ethics. In spite of modern science and the similarities
that we now know to exist among species, many still assume, without
reference to empirical evidence, that only human beings are ethical
animals. Since ethics is the subject of this book, we should consider
whether or not ethics is exclusively the domain of human beings, or
whether it is a more broad and biological phenomenon of the animal
world (including humans).
A minimal definition of ethics entails a system of behavioral norms
that generate expectations of behavior and punish deviance. Anymals
appear to comply with social expectations and to suffer social punish-
ments for infringements. For instance, the vampire bat displays “ani-
mal decision-making what looks like a system of morality based
on the principle of reciprocation of favours given in the past, cou-
pled with sanctions against those that do not live up to their oblig-
ations” (M. S. Dawkins 57). Based on observations, the same might
be true of nonhuman primates, canines, equines, felines, insects, and
perhaps a host of lesser observed anymals (“Inside”).

In the likely event that ethical systems are not exclusively human,
two interesting possibilities arise:
• Ethics, including human ethics, might be genetically encoded.
• Human ethics are but one of many ethical systems in the animal
world.
If the first point is true, then what is esteemed as human ethics may
be merely biology in action. E. O. Wilson argues that “moral senti-
ments” might be better described as “moral instincts.” If we are to
understand “deep springs of ethical behavior,” he argues that we
must consider the “development of moral sentiments as products of
the interactions of genes and the environment” (64). This argument
makes moral behavior a genetic predisposition resulting from natural
44 chapter one
selection, rather than a metaphysical truth to be discovered (E. O.
Wilson 58–59). E. O. Wilson concludes that ethics are “far more a
product of autonomous evolution than has hitherto been conceded”
(70). While it might prove difficult to explain all of human ethics
through biological analysis, Wilson’s perspective heightens awareness
of human beings as animals, not so very different from anymals. If
ethics have a biological component, it would not be surprising that
our morality is partial, favoring us and our own.
Evolution suggests that if human beings are moral animals by nature,
as has been supposed, other species are also likely to be genetically
wired with an ethical code, or with a tendency to have moral standards
that permit groups of individuals to function and prosper in commu-
nities. If this is the case, if other species have and practice their own
forms of morality, philosophers working in ethics have a much broader
field to explore than has generally been assumed. Human morality is
specifically the endeavor of human beings, but since anymals are also
ethical agents in their communities, it is important that we strive to

move outside of our narrow, human perspective of ethics to compre-
hend a larger moral sphere. Like the judge with a vested interest,
we cannot maintain impartiality, or adequately assess ethical principles
and ethical theories, unless we are able to envisage morality from
something of an “outsider’s” viewpoint. (This does not indicate that
other animals, as moral agents in their own communities, are respon-
sible for righting the wrongs that human beings cause. We are the
animals causing untold suffering and death to other species. We are
the animals who have an ethic that speaks of the importance of con-
sistency and fail to deliver. We need to critically examine our morality
and how we behave, and then change our actions to coincide with
ideals like consistency, justice, and compassion.)
Do genetically encoded morals justify speciesism? History suggests
that morality changes over time, and this may be related to evolu-
tion. Our ongoing effort to foster a more inclusive morality indicates
that partiality need not be a permanent part of our genetic code for
moral behavior. If it were, then racism, sexism, ageism, and het-
erosexism would be equally biological, and we could not expect to
make any moral progress toward a more impartial ethic. History
reveals that this is not the case.
Inherent difficulties, epistemological and personal, indicate that
sound ethical theories are not likely to stem from common human
assumptions or standard human comparisons of themselves with any-
methods and terms 45
mals. We must be diligent if we are to be impartial. Moral philoso-
phers must carefully examine all assumptions and conclusions sug-
gesting that attributes are exclusively human, especially if people link
such an attribute to moral standing. It would be wise, given our
partiality, to assume that basic interests across species are the same
unless proven otherwise. Animals of every species maintain and pro-

tect their physical existence. Even a bacterium, the simplest life form,
responds to its surroundings “to preserve and protect its form”
(Margulis 13, 50). Evelyn Pluhar comments:
Beings who are neurologically highly similar to me, who respond in
complex, relative ways to stimuli that elicit similar responses in me,
are probably conscious just as I am. This is an extraordinarily strong
inductive argument, fulfilling all criteria for good two-case analogical
reasoning, licensing one to infer that another, be the other human or
nonhuman, is not merely a cleverly contrived “machine.” Those who
are skeptical about induction as such are, of course, not persuaded by
the argument, but they also cannot be persuaded about the existence
of their own bodies, let alone anyone else’s. Short of solipsism, one
seems not to be irrational in putting one’s confidence in the argument
from analogy. (13)
Impartiality requires us to look anew at anymals. There are at least
four reasons for assuming that anymals have the same basic inter-
ests as human beings. Such an assumption
• avoids inherent epistemological difficulties of assessing cognitive or
emotional states external to ourselves;
• maintains consistency, granting anymals that which we grant other
human beings but cannot prove to be true;
• avoids partiality and bias, common flaws of assessments between
species;
• is consistent with science (shared biology), which indicates that
basic interests among living entities are fundamentally the same;
• is consistent with ethology, which also indicates that basic interests
among living entities are fundamentally the same.
In the absence of any established morally relevant distinction between
all human beings and anymals, the burden of justifying different
moral guidelines for different species lies with those who posit such

distinctions.
Partiality has proven a dangerous stumbling block in shaping human
morality. It is critical that we learn from history and not repeat the
46 chapter one
offenses of our past. For instance, in the Southern United States two
hundred years ago, immigrants from Europe developed and enforced
an ethical code that held only their kind to be morally considerable:
“Caucasians” were more powerful and passed laws that deprived
African immigrants to the United States of basic rights that we freely
granted to immigrants from Europe.
Though just one species among many, humans are no less power-
ful with regard to anymals than Caucasians were in North America
in relation to African immigrants two hundred years ago. Then, deci-
sions were made that hurt those of African descent, but were to the
advantage of Caucasians. Today humans make decisions that affect
blue-footed boobies and black-tailed deer—and the world in its
entirety—because these decisions seem to be to the advantage of
humans. But as history suggests, a biased, self-aggrandizing ethic is
not to anyone’s advantage, and neither can such an ethic establish
or demonstrate human superiority—on the contrary. Most current
citizens of the United States share a sense of shame at the human
moral shortcomings associated with the slavery of Africans. However,
powerful slave owners had much to gain financially by assuming that
blacks were ethically irrelevant. Today the same is true of the human
attitude toward and relationship with anymals.
If we are to fairly assess our ethical obligations with respect to
anymals, we must move beyond our narrow circle of personal, vested
interests. We have assumed that we are the only ethical animals, yet
in relation to anymals our “ethic” translates into little more than
“might makes right.” Bernard Rollin writes:

[W]hy does intelligence score highest? Ultimately, perhaps, because
intelligence allows us to control, vanquish, dominate, and destroy all
other creatures. If this is the case, it is power that puts us on top of
the pyramid. But if power provides grounds for including or exclud-
ing creatures from the scope of moral concern, we have essentially
accepted the legitimacy of the thesis that “might makes right” and
have, in a real sense, done away with all morality altogether. If we
do accept this thesis, we cannot avoid extending it to people as well,
and it thus becomes perfectly moral for Nazis to exterminate the Jews,
muggers to prey on old people, the majority to oppress the minority,
and the government to do as it sees fit to any of us. Furthermore, as
has often been pointed out, it follows from this claim that if an extrater-
restrial alien civilization were intellectually, technologically, and mili-
tarily superior to us, it would be perfectly justified in enslaving or
eating or exterminating human beings. (8)
methods and terms 47
On the other hand, intelligence may also be a benefit. We can use
our intelligence to subjugate others or to establish a consistent moral-
ity. Western moral theories are capable of inspiring compassion. Our
intelligence may help us to apply our complex moral outlook across
species.
Chapter 8 attempts the daunting task of presenting an impartial
moral theory. This chapter offers an ethic in which humans are
equal members in a menagerie of morally considerable animals. This
is a morality in which might does not make right, and in which the
value of life does not change according to species, race, or sex. For
the sake of impartiality, a central moral tenet, we must rigorously
question “morally relevant differences” assumed to exist between
humans and anymals. We should rather assume sameness because we
are all animals, evolved from common ancestors, and because moral-

ity requires that we strive for impartiality. Where no morally rele-
vant distinction can be demonstrated, we ought to extend our ethical
code to include other creatures.
Method 7. Casuistry
Casuistry is central to this text; it is a method used by moral philoso-
phers whereby a specific instance is compared with rulings in other
similar cases to reach a comparable and therefore presumably just
verdict.
Casuistry entails reflection on a given problem in light of relevant
accepted maxims and similar cases from the past, with intent to
reach an informed moral judgment regarding a given problem ( Jonsen
1991). The word “casuistry” comes from the Latin casus, which means
“case.” Casuistry is the study of cases, a process of resolving specific
moral problems by applying general principles of ethics, religion, or
moral philosophy.
Casuistry usually requires the assessment of specific details, such
as the degree of guilt or measure of responsibility. These are deter-
mined by weighing the specific circumstances of a given case. Motive
and consent are often critical (Runes 46). In turn, that particular
scenario becomes part of a case history, which sets a precedent by
which future moral judgments might be made in similar cases.
Casuistry is important to moral philosophy, and to this book, for
at least four reasons: Casuistry
48 chapter one
• focuses on particular circumstances in specific situations,
• depends on like cases being treated in a like manner,
• holds both motive and consent to be important considerations, and
• entails an informed moral judgment.
First, casuistry avoids abstractions that may plague moral theory and
analytical philosophy; casuistry acknowledges the importance of the

individual case. “Casuists are skeptical of principles, rules, rights, and
theory divorced from history, circumstance, and experience. One can
make successful moral judgments casuists say, only when one has
an intimate understanding of particular situations and an appreciation
of the record of similar situations” (Orlans 43). In simple terms, rules
like “do not shove or push” cannot adequately guide morality. If
someone is drowning, and a passerby swims in and pushes that indi-
vidual toward the shore, has the passerby done wrong by pushing?
The passerby may have broken a moral rule (“do not shove”) but
they have not done wrong. Similarly, other moral maxims do not
apply in all instances. This is why casuists believe that the specific
instance is critical to any moral assessment.
Second, casuistry assumes the principle of equality, whereby com-
parable instances are treated in a comparable manner, and the prin-
ciple of universality, whereby a decision made in one instance will
hold for all comparable cases (Buning 20). All things being equal, a
case of theft ought to be treated like another case of theft. One who
steals an ear of corn ought to be treated the same as one who steals
an eggplant, all things being equal. Casuists reason from one particular
case to another case that is similar in morally relevant ways; previous
cases set a precedent by which similar cases will be judged in the
future. “The casuistic method is to start with cases whose moral fea-
tures and conclusions have already been decided, and then to compare
the salient features in the paradigm case (that is, the case with morally
settled dimensions) with the features of cases in need of a decision”
(Orlans 43).
However, the qualification, “all things being equal” often doesn’t
hold, which leads to the third element of casuistry noted above:
motive and consent are critical. One often-cited philosophical conun-
drum is the thief who steals food to feed the starving. Let us assume

that the one who steals the ear of corn does so simply because she
does not want to pay for her food. In contrast, the one who steals
the eggplant does so to feed her starving husband (who is ill and
incapacitated) because she is too poor to buy food. Casuistry acknowl-
methods and terms 49
edges a morally relevant distinction between a thief who steals out
of indifference or for self-gain, and one who steals for a higher ideal
(in the hope of preserving life). No one argues with the importance
of the general maxim “stealing is immoral,” but casuistry acknowl-
edges the importance of circumstances, motive, and intent for assess-
ing the morality of individual acts.
Finally, casuistry entails an informed moral judgment. Casuistry is
not about majority opinion or common practices being written into
legal codes. Casuistry is a rigorous process of examining actual prob-
lems in specific instances, in light of relevant moral theory and other
similar cases that have been previously examined, in order to reach
an informed moral judgment on that particular situation.
Casuistry is critical to this text because this text compares moral-
ity between human beings with morality across species. Since there
are no adequately established morally relevant distinctions between
all human beings and anymals, casuistry is an effective tool for making
moral assessments of situations involving animals of different species.
We have a wealth of cases involving interactions among human
beings that can assist us in knowing what we ought to do with regard
to an oryx or echidna.
Term 8. Living Entity
For the purposes of this book, all species of animals and plants are
to be regarded as living entities (or life-forms). Cells qualify, though
viruses do not.
“Nature,” Aristotle observes, “proceeds little by little from things

lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to deter-
mine the exact line of demarcation” (Margulis 26). The Russian sci-
entist Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky refers to life as “living matter.”
What exactly is life? If we are to respect life, protect life, or cherish
life, we need to have some notion of what constitutes life.
“Living entities are best understood as ongoing processes of a cer-
tain sort” (L. Johnson 205). Life is “less a thing and more a happening,
a process; even the simplest life form respond[s] to its surround-
ings to preserve and protect its form” (Margulis 45, 50). A living
entity strives to maintain its existence as the type of entity that it is.
Even the simplest living beings have complex regulatory, that is cyber-
netic, systems that maintain the being within an acceptable range of
state of being. In the face of widely varying environmental conditions,
50 chapter one
its temperature, states of internal organs, biochemical states, and so
on, are maintained in a harmoniously balanced fashion. This is not
to say that the status quo is maintained The center of homeostasis
is not a specific condition of the entity but a whole range around which
its life processes oscillate Acorns grow to be oaks The main-
taining of an adequate balance has been given the name homeostasis.
(L. Johnson 203–04)
In short, entities that are alive, commonly called organisms, exhibit growth
by metabolizing, reproducing, and adapting to the environment via
internal change.
By this definition, animals, plants, fungus, protistans, and monerans (bac-
teria, pathogens, and blue-green algae) are all living entities. Viruses,
in contrast, do not self-maintain or metabolize and therefore do not
fit this definition of a living organism. Viruses, smaller than cells,
“come to life” when they enter another living organism, but “lack
sufficient genes and proteins to maintain themselves” (Margulis 23–24).

Yet even the smallest cells, those of the tiniest bacteria, are self-
maintaining entities, and thereby qualify as living entities (Margulis
23–24).
Term 9. Western Morality/Ethics
The terms “Western morality,” and “Western ethics,” are used with the
knowledge that there is not one comprehensive Western ethic; these
terms refer to commonly accepted moral standards shared by the vast
majority of people living according to European and North American
cultural traditions.
While there is not a single Western ethic, there are moral tendencies
in the West, many of which are backed by laws. As previously stated,
the morality of the majority is not a dependable indicator of what
we ought, or ought not, to do. However, these moral trends (major-
ity convictions) do indicate our generally accepted morality.
Western morality accepts and perpetuates a discrepancy between
the treatment of human life and the treatment of anymals. We in
the West generally protect and preserve human life. This is evidenced
not just by how we speak of human life (including what our schools
and religious institutions teach), but by how we live and by our legal
system. It is not lawful for a person to destroy human life except
under desperate conditions. If someone is in the act of stealing our
methods and terms 51
car, we are not legally permitted to attack them with a knife or shoot
them with a gun to reclaim our property. It is not legal to destroy
the life of the robber to preserve personal wealth. Only if an indi-
vidual is assaulted—unjustifiably physically threatened by another—
does that person have a right to self-defense—and defense must be
proportional; if the person stops attacking, then the one initially
assaulted must also stop. We are legally permitted to do bodily harm
to other human beings only to protect our own lives. Otherwise,

harming other human beings is unjustified, even if they are thieves
or drug dealers selling narcotics to our dependents. This law reflects
the general Western tendency to hold human life in high regard—
high above our regard for property. In many ways, current Western
law holds the preservation of human life above the protection and
preservation of general law and order.
Controversial issues such as capital punishment and abortion reflect
tension over situations that may challenge our general insistence on
the importance of preserving the lives of citizens. Most Western coun-
tries have abolished the death penalty, but this practice is alive and
well in the United States. Abortion, killing a handful of cells that
could potentially become a human being, remains a divisive issue in
many Western countries.
In contrast, Western ethics do not protect the lives of anymals.
U.S. laws reflect this moral outlook: anymals are property. It is ille-
gal to kill Myshkin, a beautiful black mutt, because Myshkin is your
neighbor’s property, not because her life is considered to be of value;
the lives of anymals are generally not protected in Western countries.
In fact, we can kill them for just about any purpose we choose, if
they are ours. It is morally and legally permissible to kill shorthorn
cattle and tabby cats at will. All types of fish can be tortured for human
pleasure; what is catch and release if not a form of torture for human
amusement?
Actions and laws in the West reveal strong moral views with regard
to humans as opposed to anymals. The terms “Western ethics” and
“Western morality,” do not assume that the West has only one moral-
ity, but that there are overarching, identifiable tendencies among the
vast majority of the population, and it is to these dominant moral
trends that I refer.
52 chapter one

Method 8. Interdisciplinary
Morality is determined by factors from different scholarly disciplines;
therefore this book is interdisciplinary, including such topics as biol-
ogy and theology, ethology and economics.
Human endeavors are rooted in human “knowledge”; our under-
standing of the world is relevant to how we think and how we
behave. Consequently, applied philosophy requires that we combine
“facts” from various other disciplines with philosophical speculation
in our quest for the best course of action. Applied philosophy asks,
“Given our understanding of the world around us, what ought we to do?”
Most modern philosophers agree that one cannot simply derive
an “ought” from an “is.” Nonetheless, there is a general consensus
that certain “facts,” bits of information gathered via empirical evi-
dence, help determine the best course of action. For instance, if biol-
ogy indicates that spotted-tailed quolls are capable of suffering, and
moral theory suggests that to cause needless suffering is morally
abhorrent, then we ought not to cause spotted-tailed quolls to suffer
without legitimate cause. However, if science indicates that the spot-
ted-tailed quoll is incapable of suffering, then ethical teachings on
the matter of suffering are irrelevant to the spotted-tailed quoll. In
some ways, biology is critical to morality, particularly in protection-
ist philosophy.
Academic disciplines do not exist in a vacuum. The moral dilemma
entailed in patenting farmed animals will be decided in light of such
diverse disciplines as genetic engineering, theology, law, morality,
biology, and economics (Orlans 100). Experts in each of these fields
of study are critical to reaching a reasonable conclusion on this moral
conundrum. Similarly, the conditions in factory farms, and what
actually goes on in laboratories, are important for determining whether
or not we ought to eat flesh or permit anymal experimentation.

One need not be a specialist to decipher many of the relevant
“facts” entailed in drawing moral conclusions. For instance, if we
know that an infant is cold, and that the child’s guardian is nearby,
most of us will conclude that the guardian ought to warm the child.
Similarly, if someone were stuck in quicksand, and several bystanders
observed the individual sinking, most people would agree that because
we value human life, those nearby ought to free the sinking victim.
Additional facts may alter these conclusions. For example, if the one
stuck in the mud was not in danger of death and was an escaped
methods and terms 53
convict—one known to kill—perhaps this evidence better indicates
that if we value life we ought to leave the convict stuck in the mud
until authorities arrive. While facts alone cannot reveal answers to
moral dilemmas, they play an important role in determining what
we ought to do. (“Facts” often constitute minor premises for ethical
discourse while the philosophy of ethics provides major premises.
Both are important.)
Effective moral determinations coincide with general understanding.
If moral principles are not aligned with how we perceive the world
around us, they may seem irrelevant or even dangerous, and such
principles are unlikely to be honored. Therefore, if applied ethics is
to be effective, it is imperative that theories and principles be rooted
in relevant information from a variety of fields of study, and that
this information is available to the general public. For instance, if
the general public is to accept that people ought to avoid smoking,
then relevant information about health and economics, for example,
should be made readily available to the public. This has in fact hap-
pened in the last thirty years. The West turned against smoking and
embarked on a campaign to educate the public in order to align
what people believe to be true with what they ought to be doing—

smoking is in fact deadly, and so we should not smoke. In contrast,
flesh eating is still widely accepted in this country because people
are given information about nutrition, the farming life, and anymal
care that support this moral outlook. But like smoking forty years
ago, the facts we are being fed are not consistent with dietary reality;
in this case, what people generally believe about mozzarella and hot
dogs, and what is true, are very different matters. Information from
various fields is critical both to determine and to support any given
moral outlook, but incorrect information can be misleading. Diligence
in exploring and incorporating information from outside the field of
ethics is critical to sound morality.
A host of disciplines shape individual worldviews. Worldviews are
“an ever-changing complex of beliefs, values, feelings, desires, and
expectations that affect the way a person sees the world and how
that person feels about things in the world” (Marietta 8). Our world-
view is central to who we are and helps us determine how we ought
to behave. Worldviews “work behind the scenes,” supporting a given
point of view or attitude, even though most of us are unaware of
our own worldview (Marietta 8). How often do we say to ourselves,
“Human life is of extreme value in my worldview, but not all world-
54 chapter one
views are like this.” Most of us expect to have partners, but do we
ever see this as part of a worldview? Do we ever think to ourselves,
“In my worldview having a partner is essential, but in other world-
views it is not”? Do we muse to ourselves, “I wash my hair almost
every day but people in other lands rarely wash their hair”? Unstated
worldviews that guide human actions are critical to morality—to
what is commonly accepted in any given community. Moral norms
depend on such a “cognitive context,” and behavior reflects our
worldview (Callicott, “Environmental” 25). Our worldview is like the

air we breathe: we are surrounded by air, and dependent on air,
but seldom notice this ever-present aspect of our environment.
Among entrenched moral beliefs that are supported by vast and
unstated worldviews, the general trend against protectionism is no
exception. In Western societies “deeply entrenched traditions sup-
port the notion that animal welfare must bow to the best interests
of humans” (Lauerman 49). Many disciplines have contributed to
shaping our worldviews and our morality; we must examine each of
these disciplines to properly assess contemporary ethical norms.
A philosophical examination of ethics and anymals is likely to
include information collected by zoologists, biologists, ethologists, and
sociologists. We must know something about what anymals are like
if we are to explore our ethical obligations toward other species.
Moral philosophers need to collect morally relevant details about
anymals before making ethical determinations. For instance, do Jersey
calves have a biology that indicates that they can suffer? Do they
behave as though they are suffering when kept in small crates and
deprived of iron on veal farms? Ought we to continue to raise calves
in this manner? Each moral determination is best supported by exper-
tise from other disciplines, in this case biology and ethology.
Regan and Taylor discuss rights theory, a discipline most commonly
linked with the social sciences. Each discusses anymal biology; their
respective theories depend on ethological studies. In contrast, Linzey’s
theory is largely dependent on interpreting sacred literature. While
our biological existence is generally in evidence in Western, science-
oriented cultures, spirituality has become tangential, even irrelevant.
But for many people, faith and scripture are still critical, as they
have been for hundreds of years. “Our attitudes toward nature and
other animals are deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature
and destiny—that is, by religion” (L. White 23).

methods and terms 55
Ethics and religion are inextricably linked. For centuries Christianity
has influenced moral philosophy, while “religion arose on a foun-
dation of ethics” (E. O. Wilson 65). For many Christians and Jews,
the Hebrew Scriptures and/or New Testament determine many per-
sonal moral obligations. For a person of faith, scriptures are often
the most important factor in shaping morality.
While many contemporary Westerners do not practice any par-
ticular religion, Western culture and beliefs are rooted in Christian
history and practice. Religious traditions are important to contem-
porary morality, worldviews, and law—even in secular societies,
whether or not the majority of individuals believe in divine forces.
A thorough assessment of moral practices entails an investigation of
deep-rooted, historic beliefs based on traditional religious teachings.
It is not surprising, then, that one of the protectionist scholars
examined in this text is a theologian, Andrew Linzey. Linzey’s the-
ory offers metaphysical (spiritual) support for a comprehensive envi-
ronmental ethic, an ethic in which all of creation is treated with
self-sacrificing service out of respect for the intentions of a divine
creator.
We determine “facts” about the world around us, for better or
for worse, through mathematics, science, scripture, art, faith, and
our senses. Each is important in determining how we understand
and interact with the larger world; each is important to any human
understanding of what we ought to do. No single field of study, no
individual factor, determines what we ought to do. Mathematics, scrip-
ture, science, and our senses each aid us in the philosophic process
behind applied moral philosophy. We determine what we ought to
do, at least in part, by sifting through relevant information from
many different disciplines. For this reason this book includes not only

philosophy, but information from several disciplines.
Final Note
Although a critical analysis is provided for the most well-known and
well-respected protectionist theories available, this book attests to and
affirms the value of the contributions of these scholars to the ongo-
ing philosophical quest for a more consistent, compassionate morality.
It is infinitely easier to find fault with the theories of others than it
is to develop a theory of one’s own.

PART TWO
PHILOSOPHICAL PROTECTIONIST THEORIES

CHAPTER TWO
TOM REGAN: THE RIGHTS VIEW
A. Regan’s Rights View
Regan began as an advocate for human rights. He turned his philo-
sophical purposes to investigating rights in the hope of understanding—
and being able to explain—why it was morally unacceptable to draft
young men to fight in Viet Nam. He wondered about the nature of
rights and how human rights might defend young men from being
drafted. Toward this end he read the works of Gandhi (Regan,
Empty 29).
Gandhi’s nonviolence did not protect only the human species. Like
many Hindus, Gandhi revered life—all life—and was a vegetarian.
Gandhi’s voice compelled Regan to ask, “Why would only human beings
have rights?” (Regan, Animal 3–5). Between the killing and dying in
Viet Nam, and a vegetarian Hindu, Regan not only developed a
moral grounding in human rights, but soon proposed the first com-
prehensive philosophical theory of anymal rights.
In The Case for Animal Rights, Regan explained the “Rights View”

in which certain animals have basic rights that ought to be taken
into consideration. Regan asserts that normal mammals aged one
year or more have what he calls “a welfare,” which is necessary for
anymals to be considered “subjects-of-a-life” (which we return to
shortly). Animals, human or otherwise, that qualify as subjects-of-a-
life, have equal inherent value in Regan’s theory. Regan outlines
several well-respected philosophical guidelines for assessing moral the-
ories, such as consistency, impartiality, and conformity with reflective
intuitions, which he uses to test his Rights View (Case 190).
Regan avoids speciesism in its most flagrant forms by identifying
and discussing moral agents, moral patients, and subjects-of-a-life.
Through these creative and well-thought-out distinctions Regan avoids
typical speciesist divisions, and incorporates a range of morally rel-
evant characteristics across species.
60 chapter two
1. Equal Inherent Value
a. The Cup Itself
Regan rests his theory on the inherent value of specified individu-
als. In the Rights View inherent value is not based on experiences,
aptitude, or any other acquired or innate characteristic. Regan uses
the analogy of a cup to illustrate his point: Like a cup filled with
various items, the cup itself is what matters, not the contents. If an
individual is of value, Regan postulates, she is of value in and of
herself—she is both the source and the locus of that value. To have
inherent value one need only be a cup (Case 236–37). Inherent value
is not dependent on what others prefer, or on any particular qual-
ities possessed. Inherent value can neither be earned nor lost.
Regan argues that if the contents of the cup—aptitude or expe-
riences—are what offer value, that entity becomes a “mere receptacle”
for those qualities. When humans are viewed as empty cups with

valuable ingredients, such as “virtues” or talents, then those who are
more gifted, or more active, have comparatively higher value. Regan
denounces this “perfectionist” approach (Case 233).
b. Perfectionism
Regan rejects perfectionism, a method of assessing the value of an
individual (Case 235–36). Perfectionism assigns various degrees of
inherent value based on acquired or biological attributes. Regan cites
racism and sexism as examples of perfectionism. Valuing athletes
over businessfolk also qualifies as perfectionism. Regan concludes that
inherent value must be based on the cup itself (the individual), and not
on the items inside the cup (such as aptitude, skin color, experience,
length of toes, income, education, etc.)
c. Equality of Inherent Value
Regan asserts that among those individuals that have inherent value,
they all have inherent value equally. There can be no entity that is
more or less inherently valuable than another. Degrees of inherent
value are perfectionist. Such moral ranking leads to elitist attitudes
such as those of slave owners or members of the Ku Klux Klan.
d. Moral Intuition
Regan rejects both levels of inherent value and perfectionism based
on moral intuition, which we turn to in short order.
tom regan: the rights view 61
2. Welfare
Regan argues that certain individuals have welfare: they fare well or
ill depending on how their interests are benefited or harmed during
the course of their lives. In the Rights View, all animals (normal
mammals aged one year or more—including people) have a “wel-
fare.” Regan agrees that humans have more numerous and varied
possibilities than anymals, but
[b]oth animals and humans have preference- and welfare-interests,

some biological, some psychological, some social; both may be benefited
or harmed and, if the latter, harmed either because of what they are
made to experience (harms as inflictions) or because of what they are
denied (harms as deprivations); both have lives that are characterized
by pleasure or pain, satisfaction or frustration; and the overall tone or
quality of the life of each, to a greater or lesser degree, is a function
of the harmonious satisfaction of those preferences that it is in the
interests of each to have satisfied. (Case 119)
a. Psychophysical Identity
Regan explains that animals with a welfare (which includes humans)
have a “psychophysical identity.” By this he means that normal mam-
mals aged one year or older have desires, beliefs, and the ability to
act; they have “preference autonomy” (Case 116).
b. Preference Autonomy
Preference autonomy entails wants, desires, and preferences that an
individual strives to fulfill. Regan offers examples of preference auton-
omy in dogs. A dog will choose between different types of food, or
between various activities, selecting the option that best satisfies her
wants (Case 85). Dogs also avoid what they do not prefer. For instance,
Regan would probably agree that a dog, if presented with both a
rolled up newspaper used for punishment and a leash used for dog
walks, would most likely move away from the paper roll and toward
the leash. The newspaper roll elicits dog behavior indicative of avoid-
ance and displeasure, such as cowing or slinking; the leash is greeted
with enthusiasm in the form of tail wagging and joyous bounding.
The dog’s actions demonstrate a preference for the leash, distaste
for the rolled-up paper; predictably, the dog would rather go for a
walk than be punished. Dogs demonstrate their belief that the leash
will satisfy wants, whereas the newspaper will not. Objects (such as
a leash) cause a reaction that most people can readily identify as joy

62 chapter two
or unhappiness, satisfied wants or thwarted desires. In this way dogs
indicate their preferences, demonstrating “preference autonomy.”
c. Benefits and Harms
Welfare is determined by “benefits” and “harms” in the Rights View.
In the above case the dog benefits by going for a walk if a walk
satisfies her biological, social, and psychological interests, and if her
interests are genuinely good for her. If there is no safe place for the dog
to walk, then going for a walk is not in her best interest. Similarly, when
a dog wants chocolate, when a child wants to stay up all night but
has to go to school in the morning, or when a cat wants to play in
the roadway, the animals’ interests are not genuinely good for them.
Under Regan’s definition, if most of the time a dog is given what
she prefers, and if what she prefers is good for her, she is living
well. For an animal that has a welfare, Regan asserts:
To live well is to have a life that is characterized by the harmonious
satisfaction of one’s desires, purposes, and the like, taking account of
one’s biological, social, and psychological interests. More generally, ani-
mals (including humans) live well relative to the degree to which (1)
they pursue and obtain what they prefer, (2) they take satisfaction in
pursuing and obtaining what they prefer, and (3) what they prefer and
obtain is in their interests. (Case 117)
An animal (Homo sapiens) that is living well will display behavior
indicative of pleasure and satisfaction.
As mentioned above, harms can be either inflictions or depriva-
tions (Case 94). The random, harsh use of the newspaper on a dog
is an infliction of harm, while repeatedly neglecting to walk a dog is
deprivation. In either case the dog’s welfare is diminished.
Because deprivation constitutes harm, bringing about an untimely
death is a harm in the Rights View. Death “forecloses all possibili-

ties of finding satisfaction” (Case 100). Even a painless, purposeful
death is a loss, and thereby a great harm to the deceased, if it is
untimely. Death may be brought to a subject-of-a-life without con-
stituting harm only if death is brought
• by the least painful means available;
• in the true belief that death is in the best interest of the one killed;
and
• out of genuine concern for the interests of the one to be killed
(Case 119).
tom regan: the rights view 63
In Regan’s view factors that constitute a good human life “over and
above considerations of basic biological needs” have a counterpart in
anymals (Case 90). Although Regan finds that the opportunities for
satisfaction are more varied and numerous for human beings, any-
mals can be harmed in similar ways. The welfare of individuals from
many species, whether they are harmed or benefited, carries impor-
tant moral implications. Regan concludes that it is wrong for humans
to do to anymals what they do not want done to themselves, and
the immorality of such an act is not lessened “if our victims are
non-rational, or not morally autonomous. What difference does it
really make whether or not they have or could have a principled
objection to our behavior? If they have no will in the matter I do
not violate their will, but I clearly violate their wishes” (Animals 77).
d. Moral Agents and Moral Patients
Regan distinguishes between moral agents and moral patients. Moral
agents are morally accountable for their actions and are therefore
“justly and fairly held accountable for their deeds” (Case 152). In
contrast, moral patients lack the ability to understand or execute
moral behavior. Therefore moral patients cannot do right, nor can
they do wrong (Case 152). A variety of animals, including human

infants and imbeciles, fall into the moral-patient category. Regan
notes that “normal adult humans are moral agents” (Case 152).
Regan affirms that both moral patients and moral agents have
inherent value. To grant inherent value only to moral agents would
violate the basic philosophical principle of consistency and impar-
tiality, which requires like cases to be treated in like manner (Case
190). Because inherent value is granted to moral agents (human
beings) without regard for experiences or aptitudes, it would be inconsistent
and arbitrary to exclude moral patients based on these same criteria:
Morality will not tolerate the use of double standards when cases are
relevantly similar. If we postulate inherent value in the case of moral
agents and recognize the need to view their possession of it as being
equal, then we will be rationally obliged to do the same in the case
of moral patients. All who have inherent value thus have it equally,
whether they be moral agents or moral patients. All animals are equal,
when the notions of “animal” and “equality” are properly understood,
“animal” referring to all (terrestrial, at least) moral agents and patients,
and “equality” referring to their equal possession of inherent value.
Inherent value is thus a categorical concept. One either has it, or one does
not Moreover, all those who have it, have it equally. (Case 240)
64 chapter two
Both moral patients and moral agents have a welfare—both fare
poorly or well depending on the fulfilment of interests; their welfare
is harmed and benefited in similar ways during the course of their
lives. Regan highlights this important similarity between anymals and
humans—between moral patients and moral agents—as critical to
morality (Case 84). Because they can be harmed in similar ways,
impartiality and consistency require that both moral agents and moral
patients be protected if either one is to be protected (Case 189).
3. Moral Standing

Even if individuals cannot rationally articulate distaste for what is done
to them, even if they cannot make moral decisions, entities with a
welfare are morally considerable in the Rights View. Therefore, we
are morally obligated to consider how a given action will impact any
individuals that have a welfare—not just human beings (“Nature” 9).
“We have a prima facie direct duty not to harm any relevantly similar
individual who can be harmed” (Case 193–94).
In the course of making decisions that might affect welfare, we
must consider all entities with a welfare, all that might be affected.
Morality requires that we assess the loss of each individual equitably
if we are to honor “equal inherent value and the equal prima facie
right not to be harmed” (Case 325). In Regan’s view, for the sake of
consistency, all beings with a welfare ought to be taken into account
if we are to consider any beings to be morally considerable because
they have a welfare. To do otherwise is to go against long-estab-
lished, basic philosophical guidelines for moral theories; to do other-
wise is to be inconsistent and partial.
a. Subject-of-a-Life
At this point Regan has established that in the Rights View both
moral patients and moral agents have a welfare, and that both there-
fore have equal inherent value (Case 239). But which individuals do
not have inherent value?
While both moral agents and moral patients are alive, Regan sees
problems with accepting the mere presence of life as a criterion for
inherent value: How can we have duties to “individual blades of
grass, potatoes, or cancer cells lawns, potato fields, or cancerous
tumors?” (Case 241–42). Each of these has life, but do they have
inherent value?