The KMP (peasant movement of the philippines) movement generation, activity, and continuity in philippine society 23

KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
54

CHAPTER II

Philippine Agrarian Landscape and the State

The 1997 financial crisis is instructive in that it highlights the importance of
rural development, specifically in Southeast Asia. Lauridsen for instance raised that
“Thailand’s economic crisis might, to some extent, be cushioned by other sectors,
e.g., as agriculture” (1998: 155). On the other hand, the financial dry up in Indonesia
was aggravated by food shortages (Montes and Ali Abdusalamov, 1998: 180). In the
Philippines,
“As economic downturn occurs and a new administration takes over, it is a good
time to call for and consider an alternative development strategy one that should
prioritize rural and agricultural development, an approach neglected by the
Philippines. By concentrating on rural development and urban-rural linkages,
economic development can be more equitable, less import-dependent and
ultimately, more sustainable”. (Lim, 1998: 220)

The Philippine agrarian landscape has hitherto been one of the facilitating
conditions of rural protest. “Centuries of Spanish rule, followed by US conquest and
tutelage, left the Philippines with perhaps the most polarized land distribution in
Asia” (Fox, 1990: 6). The seemingly degenerative character of the agrarian system
and its submission to oligarchic and foreign interests coupled with ineffective laws
and programs for rural development all contribute to the persistence of armed and
unarmed, open and secret peasant movements and organizations, which I will discuss
in the next chapter.
In this chapter, I basically aim to achieve two things. First, elaborate on the
structural causes of rural grievances and protest in Philippine society today. I present
four critical conditions that continue to marginalize the peasants and manifest the

historical neglect for rural development – landlessness and land concentration,
agrarian reform laws, economic policies and programs, and land conversion. These
conditions specifically refer to agrarian process under the Marcos, Aquino, and
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
55

Ramos governments. Second, provide a theoretical perspective of Philippine state
and politics. This consideration opens up historical arguments for movement
emergence and development in Philippine society. In this light, I discuss in the
second part the nature and character of Philippine state and politics in a historical
dimension. The third part serves as a conclusion to the underscore the interplay
between the structural causes of rural protest and the Philippine state as facilitating
contexts of rural struggles.
A. A Philippine Agrarian Situationer
The defining character of the Philippine agrarian system owes much to the
country’s colonial and neo-colonial history. A fundamental characteristic of Spanish
colonialism was the development and consolidation of feudalism. Within this
economic system, “the old rights of the conquered natives to land were extinguished
by the feudal rule that ‘everything of value’ in the colonies formed part of the estate
of the King of Castilla” (Corpuz, 1997: 2). In this social order, the encomienda (land
gr ants) and hacienda (agricultural plantations) system created and promoted
landlordism based on land grants and massive land grabbing by the colonial
government, church, and principalia (descendants of datus). Under the American
colonial period, landlordism persisted. The land laws implemented by the colonial
government became a mere instrument that promoted land grabbing and
concentration.
1. Landlessness and land concentration
The Philippine agrarian system is primarily characterized by a structure of
landlessness.
24

Landlessness does not only refer to the condition of not owning the

24
Among others, see Putzel and Cunnington 1989; Hayami et. al. 1989; Putzel 1992; IRDF 1994;
Riedinger 1995; CPAR Secretariat 1993; PIAF 1998; and PPI 1999.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
56

land a peasant toils on but it likewise refers to the absence of control over that land.
25

According to PPI, from 1990-1991 owner-cultivators made up only 25 per cent of
total agr icultural households, while landless tenants, marginal farmers and workers
comprised some 70 per cent.
26
This study confirms the earlier research center’s
findings that small-owner cultivators made up only 31% (1,416 out of 4,483) thereby
pointing to a landlessness rate of 68% (Flores, 1994: 2-4, 9). The latest account,
however, shows that in 1999, 5.5% of the landowning class controls at least 60% of
Philippine lands while 8.5 million out of 11.2 million peasants (76%) are landless
tillers.
27

The flip side of landlessness is the concentration of landownership in the
hands of the few – the landlords and/or capitalists and foreign controlled
corporations. The Philippine landowning class, for instance, refers to the likes of the
Lopez family, Eduardo and Jose Cojuanco, Tinio family, Victoria Delantar, Henry
Ng Siu Hong, and the Floirendo family among others.
28
While at least 1.02 million

small landowners control 1.23 hectares on the average, these selected seven landlords
control 6,126 hectares on the average. Moreover, the said small landowners represent
16 and 26 per cent of the total number of rural and agricultural families respectively.
On the other hand, foreign corporations refer to TNCs/MNCs like Dole
Corporation, Philippine Packaging Corporation, NDC-Guthrie, TADECO (Tagum
Development Corporation), United Brands, Sumitomo/Dahitri, and etcetera.
29
These

25
For Riedinger, the term “landless” refers throughout to all cultivating relationships in which
cultivators work land without having ownership or owner-like rights in that land, whether they are
called “tenants,” “agricultural laborers,” or something else (1995, pp. 75-76, emphasis in the original).
26
PPI 1991a, p. 115, cited in Putzel 1992, p. 26. Putzel and Cunnington (1989, p. 17) have also
indicated that there were at least 1.5 million marginal farmers occupy hilly lands.
27
Kampilan, Vol., 1, No. 1, September-October 1999.
28
From the Cojuancos to Hong, see PPI 1998: 28-33; for the Lopez family, see Corpuz 1997: 149; and
for the Floirendo family, see Putzel and Cunnington 1989.
29
For Dole, Del Monte, and Guthrie, see PEACE-PCPS 1989: 5; for Tadeco, United Brands, and
Sumitomo, see Hayami et. al. 1990: 137-138.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
57

six corporations alone control at least 92,000 hectares in Mindanao. Of the local and
foreign corporations, 722 of them control at least 216.1 hectares of prime agricultural
lands on the average. They also enjoy ownership-like rights to at least 15 per cent of

the total 3.4 million farms and at least 1.72 per cent of the total agricultural land area
of 9.6 million hectares. In aggregate, these corporations effectively control 3,061,918
mh with the TNCs controlling at least 592,690 hectares and almost all export-crops
industry.
30

To further illustrate, landholdings in Southern Luzon are claimed to be
concentrated in the hands of fifty-three (53) landlords/corporations who control at
least 276,410 hectares, hence, with an average of 5,215 hectares per person or entity.
They are led by the Roxas family, Romeo Roxas, Llana, Ayala/Zobel, Dolor, Rubio,
de Villa, and Aguirre in Batangas; Yulo, de los Reyes, Reyes/Eleazar, and Sta. Lucia
Realty Co. in Laguna; Alvarez/Pagdangan Timber Products, Nationwide Princess
Timber Corporation, and Palawan Lumber Manufacturing Co. in Palawan, de Borja,
Meralco Foundation, Borjam De Vera/Philcomsat, and Torres in Rizal; Sandico,
Interwood (Cojuanco), and Eduardo Cojuanco in Mindoro Occidental; and Escudero,
Rodriguez, Segundo Matias, Uy, Guanzon, Conuanco (Interwood), Don Domingo
Reyes, Malvar, Suleta, Juanito Tan, and Yao in Quezon.
31

In Central Luzon (Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija), lands are allegedly
concentrated in the hands of 39 landlords/corporations who control at least 70,876
hectares, hence, with an average of 1,817 hectares per person or entity. They are led
by the Romeo Roxas family, Hacienda de Santos, Sabani Estate, Berong Tinio,

30
Alternate Resource Center, ARC Mindanao, cited in Descanzo in PPI 1990, pp. 28 -34. In Mindanao
about 80% of the total cropland area (3.1 million hectares) are tilled by peasants, leaseholders,
freeholding settlers, and farmworkers. In the Visayas, around 70% of the total cropland area (2.5
million hectares) are not owned by the actual tiller-producers. In Central Luzon, despite being the
showcase for land reform , 70% of rice farmers and 50% of sugar farmers remain landless (KMP

1986).
31
KASAMA-TK Manifesto, “Landlords in Southern Luzon,” nd., pp.1 -2.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
58

Hacienda Roxas/Soriamont, Gonzales family, Joson family, Capt. Herrera, Mabutol,
Cenon Buencamino, Puyat Estate, Luis Lacalle, Vermuda Estate, and Doña Sisang de
Leon in Nueva Ecija; the Puyat Estate (Manila Bank Co.), Greggy Araneta,
Villafuerte family, Carlos Yu (Globe paper mill), Villa Rica family, Bautista family,
Gokongwei/Robina, Lipana Estate, Valarao, S. Perez, Pancho-Abadia, Ines Ramirez,
Valentin Fernando, and the Sta. Lucia Estate in Bulacan; and by the Cojuanco family,
Herson, Sawit, Calma, Macaraeg, Reyes, Sembrano, Cancio, Fajardo, Onsiaco
family, and Obiena in Tarlac.
32

2. Land/Agrarian Reform Laws
Since the dawn of the twentieth century, at least eleven (11) major land
reform laws/policies have been formulated and implemented.
33
These legislative
measures, however, have been insufficient to resolve landlessness, abate land
accumulation, and develop the agrarian system. First, the laws passed especially
during the American period facilitated land grabbing and were used to increase the
landholding of the elites.
34

The first five years of American colonialism saw the implementation of certain
“land legislation” measures that institutionalized land grabbing and accumulation. The
Philippine Bill of 1902 guaranteed the Americans the right to own and control

agricultural lands in the Philippines; the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 limited the size
of public lands that could be acquired by individuals to 16 hectares (but later amended to

32
AMGL Manifesto on Landlessness, 1998.
33
These land and agrarian reform laws pertain to the Philippine Bill of 1902, Philippine Organic Act
of 1902, Public Land Act of 1903, Land Registration Act of 1902, Friar Lands Act of 1904, Sugar
Cane Tenancy Act of 1933 (Public Act No. 4133) and Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1935 (Public Act
No. 4054), Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (R.A. 1199), Land Reform Act of 1955 (R.A. 1400),
Land Reform Code of 1963 (R.A. 3844), Proclamation No. 2 (R.A. 6389 of 1971) and P.D. 27, and the
CARP (RA 6657). See Wurfel in Ledesma, Makil, and Miralao 1983; Constantino and Constantino
1984; Ofreneo 1987; de la Cruz 1990, pp. 43-59, Esguerra 1990, pp. 93-114, Mariano 1990, pp. 117-
126, all in LINANGAN IV 1990; Putzel and Cunnington 1989, pp. 69-73; Hayami et. al. 1990, pp. 70-
79; Putzel 1992, pp. 58, 272-275; Riedinger 1995, pp. 139-176).
34
Refer to Shalom 1987; Schirmer and Shalom 1986; Putzel and Cunningtion 1989; de la Cruz in
LINANGAN IV 1990; Putzel 1992; Hayami et. al. 1989; Riedinger 1995; and Corpuz 1997.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
59

100 hectares) and by corporations to 1,024 hectares; Public Land Act of 1903 allowed
anyone to acquire 16 hectares of public land by establishing a homestead and cultivating
it for five years with payment of a nominal fee; Land Registration Act of 1902 (Act No.
496) which created a court that would certify land titles under the Torrens system but
registration was not compulsory, and until 1910 the titles distributed were only for big
landholdings; and the Friar Lands Act of 1904 which provided for the acquisition and
redistribution of friar lands that were sold at the cost of purchase.
35

Second, the land reform programs of the Quezon, Magsaysay, Macapagal, and
Marcos governments were basically limited to rice and corn farms. More so, they
have been more concerned in regulating tenurial arrangements such as land rent and
other agrarian relations such as usury.
In the 1930s, share tenancy became more widespread and reached the scale of 36
per cent compared to the 22 per cent noted in 1918. Constantino (1975) attributed this to
the decline of cash tenants (inquilinos), who were increasingly unable to pay fixed rents
demanded by the tenurial system. Many inquilinos were thus compelled to become share
tenants (kasamas), providing labor and sharing the harvest on a 50-50 basis after
deducting the planting and harvesting expenses. The relationship is further aggravated by
an overpriced land use, usury, and the provision of free labor of various kinds at the
discretion of the landowner (also cited in PPI, 1998: 57).
In this context, the Quezon government enacted land laws of limited scope.
First, the Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1933 (Public Act No. 4054) called for a
standardization of a 50-50 sharing agreement for tenants and was obviously
applicable for rice farms and limited to improving tenurial arrangements. This was
only applicable, however, to those areas that would be petitioned by the municipal

35
See Shalom, 1987; Schirmer and Shalom, 1986; Putzel and Cunningtion, 1989; Esguerra 1990: 93-
114; de la Cruz, 1990; Hayami et. al., 1989: 70-79; Riedinger, 1995; Mariano, 1990: 117 -126; Putzel,
1992: 58, 272-275; Riedinger, 1995: 139 -176; and Corpuz, 1997: 270-73.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
60

council. Second, the Sugar Cane Tenancy Act of 1934 (Public Act No. 4133) obliged
landlords to report or disclose to government the operations of their sugar centers –
amount of harvest, quantity of sugar milled, etcetera.
36

The government also enacted the law regarding the Expropriation of Landed
Estates. It stipulated the right of government to purchase vast tracts of land to be
distributed to the farmers. This measure was taken to appease peasant unrest and
weaken the revolt of farmers in Central Luzon. The law, however, did not prosper
due to the lack of support services (PPI, 1998: 58). “For obvious reasons, such as the
fact that many of his friends and supporters were from the landed class, Quezon
could only proceed slowly with agrarian reform” (Caoili, 1986: 35 cited in Rivera,
1994: 113). Interestingly, landlords in 1936 started organizing private armies and
resistance movements to refuse the implementation of Quezon’s tenancy laws (PPI
1998, p. 59).
By 1952, the problem of usury and tenancy arrangements cropped up again as
the traders had acquired dominance of the loans granted to peasants over the
landlords (De la Cruz, 1990: 48 cf Rivera and Panganiban 1975, p. 47). In this
context, the Magsaysay government implemented the Agricultural Tenancy Act of
1954 (R.A. 1199) and the Land Reform Act of 1955 (R.A. 1400). The first, however,
was confined to share tenancy, espousing a 70-30 sharing scheme, and restricted
interest loans from 8-10 per cent. The second law remarkably imposed a very high
retention limit of 300 hectares for individuals and 600 hectares for corporation. It also
limited interest rate to 30 per cent. This ‘land to the landless’ decree, however, will

36
de la Cruz, pp. 43-59, Esguerra (pp. 93-114), and Mariano (pp. 117 -126) all in LINANGAN 1990;
Putzel and Cunnington 1989, pp. 69-73; Hayami et. al. 1990, pp. 70-79; Putzel 1992, pp. 58, 272 -275;
Riedinger 1995, pp. 139-176.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
61

only be implemented in those areas petitioned by the majority of the tenants.
37
These

national laws, however, did not stop the creditors in exploiting the peasantry.
Moreover, R.A. 821 and R.A. 720 respectively established the Agricultural
Credit and Cooperative Farmers Association and rural banking system to extend rural
credit to farmers. By the end of the 1950s, however, the cooperatives and rural
banking disappeared. Instead, credit went to sugar from agriculture with the rice
industry receiving only 23.2 per cent for production and 7.45% for trading. Worse,
only 20% per cent of agricultural credit went to small peasants that comprised 95% of
the agricultural population. And by 1958, the average interest rate was 126.8 per cent
per annum (de la Cruz, 1990: 48, cf Rivera and Panganiban 1975). Under the
presidency of Macapagal, the Land Reform Code of 1963 (R.A. 3844) was
implemented. Similar with past laws, it only covered rice and corn farms and set a
retention limit of 75 hectares, a considerable decrease compared to R.A. 1400
nonetheless.
In 1971, the Marcos regime decreed Proclamation No. 2 (R.A. 6389)
imposing an ownership limit of 24 hectares while P.D. 27 subjected 1.8 million
hectares of rice and corn farms under land reform and set a lower retention limit of 7
hectares. Again, however, the laws were in essence not very different from those
passed under the Quezon, Magsaysay, and Macapagal governments. In mid-1970s,
these laws were succeeded by the implementation of MASAGANA ‘99 (for rice) and
MAISAGANA ’97 (for corn) programs. The Marcos government launched these

37
Ibid., pp. 43-59; Esguerra (pp. 93-114); Mariano in LINANGAN IV 1990, pp. 117-126; Putzel and
Cunnington 1989, pp. 69-73; Hayami et. al. 1990, pp. 70-79; Putzel 1992, pp. 58, 272-275; Riedinger
1995, pp. 139 -176.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
62

programs to provide loans for farmers to buy capital inputs and set up the
Agricultural Development and Input Financing Loan.

38

Third, the trend of implementing land redistribution has followed the pattern
where government buys the land from big landowners and sells it to the farmers. But
as early as 1903, this has been the practice under the Friar Lands Act and in the final
analysis the lands acquired go back to wealthy landowners, traders, and capitalists
because the farmers cannot simply afford to pay the price. Fourth, the implementation
of all land/agrarian reform programs and rural development has always been coupled
with “counter-insurgency” measures, if not solely driven by such politico-military
intent.
Fifth, despite being limited in their scope (mostly to rice and corn farms and
tenurial improvements), these programs have set generous retention limits for
landlords and agribusiness corporations, especially the TNCs.
39
And in the case of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), it is marred by
comprehensive exemptions, the institutionalization of land use conversion, and
alternative schemes of implementation that facilitate agrarian reform evasion.
But what has the Philippine Government achieved in land redistribution for
the last three decades? From 1972 to December 1998, a total of 4.8 million hectares
(mh) of lands have been distributed through the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). DAR
accounts for 60 per cent or 2.9 mh while DENR accounts for 40 per cent or 1.9 mh.
Approximately, 21 per cent of these lands or 1.04 mh were distributed under Marcos

38
By 1982, however, 66 per cent of total credit was still coming from “non-formal credit”. The traders
dominated the provision of loans up to the 1970s while the input dealers and some OCWs (overseas
contract workers) dominated the 1980s. The statistical figure almost equaled the average percentage of
informal credit in 1960 (De la Cruz, 1989: 51).

39
Under Marcos, 500 corporations were able to gain control of 60,000 hectares of land (Putzel and
Cunnington 1989: 15).
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
63

(1972-1986), 32 per cent or 1.57 mh under Aquino, while 47 per cent or 2.29 mh
were distributed under the Ramos regime.
40

What is even more interesting is that 82 per cent (2.6 mh) of the 4.3 mh under
the jurisdiction of DAR are locked in 108,480 agrarian-related litigations in various
courts, quasi-judicial and regular court proceedings involving cancellation,
exemption, retention, ownership disputes, and conversion applications (SENTRA,
1997: 18). On top of this sticky situation, at least 18,759 CLTs (certificate of land
transfer), 2,454 EPs (emancipation patents), and 326 CLOAs (certificate of land
ownership awards) covering about 67,442.84 hectares have been canceled. These
cancellations have affected about 25,062 farmer beneficiaries as of December 1995
(ibid., 24).
41
The situation explains the case of uninstalled farmer beneficiaries.
Finally, the argument that CARL has not significantly addressed landlessness
as it has boastfully promised boils down to the analysis of its changing scope. From
its original scope of 10.3 mh, it has gone down to 8.1 mh in 1997 and 6.80 mh in
1998 (Flores, 1994: 2-4).
42
In a ten-year period, the coverage has decreased by at
least 34 per cent or 3.5 mh. But still, the 1997 revised scope includes 3.8 mh of
forest lands under the Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP). Hence, the actual
coverage is only 4.3 mh which comprise a mere one-third of the total agricultural

land of 12 mh.
43


40
PARC Secretariat, cited in MTPDP 1998-2004, pp. 3-61 to 3-62; Unofficial DAR, IMR-FOSSO
report, cited in Borras Jr. 1999: 4-7; DAR 1997 Report, The Ramos Legacy in Agrarian Reform: A
Transition Report.
41
From 1980 to December 1993, at least 10,598 CLTs (15,598 hectares), 9,133 EPs (8,198 hectares),
and 2,302 CLOAs (8,243.9 hectares) have been canceled affecting at least 18,348 farmer beneficiaries
(Ochoa 1993, p. 6).
42
See also PARC Secretariat, cited in MTPDP 1998-2004, p. 3-61 - 3-62; DAR Reports, 1997.
43
Of the 3.8 million hectares of forest lands, at least 3.337 million hectares are note likely to be
covered by agrarian reform. First, 1.5 million hectares of the said lands are under 35 timber licensing
agreements (TLAs). Second, 927,000 hectares are under 22 suspended and 4 inactive TLAs. Third,
653,000 hectares are under 460 Industrial Forest Management Agreements, Industrial Tree Plantation
Agreements, and Tree Farm Leases, while anot her 257,000 hectares are under Pasture Lease
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
64

Aside from landlessness and land accumulation and ineffective agrarian
reform laws, peasants have to endure exploitative and oppressive agrarian relations
such as land rent, usury, unfavorable terms of trade, and low cost of labor, and low -
level production. In the 1990s, rice and corn sharecroppers pay 25-50 per cent of their
harvest to the landowner with the latter incurring the production expenses (Putzel,
1992: 31). Under the kasama system, the tenants pay an average of more than 50 per
cent (Descanzo, 1990: 35). According to a KMP-PAMALAKAYA situationer

(1999), land rent ranges from 50-80 per cent. In coconut farms, the usual sharing
scheme is 1:2 or tersio (one-third) – one part for the farm worker and two parts for
the landowner.
Moreover, current usurious lending rates range from 50-100 per cent in one
harvest season (KMP-PAMALAKAYA Situationer, 1999) while in the aspect of
buying and selling their produce, peasants have to deal with unscrupulous traders
and trading monopolies that directly and indirectly exploit them (Lactao, 1990: 61-
81). Citing government sources, KMP (1999: 13-14) states that farm workers in
general earn more or less P112.76 a day in 1997. In corn farms, they earn a maximum
of P96.86 a day. For those who work on a daily basis, they could earn only as much
as P87.10 and in Cagayan Valley, hired labor could cost as low as P69.86 a day.
On top of these conditions, peasants have to likewise confront the ever-
increasing cost of production. This pertains to the rent for carabaos and equipments
(thresher and tractor accessories), transportation, seeds, irrigation, and fertilizers and
pesticides that could cause harmful effects to them, the land, and environment. The
situation, however, is further aggravated by national economic policies and programs

Agreements. And yet, only 1.078 mh of ISF areas were excluded from coverage in the 1998 PARC
Secretariat report (AR Now! and PASCRES, 1998: 4).
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
65

that continue to undermine the importance of agrarian reform and rural development
(ARRD) in national development.
3. Economic policies and programs
The economic orientation and system under Spanish colonialism did not
“change” under the U.S. colonial rule; rather it was transformed into an “economy of
special relations”. The U.S. colonial government used Philippine society for the
expansion of American trade. From 1910 to 1913, US exports to the Philippines grew
by 437% while Philippine exports to the US grew by 213% from 1910 to 1912. And

in 1940, Philippine exports and imports accounted for 44% and 56% respectively of
the total foreign trade of almost P516 million. Moreover, the country’s imports were
still mainly manufacturers from the US, while exports continued to be in the form of
the same cash crops and agricultural goods that had been dominant since the Spanish
era. In 1913, the Payne-Aldrich Act, which still contained some trade restrictions for
Philippine exports, was abolished and replaced by the Underwood-Simmons Act
establishing a complete free trade (Corpuz, 1997: 219-40).
44

On the other hand, the period 1914 to 1929 saw the expansion of the economy
of special relations, with commercial banking resources expanding and foreign trade
reaching its highest level during the occupation period. The U.S. involvement in
World War I in 1916 strengthened the relations, manifested by the more-than-
doubling of Philippine exports to the U.S. between 1916 and 1918. The prices of
imported coal soared and hit the railroad and infant manufacturing sector. The war
also caused a halt to external capital inflows. Recession hit the Philippines in 1920 as
export trade collapsed and imports exploded. In 1921, low consumer demands led to
failures of commercial and manufacturing establishments; there were lay-offs and

44
Data on exports and imports and foreign trade were also cited in PPI, 1998: 36, 37.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
66

labor strikes, while bank loans were either frozen or written off. Recovery seemed
complete in 1929 but the Great Depression foiled the momentum. Hitting the
Philippines in 1930, it first affected foreign trade first and then spread to agriculture,
business, and government finances. Under the Commonwealth government continued
to implement a policy that focused on export agriculture and relied on imports to fill
in supply shortfalls (ibid. 235-52; PPI, 1998: 37).

Since the 1970s, broader socio-historical structures and processes like
liberalization and globalization have been crystallized in national landscapes through
economic policies and programs of respective governments. In the last three decades,
the Marcos, Aquino, and Ramos governments passed numerous laws to implement
liberalization, especially in the agricultural sector.
On 27 May 1974, the dictatorial regime enacted the Corporate Farming Act
allowing foreign and local firms to buy or lease large tracts of land. This policy
primarily attracted TNCs and MNCs to dominate plantation agriculture in the
Philippines. It also became a legal basis for succeeding laws such as the Foreign
Investment Act, Land Lease Act, and the Amendment to the Foreign Investment Act,
among others. The mid-70s also witnessed the launching of the Green Revolution
that introduced modern imported technology to rice farming and promoted the use of
high yielding varieties (HYVs). The unsustainable and ecologically damaging
character, however, of this capital-intensive technology became evident as most soils
become unresponsive to the massive doses of agro-chemicals (De la Cruz, 1990: 48;
PPI, 1998: 39). On the other hand, at least 1,027 commodity goods have been subject
to import liberalization in the later years of the regime, from 1981 to 1986 (Lactao,
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
67

1990: 74).
45

Upon Aquino’s ascendancy to power, her government formulated and
implemented CARP (R.A. 6657). Under this program, commercial farms were placed
under a 10-year deferment period (Sec. 11). The policy has also institutionalized land
conversion (Sec. 65), granted the same privileges that private corporations or
TNCs/MNCs enjoyed under the past regime (Sec. 8, par. b. and c.), and stipulated
alternative schemes of implementation that are being used to evade land reform.
Moreover, the Aquino government lifted the ban on exporting copra and the

construction of additional processing facilities that was implemented under the
Marcos regime. By virtue of deregulation, the former enticed multinational
corporations to invest and set up their processing facilities in our country and in turn
create employment. This, however, did not materialize as the investors just bought
existing facilities that were on the brink of bankruptcy (Lactao, 1990: 74). And In the
first two years of her self -declared “revolutionary government”, the number of
commodity goods put under import liberalization increased to 1,232 (ibid.)
On 16 March 1989, the government approved the Letter of Intent (LOI),
courtesy of IMF-WB pressures. The LOI pushed for the import liberalization system
and the commitment to pay the country’s foreign debts. It also contains a 3-year
economic program for government to raise the prices of fuel, rice, power, water and
port services, cut public spending, fast track the selling of state companies, develop
the collection of taxes, and implement reforms on financial and trade systems (Goño,
1995: 17).

45
Between 1981 and 1985, quantitative restrictions (QRs) were removed on more than 900 items,
while the nominal average tariff protection was brought down from 43 per cent in 1981 to 28 per cent
in 1985 (Bello, 2001: 258).
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
68

In July 1991, the Aquino government started adopting the structural
adjustment program (SAP). The SAP originated from the IMF-WB’s new credit
program, the “structural adjustment loan” (SAL) that was introduced in 1979. By the
middle of 1980, the Philippines is one of the four countries willing to accept the
conditions that came with it (Broad and Bello, 1982: 166-167). Structural adjustment
programs aim to implement a particular program of reform and contain the following
elements (Bello, 2001: 11-13, 48-53, 80):
1. A radical reduction in government spendings.

2. Liberalization of imports and removing restrictions on foreign
investments.
3. Privatization of state enterprises and radical deregulation.
4. Currency devaluation to make exports more competitive.
5. Controlling wages and elimination of mechanisms protecting labor.
The economic policies of the Ramos administration did not vary much from
past governments. Philippine political economy still treaded the path of unbridled
liberalization and export-oriented development. Under the infamous catchword
Philippines 2000, the administration aimed for economic growth as the sole
barometer for national development. This vision embedded in the development
strategy of the Medium Term Philippine Development Plan of 1993-1998 (MTPDP)
was to guide the country to NIChood - being a newly industrialized country by the
end of the century. After much realistic criticisms, however, the term “newly
industrialized country” was reformulated to “newly industrializing country”.
Embodied in the MTPDP, the Medium Term Agricultural Development Plan
(MTADP) constituted the administration’s plan for agriculture. Under the MTADP,
the Key Production Approach stipulated the reduction of rice and corn lands from 2.5
million hectares each to 1.2 million and 0.7 million hectares respectively.
46
These

46
KINAIYAHAN Bulletin June 1993. It should be noted that in 1977, around 3.7 million hectares of
agricultural lands were devoted to rice production (Putzel and Cunnington, 1989:. 29-31).
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
69

major agricultural crops were sacrificed to give way to the production of cash or
export crops like cutflowers and asparagus (Institute of Political Economy, 1999: 10)
and interestingly, golf courses.

47

To this effect, the period 1992 to 1998 witnessed the implementation of laws
to “enhance” the economic competitiveness through liberalization – e.g. R.A. 7652
48
,
R.A. 7881
49
, R.A. 7900
50
, R.A. 8178
51
, R.A. 8179
52
, R.A. 8180, FLA
53
, IFMA
54
, the
New Mining Act of 1995
55
, and the implementation of the structural adjustment
program (SAP), among others. Globalization and regionalization was characterized
by the country’s membership to multilateral institutions such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – World Trade Organization (GATT-WTO) in 1994,
the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) in 1996, and the eventual inclusion
of agriculture to the GATT-WTO.
56
Among the post-martial law governments, the

47
Under the Estrada government, the landlord dominated Congress, according to Bello , allocated the
Department of Agrarian Reform only P600 million for land acquisition and distribution in 1999, or
half of the budget for 1998 (2001: 179).
48
Otherwise known as the Land Lease Act, it extends the allowable lease period of Philippine lands
fr om 25 years to 50 -75 years for both local and foreign investors.
49
This law exempts fish ponds, prawn farms, and lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine
raising from CARP. It further defers for a ten-year period its implementation in commercial farms.
50
Grants incentives, tax holidays, and infrastructure support for agribusiness corporations engaged in
export production
51
Otherwise known as the Agricultural Tariffication Act, it abolishes quantitative restrictions on the
importation of basic agricultural products sufficiently produced in the country as well as meat
products. This law nullifies at least five significant laws such as R.A. 1296 of 1955 which prohibits the
importation of onion, potato, garlic and cabbage; R.A. 2712 which bans importation of coffee beans;
R.A. 1297 which provides for the centralized importation of beef; R.A. 7607 or the Magna Carta for
Small Farmers which prohibits the importation of agricultural products widely and sufficiently
produced in the country; and R.A. 7308 or the Seed Industry Development Act prohibiting the
importation of sees produced in the Philippines (BAYAN 1996, pp. 68 -74).
52
Amendment to Foreign Investment Act; allows foreign investors to own 100% of any business they
want to establish in the country.
53
Refers to Fishpond Lease Agreement and stipulates that private and foreign corporations can lease
coastal lines and other bodies of water for fishpond purposes and prawn farms.
54
Refers to Integrated Forest Management Agreement. The law provides rights to private and foreign

corporations to use reforestation areas as plantation for fruit trees and commercial purposes.
55
This law allegedly puts on a bargain sale 5 million hectares of land for mining. It also allows foreign
investors to own up to 100% of the mining corporation they shall be putting up in the country (KMP
1996, Special Series on APEC).
56
A very interesting case is the U.S. Farm Bill that is being supported by Pres. Bush. While the U.S. is
one of the leading proponents of globalization and ceaselessly pressures Third World countries to join
the GATT-WTO and liberalize their agriculture, it ‘moves’ to protect its own agricultural industry.
The bill, otherwise known as H.R. 2646, reverses the market-oriented policy of the 1996 Freedom to
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
70

Ramos government has, thus far, championed in the implementation of IMF-WB
imposed economic programs.
The aforementioned policies and programs have invariably affected
Philippine agriculture, peasants, and the national economy in a very negative way.
The effects range from land conversion and land grabbing, agrarian reform evasion,
land accumulation, worsening poverty and landlessness, land conflicts and rural
activism, human rights violation, food insecurity, dependency, to rural and national
underdevelopment, and the “institutionalization of stagnation” (Bello, 2001: 238).
4. Land conversion
The Philippines has a total land area of 30 million hectares. Of this land area,
49 per cent or 14.66 million hectares are classified as alienable and disposable or
devoted to agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, and other purposes, while
the remaining 51 per cent or 14.02 million hectares are forested lands. Of the
alienable and disposable lands, 65 per cent or 9.607 million hectares are devoted for
agricultural use (Descanzo, 1990: 28).
57

In 1960, the average farm size was 3.6 hectares but it decreased by 1.4
hectares or 39 per cent in 1991 reflecting a general decrease in the average farm size
of the given major crops. Rice farms grew smaller by 40 per cent or 1.8 hectares on
the average while corn and coconut farms suffered a decrease of 20 (0.5 hectare) and
18 per cent (0.8 hectare) respectively. On the other hand, sugarcane and tobacco
accounted for the highest decrease of 49 (6.8 hectares) and 41 per cent (0.7 hectares)
respectively (ibid.).

Farm law that was supposed to wean farmers from government subsidies (see “House passes farm bill”
in Associated Press, Thursday, May 2, 2:42 PM ET, by PHILIP BRASHER, AP Farm Writer;

/>bin/vote.exe?year=2002&rollnumber=123.
57
Cited from The Bureau of Lands, December 31, 1985; see also The 1999 Philippine Statistic
Yearbook, NCSB, p. 3.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
71

Furthermore, the period of 1980-1991 shows that the average farm size of
2.81 hectares covering a total of 9.6 million hectares has decreased to 2.20 hectares
or by 22 per cent. This signifies a loss of at least 2,113,487 hectares of prime
agricultural lands with rice farms accounting for a 41 per cent decrease (863,811
hectares), corn farms by 449,650 hectares or 21 per cent, and coconut farms by
284,290 or 13 per cent. These major crops accounted for the 1.59 million hectares or
75 per cent loss.
58

But such an alarming decrease in prime agricultural lands is further
aggravated by the onslaught of land use conversion. Land conversion practically
refers to the alteration of land use from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes such

as residential, industrial, commercial, and other uses. But for the Philippine peasants,
it specifically refers to “an irreversible process that can mean a permanent loss of the
soil’s capacity for agricultural production”.
59
And in the Philippines, where at least
43 per cent of the population (31.29 million)
60
and 63 per cent of the poor (16.9
million)
61
traditionally depend on the sector for their livelihood (MTPDP, 1998: 3-2),
misguided land conversion becomes virtually a crime.
On the other hand, land conversion is a very convenient way of evading
agrarian reform. Remarkably, most of the lands converted and being converted are
gazetted for distribution. This explains the widespread cancellation of certificates of
land titles
62
and certificates of land ownership awards.
63
Under the situation, the

58
NCSO Census of 1980, cited in Descanzo 1989: 28.
59
Nantes 1992, cited in PIAF 1998: 9.
60
Based on the 1999 population census of 72.74 million (1999 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, NCSB,
p. 2-25).
61
In 1999, the poor population comprised about 36.8 per cent of the total population or 26,768,532 out

of 72.74 million (1999 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, NCSB, p. 2-25). But in 1995, Ramos himself
admitted in his speech (World Summit for Social Development) that poverty oppresses half of the
population of 66 million. Under this assumption, there could be at least 22.9 million poor people
depending on the agricultural sector.
62
These refer to the certificates of land rights distributed under the Marcos regime.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
72

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) shoulders considerable responsibility in
“checking” anomalous land conversions with the assistance of the Department of
Justice.
But what is the extent of land use conversion in the Philippines?
What proved to be the landmark case for land conversion was the Lankaan
Estate in Dasmariñas, Cavite. The 232-hectare agricultural land was allegedly
declared as suitable for commercial and industrial use under the Zoning Ordinance of
1980. The National Development Corporation (NDC) had leased this prime
agricultural land to the Marubeni Corporation and in 1980 the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the property as industrial. The Aquino
administration approved the conversion of the land favoring the Marubeni
Corporation and the Japanese International Development Organization (JAIDO).
The decision was based on what is now called “DOJ Opinion 44” (infamously
known as DOJ 44) which states that all applications for land use conversion which
are approved by the HULRB before R.A. 6657 was enacted could no longer be
stopped.
64
This case was further supported by the formal launching of the
CALABARZON project (Cavite-Laguna-Batangas-Rizal Export Processing Zone) in
October 1990 symbolizing the export-led industrialization program of the Aquino
government. This project covered around 1,622,866 hectares and 53 per cent of this

area used to be agricultural lands.
65

From 1991-1997, “legal” land conversion has witnessed an exponential
growth of 1,098 per cent. The number of applications processed increased by 503 per
cent, from 468 to 2,823. The DAR-approved area increased by 606 per cent, from

63
These refer to the certificates of land rights distributed under the Aquino and Ramos regimes or
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
64
CPAR documents, 1991; see also Riedinger 1995, p. 181.
65
See KINAIYAHAN Bulletin June 1993.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
73

3,089 hectares to 21,903 hectares. On the other hand, the DOJ 44 covered area
exceeded DAR’s performance by more than three times registering a conversion-
approval growth rate of 2,005 per cent, from 7,665 hectares to 35,063 hectares.
66

As of 31 March 1997, the batting average of DAR and DOJ 44 in approving
land conversions is an outstanding 80 per cent (PIAF, 1998: 10). But the picture is
worse if we compare the DAR data from other sources. As of March 1997, DAR
states that only 50,720 hectares have been legally converted but SENTRA (1997: 21)
shows that in only three regions, at least 80,037 hectares of agricultural lands have
been converted.
67
Does it follow that the discrepancy spells the widespread practice

of illegal land conversion?
Legal and illegal land conversions have covered at least 200,000 hectares of
prime agricultural lands and affected about 130,000 farmers (PIAF, 1998: 6).
68
Other
“unaccounted” cases are exampled by the conversion of 13,000 hectares in Central
Luzon since 1992, another 7,000 hectares in Western Visayas since 1993, and 5,500
hectares more in SOCSARGEN area since 1994 (SENTRA 1997: 30).
69
But
according to DAR in its 1997 report entitled The Ramos Legacy in Agrarian Reform:
A Transition Report, only 12,564 hectares were legally converted from July 1992 to
December 1997, while some 22,000 hectares were converted from 1987 to 1992 (p.

66
Data for the years 1991-March 1997 was derived from the Philippine Institute for Alternative
Futures 1998: 4, based on DAR CLUPPI Secretariat; Data for June 1997 - PPI 1998, a situationer
based on DAR CLUPPI Secretariat reports.
67
These regions pertain to the CALABARZON, Cebu, and the Cagayan-Iligan Industrial Corridor.
68
In an earlier estimate, PPI stated that from June 1988 to March 1994, converted lands could reach
160,247 hectares (Ochoa 1994: 16; also cited in PIAF 1998: 6). Moreover, KMP (1998: 4) stated that
since 1987, 268,000 hectares of agricultural lands have been converted - 118,000 during the Aquino
period and 150,000 under Ramos.
69
Riedinger (1995: 182) citing a KMP study, further states that Section 20 of the Local Government
Code that grants authority over land conversions to local governments is likely to cause the
reclassification of 371,000 hectares of agricultural lands, which will then be exempt from the reform
process.

KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
74

31).
70
As for coconuts alone, at least 38,161,400 trees have been cut affecting about
190,807 hectares as of mid-1993 (Asprer-Grafilo in PPI, 1993: 16).
71

On the other hand, not only does land conversion perpetuate landlessness but
it reinforces the country’s food insecurity as well. In converting prime agricultural
lands, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) estimated that of the 40,644
hectares converted in 1993, 5,300 hectares of these lands could have yielded 180,000
tons of rice (PIAF, 1998: 8-9). As early as 1991, however, 118,000 hectares of
irrigated lands have been lost to non-agricultural uses (Balisacan et al, 1994, cited in
AR Now! and PASCRES, 1998: 3).
In a conservative estimate, if one hectare can produce 60 sacks of palay, the
country have los t at least 7.08 million sacks or 3.54 million cavans of rice. Another
estimate states that 53 per cent of the converted rice lands (80 cavans per hectare at
P250 per cavan) amounted to a loss of P133 million (ACSPPF-IDR-KAS, 1997: 34).
Land conversions to a significant extent explain three things – why the country has to
import 906 metric tons in 1996 and another 731 metric tons of rice in 1997,
72
why
has the country’s agricultural growth has exponentially dwindled by –253 per cent,
from 4.04 in 1980 to –6.2 in 1998,
73
and why has the country’s volume of
agricultural production only grew by 0.66 per cent from 1980 to 1997.
74

Land conversion fortifies and deepens the structure of landlessness and
exacerbates existing agrarian problems. Extant agrarian/land reform laws are simply

70
And according to other sources, the peasantry has been deprived of at least 3.772 million hectares of
agricultural lands where 800,00 hectares have already been converted and the 3.1 million hectares are
devoted to export crops (KMP-PAMALAKAYA Situationer Oct. 21, 1999).
71
The breakdown is as follows - Northern Mindanao, 16.8 million trees affecting 84,000 has.; Central
Visayas, 12.6 million trees affecting 63,000 hectares; Southern Tagalog, 3.1314 million trees affecting
15,675 hectares; Western Visayas, 2.850 million trees affecting 41,250 hectares; and Southern
Mindanao, 2.78 million trees affecting 13,900 hectares.
72
IPE 1999, p. 10, cited from Bureau of Agricultural Statistics.
73
Ibid. cited from NCSB, CB, DOLE (selected years); NCSB, GNP and GDP by Industrial Origin,
January -September 1997 and 1998 (Growth Rates).
74
Ibid. p. 8.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
75

powerless against such contrivance. But what makes the situation more incredible
and contentious is that these conversions are legalized and legitimized by interesting
legal provisions and orders. Among others, these refer to the Preside ntial Decree No.
2052;
75
EO 129-A, Series of 1987;
76

Sec. 65 of CARP;
77
Sec. 8, par. b. and c of
CARP;
78
Sec. 11;
79
DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1990;
80
DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of
1990;
81
DAR A.O. No. 8, Series of 1990;
82
Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code;
83

DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990;
84
Malacañang A.O. No. 20, Series of December
1992;
85
Memorandum Order No. 54, Series of 1993;
86
and E.O. 124 of 1993.
87

Moreover, these legislative measures are further reinforced by liberalization laws that
consent landlessness, encourage land reform without land redistribution, and promote
development based on exogenous factors – e.g. R.A. 7652, R.A. 7881, R.A. 7900,

75
A Marcos legacy declaring prime agricultural lands as tourist zones. The Philippine Tourism
Authority maintains that the law is still in effect.
76
Grants exclusive authority to decide on the conversion of farmlands to residential, commercial,
industrial and other purposes.
77
Allows the conversion of the land on the basis that the land has ceased to be economically feasible
and sound for agricultural purposes, or that conversion renders a greater economic value to the land.
78
Allows the indeterminate continuity of lease and management contracts executed with MNCs over
lands already distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. These have been used by Del Monte Phils. Inc. and
NDC-Guthrie Phils. Inc. to continue controlling, through leaseback agreement, some 8,019 and 4,000
hectares of lands respectively (SENTRA, 1997: 10).
79
Defers the inclusion of commercial farms in the implementation of land distribution within a ten-
year period.
80
Provides the rules and regulations for the conversion of private agricultural lands to non-agricultural
uses.
81
Provides the rules and regulations and identifies who may govern the processing and approval of
applications for land use conversion.
82
Amends the land conversion approval process, requiring the Regional Director to submit his
recommendation on conversion applications for lands above 5 hectares.
83
Authorizes local government officials to “reclassify 15% of agricultural lands and provide for its
manner of utilization or disposition”.

84
States that the authority of DAR to approve or disapprove conversions to non-agricultural uses
covers only applications made on or after June 15, 1988, the date CARL took effect.
85
Supersedes DOJ 44 and identifies agricultural lands which shall not be subject to conversion but
does not have specific implementing guidelines and punitive measures that render such as powerless.
86
A reaffirmation of Section 65 of R.A. 6657 and Section 20 of the Local Government Code.
Disallows LGUs from authorizing the reclassification of irrigated and irrigable lands. But again
invokes the provisions of Sec. 20 of the LGC.
87
Speeds up the approval of land conversion reducing the requirements and procedures to 10 steps
from the previous 24.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
76

R.A. 8178, R.A. 8179, R.A. 8180, and the New Mining Act of 1995, among others
(see discussions in the previous section).
The existence of the aforesaid laws and legal provisions explain significantly
what Bello mentions as the successful legal actions by landlords in moving to cancel
the emancipation patents (EPs) and certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs)
already awarded to farmer beneficiaries. In the last four of Ramos, 17,534 EPs and
CLOAs covering 40,677 hectares were nullified while 15,064 EPs and CLOAs
covering 36,315 hectares were cancelled during Estrada’s first two years (Bello,
2001: 197).
“Land conversion”, hence, is perceived to have become the instrument of the
unscrupulous to legally grab lands and perpetrate brute harassment and coercion
among the farmers, fisherfolks, and indigenous peoples, and make profits from
destroying the ecological balance of the country.
88

Today, peasants and peasant-based
formations continue to build organizations and networks, advocate their concerns,
and carry out collective action to fight the land conversion rush.
The abovementioned conditions – landlessness and land concentration,
ineffective land and agrarian reform laws, economic policies and programs, and land
conversion – illustrate the very basis of grievance and protest by a multitude of
peasant movements and organizations, nonetheless, in varying degrees and focus. In
another but very related dimension, these conditions impact on the growing violence
in the countryside. The discussions on laws and economic policies and programs,
moreover, clearly implicate the Philippine state as another subject and object of
protest. This entity, hence, requires a brief investigation.
B. Philippine State and Political Economy

88
PPI 1993, pp. 4-5; Flores in PPI 1994, pp. 6-7; SENTRA 1997; ACSPPF-IDR-KAS 1997, pp. 32-
38; PIAF 1998.
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
77

I perceive the assertion of state autonomy in Philippine society as both
theoretically and empirically problematic. On theoretical grounds, to autonomize
state from society is analogous to cutting the former’s umbilical cord. State exists in
society and it is impossible to have an ahistorical state – quite inconceivable to have
“states without societies, without either origins or conditions of reception
(Chandhoke, 1995: 11). The state, moreover, “is a strategically selective terrain
which can never be neutral among all social forces and political projects”
(Chandhoke, 1995: 71 cf Jessop 1990: 353). Moreover, the assertion of state
autonomy becomes a murky position if contextualized within Third World societies,
which have histories of colonization and neo-colonization.
Empirically speaking, the Philippine state has historically been “weak”;

captured by foreign and domestic powerful forces. The following political historical
accounts aptly describe this statement – Lande’s “patronage politics” (1966); Bello,
Kinley, and Ellinson’s “colonization without an occupation force”; Hutchcroft’s
“patrimonial plunder” (1991); Anderson’s “cacique democracy” (1988); McCoy’s
“c lientelistic politics” (1988); Wurfel’s “development and decay” (1988); Guttierez’s
“the ties that bind” (1991); Rivera’s “landlords and capitalists” (1994); Villacorta’s
“curse of the weak state” (1994); and Buendia’s “a nation that failed to become”
(1994).
Three academic literatures succinctly capture the nature and character of
Philippine state and politics. Buendia’s (1994) article, “The Philippines”, raised the
uncertainty of lasting development in a nation that failed to become. He traced the
country’s political and economic subservience of the state from the country’s colonial
past and neo-colonial status. He further characterized Philippine politics as neo-
colonial, patron-clientelistic, elitist, personalistic, run by pragmatism and
KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society
78

opportunism, and participated by political butterflies. In a similar vein but with an
internal focus, Villacorta’s (1994) article, “The Curse of the Weak State: Leadership
Imperatives for the Ramos Government”, traces the weakness of the Philippine state
to its inability to dissociate itself from the interests of oligarchy – the landed elites,
which likewise dominates the industrial sector. He further stated that the weak state
and the perceived weak leadership are systemic – actually rooted in the iniquitous
social structure as well as the refusal of past governments to confront this social
structure. Nonetheless, Villacorta underlined the country’s colonial and neo-colonial
history as an important factor in considering Philippine state and politics.
The concrete reference to the historical “weakness” of the Philippine state
could be summed up based on what Rivera, in his book Landlords and Capitalists:
Class, Family, and State in Philippine Manufacturing, claims as the four enduring
social features caused by a protracted colonial rule: “1) a resilient oligarchy rooted in

land and export agriculture; 2) a tradition of authoritarian-clientelistic political
leadership in a politically fractured polity; 3) a history of significant popular
opposition movements erupting at critical conjunctures; and 4) continuing marked
dependence on foreign external resources” (1994: 112). In particular, he examined
the dominance of landlords-and-capitalists in the Philippine manufacturing sector.
Similar with Buendia and Villacorta, he also emphasized how the country’s colonial
and neo-colonial legacy contributed to the “underdevelopment” of state and
politics.
89

The aforesaid perspectives are further elaborated by the following political
historical accounts of Philippine political development. Spanish rule did not in any

89
Fo r a special issue about varying accounts of the Philippine state and economy, refer to
KASARINLAN’s issue of “Rethinking the State and the Economy”, 1994, Vol. 10, No. 1, TWSC –
UP, Diliman.