From third world to first the singapore story 1965 2000

FROM THIRD
WORLD

TO Fl HST


FROM THIRD
WORLD

TO FIRST
THE SINGAPORE STORY:
1965-2000
Lee Kuan Yew

SINGAPORE AND THE

-

ASIAN ECONOMIC BOOM

HarperCollinsPublishers


FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST

Copyright © 2000 by Lee Kuan Yew.

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this
book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written
permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles

and reviews. For information address HarperCollins Publishers Inc.,
10 East 53rd Street, New York, NY 10022.
HarperCollins books may be purchased for educational, business, or sales
promotional use. For information please write: Special Markers Department,
HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 10 East 53rd Street, New York, NY 10022.
FIRST EDITION

Designed by North Marker Street Graphics
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dara is available.
ISBN 0-06-019776-5
00 QW 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1


To Goh Keng Swee, S. Rajaratnam, Hon Sui Sen,
Lim Kim San, Eddie Barker, Toh Chin Chye,
Ong Pang Boon, and Othman Wok,
my old-guard colleagues who together made possible
The Singapore Story.


Contents

Foreword by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Preface

Xlll

Acknowledgments

XVll

Part I

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Getting the Basics Right

Going It Alone

lX

1
3

Building an Army from Scratch

11

Britain Pulls Out
Surviving Without a Hinterland
Creating a Financial Center

Winning Over the Unions

31
49
71
83
95
109
121
135
145
157
173
185
199

A Fair, Not Welfare, Society
The Communists Self-Destruct
Straddling the Middle Ground
Nurturing and Attracting Talent
11 Many Tongues, One Language
12 Keeping the Government Clean
13 Greening Singapore
14 Managing the Media
15 Conductor of an Orchestra


Contents

Vlll

Part II

In Search of Space-Regional and International

225

1 6 Ups and Downs with Malaysia

227

17 Indonesia: From Foe to Friend
18 Building Ties with Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei
1 9 Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia: Coming to Terms
with the Modern World
20 Asean-Unpromising Start, Promising Future

259
293

21
22
23
24
25

East Asia in Crisis 1997-1 999
Inside the Commonwealth Club
New Bonds with Britain
Ties with Australia and New Zealand

South Asia's Legends and Leaders

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Following Britain into Europe
The Soviet Union-An Empire Implodes
America: The Anticommunist Anchorman
Strategic Accord with the United States
America's New Agenda
Japan: Asia's First Miracle
Lessons from Japan
Korea: At the Crossroads

35
36
37
38
39

Hong Kong's Transition
Taiwan: The Other China
China: The Dragon with a Long Tail

Deng Xiaoping's China
China Beyond Beijing
Tiananmen

309
329
343
351
373
385
403
423
439
449
471
487
501
521
531
543
559
573
595
617

40 China: To Be Rich Is Glorious

625
645

Part III

Winding Up

661

41 Passing the Baton
42 My Family
43 Epilogue

663
675
685

Index

693


Foreword
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

In the second half of the twentieth century, the emergence of scores of new
states has made international politics and economics truly global for the
first time in history. At the same time, technology has made it possible
for nearly every country to participate in events in every part of the world
as they occur.
Unfortunately, the explosion in information has not been accompa­
nied by a similar increase in knowledge. The continents interact, but they
do not necessarily understand each other. The uniformity of technology is

accompanied by an implicit assumption that politics, and even cultures,
will become homogenized. Especially, the long-established nations of the
West have fallen prey to the temptation of ignoring history and judging
every new state by the criteria of their own civilizations. It is often over­
looked that the institutions of the West did not spring full-blown from
the brow of contemporaries but evolved over centuries which shaped fron­
tiers and defined legitimacy, constitutional provisions, and basic values.
But history does matter. The institutions of the West developed grad­
ually while those of most new states were put into place in elaborated
form immediately. In the West, a civil society evolved side-by-side with
the maturation of the modern state. This made possible the growth of
representative institutions which confined the state's power to those mat­
ters which society could not deal with by its own arrangements. Political
conflicts were moderated by overriding purposes.
Many postcolonial states have no comparable history. Tasks, which, in


X

Foreword

the West, were accomplished over centuries, must be completed in a
decade or two and under much more complex circumstances. Where the
common national experience is colonial rule, especially when the state
comprises diverse ethnic groups, political opposition is often considered
an assault on the political validity of the state rather than of a particular
government.
Singapore is a case in point. As the main British naval base in the Far
East, it had neither prospect nor aspiration for nationhood until the col­
lapse of European power in the aftermath of the Second World War

redrew the political map of Southeast Asia. In the first wave of decolo­
nization, Singapore was made part of Malaya until its largely Chinese
population proved too daunting for a state attempting to define its
national identity by a Malay majority. Malaya extruded Singapore because
it was not yet ready to cope with so large a Chinese population or, less
charitably, to teach Singapore the habits of dependence if it was forced
back into what later became the Malaysian Federation.
But history shows that normally prudent, ordinary calculations can be
overturned by extraordinary personalities. In the case of Lee Kuan Yew,
the father of Singapore's emergence as a national state, the ancient argu­
ment whether circumstance or personality shapes events is settled in favor
of the latter. Circumstances could not have been less favorable. Located on
a sandbar with nary a natural resource, Singapore had in the 1950s a poly­
glot population of slightly over a million (today over 3 million), of which
75.4 percent was Chinese, 1 3. 6 percent Malay, and 8. 6 percent Indian. It
adjoined in the south with Indonesia, with a population of over 1 00 mil­
lion (now nearly double that), and in the north with Malaya (later
Malaysia), with a then-population of 6.28 million. By far the smallest
country in Southeast Asia, Singapore seemed destined to become a client
state of more powerful neighbors, if indeed it could preserve its indepen­
dence at all.
Lee Kuan Yew thought otherwise. Every great achievement is a dream
before it becomes reality, and his vision was of a state that would not sim­
ply survive but prevail by excelling. Superior intelligence, discipline, and
ingenuity would substitute for resources. Lee Kuan Yew summoned his
compatriots to a duty they had never previously perceived: first to clean
up their city, then to dedicate it to overcome the initial hostility of their


Foreword

XI

neighbors and their own ethnic divisions by superior performance. The
Singapore of coday is his testament. Annual per capita income has grown
from less than $1,000 at the time of independence to nearly $30,000
today. It is the high-tech leader of Southeast Asia, the commercial
entrepot, the scientific center. Singapore plays a major role in the politics
and economics of Southeast Asia and beyond.
This volume is Lee Kuan Yew's account of his extraordinary achieve­
ment. He navigated this passage by understanding not only the require­
ments of his own society but the needs and motives of his neighbors. A
thoughtful discussion of Indonesia and the fall of its President Suharto is
matched by Lee Kuan Yew's account of his encounters with China and its
leaders. His narrative of Singapore's abortive venture into creating a satel­
lite city in Suzhou is particularly instructive on the challenge of melding
the market economics of even so friendly an interlocucor as Singapore
with the political and social realities of a China midway between Mao and
reform.
Lee Kuan Yew would not be true to himself were he less than frank
about his analysis of the difference between the individualism of the West
and the priority for social cohesion in countries such as his and in much of
the rest of Asia. He does not ask us co change our patterns, only co refrain
from imposing them on societies with different histories and necessities.
These views have subjected Lee Kuan Yew to considerable criticism in
the West. Those of us who prize our values while understanding the com­
plexities of a new country in a different culture are prepared co leave it co
hiscory co pass judgment as to whether there were other options available
co him. But, for a generation, every American leader who has dealt with
Lee Kuan Yew has benefited from the fact that, on international issues, he

has identified the future of his country with the fate of the democracies.
And he has done so not passively but by making a seminal political con­
tribution to the struggles of our time.


Preface

I wrote this book for a younger generation of Singaporeans who took sta­
bility, growth, and prosperity for granted. I wanted them to know how
difficult it was for a small country of 640 sq. km with no natural resources
to survive in the midst of larger, newly independent nations all pursuing
nationalistic policies.
Those who have been through the trauma of war in 1 942 and the
Japanese occupation, and have taken part in building a new economy for
Singapore, are not so sanguine. We cannot afford to forget that public
order, personal security, economic and social progress, and prosperity are
not the natural order of things, that they depend on ceaseless effort and
attention from an honest and effective government that the people must
elect.
In my earlier book, I described my formative years in prewar
Singapore, the Japanese occupation, and the communist upheavals fol­
lowed by racial problems during our two years in Malaysia.
The Japanese occupation (1942-1945) filled me with hatred for the
cruelties they inflicted on their fellow Asians, aroused my nationalism
and self-respect, and my resentment at being lorded over. My four years as
a student in Britain after the war strengthened my determination to get
rid of British colonial rule.
I returned to Singapore in 1950, confident of my cause, but ignorant
of the pitfalls and dangers that lay ahead. An anticolonial wave swept me
and many others of my generation. I involved myself with trade unions

XIV

Preface

and politics, formed a political party, and at the age of 35 assumed office
in 1 959 as the first prime minister of an elected government of self­
governing Singapore. My friends and I formed a united front with the
communists. From the start we knew that there would have to be a part­
ing of the ways and a time for reckoning. When it came, the fight was
bitter, and we were fortunate not to have been defeated.
We believed the long-term future for Singapore was to rejoin Malaya,
so we merged with it to form Malaysia in September 1 963. Within a year,
in July 1964, we suffered Malay-Chinese race riots in Singapore. We were
trapped in an intractable struggle with Malay extremists of the ruling
party, United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), who were intent on
a Malay-dominated Malaysia. To counter their use of communal riots to
cow us, we rallied the non-Malays and Malays throughout Malaysia in the
Malaysian Solidarity Convention to fight for a Malaysian Malaysia. By
August 1 965 we were given no choice but to leave.
The communal bullying and intimidation made our people willing to
endure the hardships of going it alone. That traumatic experience of race
riots also made my colleagues and me even more determined to build a
multiracial society that would give equality to all citizens, regardless of
race, language, or religion. It was an article of faith which guided our
policies.
This book covers the long, hard slog to find ways of staying indepen­
dent and making a living without Malaysia as our hinterland. We had to
work against seemingly insuperable odds to make it from poverty to pros­

perity in three decades.
The years after 1 965 were hectic and filled with anxiety, as we strug­
gled to find our feet. We were relieved when we found in 1971 that we
had created enough jobs to avoid heavy unemployment even though the
British withdrew their forces from Singapore. But only after we weath­
ered the international oil crisis in 1 973, with the quadrupling of oil
prices, were we confident that we could make it on our own. Thereafter, it
was hard work, planning, and improvising to establish ourselves as a
viable nation linked by trade and investments to the major industrial
countries, and as a successful hub for the dissemination of goods, services,
and information in our region.
Our climb from a per capita GDP of US$400 in 1 959 (when I took


Preface

xv

office as prime minister) to more than US$ l 2,200 in 1 990 (when I
stepped down) and US$22,000 in 1 999 took place at a time of immense
political and economic changes in the world.
In material terms, we have left behind our Third World problems of
poverty. However, it will take another generation before our arts, culture,
and social standards can match the First World infrastructure we have
installed. During the Cold War in the 1 960s and 1 970s, when it was far
from clear which side would win, we aligned ourselves with the West.
The Cold War divide made for a simpler international environment.
Because our immediate neighbors were against the communists, we
enjoyed both regional solidarity and international support from America,
Western Europe, and Japan. By the late 1980s it was clear we were on the

side of the victors.
This is not a how-to book, whether to build an economy, an army, or a
nation. It is an account of the problems my colleagues and I faced, and
how we set about solving them. I wrote my earlier book as a chronological
narrative. To do so for this volume would have made the book too long. I
have written by themes, to compress 30 years into 700 pages.


Acknowledgments

Andrew Tan Kok Kiong started research for these memoirs in 1 995. He
was an officer in the Singapore administrative service, seconded to
Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) to help me. The prime minister, Goh
Chok Tong, allowed me access to all records and documents in the gov­
ernment ministries and in the archives. The registry officer in the prime
minister's office, Florence Ler Chay Keng, and her assistants, Wendy
Teo Kwee Geok and Vaijayanthimala, were tireless and thorough in
tracing files and documents. With the help of Pang Gek Choo, who
worked for the Straits Times, and Alan Chong, a young political science
graduate, Andrew searched through government records, minutes of
important meetings, correspondence, and other relevant documents.
Most useful were the notes I dictated immediately after meetings and
conversations.
Andrew Tan was able and resourceful. He coordinated the work of the
researchers, organized the material, and made my task easier. Pang Gek
Choo was quick and efficient in tracing reports of events and speeches in
the Straits Times' library and archives. In 1 997, when the work expanded,
Walter Fernandez and Yvonne Lim from SPH and Dr. Goh Ai Ting from
the National University of Singapore (NUS) joined my researchers.
Panneer Selvan from the ministry of foreign affairs helped retrieve

records of my dealings with foreign leaders. Lily Tan, director of the
National Archives, produced many useful documents and oral history
transcripts of those who had allowed me to read them. The staffs at the


XV!ll

Acknowledgments

NUS library, the National Library, and the Straits Times editorial library
were always helpful.
John Dickie, former diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Mail,
gave much valuable advice, especially on what would interest a British
reader. My good friend Gerald Hensley, New Zealand's former high com­
missioner in Singapore and later secretary for defence, gave good sugges­
tions.
Straits Times writers, Cheong Yip Seng (editor in chief), Han Fook
Kwang, Warren Fernandez, Zuraidah Ibrahim, Irene Ng, and Chua Mui
Hoong proposed many changes, making the book easier to read, espe­
cially for those without background knowledge of the events I described.
Lim Jin Koon, editor of Zaobao, read through the whole draft before
its translation into Chinese. Seng Han Thong, formerly of Zaobao, now in
the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), went through many ver­
sions of the drafts before finally settling the Chinese translation.
Guntor Sadali, editor of Berita Harian, minister for community devel­
opment, Abdullah Tarmugi, senior parliamentary secretary Zainul Abidin
Rasheed, and parliamentary secretaries Mohamad Maidin and Yaacob
Ibrahim gave their views on all the chapters relating to Malays. I wanted
to avoid unintentionally hurting Malay sensitivities and have tried hard
not to do so.

Old friends and colleagues, Goh Keng Swee, Lim Kim San, Ong
Pang Boon, Othman Wok, Lee Khoon Choy, Rahim Ishak, Maurice
Baker, Sim Kee Boon, S. R. Nathan (now our president), and Ngiam
Tong Dow, read various parts of my drafts and corrected or confirmed my
recollection of events.
My drafts were also read by Kishore Mahbubani (permanent represen­
tative to the United Nations), Chan Heng Chee (ambassador to Washing­
ton), Bilahari Kausikan (deputy secretary, ministry of foreign affairs),
Tommy Koh (ambassador at large), and Lee Tsao Yuan (director of the
Institute of Policy Studies). Their valuable advice as diplomats, writers,
and academics helped me give the book a better focus.
Shova Loh, line editor in Times Editions, meticulously cleaned up the
final draft.
My three personal assistants, Wong Lin Hoe, Loh Hock Teck, and
Koh Kiang Chay, worked tirelessly, often late into the evenings, to take in


Acknowledgments

XIX

every amendment and check for accuracy. They went well beyond the call
of duty. To all of them and others too numerous to name, I express my
grateful thanks. The errors and shortcomings that remain are mine.
As with the first volume, my wife, Choo, went through every page
many times until she was satisfied that what I had written was clear and
easy to read.
The line editor at HarperCollins, New York, has meticulously Amer­
icanized my English. She has also made me politically gender correct.
Wherever I wrote "man," he has become "person" or "people." I thank her

for making me appear less of a male chauvinist to Americans.


PART I

Getting the Basics Right


1. Going It Alone

There are books to teach you how to build a house, how to repair engines,
how to write a book. But I have not seen a book on how to build a nation
out of a disparate collection of immigrants from China, British India, and
the Dutch East Indies, or how to make a living for its people when its for­
mer economic role as the entrepot of the region is becoming defunct.
I never had expected that in 1 965, at 42, I would be in charge of an
independent Singapore, responsible for the lives of its 2 million people.
From 1959, when I was 35, I was prime minister of a self-governing state
of Singapore. We joined the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963.
There were fundamental disagreements over policies between Singapore
and the federal government. All of a sudden, on 9 August 1 965, we were
out on our own as an independent nation. We had been asked to leave
Malaysia and go our own way with no signposts to our next destination.
We faced tremendous odds with an improbable chance of survival.
Singapore was not a natural country but man-made, a trading post the
British had developed into a nodal point in their worldwide maritime
empire. We inherited the island without its hinterland, a heart without a
body.
Foreign press comments immediately after independence, all predict­
ing doom, added to my gloom. One writer compared Britain's withdrawal

from its colonies to the decline of the Roman Empire when law and order
collapsed as the Roman legions withdrew and barbarian hordes took over.
Denis Warner wrote in the Sydney Morning Herald (10 August 1965), "An


4

From Third World to First

independent Singapore was not regarded as viable three years ago.
Nothing in the current situation suggests chat it is more viable today." In
the London Sunday Times (22 August 1965), Richard Hughes wrote,
"Singapore's economy would collapse if the British bases-costing more
than 100 million pounds sterling-were closed." I shared these fears but
did not express chem: My duty was to give the people hope, not demoral­
ize chem.
Indeed one question uppermost in my mind was how long the British
would or could keep their bases in Singapore. Would their stay be short­
ened because of the way separation had taken place? Harold Wilson was
already facing opposition from his backbenchers. The "east of Suez" policy
was costly and did not help the Labour government win votes. They
needed the money for welfare and ocher vote-winning programs. The only
guarantor of security and stability in East Asia, the United States, was
deeply mired in a guerrilla war in Vietnam which was extremely unpopu­
lar with their European allies and with African and Asian governments.
Anti-American propaganda by the Soviets and the People's Republic of
China was most effective in the Third World. I felt it would be politically
costly, if not impossible, for Singapore to have the Americans cake over
the role of the British. Australia and New Zealand on their own would
not be credible guarantors.

I feared chat slowly but inexorably British influence would decline,
and American influence expand. For my generation born and bred in
empire, it was not an easy change. I had to come to terms with American
power without a British buffer. The British had enforced their will with a
certain civility. The Americans were different, as I could see from the way
they dealt with South Vietnamese leaders, and even with Thai and
Filipino leaders who were not in as parlous a position as chose in Saigon.
America was a power on the ascendant, with bulging muscles and a habit
of flexing chem.
There was the personal burden of tighter security. It was irksome.
Immediately after separation, the police officer in charge of my security
had warned me chat I had become the number one hate object in the
Malaysian Malay-language newspapers and radio and television broad­
casts then circulating and receivable in Singapore. He advised me to move
from my home on Oxley Road until they had made certain alterations to


Going It Alone

5

the house. I had a thick layer of security men instead of just one officer.
He also extended discreet security cover for my wife Choo and the chil­
dren. The threat from racial fanatics was unpredictable, unlike that from
the communists who were rational and calculating and would see no ben­
efit in going for Choo or our children. For three to four months, Choo and
I stayed at Changi Cottage, a government chalet by the sea, near the RAF
Changi airfield and inside a "protected" area. During that time, I held
cabinet meetings irregularly, for the drive to my office at City Hall caused
traffic disruption with the unaccustomed motorcycle outriders and a secu­

rity car. I took urgent decisions by telephone conference with the relevant
ministers which gave me relief from interminable office meetings. My
personal assistants and Wong Chooi Sen, my trusted cabinet secretary,
came every day to the cottage from where I worked. Within walking dis­
tance was a nine-hole RAF golf course that provided a welcome break
from the daily grind of papers and minutes. I would play nine holes,
sometimes with a friend, at other times on my own, with Choo walking
to keep me company.
Our three children had to attend school, so they stayed at home and
put up with the inconvenience of workers erecting a wall of bricks set in
honeycomb pattern to screen off our front porch from the road. As a tem­
porary measure, until bullet-proof glass could be obtained, they also
blocked our windows with steel plates. This made the rooms feel like
prisons, and the whole family felt a tremendous sense of relief when the
glass windows were finally installed months later. When I returned to
Oxley Road, Gurkha policemen (recruited by the British from Nepal)
were posted as sentries. To have either Chinese policemen shooting
Malays or Malay policemen shooting Chinese would have caused wide­
spread repercussions. The Gurkhas, on the other hand, were neutral,
besides having a reputation for total discipline and loyalty. All this
heightened my sense of insecurity and underlined the urgency of building
an army to protect our fragile independence.
I had many pressing concerns: first, to get international recognition
for Singapore's independence, including our membership in the United
Nations (UN). I chose Sinnathamby Rajaratnam (affectionately called
Raja by all of us) as foreign minister. He was eminently suitable, with
anticolonial nationalist credentials from his student days in London


6

From Third World to First

before and during the war, but no rabid radical. Friendly, urbane, sincere,
he had the right balance between standing up for principles and the need
for diplomatic compromise. He was to be much liked and respected by all
those he worked with at home and abroad. As messages of recognition
flowed in, Toh Chin Chye, the deputy prime minister, and Raja as foreign
minister set off to New York to take our seat at the UN that September
of 1 965.
My next concern was to defend this piece of real estate. We had no
army. Our two battalions were under the command of a Malaysian briga­
dier. How were we to build up some defense forces quickly, however rudi­
mentary? We had to deter and, if need be, prevent any wild move by the
Malay Ultras (extremists) in Kuala Lumpur (KL) to instigate a coup by
the Malaysian forces in Singapore and reverse the independence we had
acquired. Many Malay leaders in KL believed that Singapore should never
have been allowed to leave Malaysia, but should have been clobbered into
submission. If anything were to happen to Tunku Abdul Rahman, the
prime minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak would become the prime
minister and he could be made to reverse the Tunku's decision by strong­
minded Ultra leaders. It was a time of great uncertainty.
While wrestling with these major concerns, I had to attend to another
pressing need-keeping law and order. We feared that pro-UMNO Malays
would run amok when they realized they had been abandoned by the
Malaysian government and were once again a minority. Our policemen
were mostly Malays from the kampongs of Malaya and their loyalty would
be strained if they had to take action against Malay rioters who wanted to
rejoin Malaysia. Our troops, two battalions, were also mostly Malays from
Malaya.

To my relief, Goh Keng Swee was willing and eager to take on the
task of building up the forces. I decided to have him take charge of home
affairs and defense, put together into one ministry called MID (ministry
of interior and defense). This would allow him to use the police force to
help in the basic training of army recruits. (To this day, license plates of
Singapore Armed Forces vehicles carry the letters MID.) Keng Swee's
transfer left a void in the finance ministry. I discussed this with him and
decided on Lim Kim San as finance minister. Kim San had a practical


Going It Alone

7

approach to problems. Moreover, he could work closely with Keng Swee
without friction, thus allowing Keng Swee to contribute informally to
policies on finance.
My third and biggest headache was the economy-how to make a liv­
ing for our people? Indonesia was "confronting" us and trade was at a stand­
still. The Malaysians wanted to bypass Singapore and deal direct with all
their trading partners, importers, and exporters, and only through their
own ports. How was an independent Singapore to survive when it was no
longer the center of the wider area that the British once governed as one
unit? We needed to find some answers and soon, for unemployment was
alarming at 14 percent and rising. Furthermore, we had to make a living
different from that under British rule. I used to see our godowns [ware­
houses) filled with rubber sheets, pepper, copra, and rattan and workers
laboriously cleaning and grading them for export. There would be no more
imports of such raw materials from Malaysia and Indonesia for processing
and grading. We had to create a new kind of economy, try new methods and

schemes never tried before anywhere else in the world, because there was no
other country like Singapore. Hong Kong was the one island most like us,
but it was still governed by the British and it had China as its hinterland.
Economically, it was very much a part of China, acting as China's contact
with the capitalist world for trade with noncommunist countries.
After pondering these problems and the limited options available, I
concluded an island city-state in Southeast Asia could not be ordinary if it
was to survive. We had to make extraordinary efforts to become a tightly
knit, rugged, and adaptable people who could do things better and
cheaper than our neighbors, because they wanted to bypass us and render
obsolete our role as the entrepot and middleman for the trade of the
region. We had to be different.
Our greatest asset was the trust and confidence of the people. These
we had earned by the fight we had put up on their behalf against the com­
munists and the Malay Ultras, our refusal to be browbeaten and cowed at
a time when the police and the army were both in the hands of the central
government. The communists had jeered at my colleagues and me as run­
ning dogs of the colonialist imperialists, and cursed us as lackeys and
henchmen of the Malay feudalists. But when things got bad, even the


8

From Third World to First

skeptical Chinese-speaking left-leaning types saw us, a group of bourgeois
English-educated leaders, stand up for them and defend their interests.
We were careful not to squander this newly gained trust by misgovern­
ment and corruption. I needed this political strength to maximize what
use we could make of our few assets, a natural world-class harbor sited in

a strategic location astride one of the busiest sea-lanes of the world.
The other valuable asset we had was our people-hardworking,
thrifty, eager to learn. Although divided into several races, I believed a
fair and even-handed policy would get them to live peacefully together,
especially if such hardships as unemployment were shared equally and not
carried mainly by the minority groups. It was crucial to keep united
Singapore's multilingual, multicultural, multireligious society, and make
it rugged and dynamic enough to compete in world markets. But how to
get into this market? I did not know the answer. Nobody had asked us to
push the British out. Driven by our visceral urges, we had done so. Now
it was our responsibility to provide for the security and livelihood of the 2
million people under our care. We had to succeed, for if we failed, our
only survival option would be a remerger, but on Malaysian terms, as a
state like Malacca or Penang.
I did not sleep well. Choo got my doctors to prescribe tranquilizers,
but I found beer or wine with dinner better than the pills. I was then in
my early forties, young and vigorous; however hard and hectic the day
had been, I would take two hours off in the late afternoon to go on the
practice tee to hit 50 to 100 balls and play nine holes with one or two
friends. Still, I was short of sleep. Late one morning, when the newly
arrived British high commissioner, John Robb, had an urgent message for
me from his government, I received him at home lying in bed, physically
exhausted. Harold Wilson, the British prime minister, must have been
told of this for he expressed his concern. On 23 August 1 965, I replied,
"Do not worry about Singapore. My colleagues and I are sane, rational
people even in our moments of anguish. We weigh all possible conse­
quences before we make any move on the political chessboard. . . . Our
people have the will to fight and the stuff that makes for survival."
While brooding over these daunting problems, on the night of 30 Sep­
tember 1 965, alarm bells rang with the news of a coup in Indonesia. Pro-

Going It Alone

9

communist officers had killed six Indonesian generals. A bloodbath fol­
lowed as General Suharto moved to put down the coup. These further
uncertainties deepened my concerns.

On that 9th day of August 1 965, I had started out with great trepidation
on a journey along an unmarked road to an unknown destination.


2 . B u i l d i n g a n Ar m y f r o m S c ra t c h

When Parliament was due to open in December 1 965, four months after
our separation from Malaysia, Brigadier Syed Mohamed bin Syed Ahmad
Alsagoff, who was in charge of a Malaysian brigade stationed in Singapore,
called on me and insisted that his motorcycle outriders escort me to
Parliament. Alsagoff was a stout, heavy-built Arab Muslim with a mous­
tache, a Singaporean by birth who had joined the Malayan Armed Forces.
To my amazement, he acted as if he was the commander in chief of the
army in Singapore, ready at any time to take over control of the island. At
that time the First and Second Singapore Infantry Regiments (1 and 2 SIR)
of about 1 ,000 men each were under Malaysian command. The Malaysian
government had placed 700 Malaysians in 1 and 2 SIR, and posted out
300 Singaporean soldiers to various Malaysian units.
I weighed the situation and concluded that the Tunku wanted to
remind us and the foreign diplomats who would be present that Malaysia

was still in charge in Singapore. If I told him off for his presumptuous­
ness, Alsagoff would report this back to his superiors in Kuala Lumpur
and they would take other steps to show me who wielded real power in
Singapore. I decided it was best to acquiesce. So, for the ceremonial open­
ing of the first Parliament of the Republic of Singapore, Malaysian army
outriders "escorted" me from my office in City Hall to Parliament House.
Not long after this problem, at 4:00 P.M. on Tuesday, 1 February 1966,
Keng Swee suddenly came to my office at City Hall with the troubling
news that rioting had broken out at an army training depot at Shenton