Readings in social theory The classic tradition ton post - Modernism

Readings
Ỉ n Social Theory
Fourth Edition
the CLASSIC TRADITION
to POST-MODERNISM
James Favganis So
I
r~
m
Marcusc
Habermas
Foucault
Lyotard
l-i READINGS IN SOCIAL THEORY
The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism
K READINGS IN SOCIAL THEORY
The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism
FOURTH EDITION
Edited with Introductions by
James Farganis
V assar C ollege
N e w S cho ol U n ive rsity
Boston Burr Ridge, IL Dubuque, IA Madison, Wl New York San Francisco St. Louis
Bangkok Bogota Caracas Kuala Lumpur Lisbon London Madrid Mexico City
Milan Montreal New Delhi Santiago Seoul Singapore Sydney Taipei Toronto
The M cGrow Hill Companies
m u Higher Education
READINGS IN SOCIAL THEORY: THE CLASSIC TRAD ITION T O POST-MODERNISM
Published by M cG raw -Hill, a b u siness un it of The McG raw-Hill C ompanies, Inc., 1221 Avenue of

the Am ericas, New York, NY, 10020. Copyright © 2004, 2000,1996,1993, b y The McGraw-Hill
Com panies, Inc. All rights reserved. N o part o f this publication m ay be reproduced o r distributed
in any form or by any means, or stored in a data base or retrieval system, without the prior written
consent of The M cG raw-Hill Com panies, Inc., including, but not limited to, in any network or other
electronic sto rage or transmission, o r b roadcast for distance learning. Som e ancillaries, including
electronic and prin t components, m ay not be available to custo m ers outside the United States.
This book is prin ted on acid-free paper.
4 5 6 7 8 9 0 FG R /FGR 0 9 8 7 6
ISB N -13: 978-0-07-2 82577-0
ISB N -10: 0-07-2 82577-4
Publisher: Phillip A . Butcher
Sponsoring editor: Sherith H. Pankratz
Developmental editor: jill Gordon
Senior m arke ting m anager: Daniel M. Loch
Project m anager: Jill Moline
Prod uction su pervisor: Janean A. Utley
Associate designer: George Kokkoiias
Lead supplement producer: Marc Mattson
Typeface: 10/12 Paiatino
Com positor: Electronic Publishing Sen'ices Inc., TN
Printer: Qucbecor World Fairfield Inc.
Library o f C ongress C atalog ing-in-Publicatio n Data
Readings in social theory : the classic tradition to post-modernism / edited w ith
introductions bv Jam es Farganis. — 4th ed.
p. cm.
Includes bib liographical references.
ISBN 0-07-282577-4 (softcover : alk. paper)
1. Sociology—Philosophy. I. Farganis, James.
HM585.R43 2004
301'.01—dc21 2003046354

ww w .m hhe.com
About the Author
J
AMES FARGANIS was bom an d raised in Ne w York Citv, a ttend ed its public
schools, an d received his B.A. from Brooklyn College and his Ph.D. in go v
ernm ent from Cornell University. H e h as tau ght at several colleges and un i
versities, includin g H arpu r C ollege at SUNY Bingham ton, Brooklyn College,
Q ueens College, and T he G raduate Faculty of the N ew School for Social Research.
He is curren tly Professor Em eritus of Sociology at Vassar College, w here he taught
social theory and political sociology, chaired the Sociology D epartm ent and
helped establish, and later chaired, the college's first program in multidisciplinary
studies, the Program in Science, Technology, and Society. H e has been the recip
ient of an NE H Summer Fellowship, an NE H Program Development Grant, and
a Fulbrig ht Senior Scholar Gran t to Australia. H is p ublished articles on social the
ory have appeared in The British journal of Sociology, Sociological Focus, Journal of
Psychiatry and Ltnv, and Theory and Society, and he has review ed for Contemporary
Sociology, Social Forces, Polity, an d The American Political Science Revieio. He has
served on the editorial board of Polity and as a corresponding editor to Theory nticỉ
Society. H e currently teaches social theory a t the New School University.
V
Contents
Preface xi
Introduction. T he C lassic Tradition to Post-M odernism : An O verview 1
PAET 1: THE CLASSIC TRADITION 21
1. KARL
MARX:
ALIENATION, CLASS STRUGGLE, AND
CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 23
Introdu ction 23

From Karl Marx an d Frederick Engels: The Manifesto o f the Comm unist Party
From Karl Marx: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 37
From Karl M arx an d Frederick Engels: The German Ideology 43
From Karl M arx: "The Fetishism of Com m odities and the Secret T hereo f"
2. ÉMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION 55
Introductio n 55
From Ém ile D urkheim: The Rules o f Sociological M ethod 59
From Em ile Durkheim : "E goistic Suicide an d A nomic Suicide" 64
From Emile D urkheim: The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 73
From Émile D urkheim: "Ind iv idualism a nd the Intellectuals" 81
3. MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE 91
Introd uction 91
From Max Weber:
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 95
From Max Weber: "Bureaucracy" 99
From M ax Weber: "'Ob jectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" 109
From Max Weber: "Class, S tatus, Party" 116
4. GEORG SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY 12;
Introduction 127
From G eorg Simmel: "The M etropolis an d Mental Life" 129
From Georg Simm cl: "The S tranger" 138
5. GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF 143
Introductio n 143
From G eorge H erbert M ead: Mind, Self and Society 145
viii Contents
6. w. E. B. Du BOIS: DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND
THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL 165
Introduction 165
From w. E. B. Du Bois: The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study 167
From w . E. B. D u Bois: The Souls of Black Folk 171

PART 2:
CONTEMPORARY
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
179
7. FUNCTIONALISM 181
Introduction 181
From Kingsley Davis and W ilbert E. Moore: "Some Principles of Stratification" 183
From Talcott Parsons: "Age an d Sex in the Social Structure of the U nited States" 191
From Robert K. M erton: "M anifest an d Latent Functions" 201
8.
CONFLICT
THEORY 219
Introduction 219
From Ralf D ahrendorf: "Social Structure, Group Interests, and Conflict Grou ps" 222
From c . W right Mills: "The Structure of Power in A merica" 241
From Richard L. Z w eigenhaft and G. W illiam Domhoff:
"The Ironies of D iv ersity" 250
9. EXCHANGE THEORY AND RATIONAL CHOICE 263
Introdu ction 263
From Peter Blau: "The Structure of Social A ssociations" 265
From George c. H omans: "Social Behavior as Exchange" 279
From Jam es s. C olem an: "Social Capital in th e C reation of H um an Capital" 289
10. PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 303
Introduction 303
From Alfred Schutz: "Comm on-Sense an d Scientific Interp retatio n of
H um an Action" 305
From Peter Berger and T hom as L uckmann: “Foundations of Knowledge in
Every day Life" 331
From H arold Garfinkel: "Studies of the Routine G round s of
E veryday Activities" 340

11. SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 349
Intro duction 349
From Herbert Blumer: "Society as S ymbolic Interaction" 351
From Erving G offman: The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 259
Content< ix
12. FEMINIST THEORY
369
introdu ctio n 369
From D orothy Sm ith: "W om en's Experience as a Radical C ritique o f Sociology" 372
From Michele Barrett: "W ords and Things: M aterialism an d M ethod in
C ontem porary Fem inist Analysis" 381
PART 3: MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
395
13. CRITICAL THEORY
397
Introdu ction 397
From H erbert Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man 400
From Jtirgen Haberm as: "Three N orm ative M odels of D emocracy" 413
14. POST-MODERNISM
423
Introdu ction 423
From M ichel Foucault: "The Carceral" 425
From Jean-Franqois Lyotard: The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 435
ie fou rth edition of this selection of readings in social theory contains a
lum ber of sign ificant cha nges that reflect the growth and d evelopm ent in
he field. These changes are also de sign ed to presen t the read er w ith a
bro ade r and richer range of selections, a ddin g to the core read in gs an d rem ain
ing c urrent with others.
In Part 1, dealing w ith the Classic T radition, the M arx cha pter now includes

"The Fetishism of Com m odities," the D urkheim cha pter incorporates "Individ 
ualism and In te llectuals/' an d the chapter on Sim mel has been ex pan ded to
includ e “The Stranger." Part 2 on C ontem pora ry Theory has likewise been
enlarged an d n ow contain s a ch apter from Zw eigenhaft and D om hoff's Diver
sity in the Power Elite, an ex tended chapter on "Exchange Theory an d Rational
Ch oice" that contains selection s b v George H om ans an d Jam es s. C oleman, and
an expa nded "Phenom enology an d E thnom ethodolo gy" cha pter that incorpo
rates H arold Ga rfinkel's w ork on "breach ex perim ents." M ichele Barrett's essay,
"W ords an d Things: M aterialism an d M ethod in C ontem porary F eminist Analy
sis," provides an im portant co unterpoint to Dorothy Sm ith in the c hap ter on
"Feminist Theory." In Part 3, a recent essay b y Jurgen H aberm as brings th e stu 
d ent into contact w ith Haberm as's reflections on the possibility of d eliberative
dem ocracy in a m ulticultural society an d sets him a pa rt from M arcuse's critique
o f technological ration ality and domination.
A w ebsite has been developed to accom pany the fou rth edition. It includes
non-text-specific features such as: ch apter objectives, w eb links, Internet exer
cises, glossary term s, a nd flashcards. Visit the Social Theory Supcrsite by going
to w w w .m hh e.com /socialtheory.
I am very appreciative and thankful for the insightful and encouragin g reviews
sub mitted for this edition by Richard G arnett, M arshall University; C arol Ray, San
Jose State University; Glenna Colclough, University of Alabama, H untsville, Scott
A pplerouth, California State U niversity, N orthrid ge; Steve Buechler, M innesota
State University; Terri LeMoyne, University of Tennessee, C hatta nooga; Emilia
M cGulken, C ase W estern Reserve; and Basil Kard aras, Capital University. The
careful reading of the text an d the considered suggestions m ade bv these review 
ers are reflected in the chang es that I have undertak en for this revision; chan ges,
for w hich, I o f co urse, assu m e full responsibility as editor.
W orking closely w ith the sup po rtiv e staff at M cGraw-H ill has m ade it po s
sible to bring th e process of revision and rew riting to successful conclusion w ith
ease. Phil Butcher (Publisher), S herith Pankratz (Sociology E ditor), Jill G ordo n

xii Preface
(Assistant Editor), Am y Shaffer (Editorial Coordinator), and Jill M oline (Project
M anager) all deserve my special th anks for their conscientious and thoughtful
oversight of this project. Finally, I w ant to thank George Ritzer for e ndorsing the
original idea for this reader, for his con tinuing su ppo rt of the project as a con
sulting editor, and for his sustained friendship.
James Far^anh
Poughkeepsie, Nezc York
New York City, Neic York
2003
™ READINGS IN SOCIAL THEORY
The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism
Introduction
The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism: An Overview
James Farganis
I The Classic Tradition
A lth ough theories ab out society da te back to the
G re eks, sociology as a disciplined, scientific
inquiry is of m ore recent origin. Auguste Comte
(1798-1857) coined the term "sociology" in 1822
to connote the system atic stud y of society. The
influ ences up on him da te back to Charles de
M ontesquieu (1689-1755) a nd to the reflections
of the
philosophes
durin g the Enlightenment. O f
eq ual im portance to C om te w ere those conser
vative thinkers wh o surfaced after the French
R

evolution to c ond em n the E nligh ten ment and
its d octrines. Francois M arie Arou et d e Voltaire
(1694-1778), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778),
D enis D iderot (1713-1784), an d Jean A ntoine de
C ondorce t (1742-1794) w ere the eighteenth-
ce ntury E nligh te nm en t think ers w hose opti
m istic view s a bou t ind iv id ual rights, h um an
perfectibility, and social progress were absorbed
into sociological theory, as were the conserva
tive v iew s of L ouis d e Bonald (1754-1840) and
Josep h d e M aistre (1754-1821) reg arding the
prim acy of the social, the role of custom and tra
dition in social life, a nd the centrality of the fam 
ily, th e com m unity, g roup s, and institutions in
ord ering, regulating, and shap in g the lives of
ind ivid ua ls. In the next few page s w e w ill
review briefly the key ideas of the Enlighten
m en t philosopher and their conservativ e critics.
M ontesq uieu's Persian Letters, publishe d in
1721 w he n he w as thirty-tw o years old, illus
trate the idea o f sociological perspective. M on
tesqu ieu wro te these letters as if th ey were an
exchange betw een Persian visitors to France. He
pub lished them anonym ously, claim ing that the
Persians w ho w rote th em had staye d w ith him
during their visit. In the letters M ontesquieu
com m ents, often satirically, on the custom s and
hab its of French society of his time. The ability
to step outside o f on e's society, to distance on e
self from w ha t seems to b e natura l, an d to

de velop a different pe rsp ective from the one
take n for g ran te d, a re sociological a ttitud es
exhibited in this early work.
The Spirit of the Laics, M o ntesqu ieu's most
fam ous wo rk, ap peare d in 1748. In it h e d evel
op s systematically his views o n ho w the culture
of a people is affected bv their g eog ra phy and
clim ate and tem peram ent. Law s, custom s, and
forms of gov ernm ent are n ot na tu ral p hen om 
ena, bu t are shaped by the su rrou nd ing c ondi
tions un der which a particular p eop le hav e to
live. M ontesquieu's m ethod com bines observa
tion w ith reflection, and his conclusions reflect
a careful stu dy of th e relationship betw een the
beh avior a nd beliefs of p eople a nd th eir envi
ron m ental context. In ad ditio n, M o ntesquieu
explored pop ulatio n densities an d p roperty dis
tribution in ord er to a rrive at his social an d
political typologies.
Enlightenm ent philosophes like M ontesquieu
w ere the eig hteenth-century precu rsors of the
classical sociological theorists. T he philosoplies
w ere im pressed w ith the revolutionary advances
w rought in the natural sciences, particularly by
N ew to nian physics, and so ught to discover the
scientific truth s ab out society:
1
W hat is new and original about Enlighten
m ent tho ugh t, therefore, is the w ho le
hearted ad op tio n of the m eth odological

pattern of N ew to n's physics; and w ha t is
even m ore im portant for o ur consideration
of the philosoph ical found ations of socio
logical theo ry is the fact that imm ediately
w ith its ado ption it w as generalized and
em ployed In realms oth er than the m athe
m atical and physical. (Zeitlin 1968, 7).
Social order, the inequalities of class, the
dom ination bv an aristocracy were no longer to
be accepted as divinelv ordain ed and unchange
able truths. Science was to be a critical instru
m ent in the pursu it of truth, a truth that w ould
liberate people from the dark m yths of the divine
r
ight of kings and religious dog m a and lead
them toward a progressively dem ocratic order
based on the new ly discovered truths ab out the
"righ ts o f man ." Rousseau w ro te o f the inequal'
ities between people caused by social institutions
an d practices, and noted tha t in the "natural"
state the differences between people w ere far less
acu te than in society. It is society, h e argued, that
distorts the basic goodness, decency, and equal
ity that are the natural condition of m ankind:
I con ceive th at th ere are tw o k inds of
inequality amo ng the hum an species; one,
w hich I call natural or physical, b ecause it is
established bv nature, and consists in dif
ference of age, health, bodilv strength, and
the qualities of mind or of the soul: and

another, w hich m ay be called moral or polit
ical inequality, because it depen ds on a kind
of convention , and is established, or at least
autho rized , bv the consent of m en. This lat
ter consists of the different privileges which
som e m en enjov to the prejudice of others;
Mich as that of beina; m ore rich, more hon
ored, m ore pow erful, or even in a position to
extract obedience. (Rousseau N47, 160).
t ondorcct, a matht’iruitieinn who endorsed
i 'v iJiYi I hot ÍỈH' MK'ial would progress
!-'-tor If they
1
< 'Iknvt'd the m eth ods of the natural
H, V :vọ>, ,‘irmlv Ivlicved ill the notion ot hu man
2 Introduction
perfectibility and progress in the a chievement of
a just society. C ondorcet supp orted equal right*
for w omen, strongly opposed slavery, called tor
universal suffrage, and endorsed the separation
of church and state, freedom of opinion, and a
w id e range of social w elfare m easures to help
the less fo rtuna te m emb ers o f society.
The ideas of the philosopher took hold in the
clim ate of p rerevo lu tionary France, an d the
French Revolution is arguably the political cul
m in ation of those ideas in action. T he Revolu
tion challenged the legitimacy of the aristocratic
state and those religious, social, and political
institutio ns th at supp orted it.

In place of the linden regime, a new social
o rder w as legisla ted into bein g based on
ratio nal principles, consciously constructed bv
po litic ized an d inform ed in dividu als. L aw s
w ere passed w hich tran sform ed the political,
economic, social, and cultural life of France.
The aristocracy w as abolished, the church w as
abolished , the industrial g uild s were abolished.
Divorce became legalized, the educational sys
tem w as reform ed an d centralized, and a new-
go vern ing stru cture w as created. W hat
inform ed these revolutionary changes were the
ideas developed by the philosopher concerning
the rights of individuals to establish collectivelv
their own g ove rn m ent and to rem ake their
social institutions according to their notions of
progress and justice.
O ut of the revolu tionary upheaval in France
there emerged a long period of instability, of
cou nterrevolution, of attem pts at m onarchical
restoration, and Napoleonic im perial do m ina
tion. Rather than the steady progress to ward a
free an d dem ocratic society in which human
reason wo uld order the affairs of politics and
society, there follow ed a period of bloodshed,
division, dom ination, an d reaction. The Enlight
enm ent phiiofophes w ere seen by their critics as
naive m vthm akers wh o had su bstituted their
ow n a priori ideals of progress, reason, and free
dom for the earlier mythologies. Far from un der

taking a scientific examination of societv and the
human condition, the philosopher had actually
The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism: A n O verview 3
engaged in a form of m oral philosophising. Carl
Becker (1959,101) a sk s the question:
Is it, then, possible that the P hilosophers
were not really intereste d in establishing
the rights suitable to m an's nature on the
facts of experience? Is it possible that they
w ere eng aged in that nefarious m edieval
enterp rise of reconciling the facts of hu man
experience w ith th e truth s already, in some
fashion, revealed to them?
To the se q ue stio ns B ecker a nsw e rs w ith an
em phatic "yes" as he likens th e science of the
philosophes to a relig ious faith in progress, rea
son , and h um an go odness.
In the afterm ath of the French Revolution, a
g rou p of social theorists led by Louis d e Bonald
and Joseph d e M aistre em erged a s a conserva
tive, counter-Enlightenm ent, intellectual force.
They were d istressed a t the c ondition of France
follow ing th e Revo lutio n, its social dislocation,
political turm oil, and general disintegration, and
they held the pliilosophes directly accountable.
N ot on ly h ad th e plĩilosoplies an d their fo llo w e rs
badly misjudge d the social needs of people to
belon g to g roup s an d com m unities greater th an
them selv es, to abide b y collective ideals, and to
pa rtak e in collective rituals, bu t they had falsely

assum ed that hu m ans are rational a nd progres
sive creatures, and that they are constitu ted as
ind iv id uals by their natura l rights rathe r than
shaped by their social environm ent.
T he p rim acv of th e social ove r the individ 
ual is a fundam ental po int of difference between
the En ligh tenm ent philosophes an d their co nser
vative critics. W hereas the philosophes saw the
ind ivid ua l as e nd ow ed w ith n atural an d
inalienab le rig hts and society a s a co ntract
entere d in to by in div idu als, the counter-
Enligh tenm ent co nservatives v iew ed society as
p rim ary a nd th e ind iv idu al as sh aped by social
institutions to m eet the n eeds of the larg er social
order. The ideology of indiv id ualism w as a d is
tortion of the truly social nature of hu m an life.
Family, co mm unity, ch urch, tow n, and guild
are fun ctio nally interrelated and pro vide for
the m aterial an d spiritu al ne eds of ord in ary
people. Tradition, custom , and institution s that
have stood the test of tim e shou ld inform us
ab ou t the social n ature of h um ankin d, they
claim ed. The C hurch was to be seen a s a neces
sary bindin g an d in tegrative force, an d the fam
ily, no t the in dividu al, w as view ed as the basic
un it of society.
The past and th e p resent form a seam less
web, and it is only the arrog ance of individ ual
ism, or m ore particularly the presum ption o f the
pow er of hu m an reason, that ha s allowed som e

peo ple to believe that they can legislate a new
social order. The result of this arrogan ce, the
con servatives seem ed to be saving, w as the
social ch aos a nd insta bility th at co nfronted
France following th e R evolution, an d by e xten
sion, w ould be the fate of all social cha nge
inspired by abstract de duc tiv e reason.
The classic tradition begins with Karl M arx
(1818-1883) an d en ds w ith Karl M annh eim 's
(1893-1947) w ritings on the sociology of kn ow l
edge. The classical social theorists w ished to
distinguish their w ork from spe cula tive m oral
philosophy and to contribute to a scientific study
of society. This is the objective that unites them ,
b ut their success in ach ieving it is debatable.
Despite their best intention s the social theorists
of the classic tra dition w ere, for the m ost part,
unable to leave behind the m oral pre supp osi
tions that impelled their inquiries. T heir g reat
ness for us lies as m uch in their cogent analyses
of the forces of m odern iza tion and its im pact on
the hum an condition as in their noble efforts at
a science o f society.
The classical texts do not speak w ith one
voice ab out an y matter, and so it is difficult to
ascrib e com m on characteristics to them . Even
on the critical qu estion of th eir com m itm en t to
science as against philosophy, it should be noted
that these theorists held differing view s of w hat
they m eant b v science. Thev w ere div ide d over

the qu estio n of w he ther the m etho ds of science
as thev had been dev elope d in the physical sci
ences w ere ap pro priate to the subject m atter of
the social sciences. Som e saw the quest for social
4 Introduction
laws as no different from the discovery of the
law s of nature, whereas others found compelling
the claim that hum an beings are unique in their
rational and linguistic abilities. Distinctions were
m ade betw een the n atural and the cultural, o r
social, sciences, and argum ents were advanced
that each requires a different m ethodology.
A lthough th e classical theo rists agree that
claim s m ust be substantiated by appeal to evi
dence, there is little unity on what constitutes
evidence. If history is the den se and rich source
o
f sociological evidence, som e ap proach ed his
tory as if it w ere g overn ed by laws of social
developm en t that m u st be u ncovered, w hile
o
thers view ed history a s co ntingent a nd
unk now able in its totality. To some, history con
notes progressive evolution tow ard em ancipa
tion, o r social justice, or dem ocracy; to others,
histo ry is no th ing but a factual chaos until order
is im posed on it tem po rarily by the researcher
and his or her theory.
N or was th ere any unity w ith respect to
w hat constitutes society. O n the on e hand, some

m aintained tha t society can be stud ie d as a
totality, w hereas others saw individuals a s the
comp onen t p arts of society an d the source of all
observable action. If the latter w ere the case,
the n som e fea red that so cio logy w ould be
reduced to psychology and could m ake no con
tribution of its own. O n th e other hand, if soci
ety cou ld be studied as an entity un to itself,
there was the da nge r of inventing a m etaphys
ical gro up m ind an d thereby defeatin g the p u r
po se of scientific investigation.
The classic trad ition is not a single tradition
speaking with a uniform voice. It is m ired in con
flicting view s and often irreconcilable perspec
tives that reflect deeply held m oral assumptions.
Science is pow erless to resolve these moral dif
ferences, and as a result m any of these d iv er
gences continue to surface in contem porary social
theory. Today the controversy takes the form of
an intense dispute between adheren ts w ho claim
that sociological tru ths can be established by a
strict observance of the rules of positivism and
those w ho think that sociology is a discu rsive
discipline w hose tru th s c an b e established
throu gh rational, generalized, speculative, and
persuasive a rg um ent (A lexander 1987).
In w hat follow s w e w ill discuss the intel
lectual conflicts and tensio ns w ith in the classic
tradition. T hese differences stem from the var
ied attitude s of the classical theorists to the

legacy of the Enlightenment. Did thev believe in
progress? D id they view science as an unalloved
blessing? W ould hu m an reason lead to a m ore
just and hum an e society, or w ould new form s of
dom inatio n em erge in th e age of science? The
different responses to these questions stake out
the relationship of these theorists to the Enlight
enment traditions. T hev also dem onstrate how
their u narticu lated moral presuppo sitions led
the classical theorists to define their science,
their methods, an d their sociology in radically
diverse w ays.
The principal contrib utors to the classic tra
dition are both scientists and discursiv e theo
rists, and their w ork is both a continu ation of
the En lightenm ent tradition and a dep artu re
from it. T he classical theorists w ere more atten
tive system atically than their Enlightenment
predecessors to em pirical ev idence and to his
torical analysis. T heir avoid ance of unfoun ded
and broadlv specu lative g eneralizations marks
them as social theorists w ho relied on evidence
an d rational argum ent.
It has been suggested (Salom on 1945, 596)
that m uch of the developm ent of sociological
theory can be und erstood as a deb ate with the
gh ost of Karl M arx. On this v iew Marx emerges
as the child o f the Enlightenment, and the con
flicts an d contradictions w ithin the classic tra
ditio n are explained by reference to M arx and

his ad versaries. H owever, the dev elo pm ent of
sociological theory m ay also be said to ow e
m uch to the ph ilosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche
(1844-1900), especially in light of his influence on
M ax Weber an d G eorg Simm el and the grow ing
recognition of his significance for post-m odernist
social th ought (Chapter 14).
The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism: A n Overview 5
The M arxist tradition represen ts a continu
atio n of m any of the Enlightenm ent's rationalist
and progressive convictions. This humanistic
project of a ju st and dem ocratic rational social
o rde r h as been carried fo rw ard in the w orks of
Ju rgen H ab erm as (C hapter 13). By co ntrast,
N ietzsche's critique of scientific objectivity, his
view of reason as a form of dom ination, his dis
da in for dem ocratic culture and politics, and his
rom antic visio n of the heroic trium ph of the
Ubennensch over the "last m en" w ho seek h ap
pin ess find reso nan ce in th e w orks of M ax
Weber, G eorg Sim mel, an d the post-m odernists.
It is ag ainst this b ackdrop of continuities
a nd d isco ntinu itie s w ith the E nlig htenment
and th e internal ten sio ns that m ark th e classic
trad itio n that so m e of the key social theo rists
w ill b e discu ssed. O u r aim is to present the dif
feren t p erspectives , th e d ifferen t ideas co n
ce rn ing the relation ship o f the individu al to
society, an d the different m eth odologies that
co nstitu te the classic tradition , a nd to dispel the

notio n that it is a sin gu lar traditio n that repre
sen ts a unified p erspectiv e.
T he classic tradition represents those w ork s
that hav e com e to be considered the fou nda
tional texts of the discipline of sociology. T hey
are g enerally regarded to be excellent examples
of the k ind of w ork that p eop le w ho claim to be
sociolo gists ou gh t to engage in, and , because
they are exem plary, thev contin ue to serve as a
sou rce o f ideas and hypotheses abo ut, and ori
entation s to, social reality.
Fo r th e m o st p art, these w o rks ten d to
ad dre ss a broad range of p ro blems em erging
from the tran sition from a n ag rarian to an
indu strial society. W hile reading from the w orks
of M arx, D urkheim , a nd Weber, the stud en t
should c onstantly que stion the relev ance and
im portan ce o f w hat is being said. For exam ple,
h ow significant for o ur tim e are M arx's ideas of
class an d class conflict? D oes it m atter at all that
A m erica an d o ther W estern in dustrial societies
are m oving into a po st-in dustrial age, into a
service econom y in w hich ind ustria l labor is on
the decline and in which the service sector is
exp anding ? Does the em ergence of the infor
m ation age with its em phasis on know ledge cre
ate ne w class relationships, or is this an age in
w hich class categories are no lo nger relevant?
W hat are the so urces of conflict in o ur contem 
po rary society and are thev traceable to eco

nom ic discrepancies b etw een rich and poor, o r
d o the lines of conflict fall am on g different sta 
tus grou ps, tha t is, racial, ethnic, religious, a nd
sexual? Similar questions can and sh ould be for
m ulated a bout o ther reading s in th is anthology.
Even w hen these classical texts seem to be
date d, thev nevertheless p rovide us w ith the
im portant questions that m ust be u ppp erm ost in
the m in d of a sociologist. Do they alert u s to
observe those around us, to listen closelv to their
expressions of belief and to p onder w here these
view s com e from? Are th e values th at people
hold a reflection of their class ba ckgrou nd, o r is
it their status gro ups that most closely influence
their beliefs? H ow p eople speak, w hat clothes
thev wear, w hat habits they e xhibit sh ould lead
us to inquire as to the social antecedents of these
beh aviors an d to a sk w hat kind of im age is
being projected and for w ha t pu rpose.
M ore broadly, the classical texts com pel us
to ask w hat w e mean bv the term "society." We
all take it for g ranted that w e know w ha t soci
ety is, vet a m om en t's reflection will cau se the
reade r to pa use and think. Is society no th ing
m ore than a collection of in div iduals? H ow are
these d ifferent individuals b rought tog ether so
that they can coo perate and u nde rstan d one
ano ther? D oes society have an ex istence o utside
of us, or is society in us, in ou r consciousness,
an d, if so, h ow did it get there? If, as som e

w ould m aintain, society is a collective svstem of
com m only shared beliefs an d agreed-on rules of
behavior, w ho m ake s up the beliefs and the
rules and are th ey in the interest of all o r the
d om inant few? M arx a nd D urk heim w restle
w ith these questions an d come u p w ith very dif
feren t answe rs. But d espite their differences,
they are concern ed w ith fun dam en tal q uestio ns
6 Introduction
that define the sociological enterprise, and the
studen t is invited to think through these ques
tions with the skilled guidance of som e of the
great m in ds in social theorv.
A uguste Comte (1798-1857), often cited as
the first to use the w ord sociology to refer to the
new discipline, sought to use historical evidence
to establish law s of social developm ent. He w as
less rigorous and system atic in his research than
those w ho follow ed him, a nd for this reason he
m ay be view ed as a proto-sociologist. The con
tradictory influences which shaped his work are
ev id ent in his co m m itm en t to science a nd
progress on the one hand and his view that indi
vid ualism w as “the disea se of the W estern
w orld" on the other. It will be recalled that the
Enlightenm ent thinkers end orsed the view that
scientific prog ress and in div id ual rights w ere
pa rt of an em ergin g dem ocratic social order. It
w as the co unter-E nlighten m ent that con 
dem ned the idea of individualism and offered

the notion that society an d its institutions are
prim ary and shape the behavio r of individuals.
Comte taps into the Enlightenment for his view s
o
n science an d progress an d d raw s on the
counter-Enlighten m ent for his v iew s on the
r
elationship of the individu al to society.
Com te's theory of society was b ased on his
conviction that the scientific approach, or posi
t
ivism, w as the m ost ap propriate m ethod for
un derstanding social order an d social change. By
positivism Com te m eant a stud v of society based
on sensory observation, historical comparison,
and experimentation in the quest for universal
law s, rather than reliance on abstract moral prin
ciples about hum an nature and social justice.
Comte represents a viewpo int that disdains the
untidin ess of dem ocratic politics and lead s to an
endorsement of rule bv a know ledge elite. Unlike
Plato's philosopher-kings, however, the rulers
of m odern society would be sociologist-kings,
people with technical know ledge of the opera
tions of society and their consequences. Today
we refer to this kind of thinking as technocratic,
and hence for us Com te is the first technocrat.
Karl M arx (1818-1883), É mile D urkheim
(1858-1917), an d Max Weber (1864-1920) are
generally considered the "holy trinity" of the

classic tradition. A lthough there a re im portant
conceptual sim ilarities betw een them , there are
considerable m ethodological an d substantive
d
ifferences, some of which have already been
alluded to; vet the significant p oints of contrast
for wh at follow s will be in their often irrecon
cilable moral assum ptio ns, w hich provide them
w ith critical perspectives on modernity, and in
the different wavs in which thev carry on the
sociological enterp rise.
M arx and C om te w ere only superficially
similar in th eir approach. Both are interested in
a science of society, both view history as the
source of em pirical d ata, and both tend to think
in term s of stag es of historical develo pm ent
a
nd the predictiv e value of their social theories.
But M arx is a dialectical thin ker in contrast to
C om te's positivism, so that M arx sees social
dev elo pm ent as a consequence of conflicting
classes actin g to shape a fu ture society. Dialec
tical reasoning a ttem pts to capture the dynam ic
character of social reality by viewing change as
a consequence of historically evolving o pposi
tional forces. In this case it refers to the capacity
of one class to negate, to challenge, and to over
throw the dominatio n of an other and bring
ab out revolutionary change.
In p lace of Com tea n technocrats, w hose

prevision allow s them privileg ed access to the
fu tu re co urse of social d eve lo pm en t, Marx
evokes an active a nd politically conscious pro 
letariat w hose collective opp ressio n compels
them to act in behalf of their ow n liberation and
thus profou ndly alter the social, economic, and
political circumstances of their existence.
At the h eart of M arx's theory of industrial
society is the m oral view of h um an beings as
essentially free and of capitalism as a m od e of
production that enslaves pe ople throu gh insti
tution al arrang em ents w hich define the rela
tionship betw een wage labor an d capital. Marx
observed the dev elopm en t of capitalism and
The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism: An Overview 7
sa w in it a system that legitimated the exploita
tion o f on e c lass b y another. H e so ug ht to
exp ose the true nature of that relationship by
ch allen ging th e ac cepted n otions of private
prope rty and indiv id ual freedom. M arx p ro
jected a revolutionary destruction o f capitalism
as a necessary stage in the em ancip ato ry dev el
opm en t of m ankind.
N o less sincere a nd profoundly troubled by
the a dv en t o f m o dern indu stria l society,
D urk heim analyz ed th e c entra l problem of
m od ernity as the breakdow n of those shared
m o ral beliefs that deve lop as a result of a com 
m on com m itm ent to com mo n ideals a nd values
bv the m embers o f a comm unity. For Durkheim

the conditio n of m od ernity is characterized by
the b reakdown of com m unal ties and bonds as
individu als are compelled to live in a social envi
ron m en t th at is characterized as anomic, i.e,
no rm less an d law less. T he similarities to the
views of the conservative counter-Enlightenment
sho uld be noted, altho ugh D urkheim did not
seek to re tu rn to th e old order. The term anomie
literally m eans w itho ut law, an d it is Durkheim 's
view lhat this pervasiv e condition of m odernity
quite literally destroys individ uals w ho m ust
exist within it, for such con ditions are responsi
ble for increases in the suicide rate. W hereas
M arx se es th e rules and regulatio ns of capitalist
society as so m any m anifestation s of class inter
est a nd d om ina tion , an d arg ue s for their
destruc tion in ord er to liberate the proletariat
from dom ination , Diirkheim argues that legiti
m ate rules an d regulatio ns are a necessary and
essential feature of social life. People need ideals
to b elieve in, and they need ru les to gu ide their
social life. Moral regu latio n and social in teg ra
tion are po sitive features of a healthy society in
w hich ind ividu als m ay thrive as m em bers of a
com m unity.
D urkheim w restled w ith the destructive fea
tures of anom ie and the growth of individ ualism
in m odern society. T he "cult of the indiv id ual"
w as D urk heim 's attem pt to reconcile the central
tende ncy of m od ernity tow ard ind ividu alism

with the V'iew that moral consensus is threatened
by fragmentation, extreme differentiation, and
individu alization. In "Ind ividualism an d the
Intellectuals" (Durkheim 1973), he distinguished
between egoistic individualism and a moral indi
vidualism, arguing th at the latter w as the "cult of
the individu al" and had become the basis of the
new consensus of m odernity. According to this
view, the ind iv idual is a subject with rig hts a nd
with the m oral responsibility to act in accor
dan ce w ith p rinciples of justicc and the com mon
good. M oral in divid ualism is a social creation
sup ported and enco uraged by social institutions
and m oral practices. D urkheim argued that the
idea of the egoistic individual intent o n self-
interest is a metaphysical construct that depicts
a n atu ral and atom istic creation wh ose prim acy
is justified philosophically, n ot sociologically.
M uch of th e disagreem en t betw een Marx
and Du rk heim tu rns on th e m oral assu m ptions
thev m ake rega rding the relation ship of the
individual to society. M arx's em ancipatory view
precedes his em pirical analyses and p rovides
the found ation for his theory. M arx qu estion s
the legitim acy of any com m unity, ideals, o r
institutions tha t tolerate, sup po rt, o r justify
inequality, i.e., the do m in atio n of one class ov er
another. It is M arx's claim that w ith the de stru c
tion of private property the equality of all can be
secured u nd er c om m unism as all the m em bers

becom e equa l participan ts in the social, po liti
cal, and econom ic life of the com munity.
By contrast, D urkhe im rejects th is egalitar
ian concep tion as u topian an d im possible to
realize. As a resu lt, he a rgu es that ce rta in
inequalities are n atural a nd cannot b e erad i
cated. It is possible to reform in stitutions so as
to m ake them conform m ore faithfully to the
established egalitarian ideals of society. T hus
D urk heim w ou ld fa vor policies th at foster
equality of op po rtu nity be cause they allow the
na tu ral talents and abilities of individuals to be
judged irrespective of race, gende r, a nd ethnic
ity. If the institutions of society keep faith w ith
that principle of justice, then ind iv iduals w ill
8 Introduction
identify w ith the community, sharing its ideals
and its moral consensus, and will judge its ou t
comes as just and legitimate. If, bv contrast, eco
nom ic institutions favor the privileged and risk
the form ation of classes and class conflict, then
the binding ideals of the comm unity will be shat
tered. Alternatively, if economic policies favor the
least privileged by attem pting to equalize out
c
omes, society runs the risk of losing suppo rt
from the vast m ajority of its m em bers w ho
believe that rew ards are d ue to those w ho
dem onstrate ability. Consequently, Durkheim
recom mends social and econom ic reforms that

will equalize conditions and m ake the social
ideals of equality of opportu nity credible because
these reforms w ould foster integration and the
acceptance of regulative norm s as legitimate.
For Durkheim , in sh arp contrast to Marx, it
is possible to h ave com m unity w ith inequality,
pro vided the ineq uality is a consequence of
m erit an d achievement. M arx's theory seeks to
lib erate p eop le from the v ery sv stem that
D urkheim w ish es to reform and legitimate.
A lthough both theorists are analyzing and inter
preting industrial capitalism, they do so from
the different perspectives th at are formed from
the m oral presup positio ns they hold ab out the
individual and society.
D urkheim 's view s on sociological method
are clearly patterned after the natu ral sciences,
and some of his wo rk reflects a com mitm ent to
statistical analysis and system atic data gathering
that m ake it exemplary for scientific sociology.
D urkheim is m eticulous in the way he con
structs his argu m ent, im peccable in his u se of
logical analysis, a nd precise in the w av he m ar
shals evidence leading to his generalizations.
Durkheim 's study, Suicide, is taken as a m odel of
ho w a sociological a nalysis sh ou ld be co n
du cted, and his Rules of Sociological Method is
widely recognized as a m ajor contribution to the
m ethodology of the social sciences.
Max W eber's theo ry of action focuses atte n

tion on the individ ual as a social actor, a nd his
ĩvrstehcnde methodology invites us to explore
the subjective m oaning of action from the actor's
po in t of view. In this respect, W eber's w ork
seems to be in conflict with the m ore system atic
and p ositivistic inclinations of D urkh eim 's
m ethodology and the dialectical approach taken
bv Karl Marx.
W eber's Protestant Ethic ami the Spirit of Cap
italism argu es th at religious beliefs m ay have
pro fo und an d even rev olutionary econom ic
consequences; for ideas are no t sim ply epiphe-
n om e na l co nse qu enc es o f eco no m ic m o de s of
production. In th is stud y Weber reveals how
belief in the tenets of Calvinism led to changes
in the believers' attitude s tow ard w ork that
becam e an im portant factor in the em ergence of
capitalism . In op position to M arx 's rational
v iew o f h isto ry as a n o rd e red d e v e lop m en t
leading to a logically determ in ed endp oint, or
telos, W eber view s history a s contingent and
accidental, an d hum an action as often e ntailing
unforeseen and unanticipated results. Weber
seem s to be saying, how ever tentatively, that
capitalism w as the un anticipated consequence
of Protestant beliefs and not the program matic
an d ration al transition from feud alism as
depicted bv Marx.
"Class, Status, Party" focuses on W eber's
views on po wer in m odern society in contrast to

M arx's notion of the ruling class. W eber seem s to
share Marx's definition of class b ut denies the
singular im portance that M arx ascribes to it.
Rather than view ing classes a nd class co n
sciousness as a necessary developme nt u nder
capitalism , W eber sees sta tus g roups as natural
comm unities that im pact m ore directly and
imm ediately on the consciousness an d actions of
individuals. Furthermore, the Marxist view that
there is a single avenue to p ow er in society and
that the dom in ant economic class is the ruling
class is challenged by W eber's analysis. Eco
nom ic class position, status honor, and persua
sive leadership of a p arty are distin ctive means
to power. They m ay overlap, but they are not
identical an d arc not always found together in
the sam e individual.
Excerpts from W eber's essay on m ethodo l
ogy pro vide an excellent discussion of problem s
The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism: An Overview 9
su rrou nd ing the idea of objectivity and detail
W eber's contributions to a distinctively socio
logical m eth od. W eber em ploys an interpretive
m ethodology, u sing rational m odels o r ideal
types to develop them es or generalizations from
a p ainstaking exam in ation of the historical data.
H e appro ach es historical in form ation from the
p ersp ec tive of a so cio lo gist; from th is rich
em pirical d ata he d raw s ob servation s abo ut
class, status, party, religion, and modernity.

T he differences b etwe en W eb er's approach
and M arx's dialectical m ethod signal an en du r
ing a nd irresolvable conflict ove r the relation
sh ip b etw een thou ght an d action, and betw een
reason and reality. For Marx the object of social
analy sis is to change the world; for Weber it is
enou gh to try to u nd erstand it. A nd w hereas
M arx believes that his dialectical m ethodology
un cov ers the forces o f revo lutionary change,
W eber m aintains th at rational thought is lim ited
an d prescriptio ns for chan ge are the province of
po liticians a nd no t of social scientists.
W eber arg ues that objectivity in the social
sciences is possible, although only u nd er care
fully defined conditions. He recognizes the influ
ence of m oral values in social research but claim s
that these values enter at specific junctures and
sh ou ld no t influe nce th e outco m es of the
research. Social analysts holding radically dif
feren t v alues sh ould be able to agree on the facts
even if their interpretation s of their m eaning
an d significance might differ. As a result, Weber
believes that it is im possible to cond uct social
research w ithout recognizing the role that values
play. H e does not argu e for the elim ination of
values from research, a clear impossibility for
Weber. O n the other han d, such a recognition
nee d n ot lead to the v iew that all research is
tainted by subjectivity an d is therefore unscien
tific. W eber's position is m ore su btle an d more

complex. A lth ough ackn owledg ing the role of
value s W eber circum scribes their im pact and
refu ses to su rrend er ratio nal discou rse to the
arbitrary claim s of power.
The relationship b etwe en k now ledge and
po w er is develop ed bv M ichel Foucault (Chapter
14), w hose po st-m od ernist th eory is greatly
influenced by Nietzsche. Ho wever, altho ugh
F ouc ault follow s Friedrich N ietzsche m ore
closely, W eber's reluctance to un derm ine scien
tific rationality attests to his critical relatio nship
to N ietzsche. In o ther respects as w ell, there are
affinities between these two thinkers. W eber's
belief that charism atic po litics can overcom e
the ossified b ureaucratic system reson ates w ith
the idea of the Ubermensch, an d W eber's w orst
fears that instrum ental rationality w ould create
technical an d passion less m en ex tends N iet
zsch e's in tu itive insights into the realm o f so 
ciological analysis.
Follow ing N ietzsche it w as W eber w ho saw
the da rker side of scientific rationality an d w ho
pointed to the en during resistances to p olitically
d irected ch ange. W eber w rote o f the d isen 
cha ntm ent o f the w orld un de r the pres sure of
scientific reason a nd recounted the emergen ce
of a new form of do min atio n with th e sprea d of
a rational bureau cratic order. In a va riation of
N ie tzsc he's them e that G od is de ad, Weber saw
conflicts over m oral values as a ceaseless stru g

gle betw een "G ods" and "Dem ons." C ontrary
to th e Enlightenm ent, this was not a w orld in
w hich politics w ou ld necessarily ush er in a n ew
o rde r of h arm on y and justice. Politics is an
en du ring conflict of interests, a stru ggle for
power. As W eber pu ts it, politics is the " stron g
an d slow boring of hard b oard s" (W eber 1958,
128), and only those w ho en du re the struggle
an d m aintain their vision can h ope to bring
abou t change.
G eorg S im m el, G eorge Herb ert M ead, an d
Karl M ann heim o ccup y a p lace just slightly
behind that of M arx, D urkh eim , a nd Weber.
Simmel view ed m odernity a s a m ixture o f p os
itive and negative o utcom es rather than u nal
loyed b lessin g or a n unreliev ed failure. H is
social a nalysis rev eals a new form of c ultural
aliena tion in the p resen ce o f unpre ceden ted
ind ividual freed om . For S im m el, m od ernity
conn otes the bre akd ow n of small, rural com 
m unities an d their personal styles of interaction.
In their place, u rba n centers of p rod uction and