Hindu nationalism and the rise of caste based parties in north india (1984 2004)

HINDU NATIONALISM AND THE RISE OF CASTEBASED PARTIES IN NORTH INDIA

Yamini Vasudevan

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAMME
2007

a


CONTENTS

Title

Page Nos.

Abstract

i

Acknowledgments

ii

Abbreviations

iii

Introduction

1 – 22

-

Hindu nationalism and Indian politics
Rise of caste-based parties
Mandal and Mandir – Dual ideologies
Literature review
Chapter descriptions

Chapter 2: The Sangh Parivar and the
revival of Hindu nationalism
-

The BJP and the ‘new’ face of Hindutva
Revival of religious nationalism in the 1980s
Caste – The regional barometer of the north
The BJP’s advance to power
Mandal and Mandir

Chapter 3: The BJP and caste-based parties (I):
compulsions of coalition politics
-

Politics of the post-Ramajanambhoomi phase
Moving towards moderation
Constraints of caste politics

Attempts at ideological reconciliation
Sanghatan vs. Social Engineering

Chapter 4: The BJP and caste-based parties (II):
Case Study of Uttar Pradesh
-

Uttar Pradesh: The political stage
Early 1990s: Expansion and consolidation of the BJP in UP

1
5
7
10
20

23 – 46
23
26
33
37
39

47 – 68
47
50
52
57
59

69 – 96
69
70

b


-

Mid to late 1990s: Impact of post-Mandal developments
Caste (mis-) management – The Kalyan affair
The 1999 elections – Battling the odds
Early 2000 to 2004 elections – Coalitions and challenges
The 2004 elections – Picking up the pieces
Analysis – Charting the BJP’s career

Conclusion
-

The 2004 elections and the BJP –
Delusion and disappointment
In retrospect – Re-visiting the BJP’s journey
Looking to the future: Whither the BJP, whither Hindutva?

73
78
82
85
92
94

97 – 110

97
105
108

Appendix

111-113

Bibliography

114-133

c


Abstract
The rise of Hindu nationalism and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a major force in
Indian politics in the early 1990s is an oft-examined topic of contemporary Indian
political history. However, the progress of the BJP in the 1990s met several challenges,
the strongest of which centred on the rise of caste-based parties as key state-level political
mediators in north India. Whilst the Mandal Commission’s recommendations made caste
a central element of target voter bases and electoral appeal, deep-seated processes from
the 1970s spurred the rise of caste-based parties. The rise of caste-based parties
challenged the pan-Indian overtones of Hindutva and the BJP’s attempts to consolidate
the ‘Hindu vote’ – for acknowledging caste-based parties as political partners meant a
dilution of commitment towards the Sangh Parivar’s call for a united Hindu society. The
BJP’s handling of this ideological and political problematic, the effect this had on the

party’s character and functioning, and the transformation effected on Hindu nationalism
as a result of these challenges, forms the central queries of this thesis.

i


Acknowledgements
This thesis was undertaken whilst in receipt of the Graduate Research Scholarship by the
National University of Singapore. The grant was very helpful, and is gratefully
acknowledged.

Several people were instrumental in the writing of this thesis. Foremost amongst them
was my supervisor, Dr. Rajesh Rai – a friend, philosopher and guide in the true sense of
every word. His insightful comments and analysis were important to making this thesis
complete, whilst his constant motivation kept me going till the end. I also thank Prof.
Peter Reeves for his guidance through the years. Whatever little I may have gained by
way of knowledge in the realm of academic research, I owe it to him.

Needless to say, my family played one of the most important roles during this time.
Despite being away from me, they never made the distance felt. They were my constant
source of encouragement and support. Even though we were separated by time zones, it
was very comforting to know they were just a phone call away, no matter what the time.

A special thank you to Saras, my best friend. She always made time to listen to my tales
of woe, helped to strengthen my resolve and enlivened my day – she was my Duracell
battery. Thanks also to Kumeresh, a special friend, for keeping my spirits high through
one of the toughest stages of my writing, and for putting a smile on my face no matter
how dark the day.

A hearty thank you to all my graduate roommates for all the good times we spent

together, especially Sathia. I take back with me some very memorable moments.

There are many others who have stood by me through these years, and touched me with
their concern and words of encouragement. Thank you to all.
Yamini Vasudevan

ii


Abbreviations

BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party
BJS: Bharatiya Jan Sangh
BSP: Bahujan Samaj Party
JP: Janata Party
MP: Member of Parliament
NDA: National Democratic Alliance
OBC: Other Backward Classes
RSS: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SC: Scheduled Castes
SP: Samajwadi Party
UP: Uttar Pradesh
VHP: Vishwa Hindu Parishad

iii


Introduction

Hindu nationalism and Indian politics

In the late 1980s, India witnessed a surge in support for militant Hindu nationalism
espoused by the umbrella group of organizations known as the Sangh Parivar. The
change was a significant one in that it had occurred after nearly five decades of secular
post independence history, and prompted academics worldwide to ponder if the country
was on the verge of an identity crisis. Their concerns were heightened when the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its sibling Hindu nationalist organizations launched the
Ramjanambhoomi campaign, which sought to ‘liberate’ the birthplace of the Hindu god
Ram in Ayodhya in the state of Uttar Pradesh in 1990-91. Despite the fact that it left
behind a trail of communal riots and at least 2000 people dead, the movement became
extremely popular in the Hindi belt and acted as a launch pad for the BJP into Indian
politics. In the 1991 General Elections, held in the aftermath of the Ramjanambhoomi
movement, the BJP emerged as the second largest party in the Lok Sabha with 120 seats
and 20 per cent of the vote share. For a party that had scraped up a humiliating tally of 2
seats in 1984, this was a tremendous achievement. In effect, the BJP seemed poised to
emerge as a plausible successor to the Congress’s mantle at the Center, and alongside it,
Hindutva as a possible alternative ideology in Indian politics.1

1

Jaffrelot, Christophe. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics: 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies
of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company. 1996

1


Contrary to expectations, the post-Ramjanambhoomi movement period made it amply
clear that the BJP’s standing was far less secure than it appeared. In December 1992,
members of the Hindu nationalist combine demolished the Babri Masjid in line with the
promised aim of building a Ram temple in its place. However, in an ironical turn of
events, Ayodhya failed to capture the public imagination as it had the previous year. The

violent backlash that followed in many parts of north India had an unsettling effect on the
population, and robbed the movement of its earlier credibility. More importantly, the
impetus of regional politics had by this time shifted away from inter-religious differences
to caste cleavages and caste-based parties – with the result that religious majoritarianism
had lost much of its new found potency, and was instead challenged by the advent of a
new form of politics that centered on caste-based affiliations.

The intersection of the differentiated trajectories of Hindu nationalism and caste politics
in the mid 1990s was not a coincidence, but rather the convergence of two parallel
movements that had been engendered, and later aided, by the institutional and electoral
decline of the Congress from the 1970s onwards. In the post-independence period, the
Congress had instituted an extensive network of patronage politics that relied on local
notables to help bring together diverse social groups (including Upper castes, Scheduled
Castes (SC), and Muslims) under a common political umbrella, thereby allowing little
room for alternative parties to carve out their individual spheres of influence. In the
1970s and 80s, the growing tendency towards centralization of decision-making and
operation processes by the Congress leadership led to the degeneration of the clientelistic
structure, and eroded the party’s control over its ‘coalition of extremes’. As the system

2


began to crumble, differentiated political voices and demands began to emerge from the
cracks, which became manifest in the form of political parties over time. Along with the
Congress’s decline, the party’s populist, inclusive rhetoric began to lose its importance,
and in its place, political appeal based on communal and community identities began to
dominate the electoral and political circles. In other words, the Indian polity came to be
fragmented on religious and caste lines, freeing up the space and opportunity for
differentiated political parties to carve out niche vote banks from those population
segments hitherto appropriated by the Congress. The BJP was one of the beneficiaries of

this change; caste-based parties were another.

The developments mentioned above were subtle and had no perceptible impact on the
BJP’s career, especially in the early years following its formation in 1980. In the initial
period, the BJP decided to follow a moderate strategy that relied on Integral Humanism2
as its guiding principle and refrained from making direct overtures to religion. However,
the strategy failed, and the party faced a humiliating defeat in the 1984 Parliament
elections when it managed to secure only 2 seats. Faced with increasing pressure from the
Sangh Parivar to assert its core identity, the party reverted to a hard line Hindutva stance
and began to revive its efforts towards reinforcing ‘Hindu’ identity, with particular
reference to the opposing ‘Other’, which was centered on the Muslims in the subcontinent. It was an ironic coincidence that by the mid 1980s, the Congress too had begun
2

A treatise written in 1965 by RSS ideologue Deendayal Upadhyaya, ‘Integral Humanism’ set forth a
moderate socio-economic agenda that rejected westernization, and advocated a Gandhian socio-economic
model that focused on indigenous production, small-scale industries, and national culture based on
traditionalist ideals as the best means of progress. Integral Humanism was key to the foundation of the
Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the predecessor of the BJP, and played a crucial role in creating an alternative
ideological avenue for Hindu nationalists. Upadhyaya, Deendayal. Integral Humanism. 1965. (Taken from
a series of four lectures delivered in Bombay in April 1965. Source: www.bjp.org/history/human.htm)

3


to rely on religious rhetoric and symbolism to revive its waning popularity, thereby
relaxing the strict adherence to secularism and legitimizing the incorporation of religion
into politics. This proved a major advantage for the BJP, for the Congress had indirectly
sanctioned religious propaganda as a legitimate form of political appeal. In addition, the
Congress’s lack of ideological coherence in its decisions over major politico-religious
issues like the Shah Bano case3 eroded popular faith in both the party’s capability for

governance and the viability of secularism, and thrust Hindu nationalism forward in new
light as a viable political ideology.

A significant feature of the Sangh Parivar’s efforts at religious revival in the 1980s
involved the organizations’ concerted attempts to conspicuously ‘incorporate’ lower
castes within the Hindu fold – a move that was a consequence of the Hindu nationalists’
vulnerability vis-à-vis the other religious groups that drew on the social stigma suffered
by lower caste groups to propagate proselytisation. It is important to note that the stress
on inter-caste harmonization was not a new feature in Hindu nationalist ideology. In the
early stages of the Hindu nationalist movement, there had been several initiatives by
reformers to ease the barriers of caste and commence the process of integration of lower
castes, such as through Shuddhi or purification rituals advocated by the Arya Samaj for
the reintegration of Untouchables into Hindu society. The difference lay in the fact that
whilst these early initiatives were intended primarily to restructure the caste system so as
to diminish the stigma associated with ‘lower’ caste status, the Sangh Parivar, especially

3

The Shah Bano case concerned the Congress’s controversial decision to override the Supreme Court’s
judgment over the alimony to be paid to a divorced Muslim lady called Shah Bano. For more details, see
Chapter 2, pp. 31-32

4


the RSS, took the idea a step further and aimed to institute a pan-Hindu identity that
would subsume all internal sub-divisions completely over time.

Whilst the RSS acted as the social medium of change from the grassroots, the BJP played
the role of the negotiator of Hindu nationalist interests in the political sphere.

Conventionally, the BJP derived much of its electoral support from the upper-caste, urban
middle class segments, on account of their receptivity to the RSS’s traditionalist ethos
and culture. In the early 1990s, the party had made better progress due to the popularity
of the Ramjanambhoomi movement, but its appeal was still restricted to the upper-caste
segments of the population. Given the limited demographic presence of the upper castes
(about 15 per cent of the Hindu population), the party was hard pressed to expand its
support base amongst the lower caste segments in order to strengthen its standing. This
was an ideological necessity as well, to complement the Sangh Parivar’s efforts to
institutionalize ethno-religious criteria as the primary determinant of identity. In doing so,
however, the BJP was challenged by the rise of caste-based parties, which advocated a
contradictory form of politics that placed caste identity at the heart of their socio-political
agenda – one that demanded the redistribution of power to lower castes as the means of
retribution for the material and psychological deprivation suffered by them in the past.

Rise of caste-based parties
The rise of caste-based parties in the Hindi belt was relatively delayed when compared to
the south, where they had begun to dominate the political scene since the 1950s and 60s.
The lack of a collective political consciousness on part of the lower castes in the north

5


was a result of contextual limitations including the strong demographic presence of the
upper castes (10 to 15 per cent in the north as compared to 3 to 5 per cent in the south);
and the prevalence of the Zamindari system of land ownership, which concentrated
power in the hands of a select section of the population. In addition, the perceived
superiority of upper-caste ethics led to the promulgation of a culture that relied primarily
on Sanskritisation or the emulation of upper-caste practices as the means of social
mobility, thereby strengthening the ‘moral’ authority of the upper castes on the one hand,
and diminishing the chances of socio-political organization of lower castes on the other.4

Lower caste empowerment received a strong thrust from two movements in the 1960s
and ‘70s – the peasant-based mobilisation led by Charan Singh and the socialism-oriented
movement initiated by Ram Manohar Lohia – which helped lay the foundations for the
rise of caste-based parties in the 1980s and 90s.5 More importantly, the two movements
acted as a catalyst for the mobilization of lower castes into horizontal interest groups and
the propagation of the idea that the fulfillment of collective socio-political interests was
the key to the realization of personal benefits as well. Caste-based parties carried this idea
further and prioritized the capture of political power as the primary means for the
emancipation of the lower castes from the suppression they had suffered to date. The
argument rested on the premise that “the capture of political power will automatically
transform the composition of the bureaucratic elite”6 – a sign, as Varshney notes, that the

4

Jaffrelot, Christophe. India’s silent revolution: The rise of lower castes in north India. London: Hurst &
Company. 2003. See also Varshney, Ashutosh. “Is India becoming more democratic?” in The Journal of
Asian Studies. Vol. 59, No. 1. Feb 2000. p. 19
5
Jaffrelot, Christophe. India’s silent revolution. pp. 254-289
6
Varshney, Ashutosh. “Is India becoming more democratic?”. p. 19

6


caste-based parties had realised that “it [wa]s time now to play the game of democratic
politics more equally.”7

Mandal and Mandir – Dual ideologies

The inherent ideological contradiction between caste-based parties and Hindu nationalists
came to light in 1989 when the incumbent Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced the
implementation of the Mandal Commission reforms, which entailed the reservation of up
to 27 per cent of seats in government jobs and education for the Other Backward Classes
(OBC), apart from the existent reservation of jobs for the Scheduled Castes.8 The
government’s announcement elicited a harsh response from the upper castes, which
included public immolation by several students, who viewed the measure as an
encroachment of their traditional dominance in the sectors of bureaucracy and higher
education. Although a member of the ruling coalition government, the BJP condemned
Singh’s move and opposed the ‘positive’ discrimination measures as divisive and
eventually harmful to society at large. The BJP’s reaction helped to strengthen the party’s
image as well as its standing amongst the upper castes, but it also added weight to the
caste-based parties’ allegation that Hindutva was a pseudonym for Brahmanism, and the
BJP was the political guardian of the upper castes.

In the early 1990s, the polarization of opinion had little impact on the BJP due to the
party’s ability to deflect public attention to the realm of Hindu-Muslim relations through
the Ramjanambhoomi movement. However, once the communal dust had settled, caste-

7
8

Varshney, Ashutosh. “Is India becoming more democratic?”. p. 19
For more details on the Mandal Commission, please refer to Chapter 2, pp. 39 – 43

7


based parties began to dominate politics at the state level. The ability of caste-based
parties to stake their claim to regional power lay in their ability to fuse together ascriptive

categorization and socio-political connotation,9 which helped to overcome the presence
of multiple sub-divisions within the community as well as their lack of geographic
concentration. The extent of the caste-based parties’ strength in representative politics
was made clear by the mid-1990s. For example, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which
identified itself as the spokes-party of the Dalits, bolstered its standing from merely 2.5
per cent of the vote share in the 1985 elections to 16 per cent in 1989, and later 21 per
cent of the vote share in the 1998 elections. Given that SCs and OBCs together
constituted nearly 60 per cent of the total Hindu population, caste-based parties had a
huge support base to tap into.

It is important to note that the rise of caste-based parties was aided by shifts in the
political system at the center as well. By the mid-1990s, the single-dominant-party
system prominent until the late 1980s had given way to a “bi-modal, multi-party
system”10 wherein “two major or national political parties [were] manoeuvring within a
large vortex of small regional parties.”11 Major national parties, namely the Congress, the
BJP and the Janata Dal, no longer functioned as individual political agents, but rather
acted as poles around which regional parties formed coalitions. In other words,

9

Chandra, Kanchan. The Transformation of ethnic politics in India: The decline of Congress and the rise of
the Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Feb. 2000). pp.
26-61
10
Wallace, Paul “Introduction: India's 1998 election – Hindutva, the tail wags the elephant, and Pokhran”
in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace. 1999. Indian politics and the 1998 election: regionalism, Hindutva
and state politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications. p. 17
11
Ibid.

8


[By the 1990s], the overall logic of electoral politics in India had over the
last decade been transformed in such a way that the locus classicus of
political power in India – the one-party dominance at the centre which
remain[ed] the tantalizing object of BJP’s strategies – seem[ed] to have
become a thing of the past.12

Thus, to form alliances with regional parties as a means to obtain power was no longer an
option, but a compulsion. However, the process of forming and maintaining steady
alliances with caste-based parties was fraught with ideological and practical concerns for
the BJP. Unlike the RSS, which firmly believed in the long term transformation of
society as the primary aim of Hindutva, the BJP’s immediate concern was the need to
establish its presence beyond its niche support bases in order to maintain its place in the
running for power. Yet, to acknowledge the caste-based parties’ presence and/or their aim
of empowerment posed an ideological dichotomy, for Hindutva advocated a pan-Hindu
identity that derided sectarian divisions. Furthermore, the BJP’s emergence as a
prominent political agent was in large part derived from the shift of a large section of the
upper-caste vote in its favor in the post-math of the Mandal affair. Hence, by forming an
alliance with caste-based parties, the BJP faced the threat of alienating its core support
base, in turn weakening its stability in the political sphere. The need of the hour was thus
for a strategy that helped to balance the party’s traditionalist stance with the
accommodation of caste issues. Whether the BJP was able to do so, and overcome the
challenge or not, forms the central query of this thesis.

12

Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. 1998. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in
India. 2nd Ed. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 2

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Literature review
A thesis that places Hindu nationalism as its central focus might seem redundant given
the glut of literature available on the subject. With some exceptions,13 Hindu nationalism
took the academic spotlight from the mid to late 1980s, when the Sangh Parivar began to
emerge as a prominent force in Indian society and politics. With the rise of the
Ramjanambhoomi movement as a pan-north Indian concern, it was evident that the surge
in support for religious nationalism was the result of deep-rooted developments that had
altered the political landscape of the Hindi belt significantly. It might be argued at this
point that such a development was imminent given the strong presence of traditional
Hindu elements in the social psyche of this region, even as part of the Congress’s
functional agenda, since the pre-independence period. However, until the late 1980s,
there was little by way of formal support for religious majoritarianism as a political
ideology – as was seen from the failure of the BJS, and even the BJP in its early stages, to
attain a reasonable level of popular acceptance and success. The change was thus one that
spanned many dimensions and hence, created a need to interpret the nature of Hindutva
as a socio-political ideology, and gain a better understanding of its influence in
contemporary Indian society and politics.

Studies on Hindu nationalism have been so numerous and comprehensive that it is near
impossible to account for all of them. Hence, this brief review takes up some of the broad
strands of study that encompass much of the relevant literature on this subject. The first

13

Curran, Jean Alonzo. 1951. Militant Hinduism in Indian politics: A study of the R.S.S. New York:
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1975. Strategy, risk,

and personality in coalition politics: the case of India. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press.

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amongst these is the focus on the ideological and socio-political origins of Hindu
nationalism. Most studies place the genesis of Hindu nationalism at the late 19th century,
wherein the conjunction of two strands of nationalist thought – Indian nationalism and
Hindu revivalism – produced a synthesized ideology that was secular as well as religious.
The unique, or ironic, blend of elements was derived to a large extent from the influence
of European scholarship on the Indian elite, as a result of which the Indian elite attempted
to emulate the West subconsciously,14 yet outwardly sought to reinstate a national
identity that was shaped by elements of Indian tradition and culture. Significantly,
Hinduism was seen as the only religion capable of engendering and sustaining such a
transformation. The centrality of Hinduism to the nationalist movement was further
strengthened by the formation of religious and socio-political organizations (Arya Samaj,
Hindu Mahasabha) and mass-based movements (the Cow Protection movement), which
helped to disseminate and strengthen a growing sense of religious consciousness.15 It is
noteworthy that the influence was not limited to Hindu revivalists alone – the Congress’s
‘secular’ framework was itself constituted of traditionalist Hindu elements, especially at
the state level.16

There is common consensus that Hindu nationalist ideology was ‘formalized’ in the early
1920s when V.D. Savarkar sought to provide a comprehensive definition of the ‘Hindu’

14

Chatterjee, Partha. Bengal politics and the Muslim masses, 1920-47 in Hasan, Mushirul, ed. 1993.
India's partition : process, strategy, and mobilization. Delhi: Oxford University Press; Prakash, Gyan.

Body politic in colonial India in Mitchell, Timothy. 2000. Questions of modernity. Minneapolis; London:
University of Minnesota Press.
15
Pandey, Gyanendra. 1990. The construction of communalism in colonial north India. Delhi; New
York: Oxford University Press; Zavos, John. 2000. The emergence of Hindu nationalism in India. New
Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press.
16
Gould, William. 2004. Hindu nationalism and the language of politics in late colonial India. New
York: Cambridge University Press.

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based on multiple markers of geography, race, religion and ethnicity in his thesis
Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (First published in 1923).17 Savarkar’s work was
instrumental to the development of Hindu nationalism for two important reasons: firstly,
the centrality of religion to the definition of the nation and its citizenry marked the point
of divergence between Hindu and Indian nationalism; and secondly, it provided a basis
for the creation of an inclusive socio-political identity that could effectively override the
presence of sectarian divisions within Hindu society. Despite his not being a member of
the RSS, Savarkar’s work was to prove a central reference point for Hindu nationalists,
especially the RSS. The borrowing of ideological precepts can be seen from RSS
ideologue Golwalkar’s work, We or our nationhood defined (first published in 1939),
which provides a similar set of defining features for the Hindu, albeit in an extreme,
fascist framework.18

The importance of Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s works to contemporary Hindu nationalist
ideology derives from their ability to provide a firm theoretical basis that legitimizes the
exclusion of followers of other religions, especially Muslims, from the right to ‘belong’
in the country of their birth.19 Studies of the Ramjanambhoomi movement20 point to the

centrality of this element to the campaign, especially with regard to the stress on the
17

Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. 1989. Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? 6th ed. Bombay: Veer Savarkar
Prakashan.
18
The extremist nature of Golwalkar’s work needs to be seen in light of the prevalence of strong fascist
ideologies during the IInd World War. It is important to take note that Golwalkar presented a highly
moderated version of his ideological percepts in his next work, Bunch of thoughts. Details: Golwalkar,
M.S. 1966. Bunch of Thoughts. Bangalore: Vikrama Prakashan.
19
Pandey, Gyanendra, ed. 1993. Hindus and others: The question of identity in India today. New Delhi;
New York: Viking.
20
Pandey, Gyanendra, ed. 1993. Hindus and others: The question of identity in India today. New Delhi;
New York: Viking; Nandy, Ashis et al. 1995. Creating a nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi movement
and fear of the self. Delhi: Oxford University Press; Ludden, David, ed. 1996. Contesting the nation:
Religion, community, and the politics of democracy in India. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.

12


‘Muslim’ origins of the mosque and the call for the demonstration of ‘Hindu’ pride
through participation in the effort to replace it with a temple. Apart from this central
focus, the literature on the Ramjanambhoomi movement has dealt with several aspects
that relate to the larger socio-economic forces shaping the country’s psyche such as the
importance of media in shaping the public imagination, with particular reference to the
televised series, Ramayana;21 the means by which socio-economic grievances had been
contextualized within religion;22 and the contributory factors to, and impact of,

communal rioting and its impact on political and social structures.23

Another dimension of the study of Hindu nationalism concentrates on the core
organizations that constitute the Sangh Parivar. Of these, the RSS has received
considerable attention, given its primacy as the foundation upon which the Sangh Parivar
was built. On a general note, the RSS is often perceived as the progenitor and inheritor of
the fascist tradition of Hindu nationalism, largely because of the extremist leanings of the
organization in the 1930s and 40s. Although the RSS moderated much of its rhetoric and
maintained its distance from politics in the post-independence period, certain elements
that continued to be retained, such as the para-military style of its training and
organization in the shakas24, sustained the stereotype of the organization. This perception

21

Rajagopal, Arvind. 2001. Politics after television: Religious nationalism and the reshaping of the
Indian public. New York: Cambridge University Press.
22
Nandy, Ashis et al. 1995. Creating a nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi movement and fear of the self.
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
23
McGuire, John, Peter Reeves and Howard Brasted, eds. 1996. Politics of violence: From Ayodhya to
Behrampada. New Delhi; Thousand Oaks: Sage; Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. The saffron wave:
Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
24
Shakas is the term used to refer to local branches or centers of the RSS.

13


has been tempered to some extent by studies in recent times,25 which have highlighted the

different aspects of the ideology, structure and functioning of the RSS. In particular, these
studies have dealt with important issues including the spread and development of Hindu
nationalism in the post-independence period, the manner in which Hindu nationalism has
come to be ingrained within the social and political culture of north India, and the limits
to the RSS’s ‘non-involvement’ with politics.

The steady growth in membership over the years from mere hundreds to over a million in
recent times is a result of the RSS’s modus operandi that institutes cadre based networks
throughout the country, which in turn implant memberships at the local level. Underlying
this strategy is the RSS’s disregard for short-term social or numerical gain, with the sole
aim of transforming society over time from the grassroots. The RSS’s strategy is
complemented by its social welfare wings such as the ‘Sewa Bharti’ and schools like
‘Sanskrit Kendra’ and ‘Saraswathi Shishu Mandir’, which work with lower-caste or tribal
groups. In recent times, these initiatives have come under criticism on account of the
25

Andersen, Walter K. and Shridhar D. Damle. 1987. The brotherhood in saffron: The Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu revivalism. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications; Basu, Tapan et al. 1993.
Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi: Orient Longman Viking.
25
Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi:
Orient Longman; Katju, Manjari. 2003. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Indian politics. Hyderabad:
Orient Longman; McKean, Lise. 1996. Divine enterprise: Gurus and the Hindu nationalist movement.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
25
Baxter, Craig. 1969. The Jana Sangh: A biography of an Indian political party. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press; Graham, Bruce Desmond. 1990. Hindu nationalism and Indian politics:
The origins and development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press.
25

Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi:
Orient Longman; Malik, Yogendra K. and V. B. Singh. 1994. Hindu nationalists in India: The rise of the
Bharatiya Janata Party. Boulder: Westview Press; Basu, Amrita and Atul Kohli, eds. 1998. Community
conflicts and the state in India. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press; Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999.
The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.; Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1996. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925
to the 1990s: Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company;
Kanungo, Pralay. 2003. RSS’s tryst with politics: From Hedgewar to Sudarshan. Delhi: Manohar
Publisher and Distributors.

14


organizations’ efforts to propagate a synthesized set of Hindu practices that could
promulgate attachment to the religion and the society simultaneously – a practice that is
seen as representative of the RSS’s underlying pro-Brahminical ethos, and contradictory
to its claims of a casteless agenda.26 Nevertheless, despite the questions raised over the
nature of its ideological commitment, there is common consensus that the RSS is the
primary representative of Hindutva in Indian society over the years.

Whilst other organizations within the Sangh Parivar such as the VHP27 have also received
considerable attention, the BJP commands a special place in academic discourse on
account of its role as the sole envoy of the Sangh Parivar’s interests in the political forte.
Although focus on the BJP intensified only in the late 1980s, the studies that have
emerged since have been extensive and numerous, especially when compared to the
works on the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS).28 The general themes of analysis include the
BJP’s ideology, strategy and functioning.29 Amongst these, an oft-examined topic of
analysis centers on the timing of the rise of the BJP in Indian politics. Given the close26

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1996. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s:

Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company; Pandey,
Gyanendra, ed. 1993. Hindus and others: The question of identity in India today. New Delhi; New York:
Viking; Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New
Delhi: Orient Longman.
27
Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi:
Orient Longman; Katju, Manjari. 2003. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Indian politics. Hyderabad:
Orient Longman; McKean, Lise. 1996. Divine enterprise: Gurus and the Hindu nationalist movement.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
28
Baxter, Craig. 1969. The Jana Sangh: A biography of an Indian political party. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press; Graham, Bruce Desmond. 1990. Hindu nationalism and Indian politics:
The origins and development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press.
29
Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi:
Orient Longman; Malik, Yogendra K. and V. B. Singh. 1994. Hindu nationalists in India: The rise of the
Bharatiya Janata Party. Boulder: Westview Press; Basu, Amrita and Atul Kohli, eds. 1998. Community
conflicts and the state in India. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press; Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999.
The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.

15


knit framework of the Sangh Parivar, the BJP had a strong member network built up by
the RSS since the 1920s to tap into for support. However, the BJP failed to make its mark
as a prominent political force until the late 1980s. The reason for this delay lay in the lack
of an opportune political moment, which was created by the convergence of specific
socio-political conditions that provided the Sangh Parivar with an opportunity to

implement its strategy of ethno-religious mobilization and validate the notion of the
threatening ‘Other’.30 In particular, the ineptitude of the Congress in the 1970s and 80s31
and the inability of the state to adapt its secular ideology to suit a changing social polity32
resulted in the weakening of the secular principle and ‘legitimized’ the growth in support
for religious nationalism in the early 1990s.

Much has been said on the BJP’s ability to capitalize on the shifting trends through the
Ramjanambhoomi movement. It is important to note that apart from its larger
implications for Indian society and politics as a whole, the significance of the movement
lay in its ability to provide the BJP with an opportunity to reconcile its roles as both a
movement and a political party.33 However, the post-Ramjanambhoomi movement period
brought to fore challenges that restricted the BJP’s rise and expansion, and more
importantly, put to test the resilience of the BJP’s commitment to the social agenda of the
Sangh Parivar. As a result, the academic spotlight moved away from the dominant
discourse on the communal leanings of the party to an assessment of the manner in which
30

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1996. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s:
Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company.
31
Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar
Pradesh. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press.
32
Nandy, Ashis. 2002. Time warps: Silent and evasive pasts in Indian politics and religion. London:
Hurst & Company.
33
Basu, Amrita. The dialectics of Hindu nationalism in Atul Kohli, ed. 2001. The success of India’s
democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

16

the BJP had accommodated itself within Indian politics and the factors that tested its
expansion.

Given the instability of governance in the 1990s, reflected in the holding of four general
elections in quick succession in 1991, 1996, 1998 and 1999, much of the work on the BJP
from the mid 1990s onwards centered on a comparative analysis of the party’s strategies
and performance in the different sectors and states.34 When the BJP-led coalition
emerged as the ruling alliance at the center in 1999, after a shaky term in power for one
year, the party seemed to have finally found its footing in the political scene. However,
the unexpected defeat of the BJP-led NDA coalition in the 2004 general elections and the
re-emergence of the Congress gave rise to a new set of questions that aimed to better
understand whether the BJP’s failure was more the verdict of an electorate afflicted by an
anti-incumbency mood, or the end result of party’s inability to adapt to challenges and
changes at the national and regional levels.35

In the discussion above, a commonly referred to but relatively unexplored factor has been
the impact of the rise of caste politics and caste-based parties on the BJP’s strategy and
functioning. Needless to say, extensive ground has been covered on the social and

34

Gould, Harold and Sumit Ganguly, eds. 1993. India votes: Alliance politics and minority governments
in the ninth and tenth general elections. Boulder: Westview Press; Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe
Jaffrelot, eds. 1998. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University
Press; Varshney, Ashutosh. 1998. India’s 12th national elections. New York: Asia Society; Roy,
Ramashray and Paul Wallace, eds. 1999. Indian politics and the 1998 election: Regionalism, Hindutva
and state politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications; Roy, Ramashray and Paul Wallace, eds. 2003. India’s
1999 elections and 20th century politics. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications; Jenkins, Rob, ed. 2004.

Regional reflections: Comparing politics across India’s states. New Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
35
Adeney, Katharine and Lawrence Saez. eds. 2005. Coalition politics and Hindu nationalism. New York:
Routledge.

17


political significance of caste,36 the rise of caste-based parties, and their role in
contemporary Indian politics.37 Furthermore, Froystad’s38 account of the shifts in the
relationships between the different families in her study town of Kanpur in the state of
Uttar Pradesh provides an excellent account of the manner in which this change
manifested itself at the ground level. However, these studies have focused largely on the
social and political processes that led to the rise of caste-based parties as a significant
force in the 1980s and the manner in which they have transformed contemporary Indian
politics. They point to the fact that the significance of the rise of caste-based parties lay in
their ability to rephrase the demand for equality of opportunity and outcomes as one that
called for the redistribution of power and resources to the underprivileged sections of
society. Needles to say, the change was a relatively subtle one, and the extent to which
caste had become ingrained in the socio-political psyche of the population became more
evident in the fallout over the implementations of the Mandal Commission’s
recommendations.

As mentioned earlier, the BJP’s challenges came to fore only in the post-Mandal period.
The Babri Masjid issue had lost its significance by the mid-1990s; the Hindutva
bandwagon could no longer rely on religion as the sole basis of its propaganda, and the
36

Rudolph, Lloyd I and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. 1967. The modernity of tradition: Political

development in India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Bayly, Susan. 1999. Caste, society and
politics in India from the eighteenth century to the modern age. New York: Cambridge University Press;
Gupta, Dipankar. 2000. Interrogating caste: Understanding hierarchy and difference in Indian society.
New Delhi; New York: Penguin Books; Shah, Ghanshyam. ed. 2004. Caste and Democratic Politics in
India. London: Anthem.
37
Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar
Pradesh. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press; Pai, Sudha. 2002. Dalit assertion and the unfinished
democratic revolution: The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications;
Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India.
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
38
Froystad, Kathinka. 2005. Blended boundaries: caste, class, and shifting faces of 'Hinduness' in a
north Indian city. Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

18


party leadership was faced with the need to find new means of integrating their ideology
within the larger political discourse. Given the BJP’s lack of support in terms of alliance
partners at the centre and the restricted appeal of its ideology at the ground level, the
choice of maintaining its ideological stringency and rejecting co-option with caste-based
parties was a difficult choice to make. The need to form alliances with caste-based parties
was further pressed by the fact that caste-based parties had been aided by the growing
regionalization of politics and the resultant decentralization of power, and emerged as the
power brokers at the state level. However, the process of forming and maintaining such
alliances, and the larger challenge of integrating the issue of caste within the Hindu
nationalist framework proved to be a far bigger challenge for the BJP than expected.

Despite the vast literature on Hindu nationalism and caste, there is a lacuna in the

analysis on the manner in which the trajectories of caste and Hindu nationalism have
interacted, and the extent to which caste has come to affect the progress of the BJP, and
the character of Hindu nationalism. Primarily, the discourse has centered on the
discrepancy between the upper-caste nature of the BJP’s character and composition, and
the leadership’s efforts to present it as a ‘catch-all’ party, in much the same mould as the
Congress, to gain popular acceptance. Nevertheless, much of the discussion has been
situated within the larger discourse of the Sangh Parivar’s efforts to ‘integrate’ the lower
castes within the Hindu fold, and hence, place greater emphasis on the ideological and
social initiatives of the Sangh Parivar as a whole. In other words, there is relatively little
detail on the effects of the intricacies of political negotiation on the BJP’s rank and file on
the one hand, and the manner in which its character and functioning have been affected

19