In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 6 pps

264 chapter five
passage makes it clear that whatever Christians do, they must not do
anything that might cause others to falter or stumble along their
spiritual journey.
While an individual of strong faith may see nothing wrong with
eating bodies of anymals—whether or not they have been sacrificed
to idols—Paul notes that they must adjust their eating habits for the
sake of others (Eiselen 1182). Christian love requires the faithful to
be sure that their flesh eating does not become a “stumbling block”
for others (1 Cor. 8:9). Those whose diet causes others to fall away
from Christianity, “sin against . . . family,” and in so doing, “sin
against Christ” (1 Cor. 8:12). Certain foods are to be avoided not
because they are forbidden—they are not—but because these items
might turn people away from Christ. As with Peter’s dream, a more
general point is made through specific examples (in this case flesh
eating and wine drinking).
Divergent points of view have too often become catalysts for divi-
sion and stumbling blocks to faith, both of which scripture clearly
and strongly warns against. In Romans 14, scripture instructs Christians
to avoid foods that tend to be contentious so that they might avoid
turning others away from Christ. Today, flesh and dairy products
are foods that might turn people away from the Christian commu-
nity. Will vegans attend a church function such as a “barbecue” or
“ice cream social”? Their Christlike compassion will not permit them
to eat anymal products, but I have never known a flesh eater to
have a moral complaint against veggie burgers or tofu dogs, or
Popsicle socials.
The teachings of Romans 14 and 1 Corinthians 8 are just as rel-
evant today as in the time of Peter; diet continues to be divisive and
controversial. People are turned away by current Christian diets, atti-
tudes, and general indifference toward anymals. The text of

1 Corinthians 8 concludes: “Therefore, if food is a cause of their
falling, I will never eat meat, so that I may not cause one of them
to fall” (8:13). In short, if eating meat is a possible stumbling block
for others, the Christian response ought to be, “I will be a vegetarian
all my life!” (Eiselen 1182). Flesh eating in the Christian church has
become a barrier and stumbling block for vegans. Today’s carnivo-
rous Christian congregations, fattened on the flesh of factory-farmed
calves and the eggs of deprived battery hens (soon to be slaughtered
for chicken soup), turn the stomachs of more compassionate citizens.
Flesh eating is a divisive and critical issue for contemporary Westerners.
andrew linzey: christian protectionism 265
Romans 14 and 1 Corinthians 8 instruct the faithful not to eat foods
that might be morally repugnant to others—to abandon flesh eat-
ing out of love for vegetarians and vegans who turn away from
Christian congregations red in tooth and fork.
e. Ecclesiastes 3:18–21
There are few verses in either the Hebrew Scriptures or the New
Testament that challenge traditional views of anymals-as-“other” as
blatantly as does Ecclesiastes 3:18–21:
I said in my heart with regard to human beings that God is testing
them to show that they are but animals. For the fate of humans and
the fate of animals is the same; as one dies, so dies the other. They
all have the same breath, and humans have no advantage over the
animals; for all is vanity. All go to one place; all are from the dust,
and all turn to dust again. Who knows whether the human spirit goes
upward and the spirit of animals goes downward to the earth?
As noted previously, early Christian scholars, aligned with earlier
Greek thinkers, argued that humans were both distinctly separate
and above other creatures. Yet Ecclesiastes states plainly, we “are
but animals.” If the Christian philosopher, Descartes, had spent more

time reading the Bible and less time reading Greek philosophy to
reach his theological conclusions, perhaps he would not have erro-
neously concluded that anymals are automata, machines made by
God for our purposes, machines bereft of soul, and thereby bereft
of consciousness, and thereby bereft of any form of sensation.
Ecclesiastes clearly indicates that we are not so very different from
anymals, and that it is not clear what will happen to any of us after
death—except that all of our bodies will return to the dust from
which we have come.
f. John 4:8 and 4:16
Linzey emphasizes the overarching importance of self-sacrifice in
Christianity, but does not focus on specific biblical teachings of love,
or how these teachings support protectionism. Christian love is not
only central to Christianity but lies at the heart of the moral contro-
versy revolving around how people ought to treat anymals. Theologians
such as Robert Murray, whom I noted stands against protectionism,
must first and foremost be informed of what transpires in anymal
industries. Then, if such theologians wish to continue eating meat
and defending anymal experimentation, they will need to somehow
266 chapter five
justify their actions in light of the overarching Christian vision of
love and compassion in the midst of creation.
Perhaps the most common objection to protectionist philosophy is
that love directed at anymals is “misplaced” love. Linzey responds
to this objection: One kind of love is not a replacement for another;
neither does love for anymals reduce an individual’s ability to love
people. Linzey asserts that “sensitivity to suffering is a sign of grace
and also a litmus test of our fidelity to the passionate Creator God”;
“any theology which desensitizes us to suffering cannot properly be
a theology centered on the divine vindication of innocent suffering”

(Linzey, After 132). Linzey concludes that an “understanding of God’s
love which limits our care and affection for other creatures is spir-
itually impoverished” (Linzey, After 131).
Linzey’s response is well supported by hagiographies. Seemingly
boundless compassion has been associated with some of the greatest
spiritual exemplars the world has known, from Gandhi to St. Francis
of Assisi. Lynn White called St. Francis “the greatest spiritual revo-
lutionary in Western history” (1207). It is an embarrassment to
Christians, who so often and so loudly vocalize their central tenet
of love, that congregations and ministers alike indict love turned
toward other species as misplaced. Compassion—love—is not a lim-
ited resource, but a capacity that Christians are to foster and enhance
throughout their lives.
Love is not a “zero-sum game” or some sort of hydraulic fluid whose
volume is perforce static. This is the argument of “compassion fatigue”
and it only holds short-term. Long-term, all religions and especially
Christianity, teach that one can expand one’s capacity to love, and
ought consciously to do so. (Halley, Unpublished)
The life of Jesus provides many examples of overflowing compassion
and love. Jesus did not assess the moral status of those he helped;
he did not assess the intellectual abilities of those he healed. Jesus
helped whomever came to him, and most Christians express an
expectation that the devout follow this example:
[ Jesus] didn’t say to blind Bartolomeus, once healed, “Now don’t you
go ogling beautiful women.” To the owner of the withered hand that
he restored, Jesus didn’t warn, “Don’t get your hand caught in the till;
no stealing now.” The neighbor to be loved according to the Good
Samaritan is the nearest person in need regardless of race, religion,
or nationality, and we can safely add gender or sexual orientation
andrew linzey: christian protectionism 267

“Will you call vile one for whom Christ did not disdain to die?”
If Christ didn’t disdain to die for any of us, [how] are Christians
not to live for all of us? (Coffin)
Through Romans 8 and Colossians 1 Linzey demonstrates that Christ
died to redeem all of creation. In addition to the many types of peo-
ple (Asians, tax collectors, women, and Republican politicians to
name but a few) Christians are obliged to add the entirety of God’s
bountiful creation. Christian love is expected to be no less generous
than the love demonstrated by Jesus—by God.
In the story of the good Samaritan and elsewhere, Christ expanded
the idea of “love your neighbor” outwards from the small circle of
“Jews” to a much larger circle of people including Samaritans St.
Paul continued the process (Gal. 3:28), extending the circle to include
all Gentiles. Linzey is following the logic of Christianity through to
higher animals. Perhaps there is no limit. (Fundamentalists often go
in the opposite direction, imploding their ever-diminishing circle towards
a ring of “the faithful” and eventually just one’s own self.) (Halley,
Unpublished communication)
The deity is represented in the New Testament as love itself. Verses
1 John 4:8 and 1 John 4:16 state simply: “God is love.” In this pas-
sage love is “not merely an attribute of God but defines his nature,
though in a practical rather than philosophic sense God’s nature
is not exhausted by the quality of love, but love governs all its aspects
and expressions” (Buttrick 12:280). Christian love is understood to
originate in the munificence of God’s love and to connect each of
us with the divine (C. Allen 12:214). Consequently, it is not sur-
prising that almost all Christians agree that love is “the paramount
scripture essential to the Christian way of life” (C. Allen 12:214).
Christians are called upon to love fully and well; love is central to
Christianity. Christ’s love—God as love—these central teachings

demand a Christian life of radical compassion. Christ modeled a life
of love that entailed the ultimate sacrifice: “In the light of Jesus,
Christian loving can only properly be defined in terms of that kind
of loving which costs us something” (Linzey, After 102). Galatians
5:22–23 informs humanity that the “fruit of the Spirit is love, joy,
peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-
control.” Scripture demands a life of sacrificial, Christlike love, a
demand that has long been central to Christian morality—though
too often only in theory.
268 chapter five
Linzey highlights Christ’s example of loving self-sacrifice and the
original peaceable (vegan) kingdom created by God (Gen. 1). He
encourages Christians to recognize the exploitation of sentient cre-
ation as antithetical to God’s will. Surely today’s violence toward
anymals, intensified and aggrandized by modern methods of factory
farming and technology (in a world of comparable health and abun-
dance), are immeasurably worse than the simple violence of Noah’s
time. Yet even the violence of Noah’s day was appalling in the eye of the deity,
so shocking and objectionable that the Almighty determined to make an end of
all that had been created in order to stop the violence. In his book, The Cosmic
Covenant, Robert Murray defends eating other creatures. How will
such flesh-eating theologians answer the Christ challenge, the call to
live a life of loving self-sacrifice in a world of exploitation and vio-
lence toward anymals?
Verses 1 John 4:8 and 1 John 4:16 shed light on the nature of
the deity and carry the Christian imperative to live a life of love for
all, a love that entails self-sacrifice.
g. Isaiah 11:6–9
Linzey draws attention to God’s original creation as presented in
Genesis 1, a creation of peace and nonviolence, a peaceable king-

dom lost through the degradation of earthly creatures. He notes that
God created all, that all share in the fall, and that all of creation
will share in redemption. But Linzey does not focus on the ideal
world, designed by God, anticipated in the future; Linzey does not
emphasize God’s peaceable kingdom, which will eventually return to
this earth, transforming life as we know it.
This future “state of peace and well-being” is “symbolized by the
idyllic picture of powerful animals and poisonous reptiles in harmo-
nious companionship with domesticated animals and truly spiritual
human children” (Buttrick 5:249):
The wolf shall live with the lamb,
the leopard shall lie down with the kid,
the calf and the lion and the fatling together,
and a little child shall lead them.
The cow and the bear shall graze,
their young shall lie down together;
and the lion shall eat straw like the ox.
The nursing child shall play over the hole of the asp,
and the weaned child shall put his hand on the adder’s den.
andrew linzey: christian protectionism 269
They will not hurt or destroy
on all my holy mountain;
for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the LORD
as the waters cover the sea. (Isa. 11:6–9)
According to scripture, “complete harmony and peace” will once
again prevail on earth; “men and animals [will] live together in a
paradise-like relationship, and no living creature [will] hurt or destroy
another” (C. Allen 5:232). Violence will stop; there will be “recon-
ciliation in the world of nature, and the ancient enmity between
man and beast shall be done away” (Buttrick 5:249–50). Scripture

holds “an expectation that God will bring all bloodshed in creation
to an end. Earthly violence is not chronic: Isaiah offers a vision of
reconciliation, concord, and trust” (Guthrie 598).
Psalms and Proverbs also allow us to glimpse an all-encompass-
ing spiritual unity that includes the earth in its entirety. Psalm 148
exclaims: “Praise him, sun and moon;/Praise him, all you shining
stars!/Praise him, you highest heavens,/and you waters above the
heavens! . . ./Mountains and all hills,/fruit trees and all cedars!/Wild
animals and all cattle,/creeping things and flying birds! . . ./Praise
the Lord!” This biblical worldview reveals all creatures, humans and
anymals alike, praising God. “All creation is a single hymn of praise
in which humans, animals and nature as a whole praise God with
one voice” (Vischer 5).
This biblical vision of peace on earth and goodwill toward all of
creation is not to be ignored by Christians, as it most assuredly seems
to be among contemporary congregations. “The Lord’s Prayer,” one
of the most commonly repeated scriptural passages, reminds the
devout: “Your kingdom come./Your will be done, on earth as it is
in heaven” (Matt. 10). This idyllic vision for the future involves all of
contemporary Christendom; the fulfillment of God’s plan can and will
happen through the “work of all who believe in Jesus Christ and
his kingdom” (Buttrick 5:250–51). A Christian lifestyle ought to aid
the realization of God’s peaceable kingdom. The “Our Father,” so
often uttered, “acknowledges a personal and social obligation” for
each Christian, to work toward this peaceful end (Buttrick 7:312),
to participate in the “final triumph of God’s will” through daily life
(C. Allen 8:115). The peaceable world ordained by God is to once
again be realized on earth with the active participation of all Christians.
Many contemporary believers dismiss the peaceable kingdom as
beautiful imagery that cannot be realized in this world, a hope beyond

270 chapter five
hope for which we are not expected to strive. On this view, most
of Christ’s teachings can be dismissed, for Christ was an idealist, as
are many of the teachings in the Hebrew Scriptures. But scripture
commands: “Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is per-
fect” (Matt. 5:48). A peaceful, compassionate lifestyle, and the antic-
ipated peace that must ultimately follow, are the actualization of “the
knowledge of the Lord” (Guthrie 598). Christians are expected to strive
for excellence. Consistent with the works of other prophets, Mica
implores, “What does the LORD require of you but to do justice,
and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?” (Mica
6:8). It is the duty of every Christian to assist in reestablishing God’s
peaceable kingdom on earth—to abstain from investing in cruelty,
and to thereby help restore the vegan world designed and created
by the Almighty.
This biblical vision of creatures living in peace is central to the
Christian tradition. At Christmastime people put up images depict-
ing Jesus as a newborn babe, lying in a barnyard surrounded by
well-tended anymals. (It is perhaps symbolic that Jesus was laid in
the feed bin [manger] of farmed anymals, where he rested safely on
his first night.) This idyllic vision, the promise of its return, and the
expectation for a Christian life call believers to change their behav-
ior toward anymals through the love of God, for Christ transforms
“human character, and will ultimately change the whole creation”
(Guthrie 598). Christians can choose not to consume flesh, the nurs-
ing milk of cattle, or the undeveloped embryos of chickens. The
long-ago anymals living in a stable in Bethlehem did not mistake
Jesus, lying in their feed bin, for food. Neither should we mistake
other creatures for a legitimate source of sustenance when we have
other options that are scripturally preferable.

3. Theoretical Considerations
a. Theos-Centered Morality
An important difference must be noted between Linzey’s Generosity
Paradigm and most protectionist theories: Linzey’s ethic does not
focus on the lives of spotted collybia, banded geckoes, Devon cattle,
or the everglades, but rather on duty to God.
For Christians, “the duty of the steward is to carry out the plan
of the absent ruler. The duty not to mistreat animals is owed to the
absent ruler, not to the animals” (Gunn, “Traditional” 151). Linzey’s
andrew linzey: christian protectionism 271
theory protects the environment and anymals from human abuse
and plundering, and this is done for the sake of God, not for the sake
of the land, seas, plants, or animals, including people.
While the difference is central, the outcome is the same—protec-
tion. Linzey’s theology of compassion offers a refreshing alternative
to most people, who place human beings at the center. Most of us
preserve forests and species in order to maintain quiet and beauti-
ful places where we might take refuge from the bustle of urban exis-
tence and enjoy hiking, killing wildlife, or just viewing the anymals.
Others only preserve the abundance of species for possible medici-
nal purposes—to maintain the gene pool—not for the anymals them-
selves. A God-centered vision offers a more enduring and ultimate
reason to protect and preserve the world around us. Perhaps “with-
out a truly spiritual understanding of our relationship with the rest
of life on Earth, both the Environmental Movement and the Animal
Welfare Movement are condemned to irrelevance” (Porritt 15).
While we might neglect our duties to others, or even to ourselves,
those of faith are perhaps more committed to duties viewed as cen-
tral to their relationship with the deity.
Theology removes human self-interest from protectionist theory

and focuses on responsibility to God. “As one cannot praise Rembrandt
sincerely while trampling his paintings, so one cannot praise God
sincerely while trampling His works” (DeWitt 8).
b. Hierarchy
“Hierarchy,” when applied to the biological world, entails certain
species assuming a place of importance in relation to others. Hierarchy,
based on an assumption of human preeminence, is one of the cor-
nerstones on which the traditional Western concept of “dominion”
has been built and maintained. Theists who envision a hierarchy
often reason “that God exists; that He has the right to decide which
of His creatures shall live or die; that He has the right to delegate
this right to others; and that He did delegate this right to human
beings” (Singer, “Animals” 231). Any one of these assumptions might
reasonably be challenged, as Linzey has done, though he accepts a
scripture-based hierarchy.
Linzey asserts a biblical hierarchy rooted in Genesis: creation, the
covenant of Genesis 9, and dominion. He accepts the traditional
hierarchy—humans have a special place over (but not against) the
myriad creation. He asserts that humans have special responsibilities
272 chapter five
(rather than exclusive privileges) in relation to the rest of creation.
He posits that anymals ought to be included in our moral circle,
but not plants. Linzey’s assertion of hierarchy appears untenable on
five counts.
i. divergent creation stories
First, there are two creation stories in the Bible and they cannot
both be reconciled with Linzey’s hierarchy. Linzey only discusses the
creation story presented in Genesis 1, which informs that God cre-
ated day and night, then atmosphere and water on the first and sec-
ond day. The third day brought dry land and vegetation followed

by the stars and planets on the fourth day. On the fifth day God
created sea creatures and birds, and on the sixth the deity created
all the beasts of the earth, culminating in the creation of man and
woman (Gen. 1:1–30).
Based on Genesis 1 creation, assuming a hierarchy of ascending
order, the hierarchy would run as follows: time, basic earthly ele-
ments, inanimate matter and vegetation, heavenly bodies, creatures
of sea and sky, animals—including people, who were created last.
The creation story of Genesis 2, however, begins with mists, fol-
lowed by the creation of man, then vegetation. Rivers and miner-
als are mentioned before the creation of anymals. The final act of
creation is (once again) woman:
In the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens , a
stream would rise from the earth, and water the whole face of the
ground—then the Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground,
and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became
a living being. And the Lord God planted a garden in Eden, in the
east; and there he put the man whom he had formed. Out of the
ground the LORD God made to grow every tree that is pleasant to
the sight and good for food
Then the Lord God said, “It is not good that the man should be
alone; I will make him a helper as his partner.” So out of the ground
the Lord God formed every animal of the field and every bird of the
air . . .; but for man there was not found a helper as his partner. So
the LORD God took one of his ribs [and made] a woman and
brought her to the man. (Gen. 2:4–9, 18–22)
The ascending order of creation in the second chapter of Genesis
looks very different: basic earthly elements, man, vegetation, more
complex inanimate matter, anymals, and finally woman.
andrew linzey: christian protectionism 273

Linzey does not explain why the creation account in Genesis 2
might reasonably be overlooked in forming a hierarchy based on the
order of creation. If the recorded order of creation is to provide a
basis for a hierarchy of any kind, both accounts must somehow be
reconciled, and it is difficult to see how this might be accomplished.
There is only one point of consensus: if the order of creation is
ascending, women are at the apex of creation in both accounts.
ii. various covenants
The covenantal relationship is so pervasive in the Bible that it is often
thought to be the essential way God relates to humans. Certainly,
many theologians of the Old Testament have followed Eichrodt in
stressing the centrality of the covenant to any insightful interpretation
of the text; the very names Old Testament and New Testament bear
witness to the overriding significance of successive covenantal under-
standings. (Gulick 187)
Given the handful of covenants in the Bible, it is unclear why Linzey
has chosen to emphasize just one. In fact, as noted by a colleague
and Hebrew Scriptures scholar, Dr. Samantha Joo, “the Priestly edi-
tor, schematizes Israel’s early history according to the main ‘signs’
of the different covenantal periods: Sabbath, rainbow, circumcision,
and the giving of laws at Mt. Sinai” (Unpublished communication).
Yet Linzey does not discuss why he has chosen to emphasize just
one of these important exchanges between God and humanity. Which
covenant is most important; are they all equal?
Furthermore, the covenant of Genesis 9 comes immediately after
God has granted that humans may eat anymals. Linzey does not
explain this seemingly unusual occurrence: How can God enter into
a covenant equally with all beings just after permitting one species
to eat many of the others simply because human beings seem to
have a strong, perhaps even uncontrollable, inclination to kill and

be wicked?
If Linzey is going to support his assertion of the importance of
the Genesis 9 covenant, he will need to explain why he has chosen
to emphasize this particular covenant, and how it stands in relation
to other covenants made exclusively between God and human beings.
274 chapter five
iii. hierarchy order
If there is a hierarchy indicated through scriptural accounts of the
order of creation, Linzey does not indicate why the order must nec-
essarily be ascending. Nothing in scripture suggests that God cre-
ated the universe in any particular order of moral standing. Nothing
indicates that the first act of creation, or the last (or the third, for
that matter) might be the apex, or might be considered any part of
a hierarchy.
Even if Linzey’s notion of ascending hierarchy is accepted, it is
not clear how such a notion might offer moral guidance in light of
two accounts of biblical creation. How are Christians to understand
or build an ethic on a hierarchy where vegetation falls between man
and anymals, as in the second creation account? How might people
organize a hierarchy where one must choose between an ascending
order in which woman stands at the apex, and a descending order
where the basic elements of earthly matter are the most likely can-
didates for wearing the crown of God’s creation?
iv. Book of Job
In the book of Job “God’s character is revealed in and through
nature” (Gulick 188). In responding to Job’s heartfelt questioning,
the deity offers “a panoramic vision” of the natural world in which
Job lived (Gulick 189). God answers Job from a force of nature, not
a terrifying tornado, nor the everyday wind that drifts across conti-
nents unseen, but a whirlwind, “a dust-bearing wind that, paradox-

ically, can be seen” and which literally “turns things around—perhaps
even one’s assumptions about the nature of God or the godliness of
nature” (Gulick 189). And this is precisely what a close read of Job,
with regard to nature, can do. These passages in Job belie any hier-
archy that assumes humans to be self-important, such as might be
indicated by a hierarchy that places us apart from or above the rest
of creation.
The Book of Job provides four different approaches to keeping
humans in their place. First, the “wild ass and wild ox would scorn
to bear human burdens or feed at the human manger [T]he
great creatures of land and sea were not made to serve as our pets
or playthings” (Goodman 11). Many anymals are independent of
human beings, and wish to be left independent. Second, God has
given wild asses—and many other creatures—homes in the steppes,
and salt land, so that they can live free of human domination, free
andrew linzey: christian protectionism 275
from the unpleasant sounds of humans in busy settlements, where
domineering drivers shout at little, laboring burros ( Job 39:5–8).
Third, the earth was created for all creatures; God sustains all crea-
tures, and what comes to pass does not revolve around human beings.
It is written that God caused it to “rain on a land where no one
lives, on the desert, which is empty of human life; to satisfy the
waste and desolate land, and to make the ground put forth grass”
( Job 38:26–27). The deity does not care only about humanity, and
human-centered desires, but sees to the needs of all creatures. Finally,
human beings have a tendency toward self-importance and arro-
gance, which are not consistent with our place amid creation. God
asks the presumptuous human: “Where were you when I laid the
foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding” ( Job
38:4). We are but another earthly creature, in the eyes of God, not

very capable, not particularly bright.
The Book of Job reminds Jews and Christians that God purpose-
fully created nature outside the domain of human beings—even
beyond our comprehension. We have no power, no place in these
wild lands. God has consideration for all of creation and provides
for the needs of all creatures. The deity specifically set lands apart
to facilitate the lives of multitudinous creatures placed peacefully dis-
tant from human domination. In these passages the deity addresses
the tendency of humans to feel self-important, our tendency to view
ourselves as entitled. Hebrew Scriptures remind readers: [C]ertain
areas of God’s creation are outside human control, beyond acceptable
and proper realms of human influence (Vischer 9). Scripture clearly
states that God attends to every creature’s need, even the needs of
those animals that require protection from the exploitative ways of
human beings. The Book of Job speaks loudly against human-cen-
tered utilitarian assessments of creation.
The Book of Job is backed by Genesis, where people are placed
in God’s good garden to “till it and keep it” (2:15). This passage
suggests that people were intended to take care of the needs of oth-
ers living in the Garden of Eden—to tend creation. This role denotes
specific laborer’s duties assigned by God—not an elevated status. People
have been inclined to view this God-given role as indicative of a
peak position in an imagined biblical hierarchy, but notions of a
hierarchy remain unsupported by scripture, and gardeners are not
necessarily viewed as holding an elevated status. Certainly, however,
those who dutifully tend to the needs of others are viewed as spiritually
276 chapter five
elevated in the Christian world. Unfortunately, this is not the role
that we have taken.
Job, through the visions of nature provided by God, comes to a

new understanding, about which he says, “I heard of you by the
hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees you; therefore I despise
myself, and repent in dust and ashes” ( Job 42:5–6). Through nature,
Job sees the fullness of God and comes to understand his smallness;
he then repents of his previous arrogance.
v. hierarchy as a Greek concept
Linzey notes that “hierarchy” is not a concept rooted in the Hebrew
tradition, which was based on monarchy; the concept of hierarchy
is Greek.
As noted previously, Aristotle posited a hierarchy with humans at
the apex, anymals in the middle, and plants at the base. Influenced
by the philosophy of Aristotle, the Greek view of hierarchy sup-
planted Hebrew notions of monarchy and a created hierarchy emerged.
“Traditionally, Christians interpret Genesis in terms of the Aristotelian
pattern, which sees nature as a hierarchical system in which it is
assumed that the male is superior to the female, the female to
the slave, and the slave to the beasts” (Linzey, Animal Theology 18).
Dominion is thus seen not as a service rendered God through cre-
ation, but as human supremacy. Hebrew Scriptures, with an over-
lay of Greek philosophy, resulted in a biblical interpretation rooted
in hierarchy. Linzey accepts this tainted interpretation of scripture.
Second, Linzey asserts that “foundational material in scripture does
indeed make distinctions not only between humans and animals, but
also between animals and vegetables” (Animal Theology 35). He argues
that anymals therefore ought to be included in the Christian moral
circle, but not plants. His assertion is based on scriptural accounts
of creation, dominion, the covenant, and the incarnation of God as
man. None of his arguments seem tenable:
• Linzey notes that creation offers “circles of greater or lesser inti-
macy with God,” indicating hierarchy (Linzey, Animal Theology 34).

But, as noted, there are two stories of creation, offering divergent
orders. Linzey does not even bring up this devastating blow to a
hierarchical theory of creation.
• Linzey argues that humans were given dominion over anymals
because “what we owe animals is more than what we owe veg-
andrew linzey: christian protectionism 277
etables or arguably even ecosystems” (Animal Theology 34). But
Linzey notes that dominion in Genesis 1 entails “tilling and keep-
ing the garden,” a plant-centered, divinely ordained dominion (Animal
Theology 34). If human beings had not been given dominion over
plants, it would have been difficult for them to feed themselves
and all the many anymals. It is plants that humans were first
instructed to tend.
Linzey also reasons that we owe anymals in ways we do not owe
plants. But dominion aside, the Christian obligation to love is not
dependent on what is owed, but on what is needed, as exemplified
by Jesus. Overall, plants require less care, but the amount of care
needed is not a legitimate indicator of moral standing, only of
time and attention needed to satisfy a particular set of wants.
• Linzey cites the covenant, noting that fish, cattle, and “every ani-
mal” are included, while parsley, soybeans, and “every plant” are
not. Yet Linzey notes that God makes the covenant with “all liv-
ing things,” and with the earth as a whole. Plants qualify on both
counts; therefore, God’s covenant includes plant life, and the
covenant cannot convincingly be used as part of an argument to
demonstrate that anymals, but not plants, are the proper objects
of Christian moral responsibility.
• Linzey ascribes special meaning to Jesus as having animal flesh.
God did not enter into the life of an artichoke or a palm tree,
but rather the fleshly existence of a mammal. Linzey argues that

this offers special significance for fleshly beings. But Linzey denies
that the specifics of Christ’s incarnation hold an “exclusivist, overly
particularistic, understanding of the incarnation”; he warns against
an interpretation of Christ’s body “that excludes not only animals,
but also women; not only women but all Gentile, uncircumcised
men” (Animal Theology 69). It would seem that either Christ’s incar-
nation as a Middle Eastern male is an important statement, an
affirmation for Middle Eastern males (in which case women from
Poland are excluded), or it is not important that Christ was a Middle
Eastern male—or a mammal as opposed to a plant. Given that
Linzey denies the importance not only of Christ’s gender and race,
but of his species, there can be little reason to exclude plants based
on Jesus’s status as an animal.
Linzey becomes entangled in the same difficulties that face all
those who wish to expand moral concern to include nonhuman ani-
mals: Where do we draw the line? Linzey draws the line between
278 chapter five
plants and anymals, based on scripture, allowing a gray area where
slugs and earthworms dwell. But Linzey’s scriptural backing for this
division is inconclusive at best, and his arguments contradictory.
If Linzey’s hierarchy is abandoned in light of the above objec-
tions, Linzey’s Generosity Paradigm changes in a most remarkable
way. In the absence of hierarchy, Linzey’s theory presents all of cre-
ation as filled with divine significance. His theory then offers a pow-
erful theology of compassion: All of creation is inherently and equally
valuable and is rightly the benefactor of the self-sacrificing service of Christendom.
Such an all-encompassing ethic is difficult to envision, let alone imple-
ment: How do we serve both bacteria and humankind? How do we
feed a lion without sacrificing the lamb?
Implementing self-sacrificing service toward all creation is a daunt-

ing spiritual goal. On further reflection, self-sacrificing service to all
of creation is no more or less daunting than the biblical injunction
to “love your neighbor” (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39, James 2:8). The
essence of a well-lived Christian life is love, and the Generosity
Paradigm appropriately prescribes a Christian life of “audacious gen-
erosity daring to love all the suffering, perishing creation” (Kohak
170). Though such an inclusive vision is daunting, Hebrews reminds
us that faith entails “the giving of substance to the things which are
hoped for, the discerning of things which are not seen” (Mascall 40).
Christians are called to move toward their spiritual goals in the
process of daily living as evidence of faith in things not seen, not
understood, or perhaps which seem downright impossible.
Linzey’s Generosity Paradigm, bereft of hierarchy, suggests that
Christians ought to approach all of creation with an attitude of ser-
vice and self-sacrifice, asking not what can be gained from each small
part of creation, but what we might best do for that aspect of creation in
order to serve God. To be a Christian, then, is to feed a stray cat, to
water a wilting plant, and to maintain dwindling rain forests.
It is important to note that even in the absence of hierarchy
Linzey’s theological vision does not require equal treatment for a crys-
tal, a chrysanthemum, a bacterium, a katydid, and a capybara, only
equal regard for each, out of duty to God. Christian duty requires us
to help all suffering and failing members of creation in whatever
way they need assistance, whenever and wherever we perceive such
a need. This final requirement limits what humans may do to any
aspect of creation, even the bacteria, and provides a much-needed
cap on the “advancements” of science. We may not endanger or
andrew linzey: christian protectionism 279
destroy God’s good work for our own perceived benefits, even at
the expense of microorganisms.

With the toppling of hierarchy, Linzey’s theory becomes a truly
comprehensive theology of compassion. All of creation is united by
shared origin, through both the covenant and the anticipated redemp-
tion. As Christ exemplified self-sacrificing service, so are Christians
to live lives of self-sacrificing service toward every aspect of creation.
This all-embracing love is exemplified by saints such as Therese of
Lisieux and Julian of Norwich. Therese of Lisieux saw the special
place of the large and small, including the seemingly insignificant
and commonplace, in the world of God:
Jesus set the book of nature before me and I saw that all the flowers
he has created are lovely. The splendor of the rose and the whiteness
of the lily do not rob the little violet of its scent nor the daisy of its
simple charm. I realized that if every tiny flower wanted to be a rose,
spring would lose its loveliness and there would be no wildflowers to
make the meadows gay.
It is just the same in the world of souls—which is the garden of
Jesus. He has created the great saints who are like the lilies and the
roses, but he has also created much lesser saints and they must be
content to be the daisies or the violets which rejoice his eyes when-
ever he glances down. Perfection consists in doing his will, in being
that which he wants us to be.
Jesus, help me to simplify my life by learning what you want me
to be—and becoming that person. (Therese)
Christian belief, as expressed by some of those considered closest to
God, places the notion that all creation is equally valuable to God
dead center. Neither can this be dismissed as a purely Roman Catholic
development; the Christian tendency to overthrow the human hier-
archy begins with Christ (Mark 12:10; Matt. 11:25) and is main-
tained by St. Paul (1 Cor. 1:28). Of course differences can always
be used to justify hierarchy. You could say that Therese only refers

to different people when she speaks of different types of flowers: While
the violet may be as valuable as a rose, and a child as precious as
a king in the eye of the divine, this doesn’t mean that a violet is as
valuable as a child. However, the logic of scripture creates a momen-
tum to expand the circle of God’s love; once we have accepted that
the lowly is loved as much by God as the great, why then should
men and women consider themselves better than the rest of cre-
ation? Christians are called upon to offer self-sacrificing service to
every ringless honey mushroom and torrey pine, every megamouth
280 chapter five
and spotted skunk, every bronzed cowbird and triangle spider, every
mixed breed mutt and lonely veal calf, to show regard for each
prickle on every thistle, and each drop of water to the very depths
of the oceans. This type of inclusive love for God, through acts
directed at creation, is expressed in a vision of St. Julian of Norwich:
He showed me a little thing, the quantity of an hazel-nut in the palm
of my hand; and it was round as a ball. I looked upon with eye of
my understanding, and thought: What may this be? And it was answered
generally thus: It is all that is made. I marveled how it might last, for
methought it might suddenly have fallen to naught for little[ness]. And
I was answered in my understanding: It lasteth, and ever shall [last],
for that God loveth it. And so All-thing hath the Being by the love
of God.
In this Little Thing I saw three properties. The first is that God
made it, the second is that God loveth it, the third, that God keep-
eth it. (Mascall 49f )
c. The Christian Life
Linzey writes that it is a contradiction to infringe on human rights
for the sake of anymal rights (Animal Gospel 100). In many Western
countries humans have a vast array of rights, including the right to

vote and the right to free speech. We do not even grant anymals
the most fundamental right, the right to life. Linzey’s blanket state-
ment ignores the nuances of rights that are critical to the conclu-
sion he draws.
While Linzey might reasonably argue that it does not make sense
to kill people to save anymals, on what grounds does he contend
that one ought not to bomb a fur store for the cause of anymal
rights? Whether or not we judge it acceptable or not to harm one
animal to save others depends on the circumstances. If a drug-crazed
maniac is about to kill a thousand helpless children, few would deign
to prosecute the brave citizen who destroys the assailant’s gun in the
hope of saving all of the children. Whether or not it is acceptable
to destroy property to save others depends completely on the situa-
tion. Most of us would feel it acceptable to risk harming property—
even overtly harm the property of—a violent and dangerous animal
(including human beings) in order to save innocents. Clearly, then,
it is not necessarily wrong to infringe on the property rights of some
to save others. Some, such as those who threaten the lives of oth-
ers, legally annul their right not to be harmed, and we do no wrong
to protect self, or others in need of help, against such individuals.
andrew linzey: christian protectionism 281
Perhaps the current system of exclusive human rights is unjust in
and of itself, and Christians are called upon to abrogate property
rights that stand against the protection of millions of innocent lives,
such as the lives of foxes on fox farms and the lives of cattle at
slaughter houses. What would Jesus do?
Anymal Liberationists have, to date, killed no one. They have
bombed property, released “property,” and spray-painted property.
Each of these activities infringes on much-coveted “property rights.”
Why does Linzey believe that human rights—including property

rights—ought to be protected by those seeking to liberate anymals
that people have labeled as “stock,” “lab subjects,” or “investments”?
It is not “logically self-contradictory” (Animal Gospel 100) to infringe
human rights—especially property rights—for the sake of anymal
rights—for the sake of saving innocent and helpless others caught in
a web of greed and indifference. Does Linzey think direct action
against material possessions for the purpose of saving lives—though
there be some risk of bodily harm—is wrong when millions are being
slaughtered for food, tormented for science, and enslaved for enter-
tainment? Would Linzey argue that the rights of property owners
ought to be respected even if the “property” is a human slave? Linzey
does not even address the breadth and depth of this complex question.
Perhaps Linzey was closer to the truth when he commented, “I don’t
think there are many moderates in heaven” (Animal Gospel 46).
Maybe it makes no sense to infringe on human rights for the sake
of anymal rights, as Linzey contends, but he has not adequately pre-
sented the complications of such an assumption or proven that his
conclusion is the correct conclusion for protectionist Christians.
Conclusion
Linzey is the preeminent protectionist theologian. He is one of the
first to attempt to formulate a Christian protectionist theology. Through
a careful assessment of scripture, Linzey demonstrates the viability
of protectionist theology. He effectively shows that Christians should
extend the Christian duty of compassionate, self-sacrificing service to
embrace anymals. He shows that protection of anymals is not merely
a personal choice, but a duty before God. His theory offers much
to challenge historic and contemporary Christian assumptions of how
we ought to live amidst the wealth and beauty of creation.
282 chapter five
However, his work is not without difficulties. In particular, an

important part of Linzey’s theory depends on a pre-Christian notion
of hierarchy that is antithetical to Christianity. If hierarchy is removed
from Linzey’s theory, his work offers an expansive protectionist spir-
itual vision.
CHAPTER SIX
CONSISTENCY ACROSS RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
When it comes to the ethical treatment of animals, we need to recog-
nize frankly that some other religions have traditions of compassion that
equal, even surpass, that of Christianity [I]nsights from a variety
of religious traditions can be seen as implicitly or explicitly supportive
of a new ethical sensitivity to animals. (Linzey, Animal Gospel 53)
Studying comparative religions allows people to see moral ideas that
stretch across the lines of faith traditions (Kimball). Protectionism is
just such a moral ideal. This chapter provides a sampling of pro-
tectionist teachings across religious traditions. In the previous chap-
ter, which presented and critiqued Andrew Linzey’s work, he concludes
that the ideal moral standard set by Judeo-Christian scripture is pro-
tectionist in nature, requiring that we offer self-sacrificing service to
anymals. Judeo-Christian scriptures and teachings are dealt with inde-
pendently in this book because most English-speaking readers are
likely to have grown up, at least marginally, with this religious back-
ground. Nonetheless, there are other faith traditions to be explored,
and I hope readers will also come from other faith traditions, maybe
even one of the faiths covered herein. Perhaps most importantly,
whatever one’s religious convictions, protectionist teachings are likely
to be part of every faith tradition. Spiritual teachings of protection-
ism have, in fact, flourished around the globe, across religious tra-
ditions, and back to the beginnings of recorded history.
Organized religions are a force to contend with; the protectionist
movement is small, though strong. What person of faith, whether

Buddhist or Christian, could reasonably suggest that it is religiously
and morally irrelevant whether or not the food they choose to eat—
but do not need to eat—causes great suffering for other creatures?
Yet the moral force of religious institutions and the moral force of
most people are disconnected from the protectionist movement. The
protectionist movement would gain both strength and support if peo-
ple committed to major religions were moved to honor the protectionist
teachings within their particular religious tradition. Of more impor-
tance, people of faith would gain moral strength and credence if
284 chapter six
they ceased to participate in the ongoing, tremendous suffering caused
to anymals and instead took a stand against such cruelty.
The role of this book is to present moral ideals rather than actual
or common practices. The following sketch of protectionist teachings
is therefore not proof that faithful Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, or
Daoists treat anymals better than serious Jews or Christians (though
in some ways this is certainly the case). This is an exploration of
protectionist religious lore, not an explanation of common practices.
For instance, the section on indigenous peoples does not suggest,
as has often been assumed, that ancient cultures might serve as moral
exemplars of human interaction with the natural world. As with all
communities, indigenous peoples do not necessarily follow their spir-
itual teachings. Furthermore, not all indigenous teachings are beneficial
to earth or anymals. “There is a tendency in Western society to
romanticize and idealize older, indigenous cultures. No doubt, we
have much to learn from them. But this should not prevent us from
asking critical questions as part of the ongoing debate on animal
ethics” (184). Sometimes even ancient rituals intended to show respect
for anymals are inimical to protectionism, as in the case of ritual
killing of buffalo in Indonesia:

Ritual slaughtering, even though accompanied by a feeling of respect
for the buffalo about to be slaughtered, nevertheless is a cruel busi-
ness—the blood must flow. To cut the throat is a necessity; the buffalo
should die slowly so that all the blood can leave the body. The ani-
mal is stabbed with spears in non-lethal places so as to make the
process last. In order to prevent the buffalo from tearing itself loose
in fear, its tendons are sometimes cut before slaughtering takes place.
(Noske 187)
Religious rituals of respect are “not always conducive to animal wel-
fare” (Noske 189). The water buffalo would surely decline to receive
such respect, if given the opportunity to choose.
Many peoples who practice ancient lifeways are sometimes incred-
ibly cruel to anymals and remarkably destructive to the natural world.
For instance, in the twentieth century the Makah (of western Washing-
ton state) continued whaling long after whales were severely depleted,
landing a whale in 1926, when there were few to be found. The
Makah stopped whaling only when whaling “brought little in the
way of cash income”; then the Makah switched to more lucrative
enterprises: hunting seal, otter, salmon, and halibut, and logging old-
consistency across religious traditions 285
growth forests (Marr 25–33). The Makah helped European settlers
strip the seas. They sold tons of salmon to canneries and caught
thousands of pounds of halibut each day (Marr 32). By 1934 the
Makah fishing banks off Cape Flattery were depleted to about one-
fourth their former size (Colson 8). A few Makah grew wealthy off
the sea, bought Western fishing vessels, and hunted as far north as
the Bering Sea. All told, the Makah killed 1,985 seals in 1894 to
earn $30,000; in 1896 “the federal government moved to protect
the declining fur seal populations,” and commercial seal hunting was
banned shortly thereafter (Marr 25, 29). The disappointed seal hunters

then turned to old growth forests and “started a sales program with
their timber But when the timber was cut, the companies left
and the jobs were gone” (Marr 4). While the environmental dam-
age the Makah caused was a direct result of the influx of white peo-
ple, the fact remains that the Makah joined willingly, even greedily,
in the frenzy of killing for profit. While the Makah suffered under
the power and influence of Caucasians, anymals suffered under the
power and influence of the Makah.
The Makah are not the only group of indigenous peoples in America
to contribute to the suffering and death of individuals, or the deci-
mation of species, for profit. A Seminole gunned down an endan-
gered Florida panther for the “ritual use of panther parts” (Schwarz
297, 293). Gill nets are “inexcusably detrimental to the environ-
ment—trapping even the smallest of fish”; Native Americans are
legally protected from legislation banning the use of gill nets, and
various groups continue to fish with gill nets (Preece 167). For the
sake of good luck, or to prevent bad luck, the Koyukon of interior
Alaska seek and kill rare anymals (R. Nelson, Make 28, 112–13).
Menominee Indians of Wisconsin engage in modern forestry for eco-
nomic gain, as do the natives of southeast Alaska—with disastrous
ecological consequences (Buege 83). For the price of furs, natives of
southeast Alaska hunted otter nearly to oblivion in a very short time,
after having lived compatibly with this abundant species for cen-
turies. In February of 1998 a single indigenous person from the
Northwest Territories of Canada “chased 162 wolves to their deaths
on a snowmobile in a single season,” while a dozen other natives
killed 500 more wolves during the same time period (Preece 166).
Hunting, even when done out of dire need, entails “chasing, fright-
ening, wounding, and killing other living beings” (Noske 185).
286 chapter six

Indigenous peoples often focus on killing anymals as central to their
cultural heritage. For most protectionists, this poses no problem if
such people have no other way to feed themselves. But for many indigenous
peoples, hunting is no longer necessary. Why do these ancient cul-
tures hold out the killing of anymals as the foundation of their cul-
ture when, for most, hunting is no longer necessary? Is it because
this was the primary role for men—the role that afforded them power
and prestige (Gaard 68–69)? Clearly hunting is not the core of indi-
genous cultures for women, and they form at least half of every
community.
This chapter does not contend that Hindus or indigenous peoples
are protectionists, only that their sacred lore offers protectionist teach-
ings. In practice, sacred teachings are no better than religious prac-
titioners. Each spiritual tradition offers a wealth of protectionist
ideals—but actual practices may be a different matter. “One can
have a worldview of noble thoughts but if there is no call to act
on the basis of that worldview, then the ideas themselves may be of
little value” (R. Taylor 50). This chapter exposes a firm protection-
ist core across major religious traditions but does not—cannot—
demonstrate that adherents of these faiths actually live a protectionist
lifestyle. Nor does this chapter suggest that scholars and practition-
ers within these particular religions would agree that their faith or
scripture offer a protectionist vision. In fact, as is the case with
Christianity, many defend alternative points of view. Linzey notes
that protectionism “appears to have no obvious religious tradition to
which it can appeal and in which it feels unambiguously at home”
(Animal Gospel 56).
Religions are notoriously complicated, necessarily so across cen-
turies, through massive cultural changes, in light of divergent inter-
pretations of sacred lore, and in light of the many branches that

develop from divergent understandings of faith (such as the hundreds
of Protestant churches, each with its own particular dogma and tra-
ditions). Paul Waldau writes:
Upon even a cursory examination, one finds that, over the millennia
of their existence, these traditions have provided an astonishing array
of views and materials, some of which are in significant tension with
each other. Since such diversity leads to challenging problems on vir-
tually any subject that believers, scholars, and other interested parties
might explore, it also affects significantly many issues that arise when
one seeks to describe each tradition’s views of animals. (3)
consistency across religious traditions 287
This chapter does not purport to prove that any religious traditions
are unambiguously protectionist. Each religious tradition fosters teach-
ings and practices that are the nemesis of those who hope for a bet-
ter future for anymals as surely as each tradition holds sacred lore
that offers a protectionist spiritual vision that might help to provide
this better future. But many of the less compassionate elements of
religious traditions are “cultural baggage”: viewpoints or practices
that have become standard simply because of the predominant cul-
ture (Waldau 16). Such “baggage” is unavoidable because sacred sto-
ries and writ travel amidst humanity, reaching us only through other
human beings. “Thus, racist, sexist, or even speciesist” tendencies in
scriptures, or more generally in religious traditions, “do not neces-
sarily imply a divine sanction of, respectively, racism, patriarchy, or
the exclusive importance of humans, as so often has been the inter-
pretation” (Waldau 18). Sacred writings that mention anymals, even
if they are simply recording practices of the time, have regularly
been taken as descriptive of how things ought to be. For example,
for Christians, human beings are often assumed to be more impor-
tant than any other species. Is it not highly likely that this view is

nothing more than human arrogance, a human contrivance passed
from one human being to another, contrary to divine intent (Waldau
18–19)? Would a just and loving deity wish one creation (human
beings) to treat the rest of creation as lesser—as we do? Wouldn’t
an all-knowing God anticipate the misery such a situation would
bring—has brought—to anymals?
With this in mind, the following offers a mere smattering of some
of the strongest protectionist elements found in the sacred lore of
indigenous, Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, and Islamic religious traditions.
Though providing only a cursory sampling, this chapter reveals the
wealth of protectionist teachings in a handful of dominant religious
traditions. The humble hope is to show that, as common sense sug-
gests, the world’s great religions (and no doubt many smaller faith
traditions) are protectionist at heart. After all, wouldn’t we think it
odd if the great religions of the world encouraged us to be cruel
and selfish toward anymals?
288 chapter six
1. Indigenous Traditions
It is difficult to determine exactly what “indigenous” means. Is an
individual “indigenous” simply by genetics? If a newborn Inuit (north-
ern North America) is adopted by French parents living in Paris,
what does it mean for that individual to be indigenous to the Arctic
regions of North America when, as an adult, she is French in lan-
guage, custom, and nationality? Is a French boy adopted into a tra-
ditional Inuit tribe at birth more “indigenous” than the Inuit adopted
by a French couple? And what of an Inuit who lives in the Arctic,
works as a dentist, wears Western suits, drives an SUV, eats at fast-
food restaurants, and hunts gray whales with high-powered guns
from fast-moving boats? Is she indigenous? Is indigenous a fact of
birth or a lifestyle? Is it about ways of believing, thinking, and liv-

ing? Is indigenous at least as much cultural as biological?
“Indigenous” literally means native. If we are to take the term lit-
erally, human beings are all indigenous to Africa, the continent we
all seem to have come from. There are no native Americans. There
are no indigenous Australians, Indonesians, or Brazilians. There are
no indigenous Europeans. We are all transplants, except Africans in
Africa. Some of us have arrived in Europe or the United States
more recently, while others migrated long ago. When we arrived is
unimportant with regard to the term “indigenous”; it seems we are
all indigenous to Africa. Human beings are not native to any other
land.
Furthermore, many indigenous peoples now live just like other
Westerners. Before the coming of Caucasians, it was easier for indige-
nous peoples to avoid upsetting the ecological balance because of
their small populations and because of a dearth of technology.
Indigenous peoples in the United States are now granted access to
top-notch medical care and their populations have grown accord-
ingly. Most of these indigenous people would be at a loss without
manufactured clothing, gasoline-powered transport, and the best in
United States weaponry with which to kill anymals that some of
them hunt. Many have left the lands of their grandmothers. When
indigenous peoples come into contact with those of pale face, his-
tory has shown that change is the order of the day. Western influence
has transformed nearly every society; indigenous peoples are no excep-
tion. The lifeways portrayed by mythology have largely (but not com-
pletely) ceased to exist. For example, the Inuit use high-powered