CoRRuptIon, Global SECuRIty phần 7 potx

family, community, or political connections will give them the inside track.
People share a sense that corruption has perpetuated poverty in a land of wealth,
and that only the rich get richer. Nonetheless, everyone aspires to be rich.
Although Nigerians recognize and condemn, in the abstract, the patronage
system that dominates the allocation of government resources, in practice
people feel trapped. A university professor, and friend, who was appointed as
state commissioner of agriculture, explained corruption to me in this way:
“Even if I wanted to avoid the practice of awarding contracts on the basis of
favoritism, I could not. My people would say that I am selfish and foolish.Who
gets to such a position of power and then refuses to help his people? Only the
worst kind of person.” A man who enriches himself through emptying gov-
ernment coffers is, in his community, despised only if he fails to share that
wealth with his people—through direct gifts to individuals and community
development projects, but also through more ceremonial distributions such
as lavish weddings for his children, spectacular burials for his parents, and
extravagant chieftancy installation ceremonies for himself. At such events his
people enjoy his wealth; they “chop” (eat) his money.
Although their wealth must be shared, the pressure on big men to be cor-
rupt goes beyond awarding contracts to their relatives and cronies. One also
enriches oneself. To be a commissioner and not build a palatial house in the
village would be to fail to fulfill the expectations of one’s family and commu-
nity. A big man in government or business can only distribute to and share
with relatively few people the fruits of his office through official channels,
but there are additional expectations that he should accumulate significant
personal wealth—wealth that one’s kinsmen and townsmen feel entitled to
draw upon.
30
The case studies of the awarding of contracts that are detailed below illus-
trate the ways in which local moralities intersect with state politics to create and
reproduce a political economy grounded in patron-clientism. These examples
involve relatively small-sized patrons and smaller-sized clients to support the

overall argument that corruption is sustained precisely because people at all
strata in Nigeria are invested in and, in some measure, benefit from the accu-
mulation and distribution of public resources through informal private net-
works. The cases also highlight the importance of personal relationships, espe-
cially kin relationships, in negotiating a system in which patron-client ties
become less dependable as social connections grow more distant.
case study 2. Ike Nwodu is a married father of five who lives in Umuahia.
One of his relatives directed the World Bank–funded Abia State Agricul-
tural Development Programme from 1994 to 1995 and Ike was awarded a
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substantial contract—about 4 million naira (almost $50,000)—to supply
locally fabricated machinery for palm kernel processing. Ike estimated that he
would make close to a 500,000 naira profit ($6,250) for himself at the end of
the contract, after supplying the equipment and giving his relative his share.
In Ike’s case, his relative, the director, would receive about 400,000 naira.
Igbos often spoke of “the 10 percent rule”—meaning that one is expected to
give back 10 percent of the total amount of any contract to the person(s) who
awarded it. In the 1990s, people began to complain that commissioners, direc-
tor-generals, directors, and military administrators were demanding more
than the customary 10 percent. One military administrator in Abia State
earned the dubious nickname “Where My Own?” for his incessant demands
for his share.
In response to widespread evidence that its funds were being misused, the
World Bank ordered a probe of many of its projects and imposed a freeze on
payments to all contractors. Ike had supplied the equipment and used his
initial “mobilization fee” (money awarded, in theory, to help the contractor
with start-up costs) to pay off his relative. At the time that the World Bank
stipulated these investigations or freezes, Ike was waiting for the final payment
to repay debts to his own suppliers and pocket his profit.

As a result of the probe, Ike’s relative was fired and a new director was
appointed. When the World Bank finally lifted the freeze on payment of out-
standing debts to contractors and Ike went to collect, he found that the new
director wanted his own share in order to authorize disbursement. The delay
imposed by the World Bank had caused his own creditors to become annoyed,
and this change in directors meant that almost all of Ike’s profit was drained
to pay off the new man. Ike vowed never again to seek a contract from an
internationally funded project.
case study 3. Godwin Okoro is in his late 40s, married with five children.
Godwin is popularly known as “World Biz”—short for World Business—
among his friends, a praise name coined during his past as a wealthier man.
He hails from a local government area (similar to a county) that is the home
of a former civilian governor. World Biz is married to a woman from the for-
mer governor’s family, and during the former governor’s tenure, World Biz
parlayed his in-law relationship into a series of lucrative contracts.
Times became leaner during the military regime. His patron was long out
of power. World Biz did not have a job, but still managed to make a living
through small contracts. In 1996, World Biz campaigned for a particular
candidate in his local government chairmanship elections. He borrowed
money from me and others, assuring us that when his candidate won he
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would “be in money.” He expected lucrative contracts in return for his mobi-
lization of followers.
His candidate won the election, but for months afterward World Biz com-
plained that the man was ungrateful. He made frequent visits to the chair-
man’s office in hopes of a business deal. But the chairman refused, complain-
ing about lack of funds, debts to pay that had been inherited from the last
government, and increased state and federal scrutiny of local government
spending. At first World Biz accepted the excuses and maintained hope. Even-

tually he concluded that the chairman had no intention of rewarding him. The
chairman was an ingrate, World Biz said, and he did not “know politics.”
Within a few months the military again dissolved the local government coun-
cils. The chairman was out of office. Only weeks after that he died unexpect-
edly of a heart attack. World Biz said it was God’s way of punishing him.
World Biz’s expectation that he be rewarded was directly related to the fact
that he had “delivered his people” in the chairmanship election. Given World
Biz’s propensity to exaggerate on his own behalf, there is no way of knowing
how instrumental he was in securing the chairman’s election. Regardless,
World Biz had called upon a widely shared value in Nigerian politics that a
man should be rewarded for delivering his people.
While there is no doubt that elite Nigerians disproportionally benefit from
the country’s current political and economic structures, these structures are
sustainable only because they are supported by a complex moral economy in
which those at the top fulfill obligations and duties to their followers and
clients. In the first case, Ike’s kinship tie was crucial for securing the govern-
ment contract. When his relative was dismissed, Ike’s contract was compro-
mised. World Biz’s experience with his local government chairman illustrates
that patrons and clients do not always agree on the extent of obligations.
World Biz’s interpretation of the chairman’s death demonstrates the strong
belief in the moral economy of patron-clientism. That his marital ties to the
last civilian governor proved more beneficial than the political ties to the
elected official shows that one can be secure in ties created through marriage
and kinship, more so than in those produced purely through political
alliances.
Good Corruption and Bad Corruption
The community development union is perhaps the most important formal
mechanism by which the Igbo-speaking people of southeastern Nigeria (par-
ticularly those who have migrated away from their rural villages) “deliver”or
“share” the fruits of success with their kin and their communities of origin.

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The importance of these unions in tying migrants to their natal communities
and bringing material benefits to rural villages is well-documented.
31
These
voluntary organizations, with ascriptive membership bases, focus their ener-
gies on developing or “getting up” rural communities.
32
Migrants who accu-
mulate wealth in their endeavors away from the village are expected to con-
tribute significantly to development efforts at home. Of course, wealthy “sons
abroad”do not act purely out of loyalty to their natal communities; in the act
of contributing they build their networks of clients and enhance their pres-
tige. In the context of contemporary Nigerian politics, such ties and bases of
support are essential to achieve political power. These dynamics contribute to
the tremendous importance of place of origin in Nigerian politics.
33
Processes of securing and delivering resources to rural communities
through community development unions illustrate the shifting and situa-
tional definitions of corruption in the minds of Nigerians. The dynamics that
underlie these unions also illustrate the processes by which common people
put pressures on their successful kin that contribute to corruption. The fol-
lowing case study depicts the nature of such pressures and shows how differ-
ently corruption is judged depending on the context in which it occurs.
case study 4. Odi Nwoke was in his twenties when he first migrated from
Ubakala to Lagos before the Nigerian civil war. He built a successful printing
business and over the years had become rich. Like most of Ubakala’s success-
ful migrants, he built a house in his village and came home several times a year
to visit family and participate in important social events and ceremonies. He

maintained active membership in the Ubakala Improvement Union and con-
tributed to community development projects.
In the early 1990s, during one of the several transitions from military to
civilian rule, a political patron who Odi had cultivated over the years selected
Odi for a directorship in an Abia State government parastatal (an institution
set up by government that is ostensibly independent from the government).
This position enabled Odi to disperse significant business contracts and build
his own fortune. At home in Ubakala, his appointment was celebrated and
during his brief tenure of eighteen months Odi managed to enhance his posi-
tion significantly in Ubakala through awarding favors, increasing his contri-
butions to the Ubakala Improvement Union, and hosting lavish social cere-
monies to which his kin and neighbors were invited.
In 1996, Odi left Lagos and retired to Ubakala. In part as a reward for his
contributions to the community, he was voted in as an officer of the Ubakala
Improvement Union. Immediately following Odi’s election, Ubakala went
through a period of political upheaval over the selection of a traditional ruler,
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or eze. Efforts to control the Ubakala Improvement Union were central in this
political fight. Several months after his election, rivals accused Odi of misus-
ing the union’s funds. His accusers demanded that he be removed from office.
Judgments about whether Odi had misused union funds fell largely along
lines of political cleavage in the community, but no one disputed that misus-
ing union funds was a grievous offense. Odi had been celebrated and rewarded
for the benefits that he delivered to the community through his position with
the parastatal, even though most people assumed that resources had been
accumulated through diverting “public funds” for “private use.” Money
allegedly stolen from the Ubakala Improvement Union, on the other hand,
brought great condemnation and was used as a political weapon against Odi
and his allies. In these two instances, the contrast in how Odi’s corrupt behav-

ior was judged illustrates the importance of social context in Nigerians’ per-
ceptions of the relationship between morality and corruption.
419: Corruption, Deception, and Social Morality
Despite the continued prevalence of ordinary Nigerians’participation in cor-
ruption and the pragmatic role that various corrupt practices play in how
Nigerian citizens navigate the challenges of contemporary life, many forms of
corruption are perceived as illegitimate. As indicated in Odi’s case, similar
instances of corruption can be accepted or condemned based on a person’s
social position (e.g., beneficiary or victim; distant observer or interested
party). If “the Nigerian factor” is corruption, the primary mode of illegitimate
corruption in Nigeria is “419.” Named after the number in the Nigerian penal
code for a specific form of fraud, 419 (pronounced four-one-nine) emerged
in the 1980s during Nigeria’s economic decline, when the country fell from the
heights of the worldwide oil boom into a political and economic morass
marked by military dictatorships, inflation, a rapidly devaluing currency, and
widespread poverty and unemployment.
34
The original meaning of 419 is
linked to a particular practice in which the perpetrators sent letters and faxes
that relied on the symbols of Nigeria’s petroleum-dominated political econ-
omy—official letterhead and signatures, Nigerian National Petroleum Cor-
poration insignia, lines of credit, government contracts, etc.—to bait largely
foreign targets into providing advance fees with the promise of a larger pay-
off. The scams relied not only on the trappings of the Nigerian state, but also
its reputation for corruption, enticing people with the expectation that some
of the millions of dollars siphoned off by corrupt officials could be obtained
simply by providing a foreign bank account and advance fees. Apter has
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cogently described how 419 emerged as Nigerians became disillusioned with

the state at the same time that the state itself, no longer awash in oil money,
relied on the politics of illusion to maintain its eroding legitimacy.
35
The original 419 scams have continued to flourish; they have even increased
and expanded as the Internet has democratized access to technology during the
same period as Nigeria’s transition to democratic governance after many years
of military rule. Even more significant than the continued practice of 419
scams through e-mail is that 419 has become an all-encompassing signifier in
Nigerian discourse for any behavior that relies on dissimulation, illusion, or
some other manipulation of the truth to facilitate gain or advantage. Indeed,
nothing better illustrates the Nigerian definition of illegitimate corruption
than the spectrum of activities and behaviors that are described as 419.
During my fieldwork in 2004, the Nigerian Labour Congress, an umbrella
organization that represents many trade unions, called a national strike to
protest government efforts to deregulate the price of gasoline, kerosene, and
diesel, a policy that would result in significant increases in the cost of Nige-
ria’s highly subsidized domestic fuel. National strikes over fuel prices have
been common in Nigeria’s recent history.
36
The strike in 2004 was widely
observed, and after several days, during which the nation’s economy was
largely shut down, the government was forced to compromise, still raising fuel
prices but keeping them well below the deregulated levels that had been pro-
posed. In the period during and after the strike, the issue of corruption in
Nigeria’s oil economy, always a popular topic, reached its peak in everyday
conversations.
Nigerians commonly believe that cheap domestic fuel is a national
birthright, perceived as one of the few benefits that an otherwise corrupt and
ineffectual government ought to be able to deliver to the masses in Africa’s oil-
producing giant. In one of the great ironies and tragic symbols of Nigerian

underdevelopment, during the Obasanjo regime, from 1999 to 2003, Nigeria
imported nearly all of its refined fuel from overseas, as the country’s four
broken-down oil refineries remained non-functional despite numerous huge
government contracts to repair them. The popular belief, voiced in the idiom
of 419, was that the country’s political elite, led by the president, deliberately
kept the country’s refineries from being repaired so that they could profit
from controlling the importation and distribution of fuel. One account of the
domestic fuel situation, provided by a friend during a conversation as we
waited in line for fuel at a crowded petrol station after the 2004 strike was
called off, illustrates a widely held view:
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[President] Obasanjo is just playing us 419. Government could easily
repair the refineries but they leave them failing on purpose. I mean, in
this country, with the billions generated from oil revenues, are you
telling me that for several years they cannot even repair one refinery? No
way. Obasanjo and the ex-military boys, they want it this way. They
control the importation of fuel from abroad. They own the ships, the
local marketing companies, the petrol stations. I understand some of
them have even built refineries abroad. Can you imagine? While our
refineries rot they have built their own abroad to profit from our suf-
fering. It is not enough that they steal the oil revenues. They also sell our
oil back to us at a profit. No. It’s 419, it’s 419.
Whether or not this account is entirely factual, it represents a common
awareness that elites are getting rich at the expense of the masses and that
419—here, illusion created through deception—is the central strategy. While
most people see elites as the biggest perpetrators of 419, people also share a
common belief that 419 has filtered throughout Nigerian society, a perception
illustrated in the discourse resulting from the fuel strike. For example, pro-
prietors of local filling stations were accused of 419 for hoarding fuel as the

strike approached, pretending that their stocks had run out in anticipation of
higher prices after the strike. Even the urban street urchins who sell black
market fuel in plastic jugs at the roadside when gasoline is scarce are accused
of 419 because motorists suspect that they mix cheaper kerosene with more
expensive gasoline to increase their small profits.
Implied in many common popular critiques of 419 is an understanding
that politicians use the state to deceive ordinary people for the benefit of
elites. Indeed, politics is perceived to be a primary arena for 419. Over the
years Nigerians have realized that various programs implemented by military
governments as part of the promise to return the country to civilian rule were
elaborate ruses. No example is more telling than the 1993 presidential elec-
tion, when then military dictator Ibrahim Babangida ultimately annulled
the vote after dragging the country through an artificial process in which the
military directed every step of the transition, including the creation of polit-
ical parties, the writing of their manifestos, and the determination of eligi-
ble candidates. Babangida’s cancellation of the election just days after the
vote, which led to five more years of brutal dictatorship under Abacha, was
viewed by many Nigerians as the ultimate 419, committed by the Nigerian
leader who was most associated with the term.
37
Political 419 has not been the
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exclusive province of the military, however. The elections in 2003, conducted
by a democratically elected government, were widely viewed as 419 by Nige-
rians who saw the huge victories for President Obasanjo’s ruling People’s
Democratic Party as a process of elite-driven selection masquerading as a
democratic election.
The concept and practices of 419 have extended to multiple spheres of
contemporary life in Nigeria. Any new visitor to the country is bound to

notice that literally thousands of houses and buildings in cities and towns
across the country bear the message “This House Is Not for Sale.” Ask any
Nigerian the purpose of this message and he or she will tell you that it is to
prevent 419. One popular form of 419 is to assume the identity of a real estate
agent or a property owner trying to sell his house. In Nigeria’s cities and
towns, where the real estate market is tight, buyers can be induced to make
down payments to secure a later purchase, and in some cases entire transac-
tions have been completed before the buyer discovered that the deal was a
scam. In Nigeria there is always the added fear that even if a house has been
sold in a scam one might still lose it if the buyer has more money or better
political connections than the owner.
Four-one-nine appears in contexts where one might not expect it to;
indeed, that it does so is part of the reason that it is successful. When I first
lived in Nigeria, young men in Lagos sometimes stood on the side of the road
signaling to drivers that something was wrong underneath the drivers’ cars. If
a driver stopped, the man that had flagged him or her down would offer to
check under the car, quickly creating a real problem that only a mechanic—
his co-conspirator—could fix.
On a bus ride that I once took between cities in Nigeria, a passenger asked
that we all pray for Jesus’“journey mercies,” a practice common in the heav-
ily Christian south. Indeed, buses are a popular venue for evangelism and I
braced myself for proselytizing. But the man quickly shifted from talk of God
to talk of illness and medicine, explaining that he was a renowned healer and
that he had brought his medicines on board to help his companions on the
journey. He explained that his plastic bottles full of red liquid treated malaria
and typhoid and that the ones with yellow liquid treated an assortment of
“woman problems” such as irregular menses and infertility; he even had dif-
ferent powders for toothaches and foot odor. Each time that he introduced a
new medicine a man in the back of the bus shouted that he wanted it and
asked the price. He paid enthusiastically and was given his medicine. Eventu-

ally, a few other passengers bought some too.After several stops the medicine
peddler disembarked, presumably to continue his sales on a bus going the
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other way. His main customer also left at the same stop. Once they exited, the
woman sitting beside me turned toward me and said, as I had been thinking,
“It’s 419. The fellow at the back eagerly buying all the medicine is his partner.”
She paused and added, with a sigh, “Nigeria ”
Corruption and Its Discontents
Nigerians’ sense that their state and society have become increasingly
amoral—with elites pursuing wealth and power without regard for the con-
sequences, and ordinary people seeking money by all means available simply
to survive—contributes to a popular perception that law and order have given
way to rampant corruption at every level. The concept of 419 and the breadth
with which it is applied across social domains represent this collective con-
clusion that the country has spiraled out of control. The Pidgin English phrase
Nigeria na war-o (Nigeria is a war) has become one of the most common
expressions in everyday speech. No external critics are as harsh in the evalu-
ation of Nigerian society as are Nigerians.
Nonetheless, implicit in Nigerians’ anger and frustration about corrup-
tion is the recognition that matters could be and should be different. The
perception of 419 as amoral is rooted in strong expectations about social
morality, based, in part, on a traditional moral economy wherein reciprocity,
kinship, and personal allegiance dictate forms of sociability and social obli-
gation in which the welfare of others is privileged over individual interests. Or
perhaps more accurately, individual interests are tied to protecting the welfare
of others. In many ways, this moral economy remains powerful in contem-
porary Nigeria and even contributes to forms of “corruption” that Nigerians
see as more or less legitimate. In some situations, Nigerians’ discontents are
projected backward to better times, in a nostalgia for an idealized past. But in

their frustrations over the current state of affairs, many people also look for-
ward to anticipated transformations. The ideals of democracy and develop-
ment promulgated by the post-colonial state increasingly influence expecta-
tions about social morality. Concepts of probity and official accountability are
fertilized even in a setting where they are frequently deployed duplicitously.
It is absolutely essential to recognize that Nigerians are ambivalent about
corruption. Their acute dissatisfaction with the most amoral forms of cor-
ruption, commonly glossed as 419, is produced in relation to experiences with
institutions and forms of human relationship that are not corrupt. Whether it
is trusted friendships and family ties, upright and generous religious congre-
gations and fellowship groups, or networks of informal business relationships
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that cooperate effectively based on high degrees of trust and internal self-reg-
ulation, all Nigerians have experiences with social forms that are honest and
scrupulous. Even in the realm of formal institutions associated with the state,
examples of people and organizations with a reputation for integrity are well
known. Understanding these social currents that push against corruption is as
important as explaining those that facilitate corruption.
Conclusion
Distortions are created and inequalities perpetuated when corruption in Nige-
ria is explained based on reified and simplistic notions of African culture.
Such conceptions should be strongly contested. But it is irresponsible, both
from a political and a scholarly point of view, to shrink from confronting the
troubling conclusions about the relationship between corruption and culture
that are evident in this ethnographic account. It is impossible to absorb the
prevalence of corruption and the discontent that it produces in Nigeria with-
out concluding that corruption has become heavily implicated in Nigerians’
views of their culture.
Nigerians’ ambivalence about corruption is explained by the realities that

they face. To the extent that ordinary Nigerians are participants in corruption,
as well as critics and victims, it is because they are pragmatic: the stakes for indi-
viduals in Nigeria are tied ideologically and materially to the social groups to
which they belong. Thus, when individuals make choices that one might
describe in terms of corruption, they do so with a sense that their own failures
to acquire resources will drag others down, and with the knowledge that their
own success will be evaluated in terms of its contribution to the larger group.
Further, people are well aware of the intense scrutiny that they face from their
families, communities, and other associates. When Nigerians speak of “the
Nigerian factor,”they are referring not only to corruption per se, but also to the
pragmatic choices that individuals must make in the context of their obligations
to deliver to their people whatever share of the national cake they can capture.
From this perspective, corruption does not appear so detrimental, and,
indeed, if this were all there was to corruption, perhaps Nigerians would be
much less discontented than they are. But as the concept of 419 suggests, cor-
ruption in contemporary Nigeria has far exceeded the boundaries that can be
explained by ties of kinship, obligations of patronage, and duties to the com-
munities and groups to which an individual belongs. Because 419 relies on
deceptions that manipulate the facades of the state, the trappings of develop-
ment and democracy, and the symbols of modernity, 419 stands for people’s
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dissatisfaction with precisely these aspects of contemporary life in post-
colonial Nigeria. As the institutions of kinship and patron-clientism have
become increasingly stretched and strained with the rise of the state as the pri-
mary locus of national patrimony, and as people can no longer reliably
depend upon reciprocity and sharing to deliver what they need, practices of
419 have become part of a pragmatic repertoire that large numbers of Nige-
rians use to exploit the contemporary political economic landscape. To ordi-
nary Nigerians, the most troubling implication of “the Nigerian factor”is that

419 has become a way of life.
But the fact that most Nigerians are upset about, even obsessed with, the
prevalence of 419 in their society suggests that countervailing moralities and
life strategies are still dominant. The notion of 419 is an indigenous critique
of the forms of corruption that the vast majority of Nigerians reject. Unfor-
tunately, the degree to which ordinary Nigerians point fingers of accusation
inward, quickly suspecting each other of 419, also deflects attention from the
larger structural explanations for their suffering.
Notes
1. I lived in Nigeria for more than six years, and I have worked or conducted
fieldwork there for extended periods of time over the last nineteen years. From a per-
sonal point of view, I long felt that focusing on corruption stereotyped and oversim-
plified the lives of people that I knew and cared about. From an intellectual point of
view, I thought that writing about corruption ran the risk of perpetuating common
Western misrepresentations of Africa. These issues remain of great concern to me.
2. I examined corruption in Nigeria in a recent book, A Culture of Corruption:
Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (Princeton, 2007). Many of the
ethnographic examples in this chapter draw on material from this monograph. In addi-
tion to addressing the paradoxes of popular participation in corruption, the book
explores the social consequences of popular discontent about corruption, arguing that
this discontent helps explain many significant contemporary social trends in Nigeria.
3. Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London,
1993); Giorgio Blundo and Jean Pierre Olivier de Sardan,“La Corruption Quotidienne
en Afrique de l’Ouest,” Politique Africaine, LXXXIII (2001), 8–37; Patrick Chabal and
Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Bloomington, 1999);
Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the
Second Republic (New York, 1987); Jean Pierre Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy
of Corruption in Africa?” The Journal of Modern African Studies, XXXVII (1999), 25–52.
4. Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical State-
ment,” Comparative Journal of Society and History, XVII (1975), 91–112.

Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria 307
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5. Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (London, 1983), 2.
6. Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?” 29.
7. Bayart, The State in Africa, 87.
8. Ekeh,“Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa”; Bayart, The State in Africa.
9. Ibid.; Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria; Charles Nelson,“PAT
101: Principles of Patronage,” Issues: A Journal of Opinion, XXIV (1996), 45–51.
10. Warren d’Azevedo, “Common Principles and Variant Kinship Structures
Among the Gola of Western Liberia,”American Anthropologist, LXIV (1962), 404–420.
11. Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?” 41.
12. Andrew Apter, The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in Nige-
ria (Chicago, 2005); Michael Watts,“The Shock of Modernity: Petroleum, Protest and
Fast Capitalism in an Industrializing Society,” in Alan Pred and Michael Watts (eds.),
Reworking Modernity: Capitalisms and Symbolic Discontent (New Brunswick, 1992).
13. Apter, The Pan-African Nation; Watts, “The Shock of Modernity: Petroleum,
Protest and Fast Capitalism in an Industrializing Society”; Terry Lynn Karl, The Para-
dox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley, 1997).
14. Apter, The Pan-African Nation; Michael Watts,“Oil as Money: The Devil’s Excre-
ment and the Spectacle of Black Gold,” in R. Martin (ed.), Money, Power and Space
(Malden, 1994). For a similar analysis of Venezuela’s petro-state, see Fernando Coro-
nil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela (Chicago, 1997).
15. Bayart, The State in Africa, 89.
16. Ibid., 237.
17. See, for example, Arnold Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in
Comparative Analysis (New York, 1970).
18. Joseph Nye, “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost Benefit Analysis,”
American Political Science Review, LVI (1967), 419.
19. Ibid.
20. Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, “La Corruption Quotidienne en Afrique de

l’Ouest.”
21. Briefly, commission for illicit services refers to a user’s payment to officials who
then grant access to unwarranted advantages to a user. For example, a contractor
might provide money to a government official to ensure that he receives a job in a
process supposedly based on competitive bids, or an importer might pay a customs
official to underestimate the value of his goods to reduce a tariff. Unwarranted pay-
ment for public services involves an official forcing a user to pay for a service that is
ostensibly provided for free, or inflating the cost of a routine service. A gratuity is also
a kind of payment for services, but usually after the fact, and commonly couched in
the idiom of a “thank you.”
22. As I try to make clear, though, a dash is often a monetary symbol of a personal
or social relationship rather than the naked exchange of money for some (illegal or
improper) action or service, as is the case with a bribe.
23. Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, 1, 38. Italics in original.
308 Daniel Jordan Smith
11 0328-0 ch11.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 308
24. Nelson, “PAT 101: Principles of Patronage.”
25. All names in the case studies are pseudonyms.
26. As alluded to earlier in the text, from a Western viewpoint a dash appears to be
a euphemism for a bribe. Policemen ask for dashes at checkpoints; customs officers
expect them at the airport. But it can also simply be a gesture of generosity. An in-law
can be given a dash after a visit, or a poor gardener might get a dash from his wealthy
boss around Christmas-time.
27. Watts,“The Shock of Modernity: Petroleum, Protest and Fast Capitalism in an
Industrializing Society.”
28. Ibid., 36.
29. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria.
30. Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 42–43.
31. Josef Gugler, “The Son of the Hawk Does Not Remain Abroad: The Urban-
Rural Connection in Africa,” African Studies Review, XLV (2002), 21–41; Audrey

Smock, Ibo Politics: The Role of Ethnic Unions in Eastern Nigeria (Cambridge, MA,
1971); Victor Uchendu, The Igbo People of Southeast Nigeria (Fort Worth, 1965).
32. Uchendu, The Igbo People of Southeast Nigeria.
33. Smock, Igbo Politics; Peter Geschiere and Josef Gugler,“The Urban-Rural Con-
nection: Changing Issues of Belonging and Identification,” Africa, LXVIII (1998),
309–319.
34. Apter, The Pan African Nation; Watts, “The Shock of Modernity: Petroleum,
Protest and Fast Capitalism in an Industrializing Society.”
35. Apter, The Pan African Nation, 226–236.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 236–248; Larry Diamond, Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye
Oyediran, Transition without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida
(Boulder, 1997).
Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria 309
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310
The first paragraph of the Preamble to the United Nations Convention
against Corruption (UNCAC) declares the state parties’ concern “about the
seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and
security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy,
ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the
rule of law.”
1
Similarly, the Preamble to the Council of Europe Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption emphasizes that “corruption threatens the rule of
law, democracy and human rights, undermines good governance, fairness
and social justice, distorts competition, hinders economic development and
endangers the stability of democratic institutions and the moral foundations
of society.”
2

In other words, the international community recognizes that cor-
ruption directly threatens fundamental legal, as well as social, economic, and
political, principles. This realization is not new. In 1789, the Preamble to the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen stipulated that
“ignorance, oblivion, or contempt” of human rights “are the only causes of
public misfortunes” and government corruption.
3
It is intuitively and empirically plausible that there is a significant corre-
lation between low levels of development, human rights abuses, and the
spread of corruption.
4
How exactly this correlation is articulated is open to
empirical survey and further analytical inquiry, but this chapter argues that
the relationship between human rights and corruption is one that needs to
be understood from the perspective of the vulnerable and poor. The protec-
tion and empowerment of the vulnerable and disadvantaged is a core objec-
tive of a human rights approach, and, given the developmental objectives of
12
Corruption and Human Rights:
Exploring the Connection
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anti-corruption reforms, this objective is implicitly and explicitly central to
anti-corruption agendas. While in practice human rights and anti-corruption
approaches often operate in isolation from each other, both approaches
strengthen the understanding of the interdependencies between corruption,
discrimination, and accountability processes. One advantage of examining
the links between corruption and human rights is that human rights stan-
dards, as established in major international treaties, impose obligations upon
states. Focusing on specific human rights helps to identify who is entitled to

make claims when acts of corruption occur and who has a duty to take action
against corruption and protect those that are harmed by it.
As this chapter examines, in the case of Malawi, a human rights approach
may help to empower claim holders to demand their rights in relation to cor-
ruption. Such an approach can also assist states (including all branches of
government) and other public authorities to fulfill their human rights respon-
sibilities at every level. Linking human rights to corruption might also facili-
tate increased public support for anti-corruption strategies. Despite strong
rhetorical commitments to combat corruption, the political impact of anti-
corruption programs in Malawi has been low. To increase political support for
anti-corruption initiatives, it is necessary to build public pressure. Identifying
the specific links between corruption and human rights may persuade key
actors—public officials, parliamentarians, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, busi-
nesspeople, bankers, accountants, the media, and the general public—to take
a stronger stand against corruption.
This chapter does not assume that a human rights framework provides
the only or even the best tool of those that are available. Nonetheless, this
chapter analyzes the potential of the human rights framework to have a pos-
itive impact in certain areas that are key to anti-corruption reforms. Such a
framework amplifies and broadens accountability systems that are supported
by anti-corruption reforms. Ultimately, the aim of the chapter is to call for a
broader collaboration between the anti-corruption and human rights move-
ments. For this purpose, the chapter first outlines central cornerstones of
anti-corruption approaches. Second, the anti-corruption and human rights
framework in Malawi is explored for a better understanding of the measures
and issues that are facing countries and citizens. Last, the insights drawn from
the case of Malawi are discussed with regard to the potential for an anti-
corruption approach that is enriched with human rights principles and tools
to increase the inclusion and protection of discriminated, poor, and vulner-
able groups in anti-corruption reforms.

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An Anti-Corruption Perspective
In recent years, many different measures of corruption have been developed,
countering the myth that nothing can be done about corruption. In the fol-
lowing section, two different but highly influential international approaches
are outlined, followed by a discussion of the shortcomings of key anti-cor-
ruption reforms and the relevance of including a human rights perspective in
these reforms.
The International Anti-Corruption Framework
The problem of corruption has engaged the interest of national and interna-
tional communities for the last two decades. It has been put on center stage
by the development community, which has finally recognized that corruption
is a major obstacle to sustainable development and reform efforts. This recog-
nition is closely related to the emergence of the concept of (good) governance
(i.e., the role of capable, accountable, and effective public institutions to
deliver services to, respond to, and protect their citizens). Anti-corruption
efforts include a broad range of measures, the most important of which are
aimed at strengthening the rule of law; supporting meritocratic systems, eth-
ical values, and adequate pay within the civil service; establishing specialized
accountability agencies such as anti-corruption bodies to increase public
awareness and to prevent, as well as (sometimes) enforce, anti-corruption
principles; and, not least, generally fostering transparency and accountability
processes within and across all sectors of society. In many developing coun-
tries, concern with corruption has led to a wave of national anti-corruption
strategies, and on a regional and international level a host of conventions as
well as voluntary initiatives have emerged, each addressing one component or
several components of corruption.
5
The most significant of these initiatives is the United Nations Convention

against Corruption (UNCAC), which was adopted in 2003 and entered into
force in 2005. It has since been ratified by more than 120 countries. UNCAC
is the most extensive instrument against corruption, defining a wide range of
mandatory as well as voluntary principles of and best practices for anti-cor-
ruption. As an international treaty, it is evident that the state is the main sub-
ject of the duties and responsibilities that are outlined. However, UNCAC
makes clear that corruption needs to be addressed by all sectors, both nation-
ally and internationally, to support “the participation of society and reflect the
principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public
property, integrity, transparency and accountability.”
6
Major provisions regard
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the establishment of bodies responsible for coordinating preventive meas-
ures, efficient and accountable public sector management, civic participation,
and extending the criminalization of corrupt practices.
7
Recognizing the
capacity restraints of developing countries as well as the difficulties of tracing
corruption in a globalized world, UNCAC also underlines the importance of
international cooperation and information exchange in strengthening
national and international efforts against corruption. UNCAC has become the
most important internationally acknowledged frame of reference for best
practice for combating corruption and serves as a frame of reference for most,
if not all, contemporary, national anti-corruption strategies.
The most frequent critique raised against UNCAC is that many of its pro-
visions are voluntary, not mandatory. Moreover, there is no monitoring mech-
anism in place yet that assesses the degree of governmental compliance, which
makes it difficult for citizens to judge the extent of implementation. Tellingly,

though, throughout the whole document no human right is explicitly men-
tioned, although many of the articles deal with relevant provisions: cases in
point are the articles relating to public procurement and management of pub-
lic finances, access to information (named ‘public reporting’), or the partici-
pation of society.
8
National Integrity Systems
UNCAC managed to put corruption on the map of the international com-
munity by setting a comprehensive set of standards for anti-corruption
efforts. The anti-corruption measures anchored in UNCAC reflect the fact
that corruption is not a one-dimensional phenomenon, but that it needs to
be addressed by a variety of measures; such measures may be general in
nature, but they need to be adapted to the relative national context. The
importance of the institutional context for understanding and effectively
combating corruption is epitomized in the National Integrity System (NIS)
approach. The concept, coined by the most prominent non-governmental
organization (NGO) engaged in the fight against corruption, Transparency
International, stresses that the role of systemic reforms is to promote integrity,
transparency, and accountability and thus to prevent corruption.
The fundamental premise of the NIS approach is that high levels of cor-
ruption result from the promotion of private interests over the public inter-
est. In a society where power is monopolized, rules are at risk of being distorted
in the interest of those in power, and power-bearers are held less responsible
for their actions and decisions. In other words, the accountability mecha-
nisms intended to check the power of public officials are inadequate, leading
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to widespread corruption and the subversion of the public interest. The estab-
lishment of stronger horizontal accountability processes and a balanced con-
figuration of agencies and rules designed to check abuses of public power—

a National Integrity System—is seen as a key way to change such cultures of
corruption.
The NIS approach defines the most important “pillars” of integrity that
can be adapted to the specific institutional setting of any country. These pil-
lars include central public bodies, i.e., the executive, legislature, and judici-
ary; specific horizontal accountability bodies such as supreme audit institu-
tions or anti-corruption agencies; as well as the private sector and civil
society. The NIS seeks to conceptualize the interrelationships between
accountability mechanisms and provide a framework to assess the extent
and the causes of corruption and to profile systemic corruption risks in a
given country.
9
Potentially, the NIS country surveys can provide useful tools
for identifying entry-points for stakeholder dialogues about corruption or
prioritizing anti-corruption measures in a country. In practice, however,
they are underutilized by national and international actors, as they are too
general and of varying quality for practitioners and scholars. A further cri-
tique is that, as in the UNCAC, human rights do not feature explicitly any-
where in the source book, and only rarely are they mentioned in the indi-
vidual country surveys. This blind spot is highlighted by the fact that human
rights commissions are not mentioned among the key integrity pillars,
unlike, for instance, ombudsmen.
10
Accountability Systems in Anti-Corruption Strategies
As can be gleaned from the section above, the anti-corruption community
firmly promotes institutional and legal accountability mechanisms as keys to
preventing corruption. As dysfunctional public institutions and skewed power
relations are at the heart of corruption, accountability measures are aimed at
strengthening the public sector as well as making it more responsive by sup-
porting a coherent, comprehensive legal system; strong oversight institutions;

and the participation of civil society. Such measures can include provisions for
access to information, asset declaration or whistle-blowing; legal reforms such
as the introduction of anti-corruption legislation that makes specific corrupt
acts illegal and hence justiciable; or the establishment of new horizontal
accountability bodies such as an anti-corruption agency. These systems are
designed to safeguard the public interest and guarantee responsive public
institutions, and they require a strong rule of law, a sound institutional design,
as well as engaged citizens to sustain their vitality.
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However, these reforms have been heavily criticized for their top-down,
state-centered quality; they do not take into account the political context in
which they operate, which accounts for the uneven results of anti-corruption
reforms.
11
In other words, successful reforms may need to go beyond sound
institutional design; indeed, it can be argued that reform is a more intricate,
incremental, and complex process than is generally assumed. Corrupt prac-
tices are more than just a product of dysfunctional public institutions; they are
intimately intertwined with prevalent social practices, especially in the polit-
ical sphere: “[a]s an illicit form of social exchange, corruption is closely con-
nected with (and not always easily distinguishable from) other types of infor-
mal exchange engaged in by political actors.”
12
This insight is brought to life
by the ethnographic, bottom-up perspective on corruption in Nigeria pro-
vided in this volume by Smith, who illustrates “the complex ways in which
[corruption] is woven into the fabric of political and economic life—part
and parcel of both the maintenance of social inequality and the struggles to
respond to it.”

13
Institutional reform may be a necessary but not a sufficient
condition to change such exchange practices, to transform a culture of cor-
ruption into a culture of accountability.
The inclusion of a rights-based approach could prove useful to this trans-
formation process, as the language and tools of human rights focus both on
codified rights as well as on discriminatory and unequal social structures.
Although anti-corruption agendas are based on the assumption that the rule
of law and other formal accountability mechanisms will support a strong civil
society and, presumably, percolate down to the citizens’ level, there is no
explicit reference to human rights in key anti-corruption documents. The
NIS or UNCAC are cases in point.
14
This omission can be traced to the anti-
corruption community; both on an activist as well as on a policy-making
level this community does not conceive of human rights as instrumental in
the fight against corruption. If at all, human rights are seen to be an outcome,
not a method of anti-corruption intervention.
Malawi: Exploring the (Dis)junctures
The following section explores the anti-corruption and human rights frame-
work in Malawi, a country that faces many developmental challenges, and a
country that has endorsed a strong human rights framework as well as anti-
corruption measures. However, these efforts have yet to come to fruition. The
authors argue that neglecting to recognize and incorporate a human rights
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approach into the agendas of anti-corruption initiatives constitutes a serious
weakness of anti-corruption efforts, as the incorporation of a human rights
approach would enhance the spectrum and scope of accountability mecha-
nisms, thereby bringing both reforms closer to the people.

Malawi’s Commitments to Human Rights and Anti-Corruption
Malawi has voluntarily assumed several international obligations for the pro-
motion and protection of human rights. Malawi is a state party to the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and its
Optional Protocol, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
15
At the regional
level, Malawi has assumed obligations for economic, social, political, civil,
and cultural rights by ratifying the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.
16
All
of these human rights treaties impose on the state several obligations to
respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. Within the framework of these
treaties, Malawi is subject to several monitoring mechanisms. On the one
hand, there are the supervisory mechanisms of the UN treaties called “treaty
bodies”such as the Human Rights Committee; the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, as
well as several so-called charter-based mechanisms, which are supervisory
mechanisms that are not based on human rights treaties but rather on the UN
Charter.
17
Under the UN framework, the charter-based mechanisms include
the “Universal Periodic Review” (UPR) and the “special procedures,”which are
mechanisms of the Human Rights Council, which replaced the former Com-

mission on Human Rights.
18
On the other hand, Malawi is also subject to
regional human rights mechanisms such as the African Commission and
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
At the domestic level, the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi gives
great prominence to human rights. The constitution refers not only to civil and
political rights but also to economic, social, and cultural rights, and the right
to development.
19
For example, Article 30 prescribes that the state shall take all
necessary measures for the realization of the right to development. Such meas-
ures shall include, among others, equal opportunity for all in their access to
basic resources, education, health services, food, shelter, employment, and
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infrastructure.”
20
Under the “Principles of National Policy” (Article 13), the
state has an obligation to promote and protect the welfare of its citizens,
specifically in terms of gender equality, health, nutrition, the environment,
education, and the protection of various disadvantaged groups. Moreover,
under the same article, a paragraph is devoted to “Public Trust and Good
Governance,” underlining the importance of accountability and transparency
to foster trust in public institutions.
The constitution also establishes several important human rights bodies
such as a Human Rights Commission (Chapter XI), an Ombudsman (Chap-
ter X), and a National Compensation Tribunal (Chapter XIII). The “Malawi
Human Rights Commission” (MHRC), started in 1996, has a broad mandate
to promote and protect human rights.

21
According to the constitution, the
“Commission shall be competent in every respect to protect and promote
human rights in Malawi in the broadest sense possible and to investigate vio-
lations of human rights on its own motion or upon complaints received by
any person, class of persons or body.” The constitution gives the Human
Rights Commission broad powers to investigate human rights violations upon
its own initiative or upon complaints that it receives. The commissioners can
comment publicly on any human rights issue and make recommendations to
the executive and legislative branches. The Ombudsman is entrusted to inves-
tigate cases where it is alleged that a person has suffered an “injustice” and it
does not appear that there is an available remedy. The National Compensa-
tion Tribunal is mandated to investigate and take legal action against govern-
ment officials who are responsible for the abuses.
According to this constitutional framework, Malawi is equipped with an
extensive legal and institutional foundation that guarantees core political and
civil rights, as well as economic, social, and cultural human rights. Relevant
constitutional oversight bodies oversee the realization of these rights and
principles. The Republic of Malawi has also taken several measures to com-
bat corruption at the international and domestic level. The most important
one is, no doubt, the UNCAC, which Malawi signed in 2004 and ratified in
2007.
22
Malawi is also a member of the New African Partnership for Devel-
opment (NEPAD), which stipulates a wide range of principles for economic,
social, and political governance. More important, Malawi has also signed the
Memorandum of Understanding for the African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM), which assesses and supports the implementation of NEPAD’s pro-
visions. The APRM identifies corruption as a significant cross-cutting issue
and puts a strong emphasis on preventive measures.

23
At the domestic level,
the constitution considers transparency, accountability, personal integrity,
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and financial probity as “fundamental principles” and requires the “intro-
duc[tion] of measures which will guarantee accountability, transparency, per-
sonal integrity and financial probity and which by virtue of their effectiveness
and transparency will strengthen confidence in public institutions.” In con-
formity with these principles, the president gave his assent to the Corrupt
Practices Act in 1995, and Malawi established an Anti-Corruption Bureau in
1998.
24
The bureau is a government department and its director and deputy
director are appointed by the president. In addition, giving or receiving a
bribe—whether to or from a Malawian or to or from a foreign official—is a
crime under Section 90 of Malawi’s penal code.
Citizens’ Realities
In spite of Malawi’s commitment to both human rights and the prevention of
corruption on an international and domestic level, the social, political, and
economic realities of Malawi have yet to change significantly. Whereas Malawi
is ranked in the top quarter of sub-Saharan African countries in the Index of
African Governance, reflecting its strong institutional framework, according
to the 2007 Human Development Index, Malawi ranks 164th out of 177 coun-
tries. Malawi is considered one of the least developed countries, with relatively
weak state institutions, facing major development challenges. Corruption is
one of these challenges—Malawi ranked 115th out of 180 countries on the
2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with its score of 2.7, which
remained virtually unchanged from past years. This assessment is confirmed
by the World Bank Institute’s Governance Indicators, which, since 2003, has

ranked the control of corruption in Malawi just above the 25th percentile.
25
Therefore, in spite of an advanced constitution that has been in force for
fifteen years and a political agenda that emphasizes the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights and the fight against corruption, in practice, most cit-
izens remain disenfranchised and vulnerable to abuses of power by public
officials. Although some core dimensions of the National Policy Priorities
have certainly improved over the last decade, most citizens still do not have
access to adequate nutrition, health, or education. The rural standard of liv-
ing, which is postulated as a key success indicator of government policies in
the constitution, is bleak; and gender equality is still at the stage of sensitiza-
tion and awareness-raising.
26
In other words, key economic and social rights that are mentioned in the
constitution as well as relevant international standards that Malawi has
subscribed to—such as the right to life, the right to education, freedom of
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expression, the right to an adequate standard of health, or the right to food—
are not guaranteed by the state. Partly due to Malawi’s weak economic base,
partly due to a lack of political will, many of Malawi’s obligations and corre-
sponding human rights are neither being protected nor realized.
As Kayangolu argues, the “promotion of human rights as a means of social
transformation can be judged on the basis of what impact the promotion,
protection and enforcement of the rights have had on the position of dis-
advantaged groups.”
27
Discussing contemporary land, labor, and gender rela-
tions in Malawi, he comes to the conclusion that “despite changes at the high-
est normative level,” this transformation remains incomplete.

28
Current
reports on key sectors confirm that the vulnerabilities of citizens have not
improved significantly. On the contrary, reports reveal that policies that are
targeted to aid the poor are not showing tangible effects. For instance, the
Malawi Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment of 2006 reveals that there are
continuing and considerable gaps between poor and non-poor in accessing
education services, as well as access to health care.
29
Another area of grave con-
cern is the situation of prisoners, whose right to life, a fair trial, health care,
or adequate nutrition are routinely denied.
30
The question of what factors affect the access to and utilization of services,
such as health or education, especially from the perspective of marginalized
citizens, requires closer attention. In none of the sector surveys, with the
exception of prisons, was corruption mentioned explicitly as a factor imped-
ing access to services. However, it is evident from other empirical surveys
that, in a context of endemic corruption, the misappropriation of public funds
and the abuse of positions of power impact the poor disproportionally by
entrenching inequalities and the vicious circle of exclusion.
31
The poor and vulnerable bear the brunt of social, economic, and political
inequalities. Also, the gap between human rights and anti-corruption rheto-
ric and reality is a feature of the structural and material difficulties that these
countries face, in terms of national income, physical and human resources, and
infrastructure. These difficulties are not an excuse, however, for negating the
internationally acknowledged, intrinsic value of human rights and the obli-
gation of the state to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights. Moreover, the pro-
files of the sectors show that the realization of these rights is only prevented

in part by structural difficulties; political priorities define the allocations of the
available resources, and these political priorities are not sufficiently shaped by
the needs and rights of the disenfranchised. The question is, then, to whom
and through which mechanisms are the policymakers accountable.
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Anti-Corruption and Accountability Systems
Chapter Three of Malawi’s constitution postulates that “the authority to exer-
cise power of State is conditional upon the sustained trust of the people of
Malawi and that trust can only be maintained through open, accountable and
transparent Government and informed democratic choice.” Moreover, “the
inherent dignity and worth of each human being requires that the State and
all persons shall recognize and protect fundamental human rights and afford
the fullest protection to the rights and views of all individuals, groups and
minorities whether or not they are entitled to vote.”
32
Accordingly, the constitution provides a strong legal and institutional
framework that protects citizens’ rights and establishes a sophisticated system
of horizontal accountability bodies.
33
These bodies include those mentioned
above such as the Human Rights Commission and Inspectorate of Prisons.
Not surprising, for a young and poor democracy, however, these accounta-
bility institutions, as well as the whole democratic framework, have yet to be
consolidated.
34
The parliamentary culture in Malawi is still very uneven, not
least as a result of a weak electoral commission and flawed election processes
or of the lack of funds available for these committees to convene.
35

The jus-
tice system, while generally regarded as independent, suffers from meager
human, financial, and physical resources, which seriously impede procedures
of and access to justice. As a report on the justice system in Malawi describes,
“the vast majority of people are not able to enforce their rights because they
cannot access formal justice delivery institutions, including the courts. Poor
people, especially women, are disproportionately impeded by the various
physical, financial and linguistic barriers.”
36
These barriers include the phys-
ical distance to the nearest court, the financial costs of court and lawyer fees,
and the fact that English is the official language of the courts but not the first
language of the majority of the population—a problem that is also salient to
participation in and access to the proceedings of the National Assembly.
In the same vein, the capacity and visibility of the accountability bodies is
patchy. A report by the British Department of International Development
(DFID) on governance in Malawi concluded that its “accountability institu-
tions suffer the same capability weaknesses as the rest of government”: inad-
equate funding; weak legislative frameworks, terms, and conditions of serv-
ice; weak capacity and human resources, as well as particular bureaucratic
mindsets both within the executive as well as, at times, within the institutions
themselves.
37
Notwithstanding their constitutional mandate, these accounta-
bility bodies are heterogeneous and diverse in their endowments as well as in
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the degree of their financial and operational independence.
38
Whereas, for

instance, the Law Commission is a relatively strong and robust institution
that, albeit under-resourced, is in a position consistently to exercise its man-
date, other such bodies are practically non-existent or severely challenged
because they lack operational independence.
39
A prime example is the Malawi Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), which
has received prominence through President Bingu wa’ Mutharika’s vow of
“zero tolerance of corruption.” Since its establishment the ACB has been
strongly supported by various donor agencies financially, materially, and tech-
nically; hence, it does not suffer from a lack of capacity. In spite of the rela-
tively comfortable funding situation, the ACB is deemed to be “weak” by the
2007 Global Integrity Report (although Malawi’s anti-corruption legislation
is classified as “very strong”).
40
This assessment reflects the popular perception
of the ACB, which says that the ACB suffers from a “high profile cases syn-
drome.”
41
Since the ACB’s establishment, the opposition and the media have
persistently accused the ACB of being subject to political manipulation and
preoccupied with political witch-hunts, rather than with corruption cases
that concern the daily lives of citizens.
42
In spite of high rates of corruption in
daily life, citizens’ access to the ACB is low, and the ACB is not renowned for
its responsiveness and openness: “Although the ACB has made it known that
citizens can blow the whistle, it takes [a] long [time] for citizens to know or
even verify if indeed the bureau has acted on their complaint. Most times the
ACB does not. And it is not publicly known to.”
43

The inertia of the ACB
seems largely due to political interference in its operational work. An indica-
tion of how strong the political pressures may be is that the director of the
ACB has been changed three times within the last several years, always under
accusations by the government that he is incompetent or corrupt: “In Malawi,
President Bingu wa’ Mutharika’s declared war on corruption received a sig-
nificant boost after the Public Appointments Committee (PAC) of parlia-
ment appointed Alexious Nampota as the new anti corruption czar to lead the
Anti-Corruption Bureau. President Mutharika has sacked two previous direc-
tors of the anti-corruption body over graft charges. He also clashed with
members of the parliamentary appointment committee after they refused to
confirm a previous nominee.”
44
Indeed, such influence by the executive is
legal, as according to Section 6(3) of the Corrupt Practices Act, the president
is empowered to suspend the director of the bureau if he or she “considers it
desirable to do so.”
45
Executive interference also raises its ugly head in other key institutions, a
fact lamented by the Human Rights Commission in a report on accountabil-
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