Transethnic networks and mon identity ies in sangkhlaburi, thailand

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Chapter 1: Introduction
I had just crossed the wooden bridge and was looking for a spot to station my
bicycle. It was about one o'clock in the afternoon, and as I locked my bicycle, I was
mulling over my plans for the remainder of the day. Finding lunch was the most
important task at hand at this moment. As I looked to my left, the friendly aunty
smiled at me as she said, as she always did, “Mangeura-ow” ('Hello' in Mon). I
responded, “Mangeura-ow”. Then she repeated in Burmese, “Minglaba shin”
('Hello'). I responded, “Minglaba kamya” (the male equivalent). The motorbike taxi
driver who normally awaits customers at the end of the bridge greeted me, “Beh thwa
maleh” (“Where are you going?” in Burmese). I pointed over to the raan aahaan mon
(“Mon restaurant”, written in Thai), where the portly, dignified owner smiled at me
and, in his usual playful tone, greeted me: “Basaaaaaaaaaaamaleh” (“What will you
eaaaaaat?” in Burmese). He then suggested pat grapow ('fried basil', a very popular
Thai dish prepared with pork), which was one of the better items available at his
restaurant. I accepted his suggestion, which I washed down with a glass of ice water.
After lunch, I cycled up the hill to the barber shop, as it had been a long time since my
last hair cut. The barber was not there and when I enquired about his whereabouts, his
neighbour responded, “Kao mai yuu. Paya thwa deh.” (“He is not here,” in Thai,
followed by, “He went to the pagoda,” in Burmese).
This was a typical day during my stay in the Mon village of Wangka, a few
hundred metres from the Thai border town of Sangkhlaburi. As the use of different
languages might suggest, Burmese and Thai influences remain strong in this
community. The population of Wangka includes Mons who have lived in Thailand for
several generations along with those who have migrated from Myanmar more


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recently. In Myanmar, Mons make-up one of the country's largest ethnic minority
groups. For most Mons, recent history has been marred by a violent élite led
nationalist struggle for independence coupled with Myanmar's struggling economy

which has led many to seek a better life in Thailand. Many Mons residing in
Myanmar and Thailand have become monolingual speakers of their respective
country's national language (Foster 1973, South 2003). Sangkhlaburi, Thailand is one
of a few areas in Thailand where the Mon language is actively promoted and where
Mon nationalist organisations are allowed to operate. A small number of Mons,
typically university-educated in Myanmar1, work in these organisations which
function under the auspices of the New Mon State Party (NMSP), a nationalist
political party which claims to represent Mons in their fight for self-determination.
These aspiring nationalists live alongside Mon-speaking villagers, of whom many
have lost interest in issues of Mon nationalism. At the same time, Sangkhlaburi is at
the crossroads of many different peoples, including locals and travellers. This local
dynamism leads to social networks and patron-client ties which go beyond ethnic
backgrounds. It is in this context that this research has sought to understand the nature
of and reproduction of the nationalist Mon ethnic identity. Specifically, this thesis has
sought to answer how networks which transcend ethnic and geographical boundaries
simultaneously produce and contest the Mon nationalist ethnic identity. Put another
way, how has the dynamic setting of Sangkhlaburi influenced the development of the
Mon nationalist movement?
1.1 Theoretical Discussion: Ethnicity and Nationalism
Early 20th century anthropologists such as Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard,
1

Based on conversations, the most common alma mater is Mawlamyaing University in
Mawlamyaing in the part of Mon State under the Myanmar government's control. Graduates from
Rangoon University in Yangon were also common.


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conducted research on a “tribe” or a group of “natives”, wherein they understood
ethnicity as primordial, i.e., a person was born into a particular culture which defined

his/her identity and determined his/her world views. Malinowski (1922: 19, original
emphasis), for instance, sought to understand “the native's point of view[...] to realize
his version of his world”, implying that there was a (singular) point of view among
the native community. Such anthropologists took for granted that a group of
individuals living in the same community would form a 'tribe' with little internal
difference in identity, typically paying little attention to gender or class issues.
Edmund Leach (1954), with his seminal Political Systems of Highland Burma,
was a pioneer in the anthropological study of ethnicity. Based on ethnographic
research conducted during the late colonial era, Leach's work detailed a system by
which individuals constantly lived in flux between idealised Shan and Kachin
political-social systems. The former was a hierarchical feudal political system
traditionally characteristic of lowland societies in Southeast Asia, whilst the latter
represented a more egalitarian system similar to that of many other highland peoples
throughout the region. What is significant about Leach's work is that it has shown
how individuals could shift their ethnic identity and become 'like' Shans or Kachins,
regardless of their biological ancestry. In abiding by the respective political
organisation, one adopted customs associated with that particular group. In short,
Leach's work has established that ethnicity is dynamic and not set in stone.
In response to this, Lehman (1967) critiqued Leach for his theory's crudeness
and simplicity. He did not dispute the fluid and dynamic nature of ethnicity as
according to Leach's model; rather, he suggested that Leach underestimated the
dynamism of ethnicity. To Lehman, instead of oscillating between two different


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'ethnicities', people could be one of any number of ethnicities, which occupied rôles in
the over-arching social structure. In other words, the attributes of a particular ethnic
group were prone to change and were in themselves actually irrelevant (see also Barth
1960); instead, all of the ethnic groups were connected to each other in a system of
relations. These rôles can describe how groups of people related to each other, for

instance, economically, or in terms of political power. Then, according to Lehman, by
identifying with a particular ethnic group, one identified with a particular social rôle
in society. In other words, one's 'ethnic' affiliation was more about one's relationship
vis-à-vis the rest of society as opposed to intrinsic attributes of said ethnic affiliation.
Such anthropologists as Judith Nagata (1974) and Charles Keyes (1979) have
continued this deconstruction of the notion of ethnicity. Nagata, studying in
Georgetown, Malaysia, argued that individuals could change their ethnic identities,
for instance, between Arab and Malay, based on the particular context. For Keyes
(1979: 6), “ethnic identities serve as adaptive strategies for people faced with certain
types of social experiences”. In other words, not only could an individual manipulate
his/her belonging to one or another ethnic group, but certain individuals (although
Keyes does not specify who they are) could change the nature of the ethnic group in
order to adapt to a particular situation or crisis. For example, ethnic groups are
traditionally thought to distinct based on shared religion and/or language. Among
Karens of the Thai-Myanmar border, however, there is unity in neither language nor
religion. However, Karens (or perhaps more accurately, nationalist Karens) perceive
their language as distinct, thus justifying their position as a distinct ethnic group,
which Keyes suggests may be more related to structural divisions vis-à-vis other
peoples with more wealth and/or access to political power (such as the Thai and


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Burmese majority populations).
Taken together, anthropologists such as Keyes and Nagata supported the
instrumentalist approach to ethnicity, as opposed to considering ethnicity as an
inherent part of social life (primordial). In the 1970s, anthropologists debated whether
the nature of ethnicity was instrumental or primordial. By the 1990s, however, the
instrumental-primordial debate ceased to be contentious. Contemporary
anthropologists have generally accepted that ethnicity is instrumental- at least to some
extent. More recent issues have been the rôle of ethnic élites and the degree of

cohesion or unity within a supposed ethnic group.
Toyota (2003) has reminded scholars that to see globalisation as destroying the
'genuine' nature of a particular group's culture is to misunderstand the historical and
contemporary realities of extensive social and trade networks which transcend(ed)
ethnic boundaries. Instead, she has suggested that researchers focus on an individual's
social networks as a more accurate indicator of his/her (ethnic) identity. Expressions
of (ethnic) identity within a particular group, in Toyota's case the Akha of northern
Thailand, vary greatly among individuals based on their personal experiences and
networks. This shows a problem with assuming a priori the salience of ethnicity as
determiner of identity, or of social reality.
Robinne (2008: 125) takes this further, suggesting three main paradoxes about
the concept of ethnicity. Firstly, the expression “ethnolinguistic” implies the existence
of some cultural and 'ethnic' continuity among groups with similar languages. Given
the linguistic context of Southeast Asia, where language families are scattered
seemingly haphazardly throughout the region without any apparent contemporary
cultural coherence, there may be no real correlation between linguistic and cultural


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similarities. Secondly, the idea of an ethnic group implies a unity throughout time and
space which implies, thirdly, that ethnicity is used similarly by people in different
social classes. This ignores vast differences within communities, based on class,
gender, occupation, etc. Robinne suggests that all of these assumptions should be
questioned and, as such, ethnic categories should not be understood as existing a
priori, but, rather, resulting from various levels of social interaction.
Despite the abundant deconstruction of ethnicity in academic literature, human
rights organisations have called for the protection of 'ethnic rights', including 'ethnic'
nationalist movements2. Such well-intentioned declarations ignore the fluidity and
dynamism that has long characterised identities (and languages), according to the
anthropologists I have cited. But, if what anthropologists such as Toyota and Keyes

theorise is accurate and ethnic identity is contingent and contextual, then whence arise
the numerous ethnic nationalist movements which become causes célèbres for several
people in ethnic communities? While anthropologists have insightfully deconstructed
ethnicity in mainland Southeast Asia, those I have cited are relatively silent on the
issue of ethnic nationalism. Eriksen (1993: 118) has defined nationalist ideology as
“an ethnic identity which demands a state on behalf of the ethnic group”. Benedict
Anderson, perhaps the most famous scholar on the topic, has declared nationalism to
be “the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson
1991: 3). Nationalism, according to Anderson, developed in Renaissance-era Europe,
greatly aided by the development of print capitalism and proliferation of literacy in
standardised “national” languages. Anderson has argued that, among other means,
states use re-interpretations of history in order to construct and perpetuate a coherent
2

'Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities.' Available 18 December 1992.
Accessed 5 August 2011.


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nationalist narrative. For instance, in the United States, the American Civil War is
generally understood as the Northerners being the 'good' side (Anderson 1991). Had
the Southerners won, this interpretation would probably differ (ibid.). Ernest Gellner
(1983), another scholar on nationalism, has described pre-industrial societies
originally as being dependent on strict systems of stratification (for instance, caste
systems, as in premodern France and India). Sacred languages, such as Latin or
Sanskrit, were used by élites, ensuring a large social distance between them and the
masses. As societies industrialised, state economies depended on the skills and
productivity of the masses, necessitating a reduced social distance between them and
their rulers. No longer socially separated to the same extent, it became necessary to

forge a cultural homogeneity to incorporate the masses as part of a productive society,
whereas their inclusion was previously not desired, as it was largely irrelevant to the
functions of the feudal state. Gellner has argued that in order to accomplish 'national'
integration, states promote one particular high culture, typically that of the élites,
which they present as the national culture, actively displacing numerous low cultures
which had existed (and, to a certain extent, continue to exist) over a dispersion of time
and geographical space. The goal of the state, then, is to promote this particular high
culture, which it accomplishes, for instance, through institutionalised education and
promotion of a particular standardised written and spoken language. In so doing, they
seek to unify a public which was previously divided by a plethora of low cultures. For
the first time in history, then, people form bonds of solidarity with others whom they
have never met; this is what Anderson has termed the “imagined community”.
Anderson's and Gellner's works are important as they remind future scholars to
critique and problematise the concept of the nation, much like many anthropologists


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have already done with ethnicity. Particularly, they show how nation-states can
entrench their nationalist ideology through re-interpretations of history and the
promotion of a high culture. They have inspired a number of scholars to deconstruct
particular nation-states in this way, such as Thongchai (1994), who has analysed
Siamese/Thai nationalism. Thongchai (1994) argued that, in the late 19th century, the
Siamese court re-interpreted their own history in terms of territory and mapping.
Whilst, according to Thongchai, strict definitions of mapped territory did not exist in
pre-modern Siam, the European colonial scramble quickly inspired the Siamese court
to define their boundaries clearly. Most research of this type has focused on particular
nation-states in their construction of nationhood. Very seldom, however, have ethnic
stateless nations, or aspiring nations which are not (yet) officially recognised as states,
been considered in this way.
Rajah's (1990) work on Karen nationalism is an important exception. He has

argued that the Karen nation is an “imagined community”, and has shown how Karen
nationalist élites have attempted to promote a particular understanding of history and
religion in their own construction of a nationalist narrative. In this case, they promote
a unified, 'pure' Karen identity based on belief in Christianity (Rajah 1990: 115).
Nationalists “play down” the fact that only a minority of Karens is Christian (Rajah
1990: 121, original emphasis) in their efforts to promote an image of “national” unity.
Rajah has suggested that Karen nationalists are trying to forge a supralocal identity,
which he has termed an “imagined community”. By contrast, according to Rajah,
most meaningful social relationships primarily occur at the local community level,
making the national “imagined community” an artificial construct which does not
resonate with many Karens in Thailand. This work is important for its analysis of a


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stateless nation. Rajah has acknowledged the role of Westerners, particularly Christian
missionaries, in Karen nation-building, showing how it no longer makes sense to
understand nation-building as a strictly local phenomenon. However, Rajah's research
has become outdated due to rapid changes in communication technology. Rajah was
unable to analyse the influential role of the internet and borderless mass
communication in stateless nation-building.
To summarise, I have given a brief theoretical discussion of two important,
closely-related concepts. Anthropologists have so frequently questioned the notion of
ethnicity, that its problematisation is no longer an issue. In other words, many
anthropologists now take for granted that ethnicity is a social construct, which can be
actively manipulated by individuals or groups (Lilley 1990, Fenton 2003). Current
issues about ethnicity include the rôles of ethnic élites and the degree of unity within
an ethnic group, especially with regards to class. Whilst contemporary anthropologists
have discussed this in illuminating ways, they have tended to ignore issues of
separatist nationalism among such ethnic groups and have focused on mainly
localised contexts. Such movements can have profound impacts on the stability of the

nation-states in which they are situated. In addition, my research has taken place in a
globalised context, with attention to the recent explosion of cyber infrastructure.
For my theoretical framework, I will adapt Robinne's (2008) concept of
transethnicity. Transethnicity refers to a hybridised social coherence which results
from interactions - matrimonial, religious, economic, etc. - which transcend
ethnolinguistic groups. Robinne has argued against assuming the a priori existence of
particular ethnic groups. Instead, his focus has been to investigate links and networks
which exist at the community level, considering the cultural and economic


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differentiation which occurs after various types of social and economic interactions.
Robinne worked in a rather localised context in rural Myanmar. I will adopt Robinne's
framework to fit a much more cosmopolitan and globalised setting, including patronclient links which occur with the assistance of the internet. I will also add on to
Robinne's framework through my engagement with issues of ethnic nationalism. My
approach is unique in that whilst analysing an ethnic nationalist movement which
seeks to be very local in nature, I investigate social and economic networks which
transcend any type of border. In short, my research will seek to show that (ethnic
nationalist) identities are products of co-operative networks which transcend cultural,
ethnic and geographical boundaries.
1.2 Research Questions and Arguments
With these contexts in mind, this research project has sought to answer the
following questions. Firstly, how can the concept of transethnicity contribute to an
understanding of the lived realities of a particular geographic community? Secondly,
how can transethnicity help us to understand the nature of ethnic nationalism? Thirdly,
what are the implications of increased mobility and internet technologies on the
construction of ethnic nationalism?
Regarding these questions, this thesis will make the following arguments.
Firstly, by focusing on patron-client networks as the initial point of analysis, the
salience of 'the' ethnic group will be challenged. Instead, several different identities

can exist within the same geographic and 'linguistic' community. I will suggest that
distinct sets of patron-client links have led to very different cultural identities within
the community I have studied. Secondly, I will show that Mon ethnic nationalist
identity simultaneously results from and caters to patronage ties to internationally


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conscious Westerners, particularly NGO workers. At the same time, patronage ties
between ordinary Mons and Thai tourists contest the importance of Mon nationalism
among the former. Thirdly, this thesis will argue that it no longer makes sense to
understand either ethnicity or nationalism as localised. Rather, global networks and
flows of capital and information are becoming essential to the production of
(nationalist) ethnic identities.
1.3 “The” Mon(s) of Sangkhlaburi: a case study
This research project has chosen to analyse the ethnic identities of Mon
speakers in the border town of Sangkhlaburi, Thailand. Many of those who selfidentify as Mon originally come from Southeast Myanmar, where they live as one of
the largest ethnic minority groups, at roughly 2.4% of the population (Steinberg 2006:
272), concentrated in Mon State3. Although no reliable census data exist in Myanmar,
the Myanmar government's tourism website recognises eight “major races”, some of
which, like the Shan, themselves contain up to “35 races and tribes”4. Ekeh and Smith
(2007) claim that Myanmar contains over 100 ethnic groups, many of which are or
have been involved in violent conflict against the state. The civil strife caused by Mon
and other nationalist groups' wars for independence coupled with the country's
struggling economic position have led many to seek a better life in Thailand. Due to
its proximity to Mon State, Sangkhlaburi has become the destination for many Mons
leaving Myanmar. Due to an “understanding” with local authorities, it has also
become a haven for nationalist Mon political and civil society organisations (personal
communication).

3

4

Myanmar is divided into various 'States' and 'Divisions'. The 'States' are named after the ethnic
minority community most heavily concentrated there.
'Major Races' in People @ Myanmar.com. Available />2006. Accessed 4 June 2011.


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Sangkhlaburi is a particularly fruitful setting for research of ethnicity and
transethnic networks. Outside of Mon State in Myanmar, Sangkhlaburi- with its large
Mon-speaking population, Mon-language school and nationalist Mon organisations- is
an important hub for the (re)production of Mon ethnicity. In fact, it is the only part of
Thailand where Mon political organisations can operate on such a scale. Other border
towns such as Mae Sot have other Burmese exile organisations, including Karen
nationalist organisations. At the same time, Sangkhlaburi is cosmopolitan to an extent
disproportionate to its size. The presence of young Western NGO volunteers, middleclass Thai tourists from Bangkok and other groups results in many social and
economic links which transcend ethnic ties. Two such links which abound in
Sangkhlaburi result from the evangelistic human rights movement and the flourishing
domestic tourism industry. Such a setting has proven particularly rich for research as
it has allowed insightful observations of how transethnic links simultaneously
produce, consume, undermine and contest Mon ethnic nationalism.
1.4 Mon Studies: A literature review
The Mons have generally been studied in three ways: in terms of their history,
in terms of their politics and in terms of their culture and language. The study of Mon
history was particularly important due to the colonialists' perceptions of the special
status of Mon as 'civilisers' of Southeast Asia. Indeed, present nationalist rhetoric,
along with the works of such scholars as Coedès (1989) and Guillon (1999) have
claimed that Mons were the first Buddhists in Southeast Asia, as well as among the
earliest to have achieved literacy. Western scholars and nationalist Mons alike have

written in such a way as to imply that Mons 'civilised' their neighbours, particularly
the Burmese, until the Burmese unceremoniously conquered them centuries later. This


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is the generally accepted history of the Mons among those interested in the region, but
it has not gone without criticism. Lieberman (1978) has written that, as late as the mid
18th century, although the idea of Mon culture existed (for instance, Mon language,
styles of clothing, etc.), people did not identify with Mon ethnicity. In other words,
being Mon was more about how a person lived and did not reflect any sort of
primordial loyalty. Instead, loyalties were first and foremost to individual patronsélites who offered protection and other forms of assistance. Assuming this,
conquering “the Mons” was not about ethnic conflict at all, but rather a feud between
competing élites whose supporters transcended ethnic boundaries. Aung-Thwin
(2005) has presented the more scathing critique, suggesting that Mons did not civilise
the Burmese at all, but rather it was the other way around.
A number of more recent works have focused on political issues surrounding
Mons, particularly the question of national sovereignty. Hazel Lang (2002) has
analysed politics in the context of Mon nationalist armed conflict and Thailand's
inundation with refugees, including Mons, who originated in neighbouring striferidden countries, particularly Myanmar. Ashley South's (2003) work on Mon
nationalism is undoubtedly the most substantial work written within the last decade
related to Mon nationalism. In his work, he has conducted a detailed analysis of the
Mon nationalist movement, from its infancy (including premodern antecedents) until
the present, including the post-ceasefire era which started in 1995. Whilst both Lang
and South offer important insight on élite discourse and politics, neither scholar
makes any attempt to understand the views of ordinary Mons.
In addition, there have been a number of works more related to Mon culture.
Robert Halliday has been called the “Father of Mon Studies” (South 2003: 51) for his


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substantial and painstaking research on Mon history, language, literature and culture.
His most significant work, The Talaings5 (1999), originally published in 1917, sought,
in colonial anthropological fashion, to document the culture and life ways of the
Mons. His work is a rich account of Mon traditions from the colonial era and serves
as an interesting point of comparison to the present. Also, his translations of ancient
Mon texts offer insight into classical Mon cosmology. However, like many
ethnographic texts from this period, it is crude in its descriptions of the Mons as a
simple, exotic and unified people. He took great detail in describing certain dances,
rituals and customs, few of which remain. Christian Bauer (1990) is perhaps the
foremost linguist who has specialised in Mon language. His research is rather
specialised, however, and of little interest to those not focusing on Mon language
studies. Smithies (1972) and Foster (1973) were the first anthropologists to have
published detailed ethnographic research on Mons in Thailand. Both focused their
work on Mon villages near Bangkok in central Thailand. They sought to understand
how Mons distinguish themselves from Thais, with the conclusion that they are
rapidly assimilating to an extent where it may become difficult to maintain a distinct
identity. In a later essay, Smithies (1986) became more optimistic about the survival
of Mon ethnic identity, owing to the rise of Mon élites in Thailand, and their relative
lack of antagonism from Thais. Both Smithies and Foster, despite writing during the
active Mon conflict for independence in Burma, did not seem to reference the issue of
ethnic nationalism, instead focusing on a population that has been in Thailand for as
long as several centuries. Nevertheless, their research, although outdated, offers
another interesting point of comparison, but has a context which is very different than
5

Talaing is a perjorative word used by the Burmese to describe Mon people. Its origins and
etymology are unclear. Despite Halliday's use of the term for his book's title, however, it is not clear
if he meant to express ill will towards the Mons.

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along the border areas. Whereas the settings for their research were in the heart of the
Thai state, my field site is at the intersection of three states: Thailand, Myanmar, and a
hypothetical Mon State. Thus, while their research can offer an understanding of
ethnic identity, it cannot appreciate the important influence of Mon nationalist politics
which operate along the borderlands.
Apart from the historical works I have discussed at the beginning, the texts I
have reviewed so far have considered either the issue of Mon politics from above, or
the issue of Mon identity from below. A number of Thai researchers (Wongpolganan
2005, Sujaritlak and Prapasri 2006) have conducted recent ethnographic research on
the Mon community in Sangkhlaburi and have attempted to address this gap.
However, their conclusions are seemingly contradictory: Wongpolganan claims that
Mons are trying to uphold their identity to their utmost, while Sujaritlak and Prapasri
claim that many Mons, particularly youths, no longer want to be Mons. I believe that
both conclusions are overly simplistic, even if they contain some basis of truth. In
both cases, the analyses do not go into serious depth. The former merely describes the
“invented traditions” present in Sangkhlaburi without questioning the extent to which
Mons actually resonate with, let alone participate, in them. She also does not specify
which groups of Mons (based on class, age, etc.) Mons are trying to uphold their
identity. The latter conducted very short-term research which limited their abilities to
establish significant rapport with informants. In addition, they conducted research as
Thai government officials, perhaps skewing the extent to which people might show
their Mon identity. Neither piece considers in much depth the Mon political
organisations based in Sangkhlaburi and the context of the armed separatist
movement.


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My research seeks to contribute to the existing body of empirical literature on
Mons. Like Lieberman and Aung-Thwin, I seek to critically engage with existing

assumptions of the Mon nationalist narrative. As with the most recent Thai studies,
my methodological perspective is ethnographic. Ethnographic methods offer a unique
insight into everyday concerns of ordinary people, going beyond politicians' rhetoric
as well as distinguishing what informants say from what they believe ('front stage' vs.
'back stage'). An ethnographic approach has allowed me to compare multiple levels of
discourse: nationalist representations of Mon-ness to the outside world, nationalists'
articulated and unarticulated views on Mon identity and ordinary villagers' articulated
and unarticulated beliefs. My study is unique in its particular attention to patron-client
networks which transcend borders. Although South very briefly mentioned the role of
Westerners in Mon nationalism, none of the studies I have mentioned have gone into
any depth as to the significance and implications of Western support or of élite
manipulation of online content.
1.5 Methods
I chose Sangkhlaburi as my field-site for several reasons. On the one hand, it
is one of a few remaining areas with a sizeable Mon-speaking community. On the
other hand, its strategic location in Thailand offers the researcher several advantages.
Specifically, Thailand is a much more open country than Myanmar. Not only is
entering Thailand for an extended period of time in order to conduct research much
easier than in Myanmar, but many of the border areas in Myanmar remain
inaccessible to virtually all foreigners. The openness of Thailand also affords a more
internationally connected population than in Myanmar, which allowed for an
interesting approach to the issue of transethnicity. Sangkhlaburi is unique due to its


17
position as the confluence of three states- Thailand, Myanmar and a would-be Mon
state which maintains some local influence, namely through political organisations
and the instruction of Mon language. As such, I believe Sangkhlaburi offered a
fruitful forum in which to analyse Mon ethnicity.
The methodological approach to this research was ethnographic. My three

main methods have been participant-observation, interviews and content and
discourse analysis. My goal was to understand the meanings and world views of my
informants (Agar 1984). I spent a total of four months in Sangkhlaburi. During the
first month, I rented a room from a Mon woman living on the 'Thai side'6.
Subsequently, I moved to the heart of the 'Mon side', also referred to as Wangka,
where I spent the remaining three months of my fieldwork. In Wangka, I stayed at a
Mon-Thai owned guest house whose other tenants were Thai migrant workers from
another town in the province.
By establishing rapport with a select few informants rather than attempting to
make representational claims about the community, I have sought to understand
holistically the mentality of ordinary individuals. Informants were chosen on a
random basis, but skewed towards those aged 18-35. The reason for this is that they
will more accurately reflect the future trend of the community. However, some more
elderly informants were also included in this study, enabling me to recognise patterns
based on generation. Indeed, I hope that through the presentation of my data, which I
have collected through a variety of methods, I can show the diverse viewpoints which
exist within the Mon community in Sangkhlaburi.

6

The town of Sangkhlaburi is divided into what locals refer to as “Thai side” and “Mon side”.
Despite its name, “Thai side” contains people of many different ethnic backgrounds- mostly Karen
and Thai, but also Mon, Burman, Muslim and Western. “Mon side”, by contrast is relatively
homogeneous.


18
Prior to beginning fieldwork, I underwent formal instruction in Thai and selfstudy in Burmese. The vast majority of informants comfortably spoke either Thai or
English (rarely both), with Burmese used when informants could speak neither
English nor Thai comfortably7. My inability to speak Mon was a limitation that

hindered communication to some extent, however, due to the linguistic dynamism of
the area, Thai, Burmese and English are all widely used among many in Sangkhlaburi.
Therefore, my lack of knowledge of the Mon language did not hinder mutual
understanding since virtually everyone was able to communicate well in either Thai or
English. For interviewees unable to speak Thai or English, I was able to use
interpreters.
1.5.1 Participant-Observation
The idea of participant-observation is to live and interact among local
populations. In so doing, I sought to establish rapport with several individuals as well
as to observe the interactions among them. I selected three sites where I regularly
conducted participant-observation. The first site was at the souvenir market near the
golden pagoda (Image 1). Two Thai-speaking sisters, whom I have named Hla and
Nee May, kindly allowed me to conduct observation at their stall almost every day. In
addition to observing the interactions between these two vendors and their Thai and
Western customers, they accepted me as their friends and invited me to interact with
their network of friends. They also allowed me to follow them and their friends during
religious festivals and invited me to their home for dinner. This type of participantobservation gave me an insight into the lifestyles of some ordinary residents in
Wangka.
7

There was only one case of an informant who would speak neither Burmese, English nor Thai.
Although he was fluent in Burmese, he refused to speak it. In this case, I used a Mon-English
interpreter.


19

Image 1: Wat Wang Wiwekaram, in Wangka village. The adjacent souvenir marketthe largest in Sangkhlaburi, make it a central spot for tourists. At the same time, it is
the location of monthly Full Moon festivals among the Mon community.
My second site of participant-observation was at one of the Mon nationalist

organisations. Due to purposes of anonymity, I will refer to this organisation only as
“the Office”, which is also the term many informants used. I served as a volunteer to
help edit their online content into idiomatic English. There, I was able to establish
networks among the English-speaking nationalists as well as their Western interns. In
addition to establishing rapport with a few individuals, I was able to observe the
dynamics at the particular office where I conducted extensive participant-observation.
In contrast to my first site, conducting participant-observation here gave me insight
into the more nationalist segment of the local population.


20
Thirdly, I made particular, occasionally painstaking, effort to attend all cultural
and religious festivals, which typically took place at the grounds near the golden
pagoda (see Image 1) and adjacent to the souvenir market. These festivals tended to
transcend class divisions among the local Mon community. Although my lack of
religious knowledge of Theravada Buddhism prevented me from appreciating the
spiritual and traditional significances of many of these rituals, I was able to observe
demographic dynamics and types of interactions among those present.
This is not an exhaustive list of the participant-observation I conducted. I
undertook less intensive observation at other sites. The nature of ethnographic
research entails always being open to new information, and my routine required an
extent of flexibility. This meant, occasionally, changing the plans for my day on a
moment's notice. It also meant being observant at all times, including during meals. I
conducted regular visits to other Mon nationalist organisations, occasionally
volunteering on a very short-term basis. I spent time with some of the Western interns
in an attempt to understand their motivations for working in Sangkhlaburi. I also
interacted with many tourists- Thai and foreign- although their transient nature
prevented any development of rapport. Lastly, my room's location directly across
from the market allowed me to observe the economic centre of the village. In the
market itself (as well as at coffee shops and other places), I regularly engaged in

informal conversation with locals.
1.5.2 Interviews and Focus Group
I conducted a number of semi-formal interviews with a range of informants.
Several of these interviews involved several people. I conducted two interviews with
Western interns involved with Mon nationalist organisations (n=3 informants).


21
Through these interviews, I sought to understand their motivations for coming to
Sangkhlaburi to work, their knowledge and perceptions of the Mon nationalist
movement and Mons in general, including culture and history. In addition, I
conducted nine interviews and one focus group with Mons involved in nationalist
organisations (n= 19 informants). I asked them questions about Mon identity (for
instance, what does it mean to be Mon? What knowledge of Mon history do they
have?) as well as their relationships with other groups, particularly Thais, Burmans,
Karens, Muslims and Westerners. The vast majority of these interviews took place in
English, with a small number of informants responding in Thai or Burmese.
I conducted 22 interviews with “ordinary” Mons (n= 22 informants). The term
“ordinary” (Thai: “thamadaa”) was used by many informants to describe themselves
in contrast to Mon nationalist leaders. I asked them most of the same questions I
asked the nationalist Mons, particularly about their understanding of Mon identity,
Mon nationalism, their view of Thailand and their relationships with other
neighbouring groups. I conducted these interviews in Thai, for which four
respondents required a Mon-Thai translator to be present.
1.5.3 Content and Discourse Analysis
My last method consisted of archival research. I read through the archives of
three Mon news agencies: Independent Mon News Agency (IMNA), Human Rights
Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) and Kaowao News Agency. I conducted
discourse analysis on many of the English language articles published online. I sought
to analyse how the leaders of these agencies understand, construct and promote the

Mon nationalist cause through the rhetoric posted online. This was important as it
reflects how Mon nationalists represent Mons and Mon nationalism the international


22
community. I conducted content analysis of HURFOM. I selected HURFOM due to
the relatively narrow range in topics. Whereas Kaowao and IMNA focus on many
issues of concern to the Mon community, HURFOM's niche is human rights. I was
able to go through every article from the earliest available archives in 2007 until the
end of my fieldwork period in December 2010, categorising it based on who was
depicted as violating human rights. The results of this analysis will be presented and
discussed in later chapters.
1.6 Prospectus
The next chapter- chapter 2- will attempt to contextualise my study. I will give
a description of the field-site as well as the history of Mon nationalism. In chapter 3, I
will unpack the Mon nationalist narrative. I will discuss the symbolic significance of
this narrative as well as the influential role which colonial officers played. Chapter 4
will elaborate in which ways Mon leaders promote and construct the nationalist
identity. There, I will show how they attempt to “sell” it to Western donors. Chapter 5
will mainly serve as a counter-example to chapters 3 and 4. There, I will show how
“ordinary” Mons have constructed a different, non-nationalist identity, which instead
reflects a dependency on Thais, particularly tourists. Chapter 6 will offer a concluding
discussion.


23
Chapter 2: Context
It was my second day in Sangkhlaburi. I was still trying to orient myself in my
new home. I was still staying at a tourist-oriented guest house. It was an
excruciatingly hot afternoon, probably about 35º in the sun. I had spent my first day

wandering around the “Thai side” of Sangkhlaburi, which is where most of the tourist
infrastructure of the town is, and is home to much of the district's ethnic Thai, Karen,
Burmese and foreigner populations. I was now preparing to cross the 400 metre long
wooden bridge to the “Mon side”, where Mon speakers make up the vast majority.
There was a basic but atmospheric restaurant at the “Thai” end of the wooden bridge.
I had ordered- in rudimentary Burmese- a bowl of noodles and a cup of black coffee.
Then I prepared to walk across the wooden bridge. Although aesthetically picturesque
from a distance, pedestrians must contend with gaping holes and protruding nails
resulting from the haphazard construction of the bridge. After a slow walk across the
bridge, I arrived at the “Mon side”. I had the initial impression that I was in a different
town, almost a different country. The mixture of Thai, Burmese and Karen languages I
had heard on the other side transformed into very different sounding Mon. This was
my first taste of a place where I would spend a lot of time.
2.1 Sangkhlaburi and Wangka: An Orientation
Ban Wangka, or Wangka village- also known locally as “Mon side”, is a
subdivision of Amphoe Sangkhlaburi, or Sangkhlaburi District. The wooden bridge,
which has become the area's land-mark and main tourist draw (see Image 1), joins
Wangka to the town of Sangkhlaburi, locally known as “Thai side”. Sangkhlaburi is
located approximately 400 km Northwest of Bangkok, in the province of
Kanchanaburi near the Myanmar border at Three Pagodas Pass8 (see Images 2 and 3).
8

Three Pagodas Pass ('Chaedi Saam Ong' in Thai; 'Payathonsu' in Burmese) is both the name of an
historical monument consisting of three small pagodas and a modern-day town on the Myanmar
side of the border.


24
According to Thai government census data published online, the district of
Sangkhlaburi contains approximately 38,761 people9. Although quiet, the town of

Sangkhlaburi is the only significant town in the district and contains the bulk of this
population (see Image 4). Unlike many parts of Thailand, it generally has no traffic, or
even traffic lights. It does, however, have basic amenities such as a hospital, bank, wet
market and even a 7-eleven store, typically ubiquitous throughout the Kingdom of
Thailand.

Image 1: The 'Wooden Bridge' [สะพานไม/ Saphan Mai] also known as 'Mon Bridge'
[สะพานมอญ/ Saphan Mon].

9

'อาเภอสงขละบร ' in www.aphoe.com. Available />mid=1&am=18&pv=2. 17 September 2009. Accessed 6 June 2011.


25

Images 2-4: Map of Thailand10, map11 showing region and map12 showing
Sangkhlaburi and area.
On weekends and holidays, Sangkhlaburi becomes more bustling with an
influx of a few hundred tourists, mostly hailing from Bangkok or other more affluent
parts of Thailand. The influence of tourism on the local economy is noticeable, as the
streets are dotted with little coffee shops geared mainly towards Thai tourists and
accommodation which ranges from basic guest houses and house boats, to small-scale
resorts.
For a town of its size, Sangkhlaburi is disproportionately diverse. The main
groups are Mon, Karen and Thai. Within these groups, some have been in the area for
10

11

12

US Central Intelligence Agency. Available
2010. Accessed 26 May 2011.
Image Available />Accessed 26 May 2011.
This map was created by author.