Economic thought and institutional change in france and italy

Riccardo Soliani Editor

Economic Thought
and Institutional
Change in France
and Italy,
1789–1914
A Comparative Study


Economic Thought and Institutional Change
in France and Italy, 1789–1914


Riccardo Soliani
Editor

Economic Thought
and Institutional Change
in France and Italy,
1789–1914
A Comparative Study

123


Editor
Riccardo Soliani
Department of Political Science
University of Genoa
Genoa

Italy

ISBN 978-3-319-25353-4
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-25354-1

ISBN 978-3-319-25354-1

(eBook)

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Preface

The book you are about to read examines the relations between economic thought,
proposals of reform of political institutions and civil society in the Italian and
French tradition during the “long” nineteenth century, from the ascent to power of
Napoleone Bonaparte to the eve of the First World War. In Italy, this time span
covers the long process of setting the foundations for the Italian state
(Risorgimento, with the considerable French support provided to Italy during this
process), its subsequent rise on the international stage leading up to the role played
by the state in the Great War 1914–1918. At the same time, in France, we have the
long-lasting post-revolutionary struggle of republican, progressive social forces
against the conservative monarchism, with the ascent of the bourgeoisie in the era
of Louis-Philippe and Napoleon III, the dramatic events that accompanied the war
against Prussia and the birth of the Third Republic. Together with the institutional
establishment, or evolution, of the two States, we have the budding development of
economic thought: namely, liberalism, socialism, industrial utopia, egalitarianism in
France; and, in Italy, considerations on the link between liberalism, public
administration and republicanism, and the evolution of the Catholic social doctrine.
Italian Liberalism developed alongside the pursuit of independence and the
establishment of the new State. At the same time, the nineteenth century marks the
rise of Socialism in Italy, from the humanitarian solidarity of the republican
instances to the birth of organized groups of workers following the unity and the
end of the State of the Church. When Rome became capital of Italy (1870–71), the
Catholic Church exerted a strong opposition to the new State, as expressed in the
official decree Non expedit, which prohibited Catholics from participating in
political life. However, the Church continued to be deeply involved in civil society
through the provision of education and social care in favour of the poor. Popular
claims for equity and justice were addressed through the gradual establishment
of the new Catholic social doctrine, which would give rise to Catholic Corporatism.
In France, the first half of the period sees the transition from monarchy to
republic. We have the monarchy censitaire of Louis XVIII and Charles X during

the Restauration, which «restored» public finances, and the July constitutional
monarchy between 1830 and 1848, with its policy aimed at economic development,
v


vi

Preface

transport infrastructure and education (railways, schools) and colonial expansion;
however the public balance remained in surplus for most of the period. The transition to the Second Republic (1848) places Paris at the centre of European revolutionary forces, followed by the Second Empire (1852), with its financial
prosperity owing to the fast growth of the economy, when the utopian thought of
Saint-Simon seems definitely closer to being achieved, as proved by de Lesseps’
realization of the Suez Canal, and the signature of the free trade agreement with the
UK (1860), important result of the liberalism of Louis-Napoléon. An institutional
change of paramount importance is the Constitution of the Third Republic of 1875,
established sans éclat : the very peculiar case of a Republican Constitution written
by an assembly with a monarchist majority, following the revolution of 1871,
repressed by Thiers, and the catastrophic war against Prussia. The Republic will last
and grow as a major regional power, with vast colonial domains. French society is
becoming more democratic, secular, educated and egalitarian, and the great bourgeoisie of finance and industry is now republican. The mission of Saint-Simon, i.e.,
the successful outcome of a French Revolution, is finally achieved with the help of
Gambetta, who understands the position and interests of the emerging middle class
and is able to obtain the consensus of farmers and peasants. From 1876, workers’
organizations are reinstated, after the repression of the Commune. There are very
few of these outside of Paris; however, in the country, workers and artisans mostly
support republicans and radicals. Ten years later, these organizations would become
widespread and juxtaposed to the moderate majority.
The book expounds several key points of the processes just mentioned.
The first section examines the issues of identity, justice and liberty, which were

prominent both in the establishment of the Italian state and in the complex institutional evolution of France, from monarchy to republic. At the same time, they lie
at the root of the debate on Italian and French political economy. Italian and French
authors involved in the Risorgimento and in the mid-century social turmoils are
discussed. Romagnosi was the inspiration for generations of Italian politicians and
economists, amongst whom Cattaneo, who coupled political action with intellectual
reflection on the national identity of Italy and on the influence of the public
administration on growth and social justice. An alternative perspective is given in
the paper on slavery, which denies human identity, justice and liberty.
The five papers of the second section are devoted to the relationship between
political and economic freedom and its effect on equity. A few classical Italian and
French authors who discuss these issues, and their reception in Italy and France, are
at the core of the papers. Economic freedom and equity are examined in Sismondi,
a francophone author who spent an important period of his life in Tuscany, and one
paper deals with the reception of List in Italy and France for the purposes of free
trade, protectionism and social fairness. The section provides fresh insight, which
even puts a new perspective on the reflections of well-known scholars, like
Jean-Baptiste Say, according to whom economic freedom and social justice are
strictly connected, and Pellegrino Rossi, his successor as professor of political
economy in Paris. The last paper highlights the relationship between the


Preface

vii

aforementioned concepts from the point of view of the pursuit of social equity
through the reforms propounded during the unification of Italy.
The intellectual and political conflict between the social vision of Liberalism and
Socialism in some of their various forms is the main topic of the four papers of the
third section, in which different streams of Socialism are discussed. Particular

reference is made to Saint-Simon and his followers. An alternative approach to the
French utopian socialism is examined in a paper that modifies the interpretation
provided by Sombart and Durkheim. Finally, the almost unknown economic
thought of a group of prominent French intellectuals between the end of the
nineteenth century and the First World War is examined, highlighting the link
between the attitude towards economy and the political choices of Halévy, Alain
and Maurois.
Genoa, Italy

Riccardo Soliani


Contents

Part I

Fighting for Identity, Justice and Liberty

Economics and “Civilization” in Gian Domenico Romagnosi . . . . . . . . .
Edoardo Ciech and Riccardo Soliani

3

Carlo Cattaneo (1801–1869), Lombard Philosopher
and Economist, Liberal Beyond Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Enrico Ivaldi, Riccardo Soliani and Andrea Repetto

37

Liberty, Labour and Human Rights: Institutional Change

and the Intellectual Debate on Slavery in France from Condorcet
to the Mid-19th Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simona Pisanelli
Part II

51

Economic Freedom, Free Trade and Equity

Whose Sismondi? Which Italy? The Reception Italy Gave
Sismondi’s Economic Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Letizia Pagliai

77

A Comparative Analysis of the Relationship Between
Friedrich List and French and Italian Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stefano Spalletti

99

J.-B. Say: Political Economy and Social Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Riccardo Soliani
Pellegrino Rossi: A New Approach to Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Joël-Thomas Ravix
Part III

Liberalism and Its Alternatives in Various Declinations

From the People to the Industrialists: Saint-Simon

and the Eclipse of Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Simona Gregori
ix


x

Contents

Institutions and Development in Saint-Simonian Political Economy . . . . 167
Abdallah Zouache
An Economic Philosophy for the Republic: Elie Halévy,
Alain, André Maurois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Ludovic Frobert
Economics and Sociology Meet Socialism: Sombart, Durkheim
and Pareto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Vitantonio Gioia


Part I

Fighting for Identity, Justice and Liberty


Economics and “Civilization” in Gian
Domenico Romagnosi
Edoardo Ciech and Riccardo Soliani

Abstract Gian Domenico Romagnosi (1761–1835) contends that the classical
political economists took the wrong road: they believed that economics should only

study the indefinite production and reproduction of wealth and that their task was
limited to the study “of purely economic events isolated from practical theory”.
Then the narrow-minded self-interest of a speculator wishing to become enriched
was considered and calculated in its various movements for the production, distribution and consumption of wealth, without considering actual social relations at a
higher level. Whilst Romagnosi possibly misunderstood the very essence of classical doctrine, by not separating it from moral philosophy, the reasons behind his
intendedly polemic attitude towards it are rather clear: on the one hand, the attempt
to investigate the laws governing the production and distribution of wealth; on the
other hand, the deliberate intention to be guided by the “views of the family man,
longing to see all his children employed” and to contribute to this end.

1 Introduction
Romagnosi’s faithful pupil and biographer, Giuseppe Sacchi, documented significant evidence of the difficulties faced by the publishers of the Annali Universali di
Statistica [Universal Statistical Annals] to persuade the then-elderly Romagnosi to
contribute to the review, founded in Milan in July 1824. What worried Romagnosi
was not his rather uncertain and precarious state of health, but rather the task ahead.
He knew that in the Annali he was supposed to write about economic issues with
which he had dealt only “tentatively” until then. He also believed that writing about

E. Ciech
Department of Economics, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
e-mail:
R. Soliani (&)
Department of Political Science, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
e-mail:
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
R. Soliani (ed.), Economic Thought and Institutional Change
in France and Italy, 1789–1914, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-25354-1_1

3

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E. Ciech and R. Soliani

economics would have meant for him to “step into a field where almost everything
had to be redone”, to get into “a task that he described as enormous.”1
Sacchi’s testimony has twofold significance: on the one hand, as confirmation
that Romagnosi began to professionally deal with political economy only around
1827, when he first contributed to the Annali; on the other, as anticipation of his
judgment of prior and contemporary economic doctrines.
For Romagnosi, political economy as a discipline had emerged in such recent
times that it could be considered still in its “infancy.”2
It was still in that particular period that characterises the evolution of any science, where the focus is on “details”, before rising to the “governing principles”.
One of the mistakes made by “current economists” lies indeed in their attempt to
reduce “economics to serve blind emulations, and to demand privileged protection
for their sector of preference, to the detriment of the others and the Public.” In its
evolution, political economy has first theorised a prominent position for commercial
activities, then agricultural activities, and finally industrial activities. Romagnosi
views it as proof that “the doctrine is not accomplished and demonstrated”, as he
believes that any economic activity fulfils its unique function in a well organised
society.
Individuals, or groups with a common interest, are dominated by “the individual
instinct, which tends to absorb everything in itself, thus sacrificing the utility and
rights of others”. In the manifestation of this instinct lies the “driving force” of
human society, but its dominance over the rights of others carries the seed of its
disruption. Romagnosi openly condemns any doctrine, past or present, that ended
up being an expression of this particular instinct, including classical theory, which
he blamed for relying on this very “individual selfishness” and theorising the effects
of its manifestation. In view of this, there is no doubt that “the reasonings and

deductions are consistent”. However, this is not the point: “the question is whether
this individual selfishness may be assumed as governing principle in the social
order of wealth”.3 In his own words, “one thing is the material history of the
consumption goods produced and used in a general sense by man, and another is its
political economy.” Economists took the wrong road: they believed that economics
should only study the “naked and indefinite production and reproduction of wealth”
and that their task was limited to the study “of purely economic events isolated from
practical theory.”
Serious consequences have resulted from this mistake. “The narrow-minded
self-interest of a speculator wishing to become enriched was considered and calculated in its various movements for the production, distribution and consumption
of wealth, without considering actual social relations at a higher level. The whole
G. Sacchi, “Gian Domenico Romagnosi”, in Annali Universali di Statistica, Milano, 1835, Vol.
XLV. See on these points (Barucci 2009).
2
“Definizioni in economia politica, ecc.” (1827). In Opere edite ed inedite, riordinate ed illustrate
da A. De Giorgi, Milano, 1845, vol. VI, p. 18.
3
“Criterio di verità col quale si deve ragionare in politica economica” (1831), Opere, VI,
pp. 87–88.
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Economics and “Civilization” in Gian Domenico Romagnosi

5

moral aspect and that of the eminent common interest that redounds to the greater
advantage of individuals were forgotten; so much so that such material, cold and
dull selfishness breathes from the bottom of those modern doctrines.” Economists
had only studied “the abstract mechanism of the production, distribution, and

consumption of wealth”, without wondering whether their role should be different
than that of the observer and resemble more that of the edifier.
No foreign economist has avoided these mistakes. Smith is undoubtedly a good
reference point, though only for the “mechanical part of economics”.4 Only Italian
economists have “seized on the good party”: they did not “dictate the philosophy of
greed, teaching the few to become enriched by abusing and subjugating the many,
as in English doctrines,” but rather “proclaimed the doctrine and the art of the
equitable distribution of consumption goods whence come the common property
and the increased power of both the rich and the poor”.
Whilst Romagnosi possibly misunderstood the very essence of classical doctrine, by not separating it from moral philosophy, the reasons behind his intendedly
polemic attitude towards it are rather clear: on the one hand, the attempt to
investigate the laws governing the production and distribution of wealth; on the
other hand, the deliberate intention to be guided by the “views of the family man,
longing to see all his children employed” and to contribute to this end.

2 Romagnosi’s Main Economic Concept
How did Romagnosi become preoccupied with such concerns? Is it the result of a
wider philosophical concept, or rather of a method that primarily learns from historical experience? In the author’s view, it is the result of both.
Romagnosi states that man is characterised by an “absolutely peculiar quality”,
that is “perfectibility”. As a result, “man becomes civilized, inventor of the arts, and
extends his empire over nature”. However, human perfectibility may not be realized, unless “by means of the whole society and in society itself”. Romagnosi
argues, that “philosophy and experience demonstrate [this] in such irrefutable
manner, that the existence of no other phenomenon in natural history is better
proven”.5
Romagnosi finds confirmation of his theses in the period of “feudal dissolution”:
when human contacts and the “certainty of expectations” vanished, the spirit of
emulation disappeared and all economic activities languished. At that time, society
had almost disappeared, but not the spirit of sociality, which is an attribute of man
and is always realised in a social form, possibly in the mere “pairing of the sexes, in
family”, which is the “first and true state provided by nature alone in a manner

“Della necessità di unire lo studio della politica economia con quello della civile giurisprudenza”
(1832), Opere, VI, p. 79.
5
“Introduzione allo studio del Diritto pubblico universale”, in Opere, III, pp. 182–183.
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E. Ciech and R. Soliani

common to the brutes”. Society, meant as the organic tissue of human relations, is
in fact a “phenomenon produced by nature itself”. Man as an individual exists no
more: he is born, grows and works within a community, becomes a “social man”,
both a constitutive element and by-product of civil society. He creates and develops
his work not only by reason of his intellectual abilities, but also in respect of the
ideal heritage rooted in his own generation (with which he is in contact through
language, which is another by-product of society) and inherited from past generations. As result of the spirit of sociality so rooted in man, society is man’s “natural
condition”, a “necessary” condition since it represents the possibility for human
“perfectibility” to become true. However, if the emergence of the activity of the
individual is strictly conditioned by the existence of society, then the problem arises
that the “doing” of the individual be in accordance with the existence of society,
rather than lead to its dissolution.
“The principle of love of wealth, the sole mainspring of human actions”, which
man seeks to “enjoy as much as he can with as little inconvenience and trouble as
possible,” may occur under any condition. However,
every single human being is unable to reach a certain point of comfort solely with his own
strength, nor to generally and constantly defend his possession or to overcome a disaster
without the aid of his peers; still, the improvement of the economic state of the individual

must be considered as the cumulative result of the work of both the individual and the
whole society.6

This “improvement of the economic state” of the individual is thus not only due
to his individual work, but is rather the result of a complex set of human activities
and social institutions that directly or indirectly contribute to attaining this result,
thus acquiring a specific economic meaning. This consideration might pose ethical
or moral problems about the distribution of the wealth produced; nonetheless, such
problems assume a different meaning in consideration of the fact that the “sociality
of wealth” is a necessary condition for the existence of civil society.
Though thus far neglected, this is a particularly significant concept in the
thinking of Romagnosi: the survival of the human attribute of sociality is linked to
the actual emergence of sociality itself in legal and economic terms. It implies both
a fair recognition of the individual’s rights and a particular condition of equality, to
be seen in a concrete sense rather than abstract, as will be discussed below.
“Everybody knows—Romagnosi argues—that when the laws of that moral
balance that can fairly satisfy the parties are violated, no human habit or institution
usually survives”.7
From this comes Romagnosi’s attempt to demonstrate that any effort to pursue
the individual interest is meant to damage the whole society in the long-term. Only
the achievement of the “true social interest” may lead to the “maximum possible
personal benefit”.

“Introduzione”, in Opere, III, p. 344.
“Sui contratti di assicurazione” (1832), Opere, VI, p. 986.

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Economics and “Civilization” in Gian Domenico Romagnosi

7

As usual, his position is grounded in his philosophical conviction and historical
experience, and results in a fundamental principle: economics must be the doctrine
of edification rather than disruption of society, to be considered “as an edifying
physiology, rather than a dissolving chemistry”.8
Hence the obvious need for a new “governing principle to serve as guide in
economic matters” and which is entailed “in the very definition of this science.”
In general, the very term “economics” designates “the orderly distribution of any
one thing”, that is to say “an order that man seeks to attain”. Within a “civil
consortium”, i.e. society, economics—which historically had already “designated
the administration of domestic goods”—thus concerns “the social order of material
goods”, and is termed “political economy”, thus referring to “civil society under a
civil regime”. “Political” is to be understood in the meaning that Cicero attaches to
the city (from whose Greek etymology the adjective derives), defined as a “coetus
multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus” [assembly of a large
number associated by agreement in regard to justice and by common utility].9
With regard to this communio utilitatis, economics seeks to “provide for the
possession of consumption goods in an amount proportionate to the needs of life, to
be distributed as fairly and easily to the maximum number of social individuals”; it
ultimately is “the total of notions and rules” concerning the ways to attain the
“social order of wealth”.
Economics thus has two specific characters: firstly, it concerns the “order” of
material goods, i.e. those goods that, as Romagnosi said on another occasion, can
satisfy the need of individuals for food, shelter, and clothing; secondly, it has the
task to specify the “notions and rules” that enable to attain a fair distribution of such
goods among individuals.
It “thus constitutes some sort of hygienics or salutary art of the life of States”

and, in this sense, together with jurisprudence and the science of administration,
becomes part of “civil philosophy”10; it is some sort of general “doctrine of public
affairs”, which it addresses and regulates all aspects of.
As stated by Cattaneo, civil philosophy is “the whole set of doctrines on which
this civil society rests”; despite their different methods and content, these doctrines
find common ground in their ultimate research object, that is indeed the good
government of civilised society. Only within such confluence lie the ways to
overcome the “individual self-interest” as ultimate aim of economics, which should
rather be the achievement of the communio utilitatis. Much has been written on
jurisprudence, statistics and economics; however, Romagnosi notes that there exists
no “unified and demonstrated system” of these branches yet, “nor a connection with
the great tree of public affairs”; conversely, economics and jurisprudence have
“Quesito: Il modo usato da alcuni scrittori d’oggidi nel trattare le dottrine economiche è forse
plausibile?” (1827), Opere, VI. pp. 12–13.
9
“Memoria riguardante il punto di vista degli articoli economici e statistici” (1834), Opere, VI,
pp. 5–6.
10
“Lettere a Giovanni Valeri sull’ordinamento della scienza della cosa pubblica” (1826), Opere,
III, p. 11.
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E. Ciech and R. Soliani

“divorced”, which is fatal for the construction of a system of knowledge able to
achieve the desired purpose.11
Serious consequences have resulted from this “divorce”, whereby nowadays we

have “economics with no brakes, and jurisprudence with no real sanctions”. On the
one hand, “lawyers with their rigid and blurred abstractions plunder in the field of
economics”; on the other, economists, “by calculating a merely optional profit,
make public and private justice contingent”.
Romagnosi holds that lawyers and legislators have not properly understood the
direct incidence of their work also on the economic field. The law regulates human
relations, and thus leads to the activities of individuals, which are full of economic
significance. The regulation of any and all juridical institutions has in fact either
positive or negative economic effects. Property, possession, and inheritance are
legal institutions that have thus far been studied in their legal essence; however,
they incorporate a force able to break any formality and order all economic relations
in a different manner. An economics “without brakes” may for example arise from a
misunderstanding of the concept of freedom, while a privileged position may arise
from a particular discipline related to inheritance law. The legislator in particular
must be aware of the effects of his actions, so as to realise that his task is to build a
legal architecture that may prevent the emergence of the principle of self-interest
from turning into the exclusive achievement of a merely selfish purpose.
Jurisprudence and economics might appear to be in an instrumental relation,
since a wise legal system is prerequisite for the attainment of the goal of economics.
However, as will be discussed below, this is not the case, because while the
lawyer has the task to attain “fair justice”, it is up to the economist that this justice is
nurtured by and solidifies through concrete actions.
“Justice—remarks Romagnosi—is but a logical relationship of compliance with
a given norm”; the problem is thus finding a norm that is not expressed in religious
or philosophical terms only, without any “real sanctions”. “When justice is not
linked to the expectation of a good, and injustice to the threat of an unavoidable
evil, the idea of justice confronted with these passions usually downgrades to a
meaningless word”. By contrast, “the real formula of civil and political justice holds
in its essence the whole social order of goods”.12 That is to say, the purpose of
economics is only a moment of the realisation of the purpose of jurisprudence;

however, it is the moment in which this purpose becomes most effective. Hence, the
relation between economics and jurisprudence are not of an instrumental nature, but
rather of cooperation and convergence; cooperation towards a common purpose and
convergence of the legal aspect and the economic aspect realised in Romagnosi’s
concept of justice.

C. Cattaneo “Statua marmorea per pubblica soscrizione di Giovanni Locke. Alcune parole ai
nuovi Scettici Calunniatori di Locke e di Romagnosi (1836)”, in C. Cattaneo, Scritti filosofici
letterari e vari, F. Alessio (ed.), Firenze 1957, p. 19.
12
“Memoria”, Opere, VI, pp. 9–10.
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Economics and “Civilization” in Gian Domenico Romagnosi

9

The need to “balance wealth among individuals, through the inviolate and safe
operation of common freedom” creates the “governing and practical rule of
jurisprudence”, which is by now embodied “in all the articles of the good Codes of
truly civilised nations”.
Then, if economics is a moment of the realisation of “fair justice”, does it belong
to jurisprudence? When comparing their “respective conclusions”, Romagnosi
states that the science of “law eminently encloses that of political economy”, since,
“if in the relations of mere fairness no interesting sanction was seen thus far, besides
that of the religious conscience”, “it now turns out that the dictates of the Law are
recommended and sanctioned by the force of material and well-ordered interests”.
However, it is so only in this sense, because whilst the Law seeks “the fairness of
the action, without worrying about the reasons, objectives, and needs of the actor,

by contrast economics teaches how in civil consortium the means to satisfy the
needs of life may be procured, ensured and distributed by way of cooperation
between the efforts of the individual and those of his fellows”. Hence, while the task
of economics is different, the social order of wealth is the ultimate goal for both
economics and jurisprudence, the real “essence” of a problem that can be
approached from difference perspectives.
Based on these considerations, it is thus clear that “economics, considered as a
science, influences the efforts of men in the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth”, and seeks to identify the ways in which human activities may
attain such “social order of wealth”. Even in the more general definition of “economics” as “orderly distribution of any one thing”, Romagnosi had noted that “in
this sense economics is part of the art”, where by ‘art’ he means “the way to reach a
certain purpose”.
Against this background, we can easily understand the reason behind the
polemic pages that Romagnosi wrote against Dunoyer, who had denied the “operating” character of economics. By censoring Sismondi, the French economist had
observed that
governing is not up to sciences. Rather, they observe phenomena without governing them.
They study the nature of things without any claim to regulate them. True economics should
not claim in any way to preside over the production of wealth. It should be limited to the
investigation of how such wealth is produced and which circumstances are favourable or
unfavourable to its increase and fair distribution.13

First of all, Romagnosi notes that, “if Dunoyer’s arguments were correct”, then
sciences would shrink to the “search for a spectacle of mere curiosity” and “it
would not be worthwhile to engage so much in them, as man would not be able to
make nature work to his advantage”.
This is not the case, though: actually, quoting Bacon’s line that “a man can do as
much as he knows how to do”, the human ability to reach the desired purpose in
relation to the existing natural forces is the result of the knowledge of the laws of
such forces. Hence, “governing is the immediate or mediated subject of sciences. It
“Principes d’organisation industrielle de J. Fazy” (1830), Opere, VI, p. 239.

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is immediate, like in medicine, morals, arts of all kinds; it is mediated, like in
mathematics, physics, etc.”. The former are “operational” sciences, while the latter
are “contemplative”. Economics, like arts, belongs to the former and is aimed to
directly influence, modify and order society following a pre-set model.

3 “Order of Fact” and “Order of Reason”
The “operational” character of economics is connected to Romagnosi’s typical
distinction between “order of fact” and “order of reason”.
In general, the former is the result of the complex of actions and reactions that
“naturally” and “spontaneously” occur, thereby determining natural laws; the latter
is to be meant as the “determination by which, through our rational activity, we
build the ideal model, that is to say the image of this order”.
Also with reference to consumption goods, Romagnosi identifies “a part of fact
which must be studied in order to grasp the laws of the natural impulse of economic
affairs” and an order of reason, which must be built as “artificial order, where the
forces and trends of the inner and outer nature of man living in a civil society must
be used to attain the most equitable and beneficial participation in the means of
subsistence”.14
The part of “fact” is to be seen as the complex of economic laws resulting from
the natural relations between causes and effects; it is to be investigated, since “the
part of reason is essentially but a complex of purposes and means, in which the
power of nature must be made to serve the intentions of man”. However, economics
is not limited to this part, as it has rather to do with the “order of reason” of wealth.

The transition from one order to the other brings about two activities, i.e. the art
of observing (part of fact) and that of constructing (part of reason). The latter is
organised through “three subsequent logical positions”. The first position, i.e. the
“final order or reason”, corresponds to the identification of the “desired purpose”
and the “general possible means required by the very nature of the purpose”. In the
second position, i.e. the “potential order”, the issue is to “explore and test the
physical and moral powers at our disposal”. The third, i.e. the “governing order of
reason”, consists in the identification of “what must be done to achieve the desired
purpose”. Romagnosi holds that these “three positions” enclose the “entire logical
process of economic doctrine”. The adjective ‘logical’, though, is seemingly useless
in this case, if the determination of the “final order of reason” precedes the verification of the “potential order”.
As a matter of fact, in other occasions Romagnosi talks about “assuming as
purpose the highest point of attainable perfection” in relation to “all the powers at
our disposal, contributing and leading to this purpose”. He also speaks with great

“Ordinamento della economica dottrina” (1853), Opere, VI, pp. 27–28.

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insistence of a “law of opportunity” which must guide the statesman and the
economist in the choice of measures.
Romagnosi is deeply and consistently convinced of the great significance of
nature and history in man’s actions. As discussed above, perfectibility is a characteristic of human society, but the pinnacle towards which it strives is related to
both the natural abilities that society can utilize, and time, which is understood as an
instrument for measuring the evolution of a State. Nature and time: two great

powers to which, in this occasion, Romagnosi attaches great importance. Man is
affected by them: he may not hope to industrialize a society without resources, nor
civilize a society in “barbaric” conditions. The road to civilisation must be walked
step by step, slowly, and be promoted by way of organic measures, historically
suited to the State’s current stage.
In view of this, Romagnosi criticizes the universality of economic choices. These
cannot in fact be universal, as they cannot be equally valid in both a civil and
uncivilized society. Rather, their ability to attain the desired purpose is rooted in the
actual conditions that differ from people to people. Hence, economic choices must
be subject to the so-called “law of opportunity”, which is “the law of necessity in
time and for time”.
Hence, considering a complicated art like economics as being “without space,
without time and without an actual position is the same as assuming an abstract,
completely speculative profile of a doctrine which requires the knowledge of all the
powers and driving forces contributing to the composite phenomena of civil life”.
In economics, any “absolutism” is a contradiction.
Since the regime of the child, the expert, the old necessarily differ, just like the habitual
system of a good economic temperament differs from that of a faulty one, it appears that
economic dictates must necessarily vary according to the different stages of the moral and
political economic civilization of peoples.15

4 The Theory of “Civilization”
What does Romagnosi mean by ‘civilization’, which he so often discusses in his
economic writings?
It is the “economic, moral and political improvement” of a state, consisting in “providing
the entirety of a given people with men able to procure and distribute adequate subsistence,
men engaged in useful activities who give and demand due respect and reciprocate loving
kindness; lastly, men who enjoy maximum security with regard to goods, persons and
actions, both inside and outside the State”.16

“Se sia più saggio il sistema degli antichi di avere un tesoro ovvero quello dei moderni di fare
degl’imprestiti per sovvenire ai pubblici bisogni” (1829), Opere, VI, p. 516.
16
“Questioni sopra l’ordinamento delle statistiche civili” (1827–1830), Opere, VI, p. 1157.
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Romagnosi observes civilization from two different perspectives: “in the sense
of gradual progress towards a satisfactory and cultivated civil life”, and as “possession of the best and most cultivated coexistence attained by a given State”.
As for the former, once the laws of this “progress” are discovered, the ways to
promote it must be identified; civilization is thus an “art” or, better, “humanity’s
highest art, general and perpetual”. In the latter sense, the characteristic features of
an “ideal state” must be defined in relation to the environmental and cultural
conditions of a people, so as to make this “state”—to be meant as a situation of fact
—the “normative and theoretical criterion” against which to contrast the real
conditions of that people. Civilization corresponds here to this ideal state, thus
becoming a unit of measure, an abstract term of comparison and, at the same time, a
goal to be achieved. In this case, civilization is a synonym for “civilized state”.
This second aspect is of particular interest in reconstructing Romagnosi’s economic thought, because economics seeks to achieve a purpose that is necessarily
consistent with the state of civilization. Civilization as economic, moral and
political improvement is indeed a complex and composite state, where all the
conditions for a “satisfactory, cultivated and regulated” coexistence must emerge at
the same time. If any of these is missing, there is no civilization.
Besides the economic “part”, which Romagnosi identifies in the implementation
of the “fair distribution” of wealth, there are “two further branches, one of which
concerns moral education, and the other the fair regime of the State”.17

Which of the two is more important, then? Without a doubt, Romagnosi gives
the leading role to the “economic part”, not as functional primacy, but because it is
a prerequisite for moral and political improvement. In his writings, he never tires of
repeating that “from orderly material interests arises the possibility to order moral
and political interests”, and that when the former are “ill-posed or diverted, moral
interests are either stifled or corrupt”. The individual’s need for education—which
is also crucial to the establishment of the “moral order” and to prevent that “the
ignorant is forced to place his trust in the deceiver”—may not “work in general
unless after having satisfied the order of subsistence, just like that of friendliness
towards others may not develop until after having met the needs of the
individual”.18
In order to promote the “process” of civilization—which ultimately is the main
effect of the “state” of civilization—the first problem to be solved consists in
“spreading wealth to as many as possible, so that thieves and slaves disappear or at
least are reduced to a minimum”.
Complexity of issues and prominence of the “economic part” are therefore the
two main characteristics of civilization. It is not a “native, but rather dative” state,
which does not sprout spontaneously, but is achieved by man through proper use of
the means available.

“Abbozzo storico delle dottrine alle quali fu dato il nome di Industrialismo, vale a dire delle
dottrine che fondano la società su l’industria” (1827), Opere, VI, p. 144.
18
“Sopra lo stato odierno delle scienze in Inghilterra” (1831), Opere, VI, pp. 617–618.
17


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To achieve this ideal state, the first problem encountered is to identify the stage
that a State has reached in the “curve” of the process of civilization. This is the duty
of statistics.
For Romagnosi, ‘statistics’ arises from the word ‘State’, not meant as a “mere
situation, but rather as the very collective person of a given society which inhabits a
given territory and primarily lives on agriculture and trade”.19
Since this “collective person” knows the threefold “improvement”, statistics
must be able to detect every aspect of this improvement, thus becoming, in a very
general definition, the “exposition of the ways of being and of the interesting
productions of goods and persons within a given people”. At least at first glance, the
meaning of ‘ways of being’ is rather obscure. In his seminal essay on Romagnosi as
statistician, Ferrara views them as “the permanent circumstances that constitute a
nation in such and such a way”, thus seeing in Romagnosi the intention to move
away from Say’s attempts to limit statistics to the recognition of “variable data”
only. However, this might not be the case. Romagnosi himself explains that “the
phrase ‘ways of being’ includes the absolute and relative state, that is an abstraction
made up of both the single positive actions and their causes”. In line with his more
general efforts, Romagnosi’s intention was thus to designate all the complex
inter-individual, social and economic characteristics which—together with the
objective situation of a people moving towards an ideal state of civilization—
determine the distance from this very ideal state.
In the history of statistics, Romagnosi’s is undoubtedly a vigorous attempt at
moving away from the discussions of the statisticians of his time, and rather
assuming a completely personal position. While amidst controversy, Say, Dupin,
Gioia and Padovani had eventually agreed on one point: statistics was to identify
facts which can be assessed “objectively and quantitatively”. Their opinions only
differed with regard to the identification of a criterion to choose the phenomena to
be identified, in relation to the different purposes assigned to statistics.
According to Romagnosi, the purpose of statistics is no longer the identification

of an objective fact, but rather, as mentioned before, a state of fact with a great
variety of characteristics. The task is just as different, as it consists in assessing the
relative condition of this “state” and evaluating it in the context of the entire
potential process of civilization.
Statistical investigation thus becomes historical investigation. Like the historian
focusing on a moment or a problem should research its origins in previous years
and its consequences in the following, the statistician must extend his investigation
to the factors that determine the evolution or involution of the present moment, so
as to project his conclusions in a future perspective. However, statistics does not
correspond to the “positive history” of a people, at least not at the same time as it
unfolds. While “positive history” is the reconstruction of the “particular events
occurred around a given moment”, statistics is the knowledge of the “circumstances
of fact characterising both man and the productions which lead to the well-being or

The following citations can be found in “Questioni”, Opere, VI, pp. 1148–1153.

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distress” of a nation. Hence, there is a difference of scope, which is more extensive
and almost undetermined in positive history, while limited to the three aspects
above in the case of statistics. Furthermore, while statistics seeks to investigate the
current state of fact (though still researching into its causes in the recent past),
positive history examines past events within their context.
Hence, they are two different disciplines; however, being statistics the “present”
model of historical interpretation, it belongs to positive history, of which it forms a

“temporary position”. Its investigation is limited to a moment in time, in the middle
of the slow, almost motionless unfolding of the history of a people. When humankind finally evolves and produces a long series of statistics expressed in just as many
historical judgments, the history of a people will also be able to “embrace the
succession of many statistics, whence this history of the positive state should come”.
Romagnosi is driven here by a static concept, that it the fact that the historical
judgment of past events results from the analysis of many investigations temporally
limited to a single moment. Between one investigation and the other is a time
“devoid” of events. Actually, our criticism risks being extrinsic to Romagnosi’s
entire thought. In its most genuine conception, statistics was not to consist of a series
of numerical data arranged in tables, but rather to be a “historical judgment” and, as
such, a summary of prior events and forecast of new times. This can never be
stressed enough: nowadays, when talking about statistics in succession at regular
intervals, a general census or something similar comes to mind, some sort of very
detailed photograph investigating the tiniest details of the social body.
Without a doubt, though, Romagnosi considers statistics as a historical discipline. In his own words, it is midway “between the history of the actual events of
the world of nations and the philosophical history of the civilization of these
nations”. It belongs to the former, as it detects the events occurred to a people, and
to the latter, as it seeks to emphasize all the elements that show its degree of
civilization.
As for its distinctive features, statistics as seen by Romagnosi is both an
“evaluative” and “instrumental” discipline at the same time. It is evaluative, as it
implicitly expresses value judgments in identifying and showing the distance
between the real condition of a State and the ideal one; it is instrumental, as it forms
the fundamental basis to propose measures aimed at eliminating such distance.
Thus, it is “the first logical instrument of administration” and must serve as “immediately source of enlightenment to know fully and act confidently in every part of
public administration”.
In order to “act”, though, knowledge is not enough unless we “find out what is
missing, both on the part of nature and the institution”. A “specified ideal model” is
needed, an “archetype” by which it is possible to “know at the same time which
stage of civilization a given people has reached, and by way of which means it can

progress to be improved or finally preserved”. Hence, that of the “ideal state” must
be “the guiding notion for good research and good judgment” or, ultimately, to
“perform” statistics.
Romagnosi worked for many years on the notion of the “ideal state”, as he
wanted to provide the statesman with “certain and assignable notions” to facilitate


Economics and “Civilization” in Gian Domenico Romagnosi

15

his work; however, he failed. “One cannot resist the eloquence of facts, and there is
no answer to the expression of digits”, he loved to say, as if to indicate his ideal
ambition to translate abstract, imprecise constructs, easily criticized and misunderstood, into something unquestionable and unassailable. His ambition and his
taste for philosophical speculation, though, remained very much apart. In this way,
the notion of “ideal state” ended up corresponding to that of “state of civilization”
in the sense explained above, i.e. a logical instrument of comparison, though
insufficient for operational purposes.
Nevertheless, Romagnosi tried to make a few steps forward and, in the author’s
view, quite successfully, by identifying in the order of the “universal and free social
competition” the first and irreplaceable condition for the construction of the “order
of subsistence” seen as the first aspect of this “ideal model”.
Imagine a good economic system with free and legitimate competition; you will see,
growing and springing like branches from a single trunk, morality, hard work and
friendliness on the one side; sciences, literature and all arts on the other; dignity and power
on the one side, honour and glory on the other. Enlightened minds, good hearts, powerful
actions emerge spontaneously, unified, connected, inseparable, as long as no protections,
interferences, nor artificial stimuli occur.20

This extract embodies much of Romagnosi’s social philosophy: a healthy economic system results from universal free competition, which is the first foundation

and origin of each civil society. Romagnosi himself confirms the universal value of
free competition: it is “the constant principle, harmonious and beneficial, of the
economic life of society”. It is a “dogma” or, better, the fundamental dogma of social
life; it is the natural result of human actions, emerging in the absence of external
events disrupting the order that is in the events. “Economic and moral improvement
needs no artificial boosts, but only the conditions of free competition”.
Why is competition “generally accepted and defended”? Romagnosi does not
see it only as an unprovable dogma. Actually, competition is
proclaimed, defended and supported in view of the medium effect of the actions of free
competitors. This effect lies in the fair equalization of utility by way of the inviolate exercise
of common freedom, which is the only formula of any reasonable civil legislation. Every
day on the main square and in the little shops, the seller asks for ten, the buyer offers five,
and both agree on seven. This arrangement makes everyone happy, and wealth is
exchanged and distributed.21

The perennial problem of any human society is to reconcile “the indefinite
yearning of the individual to become enriched” with “social participation and
equity”. This reconciliation may only occur by way of the “conflict of the clashing
individual forces”, which results in a situation of free competition, where
self-interests dissolve under their own overwhelming desire to emerge. Romagnosi
here makes reference to Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”. Common interest is the

“Sopra lo stato”, Opere, VI, p. 622.
“Della libera”, Opere, VI, p. 39.

20
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unexpected result of the opposite behaviours of individuals; it is a natural result,
transcending both the will and power of individuals.
Competition thus becomes the emergence of the principle of a real justice and
the need for progress, a reconciliation of individual powers and negation of any
dominance presaging hindrances to social development and, consequently, leading
to social decline.
However, competition only pursues these intended purposes if it is truly free.
Romagnosi wonders whether there actually exists a “fully free competition if
contractors are allowed to do as they wish, or rather by promoting and protecting
the exercise of a full and reciprocal knowledge of things and of a mutual moral and
physical freedom of the respective actions”.
In economic affairs, one thing is to “leave man on his own, whence to abuse by
fraud or dominance of his personal superiority”; another is to “establish full and free
competition”. The first scenario leads to the triumph of the “unbridled power in the
economic functions”, while the second to the implementation of a competitive order
which, as antonym to the “unbridled power”, must contain in itself the notion of
limit and regulation.

5 “Unbridled Competition” and Free Competition
The distinction between “unbridled competition” and free competition arose in
Romagnosi parallel to another distinction, i.e. between independence and freedom.
More precisely, the former is the “economic” projection of this philosophical-legal
distinction.
Romagnosi defines ‘independence’ as the “state of a thing which is exempt from
the need to occur as a result of a cause extrinsic to itself”; it might thus be the
unlimited emergence of will outside any “influence of an empire external” to the
subject. However, the emergence of one’s will is not sufficient in itself to achieve

the intended purpose of the individual. Human actions are an “exercise of force”
against various obstacles, which may be overcome only if there exist organisational
facts. These facts, though, are always the result of the use of force, leading to a
limitation of independence; however, to overcome obstacles, the use of force ultimately brings about freedom. In fact, freedom is simply the “exemption from any
obstacles in the use of force”. Real, long-lasting freedom thus comes from the
self-limitation of the individual’s actions; freedom is subject to an “extrinsic cause”
and realizes the individual’s action in a permanent condition of society. At a closer
look, freedom is independence freed from any external obstacles, though limited by
the absolute necessity of protecting the conditions of human society. Hence, it is not
just “any” realisation of human will; it is rather its realisation aimed to achieve a
purpose directly external, but indirectly connected, to the individual as a member of
society. Freedom is therefore will’s manifestation subject to the realisation of the
principle of sociality; as Cattaneo puts it, it is the realisation of will by virtue of the
achievement of “real” interests.


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Real economic freedom, then, may not arise in a state of “unbridled competition”, but rather in that of “universal free competition”, which can be achieved
under specific “conditions” typical of civil societies.
The first of these conditions has a political nature, which Romagnosi observes
from a dual perspective, i.e. as principle and as need for a legal system guaranteeing
such principle. It is the condition of the “equalization of legal powers”, meant first
of all as guarantee of perfect equality of each individual before the law, and then as
protection of “said equalization” by way of enactment of an organic body of law
and fair administration of justice.
As fundamental as it is, this condition may only exert its fullest effect if it is
concretely realised, thus also concerning consumption goods.

Romagnosi notes that “in economic life it is always better to compute all powers,
functions and effects” and that such “effects are nothing but the result of these very
powers exerted by all encouraging and disheartening causes”. The study of economic problems shall start from these very “powers producing wealth”.
What does Romagnosi mean by this phrase? For him, these “powers” are to be
found in two different areas, i.e. one natural and one human. Nature is the fundamental source of “powers”, meant both as set of elements capable of affecting man,
and as set of resources aimed at drawing his attention. “Active” powers are however
within man, who is thus placed at the centre of each productive phenomenon and
whose ability is connected to his “knowledge, will, and strength”. In order to
contribute to achieving a “perfectible conservation”, these powers must be surrounded by a certain social and institutional context. A sound economic activity
needs, for example, “certainty of expectations”. The presence of an organic body of
laws and a balanced atmosphere of coexistence among individuals thus become
necessary, which can only be the result of a wise government. Romagnosi argues
that economic powers “are created and exerted by the simultaneous concurrence of
the individual, society and the government, so as to be in agreement with such
concurrence”.
Having defined the complex nature of “powers”, an ever more complicated
remains, since Romagnosi identifies the “order of powers” as the “first” condition
for the emergence of universal free competition.
What does Romagnosi mean by ‘order of powers’? A clear answer to this
question is not to be found in his entire body of work. It is certain, though, that for
the “equalization of legal powers” to become a concretely working condition, it
must result in equality of all before the law, but also in a fair distribution of
“material powers”.
A political and legal order envisaging serfdom, considering the Prince as sole
owner of all the land, following the principle of “territorial pretension”, or maintaining primogeniture would constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the smooth
functioning of the principle of free competition. For example, in the last example
land would be in the hands of “too few”, with too many “competitors” holding
none. Universal free competition is not to be meant only as “the right to operate
unhindered over a given good”, but also as situation of “order of reason”, which
“involves the supposed existence of powers and their respective freedom”.