The CISSP Prep Guide, Second Edition Mastering the CISSP and ISSEP Exams phần 10 pdf

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Part III ✦ Appendices
Select a Computer-Based Model
to Facilitate the Analysis Process
In the selection of a computer-based model, one must ensure that the tool selected
does what is expected, is sensitive to the problem at hand, and allows for the visi-
bility needed in addressing the system as an entity, as well as any of its major com-
ponents on an individual-by-individual basis. The model must enable the
comparison of many different alternatives and aid in selecting the best among them
rapidly and efficiently. The model must be comprehensive, allowing for the integra-
tion of many different parameters; flexible in structure, enabling the analyst to look
at the system as a whole or any part of the system; reliable, in terms of repeatabil-
ity of results; and user-friendly. So often, one selects a computer model based on
the material in the advertising brochure alone, purchases the necessary equipment
and software, uses the model to manipulate data, and believes in the output results
without having any idea as to how the model was put together, the internal analyti-
cal relationships established, whether it is sensitive to the variation of input param-
eters in terms of output results, and so on. The results of a recent survey indicate
that there are more than 350 computer-based tools available in the commercial
marketplace and intended for use in accomplishing different levels of analysis. Each
was developed on a relatively “independent” or “isolated” basis in terms of selected
platform, language used, input data needs, and interface requirements. In general,
the models do not “talk to each other,” are not user-friendly, and are too complex
for use in early system design and development.
When using a model, it is essential that the analyst become thoroughly familiar with
the tool, know how it was put together, and understand what it can do. For the pur-
poses of accomplishing a life-cycle cost analysis, it may be appropriate to select a
group of models, combined as illustrated in Figure E-9 and integrated in such a man-
ner that will enable the analyst to look not only at the cost for the system overall,
but at some of the key functional areas representing potential high-cost contribu-

tors. The model(s) must be structured around the cost breakdown structure (CBS)
and in such a way that will allow the analyst to look at the costs associated with
each of the major functions. Further, it must be adaptable for use during the early
stages of conceptual design as well as in the detail design and development phase.
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Appendix E ✦ The Cost Analysis Process
921
Figure E-9: Example models in life cycle costing.
Reliability
$
Diagnostics
$
Evaluation of
system/product
factors
Alternatives
$
Availability
$
Program time
$
A
B
C
Inventory
Alt.
A
Alt. B
System/product operational requirements;
maintenance concept, program requirements

System/product evaluation models
Personnel
requirements
model
System
operations
model
Support
equipment
model
Market
analysis
model
1 3
4
Maintenance
shop
model
Life-cycle
cost
model
Product
distribution
model
5
7
Repair-level
analysis
model
Inventory

policy
model
Production
operations
model
8
2
6
9
10
To block 3
System
product
configuration
Recommended
changes as
required
Feed and corrective action loop
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Part III ✦ Appendices
Develop a “Baseline” Cost Profile
Through the application of various estimating methods, the costs for each CBS cat-
egory and for each year in the system life cycle are projected in the form of a cost
profile. The worksheet format presented in Figure E-10 can serve as a vehicle for
recording costs, and the profile shown in Figure E-11 can represent the anticipated
cost stream.
Program Activity Cost Cost by Program Year ($)
Total
cost

($)
Percent
Contr.
(%)
Category
Designation
12345678910 11 12
Alternative A
1. Research and
development cost
a. Program
management
b. Engineering design
c. Electrical design
d. Engineering data
2.
3.
Others
C
R
C
RM
C
RE
C
RED
C
RD
Total Actual Cost
C

Total P. V. Cost (10%)
C
(10)
Alternative B
1. Research and
development cost
a. Program
management
b. Engineering design
Etc.
C
R
C
RM
C
RE
Figure E-10: Cost collection worksheet.
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Appendix E ✦ The Cost Analysis Process
923
System Cost, Dollars
Retirement and
disposal cost
Operation
and support
cost
Production and
construction cost
Research and
development

cost
System Life Cycle, Years
System cost profile
System Cost, Dollars
S
y
stem Life C
y
cle, Years
Figure E-11: Development of a cost profile.
In developing profiles, it may be feasible to start out with one presented in terms of
constant dollars first (i.e., the costs for each year in the future presented in terms
of today’s dollars) and then develop a second profile by adding the appropriate
inflationary factors for each year to reflect a budgetary stream. In comparing alter-
native profiles, the appropriate economic analysis methods must be applied in con-
verting the various alternative cost streams to the present value or to the point in
time when the decision is to be made in selecting a preferred approach. It is neces-
sary to evaluate alternative profiles on the basis of some form of equivalence.
3
3
The treatment of cost streams considering the “time value of money” is presented in most texts
dealing with engineering economy. Two good references are (1) G. J. Thuesen, and W. J. Fabrycky,
Engineering Economy, 9th ed. (Prentice-Hall, 2001); and (2) W. J. Fabrycky, G. J. Thuesen, and D.
Verma, Economic Decision Analysis (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1997). See Appendix A of
Benjamin S. Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 3rd edition, for additional references.
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Part III ✦ Appendices
Develop a Cost Summary and Identify
the High-Cost Contributors

In order to gain some insight pertaining to the costs for each major category in the
CBS and to readily identify the high-cost contributors, it may be appropriate to view
the results presented in a tabular form. In Figure E-12, the costs for each category
are identified along with the percent contribution of each. Note that in this example,
the high-cost areas include the initial costs associated with “facilities” and “capital
equipment” and the operating and maintenance costs related to the “inspection and
test” function being accomplished within the production process. For the purposes
of product and/or process improvement, the “inspection and test” area should be
investigated further. Through the planned life cycle, 17% of the total cost is
attributed to the operation and support of this functional area of activity, and the
analyst should proceed with determining some of the reasons for this high cost.
Determine the Cause-and-Effect
Relationships Pertaining to
High-Cost Areas
Given the presentation of costs (and the percent contribution) as shown in Figure
E-12, the next step is to determine the likely “causes” for these costs. The analyst
will need to revisit the CBS, the assumptions made leading to the determination of
the costs, and the cost-estimating relationships utilized in the process. It is to be
hoped that an activity-based costing (ABC) approach was used, or something of an
equivalent nature, to ensure the proper traceability. The application of an Ishikawa
cause-and-effect diagram, as illustrated in Figure B.4 (Appendix B of Benjamin S.
Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 3rd Edition)), may be used to assist in
pinpointing the actual “causes.” The problem may relate to an unreliable product
requiring a lot of maintenance, an inadequate procedure or poor process, a supplier
problem, or other such factors.
Conduct a Sensitivity Analysis
To properly assess the results of the life cycle cost analysis, the validity of the data
presented in Figure E-12, and the associated risks, the analyst needs to conduct a
sensitivity analysis. One may challenge the accuracy of the input data (i.e., the fac-
tors used and the assumptions made in the beginning) and determine their impact

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Appendix E ✦ The Cost Analysis Process
925
Production Operation-Functional Flow
Incoming
inspection
Suppliers
of materials,
components
and equipment
Inventory
Raw material
Fabrication
Forming, milling,
cutting, drilling,
machining, welding
Residual
Residual
Inventory
Purchased
items
Inspection
and test
Rework
(as required)
Inventory
Spare/repair
parts
Inventory
Subassemblies

System
inspection
and test
Rework
(as required)
Inventory
Spare/repair
parts
Inventory
Finished
product
Packing and
shipping
(distribution)
High-cost area
Consumer
Residual
System
final
assembly
Equipment
subassembly
Inventory
Manufactured
parts
16
13
11
12
17

1
2
5
7 8
9
Go
No-go
10
3
4
6
14
15
Cost Category Cost × 1,000 ($) % of Total
1. Architecture and design 2,248 7
2. Architecture and design 12,524 39
(a) Facilities 6,744 21
(b ) Capital equipment 5,780 18
3. Future operation and maintenance
17,342 54
(a) Incoming inspection
963 3
(b) Fabrication
3,854 12
(c) Subassembly
1,927 6
(d) Final assembly
3,533 11
(e) Inspection and test
5,459 17

(f) Packing and shipping
1,606 5
Grand Total $32,114 100%
Figure E-12: Life cycle cost breakdown summary.
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Part III ✦ Appendices
on the analysis results. This may be accomplished by identifying the critical factors
at the input stage (i.e., those parameters that are suspected as having a large impact
on the results), introducing variations over a designated range at the input stage,
and determining the differences in output. For example, if the initially predicted reli-
ability MTBF value is “suspect,” it may be appropriate to apply variations at the
input stage and determine the changes in cost at the output. The object is to identify
those areas in which a small variation at the input stage will cause a large delta cost
at the output. This, in turn, leads to the identification of potential high-risk areas, a
necessary input to the risk management program described in Section 6.7 (Chapter 6
of Benjamin S. Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 3rd Edition).
Conduct a Pareto Analysis to Identify
Major Problem Areas
With the objective of implementing a program for continuous process improve-
ment, the analyst may wish to rank the problem areas on the basis of relative
importance, the higher-ranked problems requiring immediate attention. This may
be facilitated through the conductance of a Pareto analysis and the construction of
a diagram, as shown in Figure E-13.
Relative Ranking of Importance
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
Lack of diagnostics (unit B)
Poor accessibility (assembly 2)
Inproper procedure for maintenance
Unstable alignment
Inadequate
labeling
Need most attention
Figure E-13: Pareto ranking of major problem areas.
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Appendix E ✦ The Cost Analysis Process
927
Identify and Evaluate Feasible Alternatives
In referring to the requirements for the communication system described in the
“Define System Requirements” section, two potential suppliers were considered
through a feasibility analysis; that is, Configuration A and Configuration B. Figure E-14
presents a budgetary profile for each of three configurations, with Configuration C
being eliminated for noncompliance. For the purposes of comparison on an equiva-
lent basis, the two remaining profiles have been converted to reflect present value
costs. Figure E-15 presents a breakdown summary of these present value costs by
major CBS category and identifies the relative percent contribution of each category
in terms of the total. A 10% interest rate was used in determining present value costs.
System Cost, Dollars
Configuration A
Configuration B
Configuration C
(Not feasible)

S
y
stem Life C
y
cle, Years
Figure E-14: Alternative cost profiles.
Although a review of Figure E-15 might lead one to immediately select Configuration
A as being preferable, prior to making such a decision the analyst needs to project
the two cost streams in terms of the life cycle and determine the point in time when
Configuration A assumes the position of preference. Figure E-16 shows the results of
a break-even analysis, and it appears that A is preferable after approximately 6.5
years into the future. The question arises as to whether this break-even point is rea-
sonable in considering the type of system and its mission, the technologies being
utilized, the length of the planned life cycle, and the possibilities of obsolescence.
For systems in which the requirements are changing constantly and obsolescence
may become a problem 2 to 3 years hence, the selection of Configuration B may be
preferable. On the other hand, for larger systems with longer life cycles (e.g., 10 to
15 years and greater), the selection of Configuration A may be the best choice.
In this case, it is assumed that Configuration A is preferable. However, when the cost
profile for this alternative is converted back to a budgetary projection, it is realized
that a further reduction of cost is necessary. This, in turn, leads the analyst to Figure
E-15 and the identification of potential high-cost contributors. Given that a large per-
centage of the total cost of a system is often in the area of maintenance and support,
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Part III ✦ Appendices
Cost Category
Configuration A
Present Cost % of Total
Configuration B

Present Cost % of Total
1. Research and development $70,219 7.8 $53,246 4.2
(a) Management 9,374 1.1 9,252 0.8
(b) Engineering 45.552 5.0 28,731 2.3
(c) Test and evaluation 12,176 1.4 12,153 0.9
(d) Technical data 3,117 0.3 3,110 0.2
2. Production (investment)
407,114
45.3
330,885
26.1
(a) Construction
45,553
5.1
43,227
3.4
(b) Manufacturing
362,261
40.2
287,658
22.7
3. Operations and maintenance 422,217 46.7 883,629
69.4
(a) Operations 37,811 4.2 39,301
3.1
(b) Maintenance 382,106 42.5 841,108
66.3
-maintenance personnel 210,659 23.4 407,219
32.2
-spares/repair parts 103,520 11.5 228,926

18.1
-Test equipment 47,713 5.3 131,747
10.4
-Transportation 14,404 1.6 51,838
4.1
-Maintenance training 1,808 0.2 2,125
0.1
-Facilities 900 0.1 1,021
Neg.
-Field data 3,102 0.4 18,232
1.4
4. Phaseout and disposal 2,300 0.2 3,220
0.3
Grand Total
$900,250 100% $1,267,760
100%
Figure E-15: Life cycle cost breakdown (evaluation of two alternative configurations).
1200
1050
900
750
600
450
300
150
0
Cost, Dollars
× 1000
Difference in acquisition cost
(R&D and investment)

divided by difference in yearly
O&M cost = 6-year,
5-month payback point
Conf. A: $900,250
Conf. B: $1,267,760
R&D, investment
and first two
years of O&M
Conf. A: $478,033
Conf. B: $384,130
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9101112
Program Span, Years
Figure E-16: Break-even analysis.
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Appendix E ✦ The Cost Analysis Process
929
one might investigate the categories of “maintenance personnel” and “spares/repair
parts,” representing 23.4% and 11.5% of the total cost, respectively. The next step is
to identify the applicable cause-and-effect relationships and to determine the actual
causes for such high costs. This may be accomplished by being able to trace the
costs back to a specific function, process, product design characteristic, or a combi-
nation thereof. The analyst also needs to refer back to the CBS and review how the
costs were initially derived and the assumptions that were made at the input stage.
In any event, the problem may be traced back to a specific function in which the
resource consumption is high, a particular component of the system with low relia-
bility and requiring frequent maintenance, a specific system operating function that
requires a lot of highly skilled personnel, or something of an equivalent nature.
Various design tools can be effectively utilized to aid in making visible these causes
and to help identify areas where improvement can be made; for example, the failure
mode, effects, and criticality analysis, the detailed task analysis, and so on.

As a final step, the analyst needs to conduct a sensitivity analysis to properly assess
the risks associated with the selection of Configuration A. Figure E-17 illustrates this
approach as it applies to the “maintenance personnel” and “spares/repair parts” cat-
egories addressed earlier. The objective is to identify those areas where a small vari-
ation at the input stage will cause a large delta cost at the output. This, in turn, leads
to the identification of potential high-risk areas, a necessary input to the risk man-
agement program described in Section 6.7 (Chapter 6 of Benjamin S. Blanchard,
System Engineering Management, 3rd Edition).
100
150
200
250
300
350
Maintenance
personnel and
support ( C
OMM
)
60
80
100
120
140
160
P. V. Cost, Dollars
×
1000
P. V. Cost, Dollars
× 1000

Spare/repair
parts ( C
OMX
)
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 0 0.5 1.0
1.5 2.0
MTBF Multiplier MTBF Multiplier
MTBF
P.V. Cost,
MTBF
P.V. Cost,
Multiplier
Dollars ( C
OMM
) Multiplier
Dollars ( C
OMX
)
0.67
223.140
0.67
199.576
**1,00 210.659 **1,00 103.520
1.33 162.325 1.33 92.235
2.00 112.565 2.00 80.130
**Baseline configuration A **Baseline configuration A
Figure E-17: Sensitivity analysis.
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Part III ✦ Appendices

Select a Preferred Design Approach
The cost issue having been addressed, it is necessary to view the results in the con-
text of the overall cost-effectiveness balance illustrated in Figure 1.24 (Chapter 1 of
Benjamin S. Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 3rd Edition). Although the
emphasis here has been on cost, the ultimate decision-making process must con-
sider both sides of the spectrum; that is, cost and effectiveness. For example, the
two alternative communication system configurations discussed earlier must
meet the reliability and cost goals described in the “Define System Requirements”
section. In Figure E-18, the shaded area represents the allowable design trade-off
“space,” and the alternatives must be viewed not only in terms of cost, but in terms
of reliability as well. As indicated in Section 3.4.12, the ultimate decision may be
based on an overall cost-effectiveness ratio or some equivalent metric (Chapter 3
of Benjamin S. Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 3rd Edition).
$21,000
20,000
19,000
18,000
17,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
Unit Cost
800
Budget goal
Trade-off
area
Conf. A
Conf. A Conf. A
675 495
0.048 0.025

13,850 19,505
Conf. B
Evaluation
criteria
Reliability-
MTBF
Unit life-cycle
cost ratio
Cost-effect
ratio
Minimum MTBF
0 400 500 600 700
Reliability MTBF (hours)
Figure E-18: Reliability versus unit life cycle cost.
✦ ✦ ✦
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AP P EN DIX
National
F
F
Information
✦ ✦ ✦ ✦
Assurance (IA)
Glossary
CNSS Instruction No. 4009 (www.nstissc.gov/Assets/
pdf/4009.pdf). Used by permission.
Revised May 2003
THIS DOCUMENT PROVIDES MINIMUM STANDARDS. FURTHER
IMPLEMENTATION MAY BE REQUIRED BY YOUR DEPARTMENT
OR AGENCY.

FOREWORD
1. The CNSS Glossary Working Group recently convened to
review terms submitted by the CNSS membership since
the Glossary was last published in September 2000. This
edition incorporates those terms.
2. We recognize that, to remain useful, a glossary must be
in a continuous state of coordination, and we encourage
your review and welcome your comments. The goal of
the Glossary Working Group is to keep pace with
changes in information assurance terminology and to
meet regularly for consideration of comments.
3. The Working Group would like your help in keeping this
glossary up to date as new terms come into being and
old terms fall into disuse or change meaning. Some
terms from the previous version were deleted, others
updated or added, and some are identified as candidates
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Part III ✦ Appendices
for deletion (C.F.D.). If a term you still find valuable and need in your environ-
ment has been deleted, please resubmit the term with a definition based on
the following criteria: (a) specific relevance to the security of information sys-
tems; (b) economy of words; (c) accuracy; and (d) clarity. Use these same cri-
teria to recommend any changes to existing definitions or suggest new terms.
In all cases, send your suggestions to the CNSS Secretariat via e-mail or fax at
the numbers found below.
4. Representatives of the CNSS may obtain additional copies of this instruction
at the address listed below.
/s/
MICHAEL V. HAYDEN

Lieutenant General, USAF
National Manager
Committee on National Security Systems
CNSS Secretariat (I42) . National Security Agency . 9800 Savage Road . STE 6716 . Ft
Meade MD 20755-6716 (410) 854-6805 . UFAX: (410) 854-6814
CNSS Instruction No. 4009
SECTION I
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
A
A1 Highest level of trust defined in the Orange Book (C.F.D.) (Department of
Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, DoD 5200.28-STD).
access Opportunity to make use of an information system (IS) resource.
access control Limiting access to information system resources only to autho-
rized users, programs, processes, or other systems.
access control list (ACL) Mechanism implementing discretionary and/or
mandatory access control between subjects and objects.
access control mechanism Security safeguard designed to detect and deny
unauthorized access and permit authorized access in an IS.
access control officer (ACO) Designated individual responsible for limiting
(C.F.D.) access to information systems resources.
access level Hierarchical portion of the security level used to identify the sen-
sitivity of IS data and the clearance or authorization of users. Access level, in
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Appendix F ✦ National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary
933
conjunction with the nonhierarchical categories, forms the sensitivity label of
an object. See category.
access list (IS) Compilation of users, programs, or processes and the access
levels and types to which each is authorized. (COMSEC) Roster of individuals
authorized admittance to a controlled area.

access period Segment of time, generally expressed in days or (C.F.D.) weeks,
during which access rights prevail.
access profile Associates each user with a list of protected objects the user
may access.
access type Privilege to perform action on an object. Read, write, execute,
append, modify, delete, and create are examples of access types.
accountability (IS) Process of tracing IS activities to a responsible source.
(COMSEC) Principle that an individual is entrusted to safeguard and control
equipment, keying material, and information and is answerable to proper
authority for the loss or misuse of that equipment or information.
accounting legend code (ALC) Numeric code used to indicate the minimum
accounting controls required for items of accountable COMSEC material
within the COMSEC Material Control System.
accounting number Number assigned to an item of COMSEC material to facili-
tate its control.
accreditation Formal declaration by a Designated Accrediting Authority
(DAA) that an IS is approved to operate in a particular security mode at an
acceptable level of risk, based on the implementation of an approved set of
technical, managerial, and procedural safeguards.
accreditation boundary See security perimeter.
accreditation package Product comprised of a System Security Plan (SSP)
and a report documenting the basis for the accreditation decision.
accrediting authority Synonymous with Designated Accrediting Authority
(DAA).
add-on security Incorporation of new hardware, software, or firmware safe-
guards in an operational IS.
advanced encryption (AES) standard FIPS approved cryptographic algorithm
that is a symmetric block cypher using cryptographic key sizes of 128, 192,
and 256 bits to encrypt and decrypt data in blocks of 128 bits.
advisory Notification of significant new trends or developments regarding the

threat to the IS of an organization. This notification may include analytical
insights into trends, intentions, technologies, or tactics of an adversary target-
ing ISs.
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Part III ✦ Appendices
alert Notification that a specific attack has been directed at the IS of an orga-
nization.
alternate COMSEC custodian Individual designated by proper authority to
perform the duties of the COMSEC custodian during the temporary absence of
the COMSEC custodian.
alternative work site Government-wide, national program allowing Federal
employees to work at home or at geographically convenient satellite offices
for part of the work week (e.g., telecommuting).
anti-jam Measures ensuring that transmitted information can be received
despite deliberate jamming attempts.
anti-spoof Measures preventing an opponent’s participation in an IS.
application Software program that performs a specific function directly for a
user and can be executed without access to system control, monitoring, or
administrative privileges.
assembly (COMSEC) Group of parts, elements, subassemblies, or circuits that
are removable items of COMSEC equipment.
assurance Measure of confidence that the security features, practices, proce-
dures, and architecture of an IS accurately mediates and enforces the security
policy.
attack Attempt to gain unauthorized access to an IS’s services, resources, or
information, or the attempt to compromise an IS’s integrity, availability, or
confidentiality.
Attack Sensing and Warning (AS&W) Detection, correlation, identification,
and characterization of intentional unauthorized activity with notification to

decision makers so that an appropriate response can be developed.
attention character (C.F.D.) In Trusted Computing Base (TCB) design, a char-
acter entered from a terminal that tells the TCB the user wants a secure com-
munications path from the terminal to some trusted code to provide a secure
service for the user.
audit Independent review and examination of records and activities to assess
the adequacy of system controls, to ensure compliance with established poli-
cies and operational procedures, and to recommend necessary changes in
controls, policies, or procedures.
audit trail Chronological record of system activities to enable the reconstruc-
tion and examination of the sequence of events and/or changes in an event.
authenticate To verify the identity of a user, user device, or other entity, or
the integrity of data stored, transmitted, or otherwise exposed to unautho-
rized modification in an IS, or to establish the validity of a transmission.
authentication Security measure designed to establish the validity of a trans-
mission, message, or originator, or a means of verifying an individual’s autho-
rization to receive specific categories of information.
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Appendix F ✦ National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary
935
authentication system Cryptosystem or process used for authentication.
authenticator Means used to confirm the identity of a station, originator, or
individual.
authorization Access privileges granted to a user, program, or process.
authorized vendor Manufacturer of INFOSEC equipment authorized to pro-
duce quantities in excess of contractual requirements for direct sale to eligi-
ble buyers. Eligible buyers are typically U.S. Government organizations or U.S.
Government contractors.
Authorized Vendor Program (AVP) Program in which a vendor, producing an
INFOSEC product under contract to NSA, is authorized to produce that prod-

uct in numbers exceeding the contracted requirements for direct marketing
and sale to eligible buyers. Eligible buyers are typically U.S. Government orga-
nizations or U.S. Government contractors. Products approved for marketing
and sale through the AVP are placed on the Endorsed Cryptographic Products
List (ECPL).
automated security monitoring Use of automated procedures to ensure secu-
rity controls are not circumvented or the use of these tools to track actions
taken by subjects suspected of misusing the IS.
automatic remote rekeying Procedure to rekey a distant crypto-equipment
electronically without specific actions by the receiving terminal operator.
availability Timely, reliable access to data and information services for autho-
rized users.
B
back door Hidden software or hardware mechanism used to circumvent secu-
rity controls. Synonymous with trap door.
backup Copy of files and programs made to facilitate recovery, if necessary.
banner Display on an IS that sets parameters for system or data use.
Bell-La Padula security model (C.F.D.) Formal-state transition model of a
computer security policy that describes a formal set of access controls based
on information sensitivity and
subject authorizations See star (*) property and simple security property.
benign Condition of cryptographic data that cannot be compromised by
human access.
benign environment Nonhostile environment that may be protected from
external hostile elements by physical, personnel, and procedural security
countermeasures.
beyond A1 (C.F.D.) Level of trust defined by the DoD Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) to be beyond the state-of-the-art technol-
ogy. It includes all the Al-level features plus additional ones not required at
the Al-level.

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binding Process of associating a specific communications terminal with a spe-
cific cryptographic key or associating two related elements of information.
biometrics Automated methods of authenticating or verifying an individual
based upon a physical or behavioral characteristic.
bit error rate Ratio between the number of bits incorrectly received and the
total number of bits transmitted in a telecommunications system.
BLACK Designation applied to information systems, and to associated areas,
circuits, components, and equipment, in which national security information
is encrypted or is not processed.
boundary Software, hardware, or physical barrier that limits access to a sys-
tem or part of a system.
brevity list List containing words and phrases used to shorten messages.
browsing Act of searching through IS storage to locate or acquire information,
without necessarily knowing the existence or format of information being
sought.
bulk encryption Simultaneous encryption of all channels of a multichannel
telecommunications link.
C
call back Procedure for identifying and authenticating a remote IS terminal,
whereby the host system disconnects the terminal and reestablishes contact.
Synonymous with dial back.
canister Type of protective package used to contain and dispense key in
punched or printed tape form.
capability (C.F.D.) Protected identifier that both identifies the object and
specifies the access rights to be allowed to the subject who possesses the
capability. In a capability-based system, access to protected objects such as
files is granted if the would-be subject possesses a capability for the object.

cascading Downward flow of information through a range of security levels
greater than the accreditation range of a system network or component.
category Restrictive label applied to classified or unclassified information to
limit access.
CCI assembly Device embodying a cryptographic logic or other COMSEC
design that NSA has approved as a Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI). It
performs the entire COMSEC function, but depends upon the host equipment
to operate.
CCI component Part of a Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) that does not
perform the entire COMSEC function but depends upon the host equipment,
or assembly, to complete and operate the COMSEC function.
CCI equipment Telecommunications or information handling equipment that
embodies a Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) component or CCI assembly
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Appendix F ✦ National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary
937
and performs the entire COMSEC function without dependence on host equip-
ment to operate.
central office of record (COR) Office of a federal department or agency that
keeps records of accountable COMSEC material held by elements subject to
its oversight.
certificate Digitally signed document that binds a public key with an identity.
The certificate contains, at a minimum, the identity of the issuing Certification
Authority, the user identification information, and the user’s public key.
certificate management Process whereby certificates (as defined above) are
generated, stored, protected, transferred, loaded, used, and destroyed.
certificate revocation list (CRL) List of invalid certificates (as defined above)
that have been revoked by the issuer.
certification Comprehensive evaluation of the technical and nontechnical
security safeguards of an IS to support the accreditation process that estab-

lishes the extent to which a particular design and implementation meets a set
of specified security requirements.
certification authority (CA) Trusted entity authorized to create, sign, and
issue public key certificates. By digitally signing each certificate issued, the
user’s identity is certified, and the association of the certified identity with a
public key is validated.
certification authority workstation (CAW) Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
workstation with a trusted operating system and special purpose application
software that is used to issue certificates.
certification package Product of the certification effort documenting the
detailed results of the certification activities.
certification test and evaluation (CT&E) Software and hardware security
tests conducted during development of an IS.
certified TEMPEST authority (CTTA) technical An experienced, technically
qualified U.S. Government employee who has met established certification
requirements in accordance with CNSS (NSTISSC)-approved criteria and has
been appointed by a U.S. Government Department or Agency to fulfill CTTA
responsibilities.
certifier Individual responsible for making a technical judgment of the sys-
tem’s compliance with stated requirements, identifying and assessing the
risks associated with operating the system, coordinating the certification
activities, and consolidating the final certification and accreditation packages.
challenge and reply authentication Prearranged procedure in which a sub-
ject requests authentication of another and the latter establishes validity with
a correct reply.
checksum Value computed on data to detect error or manipulation during
transmission. See hash total.
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Part III ✦ Appendices

check word Cipher text generated by cryptographic logic to detect failures in
cryptography.
cipher Any cryptographic system in which arbitrary symbols or groups of sym-
bols, represent units of plain text, or in which units of plain text are rearranged,
or both.
cipher text Enciphered information.
cipher text auto-key (CTAK) Cryptographic logic that uses previous cipher
text to generate a key stream.
ciphony Process of enciphering audio information, resulting in encrypted
speech.
classified information Information that has been determined pursuant to
Executive Order 12958 or any predecessor Order, or by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure
and is marked to indicate its classified status.
clearance Formal security determination by an authorized adjudicative office
that an individual is authorized access, on a need to know basis, to a specific
level of collateral classified information (TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDEN-
TIAL).
clearing Removal of data from an IS, its storage devices, and other peripheral
devices with storage capacity, in such a way that the data may not be recon-
structed using common system capabilities (i.e., keyboard strokes); however,
the data may be reconstructed using laboratory methods. Cleared media may
be reused at the same classification level or at a higher level. Overwriting is
one method of clearing.
client Individual or process acting on behalf of an individual who makes
requests of a guard or dedicated server. The client’s requests to the guard or
dedicated server can involve data transfer to, from, or through the guard or
dedicated server.
closed security environment Environment providing sufficient assurance that
applications and equipment are protected against the introduction of mali-

cious logic during an IS life cycle. Closed security is based upon a system’s
developers, operators, and maintenance personnel having sufficient clear-
ances, authorization, and configuration control.
code (COMSEC) System of communication in which arbitrary groups of let-
ters, numbers, or symbols represent units of plain text of varying length.
code book Document containing plain text and code equivalents in a system-
atic arrangement, or a technique of machine encryption using a word substi-
tution technique.
code group Group of letters, numbers, or both in a code system used to repre-
sent a plain text word, phrase, or sentence.
code vocabulary Set of plain text words, numerals, phrases, or sentences for
which code equivalents are assigned in a code system.
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Appendix F ✦ National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary
939
cold start Procedure for initially keying crypto-equipment.
collaborative computing Applications and technology (e.g. , whiteboarding,
group conferencing) that allow two or more individuals to share information
real time in an inter- or intra-enterprise environment.
command authority Individual responsible for the appointment of user repre-
sentatives for a department, agency, or organization and their key ordering
privileges.
Commercial COMSEC Evaluation Program (CCEP) Relationship between NSA
and industry in which NSA provides the COMSEC expertise (i.e., standards,
algorithms, evaluations, and guidance) and industry provides design, develop-
ment, and production capabilities to produce a type 1 or type 2 product.
Products developed under the CCEP may include modules, subsystems,
equipment, systems, and ancillary devices.
Common Criteria Provides a comprehensive, rigorous method for specifying
security function and assurance requirements for products and systems.

(International Standard ISO/IEC 5408, Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation [ITSEC])
common fill device One of a family of devices developed to read-in, transfer,
or store key.
communications cover Concealing or altering of characteristic communica-
tions patterns to hide information that could be of value to an adversary.
communications deception Deliberate transmission, retransmission, or alter-
ation of communications to mislead an adversary’s interpretation of the com-
munications. See imitative communications deception and manipulative
communications deception.
communications profile Analytic model of communications associated with
an organization or activity. The model is prepared from a systematic examina-
tion of communications content and patterns, the functions they reflect, and
the communications security measures applied.
communications security (COMSEC) Measures and controls taken to deny
unauthorized individuals information derived from telecommunications and
to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications. Communications
security includes cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security,
and physical security of COMSEC material.
community risk Probability that a particular vulnerability will be exploited
within an interacting population and adversely impact some members of that
population.
compartmentalization A nonhierarchical grouping of sensitive information
used to control access to data more finely than with hierarchical security clas-
sification alone.
compartmented mode Mode of operation wherein each user with direct or
indirect access to a system, its peripherals, remote terminals, or remote hosts
has all of the following: (a) valid security clearance for the most restricted
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Part III ✦ Appendices
information processed in the system; (b) formal access approval and signed
nondisclosure agreements for that information which a user is to have access;
and (c) valid need-to-know for information which a user is to have access.
compromise Type of incident where information is disclosed to unauthorized
individuals or a violation of the security policy of a system in which unautho-
rized intentional or unintentional disclosure, modification, destruction, or
loss of an object may have occurred.
compromising emanations Unintentional signals that, if intercepted and ana-
lyzed, would disclose the information transmitted, received, handled, or oth-
erwise processed by information systems equipment. See TEMPEST.
computer abuse Intentional or reckless misuse, alteration, disruption, or
destruction of information processing resources.
computer cryptography Use of a crypto-algorithm program by a computer to
authenticate or encrypt/decrypt information.
computer security Measures and controls that ensure confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of IS assets including hardware, software, firmware,
and information being processed, stored, and communicated.
computer security incident See incident.
computer security subsystem Hardware/software designed to provide com-
puter security features in a larger system environment.
computing environment Workstation or server (host) and its operating sys-
tem, peripherals, and applications.
COMSEC account Administrative entity, identified by an account number,
used to maintain accountability, custody, and control of COMSEC material.
COMSEC account audit Examination of the holdings, records, and procedures
of a COMSEC account ensuring all accountable COMSEC material is properly
handled and safeguarded.
COMSEC aid COMSEC material that assists in securing telecommunications
and is required in the production, operation, or maintenance of COMSEC sys-

tems and their components. COMSEC keying material, callsign/frequency sys-
tems, and supporting documentation, such as operating and maintenance
manuals, are examples of COMSEC aids.
COMSEC boundary Definable perimeter encompassing all hardware,
firmware, and software components performing critical COMSEC functions,
such as key generation and key handling and storage.
COMSEC chip set Collection of NSA approved microchips.
COMSEC control program Computer instructions or routines controlling or
affecting the externally performed functions of key generation, key distribu-
tion, message encryption/decryption, or authentication.
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Appendix F ✦ National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary
941
COMSEC custodian Individual designated by proper authority to be responsi-
ble for the receipt, transfer, accounting, safeguarding, and destruction of
COMSEC material assigned to a COMSEC account.
COMSEC end-item Equipment or combination of components ready for use in
a COMSEC application.
COMSEC equipment Equipment designed to provide security to telecommuni-
cations by converting information to a form unintelligible to an unauthorized
interceptor and, subsequently, by reconverting such information to its origi-
nal form for authorized recipients; also, equipment designed specifically to
aid in, or as an essential element of, the conversion process. COMSEC equip-
ment includes crypto-equipment, crypto-ancillary equipment, cryptoproduc-
tion equipment, and authentication equipment.
COMSEC facility Authorized and approved space used for generating, storing,
repairing, or using COMSEC material.
COMSEC incident See incident.
COMSEC insecurity COMSEC incident that has been investigated, evaluated,
and determined to jeopardize the security of COMSEC material or the secure

transmission of information.
COMSEC manager Individual who manages the COMSEC resources of an
organization.
COMSEC material Item designed to secure or authenticate telecommunica-
tions. COMSEC material includes, but is not limited to key, equipment,
devices, documents, firmware, or software that embodies or describes crypto-
graphic logic and other items that perform COMSEC functions.
COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS) Logistics and accounting system
through which COMSEC material marked “CRYPTO” is distributed, controlled,
and safeguarded. Included are the COMSEC central offices of record, cryptolo-
gistic depots, and COMSEC accounts. COMSEC material other than key may be
handled through the CMCS.
COMSEC modification See information systems security equipment modification.
COMSEC module Removable component that performs COMSEC functions in
a telecommunications equipment or system.
COMSEC monitoring Act of listening to, copying, or recording transmissions
of one’s own official telecommunications to analyze the degree of security.
COMSEC profile Statement of COMSEC measures and materials used to pro-
tect a given operation, system, or organization.
COMSEC survey Organized collection of COMSEC and communications infor-
mation relative to a given operation, system, or organization.
COMSEC system data Information required by a COMSEC equipment or sys-
tem to enable it to properly handle and control key.
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Part III ✦ Appendices
COMSEC training Teaching of skills relating to COMSEC accounting, use of
COMSEC aids, or installation, use, maintenance, and repair of COMSEC
equipment.
concept of operations (CONOP) Document detailing the method, act, process,

or effect of using an IS.
confidentiality Assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized
individuals, processes, or devices.
configuration control Process of controlling modifications to hardware,
firmware, software, and documentation to ensure the IS is protected against
improper modifications prior to, during, and after system implementation.
configuration management Management of security features and assurances
through control of changes made to hardware, software, firmware, documenta-
tion, test, test fixtures, and test documentation throughout the life cycle of an IS.
confinement channel See covert channel.
confinement property (C.F.D.) Synonymous with star (*) property.
contamination Type of incident involving the introduction of data of one secu-
rity classification or security category into data of a lower security classifica-
tion or different security category.
contingency key Key held for use under specific operational conditions or in
support of specific contingency plans.
contingency plan Plan (C.F.D.) maintained for emergency response, backup
operations, and post-disaster recovery for an IS, to ensure the availability of
critical resources and to facilitate the continuity of operations in an emer-
gency situation.
continuity of operations plan (COOP) Plan for continuing an organization’s
(usually a headquarters element) essential functions at an alternate site and
performing those functions for the duration of an event with little or no loss of
continuity before returning to normal operations.
controlled access protection The C2 level of protection described in the
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (Orange Book). Its major char-
acteristics are: individual accountability, audit, access control, and object
reuse. These characteristics will be embodied in the NSA produced,
Controlled Access Protection Profile (and its related follow-on profiles).
controlled cryptographic item (CCI) Secure telecommunications or informa-

tion handling equipment, or associated cryptographic component, that is
unclassified but governed by a special set of control requirements. Such items
are marked “CONTROLLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ITEM” or, where space is lim-
ited, “CCI.”
controlled interface Mechanism that facilitates the adjudication of different
interconnected system security policies (e.g., controlling the flow of informa-
tion into or out of an interconnected system).
controlled security mode (C.F.D.) See multilevel security.
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Appendix F ✦ National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary
943
controlled sharing (C.F.D.) Condition existing when access control is applied
to all users and components of an IS.
controlled space Three-dimensional space surrounding IS equipment, within
which unauthorized individuals are denied unrestricted access and are either
escorted by authorized individuals or are under continuous physical or elec-
tronic surveillance.
controlling authority Official responsible for directing the operation of a
cryptonet and for managing the operational use and control of keying material
assigned to the cryptonet.
cooperative key generation Electronically exchanging functions of locally
generated, random components, from which both terminals of a secure circuit
construct traffic encryption key or key encryption key for use on that circuit.
cooperative remote rekeying Synonymous with manual remote rekeying.
correctness proof A mathematical proof of consistency between a specifica-
tion and its implementation.
countermeasure Action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure that
reduces the vulnerability of an IS.
covert channel Unintended and/or unauthorized communications path that
can be used to transfer information in a manner that violates an IS security

policy. See overt channel and exploitable channel.
covert channel analysis Determination of the extent to which the security
policy model and subsequent lower-level program descriptions may allow
unauthorized access to information.
covert storage channel Covert channel involving the direct or indirect writing
to a storage location by one process and the direct or indirect reading of the
storage location by another process. Covert storage channels typically
involve a finite resource (e.g., sectors on a disk) that is shared by two sub-
jects at different security levels.
covert timing channel Covert channel in which one process signals informa-
tion to another process by modulating its own use of system resources (e.g.,
central processing unit time) in such a way that this manipulation affects the
real response time observed by the second process.
credentials Information, passed from one entity to another, used to establish
the sending entity’s access rights.
critical infrastructures Those physical and cyber-based systems essential to
the minimum operations of the economy and government.
cryptanalysis Operations performed in converting encrypted messages to
plain text without initial knowledge of the crypto-algorithm and/or key
employed in the encryption.
CRYPTO Marking or designator identifying COMSEC keying material used to
secure or authenticate telecommunications carrying classified or sensitive
U.S. Government or U.S. Government-derived information.
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Part III ✦ Appendices
crypto-alarm Circuit or device that detects failures or aberrations in the logic
or operation of crypto-equipment. Crypto-alarm may inhibit transmission or
may provide a visible and/or audible alarm.
crypto-algorithm Well-defined procedure or sequence of rules or steps, or a

series of mathematical equations used to describe cryptographic processes
such as encryption/decryption, key generation, authentication, signatures,
etc.
crypto-ancillary equipment Equipment designed specifically to facilitate effi-
cient or reliable operation of crypto-equipment, without performing crypto-
graphic functions itself.
crypto-equipment Equipment that embodies a cryptographic logic.
cryptographic Pertaining to, or concerned with, cryptography.
cryptographic component Hardware or firmware embodiment of the crypto-
graphic logic. A cryptographic component may be a modular assembly, a
printed wiring assembly, a microcircuit, or a combination of these items.
cryptographic equipment room (CER) Controlled-access room in which cryp-
tosystems are located.
cryptographic initialization Function used to set the state of a cryptographic
logic prior to key generation, encryption, or other operating mode.
cryptographic logic The embodiment of one (or more) crypto-algorithm(s)
along with alarms, checks, and other processes essential to effective and
secure performance of the cryptographic process(es).
cryptographic randomization Function that randomly determines the trans-
mit state of a cryptographic logic.
cryptography Art or science concerning the principles, means, and methods
for rendering plain information unintelligible and for restoring encrypted
information to intelligible form.
crypto-ignition key (CIK) Device or electronic key used to unlock the secure
mode of crypto-equipment.
cryptology Field encompassing both cryptography and cryptanalysis.
cryptonet Stations holding a common key.
cryptoperiod Time span during which each key setting remains in effect.
cryptosecurity Component of COMSEC resulting from the provision of techni-
cally sound cryptosystems and their proper use.

cryptosynchronization Process by which a receiving decrypting crypto-
graphic logic attains the same internal state as the transmitting encrypting
logic.
cryptosystem Associated INFOSEC items interacting to provide a single means
of encryption or decryption.