Chapter 1 Introduction
In contemporary China, some government officials, who enjoyed admirable career
prospects, have given up their official positions and turned to the business sector.
This practice is called xiahai.1 According to a government report, there has been a
substantial increase in the number of xiahai officials since 2000.2 Xiahai involves
not only lowerranking officials, but also officials in higher positions, such as the
SecretaryGeneral or President of Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Committee (CPPCC), and even influential people such as the Mayor.3 This
phenomenon is widespread in China, especially in the six provinces of Zhejiang,
Jiangsu, Hubei, Guangdong, Hainan, and Liaoning.4 Having aroused much
attention from the media, the government, and the public, this phenomenon raises
an intriguing question that this study seeks to address: why did those officials give
up these highranking and supposedly advantageous jobs for which they had
struggled to attain for years?
1
"Xiahai Guanyuan Yilan (an Overview On "Xiahai")," Financial Times, 10Nov 2003.
Dai Dunfeng, "Jujiao Ciguan Xiahai Chao (Focusing on Xiahai)," Renmin Quanli Bao (People's Power
Newspaper), 13May 2003.
3
Tang Xiaoteng, "Cong Ciguan Xiahai Shuokaiqu: Jianlun Gaoguan Luoma Yu Boshi Kaoguan(from
'Officials' Xiahai' to 'Doctors Pursue Official Career')," zhongguo guoqing guoli(China's Situation and
National Power) 12 (2003).
4
Zhong Yuming, "Beihao Hangmu: Guanyuan Xiahai Bian Qimao (Xiahai: WellPrepared to Sail in the
Sea)," Democracy & Legal System, no. 2 (2004).
2
1
PHENOMENON OF XIAHAI
We can observe three waves of xiahai which surged or resurged in 1980s, 1990s
and 2000s respectively.5 There is a significant difference between the third wave
and the first two waves. The third wave is prominent in terms of the number, the
rank level, the region and influence.6 This study focuses on the third wave of
xiahai.
The first case of xiahai in the third wave reported by the media was Xu Gang, 7
who was both the former chief accountant of the Local Tax Bureau and a member
of the Finance Bureau in Zhejiang Province. He was regarded as one of the
highestranking officials at the Department level of the province. However, beyond
the expectations of both the public and the authorities, he gave up his official
position in March 2002 and became the Chief Executive Officer of Geely Holding
Group.8 Since then, xiahai has become a hot news topic for the mass media, more
and more stories about officials’ resignations have been reported. In response, the
central government, realizing the seriousness of the situation, formed teams to
investigate this phenomenon. At the end of 2003, the investigation results from six
5
Xiaoteng, "Cong Ciguan Xiahai Shuokaiqu: Jianlun Gaoguan Luoma Yu Boshi Kaoguan(from 'Officials'
Xiahai' to 'Doctors Pursue Official Career')."
6
Ibid.
7
In this thesis, the Chinese names are rendered surname first, in accordance with the Chinese customs.
8
Zou Yao Yang Aixiang, "Di San Lun Xiahai Guanyuan Shengcun Zhuangtai (the Status of Xiahai
Officials in the Third Wave)," 21th Centrury Economic News, 16Nov 2003.
2
provinces (Jilin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces)
were reported to the Organization Department of Central Party Committee.
Statistics show that there were 125 government officials at the Directorlevel or
above left the government from 2002 to 2003 in Zhejiang province. 9 With so many
officials leaving the government for the market, xiahai is by no means accidental.
In fact, the characteristics of this phenomenon are so prominent in some regions at
the official ranklevel that some patterns of xiahai can be discerned.
Firstly, this study analyzes these patterns of xiahai in six prominent provinces.
These are Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Hubei, Guangdong, Hainan and Liaoning. In
Zhejiang province, apart from the previous example of Xu Gang, there was a
noteworthy event called “the Wenzhou Phenomenon.”10 In May 2003, after the re
election in Wenzhou, Wu Minyi gave up his position as the Vicemayor of
Wenzhou city and became the president of Hui Lima Commercial Chain in
Shanghai.11 Along with him, another three officials in Wenzhou also resigned from
their positions and decided to take up jobs in private enterprises. They were Lin
9
Wu Xinzhong Zhou Qingxing, "Fangda Yu Toushi: Xin Yilun "Guanyuan Xiahai" Jiexi (a Detailed
Analysis on the Third Wave of Xiahai)," The Forum for Chinese Cadres, 31May 2004.
10
Tao Jianqun, "Toushi Wenzhou Ciguan Chao (Analyze the 'Wenzhou Phenomenon')," Shidai Chao (Wave
of Era) 11 (2001).
11
Wu Minyi, 45 years old, assumed vicemayor of Wenzhou city in 1998, in charge of technology, industry
and business; Lin Peiyun, 52 years old, vicemayor of Wenzhou city, in charge of foreign trade and travel
industry; He Baogen, 56 years old,had been the Vicesecretarygeneral for two terms; Wang Yunzheng,
Vicesecretarygeneral in Wenzhou Municipal government. He embarked on business in early 1990s; five
years later, he reoccupied as the Vicedirector and Vicesecretarygeneral in Wenzhou Municipal
government; at last, however, he went to Ao Kang Group in May 2003.
3
Peiyun (Vicemayor), He Baogen (Secretarygeneral) and Wang Yunzheng (Vice
secretarygeneral).12 It was this event that brought the wave of xiahai to a climax,
because two Vicemayors and two Secretarygenerals in the same city resigned
from their positions almost at the same time. They might become the Vice
president of Local People’s Congress or the Secretarygeneral of CPPCC in
Wenzhou City if they had not given up their positions.
In Jiangsu Province, the most notable event is “the Jianhu Phenomenon.”13 Five
core officials in Yancheng city resigned from their positions at the same time. The
family home of these five people is Jianhu, so this was called “Jianhu
phenomenon.”14 Among them, the case of Wang Xiaoping aroused the most heated
debate in society. Wang Xiaoping, 48 years old, was the Mayor of Dongtai city in
January 2001. He left the government and became the general manager of Yong
Lin Axunge & Chemistry Ltd in Jianhu in December 2002. He had been the Mayor
of Dongtai city for less than two years, and Dongtai is the most prosperous area in
Yancheng City.15 Besides, Zhu Aiqun, once Taizhou’s Secretary, became the
Executive President of Chunlan Group.
12
Tao Jianqun, "Toushi Wenzhou Ciguan Chao (Analyze the 'Wenzhou Phenomenon')," Shidai Chao (Wave
of Era) 11 (2001).
13
Wang Shengke, "Jiangzhe Guanyuan Xiahaichao Shibushi Jinbu Xianxiang? (Is 'Xiahai' in Jiangsu and
Zhejiang Provinces Progressive Phenomenon?)," 21th Century Ecomonic News, 26June 2003.
14
They were Wang Xiaoping, the Mayor of Dongtai city; Gu Chengrong, Subprefect of Buning County; Xu
Zhengyang, Subprefect of Jianhu County; Daimei, Vicepresident of Political Consultation Session in
Jianhu County; Tang Yi, Standing Committee Member of Binghai County and Minister of Propaganda
Department.
15
Shengke, "Jiangzhe Guanyuan Xiahaichao Shibushi Jinbu Xianxiang? (Is 'Xiahai' in Jiangsu and Zhejiang
Provinces Progressive Phenomenon?)."
4
In Hainan province, Wang Wenjin became the general manager of Physical
Training Ltd in June 2003. Before that, he had been the Vicemayor of Qionghai
city for two terms and in charge of the Travel Industry for ten years. Moreover, he
had participated in the entire process of Bo Ao Project on behalf of the
government.16 In Guangdong province, Liu Zhixing, the former Vicewarden in
Foshan city, left the government in August 2003 and became the Vicepresident of
Meidi Group. He had 28 years’ working experience and was an expert in
administration, assetregrouping and capital management.17 In Hubei Province, Cai
Deshan, once the Vicepartysecretary of the district, resigned from his position in
September 2003 and became the board Chairman of Wanjiale Stock Company. He
was only 40 years old, a Masters degree holder and economic consultant.18
In Liaoning Province, Lulu, a fiftyyear old female economic consultant, was the
former Directorgeneral of the Domestic Trade Bureau in Shenyang city. In
January 2004, she became the Vicepresident of Dashang Group, as well as the
president in charge of the Shenyang area.19 Wang Zhimin, former DirectorGeneral
of the Domestic Trade Bureau in Fushun City, is also the Vicepresident of
Dashang Group.20 In addition, Gao Hongbin, the former Director of the State
16
Zhong Yuming, "Beihao Hangmu: Guanyuan Xiahai Bian Qimao (Xiahai: WellPrepared to Sail in the
Sea)," Democracy & Legal System, no. 2 (2004).
17
Ibid.
18
"Xiahai Guanyuan Yilan (an Overview On "Xiahai")."
19
Liu Yanling Yuan Jiaqiang, Liang Shuang, "Shangyeju Nv Juzhang Qiguan Zhi Sida Yingxiang (the Four
Influences of a Female DirectorGeneral Went to Business)," Huashang Morning Paper, 09Jan 2004.
20
Ibid.
5
Department of Information Industry, founded Huliantong Internet Technology Ltd
and acted both as its CEO and President.21 Men Xinguo, the head of Kenli County
in Shandong province, was invited to be the StandingViceManager of Shandong
Huanghe Group.22
These are some representative examples. In fact, each province has a significant
number of officials leaving the government. For instance, in Fujian province, there
were 238 officials who left the government by the end of September 2003, and 9
of them were Departmentlevel officials. 23
Secondly, let us look at the rank of those officials who engaged in business. There
are not only DirectorGenerals (such as Lulu and Wang Zhimin, former Director
Generals in Domestic Trade Bureau), but also SecretaryGenerals in municipal
government (such as He Baogen and Wang Yunzheng, former SecretaryGeneral in
Wenzhou Municipal Government), ViceMayors (such as Wang Wenjin, Wu Minyi
and Lin Peiyun), and a Mayor (such as Wang Xiaoping, former Mayor of Dongtai
City).
Finally, it is important to examine the age of those who moved to the private
sector. They are generally in their forties, energetic and sagacious. For instance,
Wu Minyi is 45 years old and Wang Xiaoping is 49 years old. There are also
21
Zhang Jingping, Quan Bian: Cong Guanyuan Xiahai Dao Shangren Congzheng (the Power Change:
From 'Official's Xiahai' to 'Entrepreneurs Participation in Politics'), 1 ed. (Zhejiang People's Press, 2004).
22
Ibid.
23
“Strait City Newspaper” (Haixia Dushi Bao), Jan 8, 2004.
6
officials in their fifties or thirties. For instance, He Baogen is 56 years old, Cai
Deshan is just 40 years old, and Gao Hongbin 35 years old. This is a particularly
puzzling aspect of xiahai, because officials in this age group generally have
positive career prospects in the government.
What I wish to emphasize here is that the third wave, as mentioned previously, is
significantly different from the former two waves. During the first wave in the mid
1980s, most officials only changed to the sectors or enterprises which were
subordinate to their original working department. This practice is called “semi
xiahai.”24 Most officials became engaged in business because they were not
satisfied with their jobs. Usually, they were misunderstood by people. Some of
them failed to perform well in the market due to a lack of experience. But there
were some fortunate ones, the most famous one was Ye Kangsong, who was called
“the first xiahai official.”25 He was formerly the Party Secretary of Guan Zhen in
Yongjia County of Wenzhou city and is now the Board Chairman and the
President of Kang Long Group in America. He was once received by the American
President Bill Clinton because of his accomplishments.
The second wave began in the early 1990s when some officials who had sufficient
experience and enough preparation left government for the market. Xiahai became
acceptable to the public during this period. What is significant is that most
24
"Xiahai Guanyuan Yilan (an Overview On xiahai)," Financial Times, 10Nov 2003.
"A Story of Ye Kangsong," New Shanghainese, 26Aug 2002.
25
7
officials did not give up their official positions, instead, In that case, they could
still go back to public service if they failed in the business sector. One typical
example of the second wave is Wang Yunzheng. He was once the ViceSecretary
General of the Wenzhou municipal government, he embarked on a business career
in the early 1990s. Five years later, he reoccupied the position of the ViceDirector
and ViceSecretaryGeneral in the Wenzhou municipal government. At last,
however, he went to Ao Kang Group in May 2003.26
Compared with the former two waves, xiahai is riskier in the third wave because of
the institutional constraints. 27 For example, the officials are not allowed to hold a
position in the private sector concurrently.28 Before the officials leave government,
they should be audited by commissioners of audit before they leave government.29
After leaving the government, the officials are not allowed to engage in the
business that were regulated by government agency he previously worked for, and
they are not allowed to take positions in the organizations that were under
jurisdiction of he previously working place.30 Given this policy restriction, once
the officials want to join the private enterprises, they must risk giving up their
26
Dai Dunfeng, "Jujiao Ciguan Xiahai Chao (Focusing on Xiahai)," Renmin Quanli Bao (People's Power
Newspaper), 13May 2003.
27
Wen Zhai Bao 3 May 2004
28
Xinhuanet.com 8 Sept 2004
29
Wen Zhai Bao 3 May 2004
30
Xinhuanet.com 8 Sept 2004
8
official positions. In the third wave of xiahai, many officials had totally given up
their government positions.31
This phenomenon raised an intriguing question that this study wants to explore:
why did those officials give up their official positions for which they had struggled
to attain for years? How can they pursue a career in the market?
WHY IS XIAHAI PUZZLING?
In China, this phenomenon is puzzling because a government career is considered
to be advantageous and beneficial in terms of social values and realistic situations.
First of all, resulting from China’s long history of despotism and a rigid
bureaucracy, the notion of “Advancement in Officialdom” has sunk into most
people’s minds for generations and has influenced their behavior to a large extent.
As Henry Schuman notes:
“For centuries Chinese have engaged in a pastime called
‘Advancement in Officialdom’. Chinese, until the turn of the 20th
century, could climb high socially and economically only if they
were officials.”32
31
Yuan Jiaqiang, "Shangyeju Nv Juzhang Qiguan Zhi Sida Yingxiang (the Four Influences of a Female
DirectorGeneral Went to Business)."
32
Schuman, Henry. Americans and Chinese: Two Ways of Life. New York: H.Wolff, 1953.
9
Nowadays, this notion is still strongly rooted in the Chinese people’s minds. For
example, in 2005, around 250,000 people attended the open examination held by
the state agency for recruiting civil servants.33
Secondly, a government career is still an optimal pursuit for the majority of the
people. In nowadays, being an official might be the best choice when comparing
the benefits and costs.34 In everyday life, it is easy to find that the treatment in
politics and economics is greatly influenced by Officials’ Supremacism (Guan
Ben Wei) in China. As Xiaobo Lu noticed:
“The qualification to participate in a meeting, the sequence of seat, the
level of special car, the amount of income, the length of lament, and
appearance in the newspaper, all are decided by the official position.”35
For example, in a feast, one can easily tell whose position is higher from observing
the order of toasting. Usually, if there is an official in a feast, people would first
toast the official; if there are many officials, people would toast them according to
their rank.
Based on the above analysis, no one can deny that an official career is still pursued
by the majority of people. Most people would choose to become an official if
33
Ding Sheng, "Zhongguo Daxue Biyesheng Zhengzhe Chi Huangliang (Chinese Undergraduates Strive for
Being Public Servants," Lianhe Zaobao, 01 Jan 2005.
34
Xiaoteng, "Cong Ciguan Xiahai Shuokaiqu: Jianlun Gaoguan Luoma Yu Boshi Kaoguan(from 'Officials'
Xiahai' to 'Doctors Pursue Official Career')."
35
Xiaobo Lu, "From RankSeeking to RentSeeking: Changing Administrative Ethos and Corruption in
Reform China," Crime, Law & Social Change 32 (1999).
10
possible. The puzzle is why these officials gave up the supposedly attractive
positions.
THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This research is important because it will improve our understanding of elite
transformation in transitional China. The existing literature about market transition
suggests that market transition is usually accompanied by the transformation of
elites. As Victor Nee argues, “the partial reform creates new patterns of interaction
between redistributive and market power that give rise to a hybrid elite of cadre
entrepreneurs.” But the question of how elites are transformed in the market
system has not been adequately explored. This study argues that the transitional
context may provide elites both incentives and opportunities to seek an alternative
approach to maintain their elite status. It suggests that the elites may utilize the
power capital they accumulated in the redistributive system to capture new
opportunities generated by the market. By uncovering the micro mechanism of
elite transformation in a transitional context, this study tries to make a theoretical
contribution to Market Transition Theory (MTT).
RELEVANT LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The systematic study of xiahai phenomenon remains inadequate thus far. In this
study, xiahai is conceptualized as an issue of elite transformation. In the
11
redistributive system, government officials who were in control of redistributive
power were able to engage in rentseeking activities to maximize their interests.
But in the transitional context, rentseeking becomes increasingly costly as the
state initiated administrative and judicial reform to enhance government
accountability. Responding to this change, officials chose to work as brokers to
bridging entrepreneurs with the powerholders. As a result, elites are transformed
from rentseekers to powerbrokers. To construct a theory to explain this elite
transformation, one must illuminate the incentives, contextual opportunities as
well as strategies that made the transformation possible, because the existing
literature on Public Service Motivation (PSM), Market Transition Theory (MTT),
and Social Network Theory (SNT) have proved that these factors are related to the
elite transformation in significant ways.
Does PSM Matter?
One tentative explanation for xiahai can be found in the PSM theory. The main
theme of this theory explains how PSM affects government employees’
performance and their consideration about leaving the government. PSM is
defined as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded
primarily or uniquely in public institutions” (Perry, 1996).36 Perry developed a
36
James L. Perry, "Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability and
Validity," Journal of Public Administration and Research 6, no. 1 (1996).
12
measure of PSM that has four components: attraction to public policy making,
commitment to the public interest, compassion, and selfsacrifice. 37
In other words, PSM can be characterized as a reliance on intrinsic rewards over
extrinsic rewards (Crewson, 1997). Intrinsic rewards are derived from the
satisfaction an individual receives from performing a task, such as a sense of
accomplishment and a feeling of selfworth; extrinsic rewards are those offered to
an employee by someone else, such as a pay rise, a promotion, job security, and
status and prestige.38
Naff and Crum used PSM as an independent variable in order to examine its
impact on employees’ job satisfaction, performance and thoughts about leaving
government. Their findings show that “PSM has a smaller, though statistically
significant, effect on employees’ thoughts about leaving government, meaning that
those with higher PSM are less likely to consider seeking private sector
employment.”39 However, the difference is not large. 40
37
David J. Houston, "PublicService Motivation: A Multivariate Test," Journal of.Public Administration
Research & Theory 10, no. 4 (2000).
38
Ibid.
39
Crum, John and Naff, Katherine C. "Working for America: Does Public Service Motivation Make a
Difference?" Review of Public Personnel Administration 16, no. 4 (19992000): 516
40
In his survey, he measured the PSM by six statements; respondents were required to scale the extent of
agreement or disagreement. However, using this survey as the data source, the research was forced to rely
on selfreported ratings on the employees’ ethnic values towards working in public sector, there might exist
some bias.
13
Do public employees value intrinsic rewards over extrinsic rewards in comparison
to private employees? Houston found that “public employees are more likely to
place a higher priority on intrinsic rewards, whereas private employees value
extrinsic rewards more highly.”41
Can we argue that those officials who entered the private sector had a low level of
PSM while those who did not had a high level of PSM? It may not be true.
Previous research was based on western countries where civil service systems were
more developed than China. PSM has matured in western countries while it is
still in infancy in China. Even in the United States, public choice theory focuses on
the behavior of public sector bureaucrats who are supposed to work in the public
interest and put into practice the policies of government as efficiently and
effectively as possible, but in fact they are self interested utilitymaximizers,
motivated by such factors as salary, prerequisites of the office, public reputation,
power, patronage and the ease of managing the bureau. For Niskanen, self interest
is the sole motivator for officials. 42 For Downs, broader motivations such as pride
in performance, loyalty to a program, department or government, and a wish to
best serve their fellow citizens may also affect a bureaucrat's behavior. However,
Downs admits that an official at any level, be they in the public or private sector,
41
Houston, "PublicService Motivation: A Multivariate Test."
W.A Niskanen, Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1973).
42
14
acts at least partly in his/her own self interest, and some officials are motivated
solely by their own selfinterest.43
In the context of China, the theory of PSM cannot explain the behavior of Chinese
officials, who favor taking up “rent seeking” activities. Even in a democratic
country, the officials are selfinterested.44 It is somewhat risky to explain this
phenomenon from the perspective of the intrinsic rewards that the officials receive,
and undoubtedly, the extrinsic rewards should be adequately addressed.
My fieldwork shows that the extrinsic rewards, such as economic benefits, were
top concerns for the officials to leave for the business sector. Of course, the
intrinsic rewards, such as career satisfaction, were also critical for the officials to
make the choice. Evidence shows that some officials left the government because
they could not get the achievability from their official positions, and then they
turned to the business sector to actualize their talents. In all, it is reasonable to
assume that the officials are rational actors who take strategies responding to the
changing context.
43
Downs, Anthony Inside Bureaucracy Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967.
This point is advocated by Public Choice Theory.
44
15
Market Transition Theory
Another alternative explanation can be found in the MTT,45 because it seems to
provide a macrolevel context in which xiahai emerges. Victor Nee, who has
referred to the changing value of power capital, may provide some valuable
insights to the phenomenon of xiahai. He argues that the state socialist
redistribution economies are characterized by the allocation and distribution of
goods through central planning. He asserts that “in reforming socialist economies,
the transition from redistribution to market coordination shifts sources of power
and privilege to favor direct producers relative to redistributors.” The shift
improves incentives for direct producers, stimulates the growth of private markets,
and provides to entrepreneurs an alternative path for socioeconomic mobility.” He
pointed out that “the transition to a market like economy should result in higher
returns to human capital characteristics.” 46
Victor Nee makes two basic claims. One is that the value of human capital is
increasing, especially for the entrepreneurs; the other is that the value of power
capital is declining, especially in relation to the officials. The MTT indicates the
central processes in the shift from hierarchies to markets that involve fundamental
45
Over the years after his theory appeared in 1989, the Chinese study in America aroused great interest.
Victor Nee revised his theory two times in 1991 and 1996 in response to the criticism. In 1996, American
Journal of Sociology, a very influential journal in Sociology, even published all the articles focused on his
theory of Market Transition and related debate in the January Edition.
46
Victor Nee, "A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism,"
American Sociological Review 54, no. 5 (1989).
16
changes in the sources of power and in the structures of incentives and
opportunities.47 He concludes that “the more market exchange replaces the
redistributive mechanism in state socialism, the less the value of power capital
relative to market capital.” He modified his theory in 1996 by indicating that
officials have a higher mean household income before and after market reform, but
the increase in household income of officials is substantially lower than that of
peasant entrepreneurs.48
The rising market opens up alternative avenues for socioeconomic mobility, and
thus changes the structure of opportunities and gives rise to entrepreneurship as an
alternative to bureaucratic advancement in state socialism.49 The MTT maintains
that redistributors in sectors of the socialist economy that have experienced market
reform are unable to keep up by drawing on their power capital alone, because
fundamentally, the shift from redistribution to markets involves a change in the
sources of power and privilege.50
But the MTT is problematic in terms of data collection, which weakens the
validity of this theory. Let us look at it in detail. This theory was built on a survey
conducted during the summer of 1985 in Fujian province. Victor Nee randomly
47
ibid
Victor Nee, "The Emergence of a Market Society: Changing Mechanisms of Stratification in China," The
American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 4 (1996).
49
Nee, "A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism."
50
Ibid
48
17
selected a sample of 725 households from 30 villages, resulting in 624 completed
interviews. The dependent variable, household income, was based on retrospective
reporting of all resources of household cash income.51 Interviewers carefully
explained to respondents the importance of accurate estimates of household
income for the success of the study, but we must admit that it is very difficult to
get reliable information about the income of officials.
Firstly, income is a sensitive issue, and usually officials are reluctant to speak
about their income, and they have the right to do so. Secondly, the components of
officials' total income are complex. There are two kinds of income in form
(currency and noncurrency) and there are two components in content (normal
income and “grey income”). It is well known that “grey income” composes part of
officials’ income, but it was not reported in the data collection, so the survey data
cannot reflect reality.
Grey income is a serious problem in China. Yang Fan has pointed out that “grey
income”, including direct and indirect ways of collection, reached thirty thousand
billion RMB from 1978 to 1998, almost the six times of China’s annual GNP.52
Several years have passed, none of the economists was against Yang Fan’s
51
Ibid.
"Zhongguo Jingji Mianlin De Weiji Yu Duice (the Crisis Confronted with China's Economy and Relative
Countermeasure)," Zhanlue Yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), no. 4 (1998).
52
18
calculation. It is suggested that “grey income” had reached substantial degree in
China.
The MTT deserves great attention and raises broad debate among scholars. Bian
Yanjie argues that the unrecorded income may be a source of systematic error,
because if a given group did report only part of their total income by concealing
their “grey income”, the results of mean and standard would be affected, and then,
the entire study would be problematic.53 He argues that because China is transiting
from a redistributive economy to a market economy, the two mechanisms work
simultaneously in this particular period. No one can jump to the conclusion that
the value of power capital will decline. Then, he proposed the Continued Power
theory. In this theory, he pointed out that the market has been influenced by the
political power from the beginning; it still plays a critical role in the transitional
period. Those who have access to power can gain more benefits in the market.
The MTT and relevant debates reflect the macrolevel contexts of xiahai. It could
provide some useful insights into the contextual constraints and opportunities for
xiahai officials. For one thing, the rising market economy has opened up an
alternative arena for government officials to actualize their talents. For another,
there still exist various uncertainties for the development of a market economy
because the old redistributive mechanism did not completely diminish. This means
53
Bian Yanjie, Market Transition and Stratification, Social Change in China's Reform Era (Oxford
University Press 1999). pp.109
19
that the power capital possessed by officials is still influential. It enables the
officials to seek interests in the market. What this study seeks to emphasize is that
xiahai is a distinctive phenomenon in China’s market transition period, in which
the market mechanism and redistributive mechanism simultaneously play
important roles. The scenario of xiahai is a good example to show how rational
actors maximize their interests by utilizing the special features of the transitional
period.
Social Network Theory
However, macrolevel constraints and opportunities alone cannot account for the
microlevel strategies in xiahai. For instance, how can the xiahai officials utilize
their power capital after they leave government? The existing study of SNT may
provide plausible answers to this question.
According to this theory, the resources in one’s social network are embedded in a
social structure, which will not change because of one’s job mobility.54 So the
xiahai officials are tied to the powerholder by their social network built up in the
past. Also, this theory could shed light on the behavioral variance in xiahai.
Because it finds that one individual needs to access and/or mobilize his/her social
network in purposive actions and “given the same level of accessible embedded
54
Lin Nan, "Building a Network Theory of Social Capital," Connections 22, no. 1 (1999).
20
resources, some individuals mobilize better resources than others in actions.”55 The
fourth chapter will elaborate the SNT in detail and show how it helps to explain
xiahai.
This study incorporates the reasonable elements of the above literature into a
theoretical framework, I will call a “broker” theory. This theory argues that
officials leave the government because they want to become brokers between the
government and the market. The transitional context, full of uncertainties and
constraints in the private market, provides them opportunities to seek interests as
brokers between the market and government. In this way, they can also minimize
the costs derived from government reforms and anticorruption movement. This
theory emphasizes rational assumption, contextual constraints and opportunities as
well as microlevel strategies.
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES OF DATA
This study is designed as a comparative case study with relatively small samples.
The unit of analysis is the individual official. The sources of data come from
newspaper and journal articles, official archives, statistics, and website information
for the period of 19782005, plus my fieldwork findings which was conducted in
Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces in 2004. During the fieldwork, I had completed
55
Ibid.
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fifteen indepth interviews with xiahai officials, ten with incumbent officials and a
few with entrepreneurs.
There is a limited sample in my interview data due to the following reasons.
Firstly, the name list of xiahai officials is not open to public. Not knowing the
name and contact of xiahai officials, it is impossible to conduct a largesample
survey. To solve the problem of accessibility, I tried to reach xiahai officials
through mutual friends' introduction. Secondly, xiahai is a sensitive topic to them.
It is generally difficult to interview government officials who are very cautious
about talking with outsiders. Even with an introduction from mutual friends, a few
of them were still reluctant to receive the interview. Before talking with them, I
informed them that the information they provide would be used exclusively for
research purposes and their real names would not appear in the study. At last,
fifteen xiahai officials accepted my indepth interviews. For confidentiality
reasons, the names used in this thesis are not their real names.
My fieldwork was mainly conducted in Jiangsu, Zhejiang provinces. This is
because it was convenient for me to collect data within limited time and research
fund. The interview cases that were from specific regions may have limited
representatives. This is a limitation of this study, future study may do some cross
regional comparisons.
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In this thesis, to better understand xiahai, I have addressed the incentives,
contextual opportunities and microlevel strategies. In the part of microlevel
strategies, my findings are mainly based on interview data. Therefore, it may suffer
from selection bias. Nonetheless, this study is an original and preliminary
research on the study of xiahai. With the available data, it has suggested some
patterns of xiahai. Whether these patterns can be generalized is a matter of future
study. Moreover, it has provided important theoretical implications in an
understanding of xiahai.
ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS
Chapter one gives a brief introduction to this study. It includes the research
question, the significance of the study, relevant literature, theoretical framework
and methodology.
Chapter two examines the various incentives of xiahai officials, categorizing the
incentives into “positive” and “negative” types. “Positive” includes “actualization
of talents” and “getting better economic gains.” “Negative” includes “risk
avoidance” and “comparative lower prospects.”
Chapter three shows that the transitional contexts have played a mixed role in the
development of the private economy. On the one hand, the private economy has
experienced great growth. On the other hand, the private economy is confronted
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with great political and administrative uncertainties. However, both of them have
provided opportunities for officials to undergo occupational change and transfer to
the private sector. Because the rising private economy stands as an alternative
arena for career development, "advancement in officialdom" is not as attractive as
before. Most important, the private entrepreneurs would like to recruit the xiahai
officials based on the expectation that they could solve the problem of
uncertainties.
Chapter four explains the variations in xiahai. Drawing on the Social Network
Theory, this chapter examines the role of “strong tie” and “face” in xiahai. It
argues that those who had established strong ties with entrepreneurs enjoyed
higher possibility to obtain jobs than those who had not, and those who had built
up greater “face” were more likely to stabilize their attained positions in business
enterprises than others.
Chapter five summarizes this study of xiahai, discusses the theoretical
implications of this study to Market Transition Theory and Social Network Theory,
and provides suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2 The Incentives of Xiahai
To understand the phenomenon of xiahai, one must recognize two factors: one is
the incentives that motivate officials to leave government; and the other is the
opportunities that make it possible for resigned officials to attain new positions in
the nongovernment sphere. As mentioned in the first chapter, the Chinese
officials usually enjoy extensive privileges, which they are less likely to give up.
Therefore, it is necessary to elaborate here what incentives motivate officials and
why these incentives have emerged in this particular period of time.
As a matter of fact, it is impossible and unnecessary to list all the personal reasons
for xiahai officials since concrete reasons for officials’ choice vary from individual
to individual. But it is still helpful to do some categorical analysis by constructing
several “ideal type” incentives to show the fundamental patterns of this
phenomenon. My interview data includes four types of incentives for xiahai:
comparative lower promotion prospect, risk avoidance, actualization of talent, and
better economic gains. I will elaborate each category in the following section.
COMPARATIVE LOWER PROMOTION PROSPECT
In this scenario, an official is ambitious to pursue a higher position and further
his/her political development, but instead finds that promotion opportunities are
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