Memory, reconciliation and chosen traumas the political psychology of the chinese state, media and public on sino japanese relations

MEMORY, RECONCILIATION AND CHOSEN TRAUMAS: THE
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHINESE STATE, MEDIA
AND PUBLIC ON SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

GAO DEXIANG
(LLB, FUDAN UNIVERSITY)

A THESIS SUBMITTED
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2008


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor: Dr. Kun-Chin Lin, who
has helped me through this piece of work. Thank you for your valuable comments, the
patience and understanding. It is you who led me into the amazing world of Political
Science research.
I also want to thank Dr. Reuben Wong and Dr. Peter Li for their comments and
insightful suggestions on my thesis when it was still under basic construction. In
addition, I would like to thank Professor Nardin for creating a wonderful research
environment for my study in the Political Science Department. Special thanks also go
to the secretaries in the general office for their help with the administrative matters.
I am grateful to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences for offering with the
Research Scholarship as well as the funding for my field trip during my study.
Moreover, this thesis could not be accomplished without the encouragement and
help of Dr. Peter Gries and Dr. Rose Mcdermott whose advice significantly expanded
my scope. I also feel thankful to the fellow students in the department who once
offered a helping hand.

Finally, I would hope to thank my parents for their great care.
Any mistakes that still exist are purely mine.

I


TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................ I
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................II
SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... IV
LIST OF TABLES..................................................................................................... VI
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................. VI
LIST OF ABBREIVATIONS...................................................................................VII

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... - 1 PERSPECTIVE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT OF THE RESEARCH- 2 THE FUNCTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF “PUBLIC” AND “MEDIA”...................... - 11 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. - 13 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ................................................................................ - 14 ORGANIZATIONS OF THESIS ................................................................................. - 16 CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF TRAUMAS IN MEMORY AND
RECONCILIATION............................................................................................. - 18 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... - 18 MEMORY AND RECONCILIATION ......................................................................... - 19 TRAUMA VS. NATIONALISM ................................................................................... - 23 CHOSEN TRAUMAS: DEFINITIONS ....................................................................... - 28 CHOSEN TRAUMAS: HYPOTHESES....................................................................... - 31 CHAPTER THREE: STATE-MEDIA-PUBLIC INTERACTIONS AND
CHOSEN TRAUMAS .......................................................................................... - 36 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... - 36 THE STATE-MEDIA-PUBLIC DYNAMICS ON CHOSEN TRAUMAS ..................... - 36 THE DORMANCY PERIOD—FROM THE END OF THE WAR TO THE
“HONEYMOON” ...................................................................................................... - 42 THE REGRESSION UNDER THE RESULTANT FORCES—AFTER 1989............... - 51 STATE: AMBIVALENT AMONG MULTIPLE SIDES ....................................................... - 51 MEDIA: COMMERCIALIZING ON THE MARGIN.......................................................... - 55 PUBLIC: RALLYING BEFORE TRAUMAS ...................................................................... - 59 -

CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES ................................................................. - 66 INTRODUCTION: ..................................................................................................... - 66 II


1998 JIANG ZEMIN’S VISIT TO JAPAN................................................................... - 67 THE PREDICAMENT OF “NEW THINKING”......................................................... - 75 2007 FUKUDA’S VISIT TO CHINA .......................................................................... - 83 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION ..................................................................... - 89 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY...................................................................................... - 89 POLICY IMPLICATIONS .......................................................................................... - 91 ACADEMIC IMPLICATIONS.................................................................................... - 93 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................... - 94 BIBLIGOGRAPHY.............................................................................................. - 96 -

APPENDICES ..................................................................................................... - 101 -

III

SUMMARY

Since 1972 when China and Japan established their formal diplomatic relationship,
considerable ruptures and disputes have been haunting the reconciliation between
these two countries. The increasing complexity of the differences between the
Chinese state and public in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations indicates that the
historical memory and how people perceive and respond to memory has become a
crucial factor impeding the reconciliation. Notwithstanding the ideological and
victory narrative that once suppressed the traumatic memory, the inherent suspicion
of Japan still largely outweighs any positive attitude. Nevertheless, the prevailing
negative attitude of the Chinese public is essentially the result of state narrative even
if the Chinese government has actually been making salient efforts to ameliorate the
relationship with Japan. Thus the central factor for the Chinese is chosen traumas, a
mental representation transmitted at a trans-generational level of past historical events,
varying with the three actors of state, media and public. Three case studies including
Fukuda’s visit to China in 2007, the 2003 New Thinking, and the 1998 Jiang Zemin
visit to Japan will further elaborate the argument.

My interpretation sheds light on the complicated variation of the interaction of the
Chinese government, media and public concerning Sino-Japanese relations along with
the historical evolvement from the foundation of the PRC to some current events. The
future reconciliation of China and Japan, if possible, is connected more with the

IV


solution of historically rooted and visceral distrust of Japan derived from the
traumatic memory than the negotiation and balance of strategic interests.

V

LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.2 Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations: 1982-2006 ................................... - 42 Table 4.3 The 2008 China-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (China) ............. - 87 -

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.2 How chosen traumas pattern Sino-Japanese relations.................... - 25 Figure 2.3 The evolution of Chosen Traumas..................................................... - 30 -

VI


LIST OF ABBREIVATIONS

CASS

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

CCP

Chinese Communist Party

CRC

CASS Research Center

KMT

Guo Min Dang

MFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PRC

People’s Republic of China

ROK

Republic of Korea

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

VII


CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

Since 1972 when China and Japan established their formal diplomatic relations,
considerable collisions and disputes have been haunting this peculiar bilateral
relationship. Yasukuni Shrine visit, Diaoyu Island dispute, East China Sea oil conflict
and many other issues, big or small, salient or unnoticeable, have been continuously
overshadowing the relations between China and Japan. Contrary to some expectations,
increasing economic interdependence between the two countries over the last twenty
years has not engendered a closer political relationship. The mutual mistrust, evident

on the Chinese side in dealing with the historical problem, has hampered the
reconciliation and diplomatic interchange. Hence the significance of the research on
this topic is that the two countries have not yet fully reconciled the past, and this has
broader repercussions in the region. The tension caused by diplomatic disagreements
has the potential to impact the stability and the development of the East Asian
region.1 According to Allen Whiting’s assessment in China Eyes Japan, negative
images of Japan have thwarted China’s interest in closer relations with its Asian
neighbor.2
In contrast with the situation in Europe where most states seem to have overcome
nationalist hatreds to arrive at political reconciliation, and even a grand vision of
regional integration, nothing remotely so ambitious exists in the Asia-Pacific region.

1

Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese relations: Facing the past, looking to the future? (Routledge
Curzon, c2005).
2
Allen Whiting, China eyes Japan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p.19.
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Suspicions and resentments rooted in history continue to dominate political
reconciliation efforts in the region. The residue of Japanese aggression and atrocities
is deeply embedded in the Chinese national consciousness and has, despite the
normalization of inter-state relations, continued to resurface intermittently to the
present day. A political psychology perspective could be particularly valuable in
understanding the difficulty of China-Japan reconciliation in that the public’s hostile
attitude has been much stronger than the official reaction on Japan during the past
decade, despite the recent efforts made by Chinese and Japanese leadership.

PERSPECTIVE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT OF
THE RESEARCH

The factors overshadowing the Sino-Japanese relationship spans a large spectrum.
One of the most crucial factors is the power politics concern between China and
Japan. Many scholars in this field have shed light on China’s foreign policy thinking
and setting process, assessing Chinese government’s perception of the international
environment, the theory of “China Threat”, and the delicate variation of
U.S.-China-Japan triangular relations.3 For example, scholars such as Ming Wan,
J.Pollack, Ishii Akira argue about a downward Sino-Japanese relationship since the

3

See Kalder, Kent. China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry. Foreign Affairss, Vol. 85, No. 2,
(2006). Sutter, Robert, Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War, (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). Tsuji Kogo, “Chugoku ni okeru Yoron Keisei to Tainichi
Yoron Kozo” (“The Process of the Public Opinion Formation in China and the Structure of the
Public Opinion on Japan”), Kokusai Mondai, No.492, 2001.
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1990s.4 “China and Japan have had a cyclical, dispute-prone but confrontation-averse
political relationship, which has operated between clear boundaries.”5 As K.Kent
points out, the contest for regional leadership between China and Japan today is
creating new security dilemmas, prompting concerns over Chinese ambitions in Japan
and fears of renewed Japanese militarism in China. Kent argues that such an
increasing confrontation also exacerbates the fueling nationalism on both sides.6 Not
surprisingly, China is concerned about Japan seeking a greater role, in particular a
military role, in world politics. Jian Yang claims that worries on the Chinese side have
increased over the past decade due to Japan’s gradual strategic shift away from

“homeland defense.”7 Some scholars have even predicted a simmering Sino-Japanese
rivalry based on the competition and frictions in such issues as the leading role in
Asian regional organizations, Japan’s bid for UNSC permanent seat, and the power
projection in Southeast Asia, Russia, India and the Korean Peninsula.8
The security concern, in line with the engagement of the U.S. as a dominant
player in the region, is also pivotal in the picture. Many scholars have paid
considerable attention to the security dilemma between China and Japan, as well as
4

Ming Wan. Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation (Washington, D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006). Ash Robert,
Shambaugh David, Takagi Seiichiro, China watching : perspectives from Europe, Japan and the
United States (London ; New York : Routledge, 2007).
5
Ishii Akira, “Shiren ni tatsu ‘Sekai no naka no Nicchu Kankei’” (“ Japan-China Relations in the
World’ in the Moment of Truth”), Kokusai Mondai, No.418 (1995). p.12.
6
Kalder, Kent. China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry. Foreign Affairss, Vol. 85, No. 2, (2006).
7
Jian, Yang, China’s security policy towards Japan, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.)
China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK;
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.)
8
See Kalder, Kent. China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry. Foreign Affairss, Vol. 85, No. 2,
(2006). Sutter, Robert, Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War, (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). Robert Ash, David Shambaugh, Seiichiro Takagi. (Eds.)
China watching: perspectives from Europe, Japan and the United States,( London ; New York :
Routledge, 2007).
-3-

the role of the U.S. in this aspect. For example, Robert Sutter states that both China
and Japan are concerned to a limited extent with the military modernization of the
other, and both see the actions of the other as having changed the strategic
environment. A breakdown in the relationship would have serious implications for
regional security.9 From a realistic view, Mochizuki asserts that the emergence of a
new great power can lead to a cycle of hegemonic rivalry and war. The rise of China
inevitably presents such a systemic challenge to Japan.10 Considering the role of the
U.S., “a Japan that continues to align with the United States will enhance US leverage
and help sustain its preponderant power even as Chinese capabilities grow”.11 Heazle
states that the US-Japan Security Alliance will still remain at the core of the Northeast
Asian security. China would therefore consider the rationale of the continued
existence and expansion of such an alliance as a threat to China’s Taiwan strategy.12
In particular, Sutter points out that Taiwan and North Korea are two potential
flashpoints and long-term uncertainties in Sino-Japanese relations. In both cases,
China and Japan loom as the strategic concern for each other. The emergence of a
North Korea crisis or Taiwan crisis may easily and seriously damage the
Sino-Japanese relationship.13 Heazle also focuses on energy security as a possible

9

Sutter, Robert, Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War, (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).
10
Mochizuki , Mike, Dealing with a Rising China, in Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki,
Jitsuo Tsuchiyama. (Eds.) Japan in international politics: the foreign policies of an adaptive state,
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers: Published in association with the Japan Forum on
International Relations, 2007).
11
Ibid, p.229.

12
Heazle, Michael, Nationalism, security, and prosperity, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.)
China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK;
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.177.
13
Sutter, Robert, Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War, (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).
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source of the political tension between China and Japan as both countries are striving
to gain access to reliable oil and gas supplies.14
The economic interdependence between Japan and China makes another leading
variable in Sino-Japanese relations. China has surpassed the U.S. as Japan’s largest
trade partner. Japan’s Development Assistance (ODA) to China has been playing a
positive and significant role in China-Japan economic cooperation ever since 1979.15
Many scholars have seen such an increasing economic interdependence as an
optimistic indicator regarding Sino-Japanese relations.16 For example, Ming Wan
claims that although there remain certain economic frictions, both sides have been
attempting to resolve this through increased consultation. Nevertheless, Min Wan,
along with other scholars in the field, share the notion that the course of
Sino-Japanese relations has been following a track of hot economy and cold politics
for many years.17 Heazle also argues that “Increasing economic cooperation and
integration have occurred in tandem with growing levels of political discord and
animosity between the two governments over a broad range of problems”. 18
Christopher Howe incisively points out that the exchange of commodities between
China and Japan “has followed a predictable pattern, based on close proximity and
14

Heazle, Michael, Nationalism, security, and prosperity, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.)

China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK;
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.198.
15
Liping, Xia, Living in the past? The politics of nationalism in China, in Michael Heazle, Nick
Knight, (Eds.) China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past?
(Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.)
16
See Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century:
creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.).
17
Ming Wan. Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation (Washington, D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006)
18
Heazle, Michael, Nationalism, security, and prosperity, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.)
China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK;
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.179.
-5-


obvious differences in resource endowment and comparative advantage, while the
scale and institutional framework of trade have reflected the tortuous evolution of
political relations…”19
China's rise posing a threat to Japan, fueling nationalism on both sides, the U.S.
role in strengthening alliances with Japan and defending Taiwan, as well as the
increasing economic interdependence and deepening Asian regionalism have all
played as pivotal variables in the picture of China-Japan relations. The variation of
the relationship, however, has been through significant fluctuations since year 1972 of
diplomatic normalization.20 Roy claims that the Sino-Japanese relationship has not
gone through a real complete reconciliation whereas in purely economic terms,
Sino-Japanese relations appear to be at an all time high.21 The inconsistency of the

development of Sino-Japanese relations illuminates the significance of non-economic
factors and also the strong influence of perceptions rooted in the troubled and often
violent interaction between the two countries. Kojima, for example, points out
simultaneous progression of exchanges on the surface and frictions and conflicts
underneath, and examines mutual perceptions at popular level as the cause of the
friction and conflict.22 Scholars including Michael Heazle, Hidenori Ijiri, Yinan He,

19

Howe Christopher, China, Japan and Economic Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region, in
Christoper Howe (Eds.) China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects. (Oxford : Clarendon
Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1996.) p.98.
20
Ming Wan. Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation (Washington, D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006)
21
See Denny Roy (2004), “Stirring samurai, disapproving dragon: Japan’s growing security
activity and Sino-Japanese relations”, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 31(2), Summer,
Expanded Academic ASAP Plus. Söderberg Marie, Chinese-Japanese relations in the twenty-first
century : complementarity and conflict. (London ; New York : Routledge, 2002.).
22
Kojima Tomoyuki, “Gendai Nicchuu Kankeiron” (On Contemporary Japan-China
Relationship), in Hirano Ken’ichiro, ed., op.cit. 1994.
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and Peter Gries insist that the bewildering Sino-Japanese relationship is the result of
both governments pursuing interests such as energy security, greater political and
economic influence, and the consolidation of strong, contemporary national identity.
The interests are significantly being shaped by concerns over future intentions and

existing notions of national identity.23 Heazle particularly indicates that “The history
of the Sino-Japanese relationship, and the differing perceptions of this history on both
sides, has contributed in a very major way to a widespread sense of suspicion,
resentment, and hostility between the two nations.”24
What is the core of the Chinese national identity, if it is crucial to the variation of
China-Japan interaction, on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations? What is the
influence of history or past memory on such a national identity, the mutual
perceptions between China and Japan, and the development of China-Japan relations
as a consequence? Considering the subtlety and complexity of the nature of stagnant
Sino-Japanese relations, this paper will look into “Chosen Traumas”, namely a mental
representation that is transmitted at a trans-generational level of past historical events,
to examine the situation. It is a shared mental notion of a traumatic past event during
which large groups suffered loss and experienced helplessness, shame, and
humiliation in conflict with another large group. “The trans-generational transmission

23

Ijiiri Hidenori, Sino-Japanese Controversy Since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization, in
Christoper Howe (Eds.) China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects. (Oxford : Clarendon
Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1996.) Yinan He, History, Chinese Nationalism and
the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,, Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 16, Number 50,
February, 2007. Peter, Gries, China’s New Nationalism (University of California Press, 2004).
Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a
future past? (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.)
24
Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century:
creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.2.
-7-

of such a shared traumatic event is linked to past generation’s inability to mourn
losses of people, land or prestige, and indicates the large group’s failure to reverse
narcissistic injury and humiliation inflicted by another large group, usually a
neighbor.”25 In other words, the memory of a particular trauma was chosen, not
necessarily in an intentional manner, to consolidate the national identity and affect
certain international relations of a particular nation. Aside from Professor Vamik
Volkan who actually conceptualizes chosen traumas as an instrumental framework
that can be applied to certain areas in political science, some psychologists and
political scientists have also been introducing the knowledge of memory and trauma
to analyze certain political issues. In addition to Volkan, there is a growing literature
on trauma and politics crossing disciplinary boundaries. Peter Novick’s The
Holocaust and Collective Memory emphasizes the political expediency of trauma
discourse.26 Following Novick’s claim, K.M.Fierke focuses on understanding trauma
as a social-political concept and argues that trauma may be expressed in the habitual
memory of a culture, providing social legitimation for performative acts.27
In this thesis, I will try to link the status-quo of Sino-Japanese relations to the
chosen traumas of the three actors, namely the state, media and public in China. The
major problem of stagnant Sino-Japanese relations should be attributed to the failure
of reconciliation. Such a failure is caused more by the inability to deal with the past

25

Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of
Large-Group Identity. Group Analysis, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001): 80.
26
See Peter Novick, The Holocaust and Collective Memory: the American experience
(Bloomsbury, 1999).
27
See Duncan, Bell, Memory, Trauma and World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006),
p.117.

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than a failure to settle contemporary issues. Thus the absence of a shared memory
underlines the difficult status quo of Sino-Japanese relations.
As far as the Chinese side is concerned, people could not successfully relinquish
the past and look forward to a more rational and future-oriented relations due to the
chosen trauma effect in their collective memory. Such a trauma varies according to
different historical phases with the coherent variation of the different actors at
different times. Chosen traumas, as a result of state ideological restrain to an
increasingly independent factor prevailing in the public opinion, not only confine the
possibility of complete reconciliation, but also impede the future development of
Sino-Japanese relations. Unlike the wish of Premier Zhou Enlai that “the friendship
between our two great nations shall pass on from generation to generation”28 in 1972,
what actually passed over generations was the chosen traumas of the old war. The
Chinese viewed the Japanese as the paradigmatic “devils” during World War II, and
they continue to view them that way today.29
Specifically, four core research questions are to be answered. Firstly, in an
attempt to promote societal stability and unity, the Chinese government is determined
to create a harmonious atmosphere and vigorously advocates maintaining stability at
all costs. Yet the drastic anti-Japan sentiment, best represented by the 2005 anti-Japan
riots sweeping the major metropolises in China, is obviously contradictory to the
priority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), i.e. maintaining social stability and
deepening reform and opening. Although some people may still insist that such
28

Huan Tian, ed. Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1997),
Vol.2. p. 109.
29
Peter, Gries, China’s New Nationalism (University of California Press, 2004), p.10.

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xenophobia is indeed the tactic the CCP adopts to deflect attention from the sensitive
domestic politics, the government crackdown following the 2005 riots seemed to
imply a worry about collective and spontaneous movement action.
Secondly, we are still unable to provide a sound explanation about why in the
1980s the relations were surprisingly in tune and the government tried to popularize
the slogan “Friendship forever between China and Japan”. More importantly, such a
slogan appeared to be tolerated by the people at that time and was echoed by the
well-known popularity of certain Japanese products and TV dramas.
Thirdly, for the past thirty years, huge efforts have been made in dealing with the
historical issues but the past, crystallized around the Yasukuni Shrine visit and the
textbook conflict, still weighs the most on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations.
Nevertheless, time did not wash away the mark of the anti-Japanese war and the
crimes of Japanese troops; on the contrary, the Chinese public has been used to
perceiving Sino-Japanese relations as a collection of unresolved history problems.
Last but not the least, in contrast with the older generation who had actually
experienced the war, the younger generation seems to have an even tougher stance
and a more visceral negative attitude towards Japan and Japanese people.30 Such an
inexplicable phenomenon has added more difficulty for China and Japan to settle the
past.
30

For the analysis of the different generations of the Chinese post-war society, the “founding
fathers”, like Mao and Deng, and the people at the same age are generally regarded as the first
generation. The second generation was considered to be the people who lived their youth around
1950-1978. The third generation referred to the people whose thoughts and ideas were drastically
refreshed after the opening and reform decision. For details, see Orville Schell, Mandate of
heaven: a new generation of entrepreneurs, dissidents, bohemians, and technocrats lays claim to

China's future. (New York: Simon & Schuster, c1994.)
- 10 -


THE FUNCTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF STATE, PUBLIC AND
MEDIA

A functional definition of state is necessary. Despite the general definition of state as
a supreme social association or organization within whose frame politics will
determine its legislation and policies, the definition of the Chinese state on
Sino-Japanese relations, especially when a political psychology view is taken, is
special.31 Its authoritarian and non-democratic nature determines that the definition
in this case will mostly involve the dominant decision makers in a highly centralized
and hierarchical political structure as well as their foreign policy setting.32 It includes
an authoritarian political ideology or belief system providing and reinforcing
authoritarian conventional beliefs. It is also the main instrument through which
dominant decision makers acquire power on foreign policy making.33
It is equally crucial about the definition of public in this case. So is the leading
concern of at what level of analysis the political psychology perspective can best
apply to Sino-Japanese relations. I will suggest that it will mostly include the
intellectuals and urbanites, who have the access to the compulsory education, the
opportunities of exposure to mass media, and who have some basic historical
knowledge of the anti-Japanese war, considering the diversification and the
31

Wiseman, H.V. Political Systems (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967)
Levy, Jack, Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and
Robert Jervis (Eds.) Oxford Handbook of political psychology (New York : Oxford University
Press, c2003).
33

Meloen, Jos. The Political Culture of State Authoritarianism, in Stanley Renshon (Eds.)
Political Psychology: Cultural and Cross-Cultural Foundations. (New York : New York University
Press, 2000).
32

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complication of the concept of “Chinese public.”34
Another pivotal issue is about the real function of mass media and in which way
they can actually transmit the memory. Alison Landsberg underlines the possibilities
for a progressive politics of memory in our mass-mediated era. Through subtle and
theoretically informed readings of autobiographies, novels, films, and museum
exhibits about martyrs and the holocaust, monuments, she shows us how what she
revealingly calls “prosthetic memories” can produce empathy and social
responsibility (or antagonism and instability in this case). How we think about the
past matters in the present.35 As far as the Chinese media is concerned, it is thus
evident that the tremendous legacy composed of high school history books, numerous
anti-Japanese films, prevailing stories of anti-Japanese heroes in the novels and other
forms of media have made a synergy to continuously remind the people of the war.
On the other hand, the media are not merely passive transmitters of the far-reaching
chosen traumas but have actively engaged in the evolution of traumas based on the
different patterns the mass media adapt to and the lucrative commercial interests
involved. “Media tabloidism” may also go hand in hand with the audience’s growing
appetite for sensationalism in the commercial market.36 The memory of trauma may
not always be traumatic, as it is likely to mix with the indulgence in the excitement of
potential belligerence.
34

See Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Shang Xiaoyuan. In search of civil society: market

reform and social change in contemporary China, (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996.) William C. Kirby ed. Realms of freedom in modern China,
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004.)
35
Alison Landsberg. Prosthetic memory: the transformation of American remembrance in the
age of mass culture, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). p.26.
36
Yu Huang and Chin-Chuan Lee, Peddling Party Ideology for a Profit: Media and the Rise of
Chinese Nationalism in the 1990s (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p.49.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Based on the nature of my study and the data available, my research will adopt a
substantially qualitative approach and analytical description. This thesis requires
intensive knowledge on the topic and therefore the analysis of historical data is
particularly important.
Besides the secondhand data from newspapers, journals, online resources and of
course the studies of other researchers, my research is also based on the firsthand data
collected in my fieldtrip. During December 2007, I spent two weeks in Shanghai,
China and six days in Japan, conducting surveys about the mutual perceptions in
these two nations, especially for the up-to-date Chinese public opinion on
Sino-Japanese relations. The questionnaire has covered several crucial issues
including the Senkaku island dispute, the Nanjing Massacre and the Yasukuni Shrine
Visit. Moreover, other than these necessary standard questions in such a survey, it also
includes questions about how the people of each nation perceive the people of the
other. The survey in China totally collects 123 effective samples out of 130 surveys
(Business 48 Freelancer 6 Scholars 3 Students 46 Others 20). 75% of the interviewees
are males. 90% of the interviewees range from 18-45 years old.37 Most of the

questions designed are quite similar to those surveys conducted by the major news
agencies in Japan and China.38 Moreover, I will also compare the result of my
surveys with the past surveys’. Such a comparison is important, as Sino-Japanese
37

See Appendices for details.
The most well-known related surveys are from Asahi Shinbun (2002,2003), Yomuiri Shinbun
(2003), and Chinese Social Sciences Academy(2002-2004).
38

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relations are said to improve considerably after 2005, and accordingly testing whether
there has been a coherent variation in the public opinion could be essential to my
research. Nevertheless, my surveys have also added some updated questions directly
related to the case study of the 2007 Fukuda visit. Chapter Five will address most of
the results.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Political psychology is a multi-disciplinary field that has developed for more than
thirty years. “What unifies political psychology and makes it distinct from other
forms of political analysis is the search for explanation, description, and prediction at
the individual level of analysis.”39 The individual level of analysis informs and
affects the kinds of questions that are asked, the forms of evidence that are sought,
and the natures of inferences about causality that are made by political psychologists.
“Not just limited to the individual level, it also provides a particularly humanistic
slant on politics, asserting the importance of psychological processes to political
outcomes, by extending to organizational, bureaucratic, international and other levels

of analysis”.40 Nevertheless, there are still some central questions or limitations of
political psychology as a developing approach. Some argue that it is too insensitive to
political demands and pressures. “In attempting to introduce psychological

39

See Rober Jervis Perception and misperception in international politics (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, c1976).
40
Rose McDermott, Political psychology in international relations, (Ann Arbor: The University
of Michigan Press, c2004). p.3.
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explanations into political analysis, many political psychologists inadvertently (or
otherwise) end up privileging psychological processes over political realities”.41 The
other crucial question involves the extent to which findings from controlled
experiment in a psychological laboratory can be applied to real-world decision
making.42
Despite the work on the political psychology approach, my research still has
several other limitations that need to be highlighted. First of all, although the chosen
trauma literature gives us a fresh thinking about the case of China-Japan relations, its
application would be more precise if relevant experiments in China are possible based
on sufficient time and funding. Due to the practical limits of a Master’s research, this
thesis can hardly provide enough detailed psychological analysis consistent with my
scope. Hopefully the future Ph.D. study could offer more chances to make up for the
absence of a well-designed experiment.
Moreover, as I have little access to the real policy making and media agenda
setting process, the research also lacks specific data of how the state officials and
media editors actually think and act on the issue. Nevertheless, the specific data

collected from the Chinese mass media from 1949 to 2007, the analysis of the
mutual-perception surveys held by various Chinese and Japanese institutions, and the
surveys in my field trip would hopefully be sufficient to reflect the popular opinion
on Sino-Japanese relations and its interaction with the state and media.
41

Fred I. Greenstein Personality and politics; problems of evidence, inference, and
conceptualization (Chicago, Markham Pub. Co. 1969).
42
See Fred I. Greenstein Personality and politics; problems of evidence, inference, and
conceptualization (Chicago, Markham Pub. Co. 1969). Robert Jervis, Political Psychology: Some
Challenges and Opportunities. Political Psychology No.10 (1989). pp. 481-93.
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ORGANIZATIONS OF THESIS

My thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter defines the research questions,
gives a brief introduction to the theoretical framework and literature review, and
indicates the general argument.
In Chapter Two, I will introduce the reconciliation framework in the first section
to interpret the predicament of contemporary China-Japan relations. After that, I will
highlight the unique and pivotal role of collective memory in such a framework.
Finally, I will further elaborate the chosen trauma factor in the Chinese collective
psychology in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations.
Combined with the literature review of the three parts above, I will also shed
light on the literature of Chinese nationalism as well as some similar research in this
field in terms of both their strengths and weaknesses. Despite the persuasive and
insightful part of the nationalism literature, it seems still inadequate to enunciate the
real causes of the strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China and its implications for

Sino-Japanese Relations. Almost all the scholars in this area tend to combine the
analysis of China-U.S. relations with China-Japan relations, which may mistakenly
confuse the endeavors for regaining national identity and pride with the pursuit of
historical justice and the remembering of the traumatic past.
Chapter Three, focusing on the different patterns of the three actors in dealing
with Sino-Japanese relations, will be composed of two parts. The first part addresses
the history from 1949 to the 1980s and in particular the period from 1972; the second

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part examines the situation from 1980s till today. With such a division of time frame,
I will not only show the different role of each actor, but also analyze the interactions
among the state, media and public. From a top-down chosen glory, to a conditioned
collective amnesia, and finally a strong nationalistic and history sensitive memory,
there has gradually been a larger gap of perceptions between the state and public,
with the media intermediating with their needs and voices at different times. This
chapter will apply the chosen trauma perspective to the historical evolvement of
China-Japan relations.
With three specific case studies, Chapter Four will further elaborate the chosen
traumas affecting the Chinese perception on Japan as well as its influence on their
real behavior. From 1998 Jiang Zemin visit, 2003 New Thinking, to the 2007 Fukuda
visit, this chapter will provide more empirical evidence to support the argument.
Jiang’s visit explains how the chosen traumas throughout the state and public could
dramatically hinder the normal bilateral meeting and the negotiation on a few
strategic priorities. The New Thinking case can help us understand the way chosen
traumas affect the public perception and behavior in response to a fresh idea
significantly contradicting people’s established mindset. Finally, the Fukuda visit will
further elaborate the degree to which chosen traumas root in people’s psychological
scheme, by contrast with the actual efforts made between the two governments.

Chapter Five will be the final conclusion.

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