The political economy of russian aluminium between the dual state and global markets

International Political Economy Series

The Political Economy of
Russian Aluminium
Between the Dual State and Global Markets

Edited by Jakub M. Godzimirski


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University of Massachusetts Boston, USA, and
Emeritus Professor at theUniversity of London, UK


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Jakub M. Godzimirski

The Political Economy
of Russian Aluminium
Between the Dual State and Global Markets


Jakub M. Godzimirski
Norwegian Institute of International
 Affairs
Oslo, Norway

International Political Economy Series
ISBN 978-3-319-57233-8
ISBN 978-3-319-57234-5  (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57234-5
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017940598
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Acknowledgements

This book is one of the deliverables of the TIGER project, financed by
the Research Council of Norway (RCN). The author is deeply grateful—without this funding, this book would not have been written.
The aim of the project, with its team of leading Western and Russian
experts, has been to shed light on Trade Integration, Geopolitics and
the Economy of Russia—thus, ‘TIGER’. The situation of the Russian
aluminium sector is analysed within this broader context, with special attention to the role of Russian aluminium sector in global and
regional trade, how its development has been driven by geopolitical factors in a larger historical perspective and its specific role in the broader
context of recent economic and political developments in Russia. The
project has been coordinated by Dr Arne Melchior of the Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); many members of the project team have given invaluable comments on earlier drafts of the book
at project workshops and seminars in Helsinki, Oslo and Moscow. I
would like to thank Roman Vakulchuk from NUPI, Nataliya Volchkova
and Nataliya Turdeyeva from the Centre for Economic and Financial
Research (CEFIR), Aleksander Knobel from the Gaidar Institute IET,
Laura Solanko and Heli Simola from the Bank of Finland Institute for
Economies in Transition (BOFIT) as well as David Tarr, who has long
experience from the World Bank, for useful comments on the book manuscript and fruitful collaboration within the framework of this fascinating
and very timely project.
v

vi  Acknowledgements

This book could not have been written without the support of many
other colleagues. Here I wish to thank my NUPI colleague Indra
Øverland, for making funds available as well as for many useful comments throughout the process. Also Helge Blakkisrud, Julie Wilhelmsen
and Iver B. Neumann from NUPI have been inspirational sparring
partners—our conversations on matters Russian have helped me to
understand the complexity of the situation in this great and important
country.
The current form of the book owes very much to Susan Høivik, our
long-standing language editor and guide, who has (de)Polished my
English and, I hope, made reading these chapters a smoother experience to those at the other end of the book value chain. Also, our NUPI
librarians deserve my thanks for helping with access to various types of
written sources on Russian and global aluminium industry. Many of the
most important texts used in my analysis have been provided by David
Johnson through his Johnson’s Russia List (JRL). David’s efforts are
indeed Herculean, so he deserves warm thanks from all those working
on Russian matters, this author included. We all recognize JRL as an
indispensable tool in our daily dealings with Russia—and hope that we
will never experience a day without his List.
I would also like to express my gratitude to Elena Morenko from
UC Rusal, for providing materials on the history of the company and
its current situation, during my visit to Moscow in 2016. Also several
Norwegian business partners deserve mention here for all the assistance
provided over the past 15 years—without their help this book would
have never been written.
Let me also note my gratitude to Tim Shaw, the editor of the IPE
series, who from the very beginning has shown great interest in and

support for this book project. Christina Brian and James Safford from
Palgrave Macmillan have guided me through the editorial process and
shown great support at critical junctures. However, overall responsibility for this volume, and any editorial shortcomings, rests entirely on my
shoulders.
Finally, I would like to thank my wife Magdalena, for outstanding
patience and understanding during the preparation of the final draft of
the book. She provided practical support in this hectic period—as she has
done ever since we first met, one autumn day in Paris in 1984. Also my
children Zuzanna and Jan have met the challenges with understanding
and positive attitudes.
To all these persons, I extend my warmest thanks.


Contents

1Introduction 1
Part I  Russian Aluminium and Market Forces
2

Basics of the Global Aluminium Market 11

3

Soviet and Russian Aluminium Until 2000 in Brief 29

4

National Consolidation 2000–2007 51

5

Global Consolidation and Challenges 2007–2016 79

Part II  Russian Aluminium and Russian Politics
6

Intermezzo or Regional Aluminium Games 119

7

Capture of the Russian State Under Yeltsin? 139

8

Return of the State Under Putin 167

9

Masters of the Russian Aluminium Roulette 211
vii


viii  Contents

10Conclusions 261

Index 
281

About

the

Author

Jakub M. Godzimirski has since 2012 been research professor at the
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs NUPI. Between 1995 and
2012, he served as a senior research fellow at the Centre and Department
of Russian and Eurasian Studies at NUPI. In 2009–2010, he was the
head of the NUPI Energy Programme, and in 2012–2014, he was the
head of the Research Group on European Affairs. In 2014, he returned
to the Research Group on Russia, Eurasia and the High North at NUPI.
He holds a PhD in social anthropology. His present research interests
include Russian and European foreign and security policy, with a focus
on energy’s role and Russia’s relations with the West. He has authored,
co-authored, edited and co-edited several volumes on these issues, and
published many peer-reviewed articles and book chapters with leading
academic publishers such as Palgrave Macmillan, Routledge or Ashgate.
The most recent of his major publications are Russian Energy in a
Changing World. What is the Outlook for the Hydrocarbons Superpower?
published in December 2013 with Ashgate and EU leadership in Energy
and Environmental Governance? Global and Local Challenges and
Responses with Palgrave Macmillan.

ix


Abbreviations

AP
Alumina Plant
APEC
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
AZ
Aluminium Plant
BAZ
Bogoslavsk Aluminium Plant
BEMO
Boguchansk Energy and Metals Complex
BoAZ
Boguchansk Aluminium Plant
BrAZ
Bratsk Aluminium Plant
CEO
Chief Executive Officer
CFO
Chief Financial Officer
CIS
Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSR
Centre of Strategic Research
EBIT
Earnings Before Interests and Taxes
EBITDA
Earnings Before Interests, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization
EWI
East-West Institute

FSB
Federal Security Service
GAZ
Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GEWGigawatt
GHG
Greenhouse gases
GWh
Gigawatt hour
HEP
Hydropower plant
HKD
Hong Kong Dollar
HKEX
Hong Kong Stock Exchange
ICGPs
Informal corporate governance practices
IET
Institute for Economies in Transition
xi


xii  Abbreviations
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IPO
Initial Public Offering
IrkAZ

Irkutsk Aluminium Plant
JV
Joint Venture
KhAZ
Khakas Aluminium Plant
KrAZ
Krasnoyarsk Aluminium Plant
KGB
Committee for State Security
KUBAL
Kubikenborg Aluminium Plant
kWkilowatt
kWh
kilowatt hour
LDPR
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia
LME
London Metal Exchange
MGIMO
Moscow State Institute of International Relations
MMT
Million metric Tonnes
MWMegawatt
MWh
Megawatt hour
NDPI
Mineral resource extraction tax
NGO
Non-governmental organization
NGZ

Nikolayevsk Alumina Plant
NIC
the National Investment Council
NKAZ
Novokuznetsk Aluminium Plant
NTV
Our Television Channel
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ORT
All-Russian TV Channel
PXF
Pre-export Financing
QAL
Queensland Alumina Ltd
RAO UES Russian Joint Stock Company Unified Energy Systems
RAS
Russian Academy of Science
RBKRossBusinessConsulting
RF
Russian Federation
RFE/RL
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RSPP
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
RTR
Russian Television and Radio
Rusal
Russian Aluminium
SaAZ

Sayansk Aluminium Plant
SAMEKO Samara Metallurgical Company
Sibal
Siberian Aluminium
SShHP
Sayano-Shushensk Hydropower Plant
TaAZ
Taishet Aluminium Plant
TadAZ
Tajik Aluminium Plant
TBT/SPS Technical Barriers to Trade/Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures
TEK
fuel and energy complex


Abbreviations

TNK BP
TNK
TWG
UC Rusal
USD
USSR
VNG AG
WB
WP
WTO

Tyumen Oil Company British Petroleum
Tyumen Oil Company

Trans-World Group
United Company Russian Aluminium
US Dollar
the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Verbundnetz Gas AG
World Bank
Working Party (WTO)
World Trade Organisation

  xiii


List of Figures

Fig. 2.1
Fig. 2.2
Fig. 2.3
Fig. 2.4
Fig. 3.1
Fig. 5.1
Fig. 5.2
Fig. 7.1
Fig. 10.1
Fig. 10.2

Changes in the use of aluminium in Russia 1993–2014  13
Aluminium value chain (simplified)  15
Russia and China: shares in global
aluminium production  21
Price of aluminium 1960–2015  24

Installed smelter capacity in the USSR in thousands
of tonnes and share of global installed smelter capacity  35
UC Rusal’s aluminium and alumina production
2006–2014  107
Aluminium price development, USD
and rouble: 2013, 2014 and 2015  108
Aluminium relationships  143
Russian aluminium industry between market and politics  267
Abramovich, Deripaska and Vekselberg in
Nezavisimaya Gazeta annual rankings of
top 100 figures in Russia  277

xv


List of Tables

Table 2.1 USSR and Russia: shares in global production of bauxite,
alumina and aluminium 1972–2010  17
Table 4.1 RAO UES and Aluminium Sector in Expert
Ranking 2000  66
Table 5.1 RUSAL’s acquisitions abroad 2000–2006  80
Table 5.2 The effect of the crisis on bauxite production of
UC Rusal  87
Table 5.3 The effect of the crisis on alumina production of
UC Rusal  88
Table 5.4 The effect of the crisis on primary aluminium
production of UC Rusal  89
Table 6.1 Evolution of the federal structure of the Russian
Federation 1991–2016  120

Table 6.2 Regional dimension of bauxite production in Russia  122
Table 6.3 Regional dimension of alumina production in Russia  122
Table 6.4 Regional dimension of primary aluminium
production in Russia  122
Table 7.1 Timeline of the main events in relations between
the Russian state and business community 1988–2016  148
Table 7.2Russian key oligarchs under Yeltsin: members
of semibankershchina and signatories of the letter of 13  155
Table 9.1 Evolution of the ownership of UC Rusal  218
Table 9.2 Deripaska’s meetings with leadership of the
country—Vladimir Putin and Dmitrii Medvdev  227
Table 9.3 Russian aluminium actors in Russian top
100 politicians rankings 1999–2015  249
xvii


xviii  List of Tables
Table 9.4 Deripaska’s and Vekselberg’s ‘support teams’ on
Russian power map 1994–2005 
Table 9.5 Economic policy-makers on Russia’s power map 
Table 9.6 The economic power of aluminium tycoons 2005–2016 
Table 9.7 Russian economic elite 2008–2016
(top ten positions based on Russian Forbes
annual rankings) 

250
251
252
254

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In his intriguing and unconventional account of developments in
President Putin’s close entourage, Mikhail Zygar (2015, p. 18) has
recounted how a small piece of aluminium—most probably produced
in Russia—might have changed the course of history. Persons close to
the Russian president told Zygar that when Vladimir Putin was to meet
the newly elected US President George W. Bush for the first time, in
Ljublana, he decided to show him a small aluminium medal with an
image of the Virgin Mary. Putin explained to his US counterpart that
this was his most precious family souvenir, a gift from his grandmother
that had been miraculously saved when his summer house was completely gutted by fire. In fact, Zygar was told, this piece of aluminium
had nothing to do with Putin: it had been forged by the Russian secret
services, in order to be used instrumentally as an element of deliberate
image building. As President Bush was known to be a fervent born-again
Christian, the Kremlin image-makers thought that if Putin could present
himself as a believer that would help him to convince Bush that he was a
man to be trusted, someone who held the same basic values.
Judging from the comments made by George W. Bush in the aftermath of this meeting, where he said that he had looked Putin in the eye
and had found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy, the aluminium trick apparently worked, and the two newly elected leaders got
along well together. Of course we cannot know whether this faked holy
medal was made from Russian aluminium, or what happened later to this
small piece of aluminium that was used to win over the US president.
© The Author(s) 2018
J.M. Godzimirski, The Political Economy of Russian
Aluminium, International Political Economy Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57234-5_1

1


2  J. M. GODZIMIRSKI

However, what is certain is that the story of the Russian aluminium
industry deserves closer academic scrutiny, as this branch of Russian
industry can serve as a prism through which to examine the real workings of modern Russia.
The recent history of the Russian aluminium industry has gone
through various phases. In order to understand all its ups and downs
we need to paint a broader picture, one that includes not only developments in the branch but also the wider political and economic context in Russia. This book aims to show how the aluminium industry is
an important element of the Russian political and economic puzzle, and
how, in order to survive, it has had not only to cope with global market
forces but also to find a modus vivendi with the new system of governance that has emerged in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the entry of the new elite. Although the subject is the evolution
of the Russian aluminium industry throughout the entire post-Soviet
period, special attention will be paid to the time after 2000, and how
the industry and Russian aluminium tycoons have related to the global
aluminium markets that have been the main ‘recipient’ of this Russian
commodity and to the political framework that has defined the rules of
the game on the domestic front.
Relations and tension between market and political forces are key
questions studied by political economists. This book examines how
those relations and tensions are managed by one specific branch of the
Russian economy that must operate in a challenging political and market environment. What makes the study of the Russian aluminium sector
of particular interest is the specific nature of the global aluminium market which has been undergoing a major transition. The centre of interest has been shifting to Asia—more specifically to China, which has now
developed its own production of this key industrial commodity. The evolution of the political system in Russia has had both a direct and an indirect bearing on how the various aluminium actors can operate in today’s
Russia.
In his study of the political economy of Putin’s Russia, Pekka Sutela

observed that there are three factors which make Russia a special case
(Sutela 2012, p. 1). The first is geology, which has endowed Russia with
exceptional natural resources. Secondly, Russia is the only country that is
located in Central Europe, the Arctic, the Pacific Rim, the Caucasus as
well as Central Asia; thus, Russia is part of many pictures without necessarily being the centrepiece of any of them. The third factor noted by


1 INTRODUCTION 

3

Sutela is Russia’s recent past as a superpower founded on a special messianic ideology of the Second World War. The former superpower has a
rich industrial base, an educated population, prominent capabilities in
research and development—as well as a heavy psychological burden to
bear (Sutela 2012: 1).
All three factors have influenced the development of the country’s
aluminium industry. Geology poses some challenges, as Russia is not well
endowed with bauxite ores, which have had to be imported or replaced
by locally available raw materials like nepheline or apatite. Russia’s geography is both an opportunity and a challenge. It provides Russia with
important assets—like hydropower, the main source of energy for the
country’s aluminium industry. Moreover, the fact that today’s Russian
Federation is spread over such a vast territory is advantageous for developing trade and economic relations with other actors, crucially important
for the country’s aluminium producers who export the lion’s share of
production abroad. But geography also poses challenges: the raw materials and final products must travel long distances, making transport costs a
substantial part of the Russian aluminium equation.
Finally, there is Russia’s recent past as a superpower and how that has
affected the Russian aluminium industry. We can identify at least three
main influences here. First, the rising ideological Soviet superpower
decided to develop aluminium production in the USSR for strategic reasons, as access to this commodity was of strategic significance for modernizing the military–industrial complex as well as the aviation and car
manufacturing industry. The development of the aluminium industry was also directly linked with the flagship programme of the Soviet

Communist Party: electrification of the Soviet Union. Access to cheap
hydropower has until recently been a key competitive advantage enjoyed
by Russian aluminium producers. Second, the collapse of the Soviet
Union as an ideology-driven superpower with global ambitions resulted
in a drastic fall in demand for aluminium on the Russian domestic market. Demand for aluminium in Russia in the first years after the collapse
of the Soviet project was 97% lower than during the Soviet period. The
main reason was declining demand from the country’s military–industrial
complex, which was forced to slash production, for economic reasons
(Leijonhielm and Larsson 2004, p. 16). Third, the collapse of the Soviet
project had been due largely to inability to compete economically with
other centres of global power, so the new political elite of Russia decided
to change the model of economic development. One measure intended


4  J. M. GODZIMIRSKI

to make the Russian economy more competitive, while also reducing
the possibility of sliding back to the recent Communist past, was the
programme of privatization of economic assets. The result was that the
Russian state relinquished its control of key aluminium assets, which
ended up in private hands. That changed the ownership structure of the
industry and opened a period of what has been described as ‘Russian aluminium wars’, with key actors fighting for control over production assets.
This book examines recent developments in a vital sector of the
Russian economy that is very strongly connected to global markets, but
also clearly influenced by Russian politics. Such a study is an interesting
academic endeavour, for several reasons. For one thing, there have been
various parallel processes involved in shaping the evolution of the aluminium sector—and indeed of the whole Russian economy—since the
fall of the Soviet Union.
First, the system has changed, from one in which the state was the sole
owner, to one where private ownership has become predominant. Second,

the process of denationalization and privatization of the aluminium sector
has passed through several phases—the ‘aluminium wars’ of the 1990s, followed by oligarchic consolidation at the national level around 2000, and
globalization and internationalization from around 2007. Third, internationalization of the sector was to some extent caused by the fact that
the post-Soviet Russian aluminium sector has had to redefine itself and go
global in order to survive, due to plummeting domestic demand. In the
wake of the economic crisis that hit Russia hard after the collapse of the
Soviet project, the sector has evolved—from being a central element of the
autarchic and heavily militarized national economy that supplied the Soviet
military and civilian industry with huge volumes of raw and processed aluminium, to becoming a key player on the increasingly competitive global
aluminium market, which also has been facing structural demand-andsupply challenges. Fourth, internationalization of the sector has helped
to make it much less opaque and more transparent, as going global has
brought the need to meet internationally accepted standards of governance and reporting in order to be able to attract necessary investment.
The evolution of the sector has been influenced not only by global
market forces but also by the evolution of the Russian political system.
Privatization of the aluminium sector took place during the turbulent
1990s, with Boris Yeltsin as the president of the country and the emergence of the Russian oligarchic system. During this period, several partly
violent conflicts led to consolidation of the Russian aluminium industry,


1 INTRODUCTION 

5

and its key assets came under the control of a small group of oligarchs.
Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power and the consolidation of the country’s
political system have changed the political and economic framework conditions for the activity of the aluminium sector in Russia, forcing the
owners to learn how to survive under these new circumstances. To be
able to generate revenues on the global commodities market and flourish
in Russia, the owners had to learn not only how to ‘read’ the economic
script but also how to read the minds and intentions of the country’s

politicians. Russian aluminium tycoons whose revenues were generated
globally but whose main assets were located in Russia had to learn how
to adapt to changing global market conditions and also to the changing
rules of the political game in the Russian dual state, where real political
power has shifted from the Yeltsin family supported by a small group of
oligarchs, to Putin’s power vertical dominated by a small group of new
insiders with roots from the Soviet and Russian power structures.

Outline of the book
To examine the evolution of the Russian aluminium sector in a broader
historical, economic and political context, this book addresses several
specific questions.
The second chapter presents the global market context in which
Russian aluminium sector operates. Special attention is paid to the specific characteristics of the lifecycle of aluminium production and marketization, and how those specific characteristics have influenced the
development of the global as well as the Russian aluminium sector. We
also examine how the situation in the global commodities and aluminium market evolved—in a longer historical perspective, and in the period
2000–2015, which is the main temporal focus of the study. Recent
assessments of the future outlook of the global aluminium market are
presented, to show how those factors have influenced and will continue
to influence the evolution of the Russian aluminium sector. Russian aluminium production is presented in a broader global context through a
mapping of the key actors operating in this sector, their strategies, and
how their actions may influence decisions taken by the Russian national
champion and key global player, United Company Rusal. We examine
the role of Russian aluminium producers in the global aluminium market, their share in global aluminium trade, their competition with other
aluminium suppliers and their international aluminium trade relations.


6  J. M. GODZIMIRSKI

Here the focus is on the economic dimension of Russian aluminium

trade, and the revenues generated by aluminium production and trade,
and the share of aluminium in Russian exports in a longer historical perspective.
Following this analysis of the global context, the focus narrows in
on the recent evolution of the Russian aluminium sector in the market
context. Chapter 3 of this book addresses a number of crucial questions.
What has been the Soviet and post-Soviet geographical and economic
logic of the sector? What makes aluminium production an important sector of the Russian economy? What is the connection between the aluminium sector and the energy sector in Russia? What is the geographical
framework for the operations of the Russian aluminium sector, in Russia
and elsewhere? How have the processes of national consolidation of aluminium assets and internationalization of the operations of the Russian
aluminium sector affected the geographical dimension of its operations?
How does this sectoral geography impact on its competitive ability,
regionally and globally? In order to give readers a better understanding
of how this sector has changed over the last years, Chaps. 3, 4 and 5
of this book take up several other questions, like the evolution of the
economic, political, institutional, personal and corporate landscape that
has shaped the development of the Russian aluminium sector under
Yeltsin and under Putin; and the ‘actorness’ of this sector, focusing on
key actors operating in the sector, but also on other actors whose actions
have had direct and indirect bearing on the current situation.
Part II turns to the broader Russian context for the activity of Russia’s
aluminium producers. Chapter 6 examines how the relationship between
the Russian political power elite and the key players in the country’s aluminium sector developed and evolved at the regional level. The focus
of this chapter is on the regions where the activities of the aluminium
sector are concentrated. This meso-level analysis focusing on the situation in the Krasnoyarsk krai is used to present a more detailed map of
various actors with direct and indirect stakes in the aluminium sector.
In Chaps. 7 and 8, special attention is devoted to the evolution of the
relationship between the Russian state and key economic actors operating in the country. What was the point of departure for this evolution?
How did the policy of liberalization and privatization launched by the
young liberals in the first years of Yeltsin’s rule contribute to changing
this relationship? What were the specific features of this relationship during the Yeltsin era, and how has the situation changed since the ascent

1 INTRODUCTION 

7

to power of Vladimir Putin? How was this relationship influenced by the
very modest attempts at reforming the Russian economy undertaken
by Dmitrii Medvedev during the presumably more liberal interregnum
between Putin 1.0 and 2.0 and the Putin 3.0 period? How have the economic problems faced by the Russian economy during the Yeltsin, Putin
and Medvedev periods contributed to modifying the state’s approach to
the Russian business community, and vice versa? What are the specific
features of the Putin regime today—how has the regime responded to
the current economic crisis in Russia, and how might this crisis influence
the future economic development of Russia and its aluminium sector? All
those important questions—and many others—are taken up in Part II,
which paints a broader background picture of the key political, economic
and social factors that influence conditions for various economic actors,
including those operating in the Russian aluminium sector.
Finally, in Chap. 9, we examine various strategies used by actors
operating in the Russian aluminium sector in seeking to adapt to the
changing domestic and international political and economic framework
conditions. How have these actors gone about coping with the economic
and political challenges and crises that have hit Russia several times in
the past two decades? In conclusion, we take up the question of how
the internationalization of Russian aluminium sector has contributed to
changing its internal and external modes of governance.

References
Leijonhielm, J., & Larsson, R. L. (2004). Russia’s Strategic Commodities: Energy

and Metals as Security Levers. Stockholm: FOI Swedish Defence Research
Agency.
Sutela, P. (2012). The Political Economy of Putin’s Russia. London: Routledge.
Zygar, M. (2015). Vsya Kremlevskaya Rat’. Kratkaya Istoriya Sovremennoj Rossii.
Moscow: Intellektual’naya Literatura.


PART I

Russian Aluminium and Market Forces


CHAPTER 2

Basics of the Global Aluminium Market

Aluminium is a chemical element in the boron group, with the symbol
Al and atomic number 13. In its pure form, aluminium is a silvery-white,
soft, nonmagnetic and ductile metal. It is the third most abundant element in the Earth’s crust—exceeded only by oxygen and silicon. That
makes aluminium the most abundant of all known metals, comprising about 8% of the Earth’s crust by mass. Due to its chemical characteristics, aluminium is rarely found in its pure state but is abundant in
combination with other elements in more than 270 different minerals.
The most important ore for aluminium is bauxite, but aluminium is also
extracted from other ores, such as nepheline, which is important for production of alumina in Russia.
Its physical and chemical characteristics—such as light weight, corrosion resistance, electrical conductivity (Holloway 1988, p. 10)—are what
makes aluminium important economically and in market and technological terms. Also the fact that aluminium is easily recyclable has made it the
metal of choice for many industries and has created incentives for building
national systems for its collection and reuse (Das et al. 2010; International
Aluminium Institute 2009; Schlesinger 2013). These characteristics led
Life magazine to describe aluminium as the metal of the twentieth century; and as one book on this dream metal argues (Sheller 2014), it has
indeed changed the lives of millions of people.

© The Author(s) 2018
J.M. Godzimirski, The Political Economy of Russian
Aluminium, International Political Economy Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57234-5_2

11