Games of conflict and cooperation in asia

The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific

Motoshi Suzuki
Akira Okada Editors

Games of
Conflict and
Cooperation in
Asia


The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific

Series editor
Vinod K. Aggarwal


More information about this series at />

Motoshi Suzuki • Akira Okada
Editors

Games of Conflict and
Cooperation in Asia

123


Editors
Motoshi Suzuki
Graduate School of Law

Kyoto University
Kyoto, Japan

Akira Okada
KIER, Kyoto University
Kyoto, Japan

ISSN 1866-6507
ISSN 1866-6515 (electronic)
The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific
ISBN 978-4-431-56464-5
ISBN 978-4-431-56466-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-4-431-56466-9
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016963797
© Springer Japan KK 2017
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made.
Printed on acid-free paper
This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer Japan KK

The registered company address is: Chiyoda First Bldg. East, 3-8-1 Nishi-Kanda, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo
101-0065, Japan


Preface

International relations in Asia are multifaceted. Conflict coexists with cooperation
across various issue realms. On the one hand, in the realm of security, North Korea
has been conducting tests of nuclear weapons and medium – and long-range missiles
relentlessly in spite of opposition from many Asian and non-Asian states. Territorial
disputes are intensifying between China and neighboring states over islets in the
South and East China Seas to the extent that, under a high level of uncertainty, a
small miscalculation could precipitate the outbreak of armed conflict. To counter
North Korea or China or both, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are strengthening
security ties with the United States. In contrast, the North Korean and Chinese
moves, which appear provocative to many, might be strategic responses to the
improved security ties with the external great power that they find inimical to their
own security interests.
On the other hand, both the depth and width of regional cooperation have
been expanding steadily. In the security field, internal wars in Cambodia and East
Timor have been settled through UN peacekeeping operations to which both Asian
and non-Asian states have contributed. In currency matters, the swap agreements
between central banks, which began in 2000 at the bilateral level, have expanded
and become multilateral. In the area of finance, China has established the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to satisfy strong demand for infrastructure
development in a growing Asia, with participation by 56 states. In trade matters,
bilateral and subregional free trade agreements have been concluded between Asian
states and between states inside and outside the region. In general, a multilateral
cooperation effort, found in these instances, faces a collective action problem,
thus necessitating creative institutional arrangements to solve the problem and take

effect. The abovementioned outcomes indicate that Asian states have been using
various arrangements skillfully to facilitate cooperation. Yet this does not mean
that Asian states are always successful in attaining regional cooperation. Indeed,
there are many other occasions in which cooperative efforts have failed due to
informational or institutional defects with the continuation of interstate conflict and
the impairment of states’ security and prosperity.

v


vi

Preface

Beneath the blend of conflict and cooperation, we perceive goal-oriented behavior, which seeks to maximize a state’s preference for security, prosperity, or
even domination. A state’s goal-oriented behavior often takes place in reaction
to another state’s similar behavior on an ex ante or ex post basis under various
informational and institutional constraints. The state’s goals may or may not
be realized, depending on constraints and strategic complexity. Hence, from an
analyst’s vantage point, it takes an appropriate research method to explain or predict
international outcomes that cannot be inferred directly from states’ goals.
To illuminate the strategic interactions of goal-oriented behavior and the consequences, we employ game theory as our research method. In this volume, we try
to show that Asian states play games of conflict and cooperation strategically by
creating, changing, or destroying institutions in the issue realms of security, trade,
and currency. As noted by Robert Keohane, conflict or discord is a precursor to
cooperation. The creation of appropriate institutions that coordinate states’ actions
can turn present conflict into future stable cooperation. Therefore, conflict and
cooperation are inseparable phenomena and are integral parts of states’ strategic
interactions under constraints.
We believe that instrumental rationality is a principal behavioral guide for

humanity and that there exists no discernible difference in the extent of instrumental rationality between the East and the West. Despite our commitment to the
assumption of instrumental rationality, we do not disregard history and culture as
determinants of international outcomes. Rather, we see history and culture either
as influencing states’ preferences and beliefs or as constituting social institutions
to constrain states’ behavior and strategic interactions. Accordingly, if a significant
difference is found between the East and the West in the quality of regional relations,
we will argue that a primary source of the difference rests upon variations between
regions or even within a region in the institutions that are influenced by history
and culture. Historical and cultural variations divide contemporary Asia, making
regional institutional cooperation difficult, thus prompting some Asian states to use
global or interregional arrangements in order to obtain the benefits of cooperation.
As a result, Asia has increasingly been an open or porous region.
Qualifications are provided for this line of argument in the first chapter, which
also discusses the affinity of international relations theory and game theory with
special attention to Japan and Asia. The following ten substantive chapters are
developed based on the conceptual framework and, for integrity and coherence, are
subgrouped into four parts that correspond to major issues in international relations
scholarship: (1) conflict management, (2) arms control, (3) trade, and (4) currency.
Effective institutions in the four realms are crucial to a stable international order. In
fact, such institutions were found in the medieval China-centric order as well as in
the post-World War II US-led order. Each substantive chapter analyzes the nature of
conflict and cooperation in a post-hegemonic era when institutions are in decay.
This edited volume, Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia, is an outcome
of a truly collaborative work by a research team of Japanese scholars who specialize
in game theory, international economics, international security, or international
political economy. This English volume has vastly expanded and improved on the


Preface

vii

Japanese version, titled Kokusai Funso to Kyocho no Geimu (Games of International
Conflict and Cooperation), published in 2013 by Yuhikaku, a superb publisher of
academic books based in Tokyo. Through substantial recalibrations, revisions, and
the addition of new chapters (1, 2, 3, and 10), the English version has become
completely different from the earlier Japanese version. Furthermore, we have
conducted mutual blind reviews to guarantee the quality of each chapter.
Our research team has held biannual workshops at Kyoto University every March
and at Kobe University every September since 2008. The workshops have been
extraordinarily productive and enjoyable because of the team members’ professionalism and humor. We are grateful to Atsushi Ishida (the University of Tokyo) who
had contributed his chapter to the Japanese version but whose administrative duties
prevented him from doing the same for the English version. Our special gratitude
goes to Emeritus Professor Yoshinobu Yamamoto (the University of Tokyo) for
his constructive comments in several workshop meetings and Professor Vinod
Aggarwal (University of California at Berkeley) for allowing our volume to be part
of the Springer Political Economy of the Asia Pacific series under his editorial aegis.
M. Suzuki is also indebted to T.J. Pempel (University of California at Berkeley)
and Bill Grimes (Boston University), who visited Kyoto to provide their insightful
analyses of Asian politics and international political economy. We acknowledge
the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) for the grants (#23330053
and #26245020) that made our research possible. Last but not least, we thank Juno
Kawakami, an editor in Springer’s Tokyo office who patiently waited for our belated
book manuscripts during the editorial process and gave birth to her second child at
the time leading up to publication. Our book is dedicated to young scholars and
students committed to systematic analyses of international relations in Asia.
Kyoto, Japan
September 1, 2016

Motoshi Suzuki

Akira Okada


Contents

1

A Rational Approach to the Study of International
Relations in Asia .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Motoshi Suzuki

Part I
2

3

4

1

Security Cooperation and Conflict Management

Signaling Game of Collective Self-Defense
in the U.S.-Japan Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shuhei Kurizaki

31

Information Sharing in Early Stage International
Disputes: How China and Japan Communicate . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Shoko Kohama, Atsushi Tago, and Kazunori Inamasu

57

Peacekeeping by the UN and Regional Organizations:
Sharing the Burden or Passing the Buck? . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yukari Iwanami

83

Part II

Security Cooperation and Arms Control

5

Politics Over the Claim of Individual Self-Defense
at Wars: Aid Conditionality and Reciprocity in Asian
Regional Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Atsushi TAGO

6

International Cooperation and Institution Formation:
A Game Theoretic Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Akira Okada

7

An Agenda-Setting Game of the Landmine Ban Treaty.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Hikaru Hayashi

ix


x

Contents

Part III

Trade Cooperation

8

FTA/EPA Negotiations and Domestic Reforms
in Two-Level Games Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Kaoru Ishiguro

9

The Paradox of Compliance: Does Legalization Increase
Compliance in Trade Disputes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Keisuke Iida

Part IV

Currency Cooperation

10 Analyzing International Developmental Loan Markets

with Rival Lenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Motoshi Suzuki, Keisuke Iida, and Shohei Doi
11 Globalism and Regionalism: The East Asian Currency
Crisis and Institutional Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Motoshi Suzuki
Index . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271


About the Editors

Motoshi Suzuki is a professor of international political economy at the Graduate
School of Law, Kyoto University. His Ph.D. in international studies was conferred
by the University of South Carolina. Before joining Kyoto University in 2002, he
taught at Kwansei Gakuin University and the University of North Texas and also
served as a visiting professor of the Institute of Social Science at the University of
Tokyo and a program officer of the Research Promotion Bureau in the Ministry
of Education. Dr. Suzuki has published articles in major international journals,
including the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, European Journal of Political Research,
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, International Studies Quarterly, Journal
of Politics, and Public Choice. His most recent book, Globalization and the Politics
of Institutional Reform in Japan, was published by Edward Elgar in 2016. His
current research interests lie in international political economy in the Asia-Pacific
and Japanese political economy.
Akira Okada is a professor at the Institute of Economic Research in Kyoto
University. He received his B.A. in 1977 and his Ph.D. in 1982, both from
Tokyo Institute of Technology. He has taught game theory at Tokyo Institute of
Technology, Saitama University, Kyoto University, and Hitotsubashi University. Dr.
Okada has served as associate editor of the International Journal of Game Theory,
Mathematical Social Sciences, and International Journal of Economic Theory and
as the editor in chief of the Japanese Economic Review. He acted as the president of

the Japanese Economic Association in 2014–2015. He has visited several academic
institutions, including Northwestern University, the University of Bielefeld (ZiF),
the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) in Vienna, and the University of Bonn.
Akira Okada’s research fields are game theory, bargaining theory, public choice,
microeconomics, and experimental economics. In particular, he has investigated
economic behavior and social order in human society using mathematical and
experimental methodologies of game theory. He is currently working on various
cooperative mechanisms such as group formation, bargaining, contract, institutions,
and evolution through which goal-seeking interdependent agents can improve their
xi


xii

About the Editors

welfare, overcoming conflicts. He has published many articles on game theory
and its applications in academic journals such as the American Economic Review,
Games and Economic Behavior, and Journal of Economic Theory.


Contributors

Shohei Doi is a Ph.D candidate of International Relations at the Graduate School
of Law, Kyoto University and a research fellow of the Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science (JSPS) and studied in the Department of Politics at Princeton
University as Visiting Student Research Collaborator (VSRC). He writes in the field
of international security, international political economy and political game theory.
Hikaru Hayashi is an independent researcher (Ph.D., University of Tokyo). He has
been affiliated with several institutions, including the Waseda Institute for Advanced

Study (WIAS) as an assistant professor, the Research Center for Japanese General
Social Surveys at the Osaka University of Commerce, and the Japan Society for
the Promotion of Science. His research focuses on the formation of international
institutions.
Keisuke Iida is professor in the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and has formerly taught
at Princeton University and Aoyama Gakuin University. His major publications
include Legalization and Japan (2006) and International Monetary Cooperation
among the United States, Japan, and Germany (1999). His current research interests
include the economy-security nexus in East Asia.
Kazunori Inamasu is associate professor of social psychology and vice director of
Research Center for Social Psychology at Kwansei Gakuin University. His research
focuses on the relationship between media and public opinion. He published papers
in the journals of social psychology, political science, and communication studies
such as Political Communication, Communication Research, or Japanese Journal
of Social Psychology.
Kaoru Ishiguro is professor in the Graduate School of Economics at Kobe University. Before joining the faculty at Kobe, he was associate professor at Ritsumeikan
University. He writes in the fields of international economics, international relations,
and international political economy and studies international trade negotiations and
domestic politics in Japan currently in progress.

xiii


xiv

Contributors

Yukari Iwanami is associate professor of Osaka City University. She received her
Ph.D. in political science from the University of Rochester. She has been assistant
professor at Kansai Gaidai University. She writes and publishes in the area of

conflict settlement, international institutions with a special focus on the United
Nations Security Council, and foreign aid.
Shoko Kohama is associate professor of political science at Hokkaido University.
She received her Ph.D. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia in 2014.
An expert on international security, her research primarily concerns peace and
prosperity in post-conflict countries, including issues of recurrent war, socioeconomic recovery and hostile communication among former belligerents. Her
articles have appeared in Political Communication, the Washington Post’s Monkey
Cage, and several other journals.
Shuhei Kurizaki is associate professor in the School of Political Science and
Economics at Waseda University. Before joining the faculty at Waseda, he was a
pre-doctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and
assistant professor at Texas A&M University. His work has appeared in American
Political Science Review and International Organization. His courses explore the
causes of war and peace, the history of diplomacy, and formal political theory.
Atsushi Tago is a professor of international relations at the Graduate School
of Law, Kobe University. He is specialized in a scientific study of international
politics. His research appears at Journal of Peace Research, Conflict Management
and Peace Science, International Interactions, International Relations of the AsiaPacific, British Journal of Political Science, and Political Communication.


Chapter 1

A Rational Approach to the Study
of International Relations in Asia
Motoshi Suzuki

Abstract The rationalist research program has increasingly been applied to the
study of international relations in Asia, where the interpretive research program is
still dominant. The rationalist program is founded upon objective ontology, contingent agent-structure epistemology, and the logic of consequence. In this chapter, I
argue that rationality is an integral part of the Asian political tradition, constituting

ancient military thought and medieval institutional cooperation in the realms of
security, trade, and currency. Thus, the rationalist program has considerable utility
in explaining institutional arrangements and their effects insofar as it is well
informed of structural constraints and agents’ interests that affect their behavioral
choices and their use of values and ideas to promote their preferences. This insight
motivates the game-theoretical analyses of this edited volume’s subsequent ten
chapters investigating the problems and prospects of institutional cooperation in
contemporary Asia.
Keywords Rationality • International relations theory • International institutions • Asia • Game theory

1.1 Controversies
Much like specialists in other regions of the world, specialists of Asian politics
and international relations have employed a plethora of theories and methods.
Amid their scholarly discourses, they have engaged in interrelated controversies in
methodology and theory. A methodological controversy is concerned with the extent
of rationality in Asian politics. One school of thought asserts that Asian politics
is essentially a cultural construct composed of rituals, emotions, and memories.
It holds that rationality is essentially a Western idea, premised on the logic of
consequence and cost-benefit analyses, nurtured through the Enlightenment and the
Industrial Revolution. Rationality is not a primary behavioral guide for politics in

M. Suzuki ( )
Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University, Kyoto, 606-8501, Japan
e-mail:
© Springer Japan KK 2017
M. Suzuki, A. Okada (eds.), Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia,
The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, DOI 10.1007/978-4-431-56466-9_1

1

2

M. Suzuki

Asian states that have imported some outcomes from the Western modernization
movements, but rejected the underlying beliefs. Thus, Asian politics should more
properly be understood in reference to culture and history, with the use of interpretive research methodologies that are based on the logic of appropriateness.1
In contrast, a rival school of thought holds that rationality is universal, unbounded
by time and space. Rationality, in this context, means instrumental rationality that
generates goal-oriented behaviors in intelligent human beings under the constraints
imposed by informational uncertainty and transaction costs. In any social setting,
instrumentally rational behavior transpires at both the aggregate and individual
levels. At the aggregate level, rational behavior emerges as endeavors by states or
organizations to pursue survival and prosperity. At the individual level, political
agents behave this way to acquire power and glory, and economic agents do so
to maximize their profits or market shares. In the human tendency to pursue selfinterest, no discernible difference exists between people in the East and those in the
West.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the instruments employed by goaloriented states or agents are conditioned by their institutions, and these differ
across time and space. Thus, by simply looking at the instruments used by states
or agents at one particular time and place, analysts might wrongly judge that their
observed behavioral patterns are inconsistent with those used at another time and
place and conclude that they are not rational. For instance, the absence of robust
regional institutions in an increasingly interdependent Asia may appear irrational to
analysts of contemporary European politics, where strong supranational institutions
have existed to constrain the behavior of the interdependent European states
and to support their joint interests. However, because their preferences diverge,
Asian states often face the immense difficulty of establishing their own regional
institutions and thus find it rational to rely instead on global or U.S.-led institutions
for managing regional interdependence.2

Another controversy in the study of Asian politics hinges on the theoretical
possibility of stable cooperation in contemporary Asia. Despite initial optimism
following the Cold War’s end, Asian analysts have become increasingly pessimistic
about the prospects for regional cooperation, for the following structural reasons.
First, they typically observe that contemporary Asia is saddled with an absence of
leadership and lacks a pivotal state capable of forging international cooperation.
Their observations are a reverse corollary of the theory of hegemonic stability that

1

In the second section of this chapter, I will show an example in which several analysts have applied
interpretive methods to comprehend the regional system in medieval Asia, which is known as the
tributary system. More broadly, the edited volume by Acharya and Buzan (2010) discusses various
non-Western international relations theories with non-rationalist flavors that are largely concerned
with Asia.
2
For instance, in the security realm, several Asian states have relied on U.S.-led alliances or implicit
U.S. defense commitments. They opposed the establishment of a regional alliance because they
feared that they might be drawn into an unnecessary war. See Duffield (2001) and Hummer and
Katzenstein (2002) for the related discussions.


1 A Rational Approach to the Study of International Relations in Asia

3

posits the existence of a hegemonic state as an important prerequisite for stability
and cooperation in either a global or a regional system of sovereign states (Gilpin
1983; Kindleberger 1981; Krasner, 1976). To maintain its position, a hegemonic
state, by definition, has an intrinsic incentive, as well as sufficient capability, to

provide a stabilizing or cooperative mechanism from which lesser states can incur
benefits, in exchange for their allegiance to the system of hierarchy. With sufficient
incentive and capability, a hegemonic state can solve a collective action problem
that might otherwise become exacerbated under a non-hegemonic system (Olson
1965). However, contemporary Asia lacks hegemonic leadership and is thus bereft
of a crucial stabilizing mechanism. To fill such lacunae during the post-World War
II period, the United States provided stabilizing mechanisms in the economic and
security realms. However, it has recently been in relative decline and at risk of losing
its efficacy as a stabilizer. Instead, China has been gaining wealth and power, seeking
to overshadow the U.S.-led international institutions. Nonetheless, while deepening
economic ties with other Asian states through trade and investment, China appears
reluctant to establish a cooperative mechanism, particularly in the security realm,
and rather willing to pursue a unilateral expansionist policy, generating fears among
the neighboring states.
A second reason for pessimism in contemporary Asia lies in its politicaleconomic heterogeneity. Asian states vary politically, from liberal democracies to
single-party authoritarian states, and economically, from market-capitalist to statecapitalist states. Hence, they have divergent interests and expectations, making
intra-regional cooperation extremely difficult. This pessimistic view hinges on
the interest-based theory of international relations, positing that states’ external
relations are determined by the interests they derive from their internal political, economic, and social processes (Moravscik 1997). In general, a democratic government
seeks to satisfy popular interests, while an authoritarian government pursues elite
interests, because of the distinct selection processes for public officials. Likewise,
market-capitalist beliefs formulate a causal mechanism by which public officials
rely on markets for achieving their policy goals, whereas state-capitalist beliefs
promote the use of government fiscal or regulatory tools. In both cases, governments
with different arrangements face immense difficulty in establishing a cooperative
framework for coordinating their preferred policies.
In contradistinction to a contemporary Asia plagued with the first and second
structural problems, medieval Asia is said to have achieved regional cooperation
since the Sino-centric Confucian order brought it leadership and homogeneity. This
medieval regional cooperation has received various kinds of theoretical analysis.

Most prominent are the constructivists who attribute it to the sharing of Confucian
values and norms embedded within the tributary system that was established and
maintained by the Chinese empire in concert with other lesser states. Alternatively,
rationalists ascribe medieval cooperation to a creative institutional engineering
within the tributary system, as shown later in this chapter. If this rational explanation
holds, regional cooperation in the contemporary era, if any, may also be understood
as an outcome of rational calculus.


4

M. Suzuki

In our edited volume, we seek to analyze the problems and prospects of
institutional cooperation in contemporary Asia by employing game theory as a
methodological tool to operationalize the rationalist research program.3 We intend
to do so, given that the demands for building secure institutional cooperation are
high and given the complex and strategic interdependence characteristic of the
region. We focus on institutions for the following reasons. First, it is hard to
change structural factors, such as the distribution of power and state interests in
short to intermediate time frames. However, institutions are practical instruments
for achieving cooperation in the short term and can be created through formal
intergovernmental negotiations or informal dialogue. Second, creating institutions
is the least interventionist measure available, and this measure can be agreed
upon by sovereign states, based on the principle of voluntary consent. This is
important for Asian states that value their independence and autonomy highly,
given their experiences of colonialism and great-power intervention that form
expectations about external powers’ exploitative motives. We acknowledge that
multifaceted policy approaches, including not only the institutional approach, but
also the structural approach that attempts to alter power distribution and interests,

are desirable for securing stable cooperation in the long run. Nonetheless, the
establishment of regional cooperation is widely regarded as an imminent shortterm proposition, which should be secured using institutional means suitable for an
increasingly prosperous and potentially destructive Asia, with plenty of economic
opportunities, as well as intensifying interstate rivalries and dangerous arms. To
this end, rational institutionalism can provide the best single theoretical perspective
for comprehending the problems and prospects of building regional institutional
cooperation. Hence, we employ it to guide our analyses.
The structure of this introductory chapter is as follows: in Sect. 1.2, I compare
and contrast the rationalist research program with the interpretive one and evaluate
the tributary system that has been understood mainly by constructivist scholars.
Then I suggest that the system is explicable also by the rationalist program and
argue further that the rational account can provide a meaningful implication for
considering cooperation in contemporary Asia, where values and norms are more
diverse across states than in the medieval era. In Sect. 1.3, I offer a preview of the
individual chapters that follow this introduction and apply game-theoretical analysis
to examining the prospects for, and limits of, cooperation in the policy realms of
security, trade, and currency. Section 1.4 concludes this chapter.

3
See Keohane (1984) for a prominent analysis of rational institutionalism. Similar to our edited
volume, Aggarwal and Koo (2008) focus on institutional architecture for contemporary Asia in the
realms of security, trade, and finance. However, the authors of their edited volume do not employ
explicit analytical methodologies.


1 A Rational Approach to the Study of International Relations in Asia

5

1.2 Medieval Cooperation from Rival Perspectives

1.2.1 Two Research Programs
In the early twentieth century, Weber (1978, pp. 22 25) provided a taxonomy of
social action that is composed of instrumentally rational (zweckrational), valuerational (wertrational), affectual, and traditional action, with a caveat that the
boundaries among the four ideal types are often unclear and crosscutting. For
Weber, rationality concerns the first two. Yet the study of rationality is much older
and goes back to the ancient Greek philosophers, such as Pythagoras, Plato, and
Aristotle, who considered it in terms of moral rationalism. They linked rationality
to normativity and morality with regard to Dianoia (discursive thought), Nous
(intellect), Logos (reason), and Phronesis (practical wisdom) (Webel 2013, pp.
47–49). Having integrated Christian values into medieval theology, the study of
rationality took a different turn with Enlightenment philosophers who secularized
it by emphasizing empiricism and individualism. Indeed, David Hume, Adam
Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill advanced the notions of selfinterest, utilitarianism, and comparative efficacy of means. Their tendency to stress
instrumental rationality over value rationality has led to the development of the
modern rationalist research program to explain purposive human behavior and its
consequences in the fields of economics, law, and political science (Gintis 2009).4
In contradistinction to the Western rational tradition, Asia is said to represent the
cultural tradition within which agents behave under constraints of social discourse
and historical memory, characterized as affectual and traditional types in Weber’s
taxonomy.5 For instance, Geertz (1973) argues that one can analyze such behavior in
the cultural domain through the interpretive research program, holding that agents’
goals depend on a culturally unique set of values and that “irrational” beliefs serve
as a crucial behavioral determinant. Geertz continues that there is no culturally
independent way of characterizing the needs that persons are postulated to seek to
satisfy. He expresses skepticism about the project of explaining social phenomena
on the basis of an abstract theory of means-end rationality and a materialistic
account of goals and beliefs. The interpretive research program, to which Geertz
refers, entails varying schools of thought that take distinct positions on relative

4

David Hume was a key opponent of moral rationalism. In Book 3 (Part 1, Section 1) of A Treatise
of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume argued that reason
and emotions (or the “passions,” as he often called them) are quite distinct faculties and that
the foundations of morality lie in sentiment, not reason (i.e., rationality). Hume’s psychological
analysis shows that moral judgments have an essentially emotional, sentimental, or otherwise nonrational or cognitive character.
5
Edward Said (1978, pp. 65 67) argues in Orientalism that Western writing about “The Orient”
depicts Oriental culture as an irrational, weak, and feminized “Other,” an existential condition
greatly contrasted with the rational, strong, and masculine culture of the “West.” Said says that this
artificial binary relationship derives from the European psychological need to create a “difference”
of cultural inequality between “The West” and “The East.”


6

M. Suzuki

ontology and subjective epistemology, ranging from postmodern extremism to
constructivist moderationism.
Indeed, the international relations theory of constructivism, advanced by Wendt
(1999), Katzenstein (1998), and Ruggie (1998), takes a moderate position and views
state agents as cognitively interconnected entities with shared ideas or identities.
In other words, the theory sees agents as an integral part of the structure (e.g.,
domestic or international society) to which they belong, meaning that their behavior
is constitutive of the ideas and identities embedded in the structure. Thus, analysts
can interpret agents’ behavioral patterns and their outcomes as derivatives of the
ideas and identities through intersubjective rather than objective lenses with the aid
of social science methods, such as thick descriptions, abduction, or hermeneutics.6
In contrast, the rationalist research program takes the positions of positivistic

ontology and objective epistemology and considers individuals, groups, or states,
all of which are labeled players, as the basic units of analysis. Players’ goals
or interests, defined as a set of priorities or well-ordered goals with regard to
anticipated outcomes, are central to the rationalist research program (Lake and
Powell 1999, p. 9). With interests defined, the assumption of instrumentally rational
or goal-oriented human behavior helps explain these players’ actual behaviors,
and their outcomes. Players’ interests, which lie at the core of the explanation,
are influenced by their experiences and beliefs, but are still independent of the
historical, institutional, and social environments that surround them. That is,
agency is differentiated from, and is constrained by, structure. This assumption
of a contingent agency-structure relationship is characteristic of methodological
individualism and is in stark contrast to a contiguous and mutually constitutive
agency-structure relationship assumed in the constructivist theory reviewed above.7
From the contingent assumption, it is possible for rationalists to analyze how a
player’s goal-oriented behavior interacts with another player’s similar behavior
under institutional constraints. In other words, the rationalist research program
generates an analysis of strategic interdependence, to establish causal explanations
that relate behavioral outcomes to interests via the intermediary of institutions.8
Despite its individualistic premise, instrumental rationality does not mean being
asocial or atomistic, and it can sustain interpersonal and interstate cooperation. In
other words, rational behavior in an interdependent society could produce mutually
beneficial outcomes, cooperation, or even altruism (Skyms 1996; Taylor 1975). It

6

Indeed, several analysts, including Acharya (2009), Acharya and Johnston (2007), Berger (2003),
Johnston (1995), and Katzenstein (1997), have applied the constructivist theory to interpret conflict
and cooperation in contemporary Asia.
7
See Ferejohn (1991) and Fearon and Wendt (2002) for comparison between the rationalist and the

interpretive or constructivist research program.
8
The rationalist research program has entered into the study of Asia, reinvigorating a much-needed
inter-paradigmatic controversy and contributing to its scholarly diversity and enrichment (Little,
1991). Applications to comparative politics include Popkin (1976), and Ramseyer and Rosenbluth
(1997). See Johnson and Keehn (1994) for a critique of the rational-choice approach to Asian
studies.


1 A Rational Approach to the Study of International Relations in Asia

7

must be accompanied by specific institutions, known as commitment devices or
relational contracts, because utility maximization alone may not produce a stable
cooperative equilibrium directly (Sen 1983). Such commitment devices or relational
contracts entail appropriate beliefs that are embedded within social structures or
institutions (Greif 2006; North 1990). Thus, instrumental rationality is essentially
compatible with the social or cooperative aspect of Asian politics stressed by the
constructivist theory.
I argue further that instrumental rationality underpins institutions in Asia, where
logic and reason have abounded across time, contrary to some prevailing wisdom.
Indeed, ancient Chinese strategic thinking captured by Sun Tzu in “the Art of
War” described military concepts—strategic ambiguity, preponderance, flexible
responses, and intelligence—that have been used to conduct historical and modern
warfare and design military institutions in the East and the West. Rational thought
descended on medieval Asia, thereby constituting the basis of what was an important
regional institution at the time, known as the tributary system. The medieval
tributary system is an authentic Asian institution that was subject to limited external
influences. It thus can serve as a testing ground for the instrumental rationality of

Asian international relations. In contrast, nineteenth-century Asia was subject to the
treaty port system and colonial pressures from the West, and twentieth-century Asia
was subject to U.S.-led economic and security institutions. For our analysis of Asia
in the early twenty-first century, when Western influence is in decline, the medieval
regional institution may provide significant theoretical and empirical implications
for considering institutional cooperation.

1.2.2 Constructivist Perspective
At the medieval apex of its civilization, the Chinese empire developed and maintained a tributary system that hinged on relational contracts and ensured its suzerain
authority over the Confucian area of Asia, which included Korea, Japan, Vietnam,
Ryukyu, Taiwan, Laos, and northern Burma (currently Myanmar). The Chinese
empire established indirect governance or suzerain authority by providing local
kings with official titles as legitimate rulers of the territories.9 With this imperial
investiture, the local kings could maintain substantive sovereign control over their
territories, while paying allegiance to the Chinese emperor for fulfilling the orderly
and peaceful governance of the universe with the “Mandate of Heaven.” This
hierarchical governance system created a radial order of which the Chinese empire
constituted the core, surrounded by its provinces and the tributary or vassal states.
Outside the order were peripheral areas inhabited by nomads who occasionally
caused border disruptions and even invaded the tributary areas.

9

The Qing Dynasty internalized governance over Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Uyghur as their
provinces (gun) by placing regional administrative offices in these regions.


8

M. Suzuki

The tributary system embraced the Chinese worldview and its foreign policy
outlook. The Asian region in Chinese eyes was Tianxia, literally, “all under
Heaven,” of which China perceived itself to be the center. China’s name, Zhongguo,
denoted “the central country” or the Middle Kingdom that contained the whole
world known to it. Such Chinese perception is what Western historians have called
“Sino-centrism,” the term used to characterize traditional Chinese foreign relations
(Li 2002, p. 25). The Chinese world order meant the universal preeminence of the
Son of Heaven in which all other non-Chinese nations had to be submissive and
obedient, and were expected to accept their inferior status through the medium of
the tributary system if they wished to have relations with China.
The Sino-centric belief was coupled with Confucianism to constitute the cognitive core of the tributary system. Confucianism is not a religion, but a school
of political and ethical philosophy founded by Confucius (551 479 B.C.) and
his disciples. As Confucianism was reinstated in the Western Han Dynasty (206
B.C. A.D. 24) as the state ideological orthodoxy, its cosmopolitan outlook became
integrated into the practical aspects of social and political life in China and formed
the most dominant political and cultural force (Li 2002, p. 36). What made
Confucianism serve as the principle and practice of the tributary system were its
values of peace (ping) and harmony (he) and its norms of humanity, righteousness,
proper rites, and filial piety, respectively.
The above observations are consistent with the general constructivist proposition that shared ideas are a basis of interpersonal or interstate cooperation. The
Confucian ideational ties that bounded the Chinese empire and vassal states were
critical to their mutual obedience to the system. For Zhang and Buzan (2012 p. 35),
this represents an Asian variant of Gramsci’s theory of super-national hegemony—
a form of power composed of “a combination of coercion and consent.” In this
regard, Confucian culture performed two interrelated functions: it constituted the
ideological glue that bound the regional system together, and it fostered consent
among the lesser units of the system with respect to Chinese dominance in the
region. Thus, constructivists argue that Confucian precepts created a widely shared
base of cultural, economic, and political practices that bound people throughout the

empire. Beyond the empire’s immediate borders, people across the tributary areas
felt a shared coexistence under a common set of Confucian values despite many
differences (ethnic, linguistic, and religious).
Constructivists problematize the apparent anomaly of continuous stability and
cooperation by stressing that the Chinese hegemony was not firmly established in
either material or political terms, and, worse still, the Chinese empire’s politicomilitary strength fluctuated in the wake of dynastic cycles. According to Zhang and
Buzan (2012, pp. 31 32), the tributary system was poorly institutionalized without
precise and binding behavioral rules, although it was flexible and ambivalent
so that it could deal with a variety of contingencies and maintain the tributary
relationship between its empire and lesser states for a long time. Given these
observations, neither realism nor rational institutionalism can explain the apparent
outcomes of stability and cooperation. Zhang and Buzan (2012, p. 15) attribute
stability and cooperation to the shared values and norms, arguing that, while they


1 A Rational Approach to the Study of International Relations in Asia

9

remained sovereign in retaining their domestic autonomy with some restrictions
in conducting their foreign affairs, participants in the system inter-subjectively
accepted or acquiesced in this rank-ordered social hierarchy, as well as Chinese
ritual practices and norms of procedural justice. For Zhang and Buzan (2012,
p. 33), the shared values and norms made the system stable and protected it from
change: “the moral purpose of the state, arguably the most important component
in the constitutional structure, is rarely challenged, if at all.” They continue that it
constrains institutional redesigning and legitimizes the tributary system as the “only
acceptable social order.”
Viewing the medieval Chinese hegemonic system from a perspective similar to
the ancient Greek theory of moral rationalism, constructivists focus explicitly on the

cultural and normative aspects of the tributary system. Kang (2010, p. 71), for one,
characterizes social status in this hierarchy as “a function of cultural achievement,
not economic wealth or military power.” Kang argues that, because of the ideational
ties, balance-of-power politics was absent from medieval Asia, which made it
qualitatively different from Europe, where balance-of-power politics was widely
used by lesser states as a rational instrument to prevent great-power dominance, in
attempts to maintain their independence and autonomy in both domestic and foreign
affairs. In his view, adversarial balance-of-power politics was absent from Asia’s
medieval hierarchical systems, because the Confucian moral state reduced lesser
states’ fears about Chinese hegemony.

1.2.3 Rationalist Perspective
An alternative to the above constructivist account is the view that the tributary
system is a rational institution. North (1990, p. 3) provides a rational definition as
follows:
Institutions are the rules of the game in society or, more formally, are the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence, they structure incentives in
human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.

According to Greif (2006, p. 9), incentives include “expectations, beliefs, and
internalized norms.” The beliefs shared by players motivate equilibrium play or
institutional cooperation in our case. From this definitional perspective, vassal states
followed the tributary system based on the belief that they could obtain benefits by
being subservient to the Chinese empire, whereas the Chinese empire maintained
the system based on the belief that it could stay at the apex of the world order by
providing vassal states with such benefits. The inclusion of beliefs into the definition
of institutions does not mean that the underlying theory that guides our analysis is
constructivist. Rather, the concept of beliefs is used here in regulatory rather than
constitutive terms, as incentives that motivate players to abide by the institutions in
question.

10

M. Suzuki

Similarly, Zhou (2011) treats the tributary system as a set of rational institutions
within which “the Middle Kingdom and the periphery states engaged in ongoing
strategic interactions” (p. 151). Using a game-theoretical approach, Zhou attempts
to construct a model that explains the dynamic equilibrium of the tributary
system, which represents, in his words, “a spontaneous order, an endogenous and
self-reinforcing institutional arrangement of East Asia, which appeared and was
reproduced as an outcome of continuous strategic interactions among actors within
the region” (Zhou 2011, p. 150). This view is a basis of my discussion on the
tributary system as a microcosm used to illuminate the rational aspect of Asian
politics. From the abovementioned definitional perspective, the medieval system
entailed three informal institutions outlined below.
1. Security: Regardless of whether the medieval or modern era is being discussed,
security is essential to a state’s survival, but it is by no means a fait accompli
under the anarchic system of sovereign states. What this means is that states
have to independently acquire and maintain their own security. However, in
an anarchic system, one state’s defensive action often produces a negative
effect or negative externality on another state’s security, because, suspicious of
their rivals’ intentions, states overreact with offensive countermeasures (Waltz
1979). This reciprocity of action and reaction creates and escalates a security
dilemma into an increasing likelihood of direct warfare (Jervis 1978). Rational
institutionalism claims that, to prevent the security dilemma from escalating,
states should establish a mechanism for exchanging information about their
defensive intents for preserving the status quo and coordinating their choices
(Haftendorn et al. 1999). It can be argued that the tributary system entailed the

following security arrangements, consistent with this conjecture.
A first arrangement concerns mutual recognition between the Chinese empire
and the local kingdoms. As noted above, the Chinese empire issued investitures
for local kings who were legitimate rulers of the territories, in exchange for their
respect for the Chinese emperor as the protector of the universe. Although these
exchanges were merely formalities, the arrangement ensured that tributary states
could maintain direct control over their territories, with suzerain authority being
guaranteed for the Chinese empire,10 and effectively establish an informal sovereign
state system in Asia. Fairbank (1968) equates the investiture of a claimant by the
Middle Kingdom to the throne of a vassal state in Europe that had been recognized
by the concert of powers. In medieval Europe, the formal parity of all sovereign
nations had been acknowledged, which prevented the emergence of a continental
empire and ensured stability in interstate relations.

10

A one-sided abrogation of the tributary relationship was fatal. For instance, the Qing Dynasty
sent an expeditionary mission to compel Korea’s Chosen Dynasty to accept the tributary request it
had rejected because of the Qing’s Mongolian heritage that evoked the history of interference in
Korean politics.


1 A Rational Approach to the Study of International Relations in Asia

11

In contrast, medieval Asia did not develop along the Western lines of formal
equality among nations and a substantial plurality of power. Rather, it displayed a
unipolar and hegemonic structure. A neo-Confucian system of hierarchy reinforced
the impossibility of international intercourse based on terms of legal equality.

Indeed, whoever wished to enter into relations with China was expected do so as
China’s vassal, officially accepting the hegemony of the Chinese emperor. This
meant that vassal states signaled their unwillingness to upset the status quo’s
asymmetric power relations, whereas the hegemonic state had disincentives to
invade or annex the backward areas militarily, based on the belief that direct control
would be costly, without much wealth or tax revenue collected from the areas.11
The security implications of the imperial-vassal relationship were vindicated
by the foreign policy dictum of Korea, the most loyal vassal state to the Chinese
empire. The dictum, known as sadae/kyorin, was framed by Yi T’aejo, the founder
of the Yi dynasty, and was followed more or less by successive Korean rulers
(Clark 1998). Sadae means, “serve the great,” or, more precisely, “acknowledge
the manifest superiority of China.” Kyorin means “friendly contact with neighbors
(i.e., with Japan and Manchuria) on an equal basis within the tributary system.” In
practice, while the Koreans did tolerate abuse and maltreatment over the years, in
their position of subservience to China, they succeeded in their main objective of
preserving the kingdom’s autonomy. So long as they practiced sadae, they posed
no threat to China, and the Chinese had no intention of withdrawing investitures
from the Korean Kingdom.12 Thus, the arrangement of mutual recognition played
an important role of reassurance in reducing uncertainty about states’ intentions and
ensured that their relations remained immune to a serious security dilemma,
A second security arrangement hinged on conflict management. To sustain the
Sino-centric order, Ming and Qing policymakers had far greater confidence in
military force than in the Confucian notion of international rectification—“not
fighting and subduing the enemy” (Wang 2011, p. 4; Johnston 1995).13 In effect,

11

The Hongwu Emperor of the Ming Dynasty or Ming Taizu made the following statement in the
Ancestral Injunctions. It clearly shows that rationality was central to his governing principle:
the various small countries of the southern man [barbarians] are separated from us by

mountains and seas and far away in a corner. Their lands would not produce enough for
us to maintain them; their peoples would not usefully serve us if incorporated [into the
empire]. If they were so unrealistic as to disturb our borders, it would be unfortunate for
them. If they gave us no trouble and we moved troops to fight them unnecessarily, it would
be unfortunate for us. I am concerned that future generations might abuse China’s wealth
and power and covet the military glories of the moment to send armies into the field without
reason and cause a loss of life. May they be sharply reminded that this is forbidden (quoted
in Wang 1998, pp. 311 312).

12

Zhou (2011, p. 166) argues that a spirit of independence or denial of Chinese superiority might
have provoked a repressive Chinese response, which would have been destructive to Korea in the
long run. Thus, a major function of sadae was to preserve Korean autonomy.
13
There were instances in which the Chinese empire apparently acted in the spirit of the ConfucianMercian dictum. For instance, in 1479, Dai Viet launched an attack against the Laotian Kingdom