In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 8 potx

376 chapter seven
mally, can such patients be allowed to slip out of existence. In rare
cases such patients can legally be allowed to die, through legal pro-
ceedings initiated by the family and supported by medical person-
nel. But such patients can never be killed even if treatments will
never improve conditions, even if such patients can never experi-
ence the benefits of treatment, and (in the United States) even if
such care is clearly unwanted by the patient. Care can be termi-
nated, permitting the patient to die, but patients can never be overtly
euthanized. Death by starvation or suffocation—deaths brought on
by withholding treatment—are necessarily slower and more painful
(in the event that any sensations exist) than would be death brought
on by outright killing. But Western morality and law covering med-
ical practice do not permit killing patients under any condition.
These cases highlight an ongoing dilemma in Western societies:
When is it permissible to allow an innocent human being to die,
and when, if ever, is it permissible to actively end the life of a
patient—to kill an innocent human being? But this intriguing dilemma
is not the focus of the present work, which asks a question that is
less often raised, but which also cries out when examining these six
cases: How is it morally acceptable to go to such measures to main-
tain innocent human life while killing healthy adults in the full bloom
of their lives simply because they are from another species? On what
morally relevant grounds do United States surgeons annually “trans-
plant about sixty thousand pig heart valves into humans,” destroy-
ing the lives of every last one of these sixty thousand hogs in the
hope of saving humans beings (“Medical”)? What line of reasoning
might protect bodies such as that of Baby Theresa or Anthony Bland
that are neither viable nor conscious, while annually killing six mil-
lion anymals for “educational” purposes? How can medical person-
nel be required to sustain the painful and unnatural life of Matthew

Donnelly or Tracy Latimer, how can we invest in the limp little
body of Samuel Linares, while nine billion chickens are slaughtered
annually to pacify our insatiable taste buds? How can we rationally
defend such an outrageous disparity in our treatment of life?
There is as yet no generally accepted, morally relevant distinction
between all human beings (including anencephalic infants and Anthony
Bland) and anymals. An ethic that protects Baby Theresa’s little body
while permitting anyone to kill a perfectly viable turkey vulture or
Hampshire piglet is prodigiously difficult to justify. Indeed, it is
difficult to envisage what sort of morally relevant distinction might
the value of innocent human life 377
be found between anymals and all those human beings whose lives
are currently protected (including Nancy Cruzan and Baby Theresa).
Some are not conscious, and some never have been (nor can be)
conscious (Baby Theresa). “Some of them cannot even be called
‘persons’ in the most minimal sense” (Pluhar 62). While Baby Theresa
and the three hundred or so other anencephalic infants born in the
United States each year are neither sentient nor conscious, the nine
billion chickens killed annually are conscious and sentient. Baby
Theresa cannot suffer. Every last chicken that died last year suffered.
Why do we treat these hens with no regard while paying all due
respects to these hopeless human infants?
This disparity is usually defended by noting a given quality that
is generally shared among humans—though not by all humans—but
not thought to be part of the lives of anymals.
Homocentrists often cite rationality, creativity, intelligence, language
use, and autonomy. Aquinas believed that we were favored by God
because we alone were made in God’s intellectual image; Descartes
held that beings with minds are all capable of expressing thoughts lin-
guistically. Again, however, as others have pointed out, none of these

characteristics serves to distinguish all humans from all nonhumans.
(Pluhar 46)
Patients such as anencephalic infants and the brain dead reveal that
innocent human life is valuable in the West with or without lan-
guage, rational thought, or even consciousness. Human life has moral
standing even when bereft of every attribute that human beings have
ever used to set themselves apart from other species, attributes that
humans have used to justify protecting human life while exploiting
and squandering the lives of anymals. Western ethics places supreme
value on innocent human life, especially in comparison with all other life-
forms; innocent human life is protected to such a degree as to be
truly incomparable with our treatment of any other form of life.
In the United States, Baby Theresa is protected, but we can maim
or kill anymals at will, so long as those anymals are neither pro-
tected as endangered, nor considered to be anyone’s “property.”
Anymals can be maimed by tail or ear “docking,” the cutting off of
horns or beaks, inbreeding, hormone treatments, branding, tagging,
or by catch and release fishing, for example. The philosophical eye-
brows of rational beings cannot help but be raised at such an incon-
sistent and (thus far) unjustified state of affairs.
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Do we owe an irreversibly comatose, terminally ill human every med-
ical effort needed to sustain such “life” as remains for him or her,
while a nonhuman animal is due no special consideration whatever ?
Should we make heroic efforts for brain-dead humans but, “without
any moral compunction,” give lethal injections to blind dogs? Or cause
calves suffering and death because we like their tender, “milk-fed”
flesh? [H]ow justified [can] such differential treatment really
be? (Pluhar 116)
Why does this remarkable moral disparity persist so many years after

Darwin? How can we believe that every human life has special value,
“sanctity,” or dignity that no other animal holds? Why are human
beings still not classified as “animals” in Western law when the sci-
ences have (cautiously) acknowledged for decades that we are animals?
Why doesn’t our scientific classification reveal that Homo sapiens and
chimpanzees are more closely related to one another than either one
is to any other species? Why do so many of our “scientific” and
educational materials discuss primates as if we were separate, dis-
tinct from all other primates? Microsoft’s encyclopedia defines pri-
mates as an order containing “humans, apes, which are the closest
living relatives to humans, monkeys, and some less familiar mam-
mals, such as tarsiers, lorises, and lemurs” (Burnie). Webster’s Dictionary
defines “primate” as composed of human beings, apes, monkeys,
lemurs, and others. Why not state the truth? The primate order con-
sists of apes (including human beings), monkeys, tarsiers, and lorises?
We are animals; we are apes. We are not other, outside, separate.
Our DNA has given us away, exposed us as apes not unlike those
we have caged and mocked in zoos and used for our scientific pur-
poses. Why do not scientists honor our close affiliation—at least with
other primates—by refusing to exploit them for research?
Most human beings want to believe that they/we are different,
separate, and special. Our belief “that human life has unique value
is deeply rooted in our society and is enshrined in our law” (Singer,
Writings 125). It is also evident in the sciences. It is fascinating reading
about the history of Western scientific classifications of anymals. A
book like that of Ernst Mayr, nearly one thousand pages long, reveals
the various ways we have attempted to classify anymals, and how
wrong we have often been. Part of this sordid history includes scientists
that sought symmetry in their classification—they “thought that all
taxa should have approximately the same number of species” because

the value of innocent human life 379
“taxa of highly uneven size seemed too capricious to be worthy of
the planning of the creator” (241). While theology muddied the work
of some, arrogance clouded the eyes of others who assumed that
there was a scale of perfection, with some anymals being “more per-
fect” than others—and with human beings at the top. Understanding
evolution scarcely affected this assumption; the language was simply
altered so that “more perfect” became “higher,” or “more highly
evolved.” This led to further complications, however: “Why should
fish be higher than the honeybee? Why should mammals be higher
than birds? Is a parasite higher or lower than the free-living form
from which it was derived?” (Mayr 242). Mayr attests to how “uncer-
tain our understanding of degrees of relationship among organisms
still is” in spite of years of work in the field (217). Scientific justifications
of human supremacy have worn thin as we learn more about any-
mals, and more about the human animal. But the realities of Darwin’s
work, while taking hold in the sciences, seem to have no affect on
our behavior; we continue to behave as though we are a very spe-
cial species, elevated beyond all calculation in the world of life.
Christianity is a cornerstone and sustaining force for our con-
temporary outlook. Christians often believe that humans, and only
humans, are made in the image of God, and that only humans have
intrinsic value. Many people justify this ongoing flagrant moral dis-
parity on religious grounds, convinced that human life, “no matter
how feeble or impaired, is a sacred gift from God” (Olen 268). Why
a just and loving god would instigate such a discrepancy in the value
of creation is difficult to comprehend, but this justification, however
weak, remains a common explanation for the status quo, at least in
the Western world.
Current convictions regarding the place of humans in the world

put us on an entirely different plane. In this view all other life-forms
are here for our purposes, and not only can be handled as we so
choose, but ought to be dominated and used for our benefit because
human beings are the apex of all life. Their worth is measured in
terms of human utility. Small wonder there is such a flagrant dis-
parity between our respect for the lives of innocent human beings
and our treatment of all other life-forms.
380 chapter seven
b. Do We Really Value Human Life?
Some might argue that human life is not held in such high esteem
as the above six cases suggest: Our financial choices do not support
this assertion, abortion is permitted, capital punishment is legal in
Western nations, and we continue to send soldiers off to kill and be
killed.
i. economics
One might reasonably argue that medical practices in the above six
cases have nothing to do with the value of human life, and every-
thing to do with the value of a hospital bed. Perhaps the cost of
such medical care is a benefit in capitalistic countries and the main-
tenance of innocent human life merely incidental. Medical profes-
sionals will, no doubt, deny such allegations, but can they honestly
believe that they have Tracy Latimer’s best interests in mind? Did
they operate on her distorted body out of respect for this dilapi-
dated, pain-ravaged little girl? What of Matthew Donnelly? And what
of the other infants that perished while Baby Theresa languished in
her crib? There seem to be other factors at stake, and no doubt
capitalism, greed, and profits have some effect on medical practices.
Likely economic forces aside, the point is not that we are morally
exemplary in handling human life. The point is that Western moral-
ity and law tend to hold “innocent” human life to be incalculably

precious while showing no regard for any other form of life, and
that this flagrant disparity cannot be rationally defended. While some
of those who profit from forcing intensive medical care on people
like Matthew Donnelly may be greedy (or malevolent) rather than
benevolent, the laws behind these medical practices reveal a deeper
and wider commitment, a commitment of the larger Western com-
munity to protect vulnerable patients from being hastily dispatched—
a commitment to preserve and protect innocent human life. Humans
are thought to have rights, and the right to life is perhaps the most
fundamental of all human rights. After all, do you want someone
else to decide whether or not you ought to continue living?
ii. we do not invest in life
Still others might argue that the United States does not value life—
if we did, we would quit investing in bombs and make basic med-
the value of innocent human life 381
ical care available to all citizens. Every day, every hour, life-and-
death decisions are made in Western countries based on the avail-
ability of resources such as life-sustaining machines and expensive
medicines. Every day citizens suffer because of the high cost of med-
ical care, and because of the ever-widening gap between the rich
and the poor. Do we really respect human life?
Bombs are not the only example of investments that indicate a
lack of respect for human life. Starvation kills millions of otherwise
perfectly viable human beings while citizens of Western nations dine
out on the many legs of a squid, diet to lose the extra pounds they
have gained by eating large portions of flesh from cattle and pigs,
and engage in rigorous exercise programs to burn off excess calo-
ries consumed. If we value life, why do we not prevent human
hunger worldwide? These charges are valid, but they do not harm
this overarching assertion: Innocent human life is held in extremely

high value relative to the lives of anymals. Indeed, the word “extremely”
does not seem strong enough to describe the current situation.
Human life is not everywhere and always respected at the level
evidenced by the above six cases. These cases reveal that Western
medical practice and laws regulate the protection and preservation
of innocent human life, no matter if they wish to live, no matter if
they are in pain, no matter if there is any hope of recovery, no mat-
ter if they are viable. Respect for human life is not always so read-
ily available, but these six cases reveal an ethic of respect for innocent
human life, a respect that has led to medical practice, backed by
laws, that protect and preserve innocent human life in nearly any
condition where it is possible to do so.
iii. abortion
With regard to abortion, the question is not whether human life is
of value, but rather what constitutes human life. Is a newly fertil-
ized egg to be considered a human being, worthy of all the same
protections that you, the reader, are granted by the Western legal
system? Is the single cell from which a human child develops to be
considered a full-fledged human being? Is this single living cell’s life
to be granted all the same protections that your life, or my life, is
to be granted? Is this single cell to be granted as much protection
as the mother, whose life might be endangered by that cell? The
question of abortion is not a disagreement about the value of innocent
382 chapter seven
human life; it is a question of whether or not a single cell, an embryo,
or a fetus, is a “human being.” In the Western world innocent human
life is always protected and preserved, but in the case of abortion,
it is not always clear what constitutes a human life.
Abortion also balances the rights of the mother with those of the
developing embryo. Inasmuch as we are unsure when the develop-

ing organism inside the mother ought to be considered a human
being, complete with human rights, we are certain that the mother
is a human being, protected by human rights.
iv. we kill people
Capital punishment, and our predilection for warfare, situations in
which human life is willfully destroyed, are distinct in morally significant
ways from our destruction of innocent human life, and are distinct
from the killing of anymals. In the case of capital punishment and
warfare the individuals killed have moral standing. They can only be killed
because both the convicted criminal and the enemy soldier are judged
to have made decisions that warrant revoking the standard protec-
tion of human life. Criminals who fall victim to the death penalty
have moral standing and are only executed on the basis of what is
assumed to be their previous wrongdoings. Typically, extensive legal
proceedings determine their fate.
There is a distinct difference between killing someone because she
or he is convicted of committing a heinous crime after extensive
legal proceedings and the routine killing of anymals that are by all
admissions innocent. Convicted criminals are a small subset of human
beings. They go through a rigorous process to determine guilt. They
are at all times assumed to have moral standing and are only put
to death in carefully prescribed ways if convicted. In contrast, we have
decided that anymals have no moral standing and, consequently, can
be exploited and executed at will. Any innocent Ayrshire cow may
be killed by anyone who “owns” her or by anyone given the go-
ahead to do so (by her “owner”). Her life is for sale. In contrast,
innocent human beings may never lawfully be slaughtered under any
condition by any individual. This is the point: Any innocent cow
may be killed; not one innocent human being may be killed. There
you have it. Capital punishment is not a case against the value of

innocent human life, nor does it in any way compare with our treat-
ment of anymal life.
the value of innocent human life 383
As with convicted criminals, soldiers have moral standing. Soldiers
are assumed to have jeopardized their right to have their lives pro-
tected and preserved by engaging in warfare. As convicted serial
killers are thought to have forfeited their right to life, soldiers are
considered guilty of being in opposition to a given state. Were those
same individuals not soldiers fighting against Western countries, but
visitors to Western lands, their lives would be granted full protec-
tion because every innocent human being has moral standing. In
contrast, anymals have no moral standing, and though blameless,
are the targets of human exploitation.
Warfare and capital punishment both suggest that human life is
not everywhere and always protected and preserved by Western
nations. In Iraq, the United States (in particular) killed civilians as
though they were mannequins in a test scenario simply to “defend
our way of life” ( Jhally, Ellis, G. Smith, Bush). Morally speaking,
“our way of life” is indefensible in a world of limited resources in
which the United States uses considerably more than its share of the
wealth. Such wars are not consistent with respect for human life, any
more than is our acceptance of world hunger. These events demon-
strate that not all innocent human life is respected in all cases. The
important point is not that we always respect human life, but that
innocent human life is held in extremely high value relative to the lives
of anymals—even though anymals are inherently innocent with regard
to human morality and law. Our disregard for the lives of certain
people at certain times in certain places does not compare with our
lack of moral and legal protection for the lives of anymals. Humans,
but not anymals, are assumed to have moral standing. The lives of

innocent humans, but not the lives of innocent anymals, are pro-
tected and preserved.
v. rationalizations
Those who attempt to blame the innocent in the hope of justifying
their actions sometimes accuse anymals of beings stupid, or dumb,
and therefore deserving what they get—or don’t get—during their
shortened lifetime. Cattle are so dumb, chickens are so stupid—how
can we be concerned about their innocent lives? This embarrassing
response is a form of “blaming the victim” (Davis, “Holocaust”). An
apt example of blaming the victim is when a woman is said to
deserve sexual assault because of her intellect, attitude, behavior,
384 chapter seven
appearance, or choice of clothing, for example. Anymals do not
“deserve” to be treated like chattel; it is simply a habit of ours to
do so. While human life cannot be taken without just cause, there
is generally thought to be no need to explain the killing of anymals.
This is because the former are granted moral standing while the lat-
ter are not.
Conclusion
While world hunger and warfare may cast serious doubt on the
depth and extent of our commitment to innocent human life, for
citizens living in Western countries there can be no doubt that human
life is generally viewed as priceless, and anymal life as cheap and
expendable. We debate whether fetuses can be killed in the last
trimester, we ponder whether lethal injection is an acceptable method
of capital punishment, we consider whether the death penalty is
acceptable even for the most dangerous of criminals, and engaging
in warfare is always controversial. We hold human life in such high
value that we ponder whether those who are suffering terribly, those
who are soon to die and wish to die, will be allowed to die. Meanwhile,

we unceremoniously slaughter millions of white leghorn chickens for
no better reason than that someone will pay to eat their fleshy lit-
tle bodies; we euthanize millions of “pets” annually because human
beings want their children to witness the miracle of life—puppies
and kittens born into the world only to be killed by the hundreds
of thousands because no one wants them. (We do not like our chil-
dren to witness the horror of euthanizing millions of cats and dogs,
however.) We even shoot hundreds of innocent animals for sport
and then mount their body parts on the wall as decorations. It is
permissible to experiment on any other primate but people are shocked
and horrified to learn of painful or deadly experiments that have
been done on unwitting human beings, such as the Tuskegee syphilis
studies (Regan, Animal 67–89).
This moral disparity raises a perplexing dilemma in the case of
primates. At some point in history a nonhuman primate gave birth
to a “human being.” If we could identify this historic moment of
transition, and the primates involved, our current ethical standards
would deny moral standing to the parent, while granting moral sta-
the value of innocent human life 385
tus to the offspring (a “human”). The mother or father could be
exploited and destroyed for science, while the “human” child would
be entitled to experiment on their parents. How can such a moral
system be defended?
But this conundrum is the least of our worries. The six cases pre-
sented above reveal a flagrant inconsistency in contemporary Western
morality. Human patients can only be permitted to die if they can-
not be saved, or in very specific instances, in very carefully moni-
tored ways. Even if a human being is not viable, even if a human
being feels no pain and has no brain waves, even if a human being
is terminally ill and in terrible pain, and even if a human life can

only be maintained at tremendous cost to society, Western nations
have a moral imperative and legal requirement to preserve innocent
human life.
The six cases presented are but a few examples of the extreme
limits to which Westerners take their collective regard for innocent
human life on a day-to-day basis. In most instances any and all inno-
cent civilian lives are protected and preserved, even at great cost.
“Contrary to the best attempts of several fine philosophers, there is
no way to avoid the conclusion that if sentient, conative humans are
highly morally significant, then many nonhuman animals are so as
well” (Pluhar xiii). What would this extreme value for innocent human
life look like if extended, for the sake of consistency, to all life not
proven to be different in morally relevant ways?
3. Western Ethics and the Value of Human Life in Practice
Consistency and impartiality are critical to sound applied philosophy.
Casuistry is a respected tool of philosophical inquiry (see chapter 1).
Each indicates that like cases should be treated in a like manner. In
almost all instances, regardless of abilities such as language or rea-
soning, regardless of functioning (either mentally or biologically in
the sense of viability), the moral imperative is to preserve and pro-
tect innocent human life. In fact, even if human beings beg to be
allowed to die, or beg that their loved ones might be allowed to die,
laws and medical practice dictate that human life ought to be pre-
served even against such wishes.
We have already explored what these cases do not demonstrate—
386 chapter seven
they do not demonstrate that there are no conditions under which
human life might be destroyed, though every human life is granted
moral and legal standing in the Western world.
What do these six examples teach with regard to ideal Western

morality and the preservation of innocent human life?
First, in each case it was possible to keep the individual alive.
Perhaps not for long, perhaps not without suffering, and perhaps
only at great cost, but it was humanly possible to keep these beings
functioning biologically. The above medical examples are proof of a
moral precedent, backed by law, that prioritizes the preservation of
human life whenever possible—not whenever humanely possible, only
when humanly possible. Whether or not an individual wishes to be
kept alive, whether or not keeping an individual (such as Baby
Theresa) alive will cause greater suffering (to other individuals, such
as those babies that could not receive her organs), an individual life
will be preserved and protected in its own right, whenever possible.
Second, these cases do not speak for all situations. There are a
host of medical cases in which physicians allow patients to die qui-
etly either at the request of the family involved, on their own cog-
nizance, or at the request of the patient. “Giving medicine to relieve
suffering, even if it risks or causes death, is not assisted suicide or
euthanasia; nor is withdrawing treatments that only prolong a painful
dying process” (Hendin). Such practices are legal and morally accept-
able in most Western nations (Hendin). Additionally, nations such
as the Netherlands and Belgium have legalized euthanasia (see
Euthanasia.com for more information.) In the Netherlands physician-
assisted suicide is available for patients suffering from “intolerable
suffering that cannot be relieved” (Hendin). In the Netherlands, con-
sent is not even a barrier; fully one “quarter of physicians stated
that they ‘terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request’
from the patient. Another third of the physicians could conceive of
doing so” (Hendin).
Similar to the Netherlands, Oregon state law officially permits doc-
tors to prescribe medication that will end the life of the patient—

but only in very specific situations, under tight regulations.
Receiving physician assistance in ending one’s life in Oregon is not as
easy as opponents of the state’s law might assume. To qualify for the
program, a patient must be an Oregon resident, at least 18 years of
age, and terminally ill with a prognosis of death within six months or
the value of innocent human life 387
less. In addition, the attending physician must be licensed in Oregon,
and must be willing to participate
After a patient requests an end-of-life prescription, the request must
be repeated at least 15 days later. That request must be followed by
a written request that is signed by two witnesses, one of whom may
not be related to the patient. A consulting physician is then called to
confirm the diagnosis and prognosis and to determine whether or not
the patient is able to make and communicate health care decisions for
themselves. If the patient is mentally impaired, a psychological exam-
ination is ordered.
Before the attending physician may write the end-of-life prescrip-
tion, the patient must be informed of alternatives, including hospice
care and palliative treatments. If the patient persists in requesting the
prescription, the physician must wait another 48 hours before writing
it and may request that next-of-kin be notified. Finally, the pharma-
cist who receives the prescription has the right to refuse to fill it.
(Sherer)
Employers such as the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and
Catholic hospitals, do not permit their physicians to participate,
thereby limiting availability of this option to certain categories of
patients. Given these strict regulations, complete with a handful of
limiting factors, it is not surprising that only one patient out of ten
who request physician-assisted suicide actually end their lives with a
physician’s care (Sherer).

What is perhaps most interesting is that many patients who do
receive a physician’s assistance still do not choose to end their life.
Oregon’s law seems to provide a sense of security of what one can
choose to do, rather than a certainty that patients, given the option,
will end their lives. Physician-assisted suicide seems to be about
choices, options, controlling one’s own fate. “From 1997 to 2002,
129 patients died as a result of taking end-of-life prescription med-
ications, accounting for less than one in every 1,000 deaths in Oregon.
According to the Oregon Department of Human Services, [in 2002]
58 patients received lethal prescriptions, but only 36 died as a result
of using them Another 16 died of their illnesses, and six remained
alive at the end of the year” (Sherer).
Even so, the fate of Oregon law permitting physician-assisted sui-
cide is by no means secure, and the debate is ongoing (for updates
and more information, see or http://
www.religioustolerance.org/euthanas.htm). “If the federal government
has its way, however, physicians writing such prescriptions could face
388 chapter seven
loss of prescribing privileges under the Controlled Substances Act”
(Sherer). As it stands, the Oregon law contradicts the American
Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics, which states that
“[p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the
physician’s role as a healer, would be difficult or impossible to con-
trol, and would pose serious societal risks” (Sherer). Nor is there any
indication that other states will follow Oregon’s lead.
While the debate is ongoing, no other state has followed Oregon’s
lead. Voters in California, Michigan, Maine and Washington state have
rejected assisted-suicide ballot measures, and the Maine legislature
defeated a bill that would have implemented an Oregon-style plan.
Forty states explicitly forbid physician-assisted suicide; six states pro-

hibit it through common law. Only three states other than Oregon—
North Carolina, Utah and Wyoming—do not have laws prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide. (Sherer)
Resistance to physician-assisted suicide in the United States is con-
sistent with commonly accepted and established morality in the United
States. “The biggest reason for opposing [physician-assisted suicide]
is that suicide is not morally acceptable; that it’s not an appropri-
ate role for a health care provider and that it is not morally accept-
able for people to choose to hasten their death” (Sherer). The United
States is similar to most Western nations; “The World Health Organ-
ization has recommended that governments not consider assisted sui-
cide and euthanasia until they have demonstrated the availability
and practice of palliative care for their citizens. All states and all
countries have a long way to go to achieve this goal” (Hendin).
There are also inconsistencies in the Western commitment to the
preservation of human life such as those brought up previously: world
hunger, disease, and warfare. But none of these exceptions negates
our general moral commitment to protect and preserve innocent
human life, as evidenced in medical law and practice.
Third, there are certain human actions that render humans no
longer innocent, in which case their lives may become expendable.
This is evidenced in the death penalty and by the killing of enemy
soldiers in warfare. Western ethics permits life to be taken for the
cause of self-defense. Human life can be destroyed when such a life
is not considered innocent, when that loss of innocence is of a crit-
ical or extreme nature, such as violently attacking another individ-
ual, murdering an innocent human being, or taking up arms against
the state.
the value of innocent human life 389
Fourth, there is some dispute over what constitutes a human life;

abortion is controversial but remains legal, while anencephalic infants
are considered inviolable. There is no conclusive agreement as to
where lines might be drawn, but there is a distinctive tendency to
protect more rather than less of those that might be considered
human.
Fifth, since we have failed to establish any morally relevant dis-
tinction between all human beings and anymals, consistency requires
that we universalize our ethic of protecting innocent life. We are
obliged to treat like cases in a like manner and extend our high
regard for human life to anymals. What is good for the girl is good
for the gander. If innocent human life is worthy of preservation in
almost any situation, so is other innocent life that is not shown to
be different in morally relevant ways.
Toward this end, the next chapter presents the Minimize Harm
Maxim. The case of Baby Theresa is particularly important in this
endeavor because the birth of anencephalic infants is ongoing and
predictable (whereas jellyfish babies do not normally occur in a cer-
tain predictable percentage of births). Furthermore, anencephalic
infants exemplify our extreme regard for the lives of Homo sapiens as
such because anencephalic infants have no possibility of feeling, think-
ing, acting, or even surviving. They are not viable, are in no measure
what any of us know to be human—except in general appearance—
yet they are provided a warm bed and food for as long as they
might survive. With this in mind, we explore the concept of conatus,
biological persistence.

CHAPTER EIGHT
MINIMIZE HARM MAXIM
In this chapter a moral maxim, the Minimize Harm Maxim, is pre-
sented and defended as a theory rooted in the consistent application

of our high esteem for human life. The Minimize Harm Maxim
includes three premises that culminate in an ethical maxim followed
by four subpoints. Chapter 9 applies these premises and maxims to
five pressing protectionist problems and considers two hypothetical
scenarios.
The Minimize Harm Maxim is simply a consistent extension of
contemporary morality—this maxim extends generally accepted morality with
regard to human life to all creatures that have not been demonstrated to be
different in morally relevant ways. Established Western moral standards
generally protect human life even at tremendous cost. If the Minimize
Harm Maxim seems extreme, then contemporary standards for pro-
tecting human life are extreme. If this maxim seems idealistic, then
we seek to protect human life idealistically. If it seems outrageous,
perhaps our moral accountability to human life is indeed outra-
geous or perhaps this maxim only seems outrageous because we
are not accustomed to respecting the lives of anymals. Finally, even
if this moral maxim seems extreme, idealistic, or outrageous, the
conspicuous absence of any morally relevant distinction between all
human beings and anymals, and the importance of philosophic con-
sistency, require serious consideration of the Minimize Harm Maxim.
Premise One: All Living Entities Have Moral Standing
1. Conatus, Spinoza, and Theology
Conatus defines living individuals (Scruton 457). Webster’s Dictionary
explains conatus as “the force in every animate creature,” a force
that works “toward the preservation of its existence.” In Baruch
Spinoza’s Ethics (1632–1677), conatus is the essence of every living
entity: “Everything endeavors to persist in its own being”; such
392 chapter eight
endeavoring “is nothing else than the actual essence” of a living
entity (Spinoza III, VI and VII).

In the writings of Spinoza, conatus is virtue, which is power, which
is understanding; knowledge of God is the greatest understanding
one can have (Spinoza XXV). Spinoza reasons that God, being
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent, must be everything:
“Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived with-
out God” (Spinoza I, XV).
If God is everything, then nothing is separate from God and there
can be nothing outside of the divine. The Almighty dwells in all
things, and each entity acts necessarily according to the will of God:
“[A]ll things are determined by the necessity of divine nature for
existing and working in a certain way” (Spinoza I, XXIX). Spinoza
concludes that all of nature—all that exists—must be God, and must
be set out to function in a particular way by the divine: God and
the universe are one and the same (Spinoza I, XV).
Like Socrates and Plato, Marx and Gandhi, Spinoza was inter-
ested in philosophy as a way of life (Baird 105). Once he deduced
that God is all, he was committed to a life that revealed this under-
standing. Spinoza notes that, since we share in divine nature, we
should “act only from God’s command” (Spinoza II, IV A). Love
and morality formed the basis for the application of Spinoza’s phi-
losophy in his daily life.
Spinoza asserts that the motivating power behind all of our actions
is self-preservation—conatus understood as “endeavor” (Spinoza III,
VI and VII). “The very essence of a human being is desire a
striving by which a man tries to preserve his existence” (Spinoza IV,
XXV). Furthermore, the highest virtue is conatus (Spinoza IV, XXII):
“The more each one seeks what is useful to him, that is, the more
he endeavors and can preserve his being, the more he is endowed
with virtue” (Spinoza IV, XX). He reaches this conclusion because
“[n]o one can desire to be blessed, to act well, or live well, who at

the same time does not desire to exist” (Spinoza IV, XXI). For
Spinoza, striving to exist is the foundation of virtue, and to “act absolutely
according to virtue is nothing else than to act under the guid-
ance of reason, to live so, and to preserve one’s being (these three
have the same meaning) on the basis of seeking what is useful to
oneself ” (Spinoza IV, XX).
Every living entity, according to Spinoza, is perpetually engaged
in the endeavor to persist, to maintain the actualization of its own
minimize harm maxim 393
essence which is divine (Spinoza IV, LVII). Because this endeavor to
persist is synonymous with God, each living entity finds happiness
dependent on its success in existing. Our behavior is guided by cona-
tus, guided by God, and this impulse for self-preservation brings us
back full circle to understanding, the highest form of which is knowl-
edge of God (Spinoza IV, XXVIII; Schacht 93). Conatus—the
endeavor to persist shared by all living entities—is the power of God
(Shahan 131).
Spinoza viewed God as the root source and ultimate means of
self-preservation. In Spinoza’s writing, conatus is a natural and vir-
tuous pathway to happiness, power, understanding, and the knowl-
edge of God (Spinoza IV, XXV). For Spinoza, knowing that God
figuratively stands behind our endeavor to survive, and knowing that
God is present in all other beings in a similar way, ought to influence
what we do.
2. Living Entities and Conatus
“All living beings have their own well-being. Each living creature
has life, which can be destroyed or benefited, and thus each living
creature has its biological good” (Vilkka 24). All living entities have
what Spinoza describes—conatus. Both plants and animals have a
drive to maintain integrity or unity. Conatus is fundamental to the

“biological nature” of living beings (McGinn 81–99). Conatus, Webster’s
Dictionary notes, is “an effort or striving” to maintain existence, is
present in all living entities, and only in living entities.
Any being lacking this basic biological drive to persist is not likely
to survive for long—probably not long enough to reproduce. In a
world where only the most fit survive, conatus prevents entities from
falling prey to other entities, and from death by a host of possible
means, including starvation. Pulling back from a hot flame, an adren-
aline rush when we are frightened, and digestion are all basic forms
of conatus in action.
Feedback systems, rooted in self-preservation, are indicative of
conatus:
When anything starts to go wrong, some sensory device perceives the
trouble and sends a message that acts to set things right. If sun-
shine strikes your skin cells, with possible overheating or damage from
the ultraviolet component, heat receptors may notify your brain, which
then stimulates muscles to act in ways that cause you to walk to a
394 chapter eight
shady tree. The skin cells themselves can perceive the problem and
respond by making the pigment melanin, another way of putting vul-
nerable cells in the shade. If blood sugar drops to a functionally deficient
level, it is perceived and corrective measures are taken by the con-
version of glycogen or fat reserves into sugar, or perhaps just by eat-
ing. (G. Williams 120)
Because of conatus, entities take in food and water, reproduce, and
have various methods of fending off predators, from thorns to fangs.
Animals and plants, unlike stones or buildings, computers or machines,
maintain themselves; they have mechanisms to avoid injury, reduce
threats, and restore themselves when damaged. Any living entity’s
life “consists precisely in a struggle to perform these functions, to

actualize this nature, to fulfill these needs, to maintain this life”
(Rollin 39). Baby Theresa did not have much else going for her,
but she did have conatus; her tiny body continued to function in a
manner that maintained her existence as long as possible.
Conatus highlights the most basic sense of what it is to have an
interest—to have something be in one’s good; conatus lies at the root
of moral standing among human beings. Every living being has cona-
tus, basic biological interests, the satisfaction of which will allow them
to persist as entities in their own particular ways. Conatus, as it turns
out, is the most basic morally critical similarity shared by all living
entities. Conatus as a criterion for moral standing includes all living
entities because all such entities have an interest in survival whether
or not human beings believe that they can feel, and whether or not
human beings determine that such animals have a given mental
capability.
The Minimize Harm Maxim is rooted in the consistent applica-
tion of morality regarding the protection and preservation of inno-
cent human beings. Given that there are no morally relevant distinctions
between human beings such as Baby Theresa and a quaking aspen
or spiny lobster (except that the aspen and the lobster are viable),
consistency and casuistry require that these cases be handled in a
similar manner. Aspens and lobsters ought to be granted moral stand-
ing and their biological urge to persist ought to be protected and
preserved. This protection ought to be extended to all living beings
because all living beings have conatus, while Baby Theresa has noth-
ing but conatus to indicate that her life ought to be sustained.
Given medical law with regard to anencephalic infants, conatus
must be viewed as sufficient to warrant moral standing in Western
minimize harm maxim 395
morality. For this reason and for no other reason, the Minimize

Harm Maxim revolves around conatus, biological persistence. The
life of an entity with conatus, an entity able to persist biologically,
ought to be protected and preserved because anencephalic infants
are protected and preserved by Western law, as rooted in Western
morality. This is not just an unusual event, but a practice that is
ongoing every day of the year. The Minimize Harm Maxim is built
around the consistent application of Western ethics concerning inno-
cent human life, extending that protection to all life-forms that have
not been shown to be different in morally relevant ways.
3. Epistemological Problems and Mental Attributes
Conatus is in many ways similar to what others have referred to as
teleology, the “drive, force, or urge possessed by a thing which is
directed towards the preservation of its own being” (Runes 61).
Arthur Schopenhauer, in The Will to Live, writes that the will to
live is critical for the survival of species, that this force is manifest
in sexual impulses. Schopenhauer views “will” as a force that acts
and strives in nature; for Schopenhauer, will is the vital force.
In its most basic form teleology is perhaps synonymous with cona-
tus, but Webster’s Dictionary indicates that teleology implies “design,”
“purpose,” “will,” or “final cause.” For instance, Albert Schweitzer,
known for his all-encompassing ethic of reverence for life, based his
moral code on “will to live.” “Will” is a notoriously difficult con-
cept to define. Many authors have considered “will” to be “a con-
scious mental activity . . . unlikely to occur in plants, micro-organisms,
and other life-forms that evidently lack the neurophysiological equip-
ment to engage in conscious mental activity” (Warren 34–35). Yet
Schweitzer included all of nature in his moral universe—even
snowflakes. Can a snowflake, by any stretch of the imagination, have
“will”?
Teleology is often viewed as having an element of “will,” such as

a “will to live,” but “will” is vague and often used to describe such
different phenomenon as intent, inclination, and biological urge.
Furthermore, assessing mental function is problematic. It is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for philosophers (or biologists, or psy-
chologists) to determine mental capacity or to ascertain mental states.
Theories dependent on “will” must grapple with the epistemological
difficulties of assessing mental attributes.
396 chapter eight
People have often been biased in assessing mental attributes. J. S.
Mill epitomizes the pitfalls of bias in his famous comparison of human
and porcine: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a
pig satisfied” (18). How does Mill know the mental, emotional, or
psychological states of pigs (barracudas, whirligig beetles, sea drums,
etc.)? Mill’s generalities and assumptions carry little philosophical
strength. The fact that Mill’s vacuous assumption has been oft quoted
merely highlights human bias, our tendency to believe that our own
existence is somehow more valuable—and therefore more justified—
than that of any other form of life.
Others, along the lines of Rene Descartes, have simply denied any
mental attributes to anymals, though this runs contrary to reason:
The rat could be a little machine with no feelings and our bodies
could also be machines that work in the same ways, but it just so hap-
pens that we have conscious experiences and rats do not. This is pos-
sible but distinctly less plausible than the alternative view that rats
have not just their physiology and behaviour in common with us when
it comes to eating but have conscious experiences associated with sat-
isfying their hunger too. (M. S. Dawkins 163)
Those who have not pointed to “will” have sometimes pointed to
“desire” as morally relevant. But those who argue that it is wrong
to kill a being that has a “desire” to live have yet to define what

they mean by “desire.” How can we identify or measure “desire”
in other entities any more than we can identify or measure “will”?
The mental state of a boll weevil, chinchilla, or human animal are
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine, and humans have
at times proven unfit even to assess far more basic attributes of
anymals, such as sentience. Such epistemological quandaries suggest
that “desire,” “will,” and any other mental state, while perhaps
morally relevant, are not suitable criteria by which to determine
moral standing.
In spite of the problems entailed in assessing mental states, most
protectionist philosophers consider mental attributes central to moral
standing. DeGrazia writes, “[T]he greater a being’s cognitive complexity, the
more moral weight her interests should receive” (249). Philosophers (includ-
ing Regan and Singer) tend to include consciousness in their assess-
ment of moral standing, generally favoring anymals with larger brains
and those we suppose to have more complex mental functioning.
Peter Singer writes: “Apart from individuals whose lives are so
minimize harm maxim 397
miserable that they do not wish to continue living, the only indi-
viduals likely to have no preferences for continued life will be those
incapable of having such preferences because they are not self-con-
scious and hence are incapable of conceiving of their own life as
either continuing or coming to an end” (Animal 9). Singer assumes
that mental preference for continued existence is morally relevant
(Animal 254): The “obviously relevant issue is whether nonhuman
animals have the same interest in continued life as normal humans”
(Animal 6). According to Singer, if they have such an interest, their
interest must be accorded equal consideration with other compara-
ble interests.
In Singer’s view certain life-forms (such as those that have little

or no gray matter) cannot be assumed to have a preference for (or
interest in) existence, and they are therefore not morally consider-
able. Problems in this assertion become obvious if it is rewritten to
acknowledge this more basic urge to persist, conatus. By adding the
word “conscious” to preferences, as he indicates, and by replacing
“preference” with “biological interest” (conatus) we can more clearly
see what seems a serious flaw in Singer’s proposal: “[T]he only indi-
viduals likely to have no [biological interest in] continued life will
be those incapable of having [conscious] preferences” (Animal 9). It
is highly unlikely that any creature lacks a biological interest in per-
sisting, regardless of vague and indeterminate (conscious) “preferences.” These
word changes highlight the difference between the certainty of a fun-
damental biological interest in persistence and the less certain notion
of conscious preferences, and the importance of distinguishing between
the two.
In contrast, biological functioning is more readily determined.
Biological functioning lies at the heart of conatus and is something
we can talk about in a less biased, more reasoned fashion.
My inclination is to purge all biological discussion of mentalist inter-
pretation. If I should propose that a mosquito turns upwind whenever
it detects increased carbon dioxide so that it can find a breathing ani-
mal to feed on, I am talking about its adaptive programming, not
about its understanding or thinking. Likewise, when I propose that
Suleiman the Bloodthirsty, a Moroccan potentate some centuries back,
amassed a large harem in order to maximize his genetic representa-
tion in future generations, I would not be implying that this is what
he consciously wished. I would be talking about the adaptive pro-
gramming that was precisely organized for this effect. (G. Williams 72)
398 chapter eight
Biologically, every living entity strives to persist. Both science and common

sense indicate that living entities function in order to avoid oblivion
and to maintain genetic identity over time—they all have conatus,
a biological interest in survival. In the words of the marine biolo-
gist George Liles, “the cells and organs that make life possible had
better be well designed, because the job of living is formidable”
(G. Williams 72–73). If we did not function explicitly to persist, we
would surely cease to exist as living entities. It does us well to remem-
ber that many living entities—uncounted numbers of species down
through history—have been unable to survive in spite of conatus.
The Minimize Harm Maxim, consistent with established Western
morality with regard to preserving human life, does not rest on the
value of life, on consciousness, the ability to reason, the “will” to
live, or any mental state. Conatus describes what contemporary
Western ethics requires of an individual if that individual’s life is to
be preserved and protected. Did Anthony Bland, Baby Theresa, or
Matthew Donnelly exhibit a will or desire to live? Anthony Bland’s
brain had turned to liquid. He could not have had any will. (Keep
in mind that Anthony Bland’s life was preserved over a long period
of time, and only with a major legal effort was he permitted to die.)
Anencephalic infants do not have any mental functioning, no desires.
Matthew Donnelly spoke up loud and clear, making it known that
he had a will to die. Each of these human beings had moral stand-
ing; each was protected by Western morality, backed by law and
established medical practice. “Will” plays no part in assessing whether
human beings have moral standing; “desire” does not determine
whose life will be preserved.
In contrast, conatus does describe what allowed medical person-
nel to keep Baby Theresa alive—conatus was all that she had (aside
from a body that was shaped like a human being, which is of course
not morally relevant to the protection and preservation of life).

Therefore, conatus is sufficient to grant moral standing in contem-
porary Western morality; conatus is sufficient to warrant the pro-
tection and preservation of an innocent human life. “Will” and
“desire,” are not relevant to human moral standing and the preser-
vation of human life. Consequently, teleology, which is often con-
nected with “will” or “desire” is also irrelevant to moral standing in
the Minimize Harm Maxim because this maxim is an extension of
contemporary Western ethics regarding the protection and preser-
vation of innocent human life.
minimize harm maxim 399
4. Moral Standing
The four theories presented and discussed in this book each present
a different set of criteria for moral standing:
• Regan: subjects-of-a-life
• Singer: sentient beings
• Taylor: natural teleological entities
• Linzey: all of creation, out of duty to the divine
The Minimize Harm Maxim, based on contemporary Western moral
standards for protecting innocent human life, asserts that all entities
with conatus ought to have moral standing because all human beings
that have conatus have moral standing. This is perhaps best demon-
strated by medical practice and law regarding anencephalic infants.
Baby Theresa—anencephaly in general—is an apt example for
four reasons. First, anencephaly seems to reveal what might be taken
as the outer limits of the protection and preservation of innocent
human life. Second, three hundred to one thousand such babies are
born in the United States alone, every year, revealing anencephalic
infants not as extraordinary cases, but as ordinary in the sense that
they are always present, always being provided comfort care. Third,
Baby Theresa, though hopeless and without any sensation, was offered

comfort care (rather than being pronounced “dead” so that her
organs might be harvested) against the wishes of her parents, demon-
strating that actions to preserve the life of Baby Theresa were not
taken simply for the sake of the parents, but because of the baby her-
self. Fourth, all that anencephalic infants have by way of life is cona-
tus. They are kept alive simply because they cannot be considered
dead (brain dead) when their brainstem is functioning, however mar-
ginally. Therefore, their biological persistence—conatus—is honored
and preserved. Baby K was kept alive because it was possible to
keep her alive, and she only died when it was no longer possible to
sustain her. Whereas the other four medical cases presented above
might have been kept alive for other reasons, Baby Theresa had
nothing else going for her—no other reason to be kept alive—only
conatus as evidenced by her brainstem. The only reason an anen-
cephalic infant might be considered morally relevant is because it
has conatus, which keeps these little beings breathing for as long as
they are able.
400 chapter eight
Sentience is often considered relevant to moral standing. Why be
concerned with an entity that is incapable of suffering, or as in the
case of Anthony Bland, an entity that is incapable of benefiting from
what is done? There are in fact sound reasons why sentience should
not be relevant to moral considerability.
Pleasure and pain are, in the final analysis, tools: tools by which a liv-
ing thing capable of experiencing them can ensure its survival and the
fulfillment of its needs. But it is the interests that it has in virtue of
its being a living being, and our ability to nurture or impede fulfillment
of these interests, not the pleasure and pain, that make it enter the
moral arena [H]umans would still have interests and needs and
would still be objects of moral concern, even if they no longer expe-

rienced pain and pleasure. And it is this that broadens the scope of
moral concern beyond pleasure and pain to essential characteristics of
life itself. (Rollin 38)
There is a general moral tendency in the West to preserve innocent
human existence with or without sentience. Consistency, impartial-
ity, and casuistry require like treatment of like cases. Because we
protect innocent human beings even when they are not sentient,
philosophic consistency requires that we respect all innocent living
entities, even if they are not sentient.
For the sake of philosophic consistency, the Minimize Harm Maxim
offers moral standing and an imperative to protect and preserve life
impartially and equally to all living entities. For living entities not shown
to be different in morally relevant ways, the Minimize Harm Maxim
does that which current moral standards and law do for innocent
human beings. Philosophic consistency, impartiality, and casuistry
require that we treat like cases in like manner.
5. Interests, Welfare, Sentience
Conatus—the biological inclination to persist—is fundamentally
different from other primary determinants of moral standing such as
“having an interest” and “sentience.”
Recall Regan’s clarification of two distinctive types of “interest,”
active and passive, such that the good of an entity can be either
consciously sought or a passive reality of biological existence: Regan
distinguishes between being interested in (active), versus something being
in one’s interest (passive) (Narveson, Nature 22). Children are often inter-
ested in things that are not in their interest; they may want to eat nothing