In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals [Human–Animal Studies] Part 9 doc

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globe. The “flourishing of sentient non-human life on this planet
requires an end to human population growth” (A. Taylor, “Animal”
264). To minimize interference, humans need to quit breeding with
such indifference to the larger world. We need to commit to a no-
growth policy.
The greatest harm a human being can do is to have a child, espe-
cially in capitalistic, resource-consuming Western countries. North
American children use a tremendous amount of resources in com-
parison with youngsters in most other countries. From abundant
school supplies to extensive medical care, from double-packaged
foods to fast-moving vehicles, Americans are megaconsumers. Humans
everywhere take a heavy toll on the environment, but humans in
the West are the most environmentally destructive animals on earth. Has
any other animal in the last few million years had such a negative
impact on water, air, forests, soil, or ozone layer—the environment
in general—as we have in the past century? If any other species
caused as much trouble as we do, human beings would engage in
mass killing to reduce the numbers of such a dangerous and bother-
some lot.
Humans are the bane of the earth and capitalism a primary vice
because of its dependence on unlimited, unsustainable growth.
Resources are finite and the biosphere has a limited ability to sup-
port human expansion and our concurrent destructive activities.
Unlimited growth is the ideology of the cancer cell, which ultimately
destroys its habitat, the host body. In this way humans have become
a cancer, degrading and obliterating the habitats of nearly every
other life-form and enslaving or killing previous occupants. The mil-
lions of other species gain nothing from our economic pursuits, but
they suffer the consequences.
The Minimize Harm Maxim includes a moral imperative to min-

imize consumption, regardless of the effects on economic growth.
Ongoing and extensive ecological degradation are the result of “a
conflict between our moralities (and religions) and our visible and
immediate economic interests” ( Jamieson, “Moral” 9). We must
become motivated by the common good—common to all life-forms—
rather than personal greed. We must use restraint and reduce demand.
If we are to respect the lives of these many other entities we must
reduce consumption. At this point, not only the lives of other species
are at risk, but our own lives as well.
minimize harm maxim 433
Some might argue that human conatus includes bearing children,
that we are permitted to be the animals that we are just as surely
as other animals are permitted to fulfill their own biological urges.
But statistics do not support this assumption. Statistics show that edu-
cated women, women who have other options, choose to have fewer
or no children. No one can reasonably argue that women who choose
not to have children are bereft of conatus. Statistics suggest that
childbearing is not fundamental to human beings; indeed, it is prov-
ing to be an optional activity.
Humans, like all creatures, have urges which lead to reproduction.
Our biological urge is to have sex, not to make babies. Our “instinct
to breed” is the same as a squirrel’s instinct to plant trees: the urge
is to store food, trees are a natural result. If sex is an urge to pro-
create, then hunger’s an urge to defecate.
Culturally induced desires can be so strong that they seem to be
biological, but no evolutionary mechanism for an instinct to breed
exists. Why do we stop breeding after we’ve had as many as we want?
(“Biology”)
If we choose to breed, the Minimize Harm Maxim requires that
human beings limit reproduction. “‘Stop at two’ may have been a

radical proclamation when Zero Population Growth was founded in
1968, but it was barely adequate even then. So-called replacement
level fertility wouldn’t bring about true zero population growth
until the middle of this century, due to momentum. Today the mes-
sage is only slightly revised: ‘Consider having none or one, and be
sure to stop after two’” (“Biology”). (If an individual remarries, she
or he ought not to have another child with a new spouse, even if
each has only one child.) The Minimize Harm Maxim asserts that
it is morally preferable not to have children due to current human
population problems.
[I]n terms of energy consumption, when we stop at two it’s about the
same as an average East Indian couple stopping at 60, or an Ethiopian
couple stopping at one thousand Two is better than four, and
one is twice as good as two, but to purposely set out to create even
one more of us today is the moral equivalent of selling berths on a
sinking ship. Regardless of how many progeny we have or haven’t
produced, rather than stop at two, we must stop at once. (“Biology”)
The human species is not expected to dwindle and disappear off the
face of the earth any time soon (though this might well bring about
the greatest good to the greatest number of living entities!). “Youth
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is a wonderful phase of life, whether it’s people, panda, or panther.
It’s sad to imagine there being no more of any of them. A baby
condor may not be as cute as a baby human, but we must choose
to forego one if the others are to survive” (“Biology”). The Minimize
Harm Maxim requires minimal human harm—an end to popula-
tion growth and rabid consumption—and requires that we reverse
our population explosion, reuse, and recycle.
4. Harm Low on the Food Chain
This section proposes a diet that minimizes harm, consistent with

the Minimize Harm Maxim, and consistent with morality regarding
the preservation and protection of human life.
We are permitted to harm other human beings in order to sur-
vive. Ethics regarding the protection and preservation of human life
admit of a gray area, an unspoken acceptance that if one must eat
other people to survive, one will not be prosecuted. Cannibalism is
rare. Nonetheless, there are two famous instances of cannibalism in
the last 150 years.
In the winter of 1846–1847, the ill-fated Donner party was trapped
in the Sierra Nevada not far from Lake Tahoe. Starvation reduced
friends and families to eating one another. Only forty-seven survived
of the eighty-seven original members (“Donner Party”). In 1972 in
Chile, a plane went down, stranding a handful of individuals for sev-
enty days in the Andes Mountains. Most of the passengers were
young men, members of an Uruguayan soccer team. Though extremely
fit, and young, only sixteen individuals survived; they survived by
consuming the flesh of their less fortunate traveling companions
(“Cannibalism”).
In neither instance did the individuals involved willingly select
other humans as their dietary preference. In both instances those
who survived did so because they ate human flesh. These cases were
of course controversial because no one can be sure whether those
who were eaten were murdered. Still, no one was prosecuted. Few
would prosecute, blame, or even complain, about starving people
eating one another rather than perishing. If placed in a situation
where death is otherwise imminent, history reveals that cannibalism
is an acceptable option. Under these conditions it is not legal to kill
other people to eat them, but morality permits the consumption of
those who are already dead in desperate situations.
minimize harm maxim 435

Ethics regarding the preservation and protection of human life
permit people to eat other human beings who are already dead when
there are no other options available. Consistent with this high standard
regarding human life, the Minimize Harm Maxim does not permit
human beings to kill and eat anymals. It is only permissible to eat
anymals if one is starving, and if the anymal is already dead. Consistent
with human ethics, in a pinch, one might kill and eat an anymal
and not be convicted.
The Minimize Harm Maxim requires that we minimize harm—
harm less rather than more. To harm less rather than more requires
us to avoid harm where possible and reduce harm when harm cannot
be avoided. Fruitarian diets most effectively minimize harm. Fruitarians
take fruit from other living entities, but do not kill plants or harm
any living entity’s conatus. The only harm that results from a fruitarian
diet is the destruction of potential plants—by eating fruits and nuts.
There is no moral imperative among human beings to protect poten-
tial human life.
Subpoint Two: We May Use Other Life-Forms Only with Consent
“From the ninth to the nineteenth century we have innumerable
written accounts of criminal prosecution and capital punishment of
animals . . . pigs, dogs, wolves, locusts, rats, termites, cows, horses and
doves” (Linzey, Animal Gospel 22). Indeed, into the nineteenth cen-
tury anymals were tried in human courts for behaviors that human
beings thought “wrong.” Anymals were excommunicated or executed
according to human ethics, human faith, human law, and human
judgment. Today we recognize that anymals that do not use human
language or participate in human ethics and law are not legitimate
subjects for trials, or for corporal or capital punishment. Our behav-
ior was unjust.
We no longer put anymals on trial, but we continue to subject

anymals to unjust “punishment” based on human assessments of
what ought to be done. Whether we execute, confine, medicate, or
experiment on anymals, we necessarily do so unjustly, for selfish rea-
sons, and without regard for the anymals we exploit for our pur-
poses. When we “use” anymals for science, or in the food, clothing,
or entertainment industries, we do so necessarily without their consent.
Who would consent to the sorts of terrible experiments, unnatural
436 chapter eight
behaviors, and forced confinement that we bring upon anymals?
Current Western ethics do not permit exploitation of other human
beings against their will. Under contemporary law we risk harass-
ment or stalking charges if we even persist in the presence of those
who do not choose our company. But with consent we may share
company, or even use others for certain types of research, child-rear-
ing purposes, labor, financial gain, or artistic productions. Morally
and legally, as with emergency medical personnel and the treatment
of the wounded, consent is critical.
In some instances, such as when one individual holds consider-
able power over another, even consent is not legally sufficient to
permit exploitation of another human being. Just because a fifteen-
year-old gives consent for sexual relations does not mean such inter-
actions are legal or morally acceptable. They are not. Young people
are vulnerable to the power of those who are older. Therefore, con-
sent does not necessarily demonstrate a young person’s genuine wish
to go along with a given plan or procedure.
Humans hold tremendous power over anymals—more often than
not, we determine their lives and their deaths. In this sense other
species are similar to minors: they are dependent and vulnerable;
they are at our mercy. Even if they could definitively consent to
exploitation, their consent would not be sufficient to warrant exploita-

tion any more so than for children and other unequal dependents.
What of cases where little children are trained to be gymnasts or
pianists before they are old enough to decide if they prefer such a
life? If these children can be so trained, why not anymals? To some
extent, the nature of parenting requires that adults make important
decisions for their offspring. While adults are responsible for pro-
ducing the next generation of human beings—whatever they may
be—we are not responsible for producing greyhounds or thorough-
breds that are of the right temperament and body build to run
around tracks at record speeds for the entertainment of human beings.
Furthermore, while it is possible for children to suffer because their
parents make such choices for them, little ones who lack talent or
athletic ability are never considered expendable; those who do not
make the cut are never cast aside or destroyed. For this reason the
exploitation of young athletes and artists is not equivalent to current
exploitation of, for example, horses or dogs for racing, pulling, or
appeasing the human eye. Also unlike human children, animals
remain dependents throughout their lives and can never determine
minimize harm maxim 437
for themselves, over and against human interests, what will happen
with their lives. Because anymals in our care remain dependents
throughout their lives, and because we cannot definitively gain their
consent, Minimize Harm Maxim does not permit exploitation of
other species for our ends.
The Minimize Harm Maxim is an extension of morality regard-
ing the protection and preservation of human life. We cannot
definitively ascertain whether or not other living entities consent to
what we do to them; even if they could give consent, such consent
would be no more acceptable than that of children due to their
comparative powerlessness. We therefore cannot use other living enti-

ties for our purposes any more than we can exploit little children.
While there are cases where one might reasonably argue that chil-
dren are exploited to fulfill the dreams of adults, such exploitation,
however well intentioned, is not permitted across species. Such
instances are the unfortunate result of parental responsibility for shap-
ing the lives of children, a responsibility that we do not and cannot
have for other species.
Subpoint Three: Intentions Matter
Many of us are familiar with the adage “good intentions are not
good enough,” but intentions are critical where moral matters are
concerned. Intentions are an important factor in assessing personal
morality, and the importance of intent is reflected in our legal system.
Even when good intentions have bad outcomes, the Western legal
system indicates that motivation is important in assessing guilt and
assigning punishment. For instance, if Jex’s very old great aunt drowns
while Jex is bathing her in a large bathtub, Jex is not guilty of mur-
der. She may be guilty of negligence, but not murder. If Jex throws
her aunt in a tub and intentionally drowns her, Jex is guilty of mur-
der. Intentions do not necessarily affect outcomes—Jex’s aunt is dead
either way—but intentions affect moral assessments. Sometimes we make
mistakes—even in the tending of beloved anymals or children—and
we are not held accountable for a bad outcome if we have good
intentions, so long as we have not been negligent. Intentions are
oftentimes the only difference, in a court of law, between murder
and accidental death, between stealing and borrowing, between bla-
tant cruelty and harm through ignorance.
438 chapter eight
In the Minimize Harm Maxim, consistent with human morality,
intentions matter. If one turns over a stone and crushes a pollywog
out of ignorance, she or he is not morally culpable. But if one turns

over a stone in order to crush a pollywog, that individual is morally
culpable. Similarly, if one plants a pea vine to harvest peas and in
the process steps on a garden spider, one is not morally culpable
for the life lost. However, if one sees a harmless goldenrod spider
climbing toward a pea vine and purposefully extinguishes her life,
one is morally culpable because a living entity has been purpose-
fully and unnecessarily harmed. Similarly, if one kills a small child,
by accident (not through negligence), one is not immoral, while if
one purposefully kills a small child the deed is morally reprehensible.
It is not the act itself—but one’s intentions—that ultimately determine
the moral legitimacy of a deed in the Minimize Harm Maxim.
Good intentions are linked with virtues. One who fosters such
virtues as benevolence and empathy is much more likely to live a
life rooted in good intentions than one who fosters the vices of greed
and arrogance. Responding to an overintellectual, reason-based
approach to ethics, Richard Solomon notes that what allows the cir-
cle of ethics to expand to include other people, or other species,
is not reason (in the technical sense of calculation on the basis of
abstract principles) but rather knowledge and understanding in the
sense of coming to appreciate the situations and the circumstances in
which other people and creatures find themselves. This requires what
many theorists now call “empathy” or “feeling with” . . . and it requires
care and concern, the emotional sense that what happens to others
matters. According to this “moral sentiment” view, there is no “line”
to be drawn between ethics and benevolence, no place in our experi-
ence where affect and affection leave off and some new faculty called
“reason” kicks in and takes over. Rather, our emotions get more and
more expansive and better educated and new perspectives join with
the old to enlarge our world and embrace new populations in it.
This should be recognized as the vital force in ethics. (Solomon 75)

According to L. Johnson, if we each act with goodwill toward other
living entities, we would probably behave in a morally exemplary
manner (200). Generally, one who fosters virtues will have benevo-
lent intentions and will choose a different course of action from one
who is moved by self-interest; intentions have a tremendous effect
on the overall impact of a life lived. An individual who sincerely
intends to be gentle and benevolent toward all living entities will not
minimize harm maxim 439
live as most of us live. Because we cannot avoid harming other liv-
ing entities, harm itself is not morally reprehensible, but intentions are
critical for assessing which harms are immoral. For instance, harms
that result from one’s attempt to survive are morally acceptable.
However, the same harms brought about for one’s pleasure are
immoral. As in the case of Jex bathing her aunt, the outcome is the
same but the intent differs.
Intentions do not always make a difference in how one behaves;
one might steal, kill, or lie with either good or bad intentions. In
fact, morally speaking, “crimes” are sometimes the best possible
actions, particularly when they are rooted in good intentions. For
instance, if Maggie lives in a society that punishes theft with death
and yet that same society offers no aid to the poor and needy, and
if Maggie has no wealth of her own, she might be considered a
moral exemplar if she steals to feed the needy. Though, from the
point of view of the rich she brings them harm, her intent is to feed
the poor, not to harm the rich. Maggie would, presumably, do the
same for the wealthy, should they come into hard times, and they
would no doubt see things differently. Her interest is in helping the
most desperate to survive. Maggie’s act would most likely be con-
sidered morally exemplary because her choice involves self-sacrifice
for others—good intentions. In this case the thief is concerned with

aiding the needy rather than obeying property rights or protecting
herself from possible arrest. Because her intent is to preserve life, to
feed the hungry, and because most of us consider her cause just,
the action (though illegal) is likely to be viewed as ultimately good.
Many—if not most—would argue that she does what she ought if
she steals from the wealthy for the specific intent of feeding the
needy.
Though intentions are critical, they are epistemologically prob-
lematic; one cannot definitively know the intentions of another indi-
vidual; our own intentions are sometimes obscure even to us. Perhaps
Maggie only steals from the rich because she likes to steal, or because
she hates the rich. Still, consistent with current Western ethics and
law, intentions are critical. Though they cannot be definitively known
or quantified by a jury, we acknowledge the importance of inten-
tions under such terms as “manslaughter” (unintentional, reckless
killing) as compared with “murder” (intentional slaying) both distinct
from “self-defense” (intentional, purposeful, but justified killing).
440 chapter eight
Assessing the morality of a given action also rests on intent in the
Minimize Harm Maxim.
In many ways morality is a personal endeavor. When an act is done
specifically to cause harm, it is immoral; an act that has a benevo-
lent intent but brings about the same harm is not immoral. If one
has the capacity to learn and fails to guard against repeating a moral
error, then one becomes morally culpable for an act that was once
innocent of blame. Ultimately, the acting agent is most likely to under-
stand motivation and will be the best judge of the morality of any
given act.
Consistent with Western morality with regard to human beings,
intentions are critical in assessing moral culpability in the Minimize

Harm Maxim. As with morality among human beings, reasons, moti-
vation, and intent help determine whether or not an act is moral.
Subpoint Four: Self-Defense Is Morally Permissible
Consistent with morality among human beings, one can harm in
self-defense. As in the case of innocent human life, we cannot morally
justify the forced, intentional infliction of pain, death, or other forms
of suffering on other people except to protect our immediate and
direct survival. Consistent with morality regarding the protection and
preservation of human life, we may harm any other living entity
that poses a direct physical threat. Bacteria, humans, and polar bears
can all pose direct physical threats to our lives, and we are not
morally culpable if we choose to defend ourselves, even if we harm
or destroy dangerous others.
But it is morally obligatory to try to avoid dangerous encounters
and to avoid such harm when possible.
We should not kill the insane attacker, be he human or canine, if
instead he can be trapped without great risk, nor should we cause
hostages to die if we can secure their release without endangering other
innocents. Moral agents who reflect on these matters generally agree
about the necessity of seeking alternatives when humans are involved,
but are frequently far less concerned when nonhuman animals are the
potential victims. (Pluhar 281–82)
The Minimize Harm Maxim, consistent with morality and law regard-
ing the protection of human life, requires that we take precautions
to minimize conflicts and, in the event of conflict, use the least harm-
minimize harm maxim 441
ful means of dealing with threats. Finally, if we must harm, we ought
only to cause harm in relative proportions.
1. Minimize Conflict
The Minimize Harm Maxim requires moral agents to minimize the

likelihood of conflict and the need for self-defense. For instance, if
Molly lives in a society without laws or law enforcement and depends
on pumpkins for survival, she is not wrong to frighten, threaten, or
even harm another person to defend her food source—even if she
inadvertently plants her produce in a predator’s thoroughfare. Self-
defense is acceptable if one’s subsistence, and therefore one’s exis-
tence, is threatened.
Intent also matters. If Molly chooses to plant her pumpkins in an
unprotected place knowing that planting her crop in a different loca-
tion would work just as well and would avoid confrontation, she is
morally culpable for any harm done to entities that come to feed
on her pumpkins. In fact, under the Minimize Harm Maxim, she
may not harm such entities because Molly is morally culpable; she
has not intended to reduce conflicts, the need for self-defense, or harm
caused. Similarly, if we know that intensive planting of crops is apt
to cause “infestations,” then we ought to avoid planting intensive
crops rather than kill insects and rodents that come to share the
bounty. In like manner, in order to minimize conflicts with insects
that we find to be annoying or dangerous, we ought to wear long
sleeves and use window screens.
Minimizing harm in this manner is neither novel nor prohibitively
difficult (and is included in Taylor’s theory of Respect for Nature
(Respect 268)). Down through history people have often adapted prac-
tices to avoid conflicts with other species: “While the Europeans
killed wildlife in number and without mercy, the Bantu built a struc-
ture that attempted to minimize association between humans and
wildlife” (Burnett 157). It is now simply too easy for us to kill, and
given contemporary Western humanity’s lack of regard for life-forms
that are not human, we kill at will. But most “pests” might easily
be avoided rather than eliminated. The Minimize Harm Maxim

requires that we change our behavior whenever possible to avoid harm-
ful conflicts.
The Minimize Harm Maxim is consistent with general Western
moral ideals regarding the protection and preservation of human life.
442 chapter eight
Just as we take precautions to avoid conflicts with detrimental humans
by locking doors and restricting travel in dangerous areas or at dan-
gerous times, the Minimize Harm Maxim demands that we avoid
conflicts with those that we consider problematic or dangerous. One
of my friends left her door open on a hot day and fell asleep on
her bed. When she awakened she had been robbed, and the police-
person with whom she spoke stated quite plainly that she was lucky
far worse things had not happened. According to the law, while what
the thief did was illegal, my friend’s lack of care had contributed to
criminal activity and was also unacceptable. Human morality requires
that we do all that we reasonably can to prevent such problems
from arising in the first place. Many “severe conflicts of interest
can be avoided simply by doing what is morally required early on”
(Sterba 201).
The Minimize Harm Maxim, for the sake of consistency in applied
moral philosophy, requires the same moral standard between species
as we now expect among human beings. We are morally required
to minimize conflict.
2. Exceptions
Certain scenarios alter the moral landscape, such as availability of
law enforcement. In Western law we are not allowed to harm some-
one who steals our pumpkins for at least two reasons: In such a case
our lives are not directly in danger, and dealing with criminals is
the rightful duty of trained professionals. In the Western world, if
you steal your neighbor’s source of sustenance, you pose only an

indirect threat; he or she will not die of starvation. Because one’s
life is not threatened by such an act, one is expected to notify law
enforcement and allow professionals to deal with the thief.
For law-abiding citizens of Western countries there is “no con-
sideration short of the defense of one’s own life [which] would jus-
tify taking the lives of others” (Narveson, “Animal” 165). Casuistry
requires that like cases be treated in a like manner. The Minimize
Harm Maxim extends this high value of life to other life-forms, and
we may only harm if another entity poses a direct threat to our imme-
diate physical safety (i.e. if we feel our lives are in imminent danger).
minimize harm maxim 443
3. Relative Proportion
In the Minimize Harm Maxim reactions are expected to be pro-
portional. For instance, the occasional annoying fly that finds its way
indoors despite screens ought to be brushed away or put outside
rather than swatted. Killing such comparatively mild irritants is nei-
ther a consistent nor proportional response in light of Western moral-
ity protecting innocent human life; an annoying fly does not deserve
capital punishment any more than does an annoying human. However,
a mosquito buzzing around one’s ears in an area known to have
malaria or West Nile virus might be considered a direct physical
threat, leaving open the possibility for delivering a swift swat. A
house mouse in one’s kitchen might not be considered ideal, but
does not pose an immediate, life-threatening danger. Anymals that
we do not prefer to live with ought to be relocated before numbers
pose a health issue, prior to serious conflict. We are called on to
avoid attracting such residents in the first place, but if conflicts of
interest do arise, responses ought to be proportional.
The Minimize Harm Maxim requires that humans deal with all
“pests” the same way we deal with human “pests.” Consistency and

impartiality require that we respect the lives of these other creatures
inasmuch as we respect innocent human life. In light of casuistry,
for the sake of philosophic consistency and impartiality, “pests” of
all species ought to be dealt with similarly, through discouragement
and relocation rather than execution.
Extending Ethics Regarding Protection of Human Life:
A Parallel Theory
While current Western morality generally protects and preserves inno-
cent human life, laws in Western countries allow individuals to harm
or destroy other life-forms for a host of reasons—or for no reason
at all. In fact, there are very few instances in which anymals may
not be killed, most notably when such killing harms the interests of
another human being. Killing your neighbor’s mixed-breed mutt is
categorized as destruction of property, not the destruction of a life.
Similarly, endangered species legislation protects the lives of anymals
but is ultimately intended to benefit humanity—we have a selfish
interest in biological diversity. The lives of other living entities are
manipulated for human interests.
444 chapter eight
In the absence of a morally relevant distinction between other life-
forms and all human life, philosophic consistency requires the Minimize
Harm Maxim to apply contemporary Western morality regarding
the protection and preservation of human life to all life that is not
shown to be different in morally relevant ways. We do not protect
human beings because they wish to be protected, because they are
sentient, because they are conscious, or even because they are viable—
as the six cases presented in chapter 7 reveal. We preserve human
life simply because our morals and law dictate that if a human life
can survive, we ought to do our best to assure survival. If an inno-
cent human being endeavors to persist biologically (has conatus),

there is a moral assumption that such a life ought not to be harmed,
but rather that life ought to be preserved. We have established no
morally legitimate reason to deny similar protection to other cona-
tive life-forms.
The Minimize Harm Maxim offers a consistent and impartial inter-
species morality that parallels generally accepted Western morality
protecting innocent human life. Minimizing harm requires that we
exist in ways that minimize conflicts. Only when we have consid-
ered the behaviors of others, proactively protected our lives and liveli-
hoods, and only when we are directly, physically threatened by
another, is self-defense a legitimate reason to harm another living
entity. This requirement is consistent with generally accepted Western
human moral standards between human moral agents and moral
patients.
Minimize Harm Maxim Restated
It is possible to reduce the Minimize Harm Maxim to two comple-
mentary rules: minimize harm; minimize interference. As long as the
above listed subpoints are not overlooked, this optional presentation
is acceptable. However, utilitarian scales of measurement do not apply in
the Minimize Harm Maxim any more than they apply in morality with regard
to preserving and protecting human life. (This can clearly be seen in the
six cases presented earlier.) Attempts to measure harm, or compare
harm between individuals or across species, are contrary to the
Minimize Harm Maxim, which is an extension of morality with
regard to human life.
minimize harm maxim 445
Conclusion
Due to the absence of any morally relevant distinctions between all
human beings (including the six human beings in the cases presented
previously) and other forms of life, for the sake of philosophic con-

sistency and impartiality, using the philosophical tool of casuistry,
the Minimize Harm Maxim applies contemporary morality protect-
ing human life to all other living beings that possess conatus (bio-
logical persistence). First and foremost, the Minimize Harm Maxim
states that one ought to minimize harm. In the process of carrying
this out, one ought to minimize interference. Consistent with moral-
ity and law protecting human life, harms are not weighed between
individuals; instead, a personal assessment of intention is critical.
In the Minimize Harm Maxim, harm is always regrettable, whether
to a buffalo gnat or a grison, whether by loss of habitat or loss of
a limb. It is always immoral to harm a living entity purposefully and
unnecessarily. It is only morally acceptable to harm when the poten-
tial for harm has been minimized, when harm is necessary for sur-
vival, when no other options are available, and when such harm is
proportional to the danger posed. In short, the types of harm per-
mitted, and the situations in which such harm is permissible, ought
to parallel those that are permissible with regard to innocent human
beings.

CHAPTER NINE
APPLICATION: CONTEMPORARY MORAL DILEMMAS
This section applies the Minimize Harm Maxim to five ongoing pro-
tectionist issues and two hypothetical scenarios. In each case, given
a lack of morally relevant distinction between all innocent human
beings and all other life-forms, the central question posed is, How
would we behave toward human beings in similar instances? The
Minimize Harm Maxim, rooted in the consistent application of con-
temporary Western morality regarding the protection and preserva-
tion of human life, provides a framework for applied philosophy
concerning other life-forms that are not different in morally relevant

ways, a framework for answering critical questions in contemporary
situations in an impartial and consistent fashion.
A. Ongoing Protectionist Issues
1. Zoos and Circuses
The Animal Welfare Institute recently reported that U.S. zoos gained
permission from authorities in Swaziland to capture and import eleven
wild elephants. These imports would further decimate already dan-
gerously low elephant herds in Swaziland, reducing elephant popu-
lations by a whopping twenty-five percent. The Animal Welfare
Institute, fighting to keep these elephants out of Western zoos, notes
that elephants, one of the longest-lived animals in the wilds, do not
live long in captivity due to lack of exercise, inadequate diet, poor
living conditions, neglect, loneliness, and depression (Buckley 1–2).
The Animal Welfare Institute argues that elephants do not belong
in our cages but “should be left to wander freely with their families
and friends through their native savannahs, playing in watering holes
and mud pits, and interacting with one another as they choose”
(“Save” 20).
The Elephant Sanctuary in Tennessee now houses six elephants,
all rejects from zoos, circuses, amusement parks, and businesses that
448 chapter nine
used animals to attract customers. Each elephant arrives at the sanc-
tuary with his or her own horrific story of capture and separation
from family and herd, transportation in tight confinement and chains,
then further confinement mixed with training, exploitation, and finally
rejection.
Orcas suffer a similar fate in captivity, and like elephants, “Orcas
are big business: wild-caught Orcas can net their captors a cool $1
million apiece” (Hoyt 7). Given the funds involved, it is not sur-
prising that Russian authorities have set a quota for the capture of

ten orcas from Russian waters for each of the past three years. When
captured, these giant mammals go from feeding on mackerel and
salmon, mating and playing under the snowy volcanic peaks of icy
Russian waters, to human-built holding pens in cities of North
America. They are taken from bonded family groups, where they
communicate using a specific dialect, travel, socialize, and forage as
a group, to isolated tanks (Hoyt 6). At the end of the day, orcas are
captured and sold because people like you and I pay to watch them
do tricks that we find entertaining, for which the orca receives only
dead fish.
Dolphins are among the most intelligent animals on the planet.
They are also very active, swimming up to forty miles in a day, and
remaining in motion even as they sleep. Like orcas, dolphins are
social creatures who live in pods and stay with their young for four
or five years. Most females never leave the pod into which they are
born. As with orcas, dolphin capture entails pursuit until the victims
are too exhausted to attempt any further escape. A net is then low-
ered, the pod is trapped, and the dolphins are pulled out of the
water. Dolphins between the age of two and four are selected out
and kept; the rest are thrown back into the sea. “Some drop dead
on the deck, from shock. Many are injured” (Regan, Empty 136).
[Fifty-three percent] of those dolphins who survive the violent capture
die within 90 days. The average life span of a dolphin in the wild is
45 years; yet half of all captured dolphins die within their first two
years of captivity. The survivors last an average of only 5 years in
captivity. Every seven years, half of all dolphins in captivity die from
capture shock, pneumonia, intestinal disease, ulcers, chlorine poison-
ing, and other stress-related illnesses. (Finney)
These wild mammals are then kept in concrete tanks or sea cages,
sometimes in only six feet of water in an area of roughly twenty-

five square feet. These active sea animals have nowhere to swim,
contemporary moral dilemmas 449
nowhere to dive, no family, and no pods, and cannot use their sonar
when they are surrounded by walls (Finney). Instead, these dolphins
are forced to interact with their human captors. They are taught
“tricks” to entertain the public. According to Helene O’Barry, com-
panion of Ric O’Barry (who trained Flipper), and co-founder of the
Dolphin Project, dolphins “depend totally on their keepers to be fed.
Once the hungry dolphins have surrendered to eating dead fish, the
trainer teaches them that only when they perform a desired behav-
ior do they receive their reward: a fish” (Regan, Empty 138).
Confined animals who abuse themselves (banging their heads against
the walls) are creating stimuli which their environment cannot supply.
Dolphins in captivity tend to develop stereotypical behaviors (swim-
ming in repetitive circle pattern, with eyes closed and in silence) because
of boredom and confinement. This is equivalent to the swaying and
pacing of primates, lions, tigers and bears confined in cages. (Finney)
There are an estimated one thousand captive dolphins throughout
the world (Regan, Empty 136); the vast majority of them were cap-
tured at sea because most captive-born dolphins do not survive any
length of time (Finney). Captive dolphins are exploited for human
entertainment; in the process their life expectancy is shortened ( just
a little over five years) and their quality of life is significantly dimin-
ished (Finney).
Beanie, a gibbon now under the care of the International Primate
Protection League (IPPL), was born in a zoo and then sold to a
research laboratory where he became very ill. As a result of his ill-
ness, he is now blind and epileptic (McGreal). Neither zoos nor
research facilities are interested in Beanie now that he is disabled.
He is a cast-off, robbed of his independence long ago, with nowhere

to go, and no one in the zoo who wants to look after his needs now
that he is no longer lucrative. Such anymals end up in sanctuaries
only if they are very lucky. Sanctuaries for wild anymals are chron-
ically full and funded only by private donations from those few peo-
ple who both know about these anymals and who care enough to
send money.
Anymals need not be disabled to be cast off by those who once
profited from their exploitation. Alan Green, an investigative jour-
nalist who wrote Animal Underworld, documented zoos “looking to rid
themselves of six hundred mammals, nearly four hundred reptiles,
thousands of fish, hundreds of birds, and a variety of invertebrates”
on a single day (“Canned” 6–7).
450 chapter nine
This traffic in exotic animals exists in large part because many zoos
depend on baby animals to attract paying customers. When these babies
grow up, they must be disposed of to make room for the new crop
of babies who will draw a new crowd of customers. Since the public
would not tolerate the animals simply being killed by the zoo, they
are sold to dealers, who in turn often sell them to research laborato-
ries, roadside petting zoos, and canned hunts. (“Canned” 6)
Anymals are used in zoos and circuses, on television, and in local
fairs for the entertainment and “education” of human beings and
then discarded when they are no longer profitable. Some cast-off
zoo anymals become targets for those who wish to shoot “exotic”
animals on “game preserves.”
Circus trainers and others who train anymals for the entertain-
ment industry replace normal species behavior with contrived acts,
all for the sake of personal profit. Training wild anymals to ride
bicycles, jump through flaming hoops, and stand or sit in unnatural
positions is generally accomplished with negative reinforcement. “The

tools of the trade today are much the same as the tools used by
trainers in the past: whips, bullhooks, metal bars, chains, electric
prods, muzzles, human fists” (Regan, Empty 130). Kelly Tansy, a for-
mer Ringling Brothers performer, reported to the Performing Animal
Welfare Society at a press conference in Sacramento:
I saw an elephant being beaten in what appeared to be a disciplinary
action. The beating was so severe that the elephant screamed. I have
come to realize, through all the circuses that I have worked for, that
mistreatment of animals is a standard part of training and is thought
to be a “necessary” part of exhibiting them. I have seen chimps locked
in small cages constantly when not performing; elephants chained con-
tinuously; and even animals being beaten during performances
There is no way that an animal can even begin to fulfill a decent life
while traveling on the road with the circus. (“Testimony”)
It is not surprising that these wild animals sometimes rebel against
those who restrain and manipulate them. Trainers are sometimes
attacked; the trainers often respond by destroying “aggressive” any-
mals, most often with a gun. Between 1990 and 2004, some one
hundred people were killed, and forty-three injured, by captive ele-
phants who turned on human beings (“Cruelty”). Tyke, a twenty-
one-year-old elephant, “was riddled with nearly 100 bullets before
dying in the streets of Honolulu after she killed her trainer and tore
out of a circus tent” (“Cruelty”). I was foolish enough to witness a
contemporary moral dilemmas 451
video of this event, a memory which I cannot shake, and which car-
ries a particular horror that haunts me to this day. All those who
pay to attend circuses that exploit anymals—who support these cir-
cuses in any way—share responsibility for Tyke’s terrifying, pro-
longed, and painful death at the hands of her captors and tormentors.
The Minimize Harm Maxim is rooted in noninterference. Human

beings are expected to leave each living entity to its own indepen-
dent life, to carry out its natural, biological behaviors, unless we must
harm another organism in self-defense or to fulfill a primary need.
And we may only harm other entities if we have taken appropriate
measures to avoid conflict. Confining, restricting, and training other
entities to perform bizarre acts for the sake of human entertainment
or education violates the Minimize Harm Maxim. And if such any-
mals as Tyke turn on us, we are not morally permitted to kill those
we have so thoroughly provoked.
Given that zoos and circuses exist, what ought we to do? Many
caged anymals have lost their ability to survive in the wilds, and it
would be
grossly immoral to throw a young child or mental patient out on the
streets, particularly in the name of “freedom” and “autonomy.” The
same holds for most domesticated nonhuman animals. Some could
readapt to the wild, perhaps, but we cannot contemplate releasing bil-
lions. We would be abrogating the responsibilities to them that we
have acquired, not to mention endangering ourselves and other ani-
mals through ecological devastation, if we were to do so. No [pro-
tectionist] view worth its name could sanction such idiocy. (Pluhar 270)
One of the most well-known cases of such human neglect and mis-
judgment was that of Lucy, the chimpanzee brought up like a human
child by the Temerlins so that she would learn to use sign language.
By the time Lucy was ten, she had grown too powerful for safe
keeping, and so the study was terminated. “The Temerlins decided
it would be best if Lucy were released in Africa to live a ‘free’ life.
The trouble was that Africa was as foreign to Lucy as it would be
to any ten-year-old who had never been outside Oklahoma” (Pluhar
275). Though volunteers in Africa did what they could to prepare
Lucy for life in the jungle with other chimpanzees, she was fright-

ened in her new surroundings and fearful of other chimpanzees. She
“repeatedly signed ‘Please help. Lucy wants out. Please help’” (Pluhar
275). Nonetheless, Lucy was released into the jungle. Her body was
found not long after, minus hands and feet. The humans she had
452 chapter nine
come to trust had betrayed her yet again: “[S]cientists” exploited
her for their studies, then abandoned her to the wilds of Africa,
where “poachers had killed another human, albeit in a chimpanzee
body” (Pluhar 275).
Anymals should be rehabituated and returned to the wilds when
possible. But those unlikely to survive in the wilds ought to be allowed
to live out their lives in spacious, private quarters, in conditions as
natural as possible. The Sugarloaf Dolphin Sanctuary, located in the
Florida Keys, is a fine example. This sanctuary is designed for dol-
phins who were once held captive so that they can choose between
returning to the open sea and remaining in more familiar surroundings
attended by human beings. Good intentions require that such once-
captive animals exist for their own sake, not for our entertainment or
“education.” It is sad that anymals such as Lucy exist—misused for
human interests so that they are completely incapable of living a
natural and independent life. Nonetheless, many such anymals do
exist; providing for their safety and comfort until the end of their days
is no less than morality would demand that we do for human beings.
We are not entitled to assume, across species and without con-
sent, that confinement is acceptable (or preferable) for anymals. This
includes captive breeding and caging “problem” wildlife.
While one might argue that captive breeding is well intentioned,
a closer look reveals that captive breeding fails to show good intent
toward individuals involved. Captive breeding stems from human interest
in maintaining genetic diversity. Such breeding is not done for those

individuals who are bred, nor on behalf of the species we strive to
save. Captive breeding is for our future, in hopes of maintaining bio-
diversity, a biological state that we deem beneficial to ourselves.
Captive breeding is restricted to certain species, mostly birds and
mammals, that we have a special interest in preserving out of many
that are endangered, out of many that have already been driven to
extinction. Meanwhile, for those captured and caged, a great deal
is lost. These birds and mammals lose their freedom, autonomy, local
companions, and familiar home territory. Basically, they lose every-
thing that is of meaning short of their bodily existence.
Consistency and impartiality require that we deal with anymals as
we would our own kind. We do not engage in “captive breeding”
to preserve “endangered” human races. The last purebred Maori
(indigenous to New Zealand) died at the end of the twentieth century;
contemporary moral dilemmas 453
there was no systematic effort to continue this particular breed of
human. It is considered immoral to control and manipulate human
breeding. Casuistry requires similar treatment for similar cases; philo-
sophical consistency and impartiality demand the same response to
other dwindling species. Rather than captive breeding, a long-stand-
ing ethic of minimizing interference and minimizing harm would
likely have assured the continuance of the Maori as well as that of
endangered and extinct species.
Where “problem” anymals are concerned the Minimize Harm
Maxim indicates that we must do all that we can to avoid encoun-
ters, yet if such encounters occur (even though we have tried assid-
uously to avoid them), we may harm an entity that poses a direct
threat to personal safety. Shooting circus anymals that we have kept
in chains and beaten into performing unnatural acts is unacceptable.
(Anymals such as Tyke should be retired to sanctuaries set up to

satisfy their personal needs. In the future we ought not to catch and
detain such animals.) But what of wild anymals that endanger local
residents or those hiking through forests?
The Minimize Harm Maxim extends ethics regarding the protec-
tion and preservation of human life to other living entities. How do
we deal with “problem” humans? We “cage” people who pose prob-
lems for others, but caging such humans is not comparable to caging
other species for four reasons.
First, human beings are morally accountable to human ethics. In
contrast, we do not imprison four-year-old children—they are inno-
cent—and for the same reasons we should not imprison black bears
or rattlesnakes. Additionally, other species are not accountable to
human ethics, and therefore cannot reasonably be imprisoned on the
basis of an ethical or legal code about which they have no understand-
ing, and which they play no part in either establishing or maintaining.
Second, “problem humans” undergo a rigorous procedure in order
to determine whether they ought to be detained. “Caged” humans
are determined to be morally culpable and to have willfully broken
laws. Nonhuman animals are not morally accountable to human
ethics or law, and therefore cannot be put on trial any more than
can a small child. Neither do anymals share our language, and so
they cannot reasonably participate in legal proceedings.
Third, while anymals are generally detained for life, people receive
various sentences, only very few of which are life sentences. An
454 chapter nine
anymal forced into confinement through no fault of his or her own
is often ill suited to ever be returned to a natural environment.
Fourth, we cannot legally exploit imprisoned human beings for
entertainment. Prisoners are never forced to learn and perform unnat-
ural “tricks” for profit. Nor can they be legally exploited for science

or education or sold to other industries.
Many humans would rather die than be captured or controlled
by others. The likely terror of finding oneself suddenly in a cell—
the fear, frustration, loss of freedom and autonomy, and boredom
of confinement (not to mention uncertainty regarding one’s captors)
are a dreadful thought to most human beings. The horror would be
multiplied if our captors were of a completely different species, alien
to us in nearly every way imaginable. Caged anymals exhibit behav-
iors suggesting that they feel similarly about being captured and
detained, confined and controlled.
Capture and release reveals good intentions toward those cap-
tured, and though there is perhaps no human equivalent, this approach
seems clearly preferable to ongoing conflicts likely to result in defen-
sive killing. No anymal should be detained, but capture and release
seems morally acceptable in situations where such an action will
benefit the anymals involved.
Consistency, impartiality, and casuistry require an end to zoos and
circuses, to captive breeding, and to the caging of anymals for any
reason except for their own good. In the Minimize Harm Maxim
zoos and circuses are inherently unethical because they are built and
maintained for the benefit of human beings at the expense of any-
mals. Anymals are incapable of offering verbal consent for such
exploitation, and because they are more like dependents than equal
adults, they could not offer such consent even if they were able.
Zoos and circuses, the exploitation of anymals for entertainment,
education, and/or profit, fail either to minimize harm or minimize
interference. For the sake of impartial and consistent application of
human ethical standards across species, the animals-in-entertainment
industry ought to be shut down permanently, including zoos and cir-
cuses, and the anymals retired to comfortable, private quarters if

they are not fit for release into their natural habitat. Children and
adults alike will learn much more about anymals from learning that
they are not to be caged and exploited than they will from seeing
them pace neurotically behind bars or from watching them perform
unseemly acts.
contemporary moral dilemmas 455
2. Clothing
The basic need to cover our bodies against sun and cold entails
harming other entities. The Minimize Harm Maxim, consistent with
morality regarding the protection and preservation of innocent human
life, permits harming other entities in order to satisfy basic interests,
so long as one avoids harm when possible and minimizes any harm
that cannot be avoided.
Approximately forty million anymals are killed per year in order
to produce fur products. Of these, roughly thirty-one million are
raised on fur farms, leaving eight million to be trapped in the wilds.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture reports a total of 324 fur mills
in the United States (Regan, Empty 109). Those raised on fur farms
remain genetically wild even though they are confined in small cages.
As a result, many such “fur bearers” develop neurotic behaviors like
pacing or even self-mutilation. Though unheard of in the wild, nearly
one in five fox will kill and eat their own offspring under the strained
conditions of fur farms (“Fur”). Those raised for hides on fur farms
are given a minimum of care.
While eight million animals are brought to market from wild traps,
many more anymals are killed by traps each year. Traps are indis-
criminate, catching dogs, cats, birds, and endangered species—any
creature that inadvertently springs the set jaws. Those anymals not
considered “fur” anymals are simply cast aside. Any of the anymals
caught in traps, whether wanted or unwanted by the fur profiteer,

remain pinched in the trap until the one who set the trap comes
along to check the lines. The only other option is to chew off a limb
and escape back to the wild minus one leg. Anymals sometimes wait
for many days in traps, without food or water, in extreme pain.
Perhaps the best comparison of what this might be like is to imag-
ine having your hand slammed in a car door. Of course for a per-
son, a car door is not mysterious and terrifying in the way that a
steel-jawed trap must be to wild anymals. They have no way to
understand the mechanism that holds them so painfully. Yet they
must remain in place, waiting until someone happens along to kill
them, often by simply clubbing them to death. (Bullets mar the any-
mal’s fur coat.)
What kinds of anymals, and in what numbers, die to create one
fur coat, and how do they die? According to a table provided by
the Syracuse Animal Rights Organization, the numbers and methods
are startling:
456 chapter nine
Anymal # necessary method of killing
Lynx 8–12 trapping, poison
Fox 10–20 trapping, anal electrocution
Rabbit 30–40 trapping
Raccoon 30–40 trapping
Mink 30–70 gassing, neck breaking
Sable 60–70 trapping, poison
Chinchilla 110 genital electrocution
Ermine 125 trapping (“Fur”)
Through international trade, cat and dog fur also finds its way
onto Western markets. The cuddly stuffed bunny grandpa bought as
a gift may have come from a cat or a dog. Short-haired cats and
German shepherds are the most common victims (Regan, Empty 118).

In other parts of the world people have as little regard for cats and
dogs as Westerners do for mink and fox.
Aside from the harm done to individual anymals, the fur indus-
try harms the environment. Piles of rotting corpses are not only
unseemly, but unhealthy, and somewhat difficult to dispose of in an
environmentally friendly manner. Landfills in the state of Montana
are sometimes loaded with the skinned bodies of mink. But the rot-
ting corpses are the least of the environmental problems caused by
the fur industry. A fur coat requires twenty times more fossil fuels
than are necessary to produce a synthetic coat. The fur industry uses
“environmental contaminants and possible carcinogens such as
formaldehyde and chromium” in the process of turning anymal skins
into a human coat (“Fur”); these contaminants eventually end up in
the groundwater.
The leather industry is no better for the environment. Curing
leather involves the same toxic chemicals used to tan and finish fur.
These “chemicals are not any better for the people who work with
them than they are for the streams and rivers into which their waste
eventually flows” (Regan, Empty 119).
The leather industry is for cattle what the fur industry is for rac-
coons. Contrary to common assumptions, leather is not simply a by-
product of the meat industry. Cattle are killed specifically for their
skin. Much leather in the Western world comes from India, where
once revered cattle have become the targets of leather profiteers.
Cattle, many of them too thin or too old to be killed for their flesh,
are rounded up and transported for miles in rickety trucks, without