European integration and transformation in the wester balkan

European Integration and
Transformation in the
Western Balkans

This book investigates the scope and limitations of the transformative power of
European Union enlargement in the Western Balkans.
The extension of EU enlargement policy to the region has generated high
expectations that enlargement will regulate democratic institution-building and
foster reform, much as it did in Central and Eastern Europe. However, there is very
little research on whether and how unfavourable domestic conditions might mitigate the transformative power of the EU. This volume investigates the role of
domestic factors, identifying ‘stateness’ as the missing link between the assumed
transformative power of the EU and the actual capacity to adopt EU rules across
the region. Including chapters on Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, leading scholars in the field offer up-to-date comparative
analysis of key areas of institutional and policy reform; including state bureaucracy,
rule of law, electoral management, environmental governance, cooperation with
the International Court of Justice, economic liberalization and foreign policy.
Looking to the future and the implications for policy change, European
Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans provides a new theoretical
and empirical focus on this little understood area. The book will be of interest to
scholars and students of EU politics, comparative democratization, post-communist
transitions and Balkan area studies.
Arolda Elbasani is Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute in
Florence, Italy.


Routledge / UACES Contemporary European Studies
Edited by Federica Bicchi, London School of Economics and
Political Science, Tanja Bo¨rzel, Free University of Berlin, and
Mark Pollack, Temple University, on behalf of the University

Association for Contemporary European Studies

Editorial Board: Grainne De Bu´rca, European University Institute and Columbia
University; Andreas Føllesdal, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of
Oslo; Peter Holmes, University of Sussex; Liesbet Hooghe, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; David Phinnemore,
Queen’s University Belfast; Ben Rosamond, University of Warwick; Vivien Ann
Schmidt, University of Boston; Jo Shaw, University of Edinburgh; Mike Smith,
University of Loughborough; and Loukas Tsoukalis, ELIAMEP, University of
Athens and European University Institute.
The primary objective of the new Contemporary European Studies series is to
provide a research outlet for scholars of European Studies from all disciplines.
The series publishes important scholarly works and aims to forge for itself an international reputation.
1. The EU and Conflict Resolution
Promoting peace in the backyard
Nathalie Tocci
2. Central Banking Governance in
the European Union
A comparative analysis
Lucia Quaglia
3. New Security Issues in Northern
Europe
The Nordic and Baltic states and
the ESDP
Edited by Clive Archer
4. The European Union and
International Development
The politics of foreign aid
Maurizio Carbone

5. The End of European
Integration
Anti-Europeanism examined
Paul Taylor
6. The European Union and the
Asia-Pacific
Media, public and elite perceptions
of the EU
Edited by Natalia Chaban and
Martin Holland
7. The History of the European
Union
Origins of a trans- and
supranational polity 1950–72
Edited by Wolfram Kaiser,
Brigitte Leucht and
Morten Rasmussen


8. International Actors,
Democratization and the
Rule of Law
Anchoring democracy?
Edited by Amichai Magen and
Leonardo Morlino
9. Minority Nationalist Parties
and European Integration
A comparative study
Anwen Elias
10. European Union

Intergovernmental
Conferences
Domestic preference formation,
transgovernmental networks
and the dynamics of compromise
Paul W. Thurner and Franz
Urban Pappi
11. The Political Economy of
State-Business Relations in
Europe
Interest mediation, capitalism
and EU policy making
Rainer Eising
12. Governing Financial Services
in the European Union
Banking, securities and
post-trading
Lucia Quaglia

15. The European Union as a
Leader in International
Climate Change Politics
Edited by Ru¨diger K. W. Wurzel
and James Connelly
16. Diversity in Europe
Dilemmas of differential treatment
in theory and practice
Edited by Gideon Calder and
Emanuela Ceva
17. EU Conflict Prevention and

Crisis Management
Roles, institutions and policies
Edited by Eva Gross and
Ana E. Juncos
18. The European Parliament’s
Committees
National party influence and
legislative empowerment
Richard Whitaker
19. The European Union, Civil
Society and Conflict
Nathalie Tocci
20. European Foreign Policy and the
Challenges of Balkan Accession
Sovereignty contested
Gergana Noutcheva

13. European Union Governance
Efficiency and legitimacy in
European commission committees
Karen Heard-Laure´ote

21. The European Union and
South East Europe
The dynamics of Europeanization
and multilevel governance
Andrew Taylor, Andrew Geddes
and Charles Lees

14. European Governmentality

The liberal drift of multilevel
governance
Richard Mu¨nch

22. Bureaucrats as Law-Makers
Committee decision-making in the
EU Council of Ministers
Frank M. Ha¨ge


23. Europeanization and the
European Economic Area
Iceland’s participation in the
EU’s policy process
Johanna Jonsdottir
24. The Cultural Politics of Europe
European capitals of culture and
the European Union since 1980
Kiran Klaus Patel

25. European Integration and
Transformation in the
Western Balkans
Europeanization or business
as usual?
Edited by Arolda Elbasani


European Integration and
Transformation in the

Western Balkans
Europeanization or business as usual?
Edited by
Arolda Elbasani


First published 2013
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
Ó 2013 Arolda Elbasani for selection and editorial matter; individual
contributors their contribution.
The right Arolda Elbasani to be identified as the author of the editorial
material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in
accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

European integration and transformation in the western Balkans:
Europeanization or business as usual? / edited by Arolda Elbasani.
pages cm.—(Routledge/UACES contemporary European studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. European Union—Balkan Peninsula. 2. Europe—Economic integration.
I. Elbasani, Arolda, editor of compilation.
HC240.25.B28E858 2013
337.1#4209496—dc23
2012037094
ISBN: 978-0-415-59452-3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-203-38606-4 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Book Now Ltd, London


Contents

List of illustrations
List of contributors
Acknowledgements

ix
xi
xiii

PART I

Europeanization travels to the Western Balkans
1 Europeanization travels to the Western Balkans: enlargement
strategy, domestic obstacles and diverging reforms

1

3

AROLDA ELBASANI

2 The Stabilization and Association Process: a framework
for European Union enlargement?

22

DAVID PHINNEMORE

PART II

Europeanization in consolidated states
3 The trials and triumphs of Europeanization in Croatia: the
unbearable weight of structure and state-building?

37

39

MIECZYSqAW P. BODUSZYN´ SKI

4 EU political conditionality towards Serbia: membership
prospects vs. domestic constraints

54

´
JELENA STOJANOVIC

5 EU conditionality as a transforming power in Macedonia:
evidence from electoral management
JESSICA GIANDOMENICO

70


viii Contents
6 EU administrative conditionality and domestic obstacles:
slow, hesitant and partial reform in post-communist Albania

85

AROLDA ELBASANI

7 Where does the European Union make a difference? Rule
of law development in the Western Balkans and beyond

101

MARTIN MENDELSKI

PART III

Europeanization in contested states
8 State-building without recognition: a critical retrospective

of the European Union’s strategy in Kosovo (1999–2010)

119

121

DIMITRIS PAPADIMITRIOU AND PETAR PETROV

9 Building environmental governance in potential candidate
countries: environmental impact assessment processes in
Bosnia-Herzegovina

138

ADAM FAGAN

10 Secessionism, irredentism and EU enlargement to the
Western Balkans: squaring the circle?

157

RAFAEL BIERMANN

Conclusions

171

11 When Europeanization hits limited statehood: the Western
Balkans as a test case for the transformative power of Europe

173

¨ RZEL
TANJA A. BO

Bibliography
Index

185
208


Illustrations

Tables
1.1
7.1
7.2
8.1
9.1

Status of relations between the EU and Western Balkan countries
Selected indicators of judicial capacity
Selected indicators of judicial impartiality
UNMIK: international and local personnel
Comparison of activities between Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and
CEE countries using REC questionnaire data
9.2 Annual budget of ENGOs in BiH from REC questionnaire
9.3 Binary logistic regression analysis of funding sources and types
of activity versus annual budget for Bosnian ENGOs

9.4 Binary logistic regression of funding sources, annual budget and
activities versus EIA involvement for Bosnian ENGOs

4
110
111
127
143
144
145
146

Figures
8.1 The structure of UNMIK
11.1 Statehood capacity, willingness and EU relations with the
Western Balkans

126
180


Contributors

Rafael Biermann is a Professor and Chair of International Relations at the
Department of Political Science, Friedrich-Schiller-Universita¨t Jena.
Mieczys1aw P. Boduszyn´ski is a Foreign Service Officer, US Department of
State.
Tanja A. Bo¨rzel is Professor of Political Science and Chair of European Integration
at the Otto-Sur-Institute of Political Science, Freie Universita¨t Berlin.
Arolda Elbasani is Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute in

Florence, Italy.
Adam Fagan is a Reader in Politics at the School of Politics and International
Relations, Queen Mary University of London.
Jessica Giandomenico is a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Russian and Eurasian
Studies, Uppsala University, Uppsala.
Martin Mendelski is a PhD Candidate at the University of Luxembourg.
Dimitris Papadimitriou is a Lecturer in European Politics at the School of Social
Sciences (SoSS), University of Manchester, and Associate Director of the
Manchester Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence.
Petar Petrov is a Lecturer in International Relations at the Department of
Political Science, University of Maastricht.
David Phinnemore is a Senior Lecturer in European Integration and Jean Monet
Chair in European Political Science at the School of Politics, International
Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast.
Jelena Stojanovic´ works for the European Integration Office, Government of the
Republic of Serbia.


Acknowledgements

The idea of investigating the impact of the European Union in the new candidates
in the Western Balkans – ‘The Transformative Power of Europe’ – was born while
I was a post-doctorate fellow at the Research College at the Free University in
Berlin. The Research College generously funded by the German Research
Foundation supported the organization of two international workshops that provided the initial grounds to discuss our papers and develop the book project. It also
provided me with an energizing academic environment where one is daily
immersed in a community of scholars debating relentlessly on different facets
of EU-ization. The book was then finalized during a research period at the Social
Sciences Research Centre in Berlin, which funded my research through the
Social Science Research Award, and also provided a nice office ‘with a view’, and

administrative support to see the project through.
Many academics and friends have been indispensable in completing this common endeavour. My gratitude goes first to the contributors of this volume who
have patiently committed to several rounds of re-writing, revising and editing for
‘yet another time’. The book would not have existed without the support of Tanja
Bo¨rzel who has encouraged me to put initially-scattered ideas into a proper project
and has supported every step of its progress. My PhD supervisor, Philippe
Schmitter, has not only been a continuous source of support, including on new
ideas and challenging topics of research, but he has also read and commented
meticulously on some of the papers presented in the first workshop and the final
introduction. We are also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers from
Routledge for the right dose of criticism and advice, which helped us improve the
book. Thanks are also due to Editha von Coldberg from the WZB, who helped us
secure financing for the editing, and Farina Ahaeuser and R. Andrew Go´mez for
actually helping us with the editing. Federica Bicchi, Harriet Frammingham and
Alexander Quayle at Routledge were very patient in steering and supporting the
project to the end. My final thanks go to my family for their never failing
affection.


Part I

Europeanization travels to
the Western Balkans


1

Europeanization travels to the
Western Balkans
Enlargement strategy, domestic obstacles

and diverging reforms
Arolda Elbasani

Introduction
During the 1990s, the Western Balkans1 have dominated academic attention as a
region of violent conflicts and delayed transitions when compared to the smooth
and peaceful transformations elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
However, the region’s reputation as Europe’s ‘trouble-making periphery’ promised to change at the turn of the 2000s, when the European Union (EU) expanded
its concept of enlargement to include all Balkan countries left out of the previous
wave of enlargement. The EU’s ‘unequivocal support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans’ (European Council 2003), coupled with a regiontailored enlargement policy – the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) –
(Elbasani 2008; Noutcheva 2012) were widely promoted as the anchor of future
reforms. By that time, EU enlargement was held as a success story that contributed
to creating peace and stability, inspiring reforms, and consolidating common
principles of liberty, democracy as well as market economies, in the previous candidate countries in the East. Meanwhile, the Western Balkans, for their part, had
moved away from the open conflicts and exclusionary nationalist politics that kept
hostage their first decade of post-communist transformations (Vachudova´ 2003).
More mature politicians, reformists and committed Europeanists in particular,
have gained strength in government and society, creating a friendlier environment
for the EU-led reform agenda (Pond 2006). The EU policy shift towards the
region, on the one hand, and increasing domestic demand for integration, on
the other, have generated high expectations that enlargement strategy will work to
discipline democratic institution-building and foster post-communist reforms in
the same way that it did in the previous candidates in CEE.
By 2013, European membership had emerged as the cornerstone of the region’s
future, all target countries having advanced up the institutional ladder envisaged by
the SAP (see Table 1.1). Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs, the equivalent of European Agreements) are now signed with all Western Balkan countries
except Kosovo. All countries, except Bosnia and Kosovo, have applied for membership, which opens the path to the final stage of negotiating accession terms.
Macedonia and Serbia are granted full candidate status and are now waiting to start
accession negotiations. Montenegro started negotiations in June 2012. Croatia

08/2006–10/2007

01/2003–06/2006

10/2005–04/2008

11/2005–06/2008

Montenegro

Albania

Serbia

Bosnia Herzegovina

06/2008

06/2010

04/2009

05/2010

04/2004

02/2005

Entering into force of SAA

12/2009
11/2011 positive avis
03/2012 candidate status

04/2009
11/2010 negative avis
11/2011 negative avis

12/2008
11/2010 positive avis
11/2010 candidate status

03/2004
12/2005 positive avis
12/2005 candidate status

02/2003
04/2004 positive avis
06/2004 candidate status

Application for membership

06/2012–present

10/2009 Council
recommends opening
of negotiations

03/2005–06/2011

2005 blocked
2009 blocked

Opening/conclusion of
accession negotiations

Notes
a The contractual relations between the EU and Kosovo are based on different instruments designed by the Commission in the context of non-recognition of Kosovo.
b The Stabilization and Association Process Tracking Mechanism (STM) is a mirror mechanism of SAP to monitor and keep under control reform processes.
c Signing of Stabilization and Association Process Dialogue (SAPD), which is a custom-made mechanism for Kosovo that mirrors SAAs in terms of sectors included
and negotiating dialogue.

Source: European Commission (2011a).

Kosovo

b

11/2002 signing STM
01/2010 SAPDc

03/2000–04/2001

Macedonia

a

04/2000–08/2001

Croatia

Opening/conclusion of SAA
negotiations

Table 1.1 Status of relations between the EU and Western Balkan countries


Europeanization in the Western Balkans 5
meanwhile is held as the exemplary model that has made the big jump to conclude
accession negotiations in 2011, and can look forward to assuming full membership in
2013. The EU has also advanced trade relations with all Western Balkan countries
via the adoption of autonomous trade measures and the early implementation of SAA
trade provisions. Aid has continued to flow under the new Instrument for Preaccession Assistance (IPA), which is explicitly geared towards bringing institutional
reforms into line with the EU standards. Even Kosovo, which is not recognized by all
the EU members, is accommodated in the enlargement process through custom-made
mechanisms and procedures.
The enlargement strategy is centred on the principle of conditionality – the
rewards offered by the EU (most importantly financial assistance and membership)
are conditional on the Western Balkan states meeting demands set by the EU. The
basis of the EU demands, which reflect general democratic norms and more specific standards developed at the EU level, is outlined in the initial Copenhagen
Criteria, different regional approaches, and SAP conditionality (Pippan 2004).
Moreover, each consecutive stage of SAP comes with an increasing load of conditions that the countries need to comply with in order to advance to the next stages
and towards the goal of membership. More recent rules on the accession process
have enhanced the strategy of conditionality to the extent they suggest application
of ‘strict conditionality at all stages of negotiation’ (Council of Europe 2007).
Given the embedment of the Western Balkans in the EU enlargement processes,
Europeanization (a short-hand for the domestic influence of the EU) has emerged
as the dominant approach to the study of EU-led reforms across the region. Similar
to the previous wave of enlargement in CEE, research on the Western Balkans
has made enlargement conditionality the central focus of analyzing the role of the

EU (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2006: 88). After all, both regions share the
main features that have arguably animated the celebrated success of the EU conditionality in CEE, most importantly the substantial rewards underpinning the EU
demands and the strategy of reinforcement by reward (ibid.). However, in contrast
to the previous CEE candidates, most Western Balkan countries consist of borderline cases of transformation or ‘deficient democratizers’ that face unfavourable
domestic conditions and share a poor record of reforms. Yet, very little research is
done on whether and how the challenging factors on the domestic side might undermine the transformative power of the EU in the same way they have delayed and
refracted region’s trajectory of post-communist transformation. Europeanization
studies looking at the domestic side of the equation are still at an early stage, lacking
conceptual detail and comparative evidence on the array of domestic factors that
challenge the role of the EU in difficult cases of democratization (Sedelmeier 2011:
30; Brusis 2005a: 23). Empirical research on Europeanization in the Western
Balkans, on the other hand, remains largely within the realm of expectations and has
yet to consider the domestic factors that set those countries apart and their implications for the presumed impact of Europe (Pond 2006).
This volume brings domestic factors back in, and analyze the transformative
power of the EU against challenging domestic factors in the Western Balkans.
Conceptually, we differentiate the array of domestic factors that characterize


6 Arolda Elbasani
deficient democratizers across agency- and structural-based categories. In the
Balkan context particularly, we distinguish limited stateness as ‘deep structures’
that constrain the capacity of human action to take on and execute the EU rules,
and thus limit the scope of elite-led Europeanization. We suggest that stateness is
the missing link between the transformative power of the EU and the scant willingness and capacities to fully adopt the EU rules across the Balkans. Yet, we maintain
that structural constraints, including problems of stateness, are parameters, which
the domestic agency will have to confront and cope with, rather than insurmountable obstacles, in the course of difficult Europeanization.
We use controlled comparisons among different national cases and issue areas
to investigate the EU and domestic triggers of the Europeanization outcomes. The
empirical chapters take into account the categories of domestic factors outlined in
this introductory chapter, but necessarily approach these factors from various

angles, depending on the particulars of the country and issue being analyzed. In this
way, the empirical chapters can speak to a common research agenda, but also bring
in more case-based idiosyncratic factors and contextualise the path of
Europeanization taken in different countries. The task of the empirical chapters is
to identify the appropriate blend and the intensity of the EU strategy, domestic
choices and state constraints that render intelligible the process of Europeanization
in a given country and area of reform.
Our approach has both intellectual advantages and limitations. In-depth case
studies necessarily bring in various issues that do not always permit neat comparisons and straightforward explanations. Unpacking the box of domestic politics in
difficult cases of democratization in the Western Balkans is also a complex venture
into different layers of post-communist, post-authoritarian and post-conflict challenges. The value of our enterprise is to conceptualize and assess the ‘weight’ of
domestic conditions that might inhibit Europeanization at the receiving end of
enlargement. Our framework bridges Europeanization studies, comparative democratization as well as post-communist and Balkans area studies, which have so far
largely developed as separate areas of research and rarely speak to each other. In
addition, it provides a theoretically informed comparative assessment of similarities and differences of paths of Europeanization across different countries and areas
of reform in the Western Balkan region.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. First, we sketch a
Europeanization approach to the post-communist transformations and distinguish
between different strands of explanations. Second, we unpack the domestic factors that
might challenge the role of the EU at the receiving end of enlargement in the Western
Balkans. The third part discusses the book’s approach towards assessing the role of
EU enlargement. The fourth part provides an overview of the chapters and findings.

Europeanization via enlargement and post-communist
transformation
The process of EU enlargement is largely credited with having supported postcommunist reforms in the candidate countries in the East, with democratization


Europeanization in the Western Balkans 7
being faster and less prone to reversals in countries sharing a strong promise of

membership (Pop-Eleches 2007a: 142). Indeed, enlargement policy is often credited with the quick, coinciding and, to some degree, convergent reforms in CEE
countries which were included in the first wave of Eastern enlargement concluded
in 2005, with Romania and Bulgaria succeeding in 2007 (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2006).
Analytically, the Europeanization perspective on post-communist transformation draws on the large literature that analyzes the impact of the EU on member
states’ polity, politics and policies. The focus here is to connect European and
domestic politics by shifting attention from the European-level orientation of classic integration theories to the domestic level of change (Vink and Graziano 2008:
4). The research agenda also goes beyond a narrow notion of ‘impact’ by absorbing concerns of both institutionalization, i.e. the development of formal and informal rules, procedures, norms and practices; and complex modes of interaction
between the EU and domestic level, instead of a unidirectional impact of Europe
(Vink and Graziano 2008: 17).
Empirically, Europeanization via enlargement extends the scope of research to
include the distinctive ways in which the EU affects post-communist applicant
countries. The EU’s relations with its candidates are different from those with its
member states, and so are the instruments at its disposal, especially the pressure of
conditionality. In addition, during the Eastern enlargement, the EU has developed
a range of tools that enable and complement its policy of conditionality – prescription of required reforms, aid and technical support, systematic monitoring, political dialogue, benchmarking between different candidates and the gate-keeping of
accession according to a candidate’s demonstrated progress (Grabbe 2003: 312–
16). Besides, candidate countries coming from state socialism became subject to
Europeanization while undergoing large-scale regime change involving the installation of new democratic and market economy rules, and, sometimes, even the creation of new states (Dimitrova 2004). This did not only prove to be an immense
process of transformation, but it also meant that multiple reforms had to advance
together in a rough balance in order to prevent general failure. A Europeanization
perspective to post-communist change should, therefore, analyze the influence
of the EU at the intersection of the EU enlargement pressure and the scope and
challenge of post-communist transformation.
Top-down EU conditionality versus contextualized domestic influences
Increasing evidence on uneven reforms across post-communist countries that were
subject to similar EU enlargement policies has contributed to shift Europeanization
research towards problematizing and qualifying the role of the EU vis-a´-vis other
sources of differentiated domestic change. However, the literature remains divided
when it comes to prioritizing the EU- or domestic-level factors and assessing the

magnitude of change that can be attributed to the EU enlargement policies.
The dominant strand of Europeanization research attaches an overwhelming
role to EU enlargement strategy, especially the top-down policy of conditionality,


8 Arolda Elbasani
when explaining the scope of domestic change (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005a). In the context of CEE, the EU has made accession of new candidates contingent on a set of intrusive criteria that were first outlined at the Copenhagen
Council in 1993, and were then operationalized in more detail and expanded further in the so-called Copenhagen documents (Kochenov 2004). These conditions
come with sizable rewards for post-communist elites, especially the highly appreciated ‘carrot’ of membership, which the EU bestows on compliant countries and
withholds from non-compliant ones. Candidate countries have no voice in the
making of the rules that regulate their advance in the accession process. The asymmetrical power that the EU holds in this process, when combined with the high
volume and intrusiveness of the rules attached to membership, have led to a topdown process of rule transfers, and it has arguably allowed the Union unprecedented influence on the restructuring of domestic institutions and the entire range
of public policies in CEE (Pridham 2005; Kubicek 2003). That these conditions
have been, at least partially, designed to address transformation problems and
overlapped with on-going post-communist modernization (Goetz 2001a: 1037)
have increased their appeal to post-communist reformers. The EU’s top-down
enlargement strategy has arguably proven so powerful that ‘Europeanization
superseded the transition, Westernisation, or globalisation of CEE . . . as the dominant motor of institutional change’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2006: 99).
An alternative strand of research, usually grounded in assumptions of comparative politics and post-communist area studies, adopts a more sceptical view of the
EU strategy and its influence on post-communist transitions. Critics of the EU, and
other external factors more generally, share the concern that it is important not to
‘overestimate the EU influence’ (Grabbe 2003: 305) and/or ‘prejudge the role of
the EU vis-a´-vis other sources of domestic change’ (Goetz 2000). This is often the
case with classic research on candidate countries’ Europeanization, which takes
EU conditionality as a guiding analytical concept and then evaluates the results of
reform as measured against the EU prescriptions (Brusis 2005b: 297; Elbasani
2009a: 7–8). The de-contextualized and short-term reform assessments thus
attained are particularly predisposed to decouple the policy output from the evolutionary domestic process and the array of domestic factors that screen, download
and implement the EU requirements. In addition, assumptions on the causal relation between top-down EU pressure and domestic change run into trouble against

accumulated findings that enlargement has generated differential impact across
different countries, issue-areas and time periods (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2009). Critical
accounts of candidate countries’ Europeanization, therefore, call for the need to
contextualize the impact of the EU strategy and bring in more prominently domestic factors as the key to explaining successful rule transfers in the post-communist
space (Vachudova´ 2005; Jacoby 2004; Hughes et al. 2004; Noutcheva 2012).
Thus, the ‘domestic turn’ in Europeanization research has encouraged deeper
introspection into the conditions that facilitate the role of the EU in various national
settings. Linkages with post-communist area studies have proven especially helpful in drawing attention to the variety of ‘domestic conduits’ that do the heavy
lifting to transmit the EU demands into the domestic arena. Yet, Europeanization


Europeanization in the Western Balkans 9
research in general tends to focus on different aspects of the EU strategy, while
relatively little attention is paid to the domestic politics category, which is neither
conceptually specified nor systematically explored (Sedelmeier 2011: 30).

Unpacking domestic contexts and challenging factors
in the Balkans
This section relies on both Europeanization research and post-communist and
Balkan area studies to specify the array of domestic factors that characterize
deficient democratizers in the Western Balkans. In line with much of the
Europeanization research, we distinguish (1) the strength of reformist elites, or
potential EU allies, as the primary conduits of successful EU transfers at the
receiving end of enlargement (Jacoby 2006; Sedelmeier 2011). In the Balkan context, we also identify (2) hindering historical legacies and (3) weak stateness as
interrelated long-term structures or ‘deep conditions’ that shape, if not determine,
the range of possible elite choices, and might hence limit the scope of agencydriven Europeanization (Parrot 1997; Pridham 2000; Diamandourous and Larrabe
2000). These factors should not be seen as insuperable obstacles, but indeed as
parameters, which human agency, whether in the form of individual leaders, elites,
or collective social actors, will have to confront and cope with in the course of
Europeanization, seeking to minimize their restraining impact and to maximise its

freedom to craft new arrangements conducive to successful Europeanization.
The strength of EU domestic allies
Europeanists’ search for domestic conduits of change has, by and large, focused
on the arrays of domestic actors with whom the EU can create some kind of ‘coalition’ to push forward its programme of reforms (Jacoby 2006: 625; Sedelmeier
2011: 14). Accordingly, the EU’s conditional rewards appeal to the circle of
domestic reformist and/or liberal groups who share the preferences of the EU; but
repel groups who resist the EU enlargement agenda. Thus, the EU strategy works
where and when reformist constellations, which tend to ally with the EU, get sufficiently empowered to pursue the EU requirements (Schimmelfennig 2007). In
these cases, the EU rewards tip the domestic balance in favour of reform via
(1) strengthening domestic groups who want much the same as the EU, (2) expanding the number and variety of the EU’s allies, and/or (3) weakening or neutralizing
opponents whose interests are hurt.
The EU strategy of reinforcing domestic allies can encounter far more resistance where the break with the past was rather ambiguous, and the old apparatchiks continued to hold key positions in post-communist politics and governing
structures, such as in the Western Balkans. All across the region, former communist structures have split and morphed into new political parties, but old ruling
cliques were able to survive regime change and convert their previous power into
new political and economic clout (Pond 2006: 274). Very often, old guards


10 Arolda Elbasani
resorted to isolation, nationalism and/or authoritarianism to keep their grip on
power. In fact, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia was a distinct case
among the other CEE experiences because of the way its leaders sparked nationalist discourses and ethnic conflicts as a means to maintain power (Woodward
1995), usually in the absence of a strong opposition offering alternative programmes (Vachudova´ 2003: 144). Even post-communist Albania, which had a
homogenous population, relapsed into blatant authoritarianism and state-led violence under the guidance of a political elite sharing close links with the former
communist regime (Elbasani 2009a).
By the 2000s, the situation in the Western Balkans was resolutely different from
the vicious circle of nationalism, violence and authoritarianism that had locked-in
their distinct path of transformation in the first decade of transition. The exclusionary nationalist and authoritarian politics have yielded to more differentiated
choices and flexible politics favouring negotiation and compromise (Ponds 2006).
Pragmatists betting their fortunes on the process of EU integration have become
better positioned in government and society. From Croatia to Serbia, Montenegro

and Macedonia, and to some extent even in the states that have experienced violent
war atrocities like Kosovo and Bosnia, reformists and the EU allies have become
stronger to compete with and even win over rigid nationalist forces. The region
has thus moved to accumulate more ‘liberal capital’, be it individual leaders, political parties, governing majorities, social groupings and/or a public opinion predominantly favourable to the project of European integration. Such elite circles have
become the turning point of change when and where they were able to sideline
networks that had ‘captured’ transition. Still, quite often in the Balkans, reformists
proved too weak to pursue deep-seated change, embedded, as they were, amidst
hybrid institutions and complicit old and new networks that had everything to lose
from substantial reforms (Pridham 2000).
The weight of structure
The EU’s strategy to strengthen potential domestic allies is a necessary factor, but
it may not be sufficient to generate change as long as domestic actors do not
respond to EU incentives and/or lack the requisite structural capacities to act and
pursue the chosen reforms. The fragility of domestic reformists committed to the
EU agenda draws attention to the structural constraints that enable certain choices
and constrain others.
Historical and sociological accounts of Europeanization draw attention to deeprooted formal and informal structures that constrain relevant actors’ space of
action (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2003: 69). Post-communist area studies also point to historical legacies – either in the form of ethnic cleavages, totalitarian inheritance,
weak civil society or simply political patterns – as confining conditions that limit
the range of possible choices (Ekiert and Hanson 2003). Accordingly, pre-existing
structures constitute ‘deep conditions’ that frame the capacity of human action to
take on and execute new rules and models. As Boduszyn´ski notes in his study of
regime change in former Yugoslavia:


Europeanization in the Western Balkans 11
. . . structure is ‘sticky’: it tends to persist and shape outcomes even as governments and leaders change. Moreover, as a set of confining conditions, it is
rigid: elites find it hard to overcome the constraining influence of structure
even with the best democratic intensions.
(Boduszyn´ski 2010: 252)

At the same time, the event of post-communist transition, when rules, by definition, became subject to contention and redefinition, has created many opportunities for crafting and importing new institutions, especially in the context of EU
enlargement. Transition-cum-enlargement can be perceived as a classic loci of
‘crafting’. Not surprisingly, then, enlargement literature has focused almost exclusively on ‘contemporary structures, institutions and actor dispositions’ (Cirtautas
and Schimmelfennig 2010: 423).
Yet, some of the post-communist countries became notorious for the stickiness
of the former organizational principles and informal behaviours, which continued
to ‘hollow out’ the new institutional transfers (Brusis 2005a; Stephes 2006). The
heritage of the past has been especially problematic in the Western Balkans, which
share a general weakness of reformist coalitions, but also next-to-no prior
democratic experiences, long-term patrimonial state–society relations, poor socioeconomic development, former totalitarian regimes, and predominantly violent and
chaotic modes of transition (Diamandouros and Larrabe 2000: 28). Ethnic heterogeneity and the presence of minorities is another ‘social given’ that has shaped elites’
incentives to mobilize ethnic divisions and exploit nationalism towards concrete
political ends (Boduszyn´ski 2010: 17–22). The violent dissolution of Yugoslavia
can also be seen as a more recent ‘critical juncture’ that has contributed to ‘lockingin’ ethnic divisions and patchy institutional arrangements. The use of violence has a
negative effect on the future of regime change, as it deepens the grievances between
winners and losers and reduces the chances for smooth and consensual reforms
(Parrot 1997). In addition, the vacuum of state authority created during the collapse
of the federal state has enabled the mushrooming of informal networks that use and
prey on the formal institutions, reducing them to empty shells incapable of performing the tasks required by the EU (Batt 2004a: 18–19; Kostovicova and BojicicDzelilovic 2008: 19). Even Albania, which transferred as an intact territory into its
post-communist existence, suffered a violent breakdown of state authority in 1997,
which enabled the collusion of illegal networks within the highest echelons of
political power (Della Rocca 2000). While historically-confining conditions have
defined a generally-problematic ‘Balkan’ category among the universe of postcommunist cases, weak stateness is perhaps the most crucial dimension of their
difficult democratization trajectory, and requires special attention.
The breaks of stateness
Studies on post-communist transitions in general, and the troubled experience of
the Western Balkans in particular, identify stateness2 as one of the macro factors
binding the past with the future and confining the parameters of regime change

12 Arolda Elbasani
(Linz and Stepan 1996). As Parrot reiterates, ‘the direction of post-communist
development has been [largely] shaped by whether struggles over political change
have taken place within the arena of a firmly established nation state’ (Parrot
1997: 9). Accordingly, where post-communist regime change has coincided with
the creation of new states, state-building has slowed down and complicated the
prospect of reforms. Different studies have identified multiple problems related
to the scaffolding of the new states. In this book, we define stateness-related
obstacles in terms of (1) contestation of state sovereign authority, and (2) lack of
state’s bureaucratic capacities to logistically implement its decisions (Fortin
2010: 656).
The problem of stateness as a contested sovereign authority arises when ‘there
are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community and . . . who has the right to citizenship in that state’ (Linz and Stephan 1996:
16). State sovereignty, either as externally recognized capacity to engage with
other actors in the international system or as internal sovereignty to exercise selfgovernance, presupposes the existence of a consolidated national ‘unit’. The lack
of a firmly established nation-state sharing a common sense of community that is
above mere opinion and agreement thwarts the democratic process (Parrot 1997:
9) and the capacity of a country to pursue the EU’s agenda (Noutcheva 2009;
2012). Contested stateness triggers secessionist movements, controversies over
national identities, disputed borders, ethnic tensions and reconciliation problems
that absorb much of the energy needed for reforms. As Crawford and Lijphart’s
study on the trajectories of post-communist regime change suggests, ‘the legacy of
incomplete nation-building is perhaps the most important threat to the project of
economic and political liberalisation’ (Crawford and Lijphart 1997: 25). In the
Western Balkans, the scaffolding of new states amidst clashing positions on
national identity, ethnic claims and state borders is similarly expected to challenge
the parallel processes of post-communist transformation and EU-led reforms.
The other problem of stateness is related to the lack of the infrastructural capacities to exercise state authority and enforce the law. A weak, even if consolidated,
state apparatus is typically one that
. . . is lacking functional bureaucracies, is hopelessly ensnared in losing battles

with predatory rent-seekers ravaging its resources, powerless to monitor
lower state officials, unable to extract resources from the population, and
operating in a social milieu that renders the rapid regeneration of state structures largely impossible.
(Ganev 2005: 428)
Infrastructural weakness can be a derivative of contested sovereignty, but might
well feature in consolidated nation states. Disorderly transitions across the region
have created ample opportunities for ruling elites to emasculate the state by ‘privatizing’ decision-making mechanisms and/or exercising government prerogatives
on behalf of clientelistic interests. Patterns of clientelism, defined as political


Europeanization in the Western Balkans 13
rulers’ offer of personal rewards to their clients in the form of public sector jobs
and the distribution of public resources such as licences, contracts and projects in
return for votes, has been a distinct historical feature of socio-political relations
across the Balkans (Diamandourous and Larrabe 2000: 29–33). Combining the
logic of appropriation of public office for private ends with the logic of resistance
to institutional authority, clientelistic relations undermine the capacity of the state,
weaken its legitimacy, and result in large but ultimately weak states. This type of
state, captured by particular interests and subject to elites’ predatory project of
extracting state resources, is often short of necessary capacities to implement its
policy vision (Krastev 2002).
State-building as a process of settling borders, consolidating national unity and/
or strengthening institutional capacities remains, at best, incomplete across the
Western Balkan region. Bosnia and Kosovo remain contested states that possess
limited sovereign authority and are run as protectorates. Secessionism looms large
as a potential threat in some of the countries in the region. Moreover, all Western
Balkan states, despite their sovereign attributes, suffer from weak governing
capacities when compared to CEE (Kaufman et al. 2010). In the new political
environment, featuring strengthened reformists and pro-EU allies, the issue
remains how to turn the delayed trajectory of regime change and mounting structural deficit into a successful story of state- and institution-building. Whereas one

decade ago the EU was busy ousting nationalists and uniting moderates, the question today remains whether EU enlargement can succeed in locking-in the success
of moderate groups and energize commitment for reforms against the many structural obstacles, especially the unfinished process of state-building.

Assessing the role of the EU
Our focus on domestic factors and structural legacies seeks to bring to the fore the
distinctive characteristics of the Western Balkan region, which have so far been
ignored in the large Europeanization via enlargement research. However, the
assumed relation between structural obstacles and effective Europeanization is
neither deterministic nor linear. Indeed, the task of our empirical chapters is to
identify the mixture of the EU strategy-, domestic elites- and structural-related
factors that render intelligible the dynamics of Europeanization in a particular
country, specific area of reform and at a given time period.
The methodological approach
The contributions to this volume investigate the domestic impact of the EU rules
and the conditions for their effectiveness in different national cases and areas of
reform. The empirical analysis covers the whole spectrum of national cases in the
Western Balkans and a wide variety of reform areas, including state bureaucracy,
the judiciary, electoral competition, environmental management, cooperation with


14 Arolda Elbasani
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), economic
liberalization, foreign policy, general institution-building and stabilization. This
variety of empirical cases enables us to compare and contrast the role of EU- and
domestic-related factors to the extent they feature different forms of EU involvement, EU conditions and related rewards, as well as different blends of agencyand structural-based domestic challenges.
In line with our focus on domestic factors that test the role of the EU in the target countries in the Western Balkans, most chapters are case studies which provide
a contextualized account of the adoption of EU rules. The empirical chapters delve
into the role of agency- and structural-related domestic factors as outlined in the
introduction, but also bring into the analysis more case-based idiosyncratic factors,
and specify how these factors combine to influence the path of Europeanization.

Finally, all our chapters focus on long-term processes and dynamics of rule
adoption, rather than analyzing one-shot moments of compliance with the EU prescriptions. Such focus on extended processes of rule adoption enables our volume
not only to trace and distinguish the ‘added value’ of the EU against other international and domestic factors at play, but also explore the evolution – including the
stability and functioning – of the rules and institutions established as part of
enlargement. More particularly, it allows us to differentiate between the short-term
formal adoption and the implementation of EU-driven rules, and to corroborate different explanatory factors with different stages and degrees of domestic transfers.
EU rules and degrees of domestic adoption
In the framework of this study, EU rules consist of the Copenhagen Criteria, SAPrelated conditions and the wider EU standards in different areas of the acquis communitaire. These broad categories are usually operationalized in more detail in
various EU documents, including regional and country-specific strategies, progress reports, European partnership agreements and other contractual agreements,
but also the EU’s various forms of dialogue with the respective countries.
We also distinguish between three forms of rule adoption that correspond to
different degrees of institutionalization of the EU rules: (1) verbal, (2) legal, and
(3) substantive. Verbal adoption is characterized by domestic actors’ rhetorical
endorsement of the EU’s norms and reform prescriptions. This occurs when political actors’ support for the EU’s rules is confined at the level of rhetoric, for reasons
related to willingness (Downes et al. 1996) and/or capacity (Chayes and Chayes
1993). Legal adoption is the subsequent step to verbal compliance. It consists of
attempts to pass legislation or establish formal institutions and procedures in line
with the EU rules. Legal transposition may range from debates on the floor of
parliament on proposed EU-friendly draft legislation, to the actual, legal adoption
of comprehensive legislative measures relating to the different aspects of the EU’s
rules (Saatcioglu 2010). The last stage of substantive compliance goes beyond
verbal and legal compliance to include implementation of the EU rules. We define
implementation as the process through which external norms are transposed,