Impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment inflows to vietnam

Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct
Investment Inflows To Vietnam

Quynh Hoa Le
Thu Dau Mot University, Vietnam
Abstract
The effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) on FDI inflows to Vietnam remains
unexplored despite
the proliferation of treaties that the government efforts to sign to attract foreign investment at
the end of last
century. This paper asks whether BITs stimulate FDI flows to Vietnam by using different explanation
variables
and various estimation technique to test the robustness. I find a very weak positive relationship
between BITs
and FDI, though effects of FTAs and WTO are estimated to promote FDI flows into Vietnam. My
results show
the importance of accounting for guiding investment policies to narrow down the gap between law
regulations

and provision of BITs.
Keywords: BITs, FTAs, FDI, Vietnam,
JEL codes: F15, F21, F36, F37
1. Introduction
The last century has proven that international economic integration is an indispensable
trend. The evidence is that barriers of trade and investment among countries decrease through
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). In recent decades, many
countries, especially developing countries, try to sign a number of BITs in order to attract more
foreign direct investment (FDI) that boost economic growth, enhance nation’s capital and
skilled labor force.
Not apart from that trend, in recent years, Vietnam has participated in a total of 65 BITs and
has started to implement the policy of attracting FDI since 1987. So far, after over 30 years,

this source of capital has become one of the important driving forces for promoting economic
development. In the period of 3 decades, Vietnam has witnessed the presence of foreign
investors, typically multinational corporations such as Samsung, Honda, Intel, Yamaha,
Panasonic, Microsoft, LG ... The "billion" projects of these multi-national corporations show that
Vietnam has been an attractive investment destination for foreign investors. According to
UNCTAD statistics (2017), FDI inflows into Vietnam increased dramatically with total stock
about 370 billion USD in 2017, the number is ten times more than that of the year 1997.
However, the impact of BITs to FDIs of developing countries remains a controversy subject
among scientists. As suggested by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), Neumayer and Spess (2005),
Desbordes and Vicard (2007), Lejour and Salfi (2015), Nguyen and Cao (2017), signing a treaty
has a positive effect on FDI. On the other hand, Hallward-Driemaier (2003), Tobin and RoseAckerman (2003) and Yackee (2007) have tended to find that BITs fail to boost inward FDI into
the developing countries that sign them.
Therefore, the previous empirical studies of the impact of BITs on FDI have had mixed results
and the question is whether or not signing BIT does help Vietnam to attract more FDI and more
favorable BITs lead to further FDI inflows to Vietnam.


480


To answer this question, I develops a theoretical argument to explain the mixed results of
previous studies and to advance the understanding of BITs and their impacts on FDI with the
data collected from the period of 1996-2017.
Since the introduction of the paper has been given, the next section gives a brief overview
BITs and FDI inflow to Vietnam; the third discusses the related literature review. Section four
illustrations the research design, including variables, methodology and estimation framework.
Then, section five comes to the results and discussion. Lastly, final section summarizes the
findings of the paper and policy implications.
2. Overview Of Bits And Fdi Inflows To Vietnam
As for Vietnam, foreign investment has made positive and impressive contributions in many

aspects in the process of integration and socio-economic development in each period of
development. By 2017, there has been 120 countries pouring FDI into Vietnam with a total
capital of over USD 350 billion.

Figure 3 FDI inflows and stocks in Vietnam from 1996 to 2017
FDI inflows and stocks in Vietnam
1996-2017
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
FDI inflows

FDI stocks

Source: Author’s calculation from UNCTAD database on FDI

As can be seen from the figure 1, total FDI stocks in Vietnam increased continuously over
the years from 1996 to 2007, especially in 2008 there was a sudden increase when Vietnam
became a WTO member. In the next period between 2009 and 2017, FDI remained an upward
trend and reached over 370 billion USD at the end of 2017.
However, the growth rate of FDI fluctuated within three decades and it can be summarized
as follows. In term of FDI inflows, within the first five years from 1996 to 2000, FDI inflows into
Vietnam decreased both in registered capital and the number of projects due to the impact of
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Then, in the next five years (2001-2005), FDI started to

recover but the pace was slow. The explanation for this could be that Vietnam's investment
environment and policies at that time were slowly improving, while being subject to strong
competition from the other countries like China, Thailand, Singapore, etc.
After Vietnam participated in WTO (2007), the capital of FDI poured into Vietnam increased
rapidly and reached its peak at over 70 billion USD in 2008. Moreover, the domestic investment and
business environment had been improved and the legal framework for investment had become
more and more consistent with international practice, resulting in large waves of investment from
Korea, the United States and Japan, etc.

However, in 2009 and 2010, due to the impact of the global economic crisis, FDI inflows into
Vietnam also decreased significantly and remained stable at about 20 billion USD per year
between 2011 and 2016.


481


Overall, in the period of 1996-2017, the FDI into Vietnam have been fluctuating but always
positive and has an upward trend.
Bilateral investment treaties, or BITs, is defined "agreements between two countries for
the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each other's
territories by companies based in either country." (UNCTAD’s definition).
Initially, BITs were signed between developed and developing countries. For developed
countries, which export capital, BITs have been part of a long-term efforts to establish
international rules that facilitate and protect the foreign investments of its citizens and
enterprises. Developing countries have joined in BITs in order to improve the policy framework
and attract more FDI. Moreover, by becoming more and more involved in BITs, developing
countries have begun to see BITs as an investment protection device for their own investors.
Figure 4 Proliferation of BITs between Vietnam and partners

Proliferation of BITs between Vietnam and partners
1990-2017

1990

60
50
40
30
20
10
0

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

70

VNM BIT's signed per year

Cumulative

Source: Author’s calculation from UNCTAD database on Bilateral investment treaties

The number of new treaties of Vietnam and total cumulative BITs can be seen in figure 2.
Vietnam ratified the first bilateral investment treaties with Italia in the 1990 but 4 years
later, it came into force. Until the 1990s at most twenty-five treaties were ratified. After 20
years, BITs have become popular and in 2010, Vietnam has signed total 62 BITs with several
countries, most of these are developed countries, which have abundant capital.
However, in the period of 2010-2017, only 3 BITs were signed representing the lowest
annual number of treaties in the last 27 years.
3. Literature Review
Previous studies examine whether the BITs have actually had an important role in increasing the
FDI flows to the signatory country with various economic methods, different samples, time periods,
and outcomes.

On the one hand, some studies have found that the signing of a BIT could attract a greater
amount of investment to the country.
Using both random-effects and fixed effects models in the research about whether BITs increase
the investment to developing countries, Neumayer and Spess (2005) indicate some explanatory
variables (including: GDP, population, economic growth, inflation, resource rents, BITs, WTO
membership, institutional quality, composite political risk, investment profile, government stability,
law and order) to estimate the role of BITs plays in attracting FDI. They claim that developing
nations that engage in more BITs with developed

482


partners receive larger amount of FDI inflows. In specifically, a developing country signing a BIT
is expected to attract FDI inflows with an increase amount from 40 to 90 percent.
Similarly, Büthe and Milner, in the study of “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into
Developing Countries Increasing FDI through international Trade Agreements” in 2008, have
examined the effect of BITs on inward FDI into developing countries. They conclude that foreign
investors consider BITs as government commitments to broaden economically liberal, which
alleviates or reduce the political risks to FDI in developing countries. According to their results,
there is a predicted positive, statistically and substantively significant correlation between BITs
and FDI inflow into developing countries from 1970 to 2000.
Using extensive data from 1985 until 2011 to assess the impact of the treaties on bilateral
FDI stocks, Lejour and Salfi (2014) make an investigation conducted for 34 OECD countries
reporting FDI inward and outward stocks towards 217 partners. They find that engaging in BITs
increase bilateral FDI stocks by 35% on average compared to those of non-treaty countries. In
addition, less developed countries receive larger inward FDI stocks from developed partners
and distinguishing by region, FDI stocks increase mainly in East Asia and Middle and Eastern
Europe.
On the other hand, some empirical analyses of bilateral investment flows, in particular,

indicate that developing countries could not use BITs to attract more FDI (Hallward-Driemeier’s,
2003).
Hallward-Dreimer (2003) and Tobin & Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that there is very weak
positive link relationship between the treaties and investor’s behavior. In the earlier study by
Hallward-Dreimer (2003), analyzing bilateral FDI flows in the period of 20 years from the OECD
members to developing partners finds little evidence that BITs have stimulated additional
investment. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) apply a two-pronged approach and use panel
data from the first BIT signed in 1959 through 2000 for low- and middle-income countries (176
countries). They find that BITs only have a positive effect on investment when countries have a
stable business environment; whereas the opposite occurs or BITs affect negatively FDI inflows
if the country has a high political risk.
These results are consistent with the research of Yackee (2008) focuses on whether the
presence of BITs meaningfully influences investment decisions and finds no evidence in support
of the impact of BITs on investment decisions.
Overall, the previous studies only focus on the link between the treaties and FDI flows from
developed regions to developing countries without considering the impact on a particular
country. In term of Vietnam, despite Vietnam has signed 65 BITs and 16 FTAs, there is little
research has been done on the impact of these agreements. Can say about the study by Cao
and Nguyen (2016), the investigation has been conducted to examine the impact of BITs in
general and on FDI inflows to Vietnam in particular. Basing on the study of Chaisse and Bellak
(2011) and using the principal component analysis, they apply the gravity model with the
estimation techniques for panel data such as Fixed and Random effect to affirm the consistent
positive effects of BITs on FDI inflows to Vietnam with various independent variables (proxies
for openness, institution…).
Beside a connection between BITs and bilateral FDI flows, joining free trade agreements affect the
changes in inward FDI because of several reasons, such as: improving policies and economic
environment of the country, decreasing political risk, lower tax rate and giving more incentives for
investors. However, the previous researchers only evaluate the impact of BITs and the WTO, and
some of the major agreements on FDI, not measure the effect of FTAs and BITs simultaneously on
the investment inflow, specifically in Vietnam.

4. Research Design
This paper focuses on the hypothesis that the more BITs a developing country joins in, the
more attracted foreign investors consider it as an investment destination, and the more FDI the
country will receive. Therefore, dependent variable and explanatory variables are identified to
examine the hypothesis.


483


Dependent variable
To test the hypothesis statistically, statistical analyses of inward FDI stocks into Vietnam are
collected from the UNCTAD FDI database and Statistical yearbook of the General Statistics Office of
Vietnam from 1996 to 2017. The research uses total FDI stock instead of FDI flows because stocks,
due to the accumulation of flows, may more effectively capture long-run effects (Neumayer and
Spess, 2005). Moreover, the absolute volume provides the most accurate base for the analysis
technique used in the study. Then, the natural log of the dependent variable is taken to reduce the
skewness of its distribution and increases the model fit substantially.

Explanatory variables
The model applies a total cumulative number of ratified BITs as a key explanatory variable and
data about the date of signature and the date of entry into force of BITs are available from a listing
published by UNCTAD. I use the cumulative BITs instead of new BITs that Vietnam signs in every
year, because the negotiation and signing of a treaty is a lengthy process and Vietnam doesn’t
participate in new BITs every year. Therefore, the cumulative number will reflect more accurately the
growth of BITs and its impact in the model.
Moreover, if a developing country have signed more FTAs with a developed country, it might
receive more FDI inflows because such agreements sometimes also contain provisions on policies
which might be beneficial to foreign investors and it is easier to export or import commodities with

low taxes. This indicator is evaluated by a dummy variable indicating whether Vietnam becomes a
WTO member as well as a variable counting the number of trade agreements Vietnam has
concluded, based on information are obtained from WTO (2017).

Based on the findings of Chakrabarti (2001) about the determinants of foreign direct
investment, the paper uses some control variables including: market size (GDP per capital and
POP), economic growth (GDP growth), trade openness, inflation, natural resource rents.
Market size has been the most widely accepted as a leading determinant of FDI inflows in past
empirical studies and economic theory. GDP per capital and population of the countries are two
popular proxies to estimate the specification of variables. The study doesn’t use the absolute GDP because
it is a relatively poor indicator of market potential for investors, especially in many developing
economies, as it reflects size of the population rather than income (Chakrabarti, 2001). As finding of
most of previous papers, like Tobin and Rose (2005), Yakee (2008), Frenkel and Walter (2017), etc,
GDP per capital has a significantly positive impact on FDI inflows to developing countries. On the
one hand, to be able to distinguish any possible remain determinant of market size, the country’s
population seems to be appropriate scale to measure this variable. Both GDP per capital and
population are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database.

Economic growth, or growth rate of GDP, is a crucial factor in influencing the inflow of
foreign investment. There are a number of reasons why foreign investors may prefer a fastergrowing market (Busse (2008), Yakee (2008), Buthe (2009) and Frenkle (2017)). For example, a
country with high economic growth provides relatively better opportunities, like more efficient
production or a larger market, for making profits. Moreover, the growth is a measure and signal
of market demand which attracts FDI.
Low rate of inflation is considered an incentive for FDI inflows in many empirical studies.
(Alshamsi et al (2015)). Khan and Mitra (2014) indicate that a low and stable rate of inflation
can be considered as a sign of internal economic stability because it reduces the risks and
increases the confidence of people and businesses to make investment decisions. Otherwise, a
high inflation rate can impact the preservation of foreign capital and may affect profitability as
higher prices can lead to higher costs and lower profits. (Aijaz, Siddiqui, & Aumeboonsuke,
2014).

Natural resource rents variable can be calculated by the total value of natural resource as a
share of the GDP and estimated by the Bank of the World (2017) as the price of the resource
minus the average cost multiplied by the amount of resources extracted.
Wage has been a potential determinant influencing on FDI and estimated by the Bank of the
World (2017). Theoretically, the importance of cheap labor in attracting multinationals is
agreed upon by the proponents of the dependency hypothesis as well as those of the
modernization hypothesis.


484


I expect a positive association of GDPpc, POP, Growth, WTO, FTAs and BITs with FDI; the opposite applies to
Inflation, resource rents and wage as these variables can be interpreted as a proxy for macroeconomic distortions.
This study applies the following general structure of the estimation model:
Ln(FDIvnt) = 1*Ln(GDPpcvnt) + 2*Ln(POPvnt) + 3*Inf + 4*Growth + 5*Resource_rents + 6*Wage+
7*BITs
+ 8*FTAs + 9*WTO +
const Where:

Ln: Natural logarithm of variables.
FDIvnt is the log of total inward FDI to Vietnam in
year t. GDPpcvnt is value of GDP per capital of
Vietnam in year t. POPvnt is the Vietnamese
population in year t.
Inf is the percentage of inflation of Vietnam in
year t. Growth is the annual growth rate of GDP
of Vietnam.

Resource rents is total natural resources rents as a share of GDP.

Wage is calculated by WDI database and modeled ILO estimate; It is wage and salaried
workers, total (% of total employment).
BITs are the total cumulative number of BITs Vietnam ratified in year t.
FTAs is the total cumulative number of FTAs Vietnam ratified in year t.
WTO is a dummy which is 1 in years after Vietnam is a WTO and zero otherwise.
Const is a constant of model.
Estimation Methods
Different techniques are applied in the regression analysis: simple ordinary least square
(OLS) regression, generalized least squares (GLS) estimation and Tobit regression. The use of
several alternative estimation methods in this research to examine the robustness of the
results.
5. Results And Discussion
Table 10. Estimates of the Effects of Bilateral Investment Treaties
on Total Foreign Direct Investment Activity
OLS
LnFDIvnt

GLS
LnFDIvnt

TOBIT
LnFDIvnt

lnGDPpc

0.488**

0.488***

0.488***

LnPOP

(2.53)
1.1350

(3.43)
1.1350

(3.43)
1.1350

Growth

(0.69)
-0.0469**

(0.94)
-0.0469***

(0.94)
-0.0469***

Resource_rents

(-2.63)
-0.0108

(-3.56)
-0.0108*

(-3.56)
-0.0108*

Wage

(-1.23)
-0.0148

(-1.66)
-0.0148*

(-1.66)
-0.0148*

(-1.33)
0.00777*

(-1.80)
0.00777**

(-1.80)
0.00777**

Inf

485

WTO

(1.82)
0.160*

(2.46)
0.160***

(2.46)
0.160***

FTAs

(2.02)
0.0747**

(2.73)
0.0747***

(2.73)
0.0747***

BITS

(2.86)
0.0078

(3.88)
0.0078

(3.88)
0.0078

_const

(1.03)
3.2540

(1.40)
3.2540

(1.40)
3.2540

(0.48)

(0.65)

(0.65)

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculation by STATA

I have explored the robustness of the results by testing the sensitivity of key variables with
different techniques in the regression analysis. The result shows that the coefficients of the
explanatory variables have a low fluctuation, which means that the model is highly robust and
reliable.
Firstly, GDP per capita and trade agreements and WTO that Vietnam participates in have a
positive impact on FDI inflows. This result is consistent with the hypothesis and previous

studies, for example, Neumaye and Spess (2005) and Büthe and Milner (2009). Secondly, the
elasticity coefficient between inflation rate and dependent variable is 0.007, which means that
the inflation has positive and statistically significant effect on FDI. It is against the expected
negative relationship between the two in the findings of recent researchers. According to the
argument of Romer (1990), the inflation can have a positive effect on FDI provided that it does
not exceed a certain threshold.
In contrast, natural resource rents and labor’s wage have the effect of reducing the flow of
FDI. The result is in line with previous papers, as the low cost of resource extraction and labor
cost are the key incentives for foreign investor’s decision. (Frenkel and Walter (2017) and Tobin
and Rose-Ackerman (2005)).
In terms of economic growth, the empirical study reports negative effects of GDP growth
rate on FDI. It is similar to the findings of several scientists (e.g Wint and Williams (2002), Tobin
(2005) and Buchanan et al. (2012)). One explanation for such result is that it is a scaling effect
(Jensen (2003) and Tsai (1994)). Another argues that a negative correlation between economic
growth and FDI can also occur if low economic growth in Vietnam means greater opportunities
for future profits. For instance, a country has a low growth economy that is relatively poor
capital, which means that labor and natural resources are relatively abundant and cheap. There
may here be an opportunity for investors to benefit with the hope of realizing unexploited
opportunities for profit.
From the findings, there is no association between population and inward FDI stocks, this is
similar in Aisbett's study (2007). The reasonable explanation for this could be that developed
countries are more concerned about labor productivity and labor costs than absolute amount of
population. While Vietnam's quality labor is not high and labor productivity is much lower than
its neighbors such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.
Ideally, if the BIT is considered input, the increase in FDI must be the output. Though the
provisions of BITs are expected to provide a healthy investment environment, which is beneficial for
investors; nevertheless,


486

in my findings, BITs do not have the significant effect of attracting FDI into Vietnam, because
there is a gap between policy and enforcement in Vietnam. For example, despite the
Vietnamese government’s recent attempts to negotiate more balanced investment rules in the
provision of BITs and ensure consistency within the body of investment treaties and then
national laws and regulations, but it is far from sufficient to deal with these challenges. To
bridge the gap, though Vietnam just reformed the new Law on Investment and the new Law on
Enterprise which became effective on 1 July 2015, so it takes time for the effect of increased
democracy to show, for which our sample is too short.
Moreover, as for Vietnam, since it is not a member of the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention; therefore, when a dispute arises, the foreign
investors can only litigate the Vietnamese government in accordance with BIT regulations. And
this is one of the terms that investors are afraid of because it will be detrimental to them.
In fact, Vietnam's economy still has many internal obstacles that have not been overcome,
such as lack of high quality human resources, low productivity, poor infrastructure and services
compared to many countries in the neighbor region. According to research by Sachs and
Sauvant (2009) “There is no clear evidence that BITs have significant impact on FDI inflows in
developing countries. BITs only have a positive impact on FDI in the country with an stable
economic environment and strong policy. If a BIT is signed while the government is in
institutional reform and liberalization to encourage investment, this reform will affect the
investment decision of the investor rather than the BIT.”
On the contrary, the WTO has the most positive impact on FDI inflows as the WTO content strictly
regulates commitments that Vietnam must make and change policies in line with international
regulations. This creates a more competitive environment and a more opening market for investors
than BITs regulations.

6. Conclusion
Vietnam is considered as one of the dominant destination of FDI from many developed
economies in the world. In recent years, Vietnam has participated in a total of 65 BITs and has

started to implement the policy of attracting FDI since 1987. The study set out to find the
potential impact of these BITs on FDI to Vietnam by using different explanation variables and
various estimation technique to test the robustness. Consequently, GDP per capita of Vietnam
and trade agreements and WTO have a positive effect on FDI inflows; while, natural resource
rents and labor’s wage have the reverse effect on the flow of FDI. These results are consistent
with previous studies and are explained in discussion section. However, the impact of inflation
rate and economic growth are against the expected relationship with FDI in the findings of
recent researchers. More importantly, BITs appear to have little impact on FDI inflows to Vietnam due to a
gap between policy and enforcement.
Therefore, some measures should be implemented to improve the effectiveness of BITs,
such as: A necessary first step is therefore the contemplation of a new model treaty text that
takes domestic laws and policy priorities into account. Secondly, the government should
consider to participate in the ICSID Convention to attract foreign investment and Vietnam can
use ICSID experts and arbitrators, provide technical assistance and capacity for the ISCID
dispute resolution process, simplify arbitral awards. In addition to these, rigorous regulations in
BITs will create competitive pressures in domestic enterprises, so Vietnamese businesses must
understand the relevant issues in BITs, learn and promote innovation to improve their
capabilities.


487


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Sauvant, K. and L.E. Sachs (eds.), The Effects of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties,
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Appendix 1: Countries sign BITs with Vietnam

488


No.

Partners

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

Germany
Austria
Australia
Indonesia
Thailand
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
China
Korea, Republic of
Denmark
Sweden
Finland
Netherlands
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Cuba
Latvia
Laos
Bulgaria
India
Egypt

Czech Republic
Tajikistan

26

Chile

27

Cambodia

28
29
30
31

United Kingdom
Korea, Republic of
Japan
Bangladesh

32

United Arab Emirates

33

Oman

34

Morocco

35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Greece
Finland
Lithuania
Mongolia
Argentina
Spain
Venezuela, Bolivarian
Republic of
Uruguay
Italy
BLEU
France
Switzerland
Belarus
Russian Federation
Kazakhstan
Slovakia

42

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Status

Date of signature

In force
In force
In force
Terminated
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
Terminated
In force
In force
Terminated
In force
In force
In force
In force

In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
Signed (not in
force)
Signed (not in
force)
Signed (not in
force)
In force
In force
In force
Signed (not in
force)
Signed (not in
force)
Signed (not in
force)
Signed (not in
force)
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force
In force

In force

03/04/1993
27/03/1995
05/03/1991
25/10/1991
30/10/1991
21/01/1992
27/02/1992
29/10/1992
02/12/1992
13/05/1993
23/07/1993
08/09/1993
13/09/1993
10/03/1994
26/08/1994
31/08/1994
15/09/1994
12/10/1995
06/11/1995
14/01/1996
19/09/1996
08/03/1997
06/09/1997
25/11/1997
19/01/1999

In
In

In
In
In
In
In
In
In

force
force
force
force
force
force
force
force
force

Date of entry into
force
19/09/1998
01/10/1996
11/09/1991
03/04/1994
07/02/1992
09/10/1992
29/01/1993
25/12/1992
01/09/1993
04/09/1993

07/08/1994
02/08/1994
02/05/1996
01/02/1995
16/06/1995
24/11/1994
16/08/1995
01/10/1996
20/02/1996
23/06/1996
15/05/1998
01/12/1999
04/03/2002
09/07/1998

16/09/1999
01/09/2001
01/08/2002
15/09/2003
14/11/2003
01/05/2005

01/08/2002
05/06/2004
19/12/2004

16/02/2009
10/01/2011
15/06/2012
13/10/2008

21/02/2008
27/09/1995
17/04/2000
03/06/1996
20/02/2006
20/11/2008

08/12/2011
04/06/2009
24/04/2003
13/12/2001
01/06/1997
29/07/2011
17/06/2009

12/05/2009
18/05/1990
24/01/1991
26/05/1992
03/07/1992
08/07/1992
16/06/1994
15/09/2009
17/12/2009

09/09/2012
06/05/1994
11/06/1999
10/08/1994
03/12/1992

24/11/1994
03/07/1996
07/04/2014
18/08/2011


51

Armenia

In force

01/02/1993
489

28/04/1993


52
53
54
55

Taiwan Province of
China
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Algeria

56

Myanmar

57

Korea, Dem. People's
Rep. of

58
59

Iceland
Namibia

60
61
62

Mozambique
Kuwait
Iran, Islamic Republic
of

63

Estonia

64

Sri Lanka

65

Turkey

In force

21/04/1993

23/04/1993

In force
In force
Signed (not in
force)
Signed (not in
force)
Signed (not in
force)

08/06/1994
28/03/1996
21/10/1996

08/12/1994
06/03/1998

In force
Signed (not in
force)

In force
In force
Signed (not in
force)

20/09/2002
30/05/2003

10/07/2003

16/01/2007
23/05/2007
23/03/2009

29/05/2007
16/03/2011

Signed (not in
force)
Signed (not in
force)
Signed (not in
force)

24/09/2009

15/02/2000
02/05/2002

22/10/2009

15/01/2014

Source: />

490