An analysis of state intervention in zimbabwean agriculture through the command agriculture scheme a case study of chegutu farming area

An analysis of state intervention in Zimbabwean agriculture
through the “Command Agriculture scheme” A case study of Chegutu farming area

By Peter Uledi
Abstract
The paper argues that a command economy in a country faced with a crisis will only further
worsen the crisis than arrest it. Zimbabwe has been faced with a food crisis in the past decade
causing food insecurity and insufficiency. The government introduced the command
agriculture scheme in 2014 in an attempt to attaining food self-sufficiency. The paper uses a
cause study approach of the Chegutu farming area in understanding, how central planning can
affect certain developments. Agreeing with James Scott in His book seeing like a state, a
command economy pays a blind eye to the abilities of the governed, their rational, knowledge
and at times capacity. The government of Zimbabwe engaged in a process of command
system in agriculture as a way to foster more production, and facilitate more central planning
in what is grown, where it is grown and how it is marketed. This involves among other things
the distribution of inputs and deciding what farmers should produce. This had its pros and
cons, given an economy like Zimbabwe and how government central planning of such
magnitude have failed in other countries like Tanzania, China and Russia. Zimbabwe‟s
economy formerly referred to as the “breadbasket of Africa” characterised by large
commercial farms and large industrial firms that exported most of their production. The
economic system supply chains, banking system, education system, agriculture extension, etc
was structured around serving these large farms and firms. The political and economic
challenges over the past decade have resulted in a structural shift from an economy based on
large, stable, formal enterprises to an economy based on fragmented, fragile, informal
enterprises. For a decade and a half now, Zimbabwe‟s agricultural yields have taken a knock
following the violent land reform which saw the majority of white former commercial
farmers being evicted from arable farms. Peasants have however reacted negatively to this
command system and have caused more food insecurity and financial loss on the part of the
government. Using a qualitative research methodology the paper will analyze two central
plans, one as a problem and the other one which seeks to solve the problem and the
sustainability of a command system in which there is a lot of discrepancies in the system.

Keywords Command Agriculture, food security, sustainability, Peasants, Control
Introduction
The paper is an attempt to investigate and examine the effectiveness of command agriculture
which started in 2014 to help Zimbabwe attain food self-sufficiency in the wake of peasant
reaction. Command Agriculture as a grand central government plan is used as lenses to
examine if whether governments in a crisis economy and unstable political environments, run
and mage such programs successfully. The government of Zimbabwe introduced command
agriculture with objectives of arresting food insecurity, reduce food imports and allow local
production, increase farmer‟s income, create jobs and curb poverty. The objectives are by far
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noble as they are economically relevant but the way the government executed the command
systems did not auger well with the peasant's farmer who has now dominated the agricultural
sector of the country since the violent 2003 land reform. A plethora of causes have been
given to explain this decline in grain production inter alia, droughts, the evils of the Grain
Marketing Board, poor rainfall distribution resulting in most areas not receiving adequate
moisture for planting or to sustain early crop development, chaotic land reform program,
capital flight and brain drain of agricultural experts (Stoneman, 1988). Thus most of these
reasons can be explained in the failure of the Zimbabwe central planning system. The
government has chosen farmers to give inputs and produce crops they deem necessary such
as Maize, Wheat, sunflower, and other food crops. In an economy that has a 95%
unemployment rate, most people had turned to cash crop farming including the farmers
chosen by the government. It is these very farmers who have reacted negatively against the
command system and fought the command agriculture. This has seen farmers using inputs to
grow cash crops, selling inputs, growing crops not spelled by the government, and selling the
produce to the private buyer rather than the Grain Marketing board. This has resulted in
government spending more on inputs and losing a lot of money through the distributed inputs
which are not returning what is anticipated plunging the county into more food insecurity.

This challenges the notion of central planning in a crisis economy and the rationality of
farmers to go against food production schemes. Rather than been a solution to food crisis
Command Agriculture became a national problem as the government is heavily investing in it
at the expense of other national needs such as health and infrastructure.
Methodology
Using both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, making use of newspaper
articles, government publications and archival material the research seeks to examine whether
recent state intervention in agriculture in Zimbabwe has met its stated goal of modernizing
agricultural production for food security and advancing society. The study will use material
from the Zimbabwe National Archives (NAZ). These materials include annual report,
Balance sheet, memoirs, and correspondences between the farmers and the Minister of
Agriculture which helped get the official voice on how the industry worked in the past. NAZ
provide a variety of documents that can be used to explain the role of government in food
production and how previous governments especially in the colonial period treated food
security issues.

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Personal perceptions on the role of government in planning will be derived from interviews
with commercial farmers and small scale farmers. This is important in getting the voice of the
ordinary man and the subaltern on how they see the program or they think they are taking
part in something good. This corroborates government reports on how it perceives its efforts
and role in food security. Secondary sources will also be used, as they provide a basis for
theoretical framework and foundation for the contribution of the study. Books and articles,
surveys and reviews will be used to explain the state of the food security and also to get
scholarly views on what can be the solution. The importance of secondary sources is that it
provides debates and theories in which the argument can be situated.
The paper has three sections which examine the effectiveness of government planning in
agricultural production with particular reference to food security. The first section traces the

state peasant relations in relation to agricultural production and food insecurity in Zimbabwe.
It explores the dynamics and the economic, social and political environment of the time in
which the country started to import food as a solution interrogating government central
planning. Section two examines the efforts made by the government to curb food insecurity
through Command Agriculture. This section in detail analyses the whole process of choosing
farmers to produce what, and who gets inputs and why. It examines the political economy of
production, through financing, and management. The section argues that the role of
government in facilitating more food production is not bad but how it is done determines the
outcome of the project. This involves issues of community decision making, skills, and
knowledge. Section three explores the challenges the program is facing as it involves little to
no local decision making. Some of the challenges to be analyzed includes diversion of
government resources by peasants to their own projects. The section further explores why
peasants have reacted negatively to command agriculture and the economic consequences of
such a reaction.
Historical Analysis of State peasant relations
State peasant relations in Zimbabwe from the time of independence have mainly been
influenced by the nature of the state and its policy towards agriculture. During the colonial
period, the state peasant relations were exploitative as the government favored estate
agriculture. Soon after independence, a widely populist government which wanted to
consolidate its power tried to engage peasants in a positive way and government policies
were quite favorable towards peasants. By the late 1980s, the government changed its policy
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again by encouraging estate commercial agriculture at the expense of peasants (Hyden,
2008). Peasants were exploited, heavily taxed and even dislocated from their farms to
accommodate commercial estates as the Zimbabwean paternalistic bureaucracy grew. After
the economic crumble of the early 1990s, the Zimbabwean government put in place
initiatives that tried to encourage peasant agriculture like extension programs but they were
not very effective. In the decade of 1990-2000 peasants in Zimbabwe played a significant

role in the agricultural sector which has always been the most dominant sector of the
economy as some of them participated in the export economy of the country. This brings up
the question on whether Zimbabwean peasants from the time of independence were in fact
“captured” or “uncaptured.” In the state central planning system.

The historiography of African peasants in general and that of Zimbabwe, in particular, tries to
trace the evolvement of peasant societies and the different aspects coming out of it with the
impact of independence. This has raised a lot of debates on the nature of peasants themselves,
their autonomy against government central planning and if they have any and the nature of
their relationship with the state. Hyden (2008), propounds his theory of “uncaptured
peasants” arguing that African peasants‟ remain outside the realm of the state as they
maintain their autonomy from the mainstream economy. Ellis (1993, Ng‟ongola, 1986 and
Samukonda, 1993), critically assesses the dynamics within the relationship between the state
and peasants in most agrarian economies. Mhone (1987), looks at the role of government
through its agricultural policy in affecting peasant production and the evolvement of this
policy from the time of independence as well as the impact of this policy on the peasant
economy in Zimbabwe. Contrary to Hayden‟s assertion of “uncaptured peasants,” David
Hirschmann argues that Zimbabwean peasants have actually always been captured and they
continue to participate in the mainstream economy. Mandala (2005), gives a descriptive
analysis of how Zimbabwean peasants have actually been “captured” by the state and are
used in government grand schemes without question. Pryor (1990) and B. Freeth (2017),
investigate the rationale behind government initiatives towards promoting peasant production
especially in the 2010 decade and the economic implication on the agricultural sector with
particular reference to the command agriculture system.
Grain Challenge since the Fast track land reform

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As of January 2016, the Zimbabwean Governmentmobilized $260 million to import grain as

part of its efforts to avert hunger following a series of serious droughts (The Herald 2016).
Maize was the main export followed by wheat and other grains like millet and sorghum. By
the turn of the 21st century, all this had changed and Zimbabwe was importing food to feed
its population. Various reasons have been forwarded to explain this phenomenon, on the
government side, the ministry of Agriculture blame climate change1, the opposition party
blames it on poor government policy in terms of land use and farmers support. Nonetheless,
Zimbabwe‟s food insecurity can be pointed to the failure of the land system which has seen
inexperienced farmers using land, government officials having more than one farms which
are not used and the failure to incentive the little farmers that are producing in terms of
allowing better prices on the market for food crops and protection against external
competitors. The result was food insecurity and with the economic crisis the food problems
seem to be worsening and the command economy approach adopted by the government
makes the situation worse. Economic historians have written about the Zimbabwean economy
with some scholars such as Mlambo and Raftopolous (2015) referring to it as a „failed‟
economy. However, the causes for the negative scale in grain production have received little
attention for example by scholars such as (Muzari et al, 2014).
The production of grain has declined to the extent that there is a need for other mechanisms
to provide masses with food. In light of this challenge, the paper seeks to examine the role
played by government central planning as grain production declines. It further seeks to
delineate and trace how peasants have responded to such planning over time and space. This
study has been informed by lack of research in the area when compared to scholarship
focusing on the land reform, politics and economic meltdown of the country in terms of its
contribution to grain drain causing food insecurity (Moyo, 2014). The study further examines
the sustainability of the responses.
The article seeks to examine whether state intervention in agriculture can be sustainable and
produce anticipated results. Following Scott‟s (1998) thesis that states have failed to
successfully facilitate agricultural projects due to the lack of local knowledge, the desire to
control production and exert authoritarian power on citizens only led to tarnishing local
capacity and agility of production. This seeks to examine the Command Agriculture projects
adopted by the Zimbabwean government in 2014 as a means to increase agricultural

production.
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Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates. The national assembly. Vol 45. No 11 Wednesday 10 October 2018.

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James Scott in his book “Seeing like a state” discusses the need by states to mobilize people
and their properties in order to develop and tame what the environment can offer as a step
towards modernity (Scott, 1998, p187). This is captured where he questions how the state can
turn uncivilized societies to modernity and the dynamics involved. I agree with him that there
has to be a certain level of control by the state and a high level of knowledge for it to be
successful in doing that. In support of that hypothesis, Scott uses the collectivization program
carried out by Stalin in Russia which failed to turn the economy around because the state
failed to understand the environment and society peasants in particular and how they could be
used for the development of the country. This reflects failed statecraft in which the state
attempts to organize and tries to resettle people for supervised production. This also reflects
Zimbabwe‟s Command agriculture in which the production is supervised by officials who
have been labeled ineffective and corrupt in their conduct. The state saw uncontrolled and
„uncivilized‟ societies as a disorder, and potential threat hence the need to centrally control
them.
However, the argument that there was a need to have planned settlement to have orderly
development was just an excuse used by the government to control societies, tap into their
labor, tax and earn form what those different societies could give. This is because orderly
development failed to materialize in the Ujamaa villages where people were forced to resettle
and the state-led projects failed (Clark, 1978), the Great Leap forward in China resulted into a
disaster as millions of people died due to starvation (Bachman, 1991). This brings the idea
that states should find a way to support local community development projects such has been
the case with rice growing, of the Tugalogs in Latin America or the Fulani pastoralists in

Kenya, because they are contextual and are compatible with the environment in terms of
labor, power dynamics, production systems, and climate. However, this model has its own
problems and it cannot be applied in every setting. This leaves Zimbabwe with the need to
strike a balance between state control of grand projects and allowing local farmers and local
people also to shape the course of development.

Such should be the approach the

Zimbabwean government should adopt in its bid to curb food insecurity lest it plunges the
country into more food scarcity.
Since 1980, the government of Zimbabwe has been involved in a number of projects to
spearhead modernist programs in agriculture which have dismally failed as shown by the
increase in imported agricultural; products like wheat and maize (Mutori, 2017). The reasons
for such failures include among others, the lack of local communities in the designing of the
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program and the idea that the state knows more than the general populace. This resulted in
the so-called socialist experiment from 1980 to 1990 which ended up creating an economic
problem of the negative balance of trade and payment (Makaye and Munhande, 2013). This
was followed by the Economic Structural Adjustments Programs adopted in 1992 which
worsened unemployment as local industries and farms closed down as a result of
international competition due to trade liberalization (Mlambo 1997). Making it worse was the
Fast Track Land Reform which destroyed the basis of the Zimbabwean economy in the name
of politics and appeasement for the war veterans. What the land reform did was that it killed
production, and suffocated manufacturing resulting in the closure of many companies causing
unemployment and eventually economic crisis. These events only handicapped the country‟s
capacity to feed its population despite vast lands and water resources.

Command Agriculture

Command agriculture is an agricultural scheme introduced by the Zimbabwean government
in 2014, with the main goal of aiding food self-sufficiency after two years of drought that had
affected the country‟s food security. The scheme involves the use of government resources
and governments policy on who grows what, when, and how. Command Agriculture, a
brainchild of the government, has rescued thousands of farmers who would have failed to
productively use their land owing to funding challenges. Under the program, farmers received
inputs for free, but are expected to deliver five tonnes of maize each to the GMB. In as much
as it allows farmers to access resources, the government determines the production processes
which includes a selection of crops and pricing.

This is similar to the forced cotton

production of the 1940s in Mozambique or the Ujamaa system in Tanzania, which indirectly
affected farmer autonomy to use local knowledge and the power of self-decision making to
produce (Arkaide, 1973). The only difference is that it has taken a new form in which it does
not involve the massive movement of people from one place to the other and provides a ready
market for different crops produced. Command agriculture does not fit into the environmental
advantage of production as it defines what a society or community can produce from the
environment despite trying to link local production with international commodity markets.
This has always created a parallel economic system in the form of subsistence agriculture
which provides an alternative to governments irreversible failed projects.
Government expenditure on Command Agriculture
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The Zimbabwean government took the front role in facilitating agricultural development
through the command agriculture scheme. Different roles ae been adopted by the government
firstly as the sponsor, and facilitator of the production process and as the sole buyer to
complete the whole cycle of command control. Since 2014 the government has sponsored
command agriculture through the provision of fertilizes, seeds, equipment and other inputs

that would allow peasants to produce. According to the Minister of Lands, Agriculture,
Water, Climate and Rural Settlement, Perence Shiri, the government spent in 2014, $ 155 256
000, 2015, $ 22 529 900, 2016, $163 821 00, 2017, $ 309 641 600 and 2018, $ 521 415 000.
Since the government took the role of sponsor it was supposed to help farmers with all the
necessary material to facilitate more grain production and help avert food insecurity. The
figures show an increase in the money spent each year. The increase in these figures can be
accounted to three factors, the return of the year was not enough to allow farmers to sponsor
themselves, or the money was not used in direct farming by those who received it or inputs
and or not all farmers sold their produce to the government. This meant that the Zimbabwean
government was running losses on both ends of expenditure and food production as it meant
continued food imports. Instead of increased expenditure which should have corresponded
with increased yields, there was a reverse in what the harvest record by the GMB showed.
For financing this scheme the government came up with the Command Agriculture
Revolving Fund. The revolving fund was sponsored by the private sector, the Chinese
government, and the Zimbabwean government. This was to bridge the gap of
undercapitalized peasant farmers who formed the bulk of the command agriculture farmers.
This noble idea could not sustain the system because the very farmers who were to be
beneficiaries of these funds were victims of a crumbling economy in which they struggled to
make ends meet, send children to school and have decent food to eat. As of 2017, the
government was celebrating having recovered $47, 7 million from the loans it issued under
the Command Agriculture Revolving Fund, but however, failing to meet its target of $72
million. Despite the money, farmers received being misused farmers did not deliver their
produce to the GMB, which dealt the government a huge financial blow. By as late as
December 2017, 10 000 farmers were still to deliver their maize to GMB. Government has
also collected $3, 6 million from wheat farmers against a target of $8, 8 million as at
November 23. The Finance and Economic Development Minister Patrick Chinamasa reported
that as of 2017 the government made a financial loss of $ 29.9 million distributed through the
Command Agriculture Revolving Fund. The Financial Gazette reported that “Out of the 50
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000 farmers contracted to produce maize under Command Agriculture, 33 percent fully paid
their loan obligations, with 22 percent having partially paid their obligations, while recoveries
from others are being made as they deliver to the GMB.
To encourage farmers to continue paying back their debt obligations, all fully paid farmers
were being prioritized in accessing inputs under the 2017-18 Command Agriculture program.
As of November 23, 2017, about 10 053 contracted farmers had not made any maize
deliveries to GMB, an indication that these were already defaulting on their 2017 debt
obligations. Thus to avoid that the government instituted measures to ensure recoveries from
the farmers, with monitoring teams deployed to follow up on those who were being made to
acknowledge their debts for repayment. Such actions by farmers show how the system had
faults and a central system of that magnitude in an economy marred with economic
hardships, political instability, unemployment, and income-generating activities, the
Command Fund became the source of income which was used for other things not meant for
its original use. It took 3 years for the government to realize that it was further losing money
by giving it to farmers who had no producing capacity. The Finance minister said that, “with
regards to those farmers who have partially paid, as well as the new farmers, consideration to
be contracted is based on a tight criteria which includes, among others, the need for a farmer
to demonstrate capability to produce,” The absence of effective control and distribution
mechanisms had meant that bogus farmers could access inputs through unscrupulous
suppliers. This also resulted in the abuse of fuel coupons, whose issuance was not
commensurate to farmer requirements.
As control measures to the loss of money, inputs and other farming implements the
government came up with a logistics committee. Among the roles of the committee were to
consult with private financing partners tightening the distribution and collection mechanisms
for both fuel and other inputs. All participating farmers were now required to have their
contract papers and release orders for inputs collection to be processed at the district level.
For those farmers required to collect inputs directly from inputs suppliers, Government
officials have been stationed at inputs suppliers‟ depots to clear and monitor the collection of
inputs by farmers. As Moyo (2014) argues that in an extractive setting where institutions are

set to extract and not invest, power is misused. This is what happened as such committees
became corrupt on how they distributed the inputs, by taking brides. Institutions for the
common good requires transparency first in choosing who runs them and who is run (Ostrom
1990). These committees were far from executing such measures as the members also found
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a way in which they could extract from the system which has institutionalized corruption
from national levels.
The leakages of the system related to the absence of validation processes over the use of
tillage vouchers and combine harvesters repairs and collusion between district Command
Centre officials and some farmers that could result in inputs collections in excess of
requirements determined by Agritex and ward officers. The system was too wide and it
involved a lot of stakeholders who the farmers found ways to cheat the system and used it to
their advantages. Participating farmers were required to complete the cost recovery Stop
Order forms at the point of inputs collection as a way to guarantee repayment. Furthermore,
plugging of potential leakages was extended to prevent some ward extension officers
recommending farmers without farm or land offer letters to collect inputs, resulting in no
recoveries. Thus the failure if the Command agriculture scheme cannot be attributed to the
peasant farmers but command officials who also gave resources to people who did not
deserve, or even had farms.

The yields recorded by the ministry of agriculture contradicts the amount of money spent on
maize production especially. According to the Minister of Agriculture the tonnage of maize
harvested in the period 2014 to 2018 is as follows, 2014, 1 456 153 metric tonnes, 2015, 742
225 metric tonnes 2016, 511 816 metric tonnes 2017, 2 155 526 metric tonnes 2018, 1700
702 metric tonnes. Since 2014, the expenditure increased and the yield decreased. These
figures show something more than just bad rains, uncertainties and just government loss on
money but peasant negative reaction to command agriculture. There was supposed to be a
correspondence in terms of what the government spends and what was produced but because

the government-controlled peasants and production, the farmers did the opposite and chose
survival overproduction of enough food for the nation. This is because the government did
not respect the capacity choice and ability of peasant‟s farmers to produce what they could
produce best and what they were willing to produce. This is what James Scott (1989) argues
that command economies pays a blind eye to the governed abilities and how detrimental that
can be to development, Thus instead of job creation, food security and increase income.
Command agriculture achieved the opposite.
Furthermore, the government had to increase expenditure on food imports every year. Instead
of a decrease in food imports, there has been an increase since the beginning of C.A. Figures
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for the year 2014 and 2015 on food imports are missing. This can be that the government was
not willing to publish such figures as they would contest what it was spreading that command
agriculture was a success beyond any reasonable doubts.

However, since 2016 the

government expenditure on food imports especially on maize was as follows, 2016:
$260MM, 2017: $280MM, 2018: $300MM. These figures are not as close to what was spend
on agriculture as a whole in each year and the yields harvested. The result was government
loss on three fronts, on agriculture expenditure which did not return what was an expenditure,
on harvest yields and on food imports. This is a clear sign that a command economy is an
enemy of itself as it fails to achieve the aims and goals it justifies itself to achieve.
There seems to be lack of transparency by the Minister of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate
and rural settlement on the real expenditure and grain harvested as other ministers in the
parliament seems not to agree and buy the argument made by Perence Shiri. Honorable
Chinanzvana asked the minister of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Settlement
to state the following for the period of 2014 to 2018. Such questions only questioned the
efficiency of the command agriculture and lack of transparency in how much was spent and

how much was gained. Such suspicion of lack of transparency is exposed by one Member of
Parliament Hon Madzimure who asked that;
From what the minister is saying it appears there is a variance of between 75100% in terms of yearly national yield per hectare over time. In one year it was
0.4 tonnes per hectare yet in another year it was 1.1 per hectare. Can the minister
explain the real cause of variances because with such inconsistencies it means
there is a lot of money being lost in the production process when we go by the
yield variances?
Juxtaposing the figures presented in parliament and the amount used to import more food the
figures shows that the government rather than just spending more and getting less, there is the
possibility of money being misused and unaccounted for. This has been one of the reasons
why the system has failed in which government official responsible for buying grain from
farmers have used the money on other personal schemes leaving not enough money to buy
grain. As asked by honorable Chinanzvana, “is the money allocated to agriculture enough to
pay our Grain farmers every year?” This has only led to peasants lose trust in the marketing
board as it pays less and at a time takes grain and never pays the farmers.
Furthermore, there is a lot of propaganda which explains that the government is hiding a lot
of failures. Having realized that the program has failed and is unsustainable in providing food
the minster is said to have cooked up figures just to present in the parliament. The Minister
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said the government has been supportive trough command agriculture, which explains the
increase in yield, the decline was due to 2015/16 poor rains. It is a point of no contention that
the government has been supportive, but to blame poor yields on poor rains is a misjudgment
of the whole process as peasants who are involved have ventured in cash crop production,
while other sale inputs and while command agriculture officials have taken the money and
inputs and not distributed it. The minister of agriculture further explained that said the
command agriculture only covers, maize soya beans, cotton, fisheries, and livestock. This
was said to cover up the expenditure which did not relate to the output by arguing the money
is spread over a number of initiatives. Coming to his rescues the Deputy Minister of

Agriculture, said “we have a strategic reserve of 500 000 metric tonnes and it‟s in place.
Zimbabwe is safe we have no scare of hunger” This kind of propaganda is sign enough to
show a failed government central system. As of 206 Zimbabwe has been declared food
insecure by the United Nations and as of June 2019, 75% of the Zimbabwean population
require food aid.
The year 2018 was no different as the systems remained the same and people continued to
misuse command agriculture inputs. An Agriculture ministry extension worker had been
dragged to court together with other two villagers, for allegedly abusing the command
agriculture program inputs worth $4 030 allocated to 71 farmers in the Insiza district of
Matabeleland South. The court found them guilty after overwhelming evidence pointed to the
fact that they committed the offense of dividing among them 6500kgs of fertilizer. The
magistrate sentenced each of them to 42 months in jail. Twelve months of the sentence were
suspended for five years on condition of good behavior. A further 12 months were suspended
on condition each accused pay $2 000 as restitution to Agritex on or before July 13. The state
argued that it was doing this as a measure to deter corruption and abuse of government
resources.

Invigorated by the Command Agriculture initiative and reports from the Meteorological
Services Department predicting normal to above normal rainfall, farmers had gone all out to
prepare for the 2017/18 agricultural season to maintain the momentum gained in the previous
farming season. Their optimism, which saw the hectarage being increased, had also been
buoyed by the government mantra that it was going to put more money in Command Fund
and sponsor those farmers who were doing well. The Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union

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noted that rainfall distribution in the first half of the season was very poor and most crops are
either at the stage of permanent wilting and would be a write-off. The Zimbabwe Farmers
Union and other farmer organizations have made similar observations. The argument of

fewer rains being received every year has been one used by the government as an escape to
the failure in producing enough food.
The government faced a row as Sakunda Holding one of the private investors of command
agriculture threatened to conduct an investigation on the use of command agriculture money.
The commodities and energy firm was awarded the tender by the government to bankroll the
program in 2015. The company says US$600 million has been used under the program as of
2019. Parliament has written to 15 companies involved in the program requesting proof of
purchase of inputs and equipment, proof of delivery and bank statements, among other
documents. This was to provide evidence that it has been using the funds for what they were
supposed to be used. There have also been allegations of abuse of funds, late delivery of
inputs and equipment despite some companies receiving the advance payment. This only
provided a room for more corruption to take place with inputs committees and the command
agriculture officials who were deployed in various districts. The whole command agriculture
financing system is fraught with grey areas as there have been arguments that the Chinese
investments are taken by the president and ministers for personal use. This is because the
Chinese government does not follow up on how the money is used since they are given
access to the mine, and do other business in the country without monitored by laws that
govern other players.
Peasant reacts to Command agriculture
The findings on challenges associated with Zimbabwe‟s command agriculture show that there
are a number of barriers hindering the adoption and success of the initiative, particularly in
the Chegutu farming area. Among the barriers cited by participants varied from; Government
interference/use of security agents who are not technocrats with the necessary proficiency on
new farming technologies, misappropriation of financial resources and rampant corruption.
The geographical spread of input collection depots where producers from remote areas are
hindered access to input resources and for Grain Marketing Board (GMB) being the sole
buyer of grain resulting in underpricing & delayed payment for the delivered produce by
farmers (Chisango and Tichakunda, 2018). Bureaucracy in the system and corrupt practices
where unnecessary delays on deliveries of grain from the smallholder sector are effected by
pressure from politicians and senior government officials who always solicit for favors from

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GMB officials, to lack of information which is regarded a crucial economic resource as it
guides farmers on sound decision making. Such factors result in the government being
criticized for exploiting farmers in the name of food security schemes.

Command farming programs do not target only small scale farmers but also large scale
farming. This is why participants of the program revealed that there were prospects of a
positive impact on their livelihoods as a boom in productivity would guarantee food,
nutrition, and income security, particularly for the marginalized communities. Interviewed
respondents perceived the scheme as a noble initiative in the country‟s endeavor to have
assurance on the sustainability of nutrition and food security for the populace. Others
revealed that the existence of a central marketing structure where the country‟s parastatal
(GMB) was the sole buyer though giving the institution the autonomous power to determine
the functioning of the of marketing and the producer price reduced the vulnerability of
farmers from falling prey to unscrupulous black-market buyers who have tendencies of
prejudicing farmers through price distortions. Building resilience of ecosystems through the
application of harmonized agricultural practices, integrating fisheries and wildlife
management was cited as one of the strengths of command farming. Another group of
farmers argued that they should be given autonomy on crops they want to plant.

Conclusion
Governments in a crisis economy cannot manage and run such a big project effectively. The
idea of command agriculture if put in another seeing the idea will thrive, but because of
institutionalized corruption, undercapitalized farmers, high unemployment, lack of inclusive
institutions, inconsistent policies and poor infrastructure,

In line with James Scott, Seeing

like a state, central government planning always fails to solve problems but rather causes
more unspeakable consequences. The command agriculture introduced in Zimbabwe has
been a failure in making the country reach food autarky and create employment, raise farmers
income as peasants have negatively reacted to the system. The system has proved
unsustainable as it created more problems, created room for more corruption, lack of
transparency and proved the Zimbabwean government lack of control of such a centrally
controlled national program. The command agriculture has been used in this papers as s
lenses to study central control as a way to solve a crisis and the case has proven central
control as James Scott argues in his book requires the government and the people to work
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together, the government to have knowledge of the work it is working with, and allow them a
certain degree of autonomy and the system has to be democratic and transparent. Despite the
Minister of agriculture arguing that the country is foods secure and that command agriculture
has seen great success, the figures on the ground dispute the claim. If anything command
agriculture has been a double expense on the part of the government as it continues to lose
money on food imports and the inputs it buys for the farmers. The lack of transparency has
caused corruption by the command officials.

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