The politics of land use conversion in china case study of a guangdong county 7

Chapter Seven
Concluding Reflections
7
Concluding Reflections
Lessons from Land Use Conversion in Sihui
What lessons do we glean from land use change in Sihui? We have seen how the
precedence of economic goals in local officials’ career advancement compel some
officials to cast land use quotas aside to meet top-down targets on industrialization,
economic growth and so forth. We have also seen how the revenues – including the
land conveyance fee, miscellaneous fees, direct and indirect taxes – generated from
the conversion of agricultural land and subsequent land development have enriched
local governments. Given that various tax reforms in the post-1994 context have
constricted local coffers at the county-level and below, land as an alternative revenue
source has helped to alleviate the burden of growing expenditures. Therefore, local
officials’ career-maximizing intention aside, exploiting land resources to raise
revenue may not necessarily be bad for the governance of the society. The caveat is,
of course, how the land revenue is expended.
There are a few scenarios on how local governments may make use of land
proceeds. First, investable surplus from land may or may not be diverted to the
provision of collective goods.
1
Alternatively, even if investable surplus has been
channelled to fund the construction of urban infrastructure, it may not benefit urban
residents collectively. The proliferation of superfluous image-engineering projects,
which results in overinvestment and inefficiency, illustrates this argument. As the
Asian Development Bank points out, “Local governments, which control 70% of fiscal
spending, also contribute to the investment drive by spending on new factories and
1
There is also the likelihood that some of the profits from land may be pocketed by local officials
although we lack evidence in the case of Sihui. Corruption in land processes is increasingly prevalent in
China. Gong, citing the deputy director of Land Management and Utilization Bureau of the MLR in a

CCTV interview, claims that there were 710,000 cases of illegal land deals under investigation from
1998 to 2003. See Gong Ting, “Corruption and Local Governance,” pp. 90.
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Chapter Seven
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‘trophy’ projects in their areas, often regardless of whether expansion is warranted on
economic grounds.”
2

Sometimes, instead of contributing to the collective good of society, ill-conceived
infrastructure projects may have costly economic consequences for the society. Take
a highway construction project by a Shenyang government for example. In 1998,
Shenyang embarked on the construction of a 60 kilometres highway. Out of the 1.7
billion yuan investment, 1.3 billion yuan was financed by a Hong Kong group. Upon
the completion of the highway, the Shenyang government would repay the Hong
Kong investor through the takings from the road toll, at the rate of 15 percent of the
sum of investment for the first five years and 18 percent for the second five years.
However, because the daily traffic volume had fallen short of the initial estimation of
60,000 vehicles by about 50 percent, the government had to make up for the shortfall
from its own coffers, a sum amounting to around 70 million yuan annually.
3

Another scenario is that land resources are drained from agriculture to drive
development in the non-agricultural sectors. The government expropriates land at
low cost, depressing or withholding compensation to dispossessed rural land owners
but the investable surplus is not channelled back into support for agriculture or into
social security programmes that improve the welfare of the rural community.
4
Such

2
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2006, pp. 122, available at />Documents/Books/ADO/2006/documents/prc.pdf, accessed 12 April 2009.
3
Jiang Min, “Yijie fubai ganbu de ‘zhengji,’ jijie lingdao banzi de jihuang: Nanshouguan de MuMa
zhengji gongcheng” (“‘Political achievements’ of one term of corrupt cadres ‘starve’ many terms of
government leaders: clearing up the political trophy projects of Mu and Ma), No. 48 (2003), Liaowang
xinwen zhoukan (News Watch Weekly), pp. 46-48.
4
There are also rural residents who are enriched by land requisition. The monetary compensation for
legally constructed houses in Shenzhen is equivalent to either the real estate market evaluation or the
transaction price of commodity houses or shangpinfang in the district, whichever is higher. In the second
quarter of 2007, the average price of commodity houses in Shenzhen’s Longgang district was between
3,681 yuan to 7,286 yuan per square meter; that in Bao’an district was between 4,269 yuan to 9,812
yuan per square meter. Moreover, the standard land compensation for waterland, fish ponds and
vegetable plots stands at 24,000 yuan per mu. This, together with the compensation for various types of
crops ranging from 2,000 yuan per mu to 55,000 yuan per mu, means that the government needs to pay
more than 10 billion yuan of compensation in order to requisition 260 square kilometres of land in
Bao’an and Longgang. Refer to Shenfuling document no. 161 (2007), “Shenzhen shi gonggong jichu
sheshi jianshe xiangmu fangwu chaiqian guanli banfa” (“Administrative measures for the construction of
public infrastructural projects and housing resettlement in Shenzhen”), Article 33; Dong Chaowen,
“Shangpinfang jiaoyi junjia shoudu liangxiang, jiang zuowei Shenzhen zhuzhai fangwu chaiqian
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urban-biased or pro-urbanization policy may be a boon to urban residents but rural
residents benefit only if industrialization absorbs surplus off-farm labour, or if intra-
county rural-urban migration allows them to enjoy better standards of infrastructure
and utilities in urban areas.
5

In Sihui, however, there is no evidence that the
government’s pro-urbanization growth strategy has narrowed the rural-urban income
gap. In 2001, a Sihui worker’s average annual salary was 9,763 yuan while that of a
farmer is 4,376 yuan. As of 2004, the average annual salary of a worker had risen to
16,096 yuan, more than three times that of a farmer’s at 4,961 yuan.
6
Moreover, there is also the question of how necessary and feasible it is to
marginalize agriculture for development, especially if the society is predominantly
agricultural. In the case of Sihui, two-thirds of its population are agricultural.
7
Given
its population composition, what is the rate of industrial growth required to transform
it from an agricultural to an industrial society? In other words, to assess if the
conversion of agricultural land is indeed urban-biased, some questions remain to be
answered: Has land development in rural China reinforced its underdevelopment?
buchang yiju” (“Debut of average transaction prices of commodity housing: prices shall be a guide for
the compensation for residential housing demolition and resettlement in Shenzhen”), Shenzhen
shangbao (Shenzhen Business News), 6 November 2007, pp. A08; Ouyang Mijian, “Shenzhen moshi:
‘mingyi’ beihou de zhengzhi zhihui” (“Shenzhen model: political wisdom behind the name of
urbanization”), Nanfengchuang (Window to Southern Trends), 16 October 2004, pp. 28-31.
5
China displayed signs of urban bias in the depressed prices of agricultural products and a hukou
system that more or less contributed to the widening urban-rural divide. The Chinese government, in its
11
th
Five-Year Plan, has put more emphasis on rural development. It pledges to improve the welfare of
peasants through increasing their income, grant more direct subsidies, tighten control on the collection
of ah hoc village fees. In addition to developing a social security system in rural China, it plans to
increase government spending on agriculture and villages, to improve education, healthcare and basic
infrastructure. However it is doubtful if the central government’s well-intentions cascade to local levels.

For the full text of the 11
th
Five-Year Plan, go to 41232/
4210880.html, accessed 10 May 2009.
6
Sihui nianjian 2002, pp. 13; Sihui nianjian 2005.
7
This is a question that Robert Bates raised back in the 1980s. Bates points out that “given the sectorial
composition of such developing countries as China, India or Kenya, for example, the rates of industrial
growth required to transform them from rural societies is so massive as to be virtually unattainable.” As
of today, although the contribution of agriculture to GDP has been fast declining in China and India, the
rural sector remains important because the majority of their populations are still rural. Refer to Robert H.
Bates, “Agrarian Politics and Development,” Social Science Working Paper 513 (April 1984), California
Institute of Technology, available at accessed 10 April
2009. See also Robert H. Bates, “Agrarian Politics” in Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington (eds.),
Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little Brown, 1987); Li Yuefen and
Zhang Bin, “Development Path of China and India and the Challenges for their Sustainable Growth,”
World Economy, Vol. 31, No. 10 (2008), pp. 1286; Barry Bosworth and Susan M. Collins, “Accounting
for Growth: Comparing China and India,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2008), pp.
53-54.
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Has rural-urban land use conversion led to greater disparities in rural-urban income?
In what ways and to what extent has the process of land development distributed
power and resources in favour of certain classes in society, for instance the real
estate developers or the ruling class?
Curbing Excessive Land Use Change: The Limitations of Policy Suggestions
Given the challenges the State faces in managing land use change, one question

pertinent to China as well as other developing states is, in the words of Weiss: “What
are the structural attributes and environmental conditions that enable a bureaucracy
to pursue collective goals rather than disintegrating into a collection of self-serving
revenue-maximizers?”
8

Weiss suggests that the level of institutionalization is of major importance since
institutions impose constraints on the exercise of arbitrary power.
9
This coincides with
various policy recommendations by scholars, experts and practitioners to rectify the
failings of China’s land use regime. Some of these are outlined below:
10

1. Define and clarify collective ownership of land and corollary rights. Among the
issues to be established are: who owns the land, in whole or in part; in what ways
may the land be used; who may use the land and who may stop it from being used;
who may change the characteristics of the land or add value to it; who is entitled to
8
Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp.
18.
9
Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State, pp. 18-19
10
Of the numerous works, see, for instance, Lichtenberg and Ding, “Assessing Farmland Protection
Policy”; Lin and Ho, “The State, Land System”; Ding Chengri, “Policy and Praxis”; Ho, “Who Owns
China’s Land?”; Qian Zhonghao and Qu Futian, “Zhongguo tudi zhengyong zhidu”; Zhang Baohui and
Ding Feng, “Difang guotu ziyuan guanli”; Guotu ziyuanbu tudi liyongsi diaoyanzu, “Chonggou tudi
shouyi”; Huang Zhongxian, “Jiti tudi”; Li Ping and Xu Xiaobai, “Zhengdi zhidu gaige”; Zhongguo tudi
kance guihuayuan dizheng yanjiu zhongxin, “Cong tizhi shang xiaochu defang guodu yilai ‘tudi

caizheng’” (“Reducing local over-reliance on ‘land financing’ through the system”), Zhongguo tudi
(China Land), No. 7 (2006), pp. 11-12, 22.
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Chapter Seven
Concluding Reflections
profit from the use of land and so forth.
11
Concurrently, systematic registration of rural
land and the replacement of lost land ownership titles have to be carried out.
12
2. Raise the compensation for dispossessed villagers to competitive levels based on
the market value of land instead of agricultural prices.
3. Define and clarify the scope of “public interests” in the Land Administration Law as
a legitimate reason for land expropriation.
4. Integrate city planning with the land use master plan at each level, align the time-
frame of the plans and adopt a standard set of criteria in forecasting land use needs.
In drawing up the two plans, facilitate cooperation, dialogue and consultation
between the two departments to take into consideration local developmental needs
as well as the land use quota imposed from top-down.
5. Legalize the direct circulation of land use rights of collectively-owned land. Within
the parameters of the local land use plan, allow village collectives to lease rural land
on competitive markets without going through the State. Make the villagers’ assembly
the mandatory vehicle for decisions on land lease and how villagers partake in rental
income. This has to be carried out in tandem with measures to increase returns to
farming and provide greater incentives for farmers to retain farmland.
6. Impose strict limits on land transactions through negotiation to reduce arbitrage in
the conveyances and transfers of land use rights. Further restrict state allocation of
land with the ultimate aim of abolishing the dual-track land system.
7. Grant greater autonomy to the land bureaus at all levels. Implement full vertical

management so that each land bureau comes under the direct leadership of that at
the next higher level instead of the local government in terms of its personnel,
remuneration, and funding. This eliminates problems arising from dual-leadership
and conflicting interests between land bureaus and local governments and eases
enforcement of land regulations.
11
Peter Dale, “Land Tenure Issues in Economic Development,” Urban Studies, Vol. 34, No. 10 (1997),
pp. 1626.
12
Ho, “Who Owns China’s Land?” pp. 413.
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Chapter Seven
Concluding Reflections
Based on the observations on institutional dynamics and the engines of change,
however, this study suggests that the efficacy of these policy recommendations is
limited. First, testifying to what Thelen’s dynamic constraints model advocates, the
thesis finds that institutional changes trigger new rounds of power struggles between
the central and local governments, which induce further modifications to existing
institutions.
13
The central-local fiscal system and piecemeal reforms to revenue-
sharing arrangements over the years exemplify central-local power struggles as each
strived to increase its share of revenue. Specifically, for instance, the new revenue-
sharing system implemented in 1994 had resulted in the growth of local taxes such
as the enterprise income tax and personal income tax. This, in turn, propelled the
central government to demand for a share of these tax revenues, reclassifying them
as shared taxes in 2002.
Secondly, while the central government has the upper hand in initiating institutional
changes favourable to itself, local governments are no passive bystanders resigned

to be disadvantaged by these adjustments. The practice of buying land quotas from a
less developed neighbouring region, of breaking down a tract of land into smaller
parcels to bypass higher level approval, of substituting arable land with land of
inferior quality, are just some examples of the manoeuvrings of local authorities
under the institutional constraints imposed by the central government in order to
protect their own interests and incentives. In the words of Thelen and Steinmo,
Groups and individuals are not merely spectators as conditions change to
favour or penalize them in the political balance of power, but rather strategic
actors capable of acting on ‘openings’ provided by such shifting contextual
conditions in order to defend or enhance their own positions.
14
13
Kathleen Thelen, Union of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1991).
14
Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Kathleen Thelen,
Sven Steinmo and Frank Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Analysis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 17.
Yew Chiew Ping
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Chapter Seven
Concluding Reflections
The above insights support the view that as much as institutions shape politics,
politics shape institutions too.
15
With regard to the institutions examined in this thesis,
iterated interactions between central-local governments within institutional settings
appear to be the key factor that contributes to the evolution of institutions, situated in
a broader socioeconomic context.
Thirdly, some institutions are more resistant to change than others. Prioritization of

economic growth in the cadre target responsibility system, for one, is a manifestation
of the nationwide pursuit of prosperity. Sustained and rapid economic growth is not
only driven by nationalistic pride in China’s emergence as a great power in the
international arena; it is also a crucial means to alleviate the domestic pressures of a
large and growing population and massive rural-urban migration. It is suggested that
the Chinese government, concerned that high unemployment rates may upset social
stability, has been under immense pressure to create jobs to keep up with the labour
supply.
16
Furthermore, the central government had devolved power to provinces in
making economic policies tailored to the needs of the locality, which contributed to
the rise of the local developmental state.
17
While the Centre has demonstrated its
dominance over local governments through the recentralization of power through the
revenue-sharing system and others, a retreat of the local developmental state
appears doubtful for the reasons cited above. It is likely that local leaders’ ability to
promote economic development shall continue to take precedence in their political
careers and the way they are appraised.
In addition, many existing problems in China’s land system, such as corruption and
black markets, emanate from incomplete land markets. Local governments’
resistance to the creation of market institutions, however, is hard to overcome. The
15
Ibid., pp. 10.
16
Lieberthal, Governing China, pp. 247-48.
17
Zheng Yongnian, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and
International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 31.
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preceding chapters have argued that land conveyance through negotiation is
beneficial to both local authorities and the land buyer. On top of opportunities for
rent-seeking in the form of an exchange of favours arising from the opaque process
of land apportionment, more competitive land prices through negotiation also attract
businesses to settle in one location rather than another, especially when the state of
infrastructure, labour supply and other means of production do not differ greatly
between localities. Due to intergovernmental competition, no single local government
has the incentive to reform land markets since higher prices may drive away potential
businesses and at the same time reduce rent-seeking opportunities although all may
eventually benefit from higher land prices under genuine market conditions. As Bates
observes, “If one politician renounces the apportionment of special benefits, then that
politician’s rivals would be in a position to gain a political advantage by defending the
interests that prospered from special favors.”
18
Concerted action by local
governments is therefore difficult and the formation of land markets may have to be
undertaken by the central government instead.
To sum up, motivations for indiscriminate land use conversion lie in the incentive
structure presented by the central-local revenue-sharing system and the cadre
appraisal system. So long as there is no option more expedient than land use
conversion in fulfilling local revenue requirements and cadres’ self-interests, the trend
is likely to persist despite periodic containment. While some systemic flaws can be
corrected, it is harder to keep selective implementation in check. Local governments
have proven to be adept at finding leeway in executing central policies or eschewing
institutional constraints. As the saying goes, “shangyou zhengce, xiayou duice,”
meaning policies from the upper levels are confronted with countermeasures from
18

Robert H. Bates, “Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development” in James E. Alt and Kenneth
A. Shepsle (eds.), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), pp. 53.
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Chapter Seven
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the lower levels. Once a new policy or law is imposed to rectify an old problem, local
cadres find innovative ways to get around it.
Keeping Selective Implementation in Check
So if institutionalization is not a remedy to counter selective implementation, wherein
lies the problem? This study suggests that problems with the enforceability of central
policies or state regulations stem from a dearth of effective checks on local
governments. This not only signifies inadequacies in the infrastructural power of the
Centre but also points to the weakness of societal forces vis-à-vis state entities,
evident in the lack of legal and effective feedback channels for civilians to seek
redress against local governments for the injustice they suffer.
19
For instance,
although China has an established appeals system constituted by task forces,
reception offices, and complainants offices at the various administrative levels and a
complaints bureau set up by the Central Party Committee and the State Council, only
0.002 percent of complainants managed to solve their problems through appeals.
20
The efforts of complainants are often thwarted by local governments who dispatch
cadres to higher-level complaints bureaus to deter complainants and bring them
back. Furthermore, due to the large number of complaints that authorities have to
handle, less important cases brought up to the higher levels are referred back to the
local governments.
21

This neglects the fact that complainants appeal to higher levels
precisely because their appeals have been ignored or mishandled by the lower
echelons. Similarly, villagers’ complaints to higher levels about the transgressions of
village cadres are often ignored or passed from one government department to
19
Michael Mann defines infrastructural power as “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil
society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.” See Michael Mann, “The
Autonomous Power of the State” in John Agnew (ed.), Political Geography: A Reader (London: Arnold
1997), pp. 62.
20
Cai Yongshun, "Managed Participation," pp. 429-32; Jiang Xun, “Liuwanren gaohan gongchandang
wanshui kangzheng” (“Sixty Thousand People Shout Long Live the Chinese Communist Party While
Putting up Resistance”), Yazhou Zhoukan (Asia Weekly) 18, no. 46 (2004),
accessed 3 November 2005.
21
Cai Yongshun, “Managed Participation,” pp. 445.
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Chapter Seven
Concluding Reflections
another. It is only in exceptional cases that villagers successfully seek redress for
their grievances.
22

After being repeatedly frustrated in their appeal efforts, contenders often resort to
civil disobedience to make authorities take heed. Evidence shows that protests such
as besieging public offices, blocking roads and buildings are widespread in China.
23
The extent to which a society can play a part in checking the excesses of
governments hinges on how liberal and inclusive it is. In the recent catastrophe in

Sichuan, the prompt and spontaneous acts of self-organizing civilians in delivering
aid is a clear demonstration of the benefits of allowing societal forces to make up for
what the State may be lacking in its infrastructural power.
24
China’s transparency and
efficiency in disaster relief and the expansion of domestic media freedom to report
earthquake related news was also unprecedented, a stark contrast to its handling of
the SARS epidemic in 2003. Yet the subsequent clampdown on media reports and
victims’ seeking justice against local governments for shoddily constructed buildings
in earthquake-devastated regions shows that China is still reluctant to let go of its
usual modus operandi of sweeping problems under the carpet.
25
While the State may
persist to use ideological homilies and the upholding of social stability to rationalize
its suppression of protests and its aversion to liberalizing the society, it has to be
22
Xing Xuebo, “Cunmin weihe danian chusi ba cunguan” (“Why villagers recalled village cadres on the
fourth day of lunar new year”), Xiangzhen luntan (Forum of Towns and Townships), No. 4 (2004), pp.
6-7.
23
Murray Scot Tanner, “China Rethinks Unrest,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004) pp.
137-56.
24
Zheng Yongnian, “Zhongguo de zhainan yu chongsheng” (“China’s calamity and rebirth”), Lianhe
zaobao (United Morning Post), 27 May 2008,
accessed 26 July 2008; Jake
Hooker, “Quake Reveals Deficiencies of China’s Military,” The New York Times, 2 July 2008,
accessed 26 July 2008.
25
Zheng Yongnian, “Meiti ziyou yu zhonggong de lingdaoquan” (“Media freedom and the leadership of

the CCP”), Lianhe zaobao (United Morning Post), 10 June 2008, />pages6/forum_zp080610.shtml, accessed 26 July 2008; Jake Hooker, “Voice Seeking Answers for
Parents about a School Collapse is Silenced,” The New York Times, 11 July 2008,
accessed 26 July 2008; Edward
Wong, “Grieving Chinese Parents Protest School Collapse,” The New York Times, 17 July 2008,
accessed 26 July 2008.
Yew Chiew Ping
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Chapter Seven
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recognized that this is merely temporizing as conflicts may build up into greater social
unrest.
26
It is the Best of Times, It is the Worst of Times
27
Will China evolve into an “elite authoritarian nationalist system . . . that is closely
linked to domestic business elites and attempts to keep the lower classes quiescent
by promoting ardent nationalism” or worse, degenerate into a “soft and corrupt
authoritarian system . . . that would be devoted largely to keeping itself in power and
serving the material desires of officials and their business cronies”?
28
It may be
argued that it is now the best of times for China: In the international arena, China is
on the rise to become a great economic and political power. The majority of its
people have benefited from its economic growth since the reform era and in general
enjoy a higher standard of living, better housing and greater means to purchase
material goods.
29
Yet in view of the numerous domestic challenges, it is also the
worst of times. The Chinese government, in its 11
th

Five-Year Plan, acknowledges
that it faces the problems of widening regional and urban-rural divide, worsening
environmental degradation, high unemployment, slowing economic growth and so
on.
30
More critical, perhaps, are the things left unsaid in the Plan: rampant corruption
and cronyism, anarchy at the grassroots level, an ideological vacuum, and
government officials’ moral atrophy that is manifested in recent man-made disasters
such as the poisonous milk scandal and shoddily constructed schools that collapsed
and killed numerous children in the Sichuan earthquake.
31

26
The use of ideological discourse appears to be outmoded and ineffective as the Chinese citizenry
becomes increasingly sophisticated. In early June 2007, a well-known Chinese author, Yu Qiuyu,
posted an article on his blog, urging parents whose children had died in collapsed school building in
Sichuan to refrain from seeking legal action against local authorities, lest they be used by “anti-China
media” to attack China. Yu’s article, which was promptly reprinted in several Chinese newspapers,
triggered an avalanche of fast and furious responses from Chinese netizens who denounced the
author’s sycophancy and hypocrisy.
27
Modified from opening line of Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities.
28
Lieberthal, Governing China, pp. 334-35.
29
Meisner, Mao’s China and After, pp. 532.
30
Full text at accessed 10 May 2009.
31
Refer to Zheng Yongnian, “Zhongguo shehui jiceng wuzhengfu zhuangtai lingren danyou” (“Concern

over anarchy at China’s grassroots level”), Lianhe zaobao (United Morning Post), 10 June 2008,
accessed 12 May 2009; Lucian
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In the midst of these challenges ahead, there is still reason for optimism. China is
endowed with the resources and the means to make changes, to engage its people
in the meaningful participation in social and political affairs that will check the
excesses of predatory officials. This could start with progressive liberalization of the
media to serve as a government watchdog and a strengthening of the appeals
system to ensure an effective channel of feedback to the central government.
Through the enforcement of a better reporting system on irregular practices in land
expropriation and land use conversion, the central government shall demonstrate to
lower level governments its resolve in empowering the people. In the long run,
alongside the institutionalization of land regulations, this measure will be more
efficacious than relying solely on the State’s weak infrastructural power to curb
officials’ plundering of society.
W. Pye, "An Overview of 50 Years of the People's Republic of China: Some Progress, but Big Problems
Remain," China Quarterly, No. 159 (1999), pp. 574. Pye observes, “The Chinese today feel that they
have not been getting the respect that is their due in the light of all the positive changes since the end of
Mao’s rule, but they are unable to articulate exactly what ideals, principles and values they believe their
country stands for, and for which others should respect them.”
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