The Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Corporate Governance Characteristics: Evidence from VN100.

The Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and
Corporate Governance Characteristics: Evidence from VN100.
Le Hoang Nguyen Phuong
Linh Nguyen
International University, Vietnam National University-HCMC, Vietnam
Abstract
Due to the increasing importance of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practice especially in developing
countries where there is a lack of research about CSR and factors affecting it, this study aims to provide a
better understanding of CSR disclosure and it relationship with firm corporate governance characteristics in
Vietnam. Using a sample of 100 biggest market capitalization firms (VN100) from 2014 to 2016, our study
reveals a moderate extent of CSR disclosures. Board of director size and audit type are found to have a positive
significant link with CSR reporting while the meetings by board of director and number of outside directors
demonstrate a negative connection with CSR disclosure. However, the CEO duality and presence of women
directors in the board show no relationship with CSR disclosure. Findings from this research are expected to
extend the current literature regarding CSR disclosure in Vietnam. They can also be helpful for investors in
making decisions to invest in corporate citizens as well as policy makers in considering regulations to improve
CSR practices in Vietnam.
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Citizenship, Corporate Governance, Vietnam Stock
Market
1. Introduction
Business and the public raise more awareness about corporate social responsibility (CSR) or corporate
citizenship because of the collapse of numerous corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, and Global last
twenty years ago and the application of the corporate social responsibility to analyze the equity of firms
(Holder -Webb, Cohen, Nath & Wood, 2009). Although CSR is important, CSR disclosure is still optional in
many countries including Vietnam. On publishing such information, firms want to reduce the information
asymmetry issue. Moreover, they also would like to commit society to social, ethical, and environmental
problems for gaining a good reputation. However, there existed little research on the link between the
corporate social responsibility (CSR) practice and the governance structure (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009, p.1).
Consequently, there is a strong desire to analyze the impact of the governance mechanism on firm’s corporate
social responsibility (Rao & Tilt, 2016).
This research can be helpful to markets where the knowledge of CSR is still poor because of the perception

that such practices are considered being as philanthropic activities. Bui (2010) also showed that in the past,
Vietnamese firms paid little attention to corporate ethics for three main reasons: the firms do not understand
the disclosure impacts on society, lack both financial resources, and an enforcing legal framework. These
factors have prevented firms from adopting corporate social responsibility in their policies. In Vietnam, most
studies about the corporate social responsibility practices are qualitative. To the best knowledge of the authors,
there existed no extensive studies on CSR reporting and the governance structure of listed firms on Vietnam
stock market. Prior studies in Vietnam (e.g., Vu, 2012) mainly focused on institutional, firm or individual

317


determinants of CSR disclosure. Thus, there is a scarcity of research on the association between CSR disclosure
and corporate governance.
Thus, by employing a combined method of qualitative and quantitative analysis to understand the extent
to which firms disclosure CSR and the relationship between CSR disclosure and firm governance structure,
our paper hopes to address the gap in the literature. Particularly, our paper aims to examine the following
research questions:
RQ1. To what extent do listed firms in Vietnam disclose corporate social responsibility?
RQ2. How do corporate governance characteristics influence corporate social responsibility disclosure of listed firms
in Vietnam?
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant literature. Hypotheses are also presented in
Section 2. Section 3 presents data and methodology. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes the
study.
2. Literature Review
In the early stage, corporate social responsibility is first known as an obligation of businessmen to follow
their policies, their decision-making, and desirable actions in favor of the objectives and values of our society
by Bowen (1953). Later, Friedman (2007) established the concept based on two main question: for what are
corporations responsible for? and to whom are they responsible? Overall, disclosing corporate citizenship
provides companies with financial and strategic gains. Money & Schepers (2007) suggested that through social
activities and its reporting, firms can gain the trust and goodwill from stakeholders to obtain the competitive

benefits; promote their image and their name (Li et al., 2010). Corporate citizenship participation with
reporting practice is able to lower the risk that labor quarrels, product safety disgrace, and frauds can affect
the firm’ performance and reputation (Waddock & Graves,1997).
2.1. Relationship between the Corporate Social Responsibility and the Corporate Governance
Characteristics
There are various theories that can be applied to explain why corporations are willing to disclose their
activities relating to community. In this study, the authors would like to discuss four main theories that are
relevant to the association between the corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate governance.
First, the agency theory indicates a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. The agency
relationship was considered as a contract in which the principal assigned the work to the agent, but they are
unable to examine how the agents behave (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) causing an agency problem as there
existed the contradiction between the goal and the interest among them (Eisenhardt,1989). This indicated that
the agent could perform in the best interest of them instead of amplifying the shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, there
existed three forms of costs involving agency problems. Firstly, there is monitoring cost that the owners used to mitigate
the conflict of interest with the agencies due to different goals (Hill & Jones, 1992). Secondly, bonding cost is the cost
utilized by managers to make sure that his actions benefit the owner’s wealth. Thirdly, the residual loss leads to the
reduction of the principals’ advantage because of different pursued objectives and attitude toward bearing risk. Thus, it
cannot be denied that adopting the corporate social responsibility reporting is the main way to reduce
information asymmetry, mitigate the agency problem and reduce the cost as well.
Second, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) indicates that firms operate ethically and responsibly to satisfy
the expectation of the public and the stakeholders have right to be updated information through the
sustainability performance about how the firm affects the surrounding environment (Freeman, 2010).
Moreover, the reputation and the image of the corporation can be improved by both the corporate ethics and the structure
of governance together. Therefore, it can sharpen the relations with main financial stockholders and cool down the conflict
of interest among stakeholders named as agency theory. By this way, Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & Rupp (2006) found

318


that participating in the corporate social responsibility reporting would have a positive relation to an efficient mechanism

for corporate governance. Moreover, according to Barako & Brown (2008), the theory of stakeholder posited that an
entity attempts to harmonize its activities with expectations of stakeholders through the social responsibility. Stakeholder
theory thus introduced the link between corporate governance and the corporate social responsibility practice (Driver &
Thompson, 2002; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012).
Third, legitimacy theory (Suchman, 1995) expands the function of corporate governance by adding more
different stakeholders to the principle-agent relationship. Moreover, this theory based on the contract between
corporations and society. Specificly, corporations bear responsibility for the quantity and quality of social
resouces and generate the benefits from economic activities for the society because the community provided
firms with natural and human resources and permission as well to produce goods. Therefore, managers are
likely to release their corporate social responsibility activities and other related information to present and
sustain the legitimacy of the firms or as a remedial strategy of the firm (Hooghiemstra, 2000).
Fourth, stewardship (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) is one of many theories that can enlighten the relationship between
shareholders and managers. Pursuant to Davis (1997), the agency theory assumes the discrepancy of interest between the
principals and the agents, while the stewardship assumes the agreement of interest between the principals and the
managers. Despite starting from the different assumption, both theories concentrated on the goal alignments and the
rationality of the two parties (Davis, 1997). Stewardship theory suggested that steward managers concentrated on the
collective benefit because, in their belief, their personal success is minor to the success of the corporation. Moreover, due
to the rationality of steward managers, they identified greater utility in the behavior of cooperation rather than the selfserving behavior. Donaldson and Davis (1991) claimed that managers are believed to manage the resources of business
effectively by using their intelligence and experiences, so managers are stewards and trustworthy to take actions for
protecting the owners’ wealth (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006). One of these actions
was the participation in the corporate social responsibility activities and disclosure, as it is preferred by societies to have
long-term benefit on the financial performance (McWilliams et al., 2006) and promotes the position of the organization
as well based on the notion of “doing well by doing good” (McWilliams et al., 2006).
2.1.1. Board of Director Size
From the agency perspective, the board of director size was one of the most vital components of corporate
governance in supervising the management of the company by the agents, impacting the transparency as well
as the performance of firms (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Members on board of directors represent shareholders and
protect shareholders’ wealth by encouraging the commitment to the corporate social responsibility initiatives
as strategic business activities and promoting a higher level of reporting. McWilliams et al. (2006); Ahmed Haji
(2013); Kathy Rao, Tilt, & Lester (2012b) suggested that the number of members on board decided the

effectiveness and efficiency of such mechanism.
Board of director size has been found to positively affect the corporate social responsibility reporting in
many different nations (e.g., Kathy Rao et al. 2012a; Esa & Anum Mohd Ghazali 2012; De Villiers et al. 2011
and Jizi et al. 2014a). For example, Kathy Rao et al. (2012a) found that the extent of environmental information
and the board of director size were positively conjoined basing on data collected for the largest 100 firms on
Australia stock exchange in 2008. Given the support from prior papers, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1: There is a positive relationship between the board of director size and corporate social responsibility disclosure.
2.1.2. Board of Director Meetings
According to Laksmana, (2008), the number of meetings per year is one of the indicators of the governance
structure. Laksmana (2008) argued that regular meetings gave directors chances to discuss more information,
improve decision-making process, and increase firm value, deter firm growth, consequently promoting the
corporate ethics practices (Ahmed Haji, 2013). Previous empirical studies suggested a positive link between
the board of director meeting and the corporate citizenship practices (e.g., O’Sullivan et al. 2008; Allegrini &
Greco 2013a; Chen et al. 2010). For example, Allegrini & Greco (2013a) supported a positive influence of board

319


of director meetings on the degree of the voluntary social responsibility release with the sample size of 177
non-financial Italian listed firms in 2007. Following that, H2 is posited as below:
H2: There is a positive relationship between the number of board meetings and corporate social responsibility
disclosure.
2.1.3. Audit Type
As argued by agency theory, many companies would like to disclose and become more transparent about
their financial reporting and the corporate enterprise performance as well to attract more customers and
investors. They can obtain their desire to ensure their existence and success (Brown & Deegan 1998; Deegan
2002) by hiring a good auditor (Al-Gamrh et al., 2015) because the large and international audit firms require
their client to provide more main information in the reports and websites. A review of literature shows
evidence of the positive association between audit type and corporate social responsibility reporting (e.g.,
Raffournier, 1995; Xiao et al., 2004). Take the research of Raffournier in 1995 as an example, he collected data

from 161 firms on researching the component of voluntary financial reporting in Switzerland and concluded
that audit type linked positively to the corporate citizenship disclosure. Given the support from prior papers,
this study develops hypothesis
H3: There is a positive relationship between audit type and corporate social responsibility disclosure.
2.1.4. Women Directors
The percentage of women directors plays an important role in the corporate governance literature (Carter,
Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). Female directors might constrain the board to satisfy the stakeholders’
requirements, thus, the execution of the corporate social responsibility and its performance were more
practicable (Zhang, 2012). Moreover, with more female directors, the board can make the most of multiple
stakeholders to increase level of the corporate social responsibility. Furthermore, women directors can
associate their interests with other stakeholders and higher demand from foreign shareholders for the
corporate social responsibility disclosure. The female directors might constrain the board to satisfy the
stakeholders’ requirements thus the execution of the social enterprise and its performance were more
practicable (Zhang, 2012). The presence of women directors has been found to positively associate firm
corporate social responsibility practice (e.g., Webb, 2004; Mallin & Michelon, 2011; Liao et al, 2015; Krüger,
2009). For instance, Webb (2004) reported a positive link between the percentage of women directors and the
corporate social responsibility practice by investigating the structure of board of 394 social firms in the US.
Hence, this study expects that
H4: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of women directors in the board and corporate social
responsibility disclosure.
2.1.5. CEO Duality
Agency theory argued that CEO duality concentrates all the authority of the managers and the chairperson
in the same person leading to the interest dispute between individual and firm (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).
Stewardship theory suggested that duality provides merged command structure boosting the making decision
procedure, fasten the enactment of corporate social responsibility performance (Vo, 2010). Webb (2004)
investigated the structure of board in 394 social firms in the U.S. and found a negative link between the CEO
duality and corporate social responsibility reporting. Mallin & Michelon (2011) reported that CEO duality is
negatively associated with the social performance of 176 corporations. Following these papers, this study
expects:
H5: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and corporate social responsibility disclosure.

2.1.6. Outside Directors (Independent non-executive directors)

320


Agency theory claimed that the presence of outside directors is considered being crucial in the corporate
governance for efficient management and inspection of the board (Rozaini Mohd Haniffa & Cooke, 2002;
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012) due to their authority and dominance to take the gauge of management
performance more fairly than executive directors and take action to reduce the egocentricity behavior (Post,
Rahman, & Rubow, 2011). Furthermore, based on the stewardship and the stakeholder theories, independent
nonexecutive board members ensure protections for not only the shareholders’ wealth and other stakeholders’
interest as well by pursuing the corporate social responsibility activities to reply to social concerns and meet
social obligations (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005a; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).
Webb (2004) investigated the structure of board in 394 social firms in the U.S. and reported a positive link
between outside directors and the corporate citizenship reporting. Similarly, in another context, Ntim &
Soobaroyen (2013) examined 75 firms on the stock exchange of Africa and reported a consistent finding. Given
the support from prior papers, our study proposes the following hypothesis:
H6: There is a positive relationship between the number of outside directors and corporate social responsibility
disclosure.
2.2. The Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Control Variables
As informed from the literature, out study also control for the impact of firm size, listing duration, and
profitability on the CSR disclosure. There is consistent evidence for the significant positive link between the
firm size and the corporate social responsibility disclosure (e.g., Muttakin et al. 2015; Reverte, 2009; Mahadeo
et al., 2011). For example, Muttakin et al. (2015) examined 116 non-financial corporations on Bangladesh Stock
exchange and found a positive link between the firm size and CSR disclosure. Similarly, Owusu-Ansah (1998)
investigated 49 corporations listed in Zimbabwe and documented a positive association between the listing
duration and CSR. Most prior empirical studies regarding the link between profitability and the corporate
citizenship disclosure report a positive result (e.g., Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Jizi et al., 2014a; Khan, Muttakin,
& Siddiqui, 2013b; Gamerschlag et al., 2011). For example, Gamerschlag et al. (2011) comprising 470
observations from selected corporations in Germany found that profitability was significantly and positively

associated with CSR reporting.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data
The sample include non-financial listed firms in VN100 in the period of 2014-2016 excluding insurance
companies and financial institutions due to different regulations, firms that have limit/ no relevant
information; delisted firms during 2014-2016; listed firms after January 1 2014. Data are collected from firm
annual reports and official websites and carefully examined before conducting analysis.
3.2 Model Specification
3.2.1. The relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Corporate Governance
Characteristics
Panel data regression analysis was employed to analyze the data. Specification tests (F-Test, Hausman test,
and Breusch-Pagan LM test) are used to determine which model (Pooled OLS, REM, FEM) is the most
appropriate. Breusch-Pagan test and Breusch-Godfrey LM test are employed to check the heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation problems. The following regression model is used to test the association between
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Corporate Governance Characteristics.

321


Model 1: CSRD it = β0 + β1 Dual it + β2 BS it + β3 IND it + β4 AT it + β5 BM it + β6 WD it + β7 LNTA it + β8 LD
it +

β3 PROF it + ε it.
Where:
CSRD it = Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure for ith firm at the time t.
Dual it = CEO Duality for ith firm at time t.
BS it = Size of Board of Directors of ith firm at time t.
IND it = Independent non-executive directors for ith firm at time t.
AT it = Audit Type for ith firm at time t.
BM it = Board Meetings for ith firms at time t.

LNTA it = Company Size of ith firm at time t
LD it = Listing Duration for ith firm at time t
PROF it = Profitability for ith firm at time t
WD it = Proportion of Women Directors on Board for ith firm at time t
Beta = the regression coefficient
ε it = Error term

3.2.1. The Relationship between Each Theme of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Corporate
Governance Characteristics
To provide further insights into the link between CSR disclosure and firm corporate governance, corporate
governance characteristics are regressed on each CSR theme as below:
Model2: General CSRD it = β0 + β1 Dual it + β2 BS it + β3 IND it + β4 AT it + β5 BM it + β6 WD it + β7 LNTA it
+ β8 LD it + β3 PROF it + ε it.
Model 3: Community CSRD

it

= β0 + β1 Dual it + β2 BS it + β3 IND it + β4 AT it + β5 BM it + β6 WD it + β7

LNTA it + β8 LD it + β3 PROF it + ε it.
Model 4: Environment CSRD

it

= β0 + β1 Dual it + β2 BS it + β3 IND it + β4 AT it + β5 BM it + β6 WD it + β7

LNTA it + β8 LD it + β3 PROF it + ε it.
Model 5: Workplace CSRD

it

= β0 + β1 Dual it + β2 BS it + β3 IND it + β4 AT it + β5 BM it + β6 WD it + β7

LNTA it + β8 LD it + β3 PROF it + ε it.
Model 6: Marketplace CSRD it = β0 + β1 Dual it + β2 BS it + β3 IND it + β4 AT it + β5 BM it + β6 WD it + β7
LNTA it + β8 LD it + β3 PROF it + ε it.
3.2.2. The Relationship between Total Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (Lagged) and Corporate
Governance Characteristics:
To investigate if there is any relationship between corporate governance characteristics and lagged CSR
disclosure, the following model is examined:
Model 7: CSRD it = β0 + β1 𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + β2 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + β3 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + β4 𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + β5 𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 + β6 𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + β7
𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + β8 𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + β9 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + ε .
where
CSRD it = Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure for ith firm at the time t.
𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 = CEO Duality for ith firm at time t-1.
𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡−1= Size of Board of Directors of ith firm at time t-1.
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 = Independent Non-executive directors for ith firm at time t-1.
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 = Audit Size for ith firm at time t-1.
𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 = Board Meetings for ith firms at time t-1.
𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 = Proportion of Women Directors on Board for ith firm at time t-1.

322


LNTAit−1 = Company Size of ith firm at time t.
LDit−1 = Listing Duration for ith firm at time t.
PROFit−1 = Protitability for ith firm at time t.
Beta = the regression coefficient
ε it = Error term
3.3. Measurement of Variables

Our study adopts a comprehensive 51-item checklist by Ahmad, Rashid, and Gow (2017) to measure CSR
disclosure. Almad et al. (2017) developed the check-list to be applied in Malaysia, a neighbor market of
Vietnam. Thus, we believe that the check-list is also highly applicable in Vietnam context. Content analysis
has been commonly utilized to investigate CSR reporting (Chan et al., 2014; Abudulah et al., 2011). Annual
reports and company websites are read carefully and one (1) point is given for firm that discloses ith item
within the checklist and zero (0) otherwise. Following Ahmad et al. (2017), CSR index is calculated as below:

𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑖 =

∑𝑛𝑗
𝑡=1 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗

Where
CSRI= Corporate Social Responsibility Index
nj= Quantity of items expected for jth company
Xij= 1 if firm disclosed ith item; 0 if the firm did not disclose ith item
The measurement of other variables is presented in Table 1:
Table 5: Measurement of variables
Variables

Denotation

Measurement/Description

References

CSR Disclosure

CSRD

Scoring of CSR Disclosure index

Ahmad, Rashid & Gow (2017)

Independent Nonexecutive directors

IND

Percentage of outside directors to
total directors

Haniffa & Cooke (2002)

Board Size

BS

Ln (Total quantity of directors)

Jizi et al. (2014)

CEO Duality

DUAL

1: CEO Duality
0: Others

Jizi et al. (2014)

Women Directors

WD

Number of Female directors /
Board size

H. Khan (2010)

Audit Type

AT

1 if big 4
0 otherwise

Uwuigbe & Egbide (2012)

Board of director
Meetings

BM

The quantity of meetings per
financial year.

Prado- Lorenzo &
Sanchez (2010) and

Firms Size

LNTA

ln (total asset).

Barnea & Rubin (2010)

Listing duration

LD

Ln (years listed)

Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang &
Woochan Kim (2004)

Profitability

PROF

ROA= Profit after tax
Total Asset

Ho and Yekini (2014)

323

Garcia-

4. Results
4.1. Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure
As shown in Figure 1, the extent of CSR reporting of firms in Vietnam is moderate with a mean ranging
from 0.46 to 0.49 from 2014 to 2016. This level is higher than that of Malaysian firms (M=0.22) (Ahmad et al.,
2017). Importantly, CSR index has increased from year to year, suggesting the tendency to disclosure more
CSR information by Vietnamese firms. The level of CSR reporting in Vietnam may be due to the lack of
standards or guidelines. In practice, many companies have acknowledged the importance of disclosing CSR
and followed international financial reporting standards. According to Thompson & Zakaria (2004), firms
decide not to report their CSR due to the scarcity of insights on the merits of sustainability reporting and the
cost of releasing as well.
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure in Vietnam 2014-2016
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

58% 59%
56%
49%
39%35%

57%53%
56%
47%

38%
33%

56%53%

53%
46%

36%33%

75%

74%

73%

Figure 2: Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in Vietnam 2014-2016
Overall, among five main themes, workplace related disclosure has the highest score (M=0.57) on average
(Table 2). A potential explanation is the firms’ concern over the welfare of employees, and the good working
environment would boost the efficiency, morale, loyalty of current employees and attract high quality
candidates. Hence, disclosing such information is important and vital to the growth and operation of firms.
Conversely, environment related information accounts for a small proportion (M=0.34) and appears to be less
accessible in the annual reports. Information regarding marketplace is ranked second (M=0.55) and then
followed by the general dimension (M=0.54).
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for firm CSR Reporting

Mean
Median
Std. Deviation
Minimum

Maximum

Total
CSDI
0.47
0.55
0.24
0.00
0.92

General

Community

Environment

Workplace

Market place

Others

0.54
0.43
0.34
0.00
1.00

0.38
0.44

0.21
0.00
0.67

0.34
0.36
0.23
0.00
1.00

0.57
0.64
0.27
0.00
0.93

0.55
0.60
0.35
0.00
1.00

0.74
1.00
0.42
0.00
1.00

324

4.2. Descriptive Analysis
Table 3 displays mean, standard deviation, Pearson's correlations for the variables. The correlation
coefficients among the variables ranged from r=0.10, p<0.1 to r=0.34, p<0.01 in their absolute values, which
does not indicate any collinearity problem. Tolerance statistics and variance inflation factors also refuted the
problem.
Table 7: Mean, Standard deviation, Min, Max, and Pearson’s correlation

CSRDI

Std.
Deviation
0.24

BS

0.22

1.8

1.39

2.39

0.22***

1

BM

1.83

5.77

2

13

0.10

0.21***

1

0

1

0.34***

0.06

-0.15**

1

0

0.8

0.25***

-0.03

-0.03

0.05

1

0

1

-0.03

-0.04

-0.10*

0.01

0.17***

1

AT

WD
DUAL

Mean

Min

Max

CSRDI

0.47

0

0.92

1

Big4 (1): 63.7%
Non-Big4(0): 36.3%
0.17

0.17

Duality (1) : 28.7%
Separation(0):71.3%

BS

BM

AT

WD

DUAL

IND

LNTA

LD

IND

1.35

28.84

25.43

32.83

0.15***

0.11*

-0.01

0.02

0.07

-0.14**

1

LNTA

0.22

0.21

0

1.86

0.23**

0.15**

-0.1

0.2***

0.12**

-0.08

0.06

1

LD

0.41

1.92

0

2.77

0.14**

0.02

0.03

0.13**

-0.07

-0.17***

0.11*

0.02

1

RPO

0.08

0.08

-0.39

0.38

0.15*

0.06

-0.13**

-0.00

0.24***

-0.03

-0.00

-0.06

-0.07

PRO

1

*, **, *** Correlation is significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level. BS= Board Size. BM= Board Meeting. AT= Audit Type. WD= Women
Directors on board. IND= independent non-executive directors on board. LNTA= Company Size. LD= Listing Duration.
PRO=Profitability4.3. Regression Results

4.3.1. The Relationship between Total CSR Disclosure and Corporate Governance (Model 1)
Detailed results are shown in Table 4. Both F-test and Hausman test confirm the Fixed-Effect Model (FEM)
as the most appropriate model for the data. Additional tests for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are
also conducted. Results show data suffers from both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Thus, the model
is corrected by Driscoll-Kraay standard error.
Table 8: The relationship between total CSR disclosure and corporate governance (Model 1)
Fixed effect regression

Coefficient

Board of Director Size
Board Meeting
Audit Type
Women Directors
CEO Duality
Outside directors
Companies Size
Listing Duration
Profitability
Constant
R-squared (within)
F (9,2)

0.01**

-0.001**
0.03**
0.03
0.01
-0.01*
0.01*
0.08*
-0.10
0.05
0.17
95.16

325

Driscoll-Kraay
Standard error
0.003
0.0001
0.01
0.02
0.0044
0.0049
0.0022
0.02
0.05
0.06

P> |t|
0.05
0.03

0.03
0.29
0.15
0.01
0.07
0.05
0.17
0.50


Probability
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg
heteroskedasticity

for

Breusch-Godfrey LM for autocorrelation
F-test
Breusch and Pagan LM for random
effects
Hausman
Pesaran CD

0.01
Chi2 (1) =5.8
p-value = 0.02
Chi2 (1) =110.95
P-value = 0.02
F (92, 177) = 85.23
P-value = 0.00

Chibar2(01) = 240.13
P-value = 0.00
Chi2(9) = 40.00
P-value = 0.00
Probability= 0.00

*, **, *** significance of correlation at the level of 0.1, 0.05, 0.01

Our results reveal that board of director size is in a significant positive association with CSR reporting (ß=
0.01, p-value = 0.05), which is consistent with Esa & Anum Mohd Ghazali (2012); Jizi et al. (2014a); Kathy Rao
et al. (2012a) who reported that firms having more board members do engage to the greater extent in the
corporate social responsibility activities and the corporate social responsibility reporting practice. Moreover,
number of board of director meetings are negatively related to CSR disclosure (ß=-0.001, p-value=0.03). This
finding in line with Alhazaimeh et al. (2014) who confirmed that the more frequently the meetings are held,
the less the sustainability information is disclosed. Audit type is also found to positively associated with CSR
reporting (ß =0.03 and p-value=0.03), suggesting that firms audited by big4 companies are willing to boost
their level of corporate social responsibility practice as argued by the agency theory (Raffournier, 1995; Xiao
et al. , 2004). With ß= -0.01 and p-value = 0.01, although the finding does not support our hypothesis, it agrees
with Eng & Mak (2003b); Haniffa & Cooke (2005b) who documented a negative relationship between CSR and
outside directors. Hence, with more outside directors in board, corporations tend to experience a decrease in
the extent of CSR disclosure.
However, there is no evidence of the relationship between the proportion of women directors and CSR
disclosure. Although the finding does not support our hypothesis, it is in line with the prior studies by
Giannarakis (2014); H. Khan (2010). One potential explanation is differences in Vietnam cultures. Similarly,
CEO duality and CSR disclosure shows insignificant relationship which is in line with Cheng & Courtenay
(2006); Giannarakis (2014); Said et al. (2009). It can possibly be explained that the existence but low rate of CEO
duality in the corporate board is unable to boost the better perspective to ethical and environmental concerns.
Hence, the CEO duality does not have any significant impact effect on the corporate social responsibility
reporting.
As for control variables, the listing duration (ß= 0.08, p-value =0.05 < 0.1) and firm size (ß= 0.01, p-value

=0.07) are positively associated with the corporate social responsibility reporting. Hence, large firms and firms
with long listing duration on Vietnam Stock Exchange are likely to improve and upgrade their level of CSR
reporting as claimed by agency theory. However, there is not a significant link between the firm profitability
and the corporate social responsibility practice.
4.3.2. The Relationship between each Component of CSR Reporting and Corporate Governance Structure (Model 2
To Model 6)
The study considers not only the total score of CSR disclosure but also the score of each component: the
general, the community, the environment, the workplace, the marketplace to provide further insights to the
association between CSR reporting and the corporate governance structure. Table 5 presents that FEM is the
most proper model to be employed in model 2: General and model 5: Workplace while REM is suitable for
model 3: Community, model 4: Environment, model 6: Workplace. Moreover, this table also presents the
statistical tests of six models. Particularly, model 3, model 5, model 6 suffer from both heteroskedasticity and

326


serial correlation because the p-value of Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and Breusch-Godfrey LM in these
models are smaller than 5%. Conversely, only the heteroskedasticity problem is detected in model 2 and model
4 since the p-value of Breusch- Pagan/Cook-Weisberg in these models are larger than 5%. Cluster standard
errors is employed to remove such issues in all models from model 2 to model 6. Table 5 present detailed
results for these models.
Table 9: Results for Model 2, Model 3, Model 4, Model 5, Model 6
Model 2
General
ß
Robust
SE
0.03
0.03

BS

Model 3
Model 4 Environment Model 5 Workplace
Model 6
Community
Marketplace
ß
Robust
ß
Robust
ß
Robust
ß
Robust
SE
SE
SE
SE
0.06*
0.03
0.06**
0.03
-0.11
0.07
0.18***
0.06

BM
AT

-0.005
0.01

0.004
0.02

-0.005
0.08**

0.01
0.03

-0.05
0.04

0.003
0.04

-0.001
0.004

0.003
0.02

0.01
0.23***

0.01
0.07

WD
DUAL
IND

0.05
0.03
-0.03

0.05
0.03
0.04

0.08
-0.02
0.04

0.06
0.05
0.06

0.11**
0.01
0.04

0.06
0.02
0.04

0.13

0.02
-0.19

0.14
0.02
0.12

0.17
-0.03
0.07

0.10
0.05
0.08

LNTA
LD

0.02
0.12*

0.02
0.06

0.02**
0.05

0.01
0.04

0.01**
0.05**

0.005
0.02

0.004
0.07*

0.005
0.04

0.003
0.18***

0.01
0.05

PRO
R
-squared
F

-0.18

0.17

0.13

0.14

-0.12

0.11

-0.05

0.09

-0.25

0.23

Prob>F
Wald
chi2
Prob>chi2
Heteroskedasticity

Autocorrelation
F-test

Breusch and
Pagan Lagrangian
multiplier test for
REM

0.09
3.76

0.04

0.10

25.92

35.35

Chi2(1) =0.4
Probability
=0.53
Chi2(1) =98
Probability= 0.00

0.00
Chi2(1) =11.4
Probability
= 0.0007
Chi2(1) =90.6
Probability=0.00

0.00
Chi2(1) =0.02
Probability
= 0.88
Chi2(1) =100.78
Probability=0.00

Chi2(1) = 3.19
Probability

= 0.07
Chi2(1) =12.8
Probability=0.00

0.00
Chi2(1) = 6.68
Probability
= 0.01
Chi2(1) =95.5
Probability=0.00

F (90,173)
=34.77
Probability= 0.00

F (90,173)
=20.68
Probability = 0.00

F (90,173)
= 56.75
Probability = 0.00

F (90, 173)
= 39.32
Probability = 0.00

F (90, 173)
= 18.15
Probability= 0.00

Chibar2(01)
= 209.23
P-value =0.00

Chibar2(01)
=193.46
p-value=0.00

Chibar2(01)
=238.48
p-value=0.00

Chibar2(01)
=214.69
p-value=0.00

Chibar2(01)
=188.63
p-value=0.00

Chi2(9) = 123.94
p-value= 0.00

Chi2(9) =16.1
p-value= 0.07

Chi2(9) = 9.36
p-value=0.40

Chi2(9) =35.77
p-value=0.00

Chi2(9) =11.91
p-value=0.22

0.0005

0.09
1.99

0.11

0.05
47.68

Hausman test

Pesaran CD Test

H0: Errors are not
correlated across
entities
Probability = 0.00

H0: Errors are not
correlated across
entities
Probability = 0.00

*, **, *** significance of correlation at the level of 0.1, 0.05, 0.01. BS= Board of Director Size. BM= Board Meeting. AT= Audit Type.
WD= Women Directors. IND= outside directors. LNTA=Firm Size. LD= Listing Duration. PRO= Profitability.

327


As can be seen from Table 5, board of director size has a significant positive link with community (ß=0.06,
p-value<10%), environment (ß=0.06, p-value < 5%) and marketplace dimension (ß=0.18, p-value < 1%),
indicating that firms having more directors on board are willing to reveal more information related to the
community, environment and marketplace dimension. Audit type is found to have a significant positive
relationship with community (ß=0.08, p-value<5%), and marketplace dimension (ß= 0.23, p-value <1%).
Consequently, firms audited by Big4 are willing to report more information relating to the community and
marketplace dimension. The proportion of women directors is also shown to have a significant positive link
with the environment dimension (ß=0.11, p-value<5%), suggesting that firms having more women directors
on board are likely to release more information relating to the environment dimension.
As for control variables, the significant relationship between firm size and environment (ß= 0.01 and pvalue < 5%) and community dimension (ß= 0.02 and p-value < 5%) is found. This indicates that big firms are
willing to reveal more information in terms of the environment and community dimension. A significant
positive link between the listing duration and the environment, the general, the workplace, the marketplace
dimension suggests that firms listed on the stock market for a long time are likely to release more corporate
citizenship information in favor of the environment, the general, the workplace, the marketplace dimension.
4.3.3. The Relationship between Corporate Citizenship Reporting and Corporate Governance Structure with Time
Lagged Effect (Model 7)
As shown in Table 6, both F-test and Hausman choose FEM as the most proper model. Tests also indicate
that data suffers from both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Thus, the fixed effect estimation is corrected
by Cluster standard errors. Results reveal that there exists no significant evidence to support the association
between CSR reporting and the governance characteristic when considering a time-lagged effect due to all pvalues >10%.
Table 6: Results for Model 7
Fixed effect regression
Board of Director Size
Board of Director Meetings

Audit Type
Women Directors
CEO Duality
Outside directors
Firm Size
Listing Duration
Profitability
Constant
R-squared
F(9,90)
Probability
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg
heteroskedasticity
Breusch-Godfrey
autocorrelation

LM

for

for

F-test
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
multiplier test for random effects
estimation

Coefficient
Robust SE
0.01

0.03
0.001
0.001
0.003
0.01
-0.11
0.08
0.0003
0.01
0.007
0.02
-0.0003
0.005
0.06**
0.02
0.01
0.06
0.35**
0.14
0.12
2.2
0.03
𝐻0 : 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝐶ℎ𝑖 2 (1) = 10.77
Probability= 0.001
𝐻0 : 𝑁𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶ℎ𝑖 2 (1) = 116.83
Probability= 0.00
F (90,173) = 79.68
Probability= 0.00

Test: Var(u) = 0
Chibar2(01) = 223.69
Probability= 0.00

328

Probability
0.66
0.51
0.69
0.16
0.96
0.71
0.95
0.002
0.85
0.02


Hausman

Pesaran CD

Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
Chi2(9) = 104.31
Probability = 0.00
𝐻0 : 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
Probability= 0.00

*, **, *** significance of correlation at the level of 0.1, 0.05, 0.01

329


5. Conclusion
Our study shows that firms listed in VN100 have a moderate level of CSR disclosure. The paper also reveals
significant relationships between CSR reporting and firm corporate governance characteristics. Particularly,
our study finds support for a positive relationship between the board of director size, auditor type, firm size,
listing duration and CSR disclosure and a negative influence of frequency of board meetings, and number of
outside directors on CSR reporting. Results from this research are expected to benefit both academics and
practitioners in a number of ways. Theoretically, this study enriches the relevant literature in terms of CSR
reporting and the link with corporate governance in Vietnam. These findings would promote the knowledge
of the corporate social responsibility practice in Vietnam and the developing nations as well by demonstrating
how the corporate governance structure has an impact on the level of the corporate social responsibility
practice. Practically, firm managers can find the study helpful influencing CSR reporting in their firms.
Investors can look at firm corporate governance characteristics to identify firms with high corporate social
responsibility disclosure. Additionally, the results can be utilized when regulation makers consider a new
regulation to improve the corporate social responsibility disciplines and practices, which is believed to foster
the firm sustainable development.
Despite the above contributions, our study also has some limitations which can be further examined in
future research. First, as the study only focuses on firms listed in VN100 within 3 years, the results may not be
representative for the whole market. Future research can examine all listed firms on both Hochiminh city stock
exchange and Hanoi stock exchange for a longer period of time. Second, other CSR measurements such as
through interviews or questionnaires and an inclusion of other corporate governance proxies can provide
further insights into the relationship between CSR reporting and corporate governance structure.
References
Abdullah, S. N., Mohamad, N. R., & Mokhtar, M. Z. (2011). Board independence, ownership and CSR of Malaysian large firms.
Corporate Ownership and Control, 8(2). />Aguilera, R. V., Williams, C. A., Conley, J. M., & Rupp, D. E. (2006). Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: a comparative analysis of
the UK and the US*. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(3), 147-158. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2006.00495.x
Ahmad, N. (2017). Board Independence and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting in Malaysia. Australasian Accounting,

Business and Finance Journal, 11(2). />Ahmed Haji, A. (2013). Corporate social responsibility disclosures over time: evidence
from Malaysia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 28(7), 647–676. />Akhtaruddin, M., Hossain, M. A., Hossain, M., & Yao, L. (2009). Corporate Governance
and Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reports of Malaysian Listed
Firms, 7(1), 20.
Al-Gamrh, B. A. A. (2015). The moderating effect of governance on the relationship between investment opportunities, leverage and ownership
identity with firm performance in the UAE, PhD. thesis, Universiti Utara Malaysia
Alhazaimeh, A., Palaniappan, R., & Almsafir, M. (2014). The Impact of Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure on Voluntary
Disclosure in Annual Reports among Listed Jordanian Companies. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 129, 341–348.
/>Allegrini, M., & Greco, G. (2013a). Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed
Companies. Journal of Management & Governance, 17(1), 187–216. />Barako, D. G., & Brown, A. M. (2008). Corporate social reporting and board
representation: evidence from the Kenyan banking sector. Journal of Management
& Governance, 12(4), 309–324. />Barnea, A., & Rubin, A. (2010). Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict Between Shareholders. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(1), 71–
86. />Bowen, H. R. Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. New York: Harper &
Row, 1953
Brown, N., & Deegan, C. (1998). The public disclosure of environmental performance
information—a dual test of media agenda setting theory and legitimacy theory.
Accounting and Business Research, 29(1), 21–41.
/>Bui, T. L. H. (2010). The Vietnamese consumer perception on corporate social responsibility, Journal of International Business Research, 9,
75-87.
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate Governance, Board
Diversity, and Firm Value. The Financial Review, 38(1), 33–53.
/>
330


Chan, M. C., Watson, J., & Woodliff, D. (2014). Corporate Governance Quality and CSR Disclosures. Journal of Business Ethics, 125(1), 59–
73. />Chen, J. C., & Roberts, R. W. (2010). Toward a More Coherent Understanding of the Organization–Society Relationship: A Theoretical
Consideration for Social and Environmental Accounting Research. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(4), 651–665.
/>Cheng, E. C. M., & Courtenay, S. M. (2006). Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. The International Journal of
Accounting, 41(3), 262–289. />Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management. The Academy of Management Review, 22(1),

20. doi:10.2307/259223.
de Villiers, C., Naiker, V., & van Staden, C. J. (2011). The Effect of Board Characteristics on Firm Environmental Performance. Journal of
Management, 37(6), 1636–1663. />Deegan, C. (2002). Introduction: The legitimising effect of social and environmental
disclosures – a theoretical foundation. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability
Journal, 15(3), 282–311. />Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO
Governance and Shareholder Returns. AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF
MANAGEMENT, 17.
Driver, C., & Thompson, G. (n.d.). Corporate Governance and Democracy: The
Stakeholder Debate Revisited, 28.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57.
/>Eng, L. L., & Mak, Y. T. (2003b). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 22(4), 325–345.
/>Esa, E., & Anum Mohd Ghazali, N. (2012). Corporate social responsibility and corporate governance in Malaysian government‐linked
companies. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 12(3), 292–305.
/>Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of
Law and Economics, 26(2), 301–325.
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston:
Pitman.
Freeman, R. E. (2010). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Reissue). Cambridge New York Melbourne Madrid Cape Town
Singapore: Cambridge University Press.
Friedman, M. (2007). The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits. In W. C. Zimmerli, M. Holzinger, & K. Richter (Eds.),
Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance (pp. 173–178). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
/>Gamerschlag, R., Möller, K., & Verbeeten, F. (2011). Determinants of voluntary CSR disclosure: empirical evidence from Germany.
Review of Managerial Science, 5(2–3), 233–262. />Giannarakis, G. (2014). The determinants influencing the extent of CSR disclosure. International Journal of Law and Management, 56(5),
393–416. />Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate Governance Structure and Performance of Malaysian Listed Companies. Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting, 33(7–8), 1034–1062. />Haniffa, R.M., & Cooke, T. E. (2005a). The impact of culture and governance on corporate social reporting. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,
24(5), 391– 430. />Haniffa, R.M., & Cooke, T. E. (2005b). The impact of culture and governance on corporate social reporting. Journal of Accounting and
Public Policy, 24(5), 391–430. />Haniffa, Rozaini Mohd, & Cooke, T. E. (2002). Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in Malaysian corporations. Abacus, 38(3),
317–349.
Hill, C. W. L., & Jones, T. M. (1992). STAKEHOLDER-AGENCY THEORY. Journalof Management Studies, 29(2), 131–154.
/>Ho, N. T. T., & Yekini, L. S. (2014). Investigating the link between CSR and Financial performance-Evidence from Vietnamese listed

companies. British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, 17(1), 85-101. />BJASS_17_02_02.pdf
Holder-Webb, L., Cohen, J. R., Nath, L., & Wood, D. (2009). The Supply of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures Among U.S.
Firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 84(4), 497–527. />Hooghiemstra, R. (2000). Corporate Communication and Impression Management — New Perspectives Why Companies Engage in
Corporate Social Reporting. In J. Sójka & J. Wempe (Eds.), Business Challenging Business Ethics: New Instruments for Coping with
Diversity in International Business (pp. 55–68). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. />Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of
Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. />Jizi, M. I., Salama, A., Dixon, R., & Stratling, R. (2014a). Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: Evidence
from the US Banking Sector. Journal of Business Ethics, 125(4), 601–615. />Kathy Rao, K., Tilt, C. A., & Lester, L. H. (2012a). Corporate governance and environmental reporting: an Australian study. Corporate
Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 12(2), 143–163. />Kathy Rao, K., Tilt, C. A., & Lester, L. H. (2012b). Corporate governance andenvironmental reporting: an Australian study. Corporate Governance:
TheInternational Journal of Business in Society, 12(2), 143–163. />Khan, A., Muttakin, M. B., & Siddiqui, J. (2013b). Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures: Evidence from
an Emerging Economy. Journal of Business Ethics, 114(2), 207–223. />Khan, H. (2010). The effect of corporate governance elements on corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting: Empirical evidence
from private commercial banks of Bangladesh. International Journal of Law and Management, 52(2), 82–109.
/>Krüger, P. (2009). Corporate social responsibility and the board of directors. Job Market Paper. Toulouse School of Economics, France.

331


Laksmana, I. (2008). Corporate Board Governance and Voluntary Disclosure ofExecutive Compensation Practices. Contemporary Accounting
Research, 25(4),1147–1182. />Li, S., Fetscherin, M., Alon, I., Lattemann, C. and Yeh, K. (2010). Corporate Social
Responsibility in Emerging Markets. Management
International Review, 50(5), 635-654.
Liao, L., Luo, L., & Tang, Q. (2015). Gender diversity, board independence, environmental committee and greenhouse gas disclosure.
The British Accounting Review, 47(4), 409–
Mahadeo, J. D., Oogarah-Hanuman, V., & Soobaroyen, T. (2011). A Longitudinal Study of Corporate Social Disclosures in a Developing
Economy. Journal of Business Ethics, 104(4), 545–558. />Mallin, C. A., & Michelon, G. (2011). Board reputation attributes and corporate socialperformance: an empirical investigation of the US Best
Corporate Citizens. Accounting and Business Research, 41(2), 119–144. />McWilliams, A., Siegel, D. S., & Wright, P. M. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility:Strategic Implications*. Journal of Management Studies,
43(1), 1–18. />Michelon, G., & Parbonetti, A. (2012). The effect of corporate governance on sustainability disclosure. Journal of Management & Governance, 16(3),
477–509. />Money, K., & Schepers, H. (2007). Are CSR and Corporate Governance Converging?: A View from Boardroom Directors and Company
Secretaries in FTSE100 Companies in the UK. Journal of General Management, 33(2), 1–11.
/>Muttakin, M. B., Khan, A., & Subramaniam, N. (2015). Firm characteristics, board diversity and corporate social responsibility: Evidence
from Bangladesh. Pacific Accounting Review, 27(3), 353–372. />Ntim, C. G., & Soobaroyen, T. (2013). Black Economic Empowerment Disclosures by South African Listed Corporations: The Influence

of Ownership and Board Characteristics. Journal of Business Ethics, 116(1), 121–138. />Owusu-Ansah, S. (1998). The impact of corporate attribites on the extent of mandatory disclosure and reporting by listed companies in
Zimbabwe. The International Journal of Accounting, 33(5), 605–631.
Post, C., Rahman, N., & Rubow, E. (2011). Green Governance: Boards of Directors’ Composition and Environmental Corporate Social
Responsibility. Business & Society, 50(1), 189–223. />Prado‐Lorenzo, J., Rodríguez‐Domínguez, L., Gallego‐Álvarez, I., & García‐Sánchez, I. (2009). Factors influencing the disclosure of
greenhouse gas emissions in companies world‐wide. Management Decision, 47(7), 1133–1157.
/>Raffournier, B. (1995). The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies. European Accounting Review, 4(2),
261–280. />Rao, K., & Tilt, C. (2016). Board Composition and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Diversity, Gender, Strategy and Decision
Making. Journal of Business Ethics, 138(2), 327–347. />Reverte, C. (2009). Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Ratings by Spanish Listed Firms. Journal of Business
Ethics, 88(2), 351–366. />Said, R., Hj Zainuddin, Y., & Haron, H. (2009). The relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate
governance characteristics in Malaysian public listed companies. Social Responsibility Journal, 5(2), 212–226.
/>Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. The Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571.
/>Thompson, P., & Zakaria, Z. (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in Malaysia. Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 2004(13), 125–
136. />Uwuigbe, U., & Egbide, B.-C. (2012). Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures in Nigeria: A Study of Listed Financial and NonFinancial Firms. Journal of Management and Sustainability, 2(1). />Vo, T.-N. T. (n.d.). To Be or Not to Be Both CEO and Board Chair, 67.
Vu, K. B. A. H. (2012). Determinants of voluntary disclosure for Vietnamese listed firms.
Webb, E. (2004). An Examination of Socially Responsible Firms’ Board Structure. Journal of Management and Governance, 8(3), 255–277.
/>Xiao, J. Z., Yang, H., & Chow, C. W. (2004). The determinants and characteristics of voluntary Internet-based disclosures by listed
Chinese companies. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(3), 191–225.
Zhang, L. (2012). Board demographic diversity, independence, and corporate social performance. Corporate Governance: The International
Journal of Business in Society, 12(5), 686–700. />
332