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Department of Homeland Security
DHS’ Oversight of Interoperable Communications
OIG-13-06
November 2012
OFFICE
OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department
of
Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov
November 2, 2012
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
The
Honorable
Rafael
Borras
Under Secretary for Management
FROM:
Charles K. Edwards
Acting Inspector General
SUBJECT:
DHS' Oversight
of
Interoperable Communications
Attached
for
your action
is
our final report,
DHS'
Oversight
of
Interoperable
Communications.
We incorporated the formal comments from the Departmental
GAO-
OIG
Liaison Office
in
the final report.
The
report contains
two
recommendations aimed at improving oversight
of
interoperable radio communications. Your office concurred with one
of
the
recommendations.
As
prescribed by the Department
of
Homeland Security Directive
077-01, Follow-Up
and
Resolutions
for
the Office
of
Inspector General Report
Recommendations, within 90
days
of
the date
of
this memorandum, please provide
our
office with a written response
that
includes your
(1)
agreement
or
disagreement,
(2)
corrective action plan,
and
(3)
target completion date for
each
recommendation. Also,
please include responsible parties
and
any other supporting documentation necessary
to
inform
us
about the current status
of
the recommendation. Until your response
is
received
and
evaluated, the recommendations will
be
considered open
and
unresolved.
Based
on
information provided
in
your response
to
the draft report, we consider the
second recommendation resolved. Once your office
has
fully implemented the
recommendation, please submit a formal closeout letter
to
us
within 30
days
so
that
we
may close the recommendation(s).
The
memorandum should
be
accompanied by
evidence
of
completion
of
agreed-upon corrective actions
and
of
the disposition
of
any
monetary amounts.
Consistent with our responsibility under the
Inspector General Act, we are providing
copies
of
our report
to
appropriate congressional committees with oversight and
appropriation responsibility over the Department
of
Homeland Security. We will post
the report
on
our website
for
public dissemination.
Please
call me with any questions,
or
your staff may contact Anne Richards,
Assistant Inspector General
for
Audits, at (202) 254-4100.
Attachment
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Table of Contents
ExecutiveSummary 1
Background 2
ResultsofAudit 3
DHSInteroperableCommunications 4
AuthorityandResponsibilityforInteroperability 6
Conclusion 8
Recommendations 8
ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis 8
Appendices
AppendixA: Objectives,Scope,andMethodology 10
AppendixB: ManagementCommentstotheDraftReport 11
AppendixC: MajorContributorstoThisReport 13
AppendixD: ReportDistribution 14
Abbreviations
DHS DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
GAO U.SGovernmentAccountabilityOffice
JWPMO JointWirelessProgramManagementOffice
MOA MemorandumofAgreement
OIG OfficeofInspectorGeneral
S&T Science&Technology
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Executive Summary
TheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)includesanamalgamationoforganizations
thatworktogethertopreventandrespondtoterroristattacks,naturaldisasters,and
otherthreats. Suchcollaborationrequiresthatcomponentsestablisheffective
communicationamongexternalandinternalpartnersduringoperations.DHS
establishedaninternalgoalofdevelopinginteroperableradiocommunicationsand
identifiedcommonchannels,anditscomponentsinvestedabout$430millionin
equipment,infrastructure,andmaintenancetomeetcommunicationrequirements. We
performedthisaudittodeterminewhetherDHS’oversightensuredachievementof
Departmentwideinteroperableradiocommunications.
DHSdidnotprovideeffectiveoversighttoensurethatitscomponentsachieved
Departmentwideinteroperableradiocommunications. Itdidnotestablishaneffective
governingstructurethathadtheauthorityandresponsibilitytooverseeitsgoalof
achievingDepartmentwideinteroperability.Withoutagoverningstructure,DHShad
limitedinteroperabilitypoliciesandprocedures,andcomponentpersonneldidnothave
interoperableradiocommunications. Asaresult,only1of479radiouserstestedcould
accessandcommunicateusingthespecifiedcommonchannel.Further,ofthe382
radiostested,only20percent(78)containedallthecorrectprogramsettingsforthe
commonchannel. UntilDHSdevelopsaneffectivegoverningstructureandmakesa
concertedefforttoattainDepartmentwideinteroperability,overallprogresswill
remainlimited.
WemadetworecommendationstoimproveDHS’oversightofinteroperableradio
communications.DHSdidnotconcurwiththefirstrecommendationandconcurred
withthesecondandistakingactiontoimplementtherecommendation.
www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Background
TheestablishmentofDHSin2003broughttogetherthefunctionsof22Federal
departmentsandagencies. Asaresult,theDepartmenttodayincludesanetworkof
organizationsthatworktogethertopreventandrespondtoterroristattacks,natural
disasters,andotherthreats. Suchcollaborationrequiresthatcomponentsestablish
effectivecommunicationamongexternalandinternalpartnersduringoperations.DHS
componentsperformdailyoperationstoprotecttheUnitedStatesfromattackand
illegalentry,enforceFederalimmigrationandcustomslaws,andrespondtodisasters.
Duringtheirdailyoperationsandemergencyresponses,componentpersonneldepend
onsecure,reliable,andtimelyaccesstocriticalinformationtocarryouttheirmissions.
DHS’prioritywastoassistStateandlocalfirstresponderswithattaininginteroperable
communications.DHScreatedpolicies,guidance,andtemplatestoaidinachieving
interoperabilityforfirstrespondersandprovidedassistancetoStateandlocalagencies.
Since2003,ithasprovidedabout$18.5billionin FederalHomelandSecuritygrantsto
Stateandlocalgovernmentstoimproveemergencycommunications.Thesegrants
allowedStateandlocalgovernmentstoenhanceinteroperabilityoftheiremergency
responsesystems. AccordingtotheU.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO),these
systemshaveimproved,butfullinteroperabilityremainsadistantgoal.
1
Duringthis
sametime,DHScomponentsinvestedabout$430millionin equipment,infrastructure,
andresourcestomeettheircommunicationneeds.
Radiosystemsallowpersonneltoreceiveorshareinformationthatiscriticalfor
operationalawarenessandpersonnelsafety.DHS’radiosystemsincludehandheldor
mobileradiosandsupportinginfrastructureandservices,andserveabout123,000radio
fieldusers. Figure1showstheapproximatenumberofradiousersforeachcomponent
asofDecember2011.
1
GAO12343, Emergency Communications —Various Challenges Likely to Slow Implementation of a Public
Safety Broadband Network;February2012
www.oig.dhs.gov
2 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Figure 1: Approximate Number of Radio Users for Each Component, as of December
2011
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
45,000
30,000
20,000
13,500
5,100
5,000
4,000
250
CBPCustomsandBorderProtection
TSA–TransportationSecurityAdministration
USCG – UnitedStatesCoastGuard
ICE–ImmigrationandCustomsandEnforcement
USSS–UnitedStates SecretService
FPS–FederalProtective Service
FEMA–FederalEmergencyManagementAgency
FLETC– FederalLawEnforcementTrainingCenter
CBP TSA USCG ICE USSS FPS FEMA FLETC
Source: DHS
Interoperable Radio Communications
DHSpersonnelrequireinteroperabilitytocommunicatebothwithotherDHS
componentsandexternalpartners,includingFederal,State,andlocalentities.DHS
establishedagoalthatallcomponentswouldbeabletocommunicateusing
interoperableradiosystems,anditplannedtoachievethatgoalbyestablishinga
commonradiochannelandpurchasingstandardizedequipment.
Results of Audit
DHSdidnotprovideeffectiveoversighttoensurethatitscomponentsachieved
Departmentwideinteroperablecommunications.Itestablishedagoalforinternal
interoperabilityandestablishedcommonradiochannels. However,only1of479radio
userswereviewedcouldaccessandcommunicateusingthespecifiedcommonchannel.
Further,ofthe382radioswetested,only20percent(78)containedallthecorrect
programsettings,includingthename,forthecommonDHSchannel. DHSdidnot
establishaneffectivegoverningstructurethathadtheauthorityandenforcement
responsibilitytooverseeitsgoalofachievingDepartmentwideinteroperability.Sinceit
didnothaveanauthoritativegoverningstructure,DHShadlimitedinteroperability
policiesandprocedures,andthecomponentsdidnotinformradiousersoftheguidance
thatDHSdeveloped. InternalinteroperabilitywasnotapriorityforDHScomponents,
andtheydidnotexploitopportunitiestoachieveDepartmentwideinteroperable
communications.Asaresult,DHSpersonneldonothavereliableinteroperable
communicationsfordailyoperations,plannedevents,andemergencies.
www.oig.dhs.gov
3
OIG-13-06
• 345(72percent)didnot
knowaboutthechannel.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
DHS Interoperable Communications
Radio Users
ComponentpersonneleitherdidnotknowoforcouldnotfindtheDHScommon
channelbecausethecomponentsdidnoteffectivelyinformthemofthecorrect
channel. Weselected479radiouserstodeterminewhethertheycould
communicateusingacommonchannel.
2
Weexaminedinteroperabilityinthe
simplestform—radiotoradiousingthespecifiedcommonchannel. Onlyone
radiousercouldaccessandcommunicateacrossthechannel. Theremaining
478(99.8percent)radiouserswerenotawareofthechannel(345),couldnot
findit(118),orfoundalegacycommonchannel(15)thathadbeentransferred
fromtheDepartmentofTreasurywhenDHSformedin2003. Figure2showsthe
resultsofouranalysisofradiousers.
Figure 2: Reasons Why Radio Users Could Not Communicate Using the
Specified Common Channel
• 118(25percent)knew
ofthechannel,but
couldnotfinditintheir
radios.
• 15(3percent)
founda
legacycommonchannel,
butnotthespecifie
d
channel.
Source:DHSOIG
Radio Programming
DHSdidnotexploitopportunitiestoachieveDepartmentwideinteroperable
communications.DHS’NationalInteroperabilityFieldOperationsGuide
identified18Federalinteroperablechannelsandencouragedcomponent
personneltoprogramradioswiththechannels.Wereviewedradiofrequencies
2
DHSidentifiedtwochannelsforinteroperability.Weselectedthechannelthatpersonnelcoulduse
withoutsupportinginfrastructure.
www.oig.dhs.gov
4 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
todeterminewhethercomponentpersonnelprogrammedtheradioswithboth
theDHScommonchannelandaFederalinteroperablechannel.
Ofthe479radiouserstested,wedownloadedinformationfrom382oftheir
radios.
3
Weanalyzedabout96,000channelsprogrammedintotheradiosto
determinewhetherthecomponentsprogrammedspecifiedinformation,
includingchannelnameandfrequency.Ouranalysisshowedthatallofthe
radioswerecapableofinteroperability;however,componentpersonneldidnot
programamajorityofradioswiththecorrectinteroperablechannelsettings.In
somecases,componentpersonneldidnotprogramthefrequenciesintothe
radios. Inothercases,componentpersonnelprogrammedthecorrect
frequency,butoneormoreprogramsettingswerenotconsistentwithguidance.
Thefollowingshowstheresultsofourradioprogramminganalysisofthe
interoperablechannels.
DHS Common Channel
• 205(54percent)didnotcontainthecommonfrequency;
• 99(26percent)containedthecommonfrequency;however,oneormoreof
theprogramsettingswerenotinaccordancewiththedefined
interoperabilitysettings;and
• 78(20percent)containedallthecorrectprogramsettings,includingthe
name.
Federal Interoperability Channel
• 111(29percent)didnotcontaintheFederalfrequency;
• 170(45percent)containedtheFederalfrequency;however,oneormoreof
theprogramsettingswerenotinaccordancewiththedefined
interoperabilitysettings;and
• 101(26percent)containedallthecorrectprogramsettings,includingthe
name.
Ouranalysisalsoshowedthatcomponentpersonneldidnotprogramchannel
namesaccordingtoguidanceordidnotdefinechannelnames.Forexample,we
identified99radiosthatcontainedtheDHScommonfrequencyanddetermined
3
Wewereunabletoobtaininformationfor97radiosforvariousreasons,suchasthefactthatour
softwarewasunabletoreadtheradios.
www.oig.dhs.gov
5 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
thatthecomponentsused23namevariationsforthefrequency.Accordingto
GAO,consistentnamingconventionsarenecessarytoachieveinteroperability.
4
GAOfoundlittleuniformityinthenamingofradiochannelsusedbyfirst
responders—thissamerequirementappliestointernalDHSinteroperability.
Authority and Responsibility for Interoperability
DHS Structure
DHSdidnotestablishaneffectivegoverningstructurethathadtheauthorityand
responsibilitytooverseeitsgoalofachievingDepartmentwideinteroperability.
AccordingtotheOfficeofManagementandBudget,aneffectivegoverning
structureincludesclearlydefinedareasofresponsibility,appropriatelydelegated
authority,andasuitablehierarchyforreporting. DHScreatedworkinggroups,
committees,andofficestoexploreDepartmentwidecommunicationissues,
includinginteroperability. However,nonehadtheauthoritytoimplementand
enforcetheirrecommendations.Tomanageradiocommunicationissues,DHS—
• In2003,establishedtheNationalWirelessManagementOfficetodevelop
policiesforDepartmentwideinteroperability;
• In2006,transformedtheNationalWirelessManagementOfficeintothe
WirelessServicesBranch,whichestablishedtheWirelessWorkingGroupto
ensurethatDHSwideapproachestowirelesscommunicationswere
developedandimplementedinanintegratedmanner;
• In2009,establishedtheOneDHSEmergencyCommunicationsCommitteeto
coordinateDepartmentwideemergencycommunications;and
• In2011,directedtheExecutiveSteeringCommitteetocreatetheJoint
WirelessProgramManagementOffice(JWPMO)tocoordinatewireless
communicationactivitiesanddevelopsolutionsfornewtechnology.
ThemultiplemanagementandorganizationalchangeshinderedDHS’abilityto
provideeffectiveoversight. Componentsindependentlydevelopedand
managedtheirownradioprogramswithnoformalcoordinationfromDHS.In
October2011,theOneDHSEmergencyCommunicationsCommitteeprepareda
Departmentwidemissionneedsstatement,whichsaidthatDHSradiousers
requireinteroperabilitytocommunicatewithotherDHScomponentsandwith
4
GAO09604,Emergency Communications—Vulnerabilities Remain and Limited Collaboration and
Monitoring Hamper Federal Effort, June2009.
www.oig.dhs.gov
6 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Federal,State,local,andtribalentities.DHS’ExecutiveSteeringCommittee
developedadraftchartertocreatetheJWPMO.
AccordingtotheJWPMO’sdraftcharter,theJWPMOwillcoordinate
DepartmentwideradioactivitiesandexecutetheOneDHSEmergency
CommunicationsCommittee’sstrategies,plans,andpolicies. Itwillbecomposed
ofdedicatedDepartmentresourcesand,asappropriate,representativesfrom
otherFederalagencies.Eachofthecomponentswillcontributeresourcesin
accordancewithaMemorandumofAgreement(MOA).Componentswilltailor
theirownagreementsthatdefinetheirlevelofparticipation.Atthetimeofour
review,thecomponentshadnotpreparedtheiragreements.Effectively,the
JWPMOhasnoauthoritytoimplementandenforcestandardizedpoliciesand
procedurestotakeadvantageofinteroperabilityopportunities.Figure3shows
DHS’currentorganizationalstructure.
Figure 3: Current DHS Communications Structure
One DHS Emergency
Communications Committee:
DevelopsDHSstrategyand
policyforinteroperabilityand
emergencycommunications
.
Executive Steering
Committee and JWPMO:
Coordinatecommunication
programactivities.
Components: Manage
theircommunication
programs.
Source: DHS
Policies and Procedures
Becauseitdidnothaveanauthoritativegoverningstructure,DHShadlimited
policiesandproceduresrelatedtointeroperability. InMarch2003, DHSissued
ManagementDirective4100,Wireless Management Office, whichstatedthatthe
NationalWirelessManagementOfficewouldensureinteroperabilityforDHS
www.oig.dhs.gov
7
OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
components. However,itdidnotprovidepolicytocomponentstostandardize
Departmentwideradioactivities. In2009,theWirelessWorkingGroup
identifiedandrecommendedthatthecomponentsusethecommonchannelsfor
seamlessinteroperablecommunications.Inresponse,theWirelessServices
Branchprovidedthecomponentswithspecificinstructionsforprogramming
radios,includingchannelnamesandfrequency;however,thechannelswerenot
mandatory. Asaresult,thecomponentsdidnotinformtheirradiousersofthe
commonchannelsanddidnotprogramtheradiosconsistentwiththeguidance.
Conclusion
DHSdidnotprovideeffectiveoversighttoensurethatitscomponentsachieved
Departmentwideinteroperableradiocommunications. Itdidnotestablishan
effectivegoverningstructurethathadtheauthorityandresponsibilitytooversee
itsgoalof achievingDepartmentwideinteroperability.Withoutanauthoritative
governingstructuretooverseeemergencycommunications,DHShadlimited
interoperabilitypoliciesandprocedures.Asaresult,personneldonothave
interoperablecommunicationsthattheycanrelyonduringdailyoperations,
plannedevents,andemergencies.
Recommendations
WerecommendthattheUnderSecretaryforManagement:
Recommendation #1:
Createastructurewiththenecessaryauthoritytoensurethatthecomponents
achieveinteroperability.
Recommendation #2:
DevelopanddisseminatepoliciesandprocedurestostandardizeDepartment
wideradioactivities,includingprogramsettingssuchasnamingconventionsto
ensureinteroperability.
Management Comments and OIG Analysis
WeobtainedwrittencommentsonthedraftreportfromDHS’Departmental
GAOOIGLiaisonOffice. Wereviewedthecommentsand,whereappropriate,
madechangestothereport.Accordingtoitsresponsetothedraftreport,DHS
didnotconcurwithrecommendation#1andconcurredwithrecommendation
www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
#2. Weincludedacopyofthemanagementcommentsintheirentiretyin
appendixB. ThefollowingisanevaluationofDHS’officialresponse.
Management Comments to Recommendation #1
DHS did not concur withtherecommendationandstatedthatitsexisting
structurehasthenecessaryauthoritytoensurethecomponentsachieve
interoperability.
OIG Analysis: Initsresponse,theDepartmentacknowledgeditencountered
challengesinachievingDepartmentwideinteroperablecommunicationgoalsin
thepast,andstatesitsincelearnedfromtheweaknessesoftheinitial
managementefforts.TheDepartmentcreatedtheJWPMOtocoordinate
Departmentwideradioactivities,butbasedonourreview,theJWPMOdoesnot
havethenecessaryauthoritytoensurethecomponentsachieveinteroperability.
TheDepartmentdesignedJWPMOaroundtheconceptofvoluntarymembership
throughMOAsthatallowthecomponentstotailortheagreementsanddefine
theirlevelofparticipationwiththeJWPMO.Thestructure,basedupon
cooperationandnotauthority,isthesamemanagementapproachthatproved
ineffectiveinthepastandtheuseofMOAswillcontinuetohinderDHS’abilityto
achieveinteroperablecommunications.Withouttheproperauthority,the
Departmenthasahighprobabilityofrepeatingpastmistakes.Weconsiderthe
recommendationunresolvedandopen.
Management Comments to Recommendation #2
DHS concurred withtherecommendationandacknowledgedtheneedto
developanddisseminatepoliciesandprocedurestodriveandstandardize
Departmentwidecommunicationsinteroperabilityactivities.Accordingtoits
response,DHSstatedthatitwilldevelopaDepartmentalinteroperabilityplan
anddisseminatepoliciesandprocedurestostandardizeDepartmentwideradio
activities,includingprogramsettings,suchasnamingconventionstoensure
interoperability.
OIG analysis: WeconsiderDHS’actionsasresponsiveandconsiderthe
recommendationresolved.However,itwillremainopenuntilDHSprovidesa
copyoftheDepartmentalinteroperabilityplananditspolicyandproceduresto
standardizedepartmentwideradioactivities.
www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Appendix A
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
TheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)OfficeofInspectorGeneral(OIG)was
establishedbytheHomeland Security Act of 2002(PublicLaw107296)byamendment
totheInspector General Act of 1978. Thisisoneofaseriesofaudit,inspection,and
specialreportspreparedaspartofouroversightresponsibilitiestopromoteeconomy,
efficiency,andeffectivenesswithintheDepartment.
ThisreportprovidestheresultsofourworktodeterminewhetherDHS’oversight
ensuredDepartmentwideinteroperableradiocommunications. Toachieveour
objectives,we—
• InterviewedDHSofficialsandcomponentpersonnelfromU.S.CustomsandBorder
Protection,U.S.ImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement,theTransportationSecurity
Administration,theU.S.SecretService,theFederalEmergencyManagement
Agency,theFederalProtectiveService,theFederalLawEnforcementTraining
Center,andtheU.S.CoastGuard;
• ConductedsitevisitsinHouston,TX;Chicago,IL;LosAngelesandSanDiego,CA;and
NewYork,NY;
• Reviewedpoliciesandproceduresrelatedtoradiointeroperability;
• Conductedtestsof479radiouserstodeterminewhethertheycouldcommunicate
onthedesignatedinteroperableradiochannels;
• Analyzeddatafor382radiostodeterminewhetherthecomponentpersonnel
programmedtheradioswithinteroperableradiochannels;and
• Assessedthereliabilityandvalidityofradiofrequencydata.
WeconductedthisperformanceauditbetweenMarch2011andMarch2012pursuant
totheInspector General Act of 1978,asamended,andaccordingtogenerallyaccepted
governmentauditingstandards. Thosestandardsrequirethatweplanandperformthe
audittoobtainsufficient,appropriateevidencetoprovideareasonablebasisforour
findingsandconclusionsbaseduponourauditobjectives.Webelievethattheevidence
obtainedprovidesareasonablebasisforourfindingsandconclusionsbaseduponour
auditobjectives.
www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Appendix B
Management Comments to the Draft Report
;-
a
, t.
!oj
.
tkpan
m lt
nl
or
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.nd
SH u
rlt)
W.
~
hi"ll o n
,
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20
~ 28
Homeland
~
Security
MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles K.
Edwards
Acting Inspector
Gene~l
/
_
l~~
FROM:
J im
1-1
.
Crumpuckcr
~
~("""
Di
rec
tor,
Departmen
tal GAO-OIG l.iaison Office
SUBJECT:
Draft Report OlG-I \-057, "DHS' Oversight
of
Interoperable
Com
munication
s"
Thank
you
for the opportunity to revi
ew
and
comment
on
this draft report. The U.
S,
Department
of
lIomeland
Secur
ity (Ol-IS)
app
reciat
es
the Office
of
InspccL
or
Gene
r
al's
(DIG's)
work in pl
anning
and
conducti
ng
its review and issuing t
his
report.
The Secretary and
Dep
uty Secretary
made
a priority
of
advancing interoperable
emergency
communications
and
somc
significant strides h
ave
been
made
since the establishment
of
the
Department
in
2003.
The
Department upprL'Ciates DIG
's
recognition
Ih
ut
DI-IS
has created policics,
guidance, llnd
tC
I'llplotes to aid
in
achieving
interopernbility for first responders and providcd
assistance to state and local agencies.
As
also noted, the
Depart
ment has provided
about
$18.5 billion in Fedcrul Homeland Security grants
to
state and local governments,
which
ha
ve
allowed them
to
enlmncc the
in
teropcrability
of
their
eme
rgency response systems.
While significant progress has been
made
in
assisting OIlS's external pon.ncrs
in
attaining
interoperable
communica
ti
ons
, the
Department
acknowlcdges it
has
had
some challenges
in
achieving
Department~w
i
de
interoperable
communica
ti
ons
goa
ls.
The
Departme
nt learned from the
weaknesses
ofthe
initial management
effo
rts and believes that it has established a
governing
structure
empowered
with the
au
th
ority
and responsibilities to
ensure
the goals are achieved.
Specifically, in 2009, the OneDHS Emergency Communications Comminee (OneDHS EC) was
established
and
delegated the authority to develop DI-IS policy
and
strategy
fo
r interoperability and
emergency
com
munications. In addition to the formation
ofOneDHS
Ee,
the DHS Tactical
Co
mmunication
s Network
(TACNET)
Executive Steering
Comm
ittee
(ESC)
was established to
pr
ov
ide efTective governance, oversight. and guidance to the
TACNET
program and related
initiatives.
The
ESC
charter specifies th
at
it
has the authority to oversee a
ll
aspects of
the
execution
of
the
TA
C
NET
program,
The
ESC
al
so
created the charter for the DHS Joint Wireless Pr
og
ram
Management Office (JWI'MO), which was finalized
on
April
6.
2012.
Under the
new
charter, the
JWPMO
i
~
auth
or
i
z:
ed
to
deliver the
join
t next generation tactical
communications
capabilities and resources to the operat
ors
across
th
e Depnrllllcnl. Specifically,
the
JWPMO
plans,
deve
lops. and im
plemen
ts the
DHS
enter
pr
ise-level next gcneration tac
ti
cal wireless
communic;)tions solutions that d
eliver
voice, d3ta, video, und
mobile
broadband app
li
cat
i
ons
to
mission-critical users. The
JWPMO
is l
ed
by an Executivc Director who reports directl y
to
the
DIIS
C
IO
and has delegated responsibility and
accoun
t
ab
il
ity for the
exec
ution
of
JWPMO
programs,
pro
ject
s,
and
enterprise services, Its
membership
is composed o
fdcdicntcd
resources nnd
represenl3lives from across
DI
-IS
and
, tiS tlppropriute. representatives from other federnl agellcies,
The slukehol
dcr
organizations contribute resour
ce
s in accordnnce with an organizationally specific
www.oig.dhs.gov 11 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Memorandum
of
Agreement
(MOA).
Allhough
all
the
Component
MOAs
have
not
been
prepared.
the
requisite
structure
has
been
established
with
the
authority
to
execute
DHS
's
wireless
communications
solutions.
The
draft
report
contained
two
recommendations.
T
he
Department
non-concurs
with
the
first
and
concurs
with
the
second.
Specifically
,
OIG
recommended
that
the
Under
Secretary
for
Management
(USM)
;
Recommendation
1:
Create
a
structure
with
the
necessary
authority
to
ensure
tha
t
the
components
achieve
interoperability.
DHS
Response:
Non-concur
.
DHS
believes
that
it
has
already
established
a
structure
with
t
he
necessary
authority
to
ensure
that
the
Components
achieve
interoperability.
DHS
agrees
to
finalize
and
more
effectively
leverage
the
existing
st
ructure
by
completing
the
MOAs
from
each
stakeho
l
der
and
working
through
the
JWPMO
membership
to
implement
and
enforce
the
standardized
policies
and
procedures
for
taking
advantage
of
interoperability
opportunities.
Recommendation
2:
Develop
and
disseminate
policies
and
procedures
to
standardize
Department-
wide
radio
activit
i
es,
including
program
settings
such
as
naming
conventions
to
ensure
in
t
eroperab
i
lity.
DHS
Response:
Concur.
The
USM
agrees
with
the
ongoing
need
for
deve
l
opment
and
di
ssemination
of
policies
and
procedures
to
drive
and
standardize
Department-wide
communications
interoperabilityactivities
. T
he
USM
has
directed
the
One
DHS
EC
and
the
JWPMO
to
develop
the
departmental
interoperability
plan.
Additionally
,
the
One
DHS
EC
and
the
JWPMO
will
develop
and
disseminate
policies
and
procedures
to
standardize
Department-wide
r
adio
activities,
including
pr
ogram
settings,
such
as
naming
conventions
to
ensure
interoperability.
Again
,
thank
you
for
the
opportunity
to
review
and
comment
on
this
draft
report.
Technical
comments
were
previously
provided
under
separate
cover.
Please
feel
free
to
contact
me
if
you
have
any
questions
.
We
look
forward
to
work
i
ng
with
you
in
the
future.
www.oig.dhs.gov 12 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Appendix C
Major Contributors to This Report
LindaHoward,Director
SeanPettersen,AuditManager
EdwinSoto,AuditorinCharge
LindseyKoch,Auditor
AmyRabinoff,ProgramAnalyst
PeterChristopher,ProgramAnalyst
PriscillaCast,ProgramAnalyst
ThomasHamlin,ProgramAnalyst
KevinDolloson,CommunicationAnalyst
www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIG-13-06
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Appendix D
Report Distribution
Department of Homeland Security
Secretary
DeputySecretary
ChiefofStaff
DeputyChiefofStaff
GeneralCounsel
ExecutiveSecretary
Director,GAO/OIGLiaisonOffice
AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofPolicy
AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofPublicAffairs
AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofLegislativeAffairs
ActingChiefPrivacyOfficer
Office of Management and Budget
Chief,HomelandSecurityBranch
DHSOIGBudgetExaminer
Congress
CongressionalOversightandAppropriationsCommittees,asappropriate
www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-13-06
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For additional information, visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov, or follow us on Twitter
at: @dhsoig.
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other kinds of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to Department of Homeland
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Should you be unable to access our website, you may submit your complaint in writing
to: DHS Office of Inspector General, Attention: Office of Investigations Hotline, 245
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