An examination of the state of nation building in myanmar

An Examination of the State of Nation-Building in Myanmar
Revised edition

Inga Gruss
(MSc Contemporary Asian Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam)

A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts (Southeast Asian Studies)
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
National University of Singapore
2008


Contents
Abstract........................................................................................................................... ii
Preface and Acknowledgements .....................................................................................iii
Illustrations...................................................................................................................... v
List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................ vi
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
Main Arguments .......................................................................................................... 2
Theoretical Concerns and Definitions.......................................................................... 4
Fieldwork, ethical Considerations and Limitations of the Research ............................. 8
Chapter Outline ......................................................................................................... 12
Chapter 1: “Nurturing the Soul of a Nation:” Nation-Building in Post-Colonial Myanmar 15
“We, the People of Burma:” Nation-Building in parliamentary Burma......................... 16
“Unity & Socialism:” a second Revolution, 1962-1988 ............................................... 21
“The Enemy who is more destructive than Nargis”, a Nation under Threat: Myanmar
since 1988................................................................................................................. 27
Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................................... 38
Chapter 2: Shattered Visions: Veteran Politicians’ Perspectives on Nation-Building ..... 40
Economic Stagnation and failed Political Reforms: Myanmar in inexorable Decline .. 41
Strong Man, Constitution and armed Struggle: the Way forward? ............................. 47

Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................................... 51
Chapter 3: Pragmatism rules: engaging Nation-Building from below through social
Development................................................................................................................. 53
Nation-building and civil engagement........................................................................ 53
Creating Opportunities for Participation in Nation-Building ........................................ 54
“They learn to overcome their Fear” .......................................................................... 58
Creating Bonds, creating Divisions............................................................................ 63
Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................................... 65
Chapter 4: Together, Apart?: a Nation put to Test ......................................................... 68
Fighting Elites and apathetic Masses: constitutional Referendum 2008 .................... 69
Cyclone Nargis: a State in Torpidity .......................................................................... 77
A Nation stands up .................................................................................................... 81
Sometimes, somewhere, united they stand ............................................................... 85
Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................. 89
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 94
Websites ................................................................................................................... 99

i


Abstract
This thesis explores the issue of nation-building in Myanmar. It focuses on the
post-colonial period and examines the attempts of the state to mould the Myanmar
nation according to the state’s notions and ideology. The perceptions of veteran
politicians and civil society actors on the nation-building project will be compared with de
facto experiences about the state of nation-building in Myanmar. The conduct of state
and society during the relief work in the early phase of the cyclone Nargis is used as
case study to put assumptions, opinions and propaganda about nation-building in
Myanmar to test. The main question guiding my research relates to the ideological reach
of the state. How far does the reach of the state go, in particular when it enjoys little

domestic public support and popularity, in influencing its population ideologically? Which
role can a state play in a case like Myanmar in forming and building a nation?
It is argued that the contemporary state’s project of nation-building is build
around fabricated notions of a need for national unity. This strong emphasis on national
unity is based upon concern over both the multi ethnic composition of Myanmar and the
imminent threat of foreign nations that linger to endanger the Myanmar state’s
sovereignty. The military is portrayed as a strong unified body that can overcome
divisions inside the country and protect the country from foreign invasion.
Most interviewees reject the state’s nation-building project. Nevertheless, the
state’s endeavour has resulted in the creation of a sense of nationhood. Yet, it is not the
content of the project itself that has yielded fruit, but it is the performance of the state
while delivering the project that has created a common sense of nationhood. The state
has repeatedly acted in a hostile way towards society in its nation-building project. The
contents are meaningless and aim at glorifying the role of the state. The state shows
little skill in approaching its citizens and has offered no ideological national platform for
people to identify with. Although this ideological platform has failed to materialise the
state has provided itself as the necessary platform for creating a sense of nationhood.
During the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis the state showed little respect or concern for the
victims and thereby enforced what lingered for a long time, an expression of nationhood
that is centred around a common dislike of the state.

ii


Preface and Acknowledgements
My interest in Myanmar has accompanied my life for the last five years and will
hopefully stay with me for many more years. In far away Europe it seemed difficult to
study and learn about a country that meant little to most people. Driven by curiosity
about Southeast Asia and Myanmar I quit my job as a psychologist, packed my bags
and boarded a flight to Bangkok in January 2006 and have since called this part of the

world my abode. It is the place where I have met many interesting people who became
close friends and Southeast Asia now feels more home than any other part of the world.
My time at the Southeast Asian Studies Programme at the National University of
Singapore was marked by ups and downs. The programme has provided a great
platform to interact and learn from my fellow students, maybe more than articles or
books can teach. Wonderful teachers teach at the Programme who I would not have met
otherwise. While I am grateful for the opportunity to have met these people, other
experiences I would have preferred to miss. By any standards, the power of
administrative structures at times seemed unreasonable and the programme’s
commitment to support their students in their intellectual development questionable.
Repeatedly, I experienced that my opinion in my role as a student with regard to the
programme’s performance was not appreciated. As of today, I remain confused and do
not understand why any department that wants to take pride in the intellectual
performance of their students does not appreciate student’s criticism, although, as any
student knows, only through constructive criticism one can learn and improve.
This thesis marks the end of my time in Singapore that despite personal
challenges was a time of great personal and intellectual encounters. I have been
fortunate to meet many creative minds and the friendships of extraordinary people have
accompanied me during my studies in Singapore. Beng Hui, Ermita, Mei Feng, Simon
and Thiru, you have been friends as one can only wish to meet. Xin Mei, your patience
to endure my all too often complaints has been amazing and your interest in my
endeavours an incredible support, thank you.
In Yangon, I thank K. Your home has provided serenity and peace of mind. C.,
our conversations over another portion of French fries and beer or at a musical
restaurant and fashion show helped me stay sane in times of insanity. Your critical

iii


remarks about my work have challenged me to seek alternative trains of thoughts. Yu

Yu, you are not just a great friend and teacher, but the best guide to your country.
With great respect I thank the many veteran politicians who so kindly shared their
views, ideas and life stories with me during my field work in Yangon. It was a humbling
experience to meet these wonderful men who have stood up for their ideals and dreams
without faltering for so many years. I owe gratitude to all my respondents for their trust in
me. Without the contribution of my anonymous interviewees this thesis would not have
been possible.
My family in Europa has never stopped to encourage and support me, thanks.
Dr. Pattana Kitiarsa has not only introduced me to the anthropology of Southeast
Asia, but has been a supportive, encouraging supervisor. Your support during the thesis
writing process made it easier to successfully pursue what at time’s seemed impossible.
Your critical and constructive comments throughout the MA trajectory have helped me to
intellectually mature.
The two professors and friends who deserve the most heartfelt words of thanks
are Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing and Dr. Michael J. Montesano. You have supported me
throughout my studies and research, encouraged me to pursue my dreams and helped
me to belief in myself. My wonderful future prospects I owe to both of you. Dr. Michael J.
Montesano, your empathetic supervision and teaching has provided intellectual
challenges that I wish for every student to experience. Your witty remarks have opened
many new exciting horizons. Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, your commitment to help me
understand Myanmar has been as demanding as rewarding. My field work would not
have been possible without your support.

iv


Illustrations
1.1

Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, August 13, 2000

32

1.2

Signboard opposite the former American embassy, Yangon

33

1.3

Father and son statue in People’s Park, Yangon

34

1.4

Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, March 27, 2008

36

4.1

Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, April 27, 2008

71

4.2

Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, April 22, 2008

72

4.3

Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, May 11, 2008

78

v


List of Acronyms
ABSDF

All Burma Students Democratic Front

AFPFL

Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League

BBC

British Broadcasting Company

BNA

Burma National Army

BSPP

Burma Socialist Programme Party

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CPB

Communist Party of Burma

DVB

Democratic Voice of Burma

INGO

International Non Governmental Organisation

KBTS

Karen Baptist Theological Seminary

KDC

Karen Development Committee

KIO

Kachin Independence Organisation

KNU

Karen National Union

NLD

National League for Democracy

NDUF

National Democratic United Front

NGO

Non Governmental Organisation

RC

Revolutionary Council

RFA

Radio Free Asia

SLORC

State Law and Order Restoration Council

SPDC

State Peace and Development Council

VOA

Voice of America

YMBA

Young Men Buddhist Association

vi


Introduction
“The entire national people are striving energetically hand in hand with the
Tatmadaw for the emergence of a peaceful, modern, developed and disciplineflourishing democratic nation. The stability of the State, community peace and
tranquillity, prevalence of law and order, uplifting of education standard and raising the
living standard of the people are essential for the multi-party democratic system.”1
References to the need to build a strong nation are found in countless speeches
and publications issued by the Myanmar government, often resembling each other in a
hard to distinguish manner. The central government portrays nation-building as one of
the foremost activities that the state, represented by the ruling government, is engaged
in. Central to the rhetoric of the Myanmar government concerning its nation-building
efforts is the role of the Tatmadaw (or armed forces) as the preserver and protector of a
unified Myanmar. According to the Myanmar government, one is led to believe that the
country is threatened by “internal and external anti-government elements”2 who aim to
destroy not only the government, but also peace and unity in Myanmar.
Peace and unity are elusive concepts in a country where the government’s right
to rule the country has been challenged over many decades by various parties. The

early years after independence in 1948 were characterised by armed clashes between
communist factions and the army. Communists questioned the legitimacy of the central
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government to rule the country. These
violent clashes were soon intensified by armed ethnic minority insurgent groups who
joined the armed efforts to contest the rule of the central government. Civil war
dominated the perception of state – minority relations under the Revolutionary Council
(RC) and its Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). This one-party government
ruled between 1962 until 1988, outlawed any other political parties and tried to impose
autarkist Socialist rule on its population. Political performance and legitimacy of the
BSPP government were repeatedly challenged in demonstrations and armed attacks
and culminated in 1988 in popular demonstrations. The demonstrations were quelled
violently by the army and resulted in a power take over by the military under the name

1

st

Than Shwe, excerpt from address delivered at the 61 Anniversary Armed Forces Day Parade,
New Light of Myanmar, March 27, 2008.
2
New Light of Myanmar, June 16, 2008.

1


State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The shift of name from SLORC to
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997 was a mere change of name
aided by a foreign consultancy and further manifested the nation-building project that
was in place since 1988. The government considered it as their foremost task to restore
law and order. Law, order, peace and unity have emerged to be dominant topics in the

rhetoric of the government since 1988. The contemporary Myanmar governments’
publications or speeches by government representatives have often been ridiculed and
portrayed as mere propaganda because of the widespread ill-reputation of the
government and its utmost ineptness in presenting its point of view. However, despite
these flaws the impact of the state’s nation-building campaign should be taken seriously
as an object of study. Years of intensive nation-building efforts have left their traces
upon the population and exploring its impact and implications can contribute to a better
understanding of contemporary Myanmar society.
Main Arguments
This thesis explores the issue of nation-building in Myanmar. It focuses on the
post-colonial period and examines the attempts of the Myanmar government to mould
the Myanmar nation according to their notions and ideology. The perceptions of veteran
politicians and civil society actors on the nation-building project will be compared with de
facto experiences about the state of nation-building in Myanmar. The conduct of state
and society during the relief work in the early phase of the cyclone Nargis is used as
case study to put assumptions, opinions and propaganda about nation-building in
Myanmar to test. The main question guiding my research relates to the ideological reach
of the state. How far does the reach of the state go, in particular when it enjoys little
domestic public support and popularity, in influencing its population ideologically?3
Which role can a state play in a case like Myanmar in forming and building a nation?

3

It should be acknowledged that there might be a discrepancy between the popularity of the
government in popular discourse and day-to-day interaction. Nearly every person in Myanmar will
have friends or family who in one way or another are part of the government body and their
otherwise declared dislike of the government will not be reflected in their interaction with these
people. Research demonstrating the nuances under which the government gains legitimacy in the
eye of the public has been done by Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, Behind the Teak Curtain:
authoritarianism, agricultural Policies, and political Legitimacy in rural Burma/Myanmar. (London:

Kegan Paul Ltd.): 2004. There is, however, numerous research that indicates the overwhelmingly
contested, negative perception of the government (see for example Ashley South, Ethnic Politics
in Burma: States of Conflict (New York: Routledge): 2008 or Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma
under the Military Rule (New York: Zed Books): 2001).

2


It is argued that the reach of the state does not necessarily depend on its
effectiveness or popularity. The Myanmar state has in its very peculiar way influenced
and shaped its citizens, although possibly not in the way as originally intended. By
means of analysing the nation-building project this argument will be illustrated. I will
argue that the state’s contemporary project of nation-building is built around fabricated
notions of a need for national unity. This strong emphasis on national unity is based
upon concern over both the multi ethnic composition of Myanmar and the imminent
threat of foreign nations that linger to endanger the Myanmar state’s sovereignty. The
military is portrayed as a strong unified body that can overcome divisions inside the
country and protect the country from foreign invasion. The state attempts to evoke
loyalties and a common national feeling by emphasising these factors. An important
component in the nation-building process is constitutional reform that the government
uses as a milestone to achieve a prosperous, democratic nation.
Most interviewees perceive this project as a sham and strongly reject the
governments’ attempts to create national sentiments in this manner. Although most
respondents clearly felt strongly patriotic about their country and experience a strong
responsibility to contribute to the betterment of the country, I argue that their loyalties to
their peer/interest groups supersede their sentiments of national loyalty. A strong
factionalism has developed over the decades that hamper cooperation between different
societal groups who all share a common concern to improve the circumstances of life for
Myanmar citizens. I suggest that the relief operations carried out by ordinary citizens in
the aftermath of Nargis can be understood as evidence for a common sense of

responsibility towards largely unknown fellow national citizens. Thus a certain sense of
national obligation is alive and drives people to act in societal responsible way. However,
the factionalism mentioned earlier emerges here again. Many people rather provide
assistance within the confinements of their social groups than to anonymous fellow
citizens.
This sense of nationhood is not a result of the nation-building efforts of the state,
but I interpret this sense of national identity as a shared “anti-response” to the state’s
nation-building project and the state more generally. It is suggested that the state was
not successful in building a common sense of nationhood through the content of its
campaign, but ironically created a common sense of national identity through providing a
potent object of strong negative sentiments among the population. These anti-state
sentiments are often directed towards the abstract notion of a state and are not

3


necessarily due to first hand experience, but more often based on public behaviour of
the state and shared negative stories about the state.
The argument presented above should not be considered an argument that
attempts to establish a causal chain of evidence, but rather is of interpretative nature. It
is a personal reading of texts, events, interviews and observations. By suggesting this
line of argumentation I do not claim to offer the only possible understanding of the
materials presented in this thesis. It is, however, one way to analyse the materials that
provides a meaningful interpretation that opens new venues for further research rather
than providing a conclusive statement on the state of affairs. I recognise that my
argument is based upon my interpretation of interviews with people who represent only a
small fragment of the Myanmar population and who do not provide a representative
sample. However, while it is a weakness of the argument, it does not make the
perspectives of those people interviewed less valid or truthful from their perspective.
Theoretical Concerns and Definitions

Within the Southeast Asian context, which has in the pre-colonial context been
characterised as a “state-averse archipelago”4, nation-building remains a topic of
relevance and the nation-state a meaningful unit of analysis.5 In November 2007
Malaysia was afflicted with protests of members of the Indian community who expressed
their discontent with their current standing within the Malaysian society, the south of
Thailand has for many years now been the setting of violent clashes between the
minority Muslim community and the Thai state, the dominance of the Philippine state
continues to be challenged in Mindanao and in Myanmar the hegemony of the state has
been challenged from many sites for nearly 60 years now. Although many of these
conflicts are closely linked to the existence of networks beyond national borders and the
notion of individual or social groups to be part of these networks, these conflicts need to
be understood within specific historical trajectories that particular nation-states took.
Nation-state formations need to be analysed within greater political orders, but remain a
useful and necessary unit of analysis.

4

Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), 13.
See for example Charles Keyes, Helen Hardacre, and Laurel Kendall (Eds.) Asian Visions of
Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press): 1994.
5

4


The term nation as used in this thesis is considered to be “a distinctive group of
people who feel a communal bond on the basis of culture, history, religion, geography,
or linguistics.”6 This communal bond can be nurtured through various activities, for
example top-down processes by the state or bottom-up processes by non-governmental

actors. Nation-building in turn entails different components. On the one hand, it means to
strengthen the structure of the state and political processes, and on the other hand it
attempts to build a common national identity whereby “community development and
personal relationships are the core elements when it is understood as the effort to
develop a consciousness of shared destiny.”7 Accordingly, “nation-building thus
combines two objectives: state-building, which relates to the development and extension
of administrative function; and identity-building, which refers to the creation of a
communal identity.”8 This communal identity can be achieved through economic, political
and social development.. In this thesis the emphasis is on the creation of a common
ideological perspective through concrete developments of economic, political and social
nature. The first chapter of the thesis focuses on the attempts of the state, while the
latter chapters focus on the ways in which these attempts are perceived and responded
to.
Both the terms nation and nation-building are social constructs. As mentioned
above, part of the nation-building project is a top-down process driven by the state. It is
necessary to be critical of an “exaggerated belief in the powers of elite manipulation of
the masses”9, and not to overemphasise the potential of the state to manipulate the
masses like mindless puppets, one must not ascribe too much ideological dominance
power to the state. Furthermore, some scholars have remarked that there is more to the
understanding and working of the nation-state than official ideology.10 Here, I use official
ideology as the point from where to start my analysis. I follow the state’s perspective by
analysing the channels and contents they choose in order to influence public perception
and imagination. However, once the state has laid out their game plan it is up to the
public to react. This reaction can have many faces, and only some of these faces will be
presented here, bearing in mind the existence of multiple reactions.

6

Andrea Kathryn Talentino, “The two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Function and
Identity,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17.3 (2004): 559.

7
Ibid, 559.
8
Ibism 559.
9
Anthony Smith, The Nation in History (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000), 3.
10
Michael Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1.

5


One must draw clear conceptual distinctions between the terms state, statebuilding, nation, nation-building and nation-state. The state is defined as “the
governmental and administrative institutions of a society, and […] the ideological claim
as to the sovereignty of those institutions.”11 State-building refers to the creation and
strengthening of these institutions. According to the definitions provided here, the term
state is a political concept, whereas the term nation can be considered a cultural
concept. The concept nation-state in turn is "the result of marrying a new cultural
concept of the nation to an older legal and political concept of the state."12 Accordingly,
the term nation-state is the product of the attempt of governments to create an overlap
between the concepts of state and nation.
In particular in the study of Myanmar the concepts of state, military and
government have come to be perceived as identical and been used in a conflated way.13
Although the terms state and government denominate different concepts, throughout this
thesis I use the two terms interchangeably. In general, the concept of the state should
not be regarded to entail a monolithic entity that acts uniformly within different settings
and contexts. 14 In the case of Myanmar, nonetheless, the state has been perceived as a
closely-knit unit that appears relatively united. Likely differences between people
representing the state are not acted out in public and although “It is said that there are
hard-liners and soft-liners in the Burmese armed forces but in reality there is not much

difference between them.”15 Thus, possible differences in opinions and stances are not
apparent to such an extent that for the purposes here I consider it necessary to
represent them in my choice of words when talking about the ruling authorities in
Myanmar.
The processes of state and nation-building can be closely interlinked, but
generally are independent of each other. Tarling argues that a nation can be built without
building a state and vice versa a state can be build without a nation. However, he adds
11

David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia (London, Routledge, 1994), 2.
Kenneth H.F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980),
129.
13
“There has not even been a distinction between the state, the government and the armed
forces, which have all been conflated.” Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power without
Glory (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2002).
14
See for example Derek Sayer, “Dissident Remarks on Hegemony,” Everyday Forms of State
Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in modern Mexico. Joseph, Gilbert M. and
Daniel Nugent (Eds). (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994): 367-377.
15
Lessons for Burma, Interview with Kyaw Yin Hlaing for BBC Burmese
/>12

6


that the latter is only possible on a theoretical level: “Building a state without building or
maintaining a ‘nation’ is conceptually possible, and has been attempted in the past, but it
is no longer possible in practice. Imperial powers created colonial state, but they faced

nationalist movements that they helped to create.”16
In contrast, the number of communities considering themselves a nation without
a state is listed as more then 60 by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organisation. 17 These are groups, most often formed around an assumed common
ethnic ancestry, that have not been granted a sovereign state in the existing political
order, but who lay claim to the right to form a separate state. In the Myanmar context,
there are writings about the Karen as “nation of intent”18 and the Kachin as “a stateless
nation”19 which are widely used terms to describe such nations who have aspirations to
become independent sovereign states.
It has been suggested that the nation-state “is a precarious structure, merely one
of several options for organising human communities, and a venture that has always
been vulnerable to contest and subversion.”20 Although it is correct that the nation-state
as form to organise people has been contested, it nevertheless has emerged as the
dominant organising political principle. The strength of the nation-state lies in its potential
to be emotionally meaningful to people. Its appeal must be recognised by the ruling
elites, but also by society. Nationalism has little ideological appeal, but it allows leaders
to mobilise this emotional potential to gather citizens behind their leadership.21
This thesis contributes to the discussion of the ideological reach of the state. It
highlights the contestations of the nation-building project and how resistance has been
employed to reject the prescribed ideology of a state. In the Myanmar case, the ill-repute
of the state is often highlighted. This reputation is assumed to result in ideological
immunity to the state’s narratives. I want to question the assumption that dislike of the
16

Nicholas Tarling, Nationalism in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2004), 11.
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, “UNPO Brochure”,
/>18
Ananda Rajah, “A ‘nation of intent’ in Burma: Karen ethno-nationalism, nationalism and
narrations of nation,” The Pacific Review 15.4 (2002): 517
19

Karin Dean, “Spaces and Territorialities on the Sino-Burmese Boundary”, Political Geography
24 (2005): 816.
20
Anthony Milner, “Historians writing Nations: Malaysian Contests.” in Nation-building: Five
Southeast Asian Histories, ed. Wang Gungwu (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), 117.
21
Nicholas Tarling, Nationalism in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2004), 9.
17

7


state needs to result in rejection of the state’s rhetoric. First of all, why should one
assume that people either need to fully reject or blindly disobey to a certain ideology? It
is reasonable to assume that people might be able to identify with some messages of
the state, while they find it more difficult to see their thoughts and feelings reflected in
other statements. Furthermore, there are ample examples that indicate that the
separation between state and society is not as strict as one would think according to the
assumption that dislike of the state results in complete rejection of the state’s rhetoric.
State – society interaction takes place on many levels and creates in one way or another
way linkages. It is very unlikely to assume that all personal encounters with state officials
will be of negative nature. In addition, even if one is convinced that it is possible fully to
reject the state’s message, it is questionable to assume that people’s minds might not be
influenced subconsciously.
Myanmar studies, which have become a regrettable contentious field, are morally
laden. It is often assumed that one party possesses greater moral authority than another
and thereby has the right to attempt to influence others. Through examining nationbuilding in Myanmar I reject the assumption that the mobilisation of the concept of
morality should guide one’s analysis. The claim to greater moral authority is subjective,
and it is premature to assume that one party has a greater ideological influence than
another party. The analysis of nation-building in Myanmar can help to unfold different

point of views on the state and its ideological project. It can reveal different mechanisms
that are at play and show the reader that many factors influence the workings of the
state.
I see my scholarly contribution in particular to the field of Myanmar studies and
the understanding of state – society interaction in Myanmar. While in disciplinary
programmes theoretical questions often drive the research, in this case an “area studies”
approach encourages more sensitivity towards regional issues and predicaments. By
engaging with the topic of nation-building in Southeast Asia in 2008 I will show that its
study is not an anachronistic endeavour, but an enterprise that helps to shed light on
regional realities and challenges.
Fieldwork, ethical Considerations and Limitations of the Research
I conducted fieldwork for this thesis in Myanmar between April 17 and June 18,
2008. I spent most of the ten weeks in Yangon and made one short trip to Sittwe and
Myau-U in Rakhine state. During these ten weeks I collected printed materials

8


(newspapers, books), visited public sites such as museums, monuments and other
places that are relevant to the understanding of nation-building in Myanmar and
conducted interviews. The interviews were held with various veteran politicians, ethnic
political leaders and members of ethnic community based organisations. In addition to
the fieldwork in Myanmar I did additional research at the ISEAS library in Singapore.
Conducting research in Myanmar is subject to various restrictions. The current
government tolerates the presence of researchers and their work to a limited extent,
although it is very difficult and challenging to obtain official research permission. Any
research that could be considered political is unlikely to obtain tacit or open approval by
the authorities. Most researchers enter the country on tourist or business visas and do
not state their intentions to conduct research in any official documentation required by
the government. While this raises an obvious ethical dilemma concerning deceiving the

authorities about the actual purpose of the stay, it can have larger safety implications for
the researcher and his/her respondents. In case unauthorised research comes to the
attention of the authorities, the researcher might be denied visa for future visits or will be
expelled from the country. However, the greater risk is being taken by people granting
interviews to researchers. Interviews with researchers (in many cases non-Asian
researchers) will often attract unwanted attention, no matter what the content of the
conversation is. It is the responsibility of the researcher to take all necessary precautions
to conceal the identity of the respondents and to protect them from possible harmful
consequences. Throughout my thesis I will refer to respondents either by titles or
invented names. The necessity to conceal the identities of the respondents makes it
impossible to locate their current standing in society within their biographical trajectories
here in my thesis. While I will frame the political and historical context within which the
responses of my interviewees should be understood, I will refrain from providing too
many biographical data in order to make it impossible to identity individuals.
However, it is not only Myanmar authorities who impose restrictions on research
in Myanmar. Burmese exile media groups do not hesitate to report on research activities
by researchers whom they consider not in line with their ideological approach. Research
has become politicised beyond reason, and one cannot hope to not avoid the unwanted
attention of both the authorities and exile media groups. Part of the politicisation of
research on Myanmar is the choice of name given to the country in one’s writing. The
country carried the name Union of Burma from 1948 – 1974, from 1974 – 1988 it was
called the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma and in 1989 it was renamed into

9


Union of Myanmar. In particular the last change of name into Union of Myanmar
triggered hostile responses by some parties. The SLORC government changed the
name of the country in 1989 without holding a referendum or consulting popular opinion
in any other ways. Since the SLORC government is considered an illegitimate

government by many parties, one that seized power by force, its actions are disapproved
of in principle. Parties who call themselves pro-democracy forces 22 and reside to a large
extent in exile in Thailand, but inside the country as well, strongly disapprove the change
of name and have campaigned for many years to keep the name Burma in usage. In the
rhetoric of the pro-democracy forces the usage of the name Myanmar implies tacit
approval of a government that is widely considered repressive and authoritarian. This
name controversy has sparked manifold discussions and angry exchanges. I distance
myself from any political implications that either name has and use the name Burma
when referring to the period until 1989 and thereafter the name Myanmar.23
The scope of my research is limited. The timeframe for fieldwork within the
National University of Singapore Master’s degree programme is short and ten weeks
barely allow more than a glimpse and the formulation of a first impression and ideas. I
had spent a considerable amount of time in Myanmar before embarking on the fieldwork;
thus I was familiar with living and working conditions in Myanmar. The National
University of Singapore does not provide language training for graduate students and
the little Burmese knowledge I possess, I had acquired on earlier trips. My basic
knowledge of Burmese does not allow me to interview people in Burmese, instead all the
interviews were conducted in English. Most respondents were comfortable speaking
English, some had learned English under British rule or in missionary schools and have
a higher level of English proficiency than I have. Two respondents did not speak English,
22

The term pro-democracy movement is a self imposed label. It has become a widely used term
among people involved in Myanmar related issues when referring to groups and parties who are
involved in anti-government activities. I use the term for the convenience of the reader, but want
to emphasise that I do not take any political stance in favour or against any parties involved. The
term pro-democracy movement is loaded with positive connotations and/or implies goals and
activities that many people consider desirable. However, I want to remind the reader that a label
such as pro-democracy movement does not ensure the ethically responsible behaviour of people
involved in the movement and should not automatically be assumed to possess greater moral

authority than other parties involved in Myanmar politics.
23
The name Myanmar is not less linked to the Myanmar government than the name Burma to the
pro-democracy movement. Therefore the usage of either name could be interpreted as a political
statement and I consider the association of my person with the political pro-democracy movement
as undesirable as the association with the current Myanmar government. I am fully aware that the
usage of the term Myanmar invites criticism and accusations of political naivety.

10


so here I asked other respondents who were present during the conversation to
translate. Some of the interviews were conducted in a group setting which partly
hampered the flow of the conversation. Some of the issues discussed during the
interviews were politically or ideologically contested and it can be assumed that
individuals did not always express their true sentiments, so as not to offend others or to
cause friction within the group. All the interviews were conducted informally; questions
and topics varied from interview to interview. All respondents are part of the educated
political/civil elite and mostly live in Yangon. Their point of views cannot be generalised
to other parts of the populations or be considered common public opinion.
I am aware that as a female, European researcher I elicit different responses and
reactions from my respondents than for example domestic researchers. Two of my
respondents were female, and all other respondents were male. The time constraints did
not allow me to revisit respondents and to conduct second or third interviews. Some of
the interviewees are highly media trained and will in a first conversation not go beyond
certain stereotypical utterances or portrayals. Nevertheless, certain topics were recurrent
and came to dominate all the interviews thereby indicating a particular relevance. All
respondents spoke under the guarantee of anonymity, and I conceal their organisational
affiliations if they asked me to do so.
The published materials I collected are largely written in English. Some of them

are translations from Burmese into English, while other books were exclusively
published for an English speaking audience. The New Light of Myanmar, the
government issued daily newspaper, publishes many speeches delivered by government
spokespersons and thereby providing a rich source of government perspectives.
Editorials that engage with international public opinion about the Myanmar government
show a surprising awareness among the authorities of their international standing and
are also a rich source for research purposes. I am aware that I missed out on many
publications, books, newspaper and magazines due to my limited knowledge of the
Burmese language.
All the limitations outlined above were predictable and could be taken into
account when planning/conducting research. However, some events during my research
period were not predictable and changed the course of research. During the night from 2
– 3 May the cyclone Nargis hit Yangon and the Irrawaddy delta and caused immense
destruction. Many lives were lost, and huge material damage was caused. Lines of
communication broke down for some days, electricity was cut off and movement across

11


Yangon was rendered difficult. The extent of the natural disaster became apparent after
a few days and it appeared as if my research had come to an end. In Yangon and the
Delta, people were struggling to rebuild their lives, were mourning the loss of loved ones
and facing the hardship of economic losses. In such a situation I considered it ethically
unacceptable to conduct further research. Within the first week after the cyclone an
opportunity opened up for me to volunteer with a local organisation that conducted relief
work in the Delta. I took the opportunity and thereby gained an unexpected perspective
on the topic of my research. Parts of my personal experiences and observations from my
volunteer work entered my research and are used here to provide perspective on nationbuilding in Myanmar.
Chapter Outline
In chapter one I will review nation-building policies and actions in Myanmar since

independence in 1948. When analysing nation-building endeavours in Myanmar one
needs to make a distinction between official rhetoric on the one hand and actions of the
Myanmar state on the other hand. The rhetoric of the state often is a good expression of
the state’s mindset and analysing it helps understand reasoning or argumentation. I will
argue that the nation-building project has been contested from the start of independence
in 1948 and these contestations have resulted in divisions and factions that have
become more pronounced over the years. The creation of viable political and social
institutions outside the military and sangha failed and left the state in a fragile position.
No common national ideology was created, but ideology drove people apart. The
Socialist government was heavily guided by socialist ideology in their nation-building
project and paid little attention to other issues. The post-1988 state has adopted a
different stance towards nation-building from earlier governments. In the absence of a
guiding political ideology, the state adopted a nation-building vocabulary that describes a
country under threat. No political or philosophical ideology is offered to appeal to the
creation of a new ideological overarching commonality, but instead mistrust and the
impression of a lingering danger are nurtured among the population. The state has more
and more turned to promoting the role of the military as the defender of the unified
country. Chapter one demonstrates that the government has failed to provide a unifying
basis that would allow people with competing visions about nationhood to be united in
the government’s nation-building efforts. In the absence of presenting a unifying national

12


ideology the government has presented itself as an object of dislike that provides a
platform of identification.
Chapter two presents the perspective of veteran politicians on the nation-building
attempts of the government as gathered in personal interviews. The age and experience
of this respondent group broadened the scope of my research. Most of the respondents
were involved in political activities in the 1940’s, 1950’s, and 1960’s and their

perspective reflected a unique long term acquaintance with politics and nation-building in
Myanmar. Many of the former politicians have been sidelined in national politics during
the course of time and bear personal grudges against the current government. This is
not to say that their statements are less valid or useful. The respondents made it clear
that I can’t understand contemporary Myanmar unless I am willing to engage with the
past. I will argue that from the point of view of veteran politicians, the nation-building
project in Myanmar is considered a failure. The contemporary state and its attempt to
build a nation are seen in the light of 60 years of failed political reform. The basis for
successful political reforms is constitutional reform. From the veteran politicians’ point of
view a constitution would provide the heart of the project around which a nation could be
built. Any attempts of the government or progress with regard to civil societal structures
are ridiculed and declared irrelevant. With the recent approval of a new constitution, that
in the eyes of this respondent group is mocking the population, the nation-building
project has been rendered impossible. The future is seen as bleak and the prospect of
creating any viable form of community as impossible. The interviewees represented the
interests of different political factions and had competing visions about nation-building
strategies. Yet, they presented themselves willing to overcome their individual
differences in possibly joining armed struggle against the government which suggests
that the actions and campaigns of the government have not yielded any fruit, but the
government has presented itself as a readily available platform of unification.
The third chapter deals with the perspective of young social and/or politically
active figures from urban backgrounds. Besides presenting the accounts of my
respondents, I use secondary literature to locate these respondents’ activities within
post-colonial civil societal developments. Similarly as among the veteran politicians, the
nation-building project by the government is discarded as meaningless by these figures.
However, many respondents have actively taken up opportunities that opened under the
SPDC government. I will argue that their rejection of the government’s nation-building
endeavour does not prevent them from engaging and interacting with government

13

officials. Civil society has been strengthened, in particular in ethnic-minority states, and
although the central government is largely despised, many people have chosen to
engage with government officials in order to enhance the well-being of the population.
Many interviewees felt obliged, in the light of the inadequate actions of the government
to respond to the needs of underprivileged citizens, to fill in the role that otherwise a
government would fulfil. Thus, it is the commonly perceived failure of the government to
enhance the citizen’s welfare that brings ordinary citizens together in their wish to
contribute to betterment of the nation. Yet, within this wish to contribute to the
advancement of fellow countrymen, many actors operate within the confines of their
ethnic or religious boundaries, thereby reflecting a deeply imbedded factionalism in
society.
The fourth chapter uses the unique situation created by cyclone Nargis to study
nation-building in a post-disaster context. The national outcry to help and support fellow
citizens in need was immense. Large financial sums were mobilised, human resources
made available and time and moral support offered. The citizens of Myanmar responded
in an empathetic unified way in their relief efforts. In contrast, the central government did
only gradually develop a common approach. Disagreement among various levels of high
ranking officers surfaced and, though in the end curbed by the head of state, revealed
ideological factions within the government. That this empathetic societal response
reflects a strong national spirit that can be considered an effect of the nation-building
project. It is curious that despite the rejection of the nation-building project that all
respondents echoed, nevertheless a national identity has been created.
Overall, based upon similar observation in chapters one to four I suggest that this
sense of national loyalty has its root in the state’s nation-building project. However, while
I reject the assumption that the nation-building project has not left any traces in the
national memories of citizens, I interpret the performed national spirit as an unintended
reaction to the nation-building project. The state’s growing ideological disorientation and
increasingly hostile nation-building vocabulary have turned themselves into a potent

image of national identification. Not the rejection of the nation-building project, but the
dislike of the state accelerated by the nation-building project, provides an object that
allows the imagination of a common national suffering and thereby creates a common
national identity.

14


Chapter 1: “Nurturing the Soul of a Nation:”24 Nation-Building in PostColonial Myanmar
Myanmar gained independence from British rule in 1948. The state and nationbuilders faced great challenges. Contesting calls for state power, an ethnically diverse
population, various religious groups and remnants of colonial rule were important issues
that called for attention. Successive post-colonial governments have adopted different
nation-building strategies to meet these diverse challenges. Successive trajectories were
contested by various parties and raised the political stake of the nation-building project
considerably.
This chapter reviews the nation-building policies of the post-independence
regimes. It demonstrates that the immediate post-independence years were coined by
emerging contestations of the state’s nation-building project. As a consequence,
factionalism among different groups developed into an enduring feature of the Myanmar
political landscape. The immediate post-independence regime attempted to implement a
political system leaning towards a socialist ideology. The government hoped to gather
support among its citizens by attempting to implement a socialist welfare system and to
provide increased spiritual guidance by centre-staging Buddhism. With colonial rule
having ended only recently, socialism and nationalism were ideologies appealing to
policy-makers as base for building a post-independence nation. The attempt to build the
nation around a moderate socialist political and economic system was interrupted by a
regime change. The autarkist Socialist regime that took over power concentrated in their
nation-building efforts heavily on implementing the Burmese Way to Socialism, stressing
the equality of all citizens and abolishing exploitative capitalist structures. The failure to
provide economically for the population led to the abortion of this project. After 1988 the

military in the form of SPDC focused more and more on emphasising elements of unity
in diversity against a common enemy threatening the nation.
I suggest, that this attempt at nation-building has not led to a common national
spirit, but has rather led to a stronger common anti-government sentiment that in turn
has created a shared sense of common suffering. Although all respective post-colonial
governments have employed an anti-foreign element vocabulary, the SPDC has

24

Than Nyun, Keynote Address to Human Resource Development and Nation Building in
Myanmar, by Office of Strategic Studies Ministry of Defence (Yangon: Office of Strategic Studies
Ministry of Defence, 1997), 6.

15


intensified this project greatly. In the absence of a guiding political ideology anti-foreign
battle cries have turned into hollow meaningless phrases. A schism emerged between
the state and society. The state offered little ideological guidance, but instead
increasingly attempted to manifest itself as the only eligible holder of power and exploits
the population for economic and political gains, while the latter experiences continuous
material hardship in the absence of a meaningful political ideology.
“We, the People of Burma:”25 Nation-Building in parliamentary Burma
Many theorists of nationalism and nation-building debate whether these concepts
are a product of modernity or have their roots in pre-modern times. For present purposes
this question is not of central relevance. However, Reid26 argues that the modern state
had a stronger need to justify its rule than the pre-modern state and therefore nationbuilding and state nationalism gained greater importance after the end of colonial rule
than before. Monarchs and other feudal rulers were not under pressure to justify their
right to rule before their people, but “ruled by divine right”27. With the demise of colonial
rule in Southeast Asia the expectations developed that national governments should

“rule in the name of a people and therefore to define and mould that people”.28 State
nationalism and nation-building became more powerful in the light of this development.
In a similar vein, the nation-building project in Myanmar was intensified after the end of
colonial rule. The AFPFL government that took power in 1948 was an alliance of several
political factions. It had not been formed on the basis of a common political ideology, but
on its common goal to end colonial rule.29 The AFPFL government advanced two main
nation-building policies: the creation of a welfare state and the implementation of
Buddhism as state religion.
The government appealed to the collective trauma that the country had
undergone under British Colonial rule. The British had believed in economic progress
and introduced a competitive market economy. Participation in the market economy as
entrepreneur was difficult for people without capital and largely had excluded Burmese
from participation in the profit economy. While many Burmese had not been able to profit
25

Opening words of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, approved on 24 September 1947,
effective 4 January 1948
26
Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
27
Ibid, 4.
28
Ibid, 4.
29
Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Power and factional struggles in post-independence Burmese governments,”
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39.1 (2008): 155.

16

from the competition, Indian and Chinese migrants had easier access to capital and
profited to a greater extent. This exclusion of Burmese people from the economy and the
onset of social disintegration created dissatisfaction with “Western” political systems and
Socialism and Marxism gained greater appeal in the light of colonial rule. The
introduction of a socialist economy would render impossible capitalist enrichment and
exploitation of the under-privileged.30
The 1948 constitution did not define Burma as a socialist state, but included
articles that emphasised the socialist stance that the post-independence nation-builders
hoped to implement. The government assigned itself the core role in structuring the postcolonial economy. Industrialisation of the economy was one of the foremost goals, partly
stemming from the experience during the Pacific war where Burma had greatly suffered
under the need to import textiles and other goods. Furthermore, colonial rule had left
bitter memories of being a raw material-producing country that had to rely on imports of
most processed goods. Besides wanting to modernise the Burmese economy, land
nationalisation enjoyed a high priority in the post-independence economic planning.31
First steps to nationalise land were successful in a way as land was put from the
hands of Indian land owners into the hands of Burmese farmers, but resulted in a
budgetary deficit in 1949 largely due to the lack of land revenues. The civil war
additionally put a heavy strain on the financial situation of the state. As a consequence,
Nu, the first prime minister of the Union of Burma and a former Thakin,32 invited foreign
investments and aid to Burma: “Since we do not possess either the capital or the
technical resources necessary for industrialisation, we must enlist the help of foreign
capital and technicians.”33 Foreign economic aid advisors developed an economic plan
that the Burmese government consulted and used in order to develop their own future
economic plans. These economic schemes were presented in 1952 at the first
nationwide welfare state conference. The notion of the welfare state that was elaborated
upon at this conference was subsumed under the Burmese term pyidawtha, a "country
30

David Steinberg, Burma: A Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1982), 66.

31
Frank Trager, Building a Welfare State in Burma: 1948 – 1956 (New York: Institute of Pacific
relations: New York, 1958), 90.
32
The term Thakin was the Burmese term for master and Burmese people had been required to
refer to the British colonial rulers by this title. The independence movement initiated by young
Burmese student’s referred to each as Thakin’s in reference to the colonial usage. The term
Thakin has come to be stand for the heroic deeds of young freedom fighters and is still held in
high regard.
33
Nu cited from Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: a Study of the first years of independence
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 96.

17


of peace and prosperity.”34 The core of the welfare state creation was the introduction of
further central economic planning and social welfare schemes.
However, in the light of an ill-equipped administrative apparatus, problems
related to the agricultural sectors and continuing insurgency, the welfare plan was
overambitious and destined to fail. The number of civil servants who according to the
1952 economic plan had to work in the civil service to fulfil its entire tasks was
impossible to achieve. Not enough qualified people entered the civil service to perform
necessary tasks such as policing, taxing, postal services, trade control or land
redistribution. Through the emphasis on industrialisation the agricultural sector had not
been given as much attention as in earlier years. The rice production declined and at the
same time the international market price for rice dropped. This led to a severe stagnation
of the export economy and resulted in further financial shortcomings of the state.
Combined with an increased need to finance anti-insurgent activities of the state, the
financial burdens on the state made it impossible to invest into the economy as

planned. 35
The implementation of a successful economy was further complicated by a
neglect of the government to create peaceful domestic conditions. The government did
not sufficiently invested into the creation of law and order which was necessary to allow
further investments into economic sectors. The failure of the state to create a functioning
domestic economy disappointed many Burmese citizens whose hopes and expectations
for the period after independence were neatly summarised by Furnivall:
On the eve of independence I attended a modern Burmese play.
Successive scenes depicted typical incidents of the old regime: the cultivator
making over his cattle to the Indian moneylender; the wife abandoning her loom;
the foreign capitalists, European, Indian, and Chinese, counting their gold; and
the Burman middlemen helping them to pile it up. The play ended with the people
filling their pockets in a shower of gold and silver. That is what Burmans
expected as the result of independence. Now, of course, they are impatient.”36
Nu made a last attempt to gain popular support for the implementation of the
government’s pyidawtha state and called on the support of the army to implement the
economic plans in order to ”free the Union from the ravages of both internal and external
34

Mya Maung, “The Burma Road from the Union of Burma to Myanmar,” Asian Survey 30.6
(1990): 604.
35
John Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), 617
and Frank Trager, Building a Welfare State in Burma: 1948 – 1956 (New York: Institute of Pacific
relations: New York, 1958), 104-105.
36
J.S. Furnivall, “Burma, Past and Present,” Far Eastern Survey 22.3 (1953): 26.

18