wto rules on technical barriers to trade
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WTORulesonTechnicalBarrierstoTrade
PeterVandenBossche,
DenisePrévostandMariëlleMatthee
1
TABLEOFCONTENTS
1. Introduction 4
2. TheTBTAgreement 5
2.1. ScopeofApplicationoftheTBTAgreement 5
2.2. RelationshipwithOtherWTOAgreements 13
2.3. BasicSubstantiveProvisionsoftheTBTAgreement 14
2.4. OtherSubstantiveProvisions 21
2.5. InstitutionalandProceduralProvisions 24
2.6. SpecialProvisionsforDevelopingCountries 26
3. TheSPSAgreement 27
3.1. ScopeofApplicationoftheSPSAgreement 28
3.2. RelationshipwithOtherWTOAgreements 31
3.3. BasicPrinciplesoftheSPSAgreement 33
3.4. RiskAnalysisObligations 44
3.5. OtherSubstantiveProvisions 62
3.6. InstitutionalandProceduralProvisions 69
3.7. SpecialProvisionsforDevelopingCountries 75
4. Summary 77
ABSTRACT
Inmodernsociety,productsareoftensubjecttorequirementsrelatingtotheircharacteristics
and/orthemannerinwhichtheyareproduced.Thepurposeoftheserequirementsmaybethe
protection oflife or health, the protection ofthe environment, theprevention ofdeceptive
practicesortoensurethequalityofproducts.Theserequirementsmayconstituteformidable
barriers to trade. Moreover, procedures set up to verify whether a product meets certain
requirementsmayobstructtrade.Thesebarrierstotradearereferredtoastechnicalbarriers
totrade.Onemustdistinguishbetween:
• thegeneralcategoryoftechnicalbarrierstotrade,forwhichruleshavebeensetoutin
theTBTAgreement;and
• a special category of technical barriers to trade, namely sanitary and phytosanitary
measures,forwhichrulesareprovidedintheSPSAgreement.
The rules of the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement are of great importance to
internationaltrade.TheygosignificantlybeyondtheGATTobligationsnottodiscriminate
1
PeterVandenBosscheisProfessorofInternationalEconomicLawandHeadoftheInternationalandEuropeanLawDepartment
attheFacultyofLawofMaastrichtUniversity.From1997to2001,hewasCounsellortotheAppellateBodyoftheWTO.In2001
heservedasActingDirectoroftheAppellateBodySecretariat.DenisePrévostisalecturerininternationaleconomiclawatthe
FacultyofLawofUtrechtUniversity,MariëlleMattheeisadoctoralresearcherattheFacultyofLawofMaastrichtUniversity.
TheauthorswishtothankMaikelBeckersandJillRochefortheirableassistanceinpreparingthisworkingpaperforpublication.
4
amongoragainstimportedproductsornottoimposequantitativerestrictionsbutalsoimpose
certain international disciplines on national regulation regarding products, their
characteristics and production. This working paper gives an overview of the scope of
application as well as the substantive and institutional/procedural provisions of the TBT
AgreementandtheSPSAgreement.
Keywords: WTOlaw, MarketAccess,TechnicalBarriersto Trade,TBTAgreement,SPS
Agreement.
1. INTRODUCTION
TVsets, toys,cosmetics, medical equipment,fertilisers,meatand cheese areall subject to
requirementsrelatingtotheircharacteristicsand/orthemannerinwhichtheyareproduced.
Thepurposeoftheserequirementsmaybetheprotectionoflifeorhealth,theprotectionof
theenvironment,thepreventionofdeceptivepracticesortoensurethequalityofproducts.
These requirements may be mandatory, set and enforced by governments. More often,
however,theserequirements areruleslaid downbynationalstandardisation bodies,which
arenotmandatorybutareneverthelessgenerallyadoptedinbusinesstransactionsinagiven
country. Inbothcases,theserequirements may constituteformidable barrierstotrade.TV
setsandcheese madeaccordingto therequirements ofcountryAmaybebannedfrom, or
difficult to market in, country B when the requirements of country B relating to the
characteristics or the manner of production are different. Furthermore, procedures used to
verify whether a product meets certain mandatory or voluntary requirements may obstruct
trade.
Measuresof thiskindarecommonlyreferredto as‘technicalbarrierstotrade’.Thispaper
dealswiththeWTOlawonsuchbarriers.Onemustdistinguishbetween:
• thegeneralcategoryoftechnicalbarrierstotrade,forwhichruleshavebeensetoutin
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, commonly referred to as the TBT
Agreement;and
• a special category of technical barriers to trade, namely sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, for which rules are provided in the Agreement on the Application of
SanitaryandPhytosanitaryMeasures,commonlyreferredtoastheSPSAgreement.
The rules of the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement are of great importance to
international trade. As discussed below, these rules go significantly beyond the GATT
obligations not to discriminate among or against imported products. They impose certain
5
internationaldisciplines onnational regulationregarding products,their characteristics and
production.
2. THETBTAGREEMENT
Asnotedabove,theWTOrulesonthegeneralcategoryoftechnicalbarrierstotradeareset
outintheTBTAgreement.Thissectiondiscusses:
• thescopeofapplicationoftheTBTAgreement;
• the relationship between the TBT Agreement and other WTO agreements, in
particular,theSPSAgreementandtheGATT1994;
• thesubstantiveprovisionsoftheTBTAgreement
• theinstitutionalandproceduralprovisionsoftheTBTAgreement;and
• specialprovisionsfordevelopingcountryMembers.
2.1. ScopeofApplicationoftheTBTAgreement
With respect to the scope of application of the TBT Agreement, this section distinguishes
between the substantive scope of application, i.e., the types of measures to which the
agreementapplies,thepersonalscopeofapplication,i.e.,theentitiestowhomrulesofthe
TBTAgreementapply,andthetemporalscopeofapplicationoftheagreement.
2.1.1. Substantivescopeofapplication
TherulesoftheTBTAgreementapplyto:
• technicalregulations;
• standards;and
• conformityassessmentprocedures.
AstheAppellateBodystatedinEC-Asbestos,theTBTAgreementthusappliestoa‘limited
classofmeasures’.
2
Thethree typesof measurestowhichthe TBTAgreementapplies, are
definedinAnnex1oftheTBTAgreement.
InAnnex1.1,atechnicalregulationisdefinedas:
2
AppellateBodyReport,EC–Asbestos,para.80.
6
… [a] document which lays down product characteristics ortheir relatedprocesses and production methods,
includingtheapplicableadministrativeprovisions,withwhichcomplianceismandatory.Itmayalsoincludeor
deal exclusively withterminology,symbols,packaging, markingor labellingrequirementsas theyapplyto a
product,processorproductionmethod.
For example, a law requiring that batteries of 9 Volts or more be rechargeable, or a law
requiringthatwinebesoldingreenglassbottlesaretechnicalregulationswithinthemeaning
oftheTBTAgreement.Alawrequiringthattheproductionofpharmaceuticalproductsmeet
certain requirements regarding manufacturing practices and plant cleanliness is also a
technicalregulationfallingwithinthescopeofapplicationoftheTBTAgreement.
Annex1.2oftheTBTAgreementdefinesastandardas:
…[a]documentapprovedbyarecognisedbody,thatprovides,forcommonandrepeateduse,rules,guidelines
or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not
mandatory.Itmayalsoincludeordealexclusivelywithterminology,symbols,packaging,markingorlabelling
requirementsastheyapplytoaproduct,processorproductionmethod.
Contrarytotechnicalregulations,standardsareofavoluntarynature,meaningcomplianceis
notmandatory.
The voluntary standards set by CENELEC (the
European Committee for Electrotechnical
Standardisation), such as standards for mobile phones or handheld computers, are clearly
standardswithinthemeaningoftheTBTAgreement.
Inadditiontotechnicalregulationsandstandards,conformityassessmentproceduresalsofall
withinthescopeofapplicationoftheTBTAgreement.Conformityassessmentproceduresare
definedinAnnex1.3oftheTBTAgreementas:
…anyprocedureused,directlyorindirectly,todeterminethatrelevantrequirementsintechnicalregulationsor
standardsarefulfilled.
Examples of conformity assessment procedures include, for example, procedures for
sampling,testingandinspection.
TheTBTAgreementappliestotechnicalregulations,standardsandconformityassessment
proceduresrelatingto:
• products(bothindustrialandagricultural);and
7
• processesandproductionmethods(PPMs).
3
Itisasubjectofmuchdebate,however,whethertheprocessesandproductionmethods, to
whichtheTBTAgreementapplies,includetheso-callednon-productrelatedprocessesand
productionmethods(NPR-PPMs).Thistermreferstoprocessesandproductionmethodsthat
do not affect the characteristics of the final product put on the market. An example of a
technicalregulationconcerningaNPR-PPMistheprohibitionoftheuseofenvironmentally
unfriendly sources of energy in the production of a product. Another example is the
prohibition to market beef from cattle fed with genetically modified fodder. During the
negotiationsontheTBTAgreement,discussiontookplaceonwhetherthisgroupshouldbe
included in the scope of the agreement. This discussion, however, did not result in
consensus.
4
The definitions in Annex 1, paragraphs 1 to 3,seem to indicatethat technical
regulations,standardsandconformityassessmentproceduresrelatingtoNPR-PPMsdonot
fallwiththescopeofapplicationoftheTBTAgreement.
5
Intwodisputestodate,EC– AsbestosandEC –Sardines,panelsandtheAppellate Body
had occasion to examine whether the measures at issue were technical regulations falling
withinthescopeoftheTBTAgreement.InEC–Asbestos,themeasureatissueconsistedof,
ononehand,ageneralbanonasbestosandasbestos-containingproductsand,ontheother
hand,limitedexceptionsreferringtosituationsinwhichasbestos-containingproductswould
beallowed.ThePanelconcludedthatthebanitselfwasnotatechnicalregulation,whereas
theexceptionstothebanwere.
6
Onappeal,theAppellateBodyreversedthePanel’sfinding
thatthebandidnotconstituteatechnicalregulation.Inaddressingthisissue,theAppellate
Body first firmly rejected the Panel’s approach of considering separately the ban and the
exceptionstotheban.AccordingtotheAppellateBody,the‘properlegalcharacter’ofthe
measure cannot be determined unless the measure is looked at as a whole. The Appellate
Bodystated:
Article 1 of the Decree contains broad, general prohibitions on asbestos and products containing asbestos.
However,thescopeandgeneralityofthoseprohibitionscanonlybeunderstoodinlightoftheexceptionstoit
which, albeit for a limited period, permit, inter alia, the use of certain products containing asbestos and,
3
Article1.3andtheexplanatorynotetoAnnex1,paragraph2,oftheTBTAgreement.NotethattheTBT
Agreementdoesnotapplytotechnicalregulations,standardsandconformityassessmentproceduresthat
dealwithservices.
4
CommitteeonTechnicalBarrierstoTrade,‘NegotiatingHistoryoftheCoverageoftheAgreementon
TechnicalBarrierstoTradewithregardtoLabellingRequirements,VoluntaryStandardsandProcesses
and Production Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics’, Note by the Secretariat, G/TBT/W11,
dated29August1995.
5
Note that the definitions in Annex 1.1 and Annex 1.2 state: ‘ …products and related processes and
productionmethods’.[Emphasisadded]
6
PanelReport,EC–Asbestos,paras.8.63and8.70
8
principally,productscontainingchrysotileasbestosfibres.Themeasureis,therefore,notatotalprohibitionon
asbestos fibres, becauseit also includesprovisions thatpermit, fora limited duration, the use of asbestos in
certainsituations.Thus,tocharacterizethemeasuresimplyasageneralprohibition,andtoexamineitassuch,
overlooksthecomplexitiesofthemeasure,whichincludebothprohibitiveandpermissiveelements.
7
The Appellate Body thus concluded that the measure at issue was to be examined as an
integrated whole, taking into account as appropriate the prohibitive and the permissive
elementsthatarepartofit.
8
TheAppellateBodythenexaminedwhetherthemeasureatissue,consideredasawhole,was
a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. On the basis of the
definitionofa‘technicalregulation’ofAnnex1.1,quotedabove,theAppellateBodysetout
anumberofconsiderationsfordeterminingwhetherameasureisatechnicalregulation.This
sectiondiscussestheseconsiderations.
First, for a measure to be a ‘technical regulation’, it must ‘lay down’ – i.e., set forth,
stipulate,orprovide–‘productcharacteristics’.Withrespecttotheterm‘characteristics’,the
AppellateBodynoted:
… the “characteristics” of a product include, in our view, any objectively definable “features”, “qualities”,
“attributes”, or other “distinguishing mark” of a product. Such “characteristics” might relate, inter alia, to a
product’s composition, size, shape, colour, texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity,
density,orviscosity.Inthedefinitionofa“technicalregulation”inAnnex1.1,theTBTAgreementitselfgives
certain examples of “product characteristics” – “terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
requirements”. Theseexamplesindicatethat “product characteristics” include,not only featuresand qualities
intrinsic to the product itself, but also related “characteristics”, such as the means of identification, the
presentationandtheappearanceofaproduct.
9
TheAppellateBodyalsonotedthatatechnicalregulationmaybeconfinedtolayingdown
onlyoneorafewproductcharacteristics.
Second,a‘technicalregulation’mustregulatethecharacteristicsofproductsinabindingor
compulsoryfashion.AccordingtotheAppellateBody,itfollowsthat:
7
AppellateBodyReport,EC-Asbestos,para.64.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.,para.67.
9
… with respect to products, a “technical regulation” has the effect of prescribing or imposing one or more
“characteristics”–“features”,“qualities”,“attributes”,orother“distinguishingmark”.
10
Product characteristics may be prescribed or imposed with respect to products in either a
positiveoranegativeform.Thatis,thedocumentmayprovide,positively,thatproductsmust
possesscertain‘characteristics’,orthedocumentmayrequire,negatively,thatproductsmust
notpossesscertain‘characteristics’.Inbothcases,thelegalresultisthesame:thedocument
‘laysdown’certainbinding‘characteristics’forproducts.
11
Third, a ‘technical regulation’ must be applicable to an identifiable product, or group of
products. Otherwise, enforcement of the regulation will be, in practical terms, impossible.
Clearly,compliancewiththisobligationrequiresidentificationoftheproductcoverageofa
technicalregulation. ThePanelinEC –Asbestosinterpretedthis tomeanthata‘technical
regulation’mustapplyto‘given’productswhichareactuallynamed,identifiedorspecified
intheregulation.TheAppellateBodydisagreed.NothinginthetextoftheTBTAgreement
suggeststhattheproducts concerned needbenamedor otherwiseexpressly identifiedin a
‘technicalregulation’.TheAppellateBodynotedthat:
…theremaybeperfectlysoundadministrativereasonsforformulatinga“technicalregulation”inawaythat
doesnot expresslyidentifyproductsbyname,butsimplymakesthemidentifiable–forinstance, throughthe
“characteristic”thatisthesubjectofregulation.
12
Onthebasisoftheabovethreeconsiderations,theAppellateBodyexaminedthemeasureat
issue in EC – Asbestos, a French Decree, noting that the first and second paragraphs of
Article1oftheDecreeimposedaprohibitiononasbestosfibres.AccordingtotheAppellate
Body,prohibitiononthesefibresdoesnot,initself,prescribeorimposeany‘characteristics’
onasbestosfibresbutsimplybansthemin theirnaturalstate.Accordingly,if thismeasure
consisted only of a prohibition on asbestos fibres, it might not constitute a ‘technical
regulation’.TheAppellateBodythennoted,however:
Anintegralandessentialaspectofthemeasureistheregulationof“productscontainingasbestosfibres”,which
arealsoprohibitedbyArticle1, paragraphsIandIIoftheDecree. Itisimportanttonoteherethat,although
formulatednegatively–productscontainingasbestosareprohibited–themeasure,inthisrespect,effectively
prescribesorimposescertainobjectivefeatures,qualitiesor“characteristics”onallproducts.Thatis,ineffect,
the measure provides that all products must not contain asbestos fibres. Although this prohibition against
10
Ibid.,para.68.
11
Ibid.,para.69.
12
Ibid.,para.70.
10
products containing asbestos applies to a large number of products, and although it is, indeed, true that the
productstowhichthisprohibitionappliescannotbedeterminedfromthetermsofthemeasureitself,itseemsto
usthattheproductscoveredbythemeasureareidentifiable:allproductsmustbeasbestosfree;anyproducts
containing asbestos are prohibited. We also observe that compliance with the prohibition against products
containingasbestosismandatoryandis,indeed,enforceablethroughcriminalsanctions.
13
Theprohibitionofallasbestos-containingproductsisameasurewhicheffectivelyprescribes
–althoughnegatively–certainobjectivecharacteristicsforallproducts.
Furthermore,theAppellateBodynotedthatArticles2,3and4oftheDecreecontaincertain
exceptionstotheprohibitionsfoundinArticle1oftheDecree.Anypersonseekingtoavail
oftheselimitedexceptionsmustprovideadetailedjustificationtotheauthorities,complete
with necessary supporting documentation concerning ‘the state of scientific and
technological progress’. Compliance with these administrative requirements is mandatory.
Through the exceptions to the prohibitions, the measure at issue sets out the ‘applicable
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory’ for products with certain
objective‘characteristics’.
TheAppellateBodythusconcludedinEC-Asbestos:
Viewing the measure asan integrated whole, we see that it lays down “characteristics” for allproducts that
mightcontainasbestos,andweseealsothatitlaysdownthe“applicableadministrativeprovisions”forcertain
products containing chrysotile asbestos fibres which are excluded from the prohibitions in the measure.
Accordingly,wefindthatthemeasureisa“document”which“laysdownproductcharacteristics…including
theapplicableadministrativeprovisions,withwhichcomplianceismandatory.”Forthesereasons,weconclude
thatthemeasureconstitutesa“technicalregulation”undertheTBTAgreement.
14
ConfirmingitsrulinginEC–Asbestos,theAppellateBodyinEC–Sardinesestablisheda
three-tiertestfor determining whetherameasure isa‘technical regulation’ undertheTBT
Agreement:
• themeasuremustapplytoanidentifiableproductorgroupofproducts;
• themeasuremustlaydownproductcharacteristics;and
• compliance with the product characteristics laid down in the measure must be
mandatory.
13
Ibid.,para.72.
14
Ibid.,para.75.
11
Applying this test in EC – Sardines to EC Regulation 2136/89 on common marketing
standardsforpreservedsardines,theAppellateBodyfurtherclarifieditsreasoninginEC–
Asbestos.Withregardtothefirstelementofitsthree-tiertest,theAppellateBodyheldthata
measure which did not expressly identify the products to which it applied could still be
applicabletoidentifiableproducts(asrequiredbythefirstelementofthetest).Thetoolthat
the Appellate Body used to determine whether, in this case, Sardinops sagax was an
identifiable product was by examining the way the EC Regulation was enforced. As the
enforcementoftheECRegulationhadledtoaprohibitionagainstlabellingSardinopssagax
as‘preservedsardines’,thisproductwasthereforeconsideredtobeidentifiable.
15
With regard to the second element of the three-tier test, the question arose whether a
‘naming’rule,such astheruletonameSardina pilchardus‘preservedsardines’laid down
productcharacteristics.TheAppellateBodyheldinthisrespectthatproductcharacteristics
includemeansofidentificationandthat,therefore,thenamingruleatissuedefinitelymetthe
requirementofthesecondelementofthetest.
16
2.1.2. Personalscopeofapplication
AlthoughtheTBTAgreementismainlyaddressedtocentralgovernmentbodies,itexplicitly
aimstoextenditsapplicationto‘otherbodies’responsiblefortheestablishmentoftechnical
regulations, standards, or execution of conformity assessment procedures. These ‘other
bodies’ covered by the TBT Agreement primarily consist of local government bodies and
non-governmentalbodies.
Local government bodies are all bodies of government other than the central government,
suchasprovinces,Länder,cantonsormunicipalities.Theyincludeanyorgansubjecttothe
‘control of such a [local] government in respect of the activity in question’.
17
Non-
governmentalbodiesinthecontext oftheTBT Agreementaredefinedas bodiesotherthan
central government or local government bodies that ‘ha[ve] legal power to enforce a
technicalregulation’.
18
The TBT Agreementextends its application to those ‘other bodies’by imposing, on WTO
Members,theobligation:
15
AppellateBodyReport,EC-Sardines,para184.
16
Ibid.,paras.190-191.
17
Annex1.7oftheTBTAgreement.
18
Annex1.8oftheTBTAgreement.
12
• to take measures in order to ensure compliance with the TBT Agreement by local
governmentbodiesandnon-governmentalbodies;or
• to refrain from taking measures thatcould encourageactions by these otherbodies
thatareinconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheTBTAgreement.
It does so with respect to the obligations related to technical regulations, standards and
proceduresforassessmentofconformity.
19
Note,inparticularthe‘CodeofGoodPractice’in
Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement. This ‘Code of Good Practice’ applies to the preparation,
adoption and use of standards. Members have to ensure that their central government
standardising bodies accept and comply with the ‘Code of Good Practice’. In addition,
Membershave,pursuanttoArticle4oftheTBTAgreement,theobligationtotakereasonable
measuresasareavailable tothemto ensurethatlocalandnon-governmentalstandardising
bodiesalsoacceptandcomplywiththeCode.
20
2.1.3. Temporalscopeofapplication
InEC-Sardines,theissuearosewhethertheTBTAgreementappliedtotechnicalregulations
whichwerealreadyinforceon1January1995,i.e.,thedateonwhichtheTBTAgreement
enteredintoforce.Indecidingthisissue,thePanelandAppellateBodyreferredtoArticle28
oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreatieswhichstates:
…unlessadifferentintentionappearsfromthetreatyorisotherwiseestablished,itsprovisionsdonotbinda
partyinrelationto anyactorfact which tookplaceor anysituationwhichceasedto existbeforethedateof
entryintoforceofthetreatywithrespecttothatparty.
Applyingthisbasicprovisionoftreatylaw,boththePanelandtheAppellateBodyheldthat
the EC Regulation, although adopted prior to 1 January 1995, was still in force and thus
could not be considered as a situation which has ceased to exist.
21
Therefore, it can be
concludedthattheTBTAgreementappliestotechnicalregulationswhich,althoughadopted
priorto1995,arestillinforce.
19
SeeArticles3,4,7and8oftheTBTAgreement.
20
Asof18November2002,145standardisingbodiesfrom101WTOMembercountrieshadnotifiedtheir
acceptanceofthe‘CodeofGoodPractice’.SeeListofStandardisingBodiesthathaveacceptedtheCode
ofGoodPracticeforthePreparation,AdoptionandApplicationofStandards.
21
SeePanelReport,EC–Sardines,para.7.60andAppellateBodyReport,EC–Sardines,para.216.
13
2.2. RelationshipwithOtherWTOAgreements
2.2.1. TheSPSAgreementandtheAgreementonGovernmentProcurement
Asmentionedabove,thescopeoftheTBTAgreementisdeterminedbythetypeofmeasure.
TheTBTAgreementapplies,inprinciple,totechnicalregulations,standardsandconformity
assessment procedures as defined in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. However, to avoid
overlap with other WTO Agreements, the scope of application of the TBT Agreement has
been limited in favour of two other WTO Agreements, the Agreement on Government
Procurement and the SPS Agreement. The applicability of either of these agreements
excludestheapplicabilityoftheTBTAgreement,evenwherethemeasuresatissuearefound
tobeinconformitywiththeseagreements.
First, purchasing specifications related to the production or consumption of governmental
bodies do not fall within the scope of the TBT Agreement when the Agreement on
Government Procurement is applicable.
22
The Agreement on Government Procurement
addresses government purchases for their own use, which primarily consist of domestic
goods and typically represent 10 to 15 per cent of GDP. Such purchases are outside the
obligationsofArticleIII:4oftheGATT1994
23
,whichprohibitstreatingimportedgoodsless
favourably than similar domestic products once the imported goods have entered the
domesticmarket.TheAgreementonGovernmentProcurementrequiresthateachPartymust
provide treatment of the products, services and suppliers of other Parties equal to that
affordedtodomesticproducts,servicesandsuppliers.
24
Note,however,thattheAgreement
onGovernmentProcurementisaplurilateralagreementanditsobligationsapplyonlytothe
38Memberspartytotheagreement
25
;thedisciplinessetoutinthisagreementdonotapplyto
mostWTOMembers.
26
Second,sanitary andphytosanitary measures whichtake theformoftechnical regulations,
standards or conformity assessment procedures are excluded from the scope of the TBT
Agreement as they fall under the more specific SPS Agreement.
27
It is the purpose of the
22
Article1.4oftheTBTAgreement.
23
SeeArticleII:8(a)oftheGATT1994.
24
AgreementonGovernmentProcurement.ArticleIII,para.1.Availableat: />visitedon3October2005.
25
Anadditional9countriesarenegotiatingaccession.Availableat: />visited3October2005.
26
P.VandenBossche,TheLawandPolicyoftheWorldTradeOrganization(CambridgeUniversityPress,
2005),478-479.
27
Article1.5oftheTBTAgreement.Forfurtherdiscussionofthedefinitionofsanitaryandphytosanitary
measures,seebelow,Sec.3.1.1.
14
measure that qualifies it as a sanitary or phytosanitary measure. In EC – Hormones, the
United States andCanada claimed,inter alia, that the measures atissue were inconsistent
with theTBT Agreement.ReferringtoArticle 1.5oftheTBTAgreement, thePanelfound,
however,that,sincethemeasuresatissuewereSPSmeasures,theTBTAgreementdid not
applyatallintheEC–Hormonesdispute.
28
2.2.2. TheGATT1994
TherelationshipbetweentheGATT1994andtheTBTAgreementisofadifferentnatureand
isnotcharacterisedbytheexclusionofapplicabilityofoneoftheseagreementstriggeredby
theapplicabilityoftheotherone.
The Panel in EC - Asbestos held that in a case where both the GATT 1994 and the TBT
Agreement appear to apply to a given measure, a panel must first examine whether the
measure at issue is consistent with the TBT Agreement since this agreement deals
‘specificallyandindetail’withtechnicalbarrierstotrade.
29
However,shouldapanelfinda
measuretobeconsistentwiththeTBTAgreement,itmuststillexaminewhetherthemeasure
isalsoconsistentwiththeGATT1994.
Note, in general, that the relationship between the GATT 1994 and the other multilateral
agreements on trade in goods (including the TBT Agreement) is governed by the General
Interpretative Note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.
30
This provides that in case of
conflict between a provision of the GATT 1994 and a provision of another multilateral
agreementontradein goods,thelatter willprevail totheextent oftheconflict.However,
suchaconflictbetweentheTBTAgreementandtheGATT1994isratherunlikely.
2.3. BasicSubstantiveProvisionsoftheTBTAgreement
The basic substantive provisions of the TBT Agreement contain several principles that are
also found in the GATT 1994, such as: the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment
obligation, the national treatment obligation and the obligation to refrain from creating
unnecessaryobstaclestointernationaltrade.InEC-Asbestos,theAppellateBodyobserved
that the TBT Agreement intends to further the objectives of the GATT 1994. However, it
28
PanelReport,EC–Hormones(US),para.8.29andPanelReport,EC–Hormones(Canada),para.8.32.
29
PanelReport,EC-Asbestos,para.8.16.Seeonthispointmoregenerally,AppellateBodyReport,EC–
BananasIII,para.204.
15
immediately noted that the TBT Agreement does so through a specialised legal regime,
containingdifferent andadditionalobligationstothoseof theGATT1994.
31
Thissection
examinesthebasicsubstantiveprovisionsoftheTBTAgreementrelatingtothefollowing:
• MFNtreatment;
• nationaltreatment;
• thenecessityrequirement;and
• theuseofinternationalstandards.
2.3.1. MFNtreatmentandnationaltreatmentobligations
Article2.1oftheTBTAgreementprovidesthat,withrespecttotechnicalregulations:
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any
Membershallbe accorded treatmentnoless favourable thanthataccorded tolikeproductsof nationalorigin
andtolikeproductsoriginatinginanyothercountry.
ThenationaltreatmentobligationandtheMFNtreatmentobligationthusapplytotechnical
regulations.
32
Pursuant to Annex 3 D and Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement, these
obligationsalsoapplytostandardsandconformityassessmentproceduresrespectively.Thus,
arequirementthat tropicalwoodcomingfromBrazilbelabelled as‘tropicalwood’, while
there isno such requirementfor tropical wood from African countries, wouldconstitute a
violation of the MFN treatment obligation set out in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
RequiringaccuratetestingforthepresenceofGMOsincornarrivingfromtheUnitedStates,
whilesuchverificationisnotrequiredforcornfromAustraliawouldconstituteaviolationof
theMFNtreatmentobligationsetoutinArticle5.1.1oftheTBTAgreement.Arequirement
that imported furniture is fire-resistant, while no such requirement exists for domestically
producedfurniture,wouldconstituteaviolationofthenationaltreatmentobligationsetoutin
Article2.1oftheTBTAgreement.
31
See Appellate Body Report, EC - Asbestos, para. 80. Therefore, caution needs to be used when
transposinginterpretationgiventotheseobligationsunderGATT1994tothesimilarprovisionsinthe
TBTAgreement.Thedifferentcontext,structureandformulationoftheTBTAgreement’sprovisionscan
result in an interpretation that deviates from previously pronounced interpretations under the GATT
1994.
32
Notethatwithregardtotechnicalregulationsadoptedbylocalgovernmentbodiesornon-governmental
bodies,Article3oftheTBTAgreementrequiresMemberstotakesuchreasonablemeasuresasmaybe
availabletothemtoensurecompliancebysuchbodieswiththeprovisionsofArticle2.
16
When establishing whether certain treatment is discriminatory, the determination of
‘likeness’ofthetwoproducts,whicharesubjecttodifferenttreatment,isaprerequisite.The
concept of ‘like products’ within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the TBT
Agreement has not yet been the subject of dispute settlement proceedings. However, the
conceptof‘likeproducts’hasbeenclarifiedinpanelandAppellateBodyreportsrelatingto
Articles I and III of the GATT.
33
This case law is undoubtedly instructive for the
interpretationof theconceptof ‘likeproducts’inthecontext oftheTBTAgreement.Note,
however, that it is generally accepted that the concept of ‘like products’ has different
meaningsinthedifferentcontextsinwhichitisused.InJapan–AlcoholicBeveragesII,the
Appellate Body illustrated the possible differences in the scope of the concept of ‘like
products’,betweendifferentprovisionsoftheWTOAgreement,byevokingtheimageofan
accordion:
The accordion of ‘likeness’ stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the WTO
Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any one of those places must be determined by the
particularprovisioninwhichtheterm‘like’isencounteredaswellasbythecontextandthecircumstancesthat
prevailinanygivencasetowhichthatprovisionmayapply.
34
Note that in the GATT context a finding that products are like and given discriminatory
treatmentcanbeovercomebyajustificationofthisdiscriminatorytreatmentonthebasisof
the Article XX exceptions. However, the ‘rule-exception’ relationship, which exists
between,forexample,ArticlesIandIIIoftheGATT1994,ontheonehand,andArticleXX
oftheGATT1994,ontheotherhand,isnotsoclearlyreplicatedintheTBTAgreement.The
relationshipbetween,forexample,Articles2.1and2.2oftheTBTAgreementremainstobe
clarified.
35
2.3.2. Necessitytest
Article2.2oftheTBTAgreementprovidesthat,withrespecttotechnicalregulations:
Membersshallensurethattechnicalregulationsarenotprepared,adoptedorappliedwithaviewtoorwiththe
effectofcreatingunnecessaryobstaclestointernationaltrade.
33
See Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97, para.18 which suggests
“likeproducts’mustbedeterminedonacase-by-casebasistakingintoaccount‘theproduct’send-uses
inagivenmarket;consumers’tastesandhabits…theproduct’sproperties,natureandquality.’
34
AppellateBodyReport,Japan–AlcoholicBeveragesII,p.21.
35
OnArticle2.2oftheTBTAgreement,seebelow,Sec.2.3.12.
17
With respect to standards and conformity assessment procedures, Annex 3 E and Article
5.1.2oftheTBTAgreementprovideforthesameobligationthatsuchmeasuresshallnotbe
‘prepared, adopted or applied with the view to, or the effect of, creating unnecessary
obstaclestotrade’.
Toensurethattechnicalregulationsdonotconstituteunnecessaryobstaclestotrade,Article
2.2oftheTBTAgreementfurtherrequiresthat:
…technicalregulationsshallnotbemoretrade-restrictivethannecessarytofulfilalegitimateobjective,taking
accountoftherisksnon-fulfilmentwouldcreate.
Article2.2enumeratesseverallegitimateobjectivesthatmayjustifythecreationofatrade
obstacle in the form of a technical regulation. The list of legitimate policy objectives of
Article2.2includes:
• nationalsecurity;
• thepreventionofdeceptivepractices;
• theprotectionofhumanhealthandsafety,animalorplantlifeorhealth;and
• theprotectionoftheenvironment.
As indicated by the words ‘inter alia’ in the introduction of the list, this list is not an
exhaustivelistoflegitimatepolicyobjectives.ItwillbeuptopanelsandtheAppellateBody
to assess whether the policy objectives other than those listed are, in a particular case,
legitimatepolicyobjectives.
Atechnicalregulation‘justified’underArticle2.2asnecessarytofulfilalegitimatepolicy
objectiveatpresentwillnotautomaticallyremain‘justified’inthefuture.Article2.3ofthe
TBTAgreementprovidesthat:
Technicalregulationsshallnotbemaintainedifthecircumstancesorobjectivesgivingrisetotheiradoptionno
longerexistorifthechangedcircumstancesorobjectivescanbeaddressedinalesstrade-restrictivemanner.
Members thus continually have toassess the necessity of theirtechnical regulations. They
also have to continually assess whether their technical regulations are not more trade-
restrictivethannecessarytofulfilalegitimatepolicyobjective.
Inassessingthenecessityoftheirtechnicalregulations,Membersmust,asisexplicitlystated
in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, take ‘account of the risks non-fulfilment would
18
create.’
36
It is clear that the risks of non-fulfilment of a technical regulation, aimed at
meeting consumer preferences or avoiding deceptive practices, will be different from the
risks that non-fulfilment of a regulation, aimed at the protection of human health, may
entail.
37
Otherelementsthat,accordingtoArticle2.2,maybeusefultoconsiderinassessing
thenecessityofatechnicalregulationinclude:availablescientificandtechnicalinformation;
relatedprocessingtechnology;andintendedend-usesofproducts.Todate,thereisnocase
lawontheassessmentofnecessityundertheTBTAgreement.However,inlinewiththecase
lawontheassessmentofnecessityunderArticleXX(b)and(d)oftheGATT1994,itistobe
expected that the assessment of necessity under the TBT Agreement will also involve a
processof‘weighingandbalancing’theabovementionedandotherfactorsandelements.
2.3.3. Useofinternationalstandards
The harmonisation of national technical regulations and standards around international
standards greatly facilitates the conduct of international trade.
38
Harmonisation around
internationalstandardsdiminishesthetraderestrictiveeffectoftechnicalbarrierstotradeby
minimisingthevarietyofrequirementsthatexportershavetomeetintheirdifferentexport
marketsthusmakingitpossibleforthemtotakeadvantageofeconomiesofscale.
Thus, the TBT Agreement requires Members to base their technical regulations on
internationalstandards.Article2.4oftheTBTAgreementprovidesinrelevantpart:
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their completion is
imminent,Membersshallusethem,ortherelevantpartsofthem,asabasisfortheirtechnicalregulations…
39
36
Withregardtoconformityassessmentprocedure,Article5.1.1.statesthatrisksofnon-conformityshall
be taken into account. Annex 3.E(standards) doesnot contain the provision of risks to betaken into
account.
37
AstheTBTAgreementdoesnotexplicitlyrequireaquantitativeevaluationofrisk,onecouldconclude,
inline with thedecision oftheAppellate Bodyin EC- Asbestos withregard toArticle XX(b)GATT
(para.167)andtheAppellateBodyinEC-HormoneswithregardtotheSPSAgreement(para.186)(see
below,Sec.3.4.1),thatanindicationofrisksinqualitativetermswouldsufficetojustifyamoretrade-
restrictive measure. In addition, it is very likely that Members may rely on scientific sources which,
althoughdivergingfromthemajorityscientificopinion,constituteaqualifiedandrespectedopinion(see
AppellateBodyReport,EC-Asbestos,para.178).
38
Also the harmonisation ofnationalconformity assessment procedures around international guides and
recommendationsforconformityassessmentproceduresfacilitatesinternationaltrade.
39
Inviewofthisrequirement,itisnotsurprisingthatArticle2.6oftheTBTAgreementrequiresMembers
toplayafullpart, withinthe limitsoftheirresources,inthepreparationofinternationalstandardsfor
productsforwhichtheyeitherhaveadopted,orexpecttoadopt,technicalregulations.
19
However, Article 2.4 further provides that Members do not have to base their technical
regulationsoninternationalstandardswhen:
… such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the
fulfilment of thelegitimate objectives pursued, forinstance because of fundamentalclimatic or geographical
factorsorfundamentaltechnologicalproblems.
ThePanelandAppellateBodyReportsinEC–Sardinesillustratetheimportance,aswellas
the contentious nature, of the requirement under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement that a
technicalregulationisbasedonaninternationalstandard.Thefirstquestionthataroseinthis
casewaswhethertheinternationalstandard,‘CodexStan94’developedbyaninternational
food standard-setting body, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, constituted a relevant
international standard for the purposes of Article 2.4. The Panel’s examination of this
questionfocusedonwhethertheproductcoverageoftheCodexStan94wassimilartothatof
theEC’stechnicalregulation,themeasureatissue.AccordingtothePanel,theexamination
ofrelevancewithregardtothesubjectmatterentailsananalysisofwhethertheCodexStan
94 ‘bear[s] upon, relate[s] to or [is] pertinent to’
40
the EC’s technical regulation. The
EuropeanCommunitiesarguedthatwhiletheCodex Stan94 dealswithsardinesandother
sardine-type products, the EC’s technical regulation exclusively concerns the product
Sardinapilchardus.However,thePanel concludedthatthisargumentwasnotsufficientto
rejecttherelevanceofCodexStan94asaninternationalstandard,asbothmeasurescoverthe
sameproduct(Sardinapilchardus)andincludesimilartypesofrequirementsinregardtothis
productsuchaslabelling,presentationandpackingmedium.
AnotherquestionthataroseinEC–SardineswaswhethertheEC’stechnicalregulationwas,
asrequiredbyArticle2.4,basedontheinternationalstandard.Inlinewiththecaselawon
themeaningof‘basedon’intheSPSAgreement,thePanelinEC–Sardinesconcludedthat
theterm‘basedon’isnotequivalenttotheterm‘conformto’,butimposestheobligationto
‘employ or apply’ the international standard as ‘the principal constituent or fundamental
principleforthepurposeofenactingthetechnicalregulation’.
41
AccordingtotheAppellate
BodyinEC–Sardines,thiscomesdowntoananalysisof‘whetherthereisacontradiction
betweenCodexStan94andtheECregulation.’
42
40
PanelReport,EC–Sardines,para.7.68.
41
Ibid.,para.7.110.Onthemeaningof‘basedon’intheSPSAgreement,seebelow,Sec.3.3.5andSec.
3.4.1
42
AppellateBodyReport,EC–Sardines,para.249.
20
Asnotedabove,atechnicalregulationdoesnothavetobebasedontherelevantinternational
standard if that standard constitutes an inappropriate or ineffective means to achieve the
legitimateobjectivepursued.InEC–Sardines,thePanelandtheAppellateBodyexamined
whetherthisexemptionfromtheobligationtobasethetechnicalregulationontherelevant
internationalstandardwasapplicable.
Afirststepin thisexaminationiswhethera‘legitimateobjective’ispursued.Asindicated
above, Article 2.2 of TBT Agreement contains a non-exhaustive list of legitimate policy
objectives.TheobjectivespursuedbytheEC’stechnicalregulationatissueinEC–Sardines,
namely,theprotectionofmarkettransparency,consumerprotectionandfaircompetition,are
objectives not included in the list of Article 2.2. However, Peru, the complainant, did not
contestthelegitimacyoftheseobjectivesandthePanelthusrefrained fromrulingontheir
legitimacy.
43
AsecondstepintheexaminationoftheapplicabilityoftheArticle2.2exemptioniswhether
theinternationalstandardis aninappropriateorineffectivemeanstoachievethelegitimate
objective(s)pursued bythetechnicalregulation.Accordingto theAppellateBodyin EC–
Sardines,itisforthecomplainanttodemonstratethattheinternationalstandardinquestionis
both aneffectiveandappropriatemeans tofulfil thelegitimateobjective.
44
The difference
betweeneffectivenessandappropriatenessisthat ‘thequestionofeffectivenessbears upon
the results of the means employed, whereas the question of appropriateness relates to the
nature of the means employed.’
45
In other words, the international standard ‘would be
effective if it had the capacity to accomplish all … objectives [pursued], and it would be
appropriateifitweresuitableforthefulfilmentofall…objectives[pursued].’
46
Notethat,asprovidedforinArticle2.5oftheTBTAgreement,atechnicalregulationthatis
adopted to achieve a legitimate objective explicitly enumerated in Article 2.2 and is in
accordance with a relevant international standard, shall be presumed not to create an
unnecessaryobstacletotrade,asrequiredbyArticle2.2discussedabove.
47
Thismeansthat
in combination with the enumerated legitimate objectives under Article 2.2, international
43
ThePanel,however,referredtotheinterpretationofthePanelinCanada-PharmaceuticalsPatentsof
theconceptof‘legitimateinterests’as‘anormativeclaimforprotectionofintereststhatare“justifiable”
inthesensethattheyaresupportedbyrelevantpublicpoliciesorothersocialnorms’(PanelReport,EC
–Sardines,para.7.121).
44
SeeAppellateBodyReport,EC–Sardines,para.287.
45
PanelReport,EC–Sardines,para.7.116.
46
AppellateBodyReport,EC–Sardines,para.288.
47
Article2.5,TBTAgreement.
21
standards have the function of exempting trade-restrictive technical regulations from the
necessityrequirementoftheArticle2.2.
With regard to conformity assessment procedures, the TBT Agreement introduces similar
requirements in Article 5.4. Member countries shall use the relevant guides or
recommendations, existent or imminent, as a basis for their conformity assessment
procedures unless the guide or recommendation is an inappropriate means to ensure
conformity. Unlike Article 2.4, the criterion of effectiveness of the international guide or
recommendationisnotmentionedinArticle5.4.
2.4. OtherSubstantiveProvisions
Apart from the basic substantive provisions discussed in the previous section, the TBT
Agreement also contains a number of other substantive provisions which deserve to be
mentioned.Thissectionbrieflyexamines thesubstantiveprovisionsoftheTBTAgreement
relatingto:
• equivalenceandmutualrecognition;
• productrequirementsintermsofperformance;and
• transparencyandnotification.
2.4.1. Equivalenceandmutualrecognition
Article2.7oftheTBTAgreementprovides:
Membersshallgivepositiveconsiderationto acceptingasequivalenttechnicalregulationsofotherMembers,
even if these regulations differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that these regulations adequately
fulfiltheobjectivesoftheirownregulations.
TheTBT AgreementthusrequiresWTOMembersto consideraccepting,asequivalent,the
technical regulations of other Members. They should, however, only do so if they are
satisfied that the foreign technical regulations adequately fulfil the legitimate objectives
pursuedbytheirowntechnicalregulations.
Withregardtoconformityassessmentprocedures,Article6.1oftheTBTAgreementrequires
MemberstoaccepttheresultsofsuchproceduresbyotherMembercountries,eveniftheir
22
conformityassessmentproceduresdiffer,aslongastheyprovideanassuranceofconformity
with thedomestictechnicalregulationsorstandards.Compliancewith internationalguides
andrecommendationsonconformityassessmentproceduresshallbetakenintoconsideration
whenevaluatingtheadequacyofthecompetentconformityassessmentbodies.Membersare
encouraged to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of agreements acknowledging
mutualrecognitionoftheresultsofeachother’sconformityassessmentprocedures.
48
Article 9 of the TBT Agreement encourages the adoption of, and participation in,
international and regional systems for conformity assessment. Such systems aim for
cooperation between national certification bodies of Members and often take the form of
multilateralrecognitionagreements.Examplesofsuchinternationalorregionalsystemsare
the International Accreditation Forum (IFA) or the Worldwide System for Conformity
TestingandCertificationofElectricalEquipment(IECEE).
2.4.2. Productrequirementsintermsofperformance
Withrespecttotechnicalregulations,Article2.8oftheTBTAgreementprovides:
Whereverappropriate,Membersshallspecifytechnicalregulationsbasedonproductrequirementsintermsof
performanceratherthandesignordescriptivecharacteristics.
The TBT Agreement thus prefers Members to adopt technical regulations on the basis of
productrequirements intermsofperformance. Withregard tostandards, Annex3Iof the
TBT Agreement provides for the same preference for standards based on product
requirementsintermsofperformance.
2.4.3. Transparencyandnotification
Whennorelevantinternationalstandardexistsorwhenaproposedtechnicalregulationisnot
in accordance with a relevant international standard and the proposed technical regulation
mayhaveasignificanteffectontradeofotherMembers,Article2.9oftheTBTAgreement
requiresMembersto:
• publishanotice,atanearlystage,insuchamannerastoenableinterestedpartiesin
otherMemberstatestobecomeacquaintedwiththeproposedtechnicalrequirement;
48
SeeArticle6.3oftheTBTAgreement.
23
• notifyotherMembersthroughtheWTOSecretariatoftheproductstobecoveredby
theproposedtechnicalregulation,togetherwithabriefindicationoftheobjectiveand
rationaleofthetechnicalregulation.Thisnotificationmustbedoneatanearlystage
of the process, when amendments to the proposed technical regulation can still be
madeandcommentscanbetakenintoaccount;
• provide other Members, upon their request, with copies of and information on the
proposedtechnicalregulation,includinginformation onhow theproposedtechnical
regulationdeviatesfromrelevantinternationalstandards;and
• allow a reasonable time for other Members to make comments on the proposed
technical regulation, to discuss these comments upon request, and to take the
commentsandtheresultingdiscussionintoaccountwheneventuallydecidingonthe
technicalregulation.
When a technical regulation is adopted to address an urgent problem of safety, health,
environmentalprotectionornationalsecurity,aMembermaysetasidethenotification(and
consultation) requirements set out inArticle 2.9 of the TBT Agreement. However,insuch
instances,Membersaresubjecttocertainnotification(andconsultation)obligationsafterthe
adoptionofthetechnicalregulation.
49
Article2.11oftheTBTAgreementrequiresthatalladoptedtechnicalregulationsare:
… published promptly or otherwise made available insucha manner as toenable interested parties in other
Memberstobecomeacquaintedwiththem.
Except when a technical regulation addresses an urgent problem as referred to above,
technicalregulationsmaynotenterintoforceimmediatelyafterpublication.Article2.12of
theTBTAgreementprovidesinrelevantpart:
…Membersshallallowareasonableintervalbetweenthepublicationof technicalregulation andtheirentry
intoforceinordertoallowtimeforproducersinexportingMembers…toadapttheirproductsormethodsof
productiontotherequirementsoftheimportingMember.
Such a reasonable interval between the publication and the entry into force of a technical
regulationisparticularlyimportantforproducersinexportingdevelopingcountryMembers.
49
SeeArticle2.10oftheTBTAgreement.
24
TheTBTAgreementcontainssimilarprovisionswithregardtothenotificationofstandards
andconformity assessmentrequirements.
50
Asanadditional requirement forstandards, the
TBTAgreementrequiresMembers’nationalstandardisingbodiestopublish,atleasteverysix
months, their work programme and report on the progress regarding the preparation and
adoptionofstandards.
51
Furthermore,Article10oftheTBTAgreementrequireseachMembertoestablishanenquiry
point which will answer enquiries of other Members and which will provide relevant
documentationrelatedtoadoptedtechnicalregulations,standardsandconformityassessment
procedures.
2.5. InstitutionalandProceduralProvisionsoftheTBTAgreement
Inadditiontothesubstantiveprovisionsdiscussedabove,theTBTAgreementalsocontainsa
numberofinstitutionalandproceduralprovisions.Thissectiondealswiththeprovisionson:
• theTBTCommittee;and
• disputesettlement.
2.5.1. TBTCommittee
The TBT Agreement established a Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, commonly
referredtoasthe‘TBTCommittee’.
52
ThisCommitteeiscomposedofrepresentativesofall
WTO Members and meets when necessary.
53
The function of the TBT Committee is to
provide Members with a forum for consultations regarding any matters pertaining to the
operationorobjectivesoftheTBTAgreement.Itmustalsoundertakeanannualreviewofthe
implementationandoperationoftheAgreement(annualreviews).
54
Moreover,attheendof
everythree-yearperiod,theTBTCommitteeundertakesanin-depthreviewoftheoperation
of the Agreement (triennial reviews). At that time, the TBT Committee may recommend
amendments to therights andobligations contained in theAgreementifthis isconsidered
50
Annex3L,M,NandOoftheTBTAgreement(forstandards)andArticles5.6,5.75.8and5.8ofthe
TBTAgreement(forconformityassessmentprocedures).
51
SeeAnnex3JoftheTBTAgreement.
52
SeeArticle13.1oftheTBTAgreement.
53
PursuanttoArticle13.1oftheTBTAgreement,theTBTCommitteehastomeetatleastonceayear.In
fact,in2004,itmet6times.
54
SeeArticle15.2oftheTBTAgreement.
25
necessary‘toensuremutualeconomicadvantageandbalanceofrightsandobligations’.
55
To
date,theTBTCommitteehasundertakenthreetriennialreviews,thelastofwhichtookplace
in2003.
56
Noneofthesereviewshasresultedinanyrecommendationforamendmenttothe
TBTAgreement.
2.5.2. Disputesettlement
Consultations and the settlement of disputes with respect to any matter affecting the
operationoftheTBT AgreementshallfollowtheprovisionsofArticlesXXIIandXXIIIof
the GATT 1994 as elaborated on and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU).
57
TheTBTAgreementcontainsafew‘specialoradditionalrulesandprocedures’set
out in Articles 14.2, 14.3, 14.4 and Annex 2 of the TBT Agreement.
58
These ‘special or
additional rules and procedures’ prevail over the rules and procedures of the DSU to the
extent that they differ.
59
Pursuant to Article 14.2 of the TBT Agreement, a panel, charged
withthesettlementofadisputeundertheTBTAgreementmayestablishattherequestofone
of the parties to the dispute or at its own initiative, a technical expert group to assist the
Panel in questions ofa technical nature. Asstated in Article 14.3, suchatechnical expert
groupisgovernedbytheproceduressetoutinAnnex2oftheTBTAgreement.Thepanelin
question shall define the composition, terms of reference and working procedures of the
expertgroupithasestablished.Themembersofatechnicalexpertgroupshallbepersonsof
professionalstandingandofrelevantexperienceandshallnotincludecitizensorgovernment
officialsofaMemberthatispartytothedispute.Thetechnicalexpertgroupmayseekany
information and technical advice it deems appropriate. It shall inform the Member under
whose jurisdiction the sought information or technical advice is located. Except when the
informationprovidedtothetechnicalexpertgroupisofaconfidentialnature,thepartiesto
thedisputeshallhaveaccesstothatinformation.
60
Todate,panelshavenotyetmadeuseof
thepossibilitytoestablishatechnicalexpertgroup.
Asmentionedabove,notonlycentralgovernmentbodiesbutalsolocalgovernmentandnon-
governmentalentitiesmayadoptand applytechnicalregulations,standards andconformity
55
SeeArticle15.4oftheTBTAgreement.
56
CommitteeonTechincalBarrierstoTrade,ThirdTriennialReviewoftheOperationandImplementation
oftheAgreementonTechnicalBarrierstoTrade,G/TBT/13,dated11November2003.
57
SeeArticle14.1oftheTBTAgreement.ForadetaileddiscussionoftheWTOdisputesettlementsystem,
seeP.VandenBossche,TheLawandPolicyoftheWorldTradeOrganization(CambridgeUniversity
Press,2005),Chapter3:WTODisputeSettlement.
58
SeeAppendix2oftheDSU.
59
SeeArticle1.2oftheDSU.
60
SeeAnnex2oftheTBTAgreement.
