What is the question to which ‘substitution’ is the answer

robert bernasconi
11 What is the question to which
‘substitution’ is the answer?
i
The main text for addressing the concept of ‘substitution’ is Levinas’s
essay of the same name. The essay exists in two versions. The first
version was delivered as a lecture in Brussels in November 1967 and
was revised for publication in the Revue Philosophique de Louvain in
the following year (
bpw
79–95). Although the essay was published on
its own, as a lecture it had been preceded the day before by a reading
of ‘Proximity’, the contents of which are familiar from the text of
‘Language and Proximity’ (
cp
109–26). The second and better known
version of ‘Substitution’ was published in 1974 as the central chapter
of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (
ob
99–129). I shall focus
on the first version of ‘Substitution’ in the conviction that Levinas’s
train of thought is more readily identified in his initial formulation
of it, referencing the second version only when it departs from the
first in some significant way.
Just as the chapter, ‘Substitution’, is, as Levinas himself insists,
the centrepiece of Otherwise than Being (
ob
xli), so the notion of
‘substitution’ is the core concept of that book, and yet it remains
enigmatic. There is not even a consensus about what the question is
to which substitution is supposed to be the answer. Only when this

is established will it be possible to address with any confidence the
questions scholars tend to debate, such as the extent to which the
concept of substitution represents a departure from the philosophy of
Totality and Infinity and the degree to which it should be understood
as a response to Derrida’s ‘Violence and Metaphysics’.
The initial hypothesis to be examined is that Levinas introduces
the concept of substitution to address the question of what the
234
To which question is ‘substitution’ the answer? 235
subject must be like for ethics to be possible.
1
On this understanding
the core argument of the essay is stated near its end when Levinas
explains that ‘the passage of the identical to the other in substitu-
tion ...makes possible sacrifice’ (
bpw
90). The same claim is refor-
mulated a little later as follows: ‘It is through the condition of being a
hostage that there can be pity, compassion, pardon, and proximity in
the world – even the little there is, even the simple “after you sir” ’
(
bpw
91). This suggests that Levinas is asking what underlies that
behaviour which is sometimes called superogatory, gratuitous or, as
he prefers to say, ethical. His answer is that at the hear
t of subjectiv-
ity is not a ‘for itself’, but what he calls ‘the one-for-the-other’. This
is his working definition of substitution, and when Levinas explains
substitution as ‘the one-for-the-other’ he not only posits an alterity
at the heart of subjectivity, but gives it an ethical sense. Levinas is

not preaching. He is not saying that one should sacrifice oneself. He
merely wants to account for its possibility.
Although there is some doubt as to whether this exhausts the pos-
itive doctrine of ‘Substitution’, Levinas clearly identifies the rival
accounts that he targets in the essay. There are at least three of them.
The first is a form of egoism:
All the transfers of sentiment which theorists
of original war and egoism use
to explain the birth of generosity (it isn’t clear, however, that there was war
at the beginning; before wars there were altars) could not take root in the ego
were it not, in its entire being, or rather its entire nonbeing, subjected not
to a category, as in the case of matter, but to an unlimited accusative, that
is to say, persecution, self, hostage, already substituted for others. [
bpw
91]
Levinas
obviously has Thomas Hobbes in mind, and this is in
fact only one moment in an ongoing polemic against Hobbes (e.g.
en
100–1), although Levinas never engages with Hobbes textually.
Levinas is strongly committed to the claim that egoism cannot give
birth to generosity, but that, by contrast, egoism arises from ‘an
intrigue
other than egoism
’(
bpw
88). If egoism is true, then sacri-
fice would be impossible, except perhaps under extreme conditions
of self-deception. Levinas moves beyond egoism but without having
recourse to altruism (

ob
117).
As almost always in Levinas, Heidegger is also a target of his
polemics. For Levinas, sacrifice is not possible if the human subject
is understood as concerned for its own existence, as Heideggerian
236 the cambridge companion to levinas
Dasein is on Levinas’s interpretation.
2
Levinas’s third target is the
hypothesis that the condition of the possibility of sacrifice lies in
freedom. He rejects the claim that it is because the ego is a free
consciousness, capable of sympathy and compassion, that it can
take responsibility for the sufferings of the world. The experience
of responsibility is not the experience of a free choice, but rather
‘the impossibility of evading the neighbor’s call’ (
bpw
95). Some
of the claims Levinas opposes echo theses of Sartre’s Being and
Nothingness, and Sartre is named in ‘Substitution’, as is Hegel, who
here again attracts Levinas’s critical attention (
bpw
84).
‘Substitution’, as Levinas understands it, cannot be accounted
for by
the Western philosophical tradition. To the extent that that
tradition has largely restricted its purview to whatever is accessi-
ble to consciousness, a radical challenge to the subject is excluded
by it from the outset. Communication with the other is transcen-
dence only in so far as the sovereignty of consciousness is displaced
(

bpw
92). In so far as whatever appears to consciousness is a function
of the structures of subjectivity, as in Kant’s schematism, there are
no radical surprises in store for the subject. The self-sufficiency of the
subject, its self-satisfaction, is secure because this is a subject who
cannot be challenged from the outside. The self-possession of self-
consciousness rules as an arche and is not submitted to the other’s
challenge as described in Totality and Infinity. It was already clear
from Totality and Infinity that the relation with the stranger was not
conducted through a representation of the other, but in ‘Substitution’
Levinas radicalizes this account by insisting that one does not know
from whom the summons comes. This enables Levinas to accom-
modate better his hyperbolic notion of responsibility that includes
those we do not even know and with whom we cannot therefore
have contracted. But, more importantly in the immediate context, it
takes responsibility out of the realm of consciousness.
This helps to explain why Levinas believes that it is necessary to
depart from the postulates of ontological thinking in order to think
‘the in itself of persecuted subjectivity’ (
bpw
89). This approach is
not motivated by a dogmatic rejection of the Western philosophical
tradition, still less a fascination for new modes of thinking. Levinas’s
strategy is philosophically motivated. To breakfrom traditional on-
tology Levinas speaks of the creature and creation rather than of
being. These terms were already introduced in Totality and Infinity,
To which question is ‘substitution’ the answer? 237
but he now emphasizes their role in the analysis. Levinas’s previous
hesitation about their significance seems to have arisen from his
concern to protect his philosophy from being understood simply as

Jewish philosophy, largely because he seems to have feared that that
would have been a way of dismissing it. His greater confidence on
this score is indicated by his comment in 1974: ‘It is not here a ques-
tion of justifying the theological context of ontological thought, for
the word creation designates a signification older than the context
woven about this name’ (
ob
113). And it should not go unnoticed that
the notion of substitution was already introduced by Levinas into his
confessional writings in a lecture he delivered in 1964, three years
before it found its way into his philosophical
writings (
ntr
49).
3
ii
Unlike much contemporary writing on ethics, Levinas does not as-
sume or even expect rationality and morality to be in agreement.
Nor does he conceive his project as an attempt to elucidate the way
we actually thinkabout morality. Indeed, the good conscience that
arises from satisfying the often very restricted demands imposed by
conventional morality is one of his central targets. Levinas’s radical
departure from traditional ethics is signalled by the claim added to
the 1974 version, ‘The ethical situation of responsibility is not com-
prehensible on the basis of ethics’ (
ob
120). Although he never says
so in exactly these terms, Levinas suspects that rationality, as ordi-
narily conceived, serves to tame or domesticate morality. To release
a more demanding sense of ethics, Levinas questions the inherited

sense of rationality.
Levinas is well aware of how radical his claims are and the bur-
den they place on him as he tries to articulate them. They not only
lead him to the difficult thought of substitution, but in preparation
for introducing this thought he believes himself compelled to aban-
don certain theses central to the Western philosophical tradition as
he understands it. He identifies one of them when he says that the
reduction of subjectivity to consciousness ‘dominates philosophical
thought’ (
bpw
83). Levinas announces that, according to the Western
tradition, ‘all spirituality is consciousness, the thematic exposition
of Being, that is to say, knowledge’ (
bpw
80). The initial taskthat
Levinas sets himself in ‘Substitution’ is to provide an account of
238 the cambridge companion to levinas
subjectivity that runs counter to that offered by those representatives
of the Western philosophical tradition according to which the pri-
mary relation to beings takes place in knowledge. This leads Levinas
to entertain the possibility of a relation ‘with what cannot be iden-
tified in the kerygmatic logos’ (
bpw
80), thereby setting himself on
a difficult path.
As I stated earlier, Levinas had prepared the audience of his lec-
ture on ‘Substitution’ in Brussels by giving an account of proximity
in ‘Language and Proximity’. When at the outset of ‘Substitution’
Levinas interprets language not in terms of the communication of
information, but as contact or proximity (

bpw
80), he is rehearsing
one of the claims of the earlier piece (
cp
115). It leads directly to
Levinas’s now familiar distinction between the saying and the said,
which is intended not only as a theor
y of language, but also as a
guide to how he himself should be read, albeit on certain interpre-
tations of the distinction this threatens to diminish the content of
his thought in a way that makes it virtually irrelevant what is
said
by the saying. In any event, the account of language presupposed by
‘Substitution’ makes of it an essay that self-consciously resists any
attempt to reduce it to a thematic analysis.
This raises questions as to
what it means to attempt to elucidate his text as I am attempting to
do here.
4
Levinas seems to have foreseen this problem and bypassed
it at the outset. The complexity of his strategies, in so far as they can
even be identified, are such that one is in no danger of reducing the
essay to a theme. It is not only subjectivity as such that cannot be
pinned down or identified, but also Levinas himself. And when he
says that proximity is a relationship that frustrates any schematism,
the reader shares in the fr
ustration (
bpw
80). There
are times when

one wonders if the question to which ‘Substitution’ is the answer is
not ‘what is the most obscure philosophical concept of the twentieth
century?’ The difficulty is that Levinas nowhere clearly sets out the
rules under which his exposition is to be judged. The status of his
discourse is unclear. However, some indications emerge during the
course of the investigation as Levinas expresses his own concerns
about the direction it is taking.
Levinas’s text is marked by an anxiety that arises from the diffi-
culty of being faithful to the an-archy of passivity (
bpw
89). The term
‘an-archy’ in this context signals that Levinas is not attempting to in-
troduce a new principle or foundation. But his deeper concern is that
To which question is ‘substitution’ the answer? 239
passivity is constantly threatened by the possibility of an activity, a
freedom, being posited behind this passivity (
bpw
89). This anxiety
motivates some of the heavy rewriting that Levinas undertakes be-
tween the two versions of the essay, but the anxiety remains (
ob
113).
Indeed, it is extended to embrace the question of whether he had not,
in his presentation of persecuted subjectivity, succumbed to the pos-
tulates of ontological thought more generally and in particular the
sway of eternal self-presence and of self-coincidence (
ob
113–14).
At the basis of responsibility Levinas locates
the passivity of the

hostage, and not the freedom of an ego that can find in its actions a
source of pride.
The ‘for’ of ‘one-for-the-other’ of substitution signals a surplus of
responsibility that extends even to those one does not know, includ-
ing people of the past and the future. Substitution is not the psy-
chological event of pity or compassion, but a putting oneself in the
place of the other by taking responsibility for their responsibilities.
Because substitution is my responsibility for everyone else, includ-
ing their responsibility, the relation is asymmetrical: ‘No one can
substitute himself for me, who substitutes myself for all’ (
ob
136).
Hence the trope of the-one-for-the-other is contradictory (
ob
100).
My responsibility for the responsibility of the other constitutes that
‘one degree of responsibility more’ (
bpw
91), a ‘surplus of responsibil-
ity’ (
ob
100). Against the traditional notion of responsibility Levinas
can claim that I am for the other without having chosen or acted:
‘Without ever having done anything, I have always been under accu-
sation: I am persecuted’ (
bpw
89). Levinas likes to quote Dostoevsky’s
account of the asymmetry of guilt and responsibility: ‘every one of
us is guilty before all, for everyone and everything, and I more than
others’ (see

bpw
102 and 144). Just as Sartre argues that either one
is totally free or one is not free at all, so Levinas argues that either
one is responsible for everything or one has refused responsibility.
This is how Levinas answers those who say that to be responsible
for everything is to be responsible for nothing.
In ‘Substitution’ Levinas focuses on sacrifice, but the limit-case is
being accused of and responsible for what others do at the concrete
level, even to the point of being responsible for the very persecu-
tion that one undergoes (
bpw
88). What is this but neurosis, mania,
obsession? Far from challenging this potential criticism, Levinas ac-
cepts its terms even before it has been posed. A subject obsessed with
240 the cambridge companion to levinas
the other is incapable of indifference. One should not suppose that
this analysis shifts the blame for violence and murder to the victim,
because that would be to confuse Levinas’s discussion of ethical re-
sponsibility for the legal form of responsibility that Western ethics
tends to focus on. The question is not who should be blamed, but
‘what am I to do?’ (
bpw
168). To accept responsibility for the suf-
fering undergone is to be challenged to act, but this action does not
have its seat in the spontaneity of a willing subject conceived in ar-
tificial isolation. The gift is a good example: the other can be said to
dispossess me on occasion so that giving is not an act, but an ethi-
cal event whereby I lose my sense of mine in the face of the other.
5
Levinas thus introduces an account of how ethical action arises in

the extreme passivity of obsession. The relation to the other is now
a bond rather than a form of separation, as it was in Totality and
Infinity. Whereas the structure of desire, which dominates Totality
and Infinity but not Otherwise than Being (cf.
ob
88), is that of
exteriority, obsession is inscribed in consciousness ‘as something
foreign, a disequilibrium, a delirium, undoing thematization, elud-
ing principle, origin, and will’ (
ob
81). Obsession is a persecution that
reveals the passivity of a subject already in question (
bpw
82).
‘Obsession’ is not the only word that undergoes a transformation as
it enters into Levinas’s lexicon. Equally striking is his use of the term
‘persecution’. Levinas introduces it by equating it with obsession. He
then explains: ‘Here persecution does not amount to consciousness
gone mad; it designates the manner in which the Ego is affected and a
defection from consciousness’ (
bpw
81). The denial seems to suggest
that Levinas is trying to distance himself from the idea of a persecu-
tion complex, just as he does not want his use of the term ‘obsession’
to be understood psychoanalytically. Nevertheless, the fact that he
invokes these connotations, albeit
to warn against them, is evi-
dence that he is fully aware of the danger of these terms and is willing
to take the risk. In the context of the opening pages of the essay the
terms ‘obsession’ and ‘persecution’ seem arbitrary. Only retrospec-

tively, when the argument is complete, is it apparent that the politi-
cal sense of ‘persecution’ in all its concreteness is crucial to Levinas.
At the outset, all that is clear is that Levinas introduces these terms
to assist him in establishing the terms ‘passivity’ and ‘passion’ at the
heart of the analysis (
bpw
82). This enables him to establish a cer-
tain distance from the conventional analysis of consciousness as the