Tài liệu CHAPTER TwENTY ONE A BIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO A MODEL OF AESTHETIC ExPERIENCE OSHIN VARTANIAN AND MARcos NADAL pdf

CHAPTER
TwENTY
ONE
A BIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO A
MODEL
OF AESTHETIC ExPERIENCE
OSHIN VARTANIAN AND
MARcos
NADAL
Recently, Leder and colleagues (2004) introduced
an
information-processing
model to account for aesthetic experience. This model breaks the computation
of
the aesthetic response into five stages, associating each stage with a particular
process
of
interest.
In
this paper
we
review results from recent neuroimaging
studies
of
visual aesthetics to determine the extent to which they support this
model.
In addition, we derive specific hypotheses from the model that remain to
be tested at a biological level. We argue that because all the cognitive and
emotional processes that comprise the model are instantiated in the brain, one
should
in

principle be able to test this model using biological methods. We
conclude that the model
is
a promising framework within which to conduct such
work on aesthetics.
There
is
now
general
agreement
that
the
aesthetic
experience
is
the
outcome
of
a complex interplay
of
cognitive and affective processes. Recently, Leder and
colleagues introduced
an
information-processing model to account for the
interaction
of
various component processes
in
the
computation

of
aesthetic
experience (Leder el al., 2004, 2005). Their model
of
aesthetic experience was
described at the psychological level, and unlike other models (e.g., Chatterjee,
2003) was not designed to account for the biological underpinnings
of
aesthetic
experience per se. Nevertheless, the model
of
aesthetic experience has certain
characteristics that make it amenable to neuroscientific investigation. First, it
breaks the computation
of
the aesthetic response into various stages, associating
each stage with a particular process
of
interest. Because neuroscientists have
studied those processes in contexts other than aesthetics, rudimentary cortical
maps
of
their neural correlates have
begun
to
emerge. This feature allows one to
test hypotheses about whether any particular process
of
interest
iSOlated

within
this model will map onto plausible cortical structures. Second, and critically,
there are built-in temporal constraints
in
the structure
of
the model. In other
words, information flows in specified ways through the system, and this orderly
430
Chapter
Twenty
One
A Biological
Approach
to a
Model
of
Aesthetic Experience
431
flow has certain temporal characteristics associated with it. This feature allows
one to test the temporal dynamics
of
information flow using time-course and
functional connectivity analyses.
The aim
of
this chapter
is
a~
follow.s.

First, we will review some
of
the key
features
of
the
mo~el
of
aesthetIc expenence that are particularly relevant to our
arguments. We wIll not present a detailed account
of
the model as these exist
elsewhere,(Leder
el al., 2004, 2005). Second, we will compare this model
to
Chatterjee s (2003) model
of
visual aesthetics, developed specifically
to
address
the
neur~phys.IOIogy
of
aesthetic
experience.
Third,
we
will
review
some

work
on the biOlogIcal bases
of
the aesthetic experience that speak to some
of
the
predlcllons and hypotheses derived from the model
of
aesthetic experience.
Essenllally, we beheve that
biOlogical approaches have the potential to inform
us about the vahdlty
of
thIS
model, and that predictions derived from the model
can
10
tum be tested at a biological level. Although in this paper we will focus
on neuroimaging studies only, the arguments are also relevant to
neuropsychological approaches involving patient populations (e.g., Chatterjee,
2004). Fmally, we wIll assess the current status
of
the model
of
aesthetic
experience based on the available biological data, and will outline specific
hypotheses that can be used to test the so-called joints
in
the system.
A Model

of
Aesthetic Experience
Here we
pre~ent
a stripped down version
of
Leder el
al.
's
(2004, 2005)
model
of
aesthettc expenence. The model
of
aesthetic experience is comprised
of
five
mformatlOn-processmg
stages
that
are
connected
in
sequence,
as
well
as
through.
several feedback loops (see Fig. 21-1). Information flow
is

unldrrectiOnal
lo
some parts
of
the model and bidirectional
in
others such that
certain phases involve bottom-up as well as
top-<lown processing.
fu
addition,
there
IS
an affecllve evaluation stream (Continuous Affective Evaluation) that
nms
p",:"lIel to
thIS
sequenllal stream and receives its output. The input into the
system
IS
the artwork Itself, which for the purpose
of
this paper will be limited
to
vls~~l1
s~lmuh,
speCifically paintings. Then,
at
each stage, a
particular

operation.
.IS
perf~nned
on
the
artwork, therefore extracting various
characlensllcs from
It.
The ftrst stage involves perceptual analyses. At this stage
features such as compleXJty
or
symmetry are distilled. For example, there is
mU~h
research. demonstrating that people prefer more
10
less symmetrical
deSIgn. Accordmg to the model
of
aesthetic experience, this information
is
processed rather early
in
the stream. This stage
is
not under the influence
of
top-
down processes and
IS
sllmulus driven. The second stage involves implicit

memory IUtegratton, where the perceptual information is related to past
expenence.
For
example, we know
that
people prefer colors
that
are
more
prototypical (Martindale & Moore, 1988). However, we also know that what
is
deemed prototypical depends
in
part on personal expenence. Essenllally, at
thIS
stage people compare what they see to what they know, and this affects their
responses to it. This stage
is
presumed to
be
under the indirect influence
of
top-
down processes. The third stage mvolves exphClt clasSIficatiOn, and this
IS
where expertise comes into play. At this point, the person analyzes content
information, and also explicit information about the style
of
the artwork. There
is much evidence demonstrating that expertise affects the way in which artworks

are processed (Hekkert
& van Wieringen, 1990), and this is one
of
the stages
where the difference between experts and novices would be apparent.
In some ways the fmal two stages
of
the model are the most interesting not
only because they tap higher-level cognition, but also because.they probably
exert
the
most influence on aesthetic experience. The penultunate stage
15
referred
to
as
cognitive mastering,
the
moment
at
which interpretation
or
meaning is imposed on the artwork. Thus, having already distilled its perceptual
properties and placed it within self-referential (implicit memory integrallon) and
explicit (explicit classification) contexts, we make sense
of
what
It
IS
that we

see.
Of
course, what one observes is also influenced by experllse
10
the
VIsual
arts so that different cues become more or less important
in
giving meaning to
the'
artwork (parsons, 1987).
In
the final stage referred to as evaluation we
appraise the meaning
or
interpretation that was placed on the. artwork durmg
mastering. This evaluative stage generates two outputs: aesthetIc judgment and
aesthetic emotion, which are the endpoints
of
the aesthellc expenence.
If
cognitive mastering
is
successful and the subject has successfully mterpreted the
artwork it will be evaluated as either a good
or
a poor work
of
art. Those
aestheti~

judgments will
be
accompanied by
po~itive
and
negative aesthetic
emotions respectively. On the other hand, Ifcogmtlve mastenng
IS
unsuccessful,
the artwork will likely
be
evaluated as a poor work
of
art, accompanIed by
negative
aesthetic
emotion.
. .
In
summary, the model
of
aesthetic experience has
fiv~
cognitive stages that
are interwoven by an affective component, although the lOfluence
of
affect on
the computational process. varies along the stream. The model
of
aesthetIc

experience presents a hypothetical route for the generatIon
of
the two most
common dependent variables in aesthetic research: AesthetIC judgment and
aesthetic emotion. Aesthetic emotion can
be
seen as the fmal affectIve
byproduct
of
successfuJ mastering, whereas aesthetic judgment can tap eIther
the cognitive outcome
of
the mastering stage (i.e., quahty),
or
Its
affecllve
consequences.
432
Chapter
Twenty
One
A Biological
Approach
to
a
Model
of
Aesthetic Experience 433
Theoretical Links to Other Models
Chattetjee's (2003) model

of
visual aesthetics represents a recent
neuroscientific framework
for
investigating aesthetic experience. Chatterjee
(2003) has suggested that aesthetic experiences related
to
visual ohjects involve
three visual processing stages common
to
the perception
of
any visual stimulus,
as
well
as
an
emotional response, a decision, and the modulating effect
of
attention.
In
the frrst stage early visual processes hreak the stimulus down into
simple
components,
such
as
color,
shape,
and
so

on,
which
are
extracted
and
analyzed
in
different
brain
areas.
The
second
stage,
intennediate
vision,
includes
a series
of
operations
that
segregate
some
elements
and
group
others,
forming
coherent representations.
In
late visual stages, included

under
the
representational domain in this model, certain regions
of
the ohject are selected
for
further scrutiny.
At
this moment, memories are activated,
and
ohjects are
recognized and associated with meanings. This visual analysis leads
to
emotions
associated with. the aesthetic experience, and
it
grounds decisions about
the
stimulus. However, this
is
not a strictly linear model. In fact, it posits
an
important feedback flow
of
information via attentional processes, from higher
visual and emotional levels towards early visual processing.
A comparison
of
the models proposed hy Leder and colleagues (2004) and
Chattetjee (2003) reveals similarities and differences. Both models acknowledge

the importance
of
early and late visual processes in the generation
of
an
emotional response
and
the
elaboration
of
a decision. They also take
into
consideration the influence
of
complexity, order, grouping,
and
many other
variables familiar
to
experimental aestheticians,
as
well as
the
interaction
between affective
and
cognitive processes such
as
the
activation

of
memories
and
the
search for meaning. Additionally, hoth models suggest two different
outputs:
an
emotional response
or
aesthetic emotion versus a decision
or
aesthetic judgment. However,
at
a more specific level, these models have
emphasized different aspects
of
aesthetic experience. Chattetjee's (2003) model
deals extensively with perceptual processes, hut makes little mention
of
higher
cognitive processes, such as interpretation or classification. In contrast, Leder
and colleagues (2004) suhsumed all perceptual processes in a single stage
and
did not explicitly consider a function for attention, instead specifying higher
cognitive processes in detail, and awarding them a central role in the aesthetic
experience. Fig.
21-1
shows a comhined representation
of
both models,

illustrating their similarities and differences.
There could be several reasons behind the differences between Chattetjee's
and Leder and colleagues' models. First, Chattetjee's (2003) ohjective was
to
create a framework for neuroaesthetics that was fumly based on frodings
from
visual
neuroscience.
In
his
mode~
the
processes
involved
in
visual
ohject
recognition
Elllliualioll
-
,
434
Chapter Twenty One
A Biological Approach
to
a Model
of
Aesthetic Experience
435
constitute the starting point for visual aesthetics, so it

is
not surprising that they
figure so prominently
in
his modeL This
is
also the reason why attention
is.
awarded a central role:
It
is
known
to
exert top down modulation
of
early
visual processing. On the other hand, Leder and colleagues (2004) aimed
to
present an information-processing model
of
the stages involved
in
the aesthetic
processing
of
visual artistic stimuli.
In
this sense, the starting point
of
the model

was their analysis
of
modern art (Leder ef al., 2004,
p.
491). They believe that
understanding plays a critical role
in
the aesthetic experience
of
modern art,
in
the sense that comprehending an artwork alters the way
in
which
it
is
experienced,
However, there
is
also a deeper difference between the two models, and
it
refers to the way
in
which they conceive
of
the aesthetic experience itself,
Chatterjee (2003) believes the notion
of
disinterested interest adequately
captures the aesthetic experience such that "the viewer experiences pleasure

without obvious utilitarian consequences
of
this pleasure" (Chatterjee, 2003,
p.55). From this perspective
'judgments about an aesthetic object might be
considered outside the core aesthetic experience" (Chatterjee, 2003,
p.
56).
In
fact, the model seems
to
include a decision phase only as an approach
to
laboratory settings, where participants are usually asked
to
state their
preferences or make decisions about a certain aspect
of
the stimulus.
Conversely, Leder and colleagues (2004) believe aesthetic experiences arise
when "exposure
to
art provides the perceiver with a challenging situation to
classify, understand and cognitively master the artwork successfully" (Leder
et
aI.,
2004,
p.
493). This successful mastering
of

the artwork involves, cspecially
in
relation to modern art, style-related processing, which results from the
acquisition
of
expertise, In this model, the judgment
of
the aesthetic object
is
an
important element;
in
fact, together with aesthetic emotion,
it
is
the main
output'
of
the model.
In
sum, whereas Chatterjee's (2003) proposal can be considered
as
a neuroscientific model
of
aesthetic preference for a broad range
of
visual
objects, Leder and colleagues' (2004) proposal
is
an information-processing

model
of
aesthetic judgment
of
visual works
of
art. Here we chose
to
focus on
the model
of
aesthetic experience because we were particularly interested
in
the
higher-level cognitive and emotional processes that mediate aesthetic
experience, and those are treated more thoroughly
in
the model
of
aesthetic
experience,
Neurophysiology
and
the Aesthetic Experience
Why
is
the model
of
aesthetic experience useful for biological approaches
to

the study
of
aesthetics? There are three reasons. First, the model incorporates
cognition and
emotion-broadly
defined-in
the computation
of
the aesthetic
response, and recently neuroscientists have made significant inroads
in
dissociating the neural pathways belonging
to
those modes
of
information
processing. What we know from neuroscience can be used to test predictions
from the model. Second, at a more micro level, many
of
the component
processes that characterize each
of
the five stages, namely perceptual (visual)
analyses, implicit memory integration, explicit classification, cognitive
mastering, and evaluation have been studied extensively by neuroscientists as
well, and at least at a rather gross level we know a little about their neural
correlates. This makes
it
possible to test more specific hypotheses about the
differential engagement

of
each
of
these processes
in
the computation
of
the
aesthetic response, Finally, the structure
of
the model
of
aesthetic experience
places temporal constraints on the process. For example, by definition, one
cannot engage
in
cognitive mastering unless one has carried out a perceptual
analysis first. This can be a valuable tool
in
neuroimaging because one can
conduct time-course and functional connectivity analyses to see whether the
time courses
of
activation corresponding
to
various structures occur
in
accordance with the predictions
of
the modeL

Next we will review some neuroscientific evidence that can be used
to
assess the validity
of
the model. Although we will discuss studies
in
visual
aesthetics specificaIly, we emphasize that biological data collected
in
studies
of
vision, memory, attention, and emotion can shed light on this process as
~ell.
FoIlowing this review, we will highlight specific hypotheses that can be denved
from this model and tested empirically to validate the model at a blOlog!cal
level.
Components of
the
Aesthetic Experience
To date, five neuroimaging studies have appeared that have
anc~pted
to
shed light on the cortical underpinnings
of
the aesthetic response. Four
IOvolved
the technique
of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (tMRI), and one
involved magnetoencephalography (MEG). Although none

of
the studIes was
conducted with the specific aim
of
testing any predIctIon denved from the
model
of
aesthetic experience, their results nevertheless inform
us
about the
accuracy
of
the model. We wiIl next review the key findings
of
each study, and
their bearing on the model
of
aesthetic experience.
Aesthetic Judgment
Jacobsen ef
al
(2006) asked a fundamental question: What are the specific
neural correlates that distinguish aesthetic judgment from other types
of
judgment? The "other" judgment
in
their study involved judgment
of
symmetry.
436

Chapter Twenty One
A Biological Approach to a Model
of
Aesthetic Experience
437
Recall from the description
of
the model
of
aesthetic experience that judgment
of
symmetry occurs at the first stage involving perceptual analysis, whereas
aesthetic judgment follows the fifth stage
of
the process-evaluation. Because
subjects were presented with the same kind
of
stimuli
in
the symmetry and
aesthetic judgment conditions but asked
to
make different types
of
judgments,
Jacobsen
el
at. (2006) argued that the contrast between aesthetic and symmetry
trials would reveal the brain areas that are involved
in

aesthetic judgment, in
relation to symmetry judgment. This contrast revealed activation
in
several
frontal, parietal, and temporal structures including the frontomedian cortex, the
precuneus, the temporal pole, and the
t~rnporoparietal
junction. According
to
the
model
of
aesthetic experience, the activation pattern that reflects aesthetic
judgment must differ from the pattern that reflects symmetry judgment, and
Jacobsen
el
aI's (2006) results confirm this hypothesis. Recall that the activation
pattern that was revealed in the contrast
of
aesthetic versus symmetry judgment
reflects multiple cognitive and affective processes that operate on the artwork
following the perceptual analysis at the first stage, until
an
aesthetic judgment
is
eventually fonned. These processes include implicit memory integration,
explicit classification, cognitive mastering, and evaluation. From the vantage
point
of
the model

of
aesthetic experience. what
is
interesting about Jacobsen
et
al.s (2006) resulls
is
that several
of
the activated structures have been linked
to
the aforementioned component processes. Nevertheless, additional studies
in
which the design allows the comparison
of
successive stages
of
information
processing are necessary
for
determining the contribution
of
each cortical
structure
10
a specific component process.
Affect, Cognition,
and
Aesthetic Experience
No study

to
date has investigated differences
in
the neural correlates
of
aesthetic judgment versus aesthetic emotion directly. At a rudimentary level,
this would involve presenting subjects with the same stimuli under two different
conditions: In onc condition they would be asked
to
rate the stimuli on quality,
thus tapping the cognitive component
of
aesthetic judgment exclusively (Leder
el
al., 2005; Vartanian & Goel, 2004a).
In
the other condition, they would be
asked
to
rate the same stimuli on pleasure, thus tapping the affective component
of
aesthetic emotion exclusively (Leder
el
al., 2005; Vartanian & Goel, 2004a).
However, three fMRl studies
to
date have tackled facets
of
aesthetic affect or
emotion, and can thus shed light on whether variations in aesthetic emotion

correspond
to
variations
in
cortical and subcortical activation.
Vartanian and Goel (2oo4b) sought
to
determine whether aesthetic
preference toward works
of
art
is
characterized by a "disinterested" or cognitive
stance
as
presumed by some, or whether
is
it
underwritten by an emotional
response toward properties
of
artworks. They hypothesized that
if
aesthetic
preference were mediated by emotion, then
it
should involve brain structures
that have been implicated
in
processing emotion. On the other hand,

if
aesthetic
preference were primarily a cognitive process, then
it
should involve brain
structures that have been implicated in evaluation under emotionally neutral
conditions.
In
the scanner, subjects viewed and rated paintings on aesthetic
preference. Preference was defined as the degree
of
liking for a painling. The
results demonstrated that activation in several cortical structures that have been
implicated
in
processing emotion or reward covaried as a function
of
preference
ratings, including the visual cortex, the caudate nucleus, and the cingulate
sulcus.
What do the results
of
Vartanian and Goel (2004b) tell
us
about the model
of
aesthetic experience? Recall that the affective evaluation stream runs parallel
to
the information-processing stream, and
it

receives continuous input from
it.
This
means that a subject interacting with a work
of
art can provide a preference
rating for that artwork at any given point along the information-processing
sequence, and need not have processed the artwork up
to
a particular stage
in
the
sequence before a rating can be generated. Therefore, one possibility
is
that the
results
of
Vartanian and Goel (2oo4b) shed light on the cortical and subcortical
structures that mediate Continuous Affcctive Evaluation, and indicate the areas
thal one should expect
to
see activated whenever subjects are asked to indicate
their liking for given artworks. Another possibility
is
that the ratings offered by
the subjects
in
this study reflect aesthetic emotion, which can only occur
following the evaluation stage.
An additional sludy

in
which ratings are
collected at specific time points can address this issue.
Kawabata and Zeki (2004) presented their subjects with paintings that they
had rated as beautiful or ugly prior to viewing, and rated them again
in
the
scanner. It
is
important
to
note that although beauty has affective and cognitive
components,
it
draws more heavily from the latter than from
the.
fonner
component (Leder
el
al., 2005). In contrast, preference also has affective and
cognitive components, but
it
draws more heavily from the fonner than
fr~~
t~e
latter component (Leder
el
al., 2005). Their results demonstrated that acllvtly m
the orbital frontal cortex was greater for stimuli classified as beautiful, and the
authors argued that this activation

in
the orbital frontal cortex was due
to
the
reward value
of
beautiful paintings.
In the third fMRl study on this topic, Skov
el
al., (2005) presented their
subjects not with paintings, but with stimuli from the
Inte~ation.al
Affective
Picture System. The lntemational Affective Picture System
IS
an
lDventory
of
pictures that have been categorized as emotionally positive,
~egative,
or neutral.
Subjects were asked
to
view and rate each stimulus as beautiful,
u~ly,
or
neu~al
in
the scanner. Compared
to

ugly pictures, beautiful pictures activated a
Wide
438
Chapter
Twenty
One
A Biological
Approach
to
a
Model
of
Aesthetic
Experience
439
network
of
areas including the occipital, parietal, and frontal lobes. However,
when subjects rated pictures
as
beautiful despite the fact that they were
emotionally negative (e.g., finding a scene that exhibits death or injury
beautiful), there was activation
in
a somewhat different network than before,
again including the occipital, temporal, and the frontal lobes, but
in
particular
bilateral orbital frontal corlex.
What

do
the results
of
Kawabata and Zeki (2004) and Skov
ef
al. (2005) tell
us
about
the
model
of
aesthetic experience? Despite methodological differences,
these studies
share
a critical
feature:
Both studies attempted
to
isoJate
those
cortical
structures
that
were activated relatively
more
by stimuli evaluated
as
beautiful. According
to
the model

of
aesthetic experience, evaluations
of
beauty
tap aesthetic judgment. Thus, its computation can only occur following
processing along all
five stages
of
the model, culminated by evaluation.
In
other
words, activation
in
the
orbital
frontal
cortex
is
likely not
in
relation
to
Continuous Affective Evaluation. Rather, it is more likely that certain affective
properlies
of
beauty are computed
in
the orbital frontal corlex. Activation
in
the

orbital frontal corlex has in turn been linked
to
a wide array
of
processes, but
in
particular
to
complex reward, hedonic, and emotion interactions (Kringelbach,
2005; Kringelbach
& Rolls, 2004).
Using magnetoencephalography (MEG), Cela-Conde
ef al. (2004) recorded
brain activity while subjects judged the beauty
of
a series
of
stimuli. The
greatest difference between MEG and
fMRI has
to
do
with temporal and spatial
resolution. Whereas MEG has a low spatial resolution compared with
fMRI,
its
temporal resolution is significantly greater.
In
addition
to

locating brain activity
in space, this technique affords information about
its
temporal course.
In
Cela-
Conde and colleagues' (2004) study, brain activity during the
first second after
stimulus onset was broken down into two phases, early latencies
(100 400
ms)
and late latencies (400-1000 ms). The results demonstrated that during late
latencies activii)'
in
the
left dorsolateral prefrontal corlex (DLPFC)
was
significantly greater when participants judged stimuli
as
beautiful
as
compared
to
the non-beautiful condition.
Previous studies can help
us
clarify the relation between these results and the
model
of
aesthetic experience. The literature suggests that the dorsolateral

prefrontal corlex is involved
in
the process
of
decision-making based
on
perceptual (Heekereo ef al., 2004) and/or affective (Davidson & Irwin,
1999;
Herrington
ef
al., 2005) information. Krawczyk (2002) provided an integrative
view
of
the role
of
this area: "The left DLPFC may
playa
privileged role
in
decision making that is better constrained, has fewer options, and which may
have preexisting reward characteristics that make for a more confmed set
of
rules for deciding" (Krawczyk, 2002, p.66I). Thus, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex activity seems
to
be related
to
conscious deliberation
about
different

options, influenced by emotional information from orbital frontal corlex and
certain limbic areas (Wallis and Miller, 2003).
The fact that activity in early latencies was unrelated with beauty ratings,
coupled with results from previous studies, suggest that Cela-Conde and
colleagues' (2004) results reflect the neural correlates
of
the last two cognitive
stages posited
in
the model
of
aesthetic experience.
Itis
during these stages that
the success
of
cognitive mastering
in
producing satIsfactory understanding
IS
monitored. Also,
it
is suggested
that
the subjective experience
of
success
or
failure in understanding can initialize top-down information processing.
In

fact,
monitoring other cognitive processes, as well as initiating top-down processes,
has often been associated with dorsolateral prefrontal corlex activity. The task
that Cela-Conde and colleagues' (2004) participants were asked
to
perform was
a quick judgment
of
the image. Images were presented for only 3 seconds, .and
most
of
the participants' response times were below 2s. Therefore, we beheve
that it
is
plausible that
as
Leder and colleagues (2004,
p.
503) anticipated, their
judgments may have relied heavily on affect-based heuristics. These
considerations reinforce
the
idea that the left dorsolateral prefrontal corlex
might be involved in a number
of
processes, including the evaluation phase, the
initiation
of
the feedback loops posited by the model
of

aesthetIc expenence,
and the interaction between cognitive and affective states.
Summary
Vartanian and Goel (2004b), Kawabata and Zeki (2004), Skov
ef
at. (2005)
and Cela-Conde
ef
al.
(2004) were interested in determining the neural
correlates
of
preference and beauty, two variables that have affective and
cognitive components. The areas activated by Vartanian and Goel (2004b) may
have highlighted those
cOrlical
structures that mediate Contmuous Affecllve
Evaluation,
or
those associated with aesthetic emotion. As expected, they
include the visual corlex, the caudate nucleus, and the cingulate sulcus. These
areas have been shown
to
be activated by emotions, and
in
particular by sahent
stimuli about which one
can form
an
affective impression rather automatically,

such as faces or pictures from the International Affective Picture System.
In
contrast, the studies
by
Kawabata and Zeki (2004)
and
Skov
ef
al. (2005)
attempted
to
isolate those cortical structures that are actIvated more when a
stimulus is evaluated as beautiful. Presumably, both studies tap aspects
of
aesthetic judgments. According
to
the model
of
aesthetic experience? beauty bas
affective and cognitive components and it results from an evaluallon that can
only occur following processing along all
five stages
of
the model. The results
indicate that evaluating a stimulus as beautiful was
asSOCIated
WIth
mcreased
activation in the orbital frontal cortex. Activation
in

the orbital frontal cortex has
440
Chapter
Twenty
One
A Biological
Approach
to
a Model
of
Aesthetic Experience
441
in
turn been linked to a wide array
of
processes, but
in
particular tn complex
hedonic and reward-emotion interactions (Kringelbach, 2005; Kringelbach &
Rolls, 2004). Finally, Cela-Conde et aI's (2004) results seem to reflect cognitive
processes included
in
later stages
of
the model
of
aesthetic experience, including
cognllIve mastering and evaluation. Activity
in
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex

has often been associated with monitoring and initiating
top <lown infonnation
flow,
as
well
as
with
decision-making. However,
we
suggest
that
in
this
particular instance these cognitive processes were also influenced
by
affective
information received from orbital frontal cortex
or
subcortical structures.
Testing the model
of
aesthetic experience
at
a biological level
It
goes without saying that the validity
of
the model
of
aesthetic experience

as
an
accurate
explanatory
framework
for
aesthetic
experience
must
be
detennioed at the behavioral level
flfSt.
However, we believe that because
0/1
the processes that comprise this model, including perceptual analysis, implicit
memory
integration,
explicit classification, cognitive
mastering,
and
evaluation
are instantiated
in
the brain, one can also ascertain the extent to which
hypotheses derived from the model can be validated at a biological level. We
have already discussed the extent to which results from a number
of
tMRl and
MEG studies fit general predictions from the model
of

aesthetic experience.
However, none ·of those studies was designed to test predictions derived from
the model
of
aesthetic experience. We believe that five issues in particular can
be tested effectively at a biological level, and that those results
Can
be used
to
assess the validity
of
the model.
First, Leder el
01.
(2004) argued that the context
in
which an object is viewed
affects the way
in
which
it
is processed. For the predictions
of
the model
of
aesthetic experience to hold, the input into the system must be designated as an
artwork. Essentially, this
is
based on the argument that the cognitive and
emotional processes that are brought to bear when processing an object as an

artwork will differ from the processes that will be involved when the same
object
is
not processed as an artwork.
It
is
possible to test this hypothesis at a
biological level, and to determine whether performing identical tasks on a set
of
stimuli will activate different cortical structures depending on whether they are
deSIgnated as artworks or not. This could help determine whether a critical
assumption
of
the model holds true at a biological level.
. Second, the model
of
aesthetic experience does not include top-down
influences on perceptual analyses. However, several studies, such as Kaestner
and Ungerleider's (2000)
or
Poghosyan and colleagues' (2005) have shown that
attentton modulates the processing
of
relevant visual stimuli by enhancing
neuronal responses at different levels
of
visual processing
in
the brain. Attention
seems

to
modulate
neural
responses
to
certain
locations
of
the
visual field,
whole visual objects.
or
specific visual
features,
such
as
color
or
shape.
Although
it
has been noted that these modulatory effects are stronger
in
extrastriate
visual
areas,
it
seems
that
different

features
of
selective
attention
can
also affect activity
in
striate cortex. Furthennore, it has also been shown that the
emotional valence
of
images can modulate activity
in
visual areas (Lang
el
01.,
1998; Schulman el
01.,
1997). Hence,
if
future neuroimaging studies
of
aesthetic
appreciation include strategies to control affective and attentional processes,
they might be able to detennine whether these processes exert
top <lown
influences on early perceptual analyses.
Third it
is
well established that expertise plays an important role
in

the way
artworks' are processed. Numerous studies have demonstrated systematic
differences
in
the ways experts and novices view artworks (Bekkert & van
Wieringen, 1990; Nodine el
01.,
1993). This hypothesis can be tested at a
biological level. According to the model
of
aesthettcexpenen.ce, differences due
to expertise become evident in the third stage. (ex!'"clt classificatton) when the
person
analyzes content information and expliCit mformatton about the style
of
the artwork. This process should draw on categonzatlon and memory, and
different activation patterns should
characterize those processes
in
experts and
novices.
Fourth, a critical topic in the early days
of
aesthetic research involved the
aesthetic threshold, although interest
in
this topic has subSIded over the years
(Jacobsen, 2006). Rather than calculating the aesthetic threshold,researchers are
using presentation thresholds that are appropriate for
thelT

particular Issues
of
interest (e.g., Leder
el
01.,
2006). By reliance on a combination
of
be?avioural
and neuroimaging techniques (especially MEG), the temporal dynanucs.
of
the
aesthetic experience, as well as the engagement and
disengage~ent
of
different
stages (processes), can be investigated

For
ex~mple,
what
IS
the
mmlJ~al
amount
of
time necessary for explICIt classIlkatton, and does explIcit
classification
in
fact
require

more
time
than
implicit
memory
~t.egratlO~,
as
~e
model suggests? Are implicit memory integration and expllclt
clas~Ilicatlon
associated with different' patterns
of
cortical actIvation and lInked
to
characteristic
time
courses?
Fifth what is the relationship between the two major outputs
of
the system,
namely
;"'sthetic judgment and
aesth~tic
emotion?
This
is
a
p~oblem
that has
haunted philosophers and psychologISts at least smce the

18
cenDlfy. ThIs
requires a design
in
which subjects are instructed to process art
stlfOuII
.that can
be evaluated successfully under two different conditIOns: In one condltton
th~y
will rate them on quality, broadly speaking, and
in
the other conditton they
WIll
rate them on a measure
of
liking, broadly speaking.
If
the model
of
aesthetIc
442
Chapter
Twenty
One
A Biological
Approach
to a
Model
of
Aesthetic Experience

443
experience
is
correct,
the
neural
correlates
of
these two outputs
must
be
different.
Conclusion
Th~re
exist. several models
in
experimental aesthetics
that
deal
with
the
aestheltc expenence along narrow levels
of
analysis.
In
contrast the model
of
aesthetic
expe~ence
provides a general framework for aesthetic' experience

at
the psychologIcal
le~el,
and yet can be tested experimentally using biological
methods at a more
ffi!cro level (see also Martindale, 2001). We believe that the
model
of
aestheti~
expcrience
is
a promising model for biological investigations
of
aesthetic expenence.
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