Universal basic income and the reshaping of democracy towards a citizens stipend in a new political order

SpringerBriefsinPoliticalScience
Moreinformationaboutthisseriesathttp://​www.​springer.​com/​series/​8871


BurkhardWehner

UniversalBasicIncomeandtheReshapingof
Democracy
TowardsaCitizens’StipendinaNewPoliticalOrder


BurkhardWehner
Horst,Germany

ISSN2191-5466
e-ISSN2191-5474
SpringerBriefsinPoliticalScience
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Contents
1Introduction
2BasicIncome—AProjectforGenerations
2.​1UnconditionalBasicIncome—AConsensus-BuildingTerm?​
2.​2TheTransitiontotheBasicIncomeSystem—AnImpossibleTask?​
References
3ALong-TermVision
3.​1MaximalMarketTransparency
3.​2MaximalTransparencyinRedistribution
3.​3BasicIncomeandSocialSecurity
3.​4BasicIncome,MinimumWageandFullEmploymentGuarantee
3.​5Optimization,NotMaximization
References
4BasicIncomeinOtherPolicyAreas
4.​1BasicIncomeandBusinessCyclePolicy
4.​2BasicIncomeandDemographicPolicy
4.​3BasicIncomeforNationsinNeed
References
5CommonObjectionstoBasicIncome
5.​1TaxBurdenandWorkIncentives

5.​2FurtherObjections
References
6TheRoleofPilotStudies
6.​1ExperimentstoDate
6.​2TheLogicofBasicIncomeStudies
6.​3TheCaseforNationwideExperiments
6.​4CandidatesforNationwideExperiments
6.​5PrinciplesofSponsoring
6.​6PotentialSponsors
6.​7EpistemicObjectives
References


7BasicIncome,DemographicStructureandtheSizeoftheState
References
8BasicIncomeandtheReshapingofDemocracy
8.​1IntellectualOverburdeningofPolicymakers
8.2BasicIncomeStates—InvoluntaryAssociations?
8.​3IntellectualOverburdeningofCitizens
References
9AProjectforthe22ndCentury?​
9.​1TwoBasicErrors
9.​2FormationofConsciousness
9.​3ThePoliticalDetourasaShortcut
9.​4TheFutureofBasicIncomeActivism


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BurkhardWehner,UniversalBasicIncomeandtheReshapingofDemocracy,SpringerBriefsinPoliticalScience
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1.Introduction
BurkhardWehner1
(1) Horst,Germany


BurkhardWehner
Email:
Thediscussionofuniversalbasicincomehascometoadeadlock.Sofar,thequestions
whether,when,where,andhowauniversalbasicincomecouldeventuallybeputintopolitical
practicehaveplayedaminorroleinthisdiscussion.However,thesequestionsbelongnotat
theend,butatthebeginningofthedebate.
Thislineofinquirybringsthepoliticallogicofbasicincomeintofocus.Thislogiccarries
highlycontroversialpoliticalandscientificimplications.Itrevealsthatthepoliticsofbasic
incomemustbediscussedinamuchwidercontextandoveramuchlongertimehorizonthan
hithertodone.
Inthelightofthislogic,theinstitutionsandrulesofconventionaldemocracyareshownto
beinsuperablebarrierstouniversalbasicincome—barriersnotonlytoconcretepolitical
implementation,butalsotolarge-scaleandnationwidebasicincomeexperiments.
Inthecontextofpresentdemocracies,basicincomewouldneitherfindsufficientsupport
withvoters,norcoulditbeimplementedwiththeexceptionalforesightandcompetence
necessaryforsuchaproject.
Thisbookoutlinesalternativepoliticalinstitutions,rules,andstrategiesthatcould
eventuallymakeuniversalbasicincomepoliticallyviable.


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BurkhardWehner,UniversalBasicIncomeandtheReshapingofDemocracy,SpringerBriefsinPoliticalScience
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2.BasicIncome—AProjectforGenerations
BurkhardWehner1

(1) Horst,Germany


BurkhardWehner
Email:
ThisbookisalargelyextendedversionandinpartatranslationofWehner(2018).It
summarizesargumentsfromformerpublicationsoftheauthor.Foranoverviewseehttp://​
www.​reformforum-neopolis.​de/​reformforum/​sozialstaat.​htmlorhttp://​www.​reformforumneopolis.​de/​reformforum/​gesamtkatalog.​html.

2.1 UnconditionalBasicIncome—AConsensus-Building
Term?
Unconditionalbasicincomeisdifficulttodiscussfreefromemotionandideology.
Controversiesinthisfieldresultlessfromdifferencesineconomiccalculationsthanfrom
politicalandideologicalprejudice.Thediscussionthereforecannotbeobjectiveandsober
unlessthepoliticallogicofunconditionalbasicincomeisfullyrevealed.Thislogicisthekey
tothequestionofwhether,how,where,andwhenanunconditionalbasicincomecouldbe
implemented.
Fromaneconomicpointofviewatleastonethingshouldbeuncontested:an
unconditionalbasicincomeisaffordable.Butthisisofcourseatrivialfact.Therewillbeno
denyingthatthereisanamountgreaterthanzerothatthestatecanregularlypayitscitizens
asbasicincome.Thedisputebecomesacute,however,ashigheramountsofbasicincomeare
discussed.Then—dependingonideologicaldisposition—thisbasicincomemayberegarded
asanoutgrowthofeconomicignorance,asaleftistutopia,orasafigleafofaneo-liberal
system.ThefactthatunconditionalbasicincomehasbeenincorporatedinEuropeanparty
programsandisincreasinglydiscussedinprintmediaandtalkshowsmakesthedebateeven
morediffuse.Ideologicalbiaseswillnotbeovercomeevenifthesocialandeconomic
implicationsofunconditionalbasicincomeareexaminedinevermorestate-organizedfield
trials.Suchtrialscanprovideonlyavagueindicationoftheimpactofaparticularvariantand
amountofthebasicincomeinaparticularwelfarestateandsocialenvironment.Theywillnot
andcannotreconcilecurrentconceptualcontroversiesaboutunconditionalbasicincome.

Inthepast,manyadvocatesofunconditionalbasicincomehavetakenitforgrantedthat
thisincomemustsecureasufficientlivelihoodbyitself.Thehigherthebasicincome,


however,themoredifficultitbecomestoprovethatitcouldbefinancedinawaythatis
politicallyacceptable.Mostdefendersofbasicincomedonottendtobeveryspecific
regardinghowitwouldbefinanced.Itisoftenunclearwhichtaxesandwhichtaxratesareto
beusedforfinancingandhowexistingsocialsecurityandsocialtransfersshouldbereformed
whenthebasicincomeisimplemented.Itisalsooftenleftunclearwhoshouldbeentitledto
receivebasicincome,andtherearedivergentnotionsaboutthedisbursementmode,in
particularthepossibleoffsetofthebasicincomewiththeincometax.Mostchallengingisthe
matterofdesigningaprocessoftransitionfromtheexistingsocialsecuritysystem.The
presentdebatehasfailedtomakeclearthewinnersandlosersunderanunconditionalbasic
incomeregimeandinparticularhowtheserelativeeffectsmaydevelopovertime.Suchnontransparencyinducesanxietyamongpresumedlosers,anditcanmakethemreceptiveto
populistagitationagainstbasicincomeproposals.Moreover,manyadvocatesof
unconditionalbasicincomeseekthesupportofaparticularideologicalgroupbutpresent
ideasobjectionabletoothergroups.Thistensionmayalsocontributetoageneralnegativity
towardunconditionalbasicincome.Thereby,theoverwhelmingrejectionofunconditional
basicincomeinthe2016Swissreferendumdidnotcomeasasurprise;onlyabout10%ofthe
electoratevotedinfavor.
Asclearasthisoutcomewas,itremainsunclearpreciselywhatwasrejected.Therejection
wascertainlynotaboutunconditionalbasicincomeinanyformandamount.Rather,the
electoraterejectedanorderofmagnitudeofabasicincomeinformallyrecommendedby
thosewhodesignedthereferendumproposal.
Suchablatantfailureofareferenduminevitablyaffectspublicconsciousness.Losers
includenotmerelyindividualsandorganizations,butalsotermsandconcepts.Inthiscase,a
possiblelosermaybetheterm“unconditionalbasicincome”itself.Eveniflargepartsora
majorityofcitizenssympathizewiththistermasanabstractconcept,ithasbecomeapparent
thattheoverwhelmingmajoritydistrustsitspracticability.
Undersuchcircumstances,itcouldbehelpfultoatleasttemporarilyreplacethisterm

withamoreneutralalternative.Thisreframingcouldatanyratehelpdissociatethebasic
incomeconceptfromthewidespreadassumptionthatitwouldaloneensureadecent
livelihoodpreferablyabovethelevelguaranteedbythecurrentwelfaresystem.Abasic
incomemustbynomeansreachthisleveltoinstillitsmanypositiveeffects.
Theuseofnewtermsforknownconceptscan,ofcourse,alsocreatenewconfusion.
However,thetermunconditionalbasicincomecaninthecurrentdiscussioneasilybe
replacedbyafamiliaralternativesuchas“citizens’allowance”or“citizens’stipend”.1
Suchtermsalsohaveturbulenthistories.Theyhavebeenassociatedwithprejudices,have
insomeEuropeancountriesbeeninstrumentalizedinpartypolitics,andhavebeenused
ambiguouslyinpublicdiscourse.Nevertheless,theirusedatessufficientlyfarbacktocarry
alternativeconnotations.Movingforward,thetermcitizens’stipendcanthereforebegiven
preferencetothemorefamiliartermsunconditionalanduniversalbasicincome.This
reframingmighthelptoexplorethepotentialforpoliticalconsensusonthismatterwithout
bias.Inthefollowing,basicincomeisusedonlyasamoregeneralterm,whereastheterm
citizens’stipendmostlyreferstothespecificbasicincomeschemeoutlinedinthisessay.

2.2 TheTransitiontotheBasicIncomeSystem—An


ImpossibleTask?
Unconditionalbasicincomeismostlydiscussedasifitwereanordinarypoliticalissue
comparabletosomethinglikeataxreform.Butthismissesthepoint.Thedecisionto
introduceabasicincomelackspoliticalprecedent.Itsextremelylong-termperspectivewould
markagroundbreakingprocessofchangeneverpreviouslyaccessedbyconventional
democracy.Politicalimaginationinthismatterisaccordinglypoorlydeveloped.
Indiscussingsuchaseeminglyradicalconceptasacitizens’stipend,twoaspectsmustbe
strictlyheldapart:thelong-termgoalandthetransitionalprocessesprecedingit.Acitizens’
stipendwouldbemarkedbylongrun,qualitativesocialchangedefinedbywhetherornotthe
societywillinthelongrunbemoreprosperous,dynamic,fair,free,lively,andcreative.In
contrast,atransitionprocesswouldbringtotheforefrontthequestionofinitialwinnersand

losers.Lossesandgainscanbeeconomic,butalsoideologicalandpolitical—i.e.gainsand
lossesofinterpretivesovereignty,electoralvotes,influence,andpower.Preciselythelatter
are—atleastimplicitly—themostcontroversialissuesinthecurrentpublicdebateabout
unconditionalbasicincome.Theprogram’sfiercestopponents,therefore,aretobefound,for
themostpart,wherelossofpower,prominence,significance,andimportanceismostlikelyto
besufferedduringandasaresultofasystemchange.
Incontrast,afar-sighteddiscussionaboutthecitizens’stipendpushesthearguments
beyondsuchshort-termdisputes.Prioritywouldinsteadbegiventodiscussingthelong-term
socialandpoliticalobjectivetofostertheemergenceofanewsocietalstate.
Oneofthemajorobjectivesofthecitizens’stipendsystemistomakethepoliticaldispute
overthedistributionofincomeandprosperityeasiertounderstandandlessdivisiveand
therebytofostersocialpeaceandconsent.Thatadvocatesandopponentsofunconditional
basicincomestillopposeeachotherfromseeminglyirreconcilablepositionsistherefore
evidenceofamisunderstandingandshowsthattheconceptwasintroducedintothepublic
discoursewithfalsepremises.
Onecouldarguethattheintroductionofabasicincomewouldinevitablyproducewinners
andlosers,thatthelosersmightbethemajority,andthatthereforeaharshpoliticaldebate
abouttheissueisinevitableandevennecessaryinademocracy.Citizens,stakeholders,
politicians,opinionleaders,andexpertswouldthenrightlyaskthemselveswhethertheirown
interestsandtheinterestsoftheinstitutionsandorganizationstowhichtheyfeelattached
arerespectedandwhichconvictions,whetherpolitical,ideological,scientificorothers,might
erodeinabasicincomesystem.Fromthisperspective,theintroductionofabasicincome
withbroadpoliticalconsensusisillusory,andthepoliticallogicofthebasicincomecanbe
nothingmorethanalogicofconflictofinterests.
Thisclaimwouldbeappropriateifthedecisionaboutabasicincomesystemwere
imaginedasacommoncaseofdemocraticpoliticsandtherebyasamatterofcontest
betweenpartiesandpartycoalitionsforelectoralvotes.Itwouldthenbeplausiblethat
somedayacoalitionofpartiesfavoringbasicincomewouldimpulsivelyseizeanopportunity
topassabasicincomelawwithaparliamentarymajority,howevernarrow.Butsuchalaw
couldequallyeasilybelaterabolishedunderdifferentpoliticalconditions.Consequently,

unconditionalbasicincomecouldthereafterbepoliticallydiscreditedforgenerations.
Advocatesofbasicincomewouldthereforebewelladvisedtobewareofanyshort-term
politicalsuccess.EveninSwitzerland,areferendumwinin2016wouldatbesthavebeena


Pyrrhicvictory.
Anyattempttorapidlyintroduceabasicincomewouldinevitablyresultincomplex
overlapswiththenon-transparentexistingwelfaresystem,furtherheighteningconfusion.
Thisperceivedthreattotheexistingwelfarealonecouldbesufficienttoreverseanyinitial
euphoria.Anxietiesandconcernsaboutdistributionofwealthandincomecouldbefueled
moreeasilythaneverwithpopulistandideologicalslogans.Abasicincomethatisnot
sustainedbyawideandreliablepoliticalmajorityfromtheoutsetmaythereforenotbeseen
asdependableintermsofoutlayandtaxliabilityandlevelofcomplementarysocialsecurity.
Ifnotembeddedinacoherentconceptforalong-termsystemtransition,thebasicincome
wouldmakesocialpolicyevenmorecomplicated,lesstransparent,andmoreconflict-prone
thanbefore.
Howelsethencouldthetransitionfromtheexistingsystemtoabasicincomebe
imagined?Howcoulditbekeptapartfromthetypicalpoliticalquarrelswiththeirpopulist
simplifications?Howcoulditbeexemptedfromthebanalityofcommondemocraticelection
campaignsandfromtheerraticeffectsoffrequentlychangingparliamentarymajorities?
Themostobviousand,infact,themostplausibleanswertothesequestionsis:basic
incomecannotwork,atleastnotinthedemocracywehave.Inotherwords,ourdemocracy
doesnotprovideadequateconditionsfortheintroductionofabasicincomesystem.
Skepticsofbasicincomewouldeasilyacceptthis.Theywouldarguethatthebasicincome
projectisnoreasontoquestionexistingdemocraticrulesandprocedures;thatdemocracy
shouldnotadapttoabasicincomesystem,butthewelfarestatemustadapttotheexisting
democracy;andthattheresultingrestrictionsonthedesignofthewelfarestatemust
thereforebeaccepted—thatis,ifthebasicincomeprojectisimpracticableindemocratic
politics,thisisthefaultofbasicincome,notofdemocracy.
Theemphasisonthisdirectionofcausalityisthemostconvenientreaction.Buta

completelydifferentconclusioncouldbedrawnifthequestionwere,forexample,putinthis
way:couldthepoliticalimpracticabilityofbasicincomepointtoafundamentalshortcoming
ofthepoliticalordertohandlegreatlong-termreforms?Ifthiswereso,itmustbeasked
whetherandhowthebasicincomeprojectcouldbesavedfromtheshortcomingsofthe
existingparliamentarydemocracy;whetherexistingdemocracycouldbefurtherdeveloped
sothatthebasicincomeprojectwouldatleastinthelongrunbecomepoliticallyfeasible.
Thismayatthefirstglanceseemtobeanexaggerated,overlyradicaland,therefore,
absurdquestion.Whetherandhowabsurditis,however,dependssolelyonthereformsto
whichdemocracyneedbesubjectedforthebenefitofthebasicincomeproject.
Theassumptionthataprojectsuchasthecitizens’stipendcouldactuallyoverstrain
existingdemocracydrawsuponpoliticalreality.Thenotionisillustratedbymanyabandoned,
aborted,andfailedpoliticalreformsthathaveplacedfarlesserdemandsonthefarsightedness,reason,andmoralityofpolicymakers.Sowhy,onemightask,shoulddemocratic
states,whichhavefailedonsomanylessertasks,developunprecedentedforesightand
creativepowerin,ofallthings,implementingbasicincome?Tothisthereisnoplausible
answer.
Thatexistingdemocraticprocedureswouldnotbeadequatetobasicincomeprojectscan
beinferredfromexperience,butequallyconvincingfromphilosophicalarguments.John
Rawls,inATheoryofJustice(Rawls1971),arguedthatdecisionmakersondistributional
justiceshouldbedisinterestedpersonsforwhomnothingpersonalisatstake.Thisaspectof


thedebatemayatfirstsightseempurelytheoretical,butitisacompellingargument.Rawls
suggeststhatbasicdecisionsaboutdistributionaljusticeshouldbemadeunderafictitious
temporary“veilofignorance”aboutones’personalcircumstances.Insuchafictitious
condition,currentinterestsandconflictsofinterestwouldnotaffecttheoutcomeofthe
decision-makingprocess.
Undertheveilofignorance,everyonewouldfearfindinghim-orherselfamongtheleast
advantagedofasocietyaftertheveilofignoranceislifted.Everyonewouldthereforewantto
makeprovisionsthattheleastadvantagedwillbeaswelloffaspossible.Inthistheoretical
condition,conflictsofinterestandassociatedpoliticalphenomenasuchaspartydisputes,

populistagitation,andideologicalpolemicsareofnoimportanceinsocialpolitics.Thus,a
societybasedonsolidarityratherthanonconflictmanagementwoulddowhateveritcouldto
optimizethewell-beingofitsleastadvantagedcitizens.
Inrealdemocraticdecision-makingprocesses,citizensandpoliticiansarenotinspiredby
suchphilosophicalthinking,andaccordingly,democraticpracticeisfarfromthescenario
conceivedbyRawls.Yetmorepressingisthequestionofhowpoliticalconditionscouldbe
moldedtoenablepoliticianstoconsiderRawlsiancriteriaformattersasessentialasthe
introductionofabasicincomesystem,i.e.tomakesuchdecisionsasunprejudicedand
unselfishaspossible.
Thismayseemutopianatfirstsight,butitispreciselyinthecontextofthebasicincome
issuethataviablesolutiontothisproblempresentsitself.Theinfluenceofself-intereston
eventualbasicincomelegislationcouldbeeliminatedbyaseeminglyverysimpleartifice.To
thisend,thepolicydecisioncouldrefertoabasicincomefromwhichlivinggenerationsare
excluded.Inthatcase,livinggenerationswouldnotdecideonabasicincomeforthemselves,
butfortheirdescendants.2Inthisscheme,nolivingcitizenorpoliticianwouldhavecauseto
beanxiousaboutmaterialorotherpersonaldisadvantagesresultingfromtheintroductionof
abasicincomesystem.
Suchadecision-makingschemewouldapplyifadecisionweretobemadeona
constitutionalamendmentstipulatingthefollowinginTable2.1.
Table2.1 Constitutionalamendmentforacitizens’stipend
Abasicincomesystemistobeintroduced
Allcitizensofallfuturebirthyearswillbelifelongrecipientsofbasicincome
Claimsofformerlyborncitizenstotheexistingsocialpolicysystemwillremainunaffectedbythesystemchange
Furtherdetailsaretoberegulatedbylegislation

Suchadecision-makingsituationwouldatleastbeclosetotheidealofthephilosophical
thoughtexperiment.Nolivingcitizen—andthusnopartyinvolvedinthepoliticaldecisionmaking—wouldbenegativelyaffectedbythesystemchangeortransitionprocess.Ifcitizens
andpolicymakersshowedsomeempathicinterestinthewell-beingofthenext-born,a
decisionintheRawlsianspiritwouldensueandtheamendmentwouldbepassed.
Withthisdecision,generationstocomewouldgrowintosuchacitizens’stipendsystem

asmatterofcourse,andthepreviousgenerationswouldremainentitledtothesamesocial
benefitsandburdensasintheoldsystem.Inthetransitionalperiod,therefore,oldandnew
welfare-stateruleswouldstandsidebyside,oneforthecitizensofyoungerbirthcohortsand
theotherforthecitizensoftheformer.Thelivingaswellasthesucceedinggenerations,the


oldandthenewcitizens,couldlookforwardtothetransitionperiodequallyatease.The
participantsoftheoldsystemwouldgraduallyvanish,andthissystemwouldthusdisappear
graduallyandwithoutcauseforconflict.Inthisway,oppositiontotheintroductionofbasic
incomewouldbereducedtoaminimum,andaccordinglythechancesforpolitical
implementationwouldbemaximized.
Evenwithsuchadelayedsystemchange,therewouldofcoursebeoverlapsbetweenthe
oldandthenewwelfarerules.Forexample,ifbasicincomeweretobeimmediatelyeffective
forallnewbornchildren,thenformersocialtransferssuchaschildren’sallowancesandothers
wouldimmediatelycease.Inthatcase,personalinterestswouldbeatstakeatleastforliving
prospectiveparents,whowouldthennotbefullyimpartialinfaceofthesystemchange.
Thisriskcouldbemitigatedifthebenefitstowhichparentsareentitledundertheold
ruleswerecontinuedandthebasicincomeforthenewbornwereaccordinglysuspendedfora
periodoftwoorthreedecades.Immediatelyafterthatperiodallcitizensbornintheyears
aftertheresolutiononthecitizens’stipendsystemwouldthensimultaneouslybecomebasic
incomerecipients.
Inthecontextoftraditionaldemocracyitmaytakeanextraordinaryefforttoengagein
long-termpoliticalthinkingthatreferstosuchdistantperiods.Evencommittedadvocatesof
basicincomemaynoteasilycometotermswiththeprospectofsuchalonglead-timefor
theirproject.Butanyvalidobjectionstotheapproachoutlinedherewouldalsohavetobe
basedonconcretelong-termtransformationscenariosthatcouldopenlong-termprospects
forsustainablepoliticalmajorities.
Ifabasicincomesystemwereintroducedasacitizens’stipendsystemintheprocedure
outlinedhere,itwouldonlybefullyimplementedafterthedeathofthelastcitizenlivingatits
start—perhapsacentury.Inaddition,weshouldallowhalfacenturyofpoliticalleadtimefor

thesystemtobeagreedupon.Therefore,thecompleteprocessofsystemchangewouldtake
atleastacenturyandahalf.Thisdelaymaysoundsobering,butintheabsenceofrealistic
alternativesonecanonlyengageinahopefulstruggleforsuchalong-termsystemtransition
orinahopelesseffortforafasterone.
Evenwithsuchanapproach,thetransitionwouldrequireanextremedegreeofpolitical
farsightedness.Butthisrequirementisofcoursenolongerasingularfeatureinpolitics.
Likewiseinotherpoliticalareas,increasinglylong-termdecisionshavetobemadewhich
haveseriousorevenirreversibleeffectsonthelivingconditionsoffuturegenerations.
Examplesincludeclimatepolicy,populationpolicy,migrationpolicy,resourcepolicy,and
peacepolicy.
Theissueofpoliticalcompetencewouldbelessconcerningforbasicincomeifthe
achievementsofdemocraticpolicyintheseareasweresatisfactory.Theopposite,however,is
true,asclimateandenergypolicyandalonglistofmistaken,delayed,neglected,andfailed
reformsinotherpolicyareashaveillustrated.Theseexamplesalonesuggestthat
conventionaldemocraticpoliticsisnotuptothetaskofsuccessfullyintroducingabasic
incomesystem.Thistaskwouldputanadditionalhighlycomplexburdenondemocratic
policymakers,parties,parliaments,andgovernments,andpredictablystrainthemfarbeyond
capacity.Citizensshouldthereforebewareofhopingforthecompetentimplementationofa
basicincomeschemebyconventionaldemocraticgovernments.Evenpoliticiansacutely
urgedtotakeonabasicincomeprojectmighthavepresentimentsofanintellectual
insufficiency,andtheymightthereforetrytofendoffsuchimpositionbydeliberatepassivity.


Passivitywouldbethefavoredpoliticalattitudeforyetanotherreason.Inthecaseofa
systemchangepostponedsofarintothefuture,personalinterestswouldbewidely
eliminated,andthusadecisionforabasicincomesystemwouldbepurelyamatterofreason.
Forsuchdecisionsoutsidetherealmofpersonalinterest,commitmentandenthusiasmare
difficulttoinspire,andthereforetheissuewouldlikelyencounterwidespreadpolitical
indifference.Thesemotivationsholdtrueforcitizens,andinconsequencealsoapplyto
politicians.Thelesspersonallycommittedcitizensaretoapoliticalproject,thefewerbenefits

partiesandpoliticianscanexpectintermsofvotes,prestige,influence,andpower.Thus,as
strongasthetheoreticalargumentforadecision-makingschemeasoutlinedabovemaybe,
thisschememightnotbecapableofcreatingthenecessarypoliticalmomentumin
conventionaldemocraticprocesses.
Conventionaldebatesaboutdemocracyprovidenoanswertothisdilemma.These
debatesarelargelyconcernedwiththequestionwhethertheproceduresofrepresentative
democracyyieldsufficientlyhighqualitypolicyoutcomesorwhethertheoutcomescouldbe
improvedbyproceduresofdirectdemocracy.
Thisdebate,however,hasnorelevancetothequestionofhowtodecideonthe
introductionofabasicincomesystemforfuturegenerations.Nopoliticianandnopolitical
partycouldclaimtohaveamandatebythosewhowillbeaffectedbysuchadecision.
Correspondingly,nolivingcitizenandconsequentlynovotercouldclaimthathisinterestsare
atstake.Whichpersonsorinstitutionscouldlegitimatelydecideonabasicincomeforfuture
generationsisaquestionthatmust,therefore,beansweredbeyondtheboundariesofcurrent
discourseaboutdemocracy.

References
RawlsJ(1971)Atheoryofjustice.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge
WehnerB(1990)DerlangeAbschiedvomSozialismus(Thelongfarewelltosocialism).AntonHain,Frankfurta.M.
WehnerB(1992)DerNeueSozialstaat:Vollbeschäftigung,EinkommensgerechtigkeitundStaatsentschuldung(Thenewsocial
state:fullemployment,fairincomedistributionandtheredemptionofpublicdebt).WestdeutscherVerlag,Opladen
[Crossref]
WehnerB(1997)DerNeueSozialstaat:EntwurfeinerneuenWirtschafts-undSozialordnung(Thenewsocialstate.Outlineofa
newsocialandpoliticalorder).WestdeutscherVerlag,Opladen
[Crossref]
WehnerB(2018)DiepolitischeLogikdesbedingungslosenGrundeinkommens:ZumBürgergeldim22.Jahrhundert(Thepolitical
logicofunconditionalbasicincome:towardsacitizens’stipendinthe22ndcentury).Springer,Wiesbaden

Footnotes
1 ThealternativeGermantermintroducedbytheauthoris“Bürgergeld”(Wehner1990).

2 ThisconceptwasproposedinWehner(1992,Chap.6.3)andWehner(1997,Chap.6.3).




©TheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicensetoSpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2019
BurkhardWehner,UniversalBasicIncomeandtheReshapingofDemocracy,SpringerBriefsinPoliticalScience
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3.ALong-TermVision
BurkhardWehner1
(1) Horst,Germany


BurkhardWehner
Email:

3.1 MaximalMarketTransparency
Thebasicincomesystemisadistantgoal,andallcurrentdiscussionsofdesign,financing,
complementarysocialinsurance,andtheadequacyofestablisheddemocraticdecisionmakingproceduresareatanearlystage.Creatingthenecessaryawarenesswilllargelybea
projectforfuturegenerations.Inordertodecidewhethersuchasystemisreallyworthalongtermcommitmentonemust,however,haveaconcretevisioninmind,andthisvisionshould
makeitasobviousaspossiblethatunconditionalbasicincomewouldactuallyimprovethe
qualityofthewelfarestate.
Thatcitizens’stipendsystemsshouldbeimplementedonlyforcitizensoffuturebirth
cohortsisafirstimportantconcretion.Thisseparationkeepscitizens’stipendprojectsaway
fromdailypoliticsandpartydisputes,anditgreatlyfacilitatesarationaldiscourse.Butthis
alone,ofcourse,doesnotgiverisetoalong-termvision.Whetheracitizens’stipendsystem
willbepoliticallyandmorallyrewardingmustbeassessedfrommoredetailedspecifications
—fromspecificationsthatshowhowfair,howliberal,howmotivating,andhowimportantfor

socialpeaceandconsensusbuildingthesystemwouldbeinpractice.
Suchfurtherspecifications,however,neednotandshouldnotmakedeterminationson
theamountofbasicincome.Ifcombinedwithasocialsecuritysystemasproposedhere,a
futurecitizens’stipendwouldhaveapositiveimpactonsocietyevenifitfellsignificantly
shortofcurrentlyprevailingexpectations.Demandsregardingtheamountofbasicincome
shouldthereforebemadeatamuchlaterstageofthediscussionprocess.Incontrast,the
discussionofthenoveltaxandsocialsecuritysystemstobecombinedwithbasicincome
shouldcometopreliminaryconclusionsmuchearlier.Theseconclusionswouldbeof
paramountimportanceforthemoralqualityofabasicincomesystem.
Oneofthemostimportantprerequisitesforbasicincometobecomepersuasiveis
transparency.Thelesstransparentasystem,themoredifficultitistoconductrational
discourse.Lackoftransparencybreedsideologyandfacilitatespopulistopposition.By
contrast,transparencyofawelfaresystemisaprerequisiteforlong-termsustainablesocial
peace.Abasicincomesystemshouldthereforestandintheclearestpossiblecontrasttothe
existingrulesofthewelfarestatewhichhavebecomeeverlesstransparentandevermore


rigidoverthecourseofitslonghistory.
Aprerequisiteformaximumtransparencyisthegreatestpossiblesimplicity,andbasic
incomeisthesimplestpossibleinstrumentofthewelfarestate.Theoretically,acitizens’
stipendcouldbedefinedbyasinglefigure:the—inrealterms—permanentfixedamountpaid
outbythewelfarestatetoeverycitizenofeveryageandineverylivingsituationfrombirthto
death,independentofneed.Thissimplicitycouldofcoursebestbepreservedifthisstipend
remainedtheonlyinstrumentofredistributivepolicy.Eachadditionalinstrumentof
redistributionmakesthewelfarestatemorecomplicatedandmakesarationaldebateabout
reformsmoredifficult.
However,thetransparencyofabasicincomesystemrequiresmorethantransparent
payoutstothecitizens.Inaddition,thedistributionofpersonalincomeasgeneratedby
marketprocessesshouldalsobedisclosedwiththegreatestpossibleclarity.Themore
apparentitbecomesthattheprimaryincomedistributionismorallyintolerable,themore

easilyredistributionalmeasuresareaccepted.
Fromtheperspectiveoftheexistingsystem,suchfulldisclosureofthedistributionof
marketincomemayneedgettingusedtoandmayevenseemundesirable.Meanwhile,inmost
countriestoday,redistributionislargelyeffectedindirectly,thusmaskingtruelevelsand
sourcesofinequality.Suchredistributionisdone,interalia,inthesocialsecuritysystem.For
example,instatutoryhealthinsurance,whereallinsuredpersonshavethesameinsurance
coverage,theygenerallypaydifferentamounts,asafunctionofincome,whilesome
individualsareentirelyexemptfromcontributions.Thesharingofsocialinsurance
contributionsbetweenemployersandemployeescanalsoobscuretheprimaryinequality.
Therefore,inthebasicincomesystememployeesshouldinitiallybefullycreditedtheir
“real”primaryincome,includingtheamountsthatintheexistingsystemarepaidby
employersdirectlytothesocialsecurityinstitutions.Inreturn,employeeswouldthenpaythe
fullsocialsecuritycontributionsbythemselves.
Despitetheirlackoftransparency,theexistingsocialinsuranceschemeshaveproved
themselvesinmanyrespects,butthatdoesnotmeantheyarethebestpossibleschemesfora
basicincomesystem.Thesystemwouldbemuchclearerandsimpler,forexample,ifevery
citizencontributedequalamountstothesocialsecurityschemes,therebygainingequal
claimsonpensionsandonpayoutsinthecaseof,interalia,illnessandreducedearning
capacity.Thisschemewouldcompletelyexemptthestatutorysocialsecuritysystemfrom
tasksofredistribution.
Notallcitizensandfamilieswouldbeabletopaytheresultinginsurancepremiumsfrom
theirprimaryincome,buttheycoulddoitwiththehelpofthebasicincomepayouts.Ifthe
democraticdecision-makingprocessweresufficientlytransparent,thepoliticalwillto
determinetheamountofacitizens’stipendaccordinglywouldcertainlyemerge.Insucha
system,thestillwidespreadnotionthatredistributionisanecessaryevilthatistobereduced
toitsindispensableminimumshouldloseanyremainingplausibility.

3.2 MaximalTransparencyinRedistribution
Arationaldiscussionaboutredistributionrequiresclaritywithrespecttosocialbenefits,but
equallyimportantwouldbeclarityabouttheoriginoftheredistributionfunds.Inabasic

incomesystem,therefore,itshouldbequiteclearhowmucheveryonecontributestothe


basicincomefund.
Thecurrentwelfareandtaxationsystempreventssuchclarity.Therefore,inabasic
incomesystemonlyonetypeoftaxshould,ifpossible,beusedforredistribution.Moreover,
inordertomaintainmaximumtransparency,therevenuefromthistaxshouldbeused
exclusivelyforredistribution.
Inatransparentbasicincomesystem,therewouldthusbeanappropriatedsolidaritytax,
theproceedsofwhichwouldbeusedexclusivelyforthecitizens’stipend.Wellsuitedforsuch
aroleistheincometax.Onlyifthistaxalonewereinsufficientandtheresultingtaxrates
wouldhavesideeffectscontrarytothegoalsofthecitizens’stipend,shouldasecondtaxtype
beadded.Forthispurpose,theinheritancetaxshouldpreferablybeconsidered.

3.3 BasicIncomeandSocialSecurity
Abasicincomethusconceivedshouldnotbeburdenedwiththeexpectationthatitwillsecure
acomfortablelivelihoodbyitself.Suchanexpectationisbothpoliticallyandeconomically
misguided.Thislevelofbasicincomewouldnotbesupportedbyastablemajorityofcitizens
nownorforeseeablyinthedistantfuture.Itisrealistic,however,thatabasicincomeequalfor
citizensofallagescouldadequatelycoverthecostoflivingforchildren.Acitizens’stipend
equalforchildrenandadultswouldtherebyactasstrongsupportforfamiliesandputsome
burdenonchildlesssinglesandcouples.Thiseffectwouldcertainlyhelptoenhancethe
politicalacceptanceofacitizens’stipend.
Ifacitizens’stipenddoesnotprovidesufficientlivelihoodbyitself,thenatleastoneother
incomecomponentmustalwaysandreliablybeavailable.Thiscomponentcanbeawork
incomeorasocialinsurancebenefit.Itmust,inotherwords,alwaysbepossibleforeveryone
toeitherfindsufficientworkincomeinadditiontothecitizens’stipendortoclaimsufficient
socialsecuritypayouts.Abasicincomesystemwouldthereforehavetobesupplementedbya
comprehensivestatutorysocialinsurancesystem,thebenefitsofwhichwouldsupplement
thecitizens’stipendtoasufficientminimumincome.Thenecessarycomponentsofsuchan

insurancesystemwouldbepensioninsurance,healthinsurance,long-termcareinsurance,
disabilityinsurance,and,whereappropriate,unemploymentinsurance.
Inordertoensurebeyonddoubtthatsuchasystemprovidesthenecessarysocial
protectiontoeveryone,citizenswouldhavetobeincludedintheinsuranceschemesupon
birth.Inthisway,cominggenerationswouldgrowintothisinsurancesystemparalleltothe
citizens’stipendsystem,andfromtheoutset,congenitalimpairmentswouldalsoentitlethem
tolifelonginsurancebenefits.
Manyoftoday’sadvocatesofuniversalbasicincomemightbesuspiciousofacitizens’
stipendsupplementedbyasocialsecuritysysteminthisway,butonlywithsuchahybrid
systemcouldacitizens’stipendgainlastingpoliticallegitimacy.Advocatesofacitizens’
stipendsystemmustacknowledgethattheamountofthestipendwillalwaysbeanuncertain
politicalvariableandthatthesocialsecuritysystemwouldalwayshavetobeadaptedto
changesofthisvariable.Inthecombinedsystemoutlinedabove,politicaladjustmentsofthe
citizens’stipendwould—oncealong-termpoliticalconsensusontheminimumlevelof
livelihoodhasemerged—alwaysgoalongwithcompensatingadjustmentsinsocialinsurance
benefits.
Thisinterdependencebetweenthecitizens’stipendandsocialsecuritybenefitswould


applyfromthemomentabasicincomesystemisintroduced.Preciselyforthisreason,the
initialamountofcitizens’stipendwouldnotbeacrucialorevenprohibitivecriterionwhen
decidingonabasicincomesystem.Suchadecisioncouldthereforebemorallywell-founded
evenifpoliticalconstraintsallowedonlyamodestinitiallevelofacitizens’stipend.

3.4 BasicIncome,MinimumWageandFullEmployment
Guarantee
Ifunderabasicincomeschemethecitizens’stipendaloneisnotsufficientforanadequate
livelihood,thenallmembersoftheworkforce—atleastallthosewhocannotliveonsavings
—willwanttoearnaworkincome.Foralltheseindividualstheremustthenbework
opportunitiesonacceptableterms,sothatthesumofworkincomeandcitizens’stipend

ensurestheminimumstandardoflivingasstipulated.Inthissense,fullemployment
conditionsmustbefulfilled.
Intherecentpast,suchfullemploymentconditionshaveprovednolongerattainablein
mostcountries.Inasocietywithabasicincomesystem,thecircumstancescouldbe
fundamentallydifferent.Acitizens’stipendwouldcreateconditionsinthelabormarketthat
wouldmakefullemploymentobjectiveseasiertoachieve.Notably,noworkerswouldany
longerbeunderpressuretocovertheirlivelihoodsolelyfromlaborincome.Asbasicincome
recipients,theycouldmanagewithlowerworkincomesthanundertheconventionalsocial
system.Withtheselowerworkincomes,therequiredminimumworkperformancewould
alsobelower.Workersincapableofhigherperformancewouldnotonthatgroundbe
excludedfromthelabormarket.Inthisway,acitizens’stipendcouldgeneratefull
employmentconditions.
Marketprocessesalone,however,wouldnotprovideaguaranteethatasufficient
minimumwageatthisreducedlevelisactuallypaid.Toensurethis,itmaybenecessaryto
establishalowstatutoryminimumwageatpreciselythislevel.Incombinationwithsucha
statutoryminimumwage,acitizens’stipendcouldreliablyprovideforthepoliticallyintended
minimumstandardoflivingforallemployed.
Ontheotherhand,evenalowminimumwageisapotentialobstacletoemploymentand
tofullemploymentinparticular.Therefore,additionalpolicytoolscouldbenecessaryto
ensurethatactuallyallmembersoftheworkforcecanfindacceptablework.Forthispurpose,
astate-fundedorstate-subsidizedcomplementarylabormarketcouldbecreated.Sucha
‘second’labormarketwould,however,havetoprovideforamuchlessernumberof
individualsthanintheexistingsocialsystem.
Insucha“small”subsidizedlabormarket,workingconditionswouldhavetomimicthe
normallabormarketinthebestpossiblewayandprovideforthebroadestpossiblerangeof
skillsandspecializations.Tothisend,thewelfarestatecouldactasanagencyfortemporary
employmentthatpaysitsemployeesadequateandacceptablewagesand,ifnecessary,
subcontractsthemintothenormallabormarkettospecialconditionssufficientlyattractive
foremployers.Additionally,suchacomplementarysecondlabormarketwouldhavetooffer
directemployment,andwouldalsohavetoprovideforabroadrangeofpaideducationand

training.Compensationforthesetasksshouldnotbestrictlybasedonmeasurable
achievementorprogress,butshouldalternativelybeafunctionofattendance.Thissystem


wouldensurethatparticipationinsuchasecondlabormarketwouldnotintheleastbe
perceivedasforced.
Ifdesignedtotheirfullpotential,suchsubsidizedemploymentopportunitiescouldeven
makeacompulsoryunemploymentinsurancedispensable.

3.5 Optimization,NotMaximization
Thecombinationofacitizens’stipendandasocialsecurityandtaxsystemasindicated
alreadyevokesaconcretelong-termvision.Butnobetterthanthelevelofabasicincome
couldthedesignofsocialinsurance,asecondlabormarket,andminimumwagebe
determinedfarinadvance.Pertinentproposalsdonomorethanstrengthentheimagination
forthepotentialofsocialpolicyinsuchasystem.Butitispreciselythispowerofimagination
thatmattersmostinthepoliticalprocess.Thewillingnesstosetupabasicincomesystemfor
futuregenerationscanonlygrowifcitizensandpoliticalactorshaveatleastvaguelygrasped
thepotentialofsocialvisionassociatedwiththesystemchange.
Aprimaryobjectiveofthecitizens’stipendsystemisarithmeticdistributionaljustice.
Thisfollowsfromthesimpleoperatingprincipleofdistributingincometaxrevenuesequally
toallcitizens.Acitizens’stipendis,however,notonlyasystemofmaterialredistribution,but
affectssocialjusticeinamuchbroadermoralsense.Itdoessoparticularlyinitscapacityasa
fullemploymentscheme.Adistributionaljusticeassociatedwithfullemploymentismorally
superiortoapurelyarithmeticdistributionaljustice,particularlybecausetheunemployed
caninpartbeassumedtobelongtotheleastadvantagedofasociety.Fullemployment
thereforenotonlyimprovestheoverallperceptionofsocialconditions,butalsobenefits
thosewhoarethemateriallyandimmateriallymostneedy.
Acitizens’stipendsystemwould,however,besuperiortoaconventionalsystemevenifit
neitherraisedtheminimumincomenorensuredfullemployment.Thesystemwouldbe
superiorbecausethepaymentofcitizens’stipendisnotsubjecttoanypreconditions.This

absenceofpreconditionssavesrecipientsthehasslesandstigmatizationthatinevitablygo
alongwithmeanstests.Suchtestsarepublicinterferencesinprivatecircumstances;they
violateawidespreadspontaneousso-callednon-interferenceclaimandarethereforetaken
bymanyasexcessiveanddegrading.1Aconsistentlysolidarysocietywould,incontrast,
respectthisclaimtonon-interferenceinthefullestpossibleway,especiallysobecausethis
interferenceparticularlyaffectstheleastadvantaged.
Thereare,however,variantsofunconditionalbasicincomebeingdiscussedthatwould
contributelittletothisgoalofnon-interference.Innegativeincometaxschemes,forexample,
awelfarestatewould,inordertokeepthenominalvolumeofredistributionlow,offsetthe
basicincometobepaidtoacitizenwiththesolidaritytaxthatmaybeowedbyhim.Inthis
scheme,thestatewouldfirstdeterminethetaxliabilityoftherespectivecitizen,deductit
fromthebasicincomeandpaythesurpluswhichmightensue.Inthisway,however,sincea
citizens’stipendpaymentissubjectivelyvaluedmuchhigherthananequalreductionintax
liability,anessentialpurposeofthebasicincomeisexcluded.
Witha“real”—i.e.trulyunconditional—citizens’stipendthestatewouldgivethesignal:
yougetabasicincomethatisreliableunderanycircumstanceandforlife;anincomeyoudo
nothavetofightfororargueforwithfiscalauthoritiesnorwithpension,unemployment,or
otherinsuranceagencies.Acitizens’stipendis,therefore,morethanmerelyamatterofsocial


andmaterialsecurity.Oneofitsmostprominentqualitiesisthatofariskpremiumcapableof
mitigatingriskaversion.Itisananticipatorysignaltoallcitizensthatacertainmaterialand
socialcontinuityisreliablyensuredforlife.Itsignals:youallareandremainsecuredonthe
commonlevelthatispoliticallyfeasible.Thecitizens’stipendis,thereby,anassuranceof
continuityinthefaceoftheoftendiscomfortingdiscontinuitythatmarketprocessesinflicton
workandprivatelife.Thisstipendhasthepowertocompensateforinordinatementalor
physicalstressthattheemployedandself-employedmaybeexposedto.Italsomitigatesand
restrictsfearofsocialrelegation,whetherobjectivelyjustifiedorsubjectivelyperceived.
Fromanotherideologicalpointofview,thecitizens’stipendcouldalsoberegardedaslifelong
compensationfortheimpositionsofacapitalisteconomy.

Continuityandrisk-mitigationasaffectedbybasicincomehaveadirectpositiveeffecton
thequalityoflife,buttheyalsohavepositiveeffectsonemployment.Toacertaindegree,
employmentisaffectedbytheperceptionofriskandcontinuityonthepartofeconomic
agents.Thepositiveeffectsofbasicincomeoncontinuityandriskburdenstrengthen
economicrisk-takingandtherebythewillingnessandcapacityforinnovation.Thisaltered
riskprofileappliestoavastmajorityofthoseactiveintheeconomy,especiallythose
employedinsmallormedium-sizedenterprisesorself-employedasserviceproviders,
craftsmen,farmers,artists,andothers.Whereverrisk-taking,creativityandinnovativespirit
grow,theeconomyasawholebecomesmoredynamicandcreatesmoreopportunitiesforall.
Thisdynamism,inturn,increasesemploymentandthusthegeneralmaterialprosperity.
Inadditiontothesequalitativeeffectsresultingfrombasicincome,transparencywouldbe
yetanotherbenefit.Particularlyinmattersofredistributionandsocialjustice,transparency
notonlymakesthesystemmoreefficientinatechnocraticsense.Transparencyasoutlined
abovewouldalsocounteractdistortedperceptionsofsocialinequality,therebyalso
counteractingtheideologicalenticement,politicalprejudice,andpoliticalextremism
frequentlyassociatedwiththeseperceptions.
Suchtransparencycertainlywouldnotbringalldistributionalconflictstoanendbut
wouldtangiblyprotecttheleastadvantaged.Inacitizens’stipendsystemthedisputewould
primarilyfocusontheamountofbasicincomeandwouldthusbeapeacefulandcompliant
struggleforpoliticalmajorities.Thistransparencywouldnotonlymitigatediscontentwith
distributionalpoliciesbutwouldalsohaveapositiveeffectontheperceptionandexperience
ofpoliticsasawhole.Thesignificanceofabasicincomesystemwouldtherebyextendfar
beyondsocial,fiscal,andeconomicpolicy.
Requisitetransparencycanonlybecreatedifthewelfarestateovercomesallthe
dispensablecomplicationsbuiltupoverdecadesandcenturies.Thisparadigmshiftwouldbe
muchmorethanashort-term,one-timemeasurewithasingularone-timeeffect.Ifanontransparentinflexibleorderisgraduallyreplacedbyanorderofesteemedtransparency,then
thisneworderistherebyalsolastinglyprotectedagainstregressionintonon-transparency
andinflexibility.
Thetransparencyofabasicincomeschemeistherebyintegraltoasuccessfulsocial
system.Transparencystrengthenspoliticalrationality,providesamorepositiveexperience

ofpolitics,andensuresthefuturereformabilityofthepoliticalorder.
Thisconclusionstronglysuggeststhattherighttopoliticaltransparencyshouldbe
includedasafundamentalrightinfutureconstitutions,nationalandsupranational.Ifsucha
constitutionaltransparencyclauseexisted,itcould,widelyinterpreted,beconsideredan


obligationtoimplementabasicincomesystem.Aconstitutionalrighttosystemtransparency
couldthusbeaTrojanHorsethatwouldinadvertentlyopenthewayforbasicincomeintoa
formerlyrigidpoliticalandsocialorder.

References
WehnerB(1992)DerNeueSozialstaat:Vollbeschäftigung,EinkommensgerechtigkeitundStaatsentschuldung(Thenewsocial
state:fullemployment,fairincomedistributionandtheredemptionofpublicdebt).WestdeutscherVerlag,Opladen
WehnerB(1997)DerNeueSozialstaat:EntwurfeinerneuenWirtschafts-undSozialordnung(Thenewsocialstate.Outlineofa
newsocialandpoliticalorder).WestdeutscherVerlag,Opladen
[Crossref]

Footnotes
1 Foratheoryofthenon-interference-claimseeWehner(1992,1997).




©TheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicensetoSpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2019
BurkhardWehner,UniversalBasicIncomeandtheReshapingofDemocracy,SpringerBriefsinPoliticalScience
/>
4.BasicIncomeinOtherPolicyAreas
BurkhardWehner1
(1) Horst,Germany

BurkhardWehner
Email:

4.1 BasicIncomeandBusinessCyclePolicy
Acitizens’stipendsystemofthetypeproposedherewouldthusbringaboutabroad
spectrumofpositivechangeswithoutriskingserioustransitionalproblems.Suchasystem
wouldbeadministrativelyeasytohandle,itwouldbetransparent,itwouldbefair,itwould
maketheeconomyandworkinglifemorecreativeandinnovative,anditwouldleadtofull
employmentbyreshapingthewagestructureandeconomicrisksharing.Combinedwiththe
associatedstatutorysocialsecuritysystem,itwouldcoverallspecialneedsinaggravated
conditionsoflife.Inaddition,itwouldofferthegreatestpossibletransparencyandsimplicity
indistributionissues,anditwouldtherebyhelpsecuresocialpeace,contributetoanew,
clearer,andmorerationalperceptionofpolitics,counteractdisaffectionwithdemocracy,
reducethesusceptibilitytopopulistmessages,raisethelevelofpoliticaldiscourse,andeven
pavethewayforahigherlevelofpoliticalcivilization.Itishardtoimaginethatthisbroad
rangeofpositiveeffectsofthecitizens’stipendsystemmayinanywaybeoutweighedby
negativesideeffects.
Allthesepositiveeffectsresultfromtheuseofcitizens’stipendinredistributivepolicy,
butitspossibleapplicationswouldtherebybefarfromexhausted.Foratleasttwoother
significantpoliticalpurposescouldthecitizens’stipendbeusedveryeffectively:foreconomic
stabilization(seeWehner1992b,Chap.6.1orWehner1997,Chap.6.1)andforpopulation
policy(seeWehner2007).Afurthersignificantapplicationwouldbeforeignaidtonationsin
distressafterwars,upheavalsornaturaldisasters(seeinteraliaWehner1990,1991,1992c,
1999).
Theuseofbasicincomeinbusinesscyclepolicyanddemographicpolicywouldby
comparisonberathersimpleandeasy.Inordertopreventandmitigateeconomicslowdowns,
citizenscouldbepaidaneconomicstabilizationallowanceintheformofatemporary
supplementtothecitizens’stipend.Suchastabilizationallowancewouldincreasethe
purchasingpowerinthemostdirectandeffectivewaypossible,thusincreasingconsumption

promptly,ubiquitously,andinpredictablequantity,therebyalsoboostinginvestment.It
wouldservethispurposebestifitwasnotfinancedbygovernmentdebts,butratherby
interest-freecentralbankloanstothewelfarestate.1Moreover,suchastabilizationallowance


wouldbebeyondsuspicionofleadingtounwantedsideeffectsonthedistributionofincome
andwealth,asisthecasewithmostconventionalmeasuresofbusinesscyclepolicy.An
economicstimulusbymeansofasupplementtothecitizens’stipendwouldthusbefar
superiortoconventionalpolicymeasuresforthispurpose.
Aswithallbusinesscyclestimuli,suchstabilizationsallowanceswouldalsorequire
provisionstoensurethatthestimulusdoesnotinduceunsustainableclaimsagainstthe
welfarestate.Forthispurpose,theseallowancescouldbedeclaredasadvancepaymentsof
citizens’stipend.Intheeventofsubsequenteconomicoverheating,itwouldthenbepossible
tooffsetformerlypaidstabilizationallowancesfromcurrentcitizens’stipendpayoutsin
smallinstallments.Alsointhisrespect,suchpolicywouldbesuperiortoconventionalpolicies
intermsofeffectivenessandredistributionalfairness.
Suchanapplicationofcitizens’stipendtobusinesscyclepolicymay,atfirstsight,seem
easilycomprehensibleandeasilymanageable.Nonetheless,itisbynomeansobviousthat
democraticinstitutionswouldhandlesuchnewpolicyschemewithsufficientcompetence.
Thisissueofcompetenceisrelevantbothforgovernmentsofexistingstatesandforcentral
banks.Therefore,inconnectionwithacitizens’stipendproject,thecompetenceofpolitical
institutionsmeritscarefulconsiderationalsowithregardtostabilizationpolicy.

4.2 BasicIncomeandDemographicPolicy
Theotherfieldofpoliticsinwhichanapplicationofthecitizens’stipendseemsalmost
mandatoryisdemographicpolicy.Ifthebirthratesofacountrydeviatefromthosewhichare
politicallydesirable—forinstanceiffertilityisexpectedtoleadtoanunwantedpopulation
declineorpopulationgrowth—thendemographicpolicycouldcounteractwithincreasesor
decreasesinthecitizens’stipendforchildren.Inthisway,basicincomecouldbeusedasa
tooltoinfluencepopulationgrowthwithoutundesirabledistributionaleffects.

Thisapplicationofthecitizens’stipendwouldrequireexceptionalpoliticalforesightand
long-termdetermination.Inordertoinfluencethebirthrateaspreciselyanddirectlyas
possible,increasesanddecreasesincitizens’stipendwouldhavetoapplyonlytochildrenyet
tobeborn.Moreover,thesemeasureswouldhavetobereliablywarrantednotonlyfora
legislativeperiod,butatleastuntiltheintendedrecipients,i.e.childrentobeborn,reachthe
ageofmajority.Onlyinthiswaycanthedesiredeffectonreproductivebehaviorbeachieved.
Suchuseofthecitizens’stipendwouldagaingiverisetothequestionwhetherexisting
democraciescouldliveuptothistask.Populationpolicyisfundamentallydifferentfrom
almostallpolicyareasdemocracywascreatedforandistraditionallyconcernedwith.
Moreover,indemocraticcountriesithaslongbeen—andinpartstillis—considered
illegitimateforpoliticstointerferewiththereproductivebehaviorofcitizens.Therefore,itis
notsurprisingthatdemocraticcountrieshaveshownlittleforesight,reason,orenergyin
demographicpolicyinthepast,anditisnotamatterofcoursethatthispoorperformance
wouldimproveinacitizens’stipendsystem.
Ifconventionaldemocraticinstitutionsstipulatedariseinfuturechildren’sbasicincome
validfrombirthtotheageofmajority,citizenscouldhardlytakeforgrantedthatthisdecision
willnotsoonerorlaterberevisedbyadifferentparliamentarymajority.Insofar,implemented
modificationsofchildren’sbasicincomecouldfailtoinducetheirintendedeffectsonthe
birthrate.Thus,asmuchasdemographicpolicycouldbeenrichedandsimplifiedbythis


instrument,itspotentialinexistingdemocraciesremainsuncertain.

4.3 BasicIncomeforNationsinNeed
Acitizens’stipendisaninstrumentofdomesticredistribution.Itisbasedondomestic
solidarity,andittranslatesthissolidarityintopracticalpolitics.Therefore,thegeographical
reachofacitizens’stipendsystemendsatexistingstateborders.Butthereareexceptional
situationsinwhichcitizensaretosomeextentwillingtoshareprosperitywithcitizensof
otherstates.Thissolidarityfindsexpressioninspontaneousprivatedonationsto
internationallyactiveaidorganizations,butalsointhepoliticalconsenttoforeignaidfor

statesinneed.
Thisinternationalcross-bordersolidarityis,ofcourse,farmorevariableanddivergent
thanthenationalone.Itdependsonobjectiveneediness,butalsoonsuchcriteriaas
geographicproximityofbeneficiariesandthetopicalityandmediapresentationofneediness.
Cross-bordersolidaritymostlyfailstodevelopwheretheneedforhelpseemsendless,andit
fadesawaywhenitmissesthehoped-foreffect,e.g.duetocorruptionintherecipient
countriesorincompetenceinthedonorstates.Theprevalenceandextentofsuchabuseshas
ledtoincreasingdoubtconcerningtheusefulnessoftraditionalforeignaid.Themost
commonandmostimportantobjectionisthattoosmallaportionofthecitizensinthe
recipientcountriesprofitfromsuchaid.
Therefore,apromisingalternativetotraditionaldevelopmentaidcouldinmanycasesbe
acitizens’stipendaid.Thisaidwouldbepaidasanunconditionalbasicincomeequaltoall
citizensintherecipientstate.
Withthiskindofhelp,itwouldcertainlynotbepossibletoreachallthegoalspursuedby
moretargetedconventionaldevelopmentaidinallcircumstances.Basicincomeaidis
particularlysuitableasatransitionalaidinstate-wideemergenciesastheymayarisefrom
warsandcivilwars,fromnaturaldisastersandfromthecollapseofeconomicandpolitical
systemsandastheycanbecausedbynon-militarycoercivemeasuressuchasembargosor
othertradesanctions.
Basicincomeaidcouldplayaparticularlysignificantroleincaseswherecompensationis
soughtformorallyquestionablemilitaryinterventionsastheyhaveinrecenttimesbeen
executedbytheUS,Russia,andEuropeanstatesinandneartheArabworld.When
interveningpowershaveprovidedcompensationforsuchinflictionsinthepast,theyhave
mostlydonesobytargetedreconstructionaid.Therearegoodpoliticalandethicalreasons,
however,toatleastcombinesuchreconstructionaidwithbasicincomegrants.Suchgrants
couldbestservethepurposetostrengthenthecitizens’supportforconstitutionalregimesin
beneficiarystatesandtorestitutethemoralstandingofdonorstates.
Universalbasicincomeaidtoforeigncountriescouldbeplannedandimplemented
quicklyandunbureaucratically,itwouldplaceonlymanageabledemandsonthestate
administration,anditwouldbeincontestablyfair.Inaddition,itsproperimplementation

could—andthisalonecanmakeitanunrivaledconcept—beverifiedinthesimplestpossible
way.Thecitizensthemselvescouldprovidethebestpossibleassistanceinthisverification.
Universalbasicincomeassistancecouldalsoplayanimportantroleincaseswhere
aggravatedeconomicsanctionsareimposedbecauseapoliticalregimefailstomeet
elementarymoralstandards.Insuchcases,thesanctionsaredirectedagainstpolitical


leaders,butthevictimsareultimatelythecitizens.Thisdynamicmaycausecitizenstoeven
develophostilitytowardsthesanctioningstates,anditmayevenrevitalizetheirloyaltyto
theirownleaders,howevermuchtheylackpoliticalmorality.Apromisingsolutiontothis
problemwouldbetocombinesanctionsagainsttheregimewithsubsequentbasicincome
assistancetothecitizens.Apeoplesufferingundersuchsanctionscouldbegiventhepromise
thatitwilllaterbecompensatedforthissufferingbyadequatetransitionalbasicincome
grants.
Suchpledgeforbasicincomegrantscouldincitethecitizensofarecipientstateto
contributetoaregimechangeforthebetter.Iftheydidnotcollectivelytakeadvantageofthis
opportunity,theywouldruntheriskoflosingthepromisedbasicincomegrants.Inthisway,
thepromiseofbasicincomeaidcouldactasastrongincentiveforcitizenstooustimmoral
andincompetentpoliticalleaders.
Suchaidcouldreplacetraditionalaid,thebeneficiariesofwhichhavemostlybeena
minorityofthepeopleandwhichhastherebyfailedtomeetitsmoralobjectives.Thatalone
wouldbereasonenoughfordonorstatestogivebasicincomeaidpreferenceinappropriate
cases,butbasicincomeaidcouldhaveaanotherhighlysignificantpositiveeffect.Theaid
couldcreatefamiliaritywiththeconceptandthepracticeofbasicincomeintherecipientand
alsointhedonorcountry,andsuccessfullyimplemented,itcouldhelptoovercomethe
indifferenceoflivinggenerationstowardsdomesticcitizens’stipendprojects.Basicincome
aidcouldtherebyshortentheotherwiseincalculablylongpathtofirstcitizens’stipend
projectsbydecades.
Indonorcountries,suchassistancewouldhavetoassertitselfmainlyagainstthe
objectionthatitwastoountargetedandtooexpensive,butthisindeeddependsonthe

circumstancesofthecase.Themorepopuloustherecipientstate,themoredifficultwouldit
betofinancebasicincomeaid,andthemoredivergenttheneedswereintheregionsofa
recipientstate,thestrongerwouldbethereservationsagainstaidforallitscitizens.But
nonethelesstherewon’tbealackofcasesinwhichabasicincomeaidforallwouldproveto
bethebestpossibleconceptfromtheperspectivesofboththedonorandtherecipient
country.Underfavorablecircumstancesitwouldevenbeconceivablethatasmallbeneficiary
statecouldgraduallyreplaceanexpiringschemeofbasicincomeaidbyabasicincome
systemofitsown.Theadministrationinthebeneficiarystatewouldbepreparedforsucha
transition.

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